

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA**

UNIVERSITY OF DEFENCE
STRATEGIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE
&
NATIONAL DEFENCE SCHOOL

ASYMMETRY AND STRATEGY

THEMATIC COLLECTION OF ARTICLES

Belgrade 2018

Published by
STRATEGIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE
&
NATIONAL DEFENCE SCHOOL

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ISBN 978-86-81121-17-7
(STRATEGIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE)

Co-Publisher
MEDIA CENTER “ODBRANA”

Library „Vojna knjiga“
Book no. 2189

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Printed in
300 copies

Print
Vojna štamparija Beograd

ISBN 978-86-335-0594-9
(MEDIA CENTER “ODBRANA”)

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Introduction

INTRODUCTION OF EDITOR

We are witnessing that the modern world has become more dangerous, unstable and unpredictable. Instead of era of global harmony whose start was announced by the globalists at the end of the last century, the world is experiencing a dramatic experience of comprehensive endangering the security. The fascinating technological progress and ambivalent global processes, with their comprehensive and general presence in lives of modern people, reduce distance and accelerate relations of interdependence, but also strongly encourage animosities and conflicts among them. Changed social circumstances, as well as the decrease of the nation-states potential to protect their national interests, have opened space for the "democratization of violence" and the domination of non-traditional forms and actors of endangering the security.

Today, it is quite clear that states are not the sole, exclusive possessors of monopoly over the use of physical force. Extremism, terrorism and organized crime, as a reflection of transnational dynamics and more pronounced antisocial nature of global processes, with their prominent asymmetrical characteristics that are the opposite to traditional, Westphalian, model of endangering the security of modern societies are making the world the space exposed to universal risk. The diversity of asymmetric threats, regarding the organization, goals, motives and methods of operation, confirms the view that this is a specific strategic approach which is sustainability based on the principles of asymmetry. With their effects on the global rise in insecurity and uncertainty, as well as increasing the complexity of geopolitical competition of the key actors in contemporary international politics, asymmetric threats are imposing a number of dilemmas regarding suitable traditional strategic approaches as a framework for finding answers to asymmetric endangering the security.

With the aim to find scientifically based answers of some questions that reflect the contemporary security environment, Strategic Research Institute and the Department for Strategy of the National Defence School organized an international scientific conference "Asymmetry and Strategy." that held in Belgrade on October 18 2017. The Thematic Collection of

Articles: "Asymmetry and Strategy" is just result of this international scientific meeting. It contains 41 articles, among them 18 articles are from abroad, written by eminent scholars in the field of security. Each article has been reviewed by reviewers, international experts competent for the field to which the paper is related. We particularly want to emphasize that the Thematic Collection of Articles, according to the Rules of procedure and way of evaluation and quantitative expression of scientific results of researchers, passed by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, as scientific publication, meets the criteria for obtaining the status of thematic collection of papers of international importance.

The articles in The Thematic Collection of Articles are presented through three sections: *The Concept of Asymmetric Threats*, *Strategic Context of Contemporary Asymmetrical Threats*, and *Relevance of Classical Strategic Thought*.

The articles of first section *Concept of Asymmetric Threats* are dedicated to defining the concepts of asymmetry and asymmetric threats, identifying forms and contents of their appearance, as well as their actors, which may be state and non-state. Also, articles of this section are dedicated to the historical context of manifestation and the development of asymmetrical forms of security threats and the asymmetric war as a specific phenomenon.

Contemporary global security environment and concrete forms of asymmetric security threats such as extremism, terrorism, organized crime, migration and other, at the global, regional and national levels is considered in the second section *Strategic Context of Modern Asymmetric Threats*. In addition, in this section concrete measures that can be taken as a strategic response to a wide range of asymmetric threats, from their identification to creating conditions for preventive and repressive action are considered and offered.

Articles of the third section, *Relevance of Classical Strategic Thought*, particularly consider the relation between the strategy and the contemporary state of international security, with all the features that characterize the transition period from a unilateral to a multilateral world order, and the power redistribution of key actors. In this context, in addition to the alarming rise of asymmetric threats, it is necessary to bear in mind the classic strategic thought, given that the traditional instruments of power of nation states have not yet been overcome as it was anticipated, and even considered at one point.

The Thematic Collection of Articles has no ambition to answer on the numerous questions concerning the asymmetry and the strategic thought regarding this phenomenon, because this is not possible, bearing in mind the

complexity of the phenomenon of asymmetry. However, we are convinced that the Collection of Articles presents a framework for better understanding of asymmetric risks to the safety of contemporary societies. Also, we firmly believe that it will be a strong incentive for further research of asymmetry, as well as possible strategic responses to asymmetrically-based threats.

Editor-in-Chief
Assoc. prof. Stanislav Stojanovic, PhD

The Concept of
Asymmetric Threats

ASYMMETRIC THREATS IN SECURITY STUDIES

Milica Ćurčić*

PdD candidate at Faculty of Security Studies,
University of Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: Disappearing of bipolar division of the world has influenced on redefinition of the security concept and has created new theoretical considerations dealing with this problem. While during the Cold War security was primarily of the state-centric and military significance, concept of security has nowadays changed both in width and depth. Horizontal broadening refers to incorporating of non-state and non-military aspect of security, while vertical broadening refers to moving from the state to other level and actors. This has created the possibility of combining non-military dimensions and non-state referent objects which resulted in creation of new security concepts, but new concepts of threats as well. Although approaches based on asymmetry permeate the history of warfare, the concept of asymmetric threats became increasingly recognized and used by the scientific community worldwide after 9/11, primarily because it was necessary to find an explanation for different constellations of power between state and non-state actors. The focus is on attempts to define the concept of asymmetric threats and making difference between it and other similar concepts (asymmetric warfare, asymmetric strategies), to determine modern security threats that can be classified as asymmetrical threats, as well as to oppose and find an appropriate response to the threats. The paper researches foundation of the concept of asymmetric threats in the security studies, the genesis of its creation, criteria of classifying contemporary security threats as asymmetric ones and applicable value of the very concept. Asymmetric threats are generally divided into three categories: threats that endanger information technologies (cyber threats), use of weapons for mass destruction and terrorism. By analyzing the characteristics of asymmetric threats we seek to find answer whether the concept of asymmetric threats represents one of coherent approaches to understanding of contemporary threats at the beginning of 21st century.

Key words: security, security studies, asymmetry, asymmetric threats, asymmetric warfare.

* milicacurcic89@hotmail.com

INTRODUCTION

The new global security constellation caused by the disappearance of unipolar world after the implosion of Soviet Union, created the real need to re-examine the existing security concepts of understanding of social reality. Reconsideration of the existing theoretical and conceptual framework necessary for analysis of national and international security influenced the development of new theoretical approaches. That was time when understanding of security was transformed, and it caused change in both broadening and deepening of security. It was broadening of the object of studying to not-state and non-military sectors in horizontal sense and to other levels and actors in vertical sense which meant the turning point which initiated changes in theory of security studies. The central issue of security paradigm are now not only states, but also individuals and communities which was caused by broadening of security analysis levels¹, resulting in the fact that national security is now not an only referent framework of analysis.

Initially, the security studies originally derived from academic discussions in international relations. Even today, there is a dilemma in academic circles if contemporary security studies are sub-discipline of international relations or a separate scientific discipline. The main source of problems that the security researchers are faced with are in the lack of theoretical development, not clear enough definition of the central problems in central issues which cause non-existing network of systematically linked terms². That is why the focus is on development of the broadest possible conceptual framework applicable on all levels of security, starting from individuals to international community.

The asymmetric threats concept imposed itself as one of the new concepts and became unavoidable in clarification of security constellation. This concept aims to fill theoretical gap, i.e. the lack of possibility in the previous theoretical and conceptual frameworks to identify and explain the nature of security threats at the beginning of the 21st century. In that way, this concept became the most frequently used framework for understanding of

¹ According to Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, the five most commonly used levels of analysis are: international system, international subsystem, units (states / nations), subunits (social communities) and individuals. Barry Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1998), 5.

² Sladjana Djurić, *Istraživanje bezbednosti - kvalitativni pristup* (Beograd, Fakultet bezbednosti, 2013):30.

contemporary security treats. The concept of asymmetry (asymmetric threats, asymmetric warfare) includes numerous not clearly explained and marked off terms, thus making the impression that this concept is uncritically accepted and used. Consequently, the following question appears: can introduction and use of insufficiently clear and developed concept into security studies (which are still considered to be young and not fully developed discipline) contribute to its development or can it potentially have harmful effect?

THE DEFINITION OF SECURITY ASYMMETRY

The concept of asymmetry in security studies, although a significantly exploited term, does not explain too much. It implies that there is a counterweight in the field of security studies, without further consideration of this phenomenon. Counterweight to asymmetry is symmetry³ which represents a mapping of figures in geometry, that is, a figure that does not fulfill the conditions of symmetry in relation to some other by certain criteria is marked as asymmetrical one. Symmetry is a very significant phenomenon in numerous natural sciences and arts. However, when it comes to security studies, symmetry did not attract too much attention before introduction of the concept of asymmetry, which is confirmed by the fact that there is not a definition of the symmetric threat, symmetric war, symmetric conflicts, or symmetric strategy. It is clear that there is symmetry between the same type of things, so lack of the definition of symmetry and the criteria for determining of the symmetry of two phenomena has not created conditions for a scientific approach, specific for security studies or military science, to make non-symmetrical phenomena considered asymmetrical. Consequently, the concept of asymmetry is considered outside the concept of symmetry and it remains unclear what the asymmetry represents in the field of security studies. Even in military studies, focus on asymmetry does not explain much per se, as the application of asymmetry in strategies is not considered a new phenomenon in the history of warfare⁴, in spite of the fact that the literature creates illusion that the US recognized this phenomenon. The US, being the only world power

³ Mathematics indicates that symmetry occurs by applying various transformations, such as: reflection, rotation, translation, related projection, topological symmetry, or slippery reflections. Whatever transformation is applied to a particular, arbitrarily defined figure, and when it is transcribed according to certain laws, this basic figure and its copy make symmetry (Renata Jadrešin Milić, „Symmetry Notion as a Universal Principle of Design.“ *Arhitektura i urbanizam* 22-23 (2008): 86-87).

⁴ The existence of symmetry between the opposing sides would imply that their actions have a non-strategic manner. In that sense, strategies are based on asymmetry. In the conflict of the two sides we can only recognize the symmetry in intention to harm each other.

at the time, were the first to express the intention to include asymmetry in their doctrinal documents. Explicit mentioning of asymmetry first appeared in the 1995 *Joint Publication (JP) 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* in which the definitions of symmetric and asymmetric engagement were given. “Symmetric engagements are battles between similar forces where superior correlation of forces and technological advantage are important to ensure victory and minimize losses. Asymmetric engagements are battles between dissimilar forces. These engagements can be extremely lethal, especially if the force being attacked is not ready to defend itself against the threat. An example is air versus land; air versus sea; sea and air versus land and land versus air and sea”⁵. Those definitions were very simple and used in limited sense.

In the *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, from May 1997, greater attention was paid to asymmetric threats and it was stated that “U.S. dominance in the conventional military arena may encourage adversaries to use such asymmetric means to attack our forces and interests overseas and Americans at home”⁶. Thus, the term of asymmetric threats was introduced without prior definition, and asymmetric threats were merely listed: terrorism, NBC threats, information warfare and environmental sabotage. The stated aim of using of the asymmetric threats was to avoid direct military confrontation with the United States, or if, however, an adversary ultimately faced a conventional war with the United States, it could also employ asymmetric means to delay or deny U.S. access to critical facilities; disrupt the US command, control, communications, and intelligence networks; deter allies and potential coalition partners from supporting US intervention.

The Joint Strategy Review from 1999 provided the broadest official treatment of asymmetry. “Asymmetric approaches are attempts to circumvent or undermine US strengths while exploiting US weaknesses using methods that differ significantly from the United States. Asymmetric approaches generally seek a major psychological impact, such as shock or confusion that affects an opponent’s initiative, freedom of action or will. Asymmetric methods require an appreciation of an opponent’s vulnerabilities. Asymmetric approaches often employ innovative, nontraditional tactics, weapons or technologies and can be applied at all levels of warfare (strategic, operational and tactical level)”⁷. This definition of asymmetry is specific to the current strategic environment and US security situation, and it deals primarily with

⁵ Joint Publication (JP) 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 10 January 1995), IV-10 and IV-11.

⁶ William S. Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, May 1997, Section II.

⁷ Joint Strategy Review (Washington, DC: CJCS, 1999), 2.

what an opponent might do to the US rather than giving equal weight to how the US military might use asymmetry against its opponents.

Metz criticizes these shortcomings as "negative asymmetries" and strives to provide more general, complete definition of strategic asymmetry. "In military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing and thinking differently from opponents to maximize relative strengths, exploit opponent's weaknesses or gain greater freedom of action. It can be political-strategic, military-strategic, operational or a combination, and entail different methods, technologies, values, organizations or time perspectives. It can be short-term, long-term, deliberate or by default. It also can be discrete or pursued in conjunction with symmetric approaches and have both psychological and physical dimensions"⁸. Metz proposes certain characteristics of asymmetry: asymmetry is positive if uses differences to gain an advantage and negative asymmetry involves an opponent's threat to one's vulnerabilities. Also, Metz noticed that there are at least six forms of asymmetry that are relevant: methods, technologies, values, morale, organizations or time perspectives⁹. This definition has too many aspects of "perhaps" on one hand, and a lot of levels of analysis and form of asymmetry to the other side, so the question that undoubtedly arises is: what is not an asymmetry?

McKenzie, criticizing the existing definitions of asymmetry as not capable of sufficiently explaining this term, suggested the definition of asymmetric warfare would be: "Leveraging inferior tactical or operational strength against American vulnerabilities to achieve disproportionate effect with the aim of undermining American will in order to achieve the asymmetric actor's strategic objectives"¹⁰. McKenzie explains that the key differences in this proposed definition are in two elements element: *disproportionate effect*-achieving of strategic objectives through application of modest resources and the explicit recognition of the importance of the *psychological component*.

Blank suggests that numerous phenomenon as wars, enemies, battles, strategies, approaches, options, challenges, and many other phenomena related to armed conflict have all been labeled as "asymmetric," often in the same work. In other words, the terms "asymmetric" and "asymmetry" have become mantras or slogans that are trotted out for any and all occasions but which have been devoid of useful analytical content. These terms obscure understanding

⁸ Steven Metz, "Strategic Asymmetry", *Military Review* 81, no.4(July-August 2001): 25

⁹ Ibid, 25-26.

¹⁰ Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., *The Revenge of The Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR*.(Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2000), 2.

more than they enlighten, having become politicized rather than being truly analytical¹¹.

By reviewing the abovementioned definitions, as well as broader literature, we can notice that there is no clear conceptual delimitation and that we can provisionally recognize two phases of development (actualization) of concept of asymmetry. The first phase lasted from the end of the Cold War until the terrorist attack in US, when theoretical considerations were based on attempts to clarify the complex relations on the international security scene through the concept of asymmetry; in this phase one side in conflict was represented by the United States (in some definitions its allies as well) and the other side by “American enemies”. In that way asymmetry is used to describe enemies who think and act differently from US, especially when they are faced with superior US forces.

In the definitions given later the tendency is directed towards the fact that, when actors are concerned, the concept is expanded, and it is stated that there are two sides which differ in technology, weapons and tactics they use, i.e. the actors rely on different methods, values, operational forces etc. It can be seen that there is no definition of asymmetry (symmetry, as a counterbalance, is not even mentioned). The asymmetry is a term that social sciences have taken from natural sciences and they are trying to transform and adapt it in order to make it useful for describing and explaining disproportion which can appear in the relationship between the security subject and the perpetrator of the threat. However, the absence of such a definition¹² that should have been a solid foundation on which the conceptual apparatus will be developed within the concept of asymmetry, conditioned the insufficient precision of meanings of various terms which are even used as synonyms. Such situation contributes to confusion in the academic public, on the one hand, and to uncritical use of the concept, on the other hand.

The second phase of the development (actualization) of the concept of asymmetry has been lasting from the terrorist attack on the US in 2001 to the present time, in which the concept of asymmetric threats tends to clarify the existing disproportion of power among actors, as well as transformed threats, especially terrorism.

¹¹ Stephen Blank, *Rethinking Asymmetric Threats*. (Army War College (U.S.): Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 3-4.

¹² There are other security phenomena that, instead of a precise definition, have a whole range of different definitions, such as terrorism. However, with such definitions there is consensus which represents the constituent elements and key features of the given phenomenon.

ASYMMETRIC THREAT AND RELATED TERMS

The terrorist attack on the US in 2001 marks a sort of milestone in the development (actualization) of the concept of asymmetry which has become object of interest of the wider scientific community, primarily because it was necessary to find an explanation for this different constellation of forces between state and non-state actors. In order to find a new analytical framework for understanding of the threats as well as new security environment, the concept of asymmetric threats gets priority. The term "asymmetric threats" quickly became an essential part of vocational vocabulary, although it is still not clear how these threats differ from non-traditional, irregular, modern or non-conventional threats, i.e. which level of generality asymmetrical threats possess in relation to the abovementioned threats.

The existence of asymmetric threats implies that the universe of threats is divided into symmetric and asymmetric threats, so any new threat can be classified into one of these two groups. That is why it should not be surprising that each "new" threat is classified as an asymmetric threat. The perspective from which we observe the phenomenon can also be a confusing one: in the way a terrorist is for some people fighter for freedom, asymmetric threats can be standard *modus operandi* for some other. For this reason, it is necessary to analyze the very definition of asymmetric threat, as well as the characteristics that these threats possess, in order to find ways to provide an adequate response to these threats. However, even the first step shows that there are insurmountable problems: there is no consensus about definition of an asymmetric threat in the academic and professional public. Consequently, differentiation with related types of threats has not been made (or perhaps identical), so they are used to explain each other¹³. The party using asymmetric threats is usually a weaker actor who tries to overcome the existing disproportion of power in relation to some actor with greater power. That weak actor is often referred to as a non-state actor, although it is not clear why there is the sign of equality between these two terms.

Some authors think that identifying an asymmetric threat is much easier than defining it and that the focus should be on identifying of the main characteristics and consequences of asymmetric threats¹⁴. Lambakis stated a

¹³ In one definition the asymmetric threats are defined as unconventional threats, in the next definition unconventional threats are non-traditional threats, and then in some of the following definitions non-traditional threats are asymmetric threats.

¹⁴ Aleksandar Glavinov i Nenad Taneski „Asimetrične pretnje i njihova refleksija na međunarodnu bezbednost u *Multikulturalnost i savremeno društvo* (Novi Sad: Visoka škola za pravne i poslovne studije „Dr Lazar Vrkatić“): 460.

list of the characteristics which threat should have in order to be considered as “asymmetric”:

1. Unusual from our point of view (taking and torturing hostages);
2. Irregular - against the laws of armed conflict or in violation of treaties (using nuclear weapons to disrupt satellite operations);
3. Unmatched to our capabilities and departing from war as we understand it (flying airplanes into buildings);
4. Highly leveraged against our assets (using ballistic missiles and WMD);
5. Difficult to respond to in kind or proportionately, so responses against terrorism or guerrilla warfare seem heavy-handed and
6. Unknown or have unforeseen consequences - for example, a wide-scale biological attack that reduces an urban area to a wasteland.¹⁵

Lambakis concludes that majority of these threats is neither directed to providing physical control nor they rely on brute strength; they rather rely on exploitation of vulnerabilities. According to him, in significant respects, the concept of asymmetry in its most significant aspects creates analytical concept which is nothing more than effective strategy.

By analyzing the literature on security threats we can notice which threats are dominantly labeled as asymmetric threats: terrorism, the use of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the threats that inflict information technology (cyber threats). As already mentioned, after the 9/11 numerous authors have begun to explore the phenomenon of terrorism, its transformation, and the defense strategy and contemporary terrorism has been characterized as an asymmetric threat, which has actualized the concept of asymmetry. After that, other threats started to be recognized and called asymmetric threats (environmental threats, migrations). The qualification of WMD as an asymmetric threat is an interesting case in particular. Namely, during the Cold War WMD represented a very serious threat, whose deadliness was a cause for serious concern. At that time, WMD was not qualified as an asymmetric threat, but as a means of deterrence. In which way and by which criteria has this threat transformed into asymmetrical? Is this threat automatically used in the context of an asymmetric threat or only in cases when it is used against a significantly stronger opponent? What would

¹⁵ Steven, Lambakis “Reconsidering Asymmetric Warfare”. *Joint Forces Quarterly* (February 2005): 104.

happen in case that the weaker party uses WMD as a balance against a stronger enemy in order to deter them from an attack, but not as a threat?

Analyzing a broader list of asymmetric threats¹⁶, the impression is that the asymmetry can describe any threat, tactics, or approach that is considered as unjust, unusual, surprising, unknown or unimaginable. What is the use value of this concept if we start to look at every threat as an asymmetric threat? Also, if something is new, e.g. tactics, strategy, weapons, it does not mean that the given phenomenon is automatically asymmetrical. It is necessary to familiarize with the phenomenon, describe it and after that start with explanation, otherwise such an approach becomes uncritical and harmful. This can result with situation that any new enemy can be seen as asymmetric threat that use asymmetric weapon to act from asymmetric environment.

The question that undoubtedly arises is which scientific and practical contribution of the concept of asymmetric threat can be realized when existing definitions do not explain how the asymmetry refers to disproportion of power, or to unpredictable methods that can be used by weaker actors in order to achieve their goals.

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Debates about whether and how the nature of warfare is changing are as old as the concept itself. Williams believed that debates about three questions have been particularly important in addressing this issue. “First, to which extent is the concept of “total” war useful for thinking about development in warfare? Second, what kind of relationship exists between warfare and globalization; has the processes of globalization caused “new” type of warfare? Third, which changes can be identified in the way the advanced industrialized democracies in the West are waging a new type of war nowadays compared to earlier historical periods”¹⁷. Debates about war transformation have caused development of the ideas of “new war”, among which we recognize: non-traditional, non-conventional, irregular, asymmetric and hybrid (proxy) wars. In this way, we seek to find ways how to confront “new” wars that are different from “old” wars in terms of their actors, military capabilities, the methods of warfare and the politics of war.

¹⁶ The asymmetric threats that are commonly mentioned are: terrorism, sabotage, rebel action, use of ballistic and cruise missiles, threats to information technology, WMD, nuclear explosions in space, environmental threats, migrations, etc.

¹⁷ Pol D. Viliijams, „Rat“ u *Uvod u studije bezbednosti*, ed. Pol D. Viliijams (Beograd: JP Službeni Glasnik, 2008): 228.

Unlike asymmetric threats, articles about asymmetric warfare could be found even in a Cold War period. In his article from 1975 Mack tried to understand the politics of asymmetric conflict by raising the question of why big nation used to lose small wars. Following the Clausewitz's idea that war only resembles its "pure form" when a "grand and powerful purpose" is at stake, because only then will the full mobilization of national resources become a possibility, and only then will the diverse and sometimes conflicting goals that various national groups pursue in time of peace be displaced by a single overriding strategic aim-"the overthrow of the enemy", Mack strived to define symmetric and asymmetric war. "In a symmetric, "total war" situation where the survival of both sides is at stake, both have a "grand and powerful purpose" to defend. Thus, other things being equal, the potential for internal divisions arising in either camp is small relative to the potential for domestic conflict in the homeland of the metropolitan power involved in an asymmetric conflict. In symmetric conflicts, ceteris paribus, the absence of constraints on the mobilization and the use of conventional military force maximize the strategic utility of conventional warfare. Examples of symmetric "total wars" are the first and second World Wars and civil wars in which the struggle can be seen in zero-sum terms-as one of survive"¹⁸. Mack suggested that relative interest of actors can explain success in asymmetric warfare rather than material capabilities: the situation in which a strong actor is inhomogeneous and politically vulnerable, and a weak actor is consolidated in that area, is going to result in a strong actor losing war. Mack's work has influenced other authors to try to understand how a strong actor can lose war in interaction with the weak actor, looking through the prism of asymmetries¹⁹.

In his analysis, Mazarr also started from Clausewitz's idea about differences between limited and unlimited, or absolute, wars; to be more precise, with ways in which war could be limited: by the level of political demands of the combatants, the situation or condition of the belligerents, the strength of will on both or all sides and the degree of force employed. In attempt to defend the thesis that US are fighting a wrong kind of war, Mazarr

¹⁸ Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict", *World Politics*, no.2 (1975):182

¹⁹ Toft thinks that strong actors lose asymmetric conflicts when they adopt the wrong strategy vis-à-vis their weaker adversaries: if there are same-approach interactions (whether direct-direct or indirect-indirect), favor strong actors because they imply shared values, aims, and victory conditions, so nothing therefore intervenes between raw power and goals. Opposite approach interactions (whether direct-indirect or indirect-direct) favor weak actors because they sacrifice values for time. This results in a significant delay between the commitment of armed forces and the attainment of objectives (Ivan Arreguin-Toft, „How the Weak Win Wars". *International Security* 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 121-122)

followed this Clausewitz's idea. "The problem with asymmetric wars around the world as well as the most essential reason why the United States has trouble prosecuting them effectively is that such conflicts will inevitably be strictly limited for the United States, whereas for its enemies, they will often approach absolute warfare. This mismatch is inherent to the character of asymmetric war, in which fanatically devoted terrorists, insurgents, or rebels are attempting to win a conflict they may see in absolute, even apocalyptic terms, whereas the United States is trying to manage a war far from home that engages secondary national interests"²⁰.

One attempt of understanding the asymmetric wars starts with questions: is and to which extent is Clausewitz's opinion about war still relevant and if it has and to which extent transformed? These attempts seek to find an answer to how is it possible for a weaker actor to win war against more powerful and stronger actor and which methods are to be implemented in confronting weaker actor in asymmetric conflict. This approach hasn't been directed to attempts to define the term of asymmetric warfare and to identify its characteristics, but it has been oriented towards accepting of existence of asymmetric warfare as a counterbalance to classical war.

The second approach in attempt to understand the asymmetric warfare has been focused primarily on defining of the term asymmetric warfare and identification of its characteristics. Some of these definitions are: "Asymmetric warfare is population-centric nontraditional warfare waged between a militarily superior power and one or more inferior powers which encompasses all the following aspects: evaluating and defeating asymmetric threat, conducting asymmetric operations, understanding cultural asymmetry and evaluating asymmetric cost"²¹. "Asymmetric warfare could be defined as: a form of warfare in which a non-state actor uses unconventional tools and tactics against a state's vulnerabilities to achieve disproportionate effect, undermining the state's will to achieve its strategic objectives"²².

Disadvantages occurring in the attempts to define asymmetric threat, that is, misunderstanding what the asymmetry in security implies, have also been transferred in defining the asymmetric war. We can conclude that the asymmetric warfare is different from any other earlier wars, which brings as to a common denominator with both asymmetric threats and asymmetric wars: all that is different have become asymmetric.

²⁰ Michael, Mazarr, "The Folly of Asymmetric War". *The Washington Quarterly* 31, no.3 (Summer, 2008):42

²¹ David, Buffaloe. *Defining Asymmetric Warfare*. Virginia: The Institute of Land Warfare (2006):17

²² Ajey, Lele, "Asymmetric Warfare: A State Vs Non-State Conflict". *OASIS*, no.20 (2014):103

CONCLUSION

The tendency for security studies to develop their theoretical framework and more comprehensive conceptual framework which would be applicable in security studying on all levels means that numerous concepts which can contribute to better understanding of security will become essential components of security studies. Having systematic and in-depth knowledge in the field of security studies and developed criticism among researchers in this field will have the necessary effect on concepts that are not well-founded and whose scientific and practical contribution is discussable in such a way that they will stay of scope of these knowledges.

The Concept of asymmetric threats should have provided high-quality analytical framework for understanding of security threats at the beginning of the 21st century and the new security environment. In that way, the knowledge about the relations among state and non-state participants in conflicts would have been immensely advanced. However, this concept did not provide an answer to the question about the way in which asymmetry relates to the disproportion of power, i.e. to the unpredictable methods that inferior actors use to achieve their goals. The extent of this concept has gone to the other extreme that is, any threat that is new, or has a new appearance form the existing, is automatically defined as an asymmetric one.

Non-critical acceptance of certain concepts and concepts in security studies does not contribute to a better understanding of the security architecture of the modern world, but it leads to further ambiguities. Such concepts are classified as part of the categorical apparatus in the field of security studies and are mechanically used to clarify any new phenomena.

The ambiguities which have appeared about perception of the concept of asymmetry in security and military science resulted in different understandings of asymmetric threats, but asymmetric wars as well. These misinterpretations are directly reflected on two levels: Firstly - asymmetric threats become a means of explaining new phenomena. When we consider the definitions of hybrid threats, as "the new form of threats", we can see that they are usually defined as a combination of symmetrical and asymmetric threats, although it is not clear what symmetrical and asymmetric threats are. Secondly: it's difficult to plan, organize, and implement adequate confrontation and a successful triumph against the phenomena we do not understand. Therefore, the concept of asymmetric threats needs to be redefined, deprived of logical errors and improved, thus setting up strong foundations and building a quality model for understanding and fighting (non)security phenomena.

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ASIMETRIČNE PRETNJE U STUDIJAMA BEZBEDNOSTI

Milica Ćurčić*

doktorand Fakulteta bezbednosti, Univerziteta u Beogradu,
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Nestanak bipolarne podele sveta uticao je na redefinisane pojma bezbednosti i nova teorijska promišljanja koja se bave tim problemom. Dok je tokom Hladnog rata bezbednost imala prvenstveno državo-centrično i vojno značenje, danas se pojam bezbednosti promenio i po širini i po dubini. U horizontalnom smislu, pojam bezbednosti proširio se na nedržavne i nevojne sektore, a u vertikalnom sa države na ostale nivoe i aktere. Time je stvorena mogućnost kombinovanja nevojnih bezbednosnih dimenzija i nedržavnih referentnih objekata, što je rezultovalo nastankom novih koncepta bezbednosti, ali i novih koncepta pretnji. Iako pristupi zasnovani na asimertiji prožimaju istoriju ratovanja, nakon terorističkih napada u SAD 11. septembra 2001. godine koncept asimetričnih pretnji postaje predmet interesovanja šire naučne zajednice prvenstveno zato što je bilo potrebno pronaći objašnjenje za drugačiju konstelaciju snaga između državnih i nedržavnih aktera. Fokus interesovanja je na pokušajima definisanja pojma asimetričnih pretnji i njegovog razgraničenja sa srodnim pojmovima (asimetrično ratovanje, asimetrične strategije), utvrđivanja savremenih bezbednosnih pretnji koje mogu da se klasifikuju kao asimetrične pretnje, kao i suprostavljanju i iznalaženju adekvatnog odgovora na date pretnje.

Rad istražuje utemeljenost koncepta asimetričnih pretnji u studijama bezbednosti, genezu nastanka, kriterijume klasifikovanja savremenih bezbednosnih pretnji kao asimetričnih pretnji i upotrebnu vrednost samog koncepta. Asimetrične pretnje su uglavnom podeljene u tri kategorije: pretnje koje ugrožavaju informacione tehnologije (sajber pretnje), upotreba oružja za masovno uništenje i terorizam. Kroz analizu karakteristika asimetričnih pretnji teži se pronalaženju odgovora da li koncept asimetričnih pretnji predstavlja jedan od koherentnih pristupa za razumevanje savremenih bezbednosnih pretnji na početku 21. veka.

Ključne reči: bezbednost, studije bezbednosti, asimetrija, asimetrične pretnje, asimerični rat.

* milicacurcic89@hotmail.com

A CONCEPT OF ASYMMETRIC THREATS

Zoran Jovanovski*

Military Academy „Gen. Mihailo Apostolski” – Skopje,
Republic of Macedonia

Abstract: The terrorist attack 11 September 2001 on American soil is understood as a war. But the question is: What kind of war is it? Al Qaeda is not a state, but a non-state actor. Many perceive al Qaeda as the transnational terrorist organization. Can such non-state armed group wage war against one of the world's biggest military powers? What kind of military acts could it conduct? Within a short time after the attack, the US government decided to join the fight against the unconventional and asymmetrical enemies. To the US, these enemies represent big, even strategic security threat and this is why the US declared global war against terrorism. Since then, the question is how to understand those that fight this strange war? What are their goals and what kind of strategy and tactics do they use to win the war? Who are they and what kind of war do they fight? In the past decade the notions of asymmetry and asymmetric became a trend in the US strategic and political sciences. The use of these notions addresses the problems of the modern war and in this way they became central concepts of the American discourse about war. Wars, enemies, battles, strategies, approaches, options, challenges and many other aspects related to the military conflict are labeled as asymmetric, which is the subject of this paper.

Key words: asymmetric threats, asymmetric conflict, asymmetric warfare, asymmetric enemy, concept.

INTRODUCTION

Less than three weeks after al-Qaeda terrorists crashed hijacked planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 11 September, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld issued his first quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). He wrote that "it was imperative the U.S. military plan is not intended only for conventional wars, but that it should also develop strategies to prevent defeat of adversaries who rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric war in

* Author is Assistant Professor at Military Academy „Gen. Mihailo Apostolski“, Skopje, Republic of Macedonia; e-mail: zoranjovanovski43@gmail.com.

order to achieve their objectives." ²³ Rather than plan for large military operations, or even small wars limited to specific national states, the Pentagon should develop strategy to tackle unconventional threats on behalf of the (non)-state actors who could attack the U.S. interests.

Asymmetric threats are not new. In every period, from the pre-modern to the present day, weaker forces use surprise, technology, new tactics, or what some might consider violation of military ethics in order to resist stronger forces.

In order to ensure cohesion in terms provision and strategy implementation, the American Congress accepted legislation in 1996 „which required the Pentagon to conduct quadrennial defense review recommendations.”²⁴

In the first report the following year, then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen identified asymmetric challenges as major components of the future threats. In the conclusion of the report it was suggested that adversaries "are likely to seek advantage over the United States by using unconventional approach, circumventing or undermining American strengths while exploiting their vulnerabilities."²⁵

Identifying the asymmetrical threats is far easier than defining them. While asymmetry focuses on how to keep dominant position by revealing adversary's weaknesses, no matter whose conventional strength is bigger, there is no consensus about the concept and nature of the asymmetric threats. Still, it does not mean strategies concerning their repression and neutralization should not be developed.

PROBLEMS IN DEFINING ASYMMETRIC THREATS

Asymmetric threats neutralize the advantage of a stronger opponent and rely on indirect approaches to achieve their goal. There are several definitions concerning asymmetric threats. The USA Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) defines asymmetric threats as „the use of innovative strategies, tactics and technology by the weaker state or non-state opponent, aimed at avoiding the power of the stronger and exploiting the potential vulnerability of

²³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report, IV*, 2001, available: www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf, accessed on October, 30, 2016 at 23:30.

²⁴ Public Law 104-201, 1996, available: <http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/1997NDAA.pdf>, accessed on October, 31, 2016 at 20:10.

²⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Section II: The Global Security Environment*, 1997, available: <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/qdr/sec2.html>, accessed on November, 01, 2016 at 23:10.

a larger and technologically superior opponent. This includes: the selective use of weapons or military resources of a state or non-state group that will resist, repel, or perhaps even defeat numerically and technologically superior military force, and use diplomatic and other non-military means or tactics, so that powerful military forces are discouraged or limited while conducting military operations“.²⁶

Paul Mann explains that "an asymmetric threat is a new term used to describe weapons and tactics used by relatively weak enemies in order to circumvent the technological domination of the Western countries. Their primary goal is not to occupy the territory and they do not pose a threat to the sovereignty of their opponents. Their aim is to weaken the will and ability of their opponents to use superior conventional military capacities and to intervene effectively in regional conflicts. Asymmetric threats include a full spectrum of disproportionate intimidation that the West could face, ranging from international civil disobedience and crime, to military conflicts of low intensity. They range from fighting in cyber space to the use of weapons of mass destruction, as well as national destabilization caused by mass migration“.²⁷

In order to understand asymmetric threats, one must first understand what is meant by asymmetry and how it relates to warfare. In conflicts, asymmetry can exist in different forms, and it can also be expressed in the structure of warfare.

For example, asymmetry in the structure of war means that „the American engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq is limited, that is, the USA were not in total war at the level that it was in the Second World War. Many Americans were not involved, or even remained uninformed about the conflict in which the USA are taking part“.²⁸

Due to the different forms of asymmetry in the structure of the conflict, many debates were held in order to define asymmetric threats and asymmetric conflicts in the best way. These debates are a source of confusion, because they often result in the introduction of various concepts, interpretations or meanings, which are so extensive as they become useless. The best approach to a better understanding of asymmetry is not through an unsuccessful search for the perfect definition, but through the identification of

²⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, *Statement of Work for Asymmetric Warfare Threats to US Interests: Expert Panel Support*, Washington, D.C., DIA, 1997, p.2.

²⁷ Mann P., *Asymmetrical Threats New Military Watchword*, Aviation W&S Technology, 1998, p. 55-56.

²⁸ Mack A., *Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict*, World Politics 27, no. 2., 1975, p. 35.

the main characteristics and consequences of asymmetric threats. As a result, the asymmetric conflict is often used as a synonym for a non-traditional, irregular, unconventional, low-intensity, guerrilla, different from military operations - small-scale conflict.

To facilitate interpretation of the concept of asymmetric threats - conflicts we will use all of these conditions and the following definition: „Asymmetrical warfare is a nontraditional conflict being waged between military superior power and one or more lower powers, and it includes the following aspects: assessment and victory of asymmetric threats, conducting asymmetric operation, understanding and evaluating cultural asymmetry, and the cost of an asymmetric threat“.²⁹ This definition is comprehensive and accurate, not only because it addresses asymmetric threats, but also because it expresses the contradiction in these types of threats, cultural factors, as well as costs that are key attributes that are often neglected in other definitions. The threat in this definition consists of the following components: terrorism, crime, information operations, harassment and threats to certain individuals.

KEY FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT

In the early post-war period, after the Second World War, communist and nationalist ideologies dominated, and today ideologies are concentrated on religion. Groups motivated by the radical interpretation of religion see themselves as culturally superior to powerful military forces. They believe that terrorism will help the world to become a better place for the population they claim to serve. Guided by extremist-fundamental beliefs, fueled by economic repression, supported by the media, and armed with hope that death is a glory, suicide bombers become increasingly violent and more dramatic in their methods.

The Islamic State (ID)³⁰ in Syria and al Qaeda are perfect examples of this kind of asymmetric threat. „Al Qaeda uses modern methods of proven warfare models, through which they achieve a political movement to defeat legitimate democratic governments all around the world. The basic rule of al Qaeda is that with the proper use of superior political will and strategy, one can defeat economic and military power.. It is hard to fight against groups such

²⁹ Buffaloe D. L., *Defining Asymmetric Warfare*, The Land Warfare Papers, no. 58., 2006, p. 27.

³⁰ The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State (IS), and in Arabic language *الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام*. It is unrecognised proto-state established on January, 03, 2014. On June, 29, 2014 it announced a caliphate on the territory of Iraq and Syria.

as al Qaeda and similar to it, because they are organized to secure first political and then military success.³¹

Further, „al Qaeda and other terrorist groups similar to them are distinguished by horizontal leadership whose structure functions within small network-linked and widespread cells that have a global effect. In the daytime, their fighters are peaceful ordinary citizens, and at night they are rebels, which makes it almost impossible for their violent acts to be discovered before they happen.³²




Figure 1: Model of asymmetric conflict³³

The war in Afghanistan is an asymmetrical conflict that has a rebellious character. This war is not a traditional armed conflict, which is confirmed by the analysis of the key internal and external factors that define an asymmetric conflict. These factors are „geography, population structure, ethnical qualification of the people, political scene, role of the international

³¹ Stern. J., *The Protean Enemy*, *Foreign Affairs*, no.4, 1982, p. 31.

³² Corum J.S. и Johnson W.R., *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Terrorists and Insurgents*, Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003, p. 7.

³³ *Ibid*, p. 17.

community, external support, and rebellious strategy. ³⁴ Figure 1 shows the most relevant factors that influence the development of an asymmetric conflict.

Experiences from previous efforts in Afghanistan say that „the intervention of the security forces in overcoming asymmetric threats has to be focused on solving internal problems in the country (internal factors of modern asymmetric conflict). Unlike the conventional way of resolving conflicts in crisis areas, in asymmetric conflicts it is necessary to establish mechanisms and structures that support conflict resolution, and which are at the same time adapted to local conditions, culture and history.“³⁵

In addition, insurgents are structured as small, decentralized radicalized groups of people who, using specialized tactics and non-military operations seek to destroy their opponent by utilizing a shift in balance, that is, attacking goals such as people who have different opinion concerning policy and ideology, security forces members and state symbols, while simultaneously spreading their extremist ideologies in order to gain the affinity of the local population. Therefore, it is very important that every counterinsurgency strategy has the ability to timely adapt to an asymmetric enemy as well. The precondition for this is understanding the dynamics, structure and level of an asymmetric opponent power, that is, breaking up his ability to learn, transfer and apply new patterns of behaviour.

Modern asymmetric enemies are also aware of the power of the media, public opinion, politics and freedom of speech in democratic societies, and they use it very well in the fight against conventional combat power.

It can be concluded that the asymmetric threat that large countries, such as the USA, Russia and China, face may be irrelevant with regard to their military capabilities, but they are completely capable to strategically defeat these countries on diplomatic and information level. Unfortunately, the inadequate conventional military capability of large countries (in particular the USA) slowed down the overall response to the changed asymmetric nature of the modern warfare in the information era.

ASYMMETRIC THREATS IN THE KEY INTERNATIONAL ACTORS CONCEPTS

The world has undergone major and fundamental changes in the last two decades. New security risks and threats that impose urgent need to redefine

³⁴ Nikola Brzica, *Asimetrični rat u Afganistanu i protupobunjeničke strategije*, expert work, 2013, p.2.

³⁵ Nikola Brzica, *Ibid*, p. 17.

security concept and system have appeared. Some of them are definitely asymmetric threats which became global danger in modern conditions. Modern world has significantly changed and is still changing, and those changes require need to redefine national security concepts on all levels of its territorial organization. The concepts of the USA, Russia and China related to asymmetric threats are presented in the following chapters:

Concept of the USA. In terms of history the USA faced asymmetric threats (opponents) for the first time during the Vietnam War (1955-1975). It was a different war in comparison to all previous, where the USA gained significant experience. Throughout the war, the USA maintained air superiority. „Initial USA strategy prepared the terrain to maximize USA advantage in the second phase on land.. In 1968, general William Westmoreland established the marine base in Khe Sanh in order to lure the attention of the Vietnamese.“³⁶

The tactics was not completely successful. While the U.S. forces inflicted a lot of losses, the Vietnamese consolidated control of the terrain, eventually forcing the USA to evacuate from the Ki Sun base. Air superiority did not help to restore terrain control. The U.S. air force disrupted the Vietnamese supply lines, but they did not achieve the complete obstruction. Cheap Soviet surface-to-air missiles contributed to weakening of the U.S. air superiority. The Vietnamese had more than three million victims in comparison to 58,000 American victims. This ratio according to the government in Hanoi was considered acceptable. Faced with an opponent willing to suffer so many casualties—a price many Western countries and democracies were not willing to pay. Concerning this, Washington could do little, and the Vietnamese could easily win the opponents. For the USA, Vietnam was important in terms of how the USA reacted to their defeat. The USA emerged from this war with valuable lessons learned about guerrilla fighting and they focused on the Soviet military forces and conventional warfare, with an unspoken promise that they will enter that kind of conflict never again. The USA directed their attention to technological solutions in order to increase the firepower precision. This also codifies what many may call the American way of fighting, also known as warfare with causing as many losses as possible, the second generation warfare or the industrial warfare era. „The American way of fighting has the following characteristics: non-political, non-strategic, unhistorical, optimistic, culturally challenged,

³⁶ Mrozek D. J., *Asymmetric Response to American Air Supremacy in Vietnam*, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1988, p. 96.

technologically dependent, focused on firepower, large-scale, aggressive, regular, patient, logistically excellent and very sensitive to casualties.³⁷ All of these attributes are ideal for conventional wars. However, with the exception of the logistics excellence, all these attributes are just the opposites to what the USA need in order to effectively fight against the asymmetric threats.

With their conventional approach to war, the US became an easy target for the asymmetric opponents. American military dependence on low-risk attacks and weapons with great precision is not capable of solving military situations which infantry units are trained for. War did not change its true essence, only management changed. According to Clausewitz, „war is, and always will be an act of power, used to force the enemy to act in accordance with our will.“³⁸

The USA efforts for cheap, network-centric warfare are the main reason why asymmetric threats are so topical nowadays. The reason is that the USA have become predictable in responding to crises that threaten national security. The problem is that nowadays the American way of fighting is not a secret at all. Terrorist groups know they can not compete with the USA military power, but they can lure the USA into conflict at political and strategic levels, as this is where these groups take advantage. Osama bin Laden was aware that with the attacks 11 September 2001, no significant damage was done, but he successfully threw out the „bait“ to the USA, which they bit well. James Fallows argues that „the US have an urgent need to review their capacities in order to respond to asymmetric threats.“³⁹ However, the US still continues to be heavily reliant on its military instrument of power as a primary tool in the fight against enemy.

Unfortunately, military power is not the answer to victory against asymmetric threats. „The USA cannot apply simple definition or rely on the moment of power, wisdom, which according to their opinion promises victory against irregular forces in 5 easy steps“. Complex opinion in the USA has led to incoherent strategy. „Unfortunately, the key to victory can be found at political and strategic levels of asymmetric conflict, not at tactical. But, this is where most of the US military analysts gravitate, and the false strategies contribute to the fact that the USA have no solid, coherent and consistent policy for facing asymmetric threats.“⁴⁰ The strategy of asymmetric threats is

³⁷ Gray C. S., *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can The American Way of War Adapt?*, Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2006, p. 29-30.

³⁸ Clausewitz C., *On War*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 75.

³⁹ Fallows J., *Declaring Victory*, The Atlantic Monthly 298, no. 2, 2006, p. 62.

⁴⁰ Gray C. S., *ibid*, p. 9-10.

exactly the opposite. They are well-focused on the areas that are underestimated or ignored on behalf of the US, such as for example, minority dissatisfaction or public opinion instability.

According to Colin Grey, „asymmetric threats work intensely to defeat any American strategic imagination that can survive. Since the USA is a free, democratic society led by the elected representatives, it is not able to prepare for all possible emergencies, arising from prospective threats, due to limited information, time, money and flexibility of the USA government. «Even the world's richest countries cannot afford to invest in protection against all possible threats. The impossibility of an imaginary identification of asymmetric threats before they become reality is a major problem.”⁴¹ Instead of dealing with these issues, the USA military placed asymmetric threats in the background, behind a concrete conventional threat, which can be easily identified and justified in front of the politicians and the American public. The USA National Security Strategy supports this moment. In it, former US President George W. Bush said „In a short time, the fight involves the use of military force and other instruments of national power to kill or capture terrorists, in order to prevent their safe escape or finding a refuge in another state“.⁴² Clearly and concisely, this statement characterizes a short-term enemy in a physical context, who deals with conventional, direct means of attack. If the USA really understand the enemy and its environment, then they must identify threats in the near future, and not only in the long run, in less tangible form. It can not be said that the only approach is indirect - direct methods certainly have their place. The US military most likely achieved the most in this respect. The National military strategic plan for war against terror since February 2006 in the best way determines the US required approach: to attack terrorists and their operational capacities in the country and abroad; to support true Muslims in order to reject violence. The defeat of the asymmetric threat is not measured by victory on the battlefield, but by achieving strategic victory in political, economic and social field, which influences the population.

Although the USA acknowledged the need to place all national government instruments in the function of winning the Global war against terrorism, the USA military has the greatest burden. Though the USA military strategy for fighting against asymmetric threats has passed a long way, strategy implementation, as an effective tactical operation still remains a problem. One of the reasons is that many military analysts still believe that the

⁴¹ Gray C. S., *Ibid*, p. 6.

⁴² Bush G., *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, DC, 2006, p. 9.

old way of warfare and the use of massive firepower will somehow lead to victory.

Concept of the Russian Federation. The Russian military has long been worried about the asymmetric threats. The experience of the former Soviet Union Socialist Republics in Chechnya - especially at the beginning of the first war (1994-1996) - is not a good example of the effective confrontation of a great power with asymmetric threats. During this non-traditional, guerrilla-style conflict, which can be defined as an asymmetric war, the USSR paid a high price in the sense that it suffered significant losses. Nevertheless, negative result is also a result, and negative experience is also an experience. Based on Chechen experience, asymmetric warfare can be divided into military, security and political components. In this war, the Chechen nationalists and their foreign supporters used a very similar strategy as the Vietnamese in the war against the United States. „ Chechen readiness to suffer immense casualties—or, at least to permit the civilian population to suffer—may not have won an independent state, but in this way they denied the Russian military victory and Moscow domination on one side, and at the same time they showed the international community unwillingness to offer help against violence. “⁴³

Nowadays significant attention is paid to asymmetric warfare forms in the Russian federation. During the panel discussion called «Asymmetric wars of the 21 century» which was held at the Military University in Moscow in January 2015, with the participation of military, police and other departments representatives, Alexander Bartosh, a director of the Informational centre concerning the international security within the Moscow state linguistic university explained the asymmetric threat concept. According to him the concept includes wide range of unfriendly circumstances and intentions, such as cyber (computer) warfare, low-intensity asymmetric conflicts scenarios, global terrorism, piracy, illegal migration, corruption, ethnic and religious conflicts, demographic challenges, transnational organized crime, globalization problems and proliferation of mass destruction weapons. It should be stressed that asymmetric threat for the Russian federation is tightly related to the Washington’s plan for deployment of the anti-missile defense system.

"If we consider three aspects of conducting asymmetric war - economic, medium and military; then Russia is ready to oppose only in two directions”, retired Colonel Mikhail Timoshenko, an independent military

⁴³ Pipes R., *Give the Chechens a Land of their Own*, The New York Times, 2004, p.16.

expert and analyst, told “the Russian word”. “It is difficult to suppress us economically, because of our vast survival experience in difficult conditions, acquired in the Soviet period, when the blockade was much stronger. In military terms the Russian federation has also adapted to modern conditions and is capable of solving local problematic situations in areas along its border. The nuclear shield is still effective as well as the modern missiles with warheads. The weak link in the asymmetric war is the medium logistics. We inherited this backlog from the Soviet Union. There is the language barrier, too. The whole world speaks English and there are less and less countries where Russian is spoken. In view of the social networks role growth, the West, that is, NATO has an obvious advantage. However, since the media often depend on the economy, one can say that the protection of the Russian federation will depend on our economy development success.”

One of the key tools to fight against asymmetric enemies in the Russian federation is the National Defence Management Centre.⁴⁴

On the other hand, concerning the international plan, the Russian federation is facing accusations for conducting asymmetric war against certain countries. The United States and NATO try to take the initiative and accuse the Russian federation of conducting asymmetric war in Ukraine and Crimea. Alexander Vershbow, deputy NATO secretary general, while speaking at the Inter-Parliamentary Conference held in Riga 5 March 2015 where representatives from the European Union countries discussed common foreign policy and security, said NATO was prepared for asymmetric war with the Russian federation. According to him, the NATO and European Union response to similar threats should include both “hard» and «soft” battle instruments which mutually complement each other.

Concept of the People’s Republic of China. The discussion about asymmetric threats and security is not limited only to the USA and the Russian federation. Chinese theorists saw the concept of asymmetric threats through their national, cultural and strategic prisms. Strategic thought in People’s Republic of China generally does not address asymmetric threats and warfare in the same manner as the Western analysts do. Instead of that, the notion of

⁴⁴ It is a new system to monitor, comprehensively analyses and efficiently respond to all possible threats to national security. It is established in 2014. In case of a military threat, the country's leadership, including the various branches of the government will be able to coordinate their work with the military and other security services inside the NDMC building. Previously, this kind of coordinated operation was not an option. The NDMC software allows for simulation of likely scenarios and development of options to resolve any critical situations, and determine whether or not they represent a threat to Russia.

asymmetric threat is imbedded in the core of understanding how one country should approach the use of force. Some of the central concepts are described by Sun-Tzu, who said “the greatest achievement of warfare is to attack the enemy’s plans; next is to attack their army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities. The perfect way would be to subjugate the enemy army without engaging own forces in the battle.” Other theorists stress that when one military force is actually used, the aim should be to “capture foreign fortified city without attack, and destroy foreign state without longer fighting.”⁴⁵

The hierarchy of force usage in Chinese strategic thought is topical even now, when modern Chinese leaders recognize that the countries identified as likely opponents of the People’s Republic of China (primarily the United States), have significant qualitative superiority over the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Those conditions dictate the way in which China treats Taiwan – deployment of ballistic missiles and submarines not easily opposed by Taiwanese defense, and attempting to undermine the U.S. determination to help Taiwan in case of conflict.

Some potential non-military forms of struggle, which can be classified as asymmetric can be recognized in the Chinese literature. These include, first of all, „financial attacks, terrorist attacks and cyber (computer) warfare, which could possibly arise in future wars as methods that would replace existing military methods or would be used as additional, that is, they would enrich the existing approaches to warfare.”⁴⁶

In the People’s Republic of China, the discussion of asymmetric threats reflects a specific approach to strategic problem solving. Chinese strategists and theorists are trying to understand how analysts in the USA understand asymmetric threats. In addition, the People’s Republic of China fears the possibility that the USA will apply a new approach to fight this phenomenon, which would have a negative influence on the Chinese military power.

CONCLUSION

Asymmetric conflict lasts for a long time. Time is the ally of the asymmetric fighter. Vietnamese communists fought for 30 years, and the Palestinians have been fighting for nearly 60 years against Israel (so far there is no indication that the conflict will end in the near future). Asymmetric

⁴⁵ Michael Tsai, York Chen, „*Submarines and Taiwan’s Defense*,” *Taiwan Defense Affairs*, vol. 1, no. 3, 2001, p. 126.

⁴⁶ Beijing Liaowang, FBIS Document ID: CPP20000322000070, 2000, p. 55-56.

threats calculate time using decades or generations, not days, weeks, months or years.

Prolonging the conflict and exhausting the enemy and its resources is a basic strategy of the asymmetric threats. No matter how powerful and technologically capable armies of the big countries are, the power of radical religious ideology and asymmetric warfare approach cannot and must not be underestimated. The enemy cannot be defeated by firepower, even with the most modern weapons.

Friendly disposed big countries (especially the USA) in facing the asymmetric threats through military centered approach and directed usage of firearms are not efficient and most likely will not pass the test of time. History is full of examples in which the stronger military power bows in front of weaker opponent during asymmetric conflicts. The asymmetrical battlefield requires fundamental shift in priorities between elements of military power; particularly air strikes which are frequently applied while fighting against asymmetrical threats. If a superior army wants to defeat the asymmetric theatre against irregular, that is, asymmetric enemy, then it has to change the general strategic approach to the war, normally with the support of political will.

The changes in the modern world, where security challenges, risks and threats watch for, dictate the need of world countries to redefine security concepts at all levels. That is the proper way for them in order to be more effective in fighting against asymmetric enemy, who is constantly stronger and does not stand still.

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KONCEPT ASIMETRIČNIH PRETNJI

Zoran Jovanovski*

Vojna akademija „Gen. Mihailo Apostolski“, Skoplje,
Republika Makedonija

Apstrakt: Teroristički napad 11. Septembra 2001. godine na američko tlo se tumači kao rat. Ali pitanje je kakav je to rat? Al Kaida nije država, već nedržavni igrač. Mnogi poimaju Al Kaidu kao transnacionalnu terorističku organizaciju. Dali je moguće da ovakva nedržavna naoružana grupa ratuje protiv jedne od najvećih vojnih svjetskih sila. Kakva vrsta vojnih akcija bi ova grupa mogla da izvede? U kratkom vremenskom roku nakon napada, američka vlada je odlučila da uđe u borbu protiv nekonvencionalnih i asimetričnih neprijatelja. Za Sjedinjene Američke Države (SAD), oni predstavljaju veliku, čak i stratešku pretnju bezbednosti i stoga su one najavile globalni rat protiv terorizma. Od tog momenta bilo je pokrenuto pitanje na koji način da se shvate oni koji praktikuju ovaj čudan rat? Koji su njihovi ciljevi i kakve strategije i taktike koriste da dobiju svoju borbu? Ko su oni i kakav oblik rata oni vode? U posljednje decenije, termini asimetričnost i asimetričan su postali trend u američkim strateškim i političkim naukama. Sa korišćenjem ovih termina otvaraju se probleme savremenog rata i s tim, isti su postali centralni koncepti američkog diskursa o ratu. Ratovi, neprijatelji, bitke, strategije, pristupi, opcije, izazovi, kao i mnoge druge pojave u vezi sa oružanim sukobom su označene kao asimetrične, što je predmet ovog rada.

Ključne reči: asimetrične pretnje, asimetrični sukob, asimetrično ratovanje, asimetrični neprijatelj, koncept.

* Autor je vanredni profesor na Vojnoj akademiji „Gen. Mihailo Apostolski“ u Skoplju, Republika Makedonija; e-mail: zoranjovanovski43@gmail.com.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ASYMMETRIC THREATS

Darko Trifunović*

Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: This introduction to a special issue on the theme investigates some potentially important new avenues to studying the phenomenon in the light of these trends. The use of surrogate or ‘proxy’ actors within the context of ‘irregular’ or guerrilla conflict within (or between) states constitutes a phenomenon spanning nearly the whole of recorded human military history. Yet, it is a phenomenon that has also acquired urgent contemporary relevance in the light of the general evolution of conflict in Ukraine and the Middle East. Opposing powers are usually core countries that have conflicting ideologies and interests with each other. However, a direct large-scale war between them would cause enormous damage to all belligerent powers. Therefore, they rather conduct proxy wars in developing countries in order to avoid loss and achieve some certain interests at the same time. Third parties can be local governments built or supported by opposing powers or armed forces, mercenaries and terrorist groups who could strike an opponent without leading to full-scale war. This frequently involves both countries fighting their opponent's allies, or assisting their allies in fighting their opponent. This can also emerge from independent conflicts escalating due to the intervention of external powers. Additionally, the governments of some nations, particularly liberal democracies, may choose to engage in proxy warfare (despite military superiority) when a majority of their citizens oppose declaring or entering a conventional war. Nations may also resort to proxy warfare to avoid potential negative international reactions from allied nations, profitable trading partners, or intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations.

Key words: international security, modern history, asymmetric threats, security risks, safety, proxy wars.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past 50 years, the great powers have avoided direct conflict between each other. A cold-blooded way of conducting non-direct conflicts between great powers, by the time evolved into *proxy wars*, where each super-

* galileja@yahoo.com

force tried to achieve something for itself through other parties in the conflict. Their activities were mainly aimed at provoking conflicts and supporting conflicting sides, and this all is reflected on the interests of a super-force. That psychological propaganda and its operations aimed at distracting and even making the unattractive idea of communism from the citizens of the state (good example for this are the United States).⁴⁷ Great forces will strive to avoid direct confrontation in the future, and many parts of the world will become battlefields for proxy wars.

In most cases, these conflicts are driven by the tendency of domination and the pursuit of interests, in particular control over resources and energy, various forms of communication, as well as the realization of other political interests. In order to understand properly contemporary relationships and processes between the participants of international security and its threats, it is necessary to analyze all developments and trends in modern history. Modern history can be divided into different phases, which are in a way very diverse, and sometimes even radical, while at the same time in different parts of the world extremely dynamic. Understanding the historical phases and key events that characterized them implies great knowledge from different fields of science.

For the modern history of the world, the following stages are very important:

- *First phase* - from 1947 to 1991 - The Cold War phase (according to the opinion of some scientists, the Cold War started in 1917).⁴⁸
- *Second Phase* – from 1991 to 2008 – Stage of consolidation of the world major powers.
- *Third Phase* – from 2008 to date – Stage of Defining the postmodern world.

Undoubtedly, the third phase is causing great concern and instability in international relations, thanks to the turbulent events that carry the consequences of the conflict of large and regional super powers. The practice of delaying resolution, and not facing the problem, especially when it comes to world organizations with mandates to solve problems such as UN or the EU, has brought the reality to the absurdity. This is related mostly to the UN, which in many crises was ineffective. The statement that the UN is ineffective

⁴⁷ Carl J. Jensen, III, David H., *Introduction to Intelligence Studies*, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, US, 2012, p. 26.

⁴⁸ Dominik George Nargele, *Endless Cold War*, Author House, Bloomington In, US, 2009, p.1.

means that all UN member states were in fact powerless to solve some of the world's biggest issues effectively. How is that possible? The accumulated global and local crises that are left without long lasting solutions, inevitably lead to violation of international security and to the collapse of the socio-political order of the modern world. With the disappearance of the USSR, the bloc's division of the world lost its significance. During that period, each side had clear goals and each made its allies aware of who the enemy is, how to deal with the enemy and how to prevent hazards. With the disappearance of the bloc's divisions, the world came in a relatively unclear consolidation of great powers despite the fact that only one remained the winner of the Cold war (the United States of America and NATO Alliance). With the victory in the Cold War, NATO not only won a 'clean victory', but it also liberated the nations and countries of Eastern Europe that were detained by the USSR⁴⁹. At the same time, Russia became a member of the PFP (Partnership for Peace) and permanent council NATO-Russia was established⁵⁰.

ASYMMETRIC THREATS

Asymmetric threats are increasingly prevalent in the post-modern world. As a result of rapid scientific-technological development, the use of sophisticated technical and technological achievements, and at the same time as a result of conscious avoidance of direct conflicts of great super powers we have this predominant phenomenon. Asymmetric threats are more often referred to non-traditional threats such as terrorism, organized crime, artificial provoked crises, ethnic conflicts, or even hybrid threats that are more complex than any other is.

Traditionally, the term asymmetric threat comprises six different forms of threats: nuclear, chemical, biological, information operation, operational concept and terrorism.⁵¹

The asymmetric threats themselves have experienced their transition over time, which can be seen from Figure 1.

⁴⁹ Sebastian Mayer, *NATO's Post-Cold War Politics: The Changing Provision of Security*, Springer, 2014.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Kenneth F. McKenzie, *The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR*, DIANE Publishing, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington D.C.US. 2000, p. 19.

20th Century	vs	21st Century
The Good War – WWII	vs	The Longest War – Iraq
MAD Strategy	vs	Undefined Strategy
War/Military	vs	Conflict/Non-Military
Nation-State Wars	vs	Cell Conflicts
Generals’/Admirals’ Wars	vs	Sergeants’ Wars
Combat Power	vs	Influence the Population
DoD Superior Technology	vs	Will, Time, Determination
Think Order of Battle	vs	Think in Terms of Enemy’s Culture/Ideals
Maneuver Space (Battlefield)	vs	Population/Urban Space (More People in Cities)
Military Victory, Rebuild	vs	Hearts & Minds Victory, Nation-Building
Sequential Process (In Phases)	vs	Parallel Processes (All Phases at Once)
Physical Defeat/Victory	vs	Ideological Defeat/New Ideals
Regulated Warfare	vs	Unregulated Warfare
Unconditional Surrender	vs	Negotiated Peace (Limited Objectives)
One Moral High Ground	vs	Multiple Moral High Grounds
War of Military Might	vs	War of Ideas
Courage, Commitment, Rejection	vs	Fear, Apathy, Support
Ex-Urban Scattered Population	vs	Urban Clustering & Megacities

Figure 1: Evolution of the Asymmetrical Threat Environment: Twentieth to Twenty-First Century⁵²

Actually, the term *asymmetric threat* is inextricably linked with the term *asymmetric warfare*. In order to understand this term better, we will distinguish some of its most important characteristics:

1. The disparity of interests;
2. The asymmetric approach is present at all three levels of warfare, but it is focused on achieving strategic goals.

It is interesting to note that in 2006, the US Department of Defense incorporated it into its 4th generation of warfare strategic plans, in which the following four types of threats were identified: irregular, traditional or conventional, mass destruction and reconnaissance (criminal / terrorist).⁵³ How

⁵² DealingWith Today’s Asymmetric Threat to U.S. and Global Security, https://www.asymmetricthreat.net/docs/asymmetric_threat_1_paper.pdf Retrieved 07.06.2017

⁵³ Douglas Lovelace, *Hybrid Warfare and the Gray Zone Threat*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY.2016.p. 63.

quickly the approach to this matter is rapidly changing can be seen from the fact that only four years later a new division of threats was made: conventional, hybrid and non-conventional threats.⁵⁴

In this fourth generation of warfare, it is pointed out that the whole world is in a new era of warfare. The first generation of warfare was characterized by a huge dominance in manpower. The second generation of warfare was characterized by great firepower. The third generation of warfare was known for tactical manoeuvres and movement of troops. The fourth generation of warfare was characterized by the use of all instruments of power, not only military, but also all those strategies and methods that would lead to the victory over the enemy and over their decision makers.⁵⁵

The asymmetrical way of warfare involves examining the important weaknesses of the opponent in order to focus its attention on the exact weakness. In case when the opponent is technically, technologically and numerically superior, possible weakness can be compensated. In such situation, unconventional methods of warfare might be used, sometimes including terrorism, guerrilla warfare, as well as all other types of rebellion with one aim only – weakening or even destroying opponents. Unconventional warfare has become an integral part of the modern theatre of war, especially if we consider new strategic environment that requires execution of military operations by using some special methods. When it comes to guerrilla warfare, globalization and some new trends that dictate this change are easily noticed, predominantly taking place in rural areas, replacing it with secret operations and all possible aspects of unconventional warfare. Unconventional warfare also has a significant participation in psychological operations (PSYOP) undertaken against civilians in order to warp reality and reduce the capacity of the enemy to fight. Similarly, unconventional warfare involves secret or intelligence operations through irregular forces (guerrillas, terrorists) in order to support the movement of resistance, rebels or conventional military forces or just any kind of operations against the enemy.

With that purpose, the USA, although very often in a superior position in a conflict, have highly developed their capacities to lead this type of asymmetrical wars, but also at the same time to develop systems of protection for similar kind of threat for itself. It is essential to distinguish four large doctrines:

⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 57.

⁵⁵ *Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, FM 3-05.130*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, 30 September 2008, J-4, <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-130.pdf> Retrieved 23-6-2017.

1. PSYOP in Support of Diplomatic Measures,
2. PSYOP in Support of Information Measures,
3. PSYOP in Support of Military Operations,
4. PSYOP in Support of Economic Measures⁵⁶

With these doctrines, US military strategists describe the creation of an agency network that may affect the defense system of the attacked territory or country through the most important functions such as:

- Observation
- Recognition
- Decisions
- Actions




Figure 2: PSYOP model FM 3 – 05. 30⁵⁷

All four functions are crucial for performing operations or counter operations. Figure 1 describes model FM-3-05.30, where we can see how important the role of intelligence agencies in PSYOP is and that PSYOP is

⁵⁶ FM 3-05.30 MCRP 3-40.6 Psychological Operations, Headquarters No. 3-05.30 Department of the Army Washington, DC, 15 April 2005.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

very often used for unconventional and asymmetric warfare. In fact, it can be stated that asymmetry is most often used by unconventional methods of warfare. Therefore, we will distinguish the following good examples of unconventional warfare:

- Guerrilla warfare
- Psychological warfare
- Biological warfare
- Chemical warfare
- Nuclear warfare
- Mine warfare
- Sub-aquatic warfare
- Space warfare
- Electronic warfare
- Cyber warfare
- Directed-energy warfare
- Tribal warfare
- Gang warfare⁵⁸

CONTEMPORARY WORLD AND ASYMMETRIC CHALLENGES

As one of a couple of the remaining world powers that lead globalization, the USA are faced with domestic requirements towards self-isolation, stemming from the economic crisis that has largely affected the whole country. On the international level, the United States are exposed to strong criticism in the name of all NATO activities. Criticism is even coming from the Member States themselves on one side, while the obligations of that State under this alliance are not being met, which put them into a very difficult situation. An obvious example of this is the NATO intervention in Libya, where all the members who participated in this intervention rely on the initial US military power.⁵⁹

Due to this newly arisen vacuum between the NATO allies, the growing military power of China, and the demonstration of force by Russia in the war in Syria, a disorientated situation has been created, especially in the

⁵⁸ Peter Baofu, *The Future of Post-Human War and Peace: A Preface to a New Theory of Aggression and Pacificity*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, New Castle, UK, 2010, p. 6.

⁵⁹ Graeme P. Herd, John Kriendler, *Understanding NATO in the 21st Century: Alliance Strategies, Security and Global Governance*, Routledge, 2013, p. 42.

United States, which has developed a form of dissatisfaction with neoliberal politicians who were and still are actually largely paid by traditionalists.

In the UK, we have similar situation now. In the same context, we can observe the rise of Donald Trump in the United States, as well as Brexit in the UK, as the initial dramatic indication where elder native people, in the most developed parts of the world are now practically fighting against violating the Westphalian principles on which they have raised the Modern Europe we all know.⁶⁰ The entire world order is in the most dramatic times defining its postmodern postulates. It looks like Samuel Huntington's predictions happened in our reality. Huntington states that the fundamental cause of the conflict in this new world will not be ideological or economical. Due to the major divisions of mankind, the predominant source of conflict will be cultural. The nation-states will remain the most powerful players in the world, but the main conflicts of global politics will emerge between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations, as Huntington mentioned, will dominate in the global politics. Unstable demarcation between civilizations will become the battlefield of the future. Conflicts between civilizations will be the final stage in the evolution of the conflict in the modern world.⁶¹ However, Huntington himself did not understand many details of the historical development of civilizations and cultures, first of all that civilizations are formed for structural and logical reasons. Huntington did not understand that the collapse of the USSR in the 1990s was not a triumph of the West over the USSR, just triumph of Russian culture over the Soviet one.

Recovering very hard from the shock caused by dismemberment of the Soviet Union, Russia, as a continental force, tried to realize its interests through the principles of the Russian main strategy (author Alexander Dugin), that was easily adopted by President Vladimir Putin. Dugin introduced the Russian version of the doctrine - *Eurasianism* in his book published in 1997 with the title: '*Foundations of Geopolitics*'.⁶² According to Dugin, the Russian interpretation of Euro-Asianism, legacy and message of Eurasianism is of particular importance for the whole of Eurasia, starting with Western Europe. In a wider sense, Euro-Asianism can be considered as a form of continentalism for the project of creating a common space for Europe and Russia - Great Europe that spreads from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Vladimir Putin has already

⁶⁰ Randall Lesaffer, *Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One*, Cambridge University Press, 2004.p.2

⁶¹Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster, New York, NY, 1996.

⁶² Aleksandar Dugin, *Osnovygeopolitiki: geopoliticheskoyebudushceyeRossii*, Arktogeya, Moscow, Russia, 1997.

announced that this exists in his plans for Russian aspirations towards Europe.⁶³ The real aspirations of Russian geostrategists are clearly shown and understood from the fact that Europe is the focus of its attention.

With all his ideas, Dugin tried to return Russia to the geostrategic map, in a situation when the map itself dramatically changed. He is not alone with his ideas of geostrategic aspirations. The Chairman of Russian Duma, Sergei Naryshkin, during his visit to France in 2014, said that De Gaulle's ideas of Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals) are crucial to European security and that it has no alternatives. 'We remember General De Gaulle as the author of the idea of a united Europe that should spread from the Atlantic to the Urals. He had felt, like no one else, the essence of the global process that would take place in Europe at that time. His scenario of providing a secure future for Europe is up to date even now and there is no alternative. Those who are trying to stop this trend will remain thousands of miles away from Europe and will make a major historical mistake (prim. author - he was referring to the USA)'⁶⁴.

Russian aspirations towards the whole Europe, spreading even to Asia, are clearly noted, but it has been shown many times in history that this country will never give up of its European pretensions.

When it comes to the security and its architecture in Europe, it is important to mention that the Second World War ended with the defeat of Germany and its allies, and the Cold War ended with the collapse of the USSR and Russia. Although at the end of the Second World War Germany was divided and identified as participant that lost the war, its geopolitical role (when speaking of the then West Germany) was greatly enlarged even though it bordered with Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War, symbolically marked with the fall of Berlin Wall and merging of the two German states, represents a period of weakening of already defeated Russia as the successor of the USSR. At the same time, the role of East European countries in geopolitical relations has become more significant. Therefore, nowadays the gravity of attention, at least as far as the US is concerned, is focused on the countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland or other Baltic republics, because these countries border with Russia, which the United States and its NATO partners labelled as

⁶³ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism*, Aktos, London, UK, 2014.p.1 4.

⁶⁴ Anna Mahjar-Barducci, Giuseppe Ripa, *Understanding Russian Political Ideology and Vision: A Call for Eurasia, From Lisbon to Vladivostok*, MEMRI-The Middle East Media Research Institute, <https://www.memri.org/reports/understanding-russian-political-ideology-and-vision-call-eurasia-lisbon-vladivostok> Retrieved 08.06.2017.

the main threat.⁶⁵ Russia has been identified as the main threat to the US and its allies, after Russia marked the United States and its allies as the main threat.⁶⁶ We are witnessing a new conflict between NATO and Russia, but this time Russia is significantly weaker in every sense. This conflict will not lead to a fatal, nuclear showdown, but it will be conducted by all other means such as hybrid war, proxy wars, terrorism, even open confrontations on problematic territories (in which the possibility of civil war or any other ethnic conflicts is high). Europe, led by Germany as a regional power, just begins to understand the complicated reality, both globally and in the region. Europe's reaction to migrants and the refugee crisis continues and further aggravate the conflict between radical Islamists and Christian Europe. Great forces are focused on preserving their vital interests towards inferior countries or territories that are in one way or another, considered as areas of their own interests. Russia's aggression against Ukraine and Georgia will inevitably produce a NATO's counter-reaction that will be in range from diplomatic initiatives to unconventional wars. It is correct to point out that the Russian aggression on these two countries was initiated by NATO aggression. NATO did the same against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and attempted secession processes of part of Serbia's territory. In this range of interaction of super powers, it is also necessary to analyze large changes in Southeast Europe, first of all the loss of Russian positions in Montenegro, Macedonia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and increasingly in Serbia, as well as the possible current and future reaction of Russia. Almost the whole world is in various interactions of large or regional powers. Asymmetry remains a possible answer to more powerful parties in conflict.

Conflicts with elements of asymmetry are the strongest and most pronounced in most affected regions of the world, such as the Middle East and Africa. As a result of 'Arab spring' we have no more Arab modernist state. Libya, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon no longer exist, Jordan and Yemen are not far from disappearance. They are replaced by entities based on an ethnic and religious factor: Sunni-Arab Islamic Caliphate in the heart of Al-Jazeera, predominantly Alawiti, and the entity in western Syria, the Shiites on the Hezbollah land, the Maronite-Druze block, and the Shiite-Arab entity in southeast Iraq, Kurdish land. Yemen is torn between Hut, Hadhramautis and other smaller groups.

Libya is in the middle of a very violent and fratricidal fighting between tribes, clans and others who are keen to gain power. Those countries

⁶⁵ *The Pentagon's Top Threat? Russia*, The New York Times, Retrieved Feb 3, 2016 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/opinion/the-pentagons-top-threat-russia.html?_r=0.

⁶⁶ *Russia security paper designates NATO as threat*, BBC, Retrieved Dec 31, 2015 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35208636>.

will never accept to lose ‘self-control’ in favour of returning among previous unities in which they failed to succeed. Even Iran wants to change its policy and its expectations. Teheran is making an effort to consider returning to a traditional Persian view of the world and adapting its strategies. In such a concept, Iran would again become inferior to China and Russia. Also, clear lack of support from the US and EU to Turkey regarding issue of the Fethullah Gulen, can be an important indicator of Turkey's rapprochement to Russia, Iran and China.⁶⁷ The conflicts from the Middle East are spreading to other parts of the world, especially Central Asia and Africa. At the same time, Europe cannot be exempted from the spread of conflicts whose roots are in the Middle East. With recent migrant movements, as well as the ongoing migration process that has been present in Europe for the last several decades (especially in Europe), terrorist organizations like Hizbut Tahrir (with headquarters in Central Asia), regardless the fact that are banned, have expanded their network throughout Europe, Asia and Africa.⁶⁸ This terrorist organization is just one of the forerunners of the terrorist organization ISIL.

A special conflict of the Middle East exists in relations between the United States and the traditional ally of Saudi Arabia. Long-standing trial against Saudi Arabia is being conducted in the United States for the damage caused by the biggest terrorist attack in modern history from 9/11/2001. The US Senate passed a law – a precedent by which individuals can sue the state for the compensation of damages.⁶⁹ Saudi Arabia, if it is proven responsible for 9/11/2001, in the name of a compensation charge, will have to pay the trillion-dollar damage to the United States, which would actually bring this country to the edge of existence. Considering the fact that Saudi Arabia is the leading Middle Eastern country, it is also possible to expect a deterioration in the relationship between Riyadh and Washington, as well as a series of measures including regional crises that this country can organize, due to the large, political, financial and religious power.

In Africa, the key secessionist crises in Eritrea and South Sudan (successful), then Biafra, Darfur and Somalia (not successful), only scattered ideas about the changing postcolonial borders. The traditional influence of

⁶⁷ Barin Kayaoğlu, Willem Th. Oosterveld, Rob de Rave, Nicholas Farnham, *A Farewell to the West? Turkey's Possible Pivot in the Aftermath of the July 2016 Coup Attempt*, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, The Hague, Netherland, 2017, p. 11.

⁶⁸ Katerina Dalacoura, *Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2011 p. 60.

⁶⁹ *Congress Votes to Override Obama Veto on 9/11 Victims Bill*, *New York Times*, September 28, 2016. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/us/politics/senate-votes-to-override-obama-veto-on-9-11-victims-bill.html> Retrieved 21-06-2017.

colonial forces interweaves with the influence of new forces in a constant race for ore, minerals and energy sources. It is of great importance to control major roads that pass not only the land, but also sea. People who live in certain territories are often in the focus of attention of large and regional powers. Conflicts within these communities, as well as conflicts with other communities in the region are used to achieve different goals and strategies that usually involve asymmetrical and unconventional ways of warfare. Entering into fourth phase of defining the modern world, if political processes are not prioritized over conflicts, terrible bloodshed will continue throughout South Asia, in the wider Middle East as well as across Africa. Europe is currently safe as far as bloodshed is concerned, however, countries such as France, Belgium, Germany or the United Kingdom will face the attacks, as well as the potential threat of terrorist attacks (that will be led by radical Islamists).

Large cities of Western Europe, such as London, Paris, Brussels, Berlin, Madrid and Copenhagen, have become targets of terrorist attacks. Likewise, terrorists attacked the East Europe, from Moscow to Istanbul, as well as the Southeast of Europe, where small towns such as Zvornik (Republic of Srpska), Kumanovo (in Macedonia) represented an easy target. The biggest paradox of nowadays history is recognition of independent Kosovo from the “international community”. It is very well known that UCK was marked from the United States at the beginning of the conflict as a terrorist organization with an unquestionable record of violence of all forms, including terrorism, the removal and smuggling of human organs, the erosion of Christian churches and now have proven connections with Islamic fundamentalists.⁷⁰

Not only large cities of Western Europe became easy targets, but also they represent the biggest sources of terrorism, known as ‘safe havens’. In fact, there is no greater city in the Western Europe which has ten or more active ‘cells’ of Islamic fundamentalists, because Muslim population in the last few decades actively inhabited major European capitals. Thus, for example, Paris has been linked to the acts of Al Qa’ida Alnusra, Islamic countries, Al-AQSA Martyrs’ Brigade, Boko Haram, Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahedin (al-Shabaab), Jamaat Ansar Al Mehdi, Dhamat Houmet Daawa Salafia, Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), Islamic Salvation Army, Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, Islamic Jihad (Holy War), Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA), Armed Islamic Group (Algeria), Groupe Islamique Combatant Marocain (Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group – GICM from Morocco), Hamas, Hizballah and other terrorist organizations of

⁷⁰ *The Kosovo Liberation Army: Does Clinton Policy Support Group with Terror, Drug Ties?* From 'Terrorists' to 'Partners', United States Republican Policy Committee, March 31, 1999, <https://web.archive.org/web/20080517121236/http://www.senate.gov/~rpc/releases/1999/fr033199.htm> Retrieved 21-6-2017

Islamic fundamentalists. Regardless of what kind of intelligence security system France has and how much effort they put in it, if a terrorist organization is operating in the territory of the country, it represents a serious threat to national security.




Figure 3: Global Terrorism Database⁷¹

Justifiably, some questions arise: what if several terrorist organizations operate on the territory of one country, ready to act at any moment? Is there a system or security force that can protect this country and its citizens? The answer is simple – no. Intelligence – security services, due to incorrect operation and neoliberal principles of the EU itself, neglected problem of Islamic fundamentalists and continue to follow the political practice when a problem occurs – simply just swept it under the carpet.

Their mistakes were paid by the innocent citizens of those countries. Please find statistics in the Figure 3.

This is exactly what happened. Intelligence and security services of Western countries have failed to understand and process the threats that directly threatened the security of their countries. Due to such situation, they did not even get a chance to meet with legislators, so that they could bring a

⁷¹ *People Killed by Terrorism per Year in Western Europe 1970-2015*, <http://www.datagraver.com/case/people-killed-by-terrorism-per-year-in-western-europe-1970-2015> Retrieved 6-21-2017

series of laws and other acts with only one aim – to suppress the activities of Islamic fundamentalists. Despite the facts and all the evidences that terrorist attacks were led by Islamic fundamentalists (as it was indicated in Figure 3), Europe has no effective security policy up to date, or certain laws to protect itself from this evil and all harm it brings.

CONCLUSION

Some massive changes has happened in our recent history, such as the exit of Great Britain from the EU, arrival of Donald Trump on the political throne in the United States, as well as the polarization of societies within the EU. All of this tremendously changed the political and security approach to new challenges. In addition to all other conflicts on the horizon now, there is also a cultural war and it will change the approach to the defence philosophy in the future. Modern civilization will have to face a complete reorganization of society. However, to be honest, it does not need only reorganization, but also a very radical change. The causes of new conflicts will be located in opposite corners of those who ruled during and after the Cold War. The conflicts that arose in the post-Cold War era were between geopolitical forces, not between civilizations. Often, the conflicted parties shared the same or similar civilization values, but participants came from very different cultural environments. Recognizing these global trends, politicians as well as security experts must strive to give priority to political processes rather than war and other similar destructions. This should be done no matter whether we face direct confrontations (symmetrical conflicts) or asymmetric ones (with the use of unconventional methods of warfare). They will have to change the entire philosophy of defence, taking into account that in this modern world, there are new threats and security risks arising from unconventional methods of warfare.

Special attention must be paid to both the executors and masterminds and all those who support various forms of violence in order to pursue their goals. This is essential when it comes to guerrilla, partisan, insurgent, subversive, resistance, terrorist, revolutionary, and similar organizations and methods. Irregular activities include acts of military, political, psychological, and economic nature, conducted predominately by inhabitants of a nation for the purpose of eliminating or weakening the authority of the local government, or occupying power and using primarily irregular and informal groupings and measures⁷².

⁷² *FM 3-05.30 MCRP 3-40.6 Psychological Operations*, Headquarters No. 3-05.30 Department of the Army Washington, DC, 15 April 2005, J 2, <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-130.pdf> Retrieved 6-23-2017.

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MEĐUNARODNA BEZBEDNOST I ASIMETRIČNE PRETNJE

Darko Trifunović*

Fakultet bezbednosti, Univerzitet u Beogradu,
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Ovaj uvod u posebnu problematiku predmetne teme istražuje neke potencijalno važne nove načine proučavanja ovog fenomena u svetlu ovih trendova. Upotreba surogata ili „proksi“ aktera u kontekstu „iregularnog“ ili gerilskog sukoba unutar (ili između) država predstavlja fenomen koji se odnosi na gotovo čitavu zabeleženu vojnu istoriju čovečanstva. Ipak, to je fenomen koji je u akteulnom vremenu dobio izuzetan značaj u svetlu opšteg razvoja sukoba u Ukrajini i na Bliskom istoku. Konfrotirane sile su obično ključne zemlje koje imaju suprostavljene ideologije i interese. Međutim, neposredni rat velikih razmera između njih bi izazvao ogromnu štetu svim sukobljenim silama. Stoga oni radije vode „proksi ratove“ u zemljama u razvoju kako bi izbegli gubitak i istovremeno ostvarili određene interese. Treće strane u sukobu mogu biti lokalne vlade, postavljene ili podržane od strane suprotstavljenih sila ili oružanih snaga, plaćenika i terorističkih grupa koje bi mogle da napadnu protivnika bez vođenja rata. To najčešće uključuje zemlje koje se bore protiv protivnikovih saveznika ili pomažu svojim saveznicima u borbi protiv protivnika. Takva situacija se može pojaviti i unutar nezavisnih sukoba koje su eskalirale zbog intervencije spoljnih sila. Pored toga, vlade nekih naroda, naročito liberalnih demokratija, mogu odlučiti da se angažuju u „proksi ratovima“ (uprkos vojnoj superiornosti) kada se većina njihovih građana protive ulasku u konvencionalni rat. Države takođe mogu pribegavati „proksi ratovima“ radi izbegavanja potencijalnih negativnih međunarodnih reakcija od saveznih zemalja, profitabilnih trgovinskih partnera ili međuvladinih organizacija kao što su Ujedinjene nacije.

Ključne reči: međunarodna sigurnost, moderna istorija, asimetrične prijetnje, bezbednosni rizici, bezbednost, proksi ratovi.

* galileja@yahoo.com

**DE-TERMINOLOGIZATION OF *ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE*:
METALEXICOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF THE TERM IN
LEARNER MONOLINGUAL DICTIONARIES OF ENGLISH**

Valentina Rapajić*

Military Academy, University of Defence
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: When an entity designated by a scientific or specialist term becomes distinctly important in a language community, it becomes appropriated (with its original semantic composition, or modified to various extents) by the sufficient number of speakers, which in turn leads to its incorporation into the general lexicon of the language. This process, known as de-terminologization, is evidenced by the inclusion of the term in descriptive, non-specialist, general dictionaries of the language. If in addition to this, the term is recorded in pedagogical dictionaries, the entity is deemed to be part of the language community discourse to such an extent that it is recommended for acquisition by language learners. Through metalexicographic analysis of the entries for *asymmetrical warfare* in eight major dictionaries of English, this paper aims to establish the degree of its de-terminologization.

Key words: asymmetrical warfare, English, metalexicographic analysis, de-terminologization.

INTRODUCTION: TERMS AND DE-TERMINOLOGIZATION

Lexicon, the stock of words in any language, has units⁷³ that are known and used by members of the language community in everyday situations, and those that are used in specialist fields (such as sciences, industries, crafts), called terms. “A term is any conventional symbol representing a concept defined in a subject field.” (Felber, 1984: 1) The lexical units considered in this paper are presumed to be military terms, and investigation reveals that they are, with one exception⁷⁴. The main purpose of

* valentinrapajic@yahoo.co.uk

⁷³ The units of lexicon, or *lexical units*, can be simple or composite; the same is true of terms (e.g. *company*, *battle group*).

⁷⁴ Comments are due regarding the items situated at the top and the bottom of the lexicographic presence list, shown below in Table 1. While undoubtedly a term, with one meaning listed in 6 dictionaries, as well as in DoD DMAT, *terrorism* has 3 meanings in CED and 2 meanings in WNWCD, very closely related. To be a term, a lexical sequence has to be a lexical item, a unit

this study is, however, to determine the extent of their de-terminologization, which signals the relevance they have for speakers of English in their universe of discourse.

The *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* does not contain the phrase *asymmetrical warfare*, but it defines *asymmetric*⁷⁵: “In military operations the application of dissimilar strategies, tactics, capabilities, and methods to circumvent or negate an opponent’s strengths while exploiting his weaknesses”. Thus a provision is made for nouns modified by this adjective (*war, conflict, threat*) to be treated as terminological phrases. In this paper the noun *warfare* is selected as the nominal constituent of the terminological phrase, because it is precisely this lexical unit that is recorded in major non-specialist dictionaries of English⁷⁶.

De-terminologization is the process in which terms from expert domains start inhabiting everyday discourse. Meyer and Mackintosh define de-terminologization as a process whereby a term “transcends the boundaries of expert language and starts to be used by the general public” (Meyer and Mackintosh, 2000: 111). According to them, a lexical unit that has a fixed meaning within a limited specialist domain can become part of the general vocabulary when it gains the attention of the general public.

Writing about computer terms, Meyer explains that many of them become de-terminologized because “(...) computers are central to our everyday lives. (...) We cannot help adopting words such as *surfing, downloading, desktop,* and *email* because we are faced with these concepts daily. Other computer words, in contrast, such as *virtual reality*, may become extremely popular even though they are not at all part of our daily experience – *virtual*, for example (...). [I]t appears that certain computer concepts capture the attention of the media and general public, probably because of exciting future applications.” (Meyer, 2000: 46)

Specialist terms enter the general vocabulary when their referents become part of daily experience for the members of a language community, or when they capture collective attention and become prominent in communication, whether or not directly experienced by most speakers of the language.

of lexicon. The lexical sequence *nuclear warfare* will be shown to have a questionable status of a term, with lexicographic evidence suggesting that it is rather a free phrase (see Tables 1 and 2).

⁷⁵ The form *asymmetric* is typical of North American English, while the form *asymmetrical* is typical of British English.

⁷⁶ These dictionaries are the *Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary*, the *Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners* (learner dictionaries), and the *Collins English Dictionary* (a general dictionary).

Two de-terminologized lexical items will suffice here as examples. In the military context, *the vanguard* means “the part of an army or navy that leads a battle” (MEDAL); “the soldiers, ships, etc., that are at the front of a fighting force that is moving forward” (MWLD). In everyday usage, however, it means “the people who introduce and develop new ways of thinking, new technologies etc.” (MEDAL); “the group of people who are the leaders of an action or movement in society, politics, art, etc.” (MWLD). In both learner dictionaries quoted here (the former British, the latter American), the military-related meaning is listed as secondary. In the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, the vanguard is not listed at all. An example of a fully de-terminologized term is *guerrilla*, a lexical item recorded in eight dictionaries, that designates “a member of an irregular usually politically motivated armed force that combats stronger regular forces, such as the army or police” (CED); “[a] member of a small independent group taking part in irregular fighting, typically against larger regular forces” (OALD). This noun can be used as a modifier, which renders *guerrilla warfare* (recorded as a lexical unit with its own entry only in OALD and CED), or *guerrilla force* (recorded in DoD DMAT). However, as a modifier, guerrilla often refers to “actions or activities performed in an impromptu way, often without authorization” (OALD). Not only does *guerrilla* modifying various nouns acquire metaphorical meanings⁷⁷, but the word itself has a specialized meaning (in biology) developed through metaphoric extension: “a form of vegetative spread in which the advance is from several individual rhizomes or stolons growing rapidly away from the centre, as in some clovers” (CED). Among the lexical item considered here, only the de-terminologization of *terrorism* can be compared to that of *guerrilla*. No other lexical items discussed here are fully de-terminologized, in no small part due to their

⁷⁷ Examples are: *guerrilla art*: “Unconventional art created (often anonymously) in public spaces, usually conveying a social or political message; street art.” (OALD); *guerrilla financing*: “the use of unconventional and marginally legal means to capitalize enterprises (CED); *guerrilla gardening*: “the activity of growing plants or vegetables on any piece of land in a city that you do not own, especially land that is in bad condition because it has not been used for a long time. People do this so that cities will have more green areas and be better places to live.” (LDOCE); *guerrilla gig*: “an impromptu musical performance in an unlikely public space, such as an underground train or on the roof of a building, organized by text-message communication between the band and its fans” (CED); *guerrilla knitting*: “The action or activity of covering objects or structures in public places with decorative knitted or crocheted material, as a form of street art.” (OALD); *guerrilla marketing*: “marketing (=the activity of deciding how to advertise a product, what price to charge for it etc) that uses new, clever, and unusual methods to sell a product, rather than spending a lot of money to sell it” (LDOCE); *guerrilla theater*: “a form of propaganda or political protest in which a group of activists perform satirical skits, sing songs, engage in playful pranks, etc. in the midst of a public event or activity” (WNWCD).

composite morphosyntactic structure, but some of them exhibit evidence of tendencies towards de-terminologization. Based on the combined criteria of the items' lexicographic presence and the number of microstructural lexicographic features that describe them, they are deemed to be moderately de-terminologized (*germ warfare, psychological warfare, chemical warfare, biological warfare, trench warfare*), approaching de-terminologization (*asymmetrical warfare, cyberwarfare, information warfare, guerrilla warfare*), and showing no evidence of de-terminologization (*hybrid warfare, nuclear warfare*).

METALEXICOGRAPHIC DATA

The status of *asymmetrical warfare* (and several other lexical items related to it formally or semantically) in the general lexicon is studied in this paper by exploring the presence and aspects of lexicographic description in dictionary entries for these items. In this paper, a metalexigraphic analysis is performed comparing data from eight monolingual dictionaries of English⁷⁸. A specialized dictionary of military terms was used to check the terminological status of the items studied, and was not included in the metalexigraphic analysis. Since the eight dictionaries are based on English corpora (collections of digitalized text, searchable by various criteria), it may be claimed that not only the expert compilers' intuition is taken into account, but also the facts concerning naturally occurring language data (although the corpora design and the selection of data to be included in entries ultimately rests upon the experts).

To determine the level of determinologization for *asymmetric warfare*, the lexicographic status of this term is compared to the statuses of terms comparable in form and meaning. A list of terms generated following the criterion of formal resemblance with *asymmetric warfare* includes the following terms in alphabetical order: *biological warfare, chemical warfare, cyber warfare, germ warfare, information warfare, nuclear warfare, psychological warfare, and trench warfare*. The formal resemblance criterion is obvious: all terms are composite, with the component *warfare* occurring in each. An attempt to generate a list of terms semantically related to *asymmetric warfare*, yielded one result: *terrorism*.

⁷⁸ OALD, LDOCE, CCAED, CALD, and MEDAL are major British learner dictionaries (Prčić, 2005). Since the CollinsCOBUILD lexicographic portal provides information on CED and WNWD, although general purpose dictionaries, they were also used in this study. The only representative of American learner dictionaries is MWLD, as it is the only one that is comparable in quality with British competition. Lew makes this point clear, recommending British-published dictionaries of American English (Lew 2011).

Elements of lexicographic microstructure (or in plain terms, the kind of information in dictionary entries) that are provided for the lexical items discussed here (but not in all dictionaries and not for all items) include the definition, illustration, corpus examples, pronunciation, grammatical information, etymology, frequency, information on semantic field members, information on usage, semantically related words (synonyms and/or antonyms) and collocations.

The lexical items discussed here are not described in dictionaries in terms of polysemy, derivation and composition, as well as participation in idioms. Being (primarily) terms, they are characteristically monosemantic, and they typically do not have or develop multiple meanings; this propriety precludes their participation in idioms, which would require metaphoric extension of meaning. With the exception of *terrorism*, they are composite (composed of two lexical units), and therefore not suitable bases for derivation (the formation of other words by affixation). As composite units they can themselves constitute a component of a larger unit (e.g. *information warfare outcome*), but such resulting forms are free phrases, and not units of lexicon.

The presence of a lexical item in a dictionary, however, turns out not to be a straightforward matter. A lexical item may be used to illustrate frequent combinations of the word that the dictionary entry is about. For instance, there is no entry for *psychological warfare* in MWLD, but this term is found and explained, and even illustrated, in the entry for the adjective *psychological* under one its two meanings listed in the dictionary. On the other hand, *germ warfare* has its own entry in the aforementioned dictionary, but no definition, illustration, or any other kind of description other than the fact that it is a synonym for *biological warfare*.

It does not suffice, therefore, simply to record the lexical item's presence in the dictionary as evidence for it being part of general English lexicon, i.e. being de-terminologized. The depth of its description should also be represented. Assuming that the item has its own entry and a definition (the explanation of its meaning), it still does not guarantee lexicographic illustration⁷⁹, the element of the lexicographic microstructure that represents further evidence for the relevance of the item for the general user or learner of the language. Entries provide data on pronunciation and grammatical properties⁸⁰ of the headword⁸¹, but it is not necessarily so for all the lexical

⁷⁹ Lexicographic illustration is a sentence or a phrase in which a lexical item is used. The purpose of illustrations in learner dictionaries is to show the item in context. The illustration may signal grammatical properties, lexical combinatorial affinity, stylistic value, etc.

⁸⁰ For example, all lexical items under discussion here are uncountable nouns.

items discussed here.⁸² Examples from the corpora used in the compilation of the dictionary are further evidence of the lexical items' relevance. Corpus examples come from real-life recorded usage of lexical items in the press, fiction, transcribed lectures, everyday conversations, and other sources.

Data on origin and frequency are further indicators of the lexical items' relevance: the former because the item's etymology is seen as conducive to better understanding of the word, and the latter because, self-evidently, the higher the frequency of an item, the greater the presence of it in general English lexicon. Listing synonyms and antonyms, on the other hand, depends both on their presence in the lexical paradigm and on the compilers' judgment of the significance of the lexical item.

Since all lexical items listed here refer to the thematic domain of armed conflict, it does not surprise that members of the semantic field are also listed. This element of lexicographic microstructure is variously termed (most often *Thesaurus*, or less technically, *Related topics*).

Labels of usage signify that not only is the item's usage present in non-specialist English, but there are some nuances of which language users should be aware. If information on collocations is supplied, it means that the item is frequent enough, or specialized enough⁸³, in general lexicon that it has developed lexical preferences, i.e. that it is conspicuously used with some words more frequently than with others.

Table 1 shows presence of *asymmetrical warfare* and related terms in the eight dictionaries consulted in this study, as well as the number of lexicographic features that describe them.

⁸¹ The headword is the word or a phrase that the dictionary entry is about. The dictionary entry itself can be viewed as a story about a word (or a phrase).

⁸² Lack of information on pronunciation may be attributed to the compilers' assessment that dictionary users are most likely familiar with the pronunciation of both constituents of the composite item, especially if the constituents are highly frequent items themselves.

⁸³ For example, *X warfare/attack/threat* points to the thematic domain, a feature that is to be expected with de-terminologized terms.

Table 1: The presence of asymmetrical warfare and related terms in dictionaries and depth of their description

Term	Number of dictionaries in which the item is recorded (in its own entry or in another item's entry)	Number of lexicographic features that describe the (possibly de-terminologized) items
<i>terrorism</i>	8	11 features
<i>germ warfare</i>		7 features
<i>psychological warfare</i>		7 features
<i>chemical warfare</i>	7	6 features
<i>biological warfare</i>	6	7 features
<i>trench warfare</i>	5	7 features
<i>asymmetrical warfare</i>	3	6 features
<i>cyberwarfare</i> (2) <i>cyber warfare</i> (1)		5 features
<i>information warfare</i>		4 features
<i>guerrilla warfare</i>	2	5 features
<i>hybrid warfare</i>	1	2 features
<i>nuclear warfare</i>	1	1 features

As can be seen in Table 1, the numbers of dictionaries in which the lexical items discussed here are recorded form a sequence broken between *trench warfare* and *asymmetrical warfare*. For the purposes of this study, this can be taken as a cut-off point on the scale of the lexicographic presence of the terms in non-specialist dictionaries. Although situated in the lower half of the scale, recorded in only 3 out of 8 dictionaries, *asymmetrical warfare* significantly tops the group of terms with the same lexicographic presence,

being described by most features.⁸⁴ The top and the bottom of the scale are occupied by a fully de-terminologized item (*terrorism*), recorded in all dictionaries consulted for the purposes of this study, and described in terms of all types of lexicographic information considered here⁸⁵, and a lexical item whose status not only as a term but also as a unit of lexicon is questionable (*nuclear warfare*), recorded only in WNWCD, as an illustration for one of the meanings of *nuclear*, with a definition concerning rather the meaning of *nuclear* when associated with *warfare*, and without its own entry⁸⁶. The next lowest positioned item is *hybrid warfare*, recorded in one dictionary, with its own entry containing a definition and (minimal) grammatical information.

The clear-cut cases at the extreme ends of this particular lexicographic presence scale make the positioning of *asymmetrical warfare* seemingly straightforward: location in the lower half of the scale indicates relatively weak de-terminologization. However, *asymmetrical warfare* is not only described by more features than 2 other terms sharing the same position on the lexicographic presence scale, but it is described by the same number of features as two terms in the upper half of the scale.

Presence in dictionaries alone cannot be taken as the only measure of de-terminologization. A closer look at the type of information provided in the dictionaries for each of the lexical items considered introduces another criterion for metalexigraphic assessment of de-terminologization.

⁸⁴ There are 3 other lexical items recorded in fewer dictionaries: *guerilla warfare*, recorded in 2 dictionaries; and *hybrid warfare* and *nuclear warfare*, recorded in one dictionary each.

⁸⁵ For example, *terrorism* has related forms, such as *terrorist* (noun) and *terrorist* (adjective), but this feature was not considered here because all other terms, being composite, are not expected to have related words or idioms included in their entries.

⁸⁶ Unlike *asymmetrical warfare*, not listed in DoD DMAT as a phrase, but with *asymmetric* listed, and with 3 dictionaries recording *asymmetrical warfare* as an item, DoD DMAT lists *nuclear incident*, but not *nuclear warfare*. This brings to question the status of *nuclear warfare* even as a term: it may be interpreted as a free phrase. A further comment is due here. Lexicographic evidence, or rather the lack of it, concerning *nuclear warfare* gives some insight into the way the idea of a nuclear conflict is reflected in language, in this case the English language. Although dictionaries list numerous collocations, such as *nuclear war/attack/strike/weapon/bomb/missile*, with one dictionary (OALD) actually providing an entry for *nuclear war*, *nuclear warfare* is strangely absent from all dictionaries consulted but one (WNWCD), where it is an illustration for one of the meanings of *nuclear*. The status of a lexical unit is acknowledged for *nuclear war* by one dictionary, and for *nuclear warfare* by none. The semantic difference between *war* and *warfare* may be the reason. Whereas *war* can designate an event or a state of affairs, *warfare* foregrounds the methods and weapons used. Perhaps it is close to impossible, or completely impossible, to think of a nuclear conflict as a lasting effort, or as anything other than instantaneous annihilation of our world.

Table 2: Types of lexicographic information provided in dictionaries for asymmetrical warfare and related terms⁸⁷

Term	E	D	GI	P	I	CE	SFM	F	O	L	C	S/A
<i>terrorism</i>	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
<i>germ warfare</i>	√	√	√	√	√	√	√					√
<i>psychological warfare</i>	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√				
<i>chemical warfare</i>	√	√	√	√		√	√		√			
<i>biological warfare</i>	√	√	√	√	√	√	√				√	
<i>trench warfare</i>	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√				
<i>asymmetrical warfare</i>	√	√	√	√		√	√	√				
<i>cyberwarfare</i>	√	√	√	√	√	√						
<i>information warfare</i>	√	√	√		√				√			
<i>guerrilla warfare</i>	√	√	√		√	√		√				
<i>hybrid warfare</i>	√	√	√									
<i>nuclear warfare</i>		√										

⁸⁷ E – entry, D – definition, GI – grammatical information, P – pronunciation, I – illustration, CE – corpus examples, SFM – semantic field members, F – frequency, O – origin, L – label, C – collocations, S/A – synonyms/antonyms

DISCUSSION

Canonical types of information that describe lexical items in their entries are: definition (abbreviated D; the explanation of the meaning), grammatical information (abbreviated GI; all lexical items considered here are uncountable nouns), and pronunciation (abbreviated P; online dictionaries provide this type of information in the form of an audio file, phonetic transcription, or both). As can be seen in Table 1, all items in the lexical presence scale, down to *cyberwarfare* (recorded in 3 out of 8 dictionaries), are described by these three features.

Linguistic illustration (I), that puts a lexical item in the context of a sentence or a phrase, if present, immediately follows the definition. Table 1 shows that it is not provided for all lexical items in the dictionaries that record them. The item *asymmetrical warfare* is among those that are not illustrated. Lack of lexicographic information does not necessarily signal lack of relevance: besides *asymmetrical warfare*, as well as *hybrid warfare* and *nuclear warfare* (positioned at the bottom of the lexicographic presence scale), the term *chemical warfare* is also not illustrated, although situated much higher on the scale.

Electronic dictionaries utilize the flexibility of display⁸⁸, abundance of data and the possibility of cross-linking data, to provide corpus examples (CE) in addition to illustrations, as well as other lexical items in the same semantic field (SFM – semantic field members). Both types of information are provided for *asymmetrical warfare*. Interestingly, semantic member fields are provided for none of the items below *asymmetrical warfare* (and there are five of them) on the lexicographic presence scale.

Frequency (F) shows how often a lexical item occurs in the corpus that informs the compilation of a dictionary. Most learner dictionaries today provide this information for frequent words, because the likelihood is high for language learners to come across them, and indications of high frequency actually signal to language learners that the items are worth paying attention to. Absence of data on frequency means that the lexical item is rare. Interestingly, frequency-related information is provided for fewer than half of the terms studied here; *asymmetrical warfare* is among them⁸⁹.

⁸⁸ Both corpus examples and semantic field members can be hidden or displayed, depending on what the dictionary users' need at any given moment: a general overview of information regarding a lexical item, or detailed insight into it.

⁸⁹ CED notes that *asymmetrical warfare* is in the lower 50% of commonly used words in the dictionary; but it is still among commonly used words.

The origin of the lexical (O) item may or may not be deemed relevant to language users, and therefore included in the entry or left out of it. This information is provided for three terms only (*terrorism*, *chemical warfare*, and *information warfare*).

Labels of usage (L) may concern the variety of English (e.g. British English or North American English), stylistic value (formal, informal, humorous, offensive), domain (military, medicine, law), or connotation. It is the connotation of disapproval that is stated as a label for the usage of *terrorism*. It is at the same time the only label provided for any of the items considered here. Interestingly, none of them are labeled as military, which in itself is an indication of de-terminologization.

Collocations (C) are words typically used with the lexical item in the entry. The only two items for which this information is provided are *terrorism*⁹⁰ and *biological warfare*⁹¹.

Information on synonyms/antonyms (S/A) can be provided for a lexical item only if it has them; this does not necessarily imply that if the item has them, they will be stated. This type of information is provided for two terms: the antonym *counterterrorism* for *terrorism*, and the synonym *biological warfare* for *germ warfare*⁹².

CONCLUSION

In sum, although recorded in fewer than half of the consulted dictionaries, all canonical types of lexicographic information (definition, grammatical information, pronunciation) are provided for *asymmetrical warfare*, which is true of all terms in the upper half of the scale, and only one other term (*cyberwarfare*) positioned below *asymmetrical warfare* in the scale. Besides, *asymmetrical warfare* is described by three other parameters characteristic of terms recorded in more dictionaries and thus considered more de-terminologized. Although illustration, an optional type of information, is not provided for *asymmetrical warfare*, three more types of information are: semantic field members, corpus examples, and frequency. It can therefore be

⁹⁰ Adjectives *international*, *global*, and *political* frequently modify the noun *terrorism*. Verbs *fight* and *combat* frequently have the noun *terrorism* as their object.

⁹¹ In one of the dictionaries, the collocations *biological weapons/warfare/attack* actually take up the position of the headword (the word that the entry is about).

⁹² However, provision of synonyms is not reciprocal: dictionaries do not provide *germ warfare* as a synonym for *biological warfare*. Synonymy is rare in terminology, yet two items in the small set of terms with the constituent *warfare* are synonyms.

concluded that according to metalexigraphic evidence, the term *asymmetrical warfare* is almost half-way to full de-terminologization.

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DICTIONARIES

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3. (CED) Collins English Dictionary, <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english>.
4. (DoD DMAT) Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf.
5. (LDOCE) Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, <http://www.ldoceonline.com>.
6. (MEDAL) Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners, <http://www.macmillandictionary.com>.
7. (MWLD) Merriam-Webster's Learner's Dictionary, <http://learnersdictionary.com>.

8. (OALD) Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com>.
9. (WNWCD) Webster's New World College Dictionary, <http://websters.yourdictionary.com>.

**DE-TERMINOLOGIZACIJA TERMINA ASIMETRIČNO
RATOVANJE: METALEKSIKOGRAFSKA ANALIZA
NJEGOVOG PRISUSTVA I OBRADU U PEDAGOŠKIM
JEDNOJEZIČNIM REČNICIMA ENGLESKOG JEZIKA**

Valentina Rapajić*
Vojna akademija, Univerzitet odbrane,
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Kada entitet označen naučnim ili stručnim terminom postane izrazito značajan u jezičkoj zajednici i počne da ga koristi dovoljan broj govornika (u originalnom značenju, ili kao manje ili više semantički modifikovan), on biva inkorporisan u opšti leksikon datog jezika. O ovom procesu, poznatom pod nazivom de-terminologizacija, svedoči uključivanje termina u opisne opšte rečnike, koji nisu namenjeni predstavnicima struke, već najširoj javnosti. Ako povrh toga termin biva zabeležen i u pedagoškim rečnicima, smatra se da je entitet označen njime prisutan u diskursu jezičke zajednice u takvoj meri da se i učenicima datog jezika preporučuje da ga usvoje. Primenom metaleksikografske analize rečničkih odrednica za *asimetrično ratovanje* u osam najznačajnijih rečnika engleskog jezika, u ovom radu nastoji se utvrditi stepen njegove de-terminologizacije.

Ključne reči: asimetrično ratovanje, engleski jezik, metaleksikografska analiza, de-terminologizacija.

* valentinarapajic@yahoo.co.uk

NEW TYPES OF WARS – HYBRID AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE – LOOKING FOR MODERN CANON OF THE ART OF WARFARE

Andrzej Krzak*

Institute of Social Sciences and Security
The Jan Dlugosz University in Czestochowa,
Poland

Bellum omnia contra omnes
/War of everyone against everyone/

Abstract: Jean-Jacques Babel counted that, starting from 3500 BC, mankind lived without military conflicts for only 292 years. There were about 14550 big and small wars, in which more than 3,66 billion people died or passed away from various reasons, usually related to military actions. It shows that mankind has always lived in the state of permanent fight, improving both measures and methods of killing. War in its forms was developing as dynamic as mankind. It made use of human experience and ideas. Looking for new and improved methods and forms of waging wars led to development of science, which examined the processes leading to wars, waging them and solving conflicts and crises, that is, war studies and the art of warfare, which partially examine the essence of organizing and conducting military actions at every level. The goal of the article is to present typology of new warfare in terms of asymmetric threats and to present features specific for hybrid wars. The author emphasizes that modern military conflicts and wars are a real challenge for theoreticians of military science, because they are something new in the history of wars. They are characterized by certain inaccuracy of current ways of comprehending the war, and the ways of waging so-called traditional wars, in which states or their coalitions were the sides. Numerous and different ideas and visions, as well as propositions of classifications and attempts to carry out subjective and objective analysis of phenomenon of modern wars emerged during discussion on military threats, conflicts and wars. There are various theories on hybrid wars. The author emphasizes that they are waged in order to achieve political goal, using various measures and forms of waging war such as: conventional actions and weapons activities, irregular activities (guerrilla

* stanczyk2@o2.pl

warfare, sabotage), terrorist attacks, criminal organizations, operations in cyberspace, disinformation, propaganda (psychological warfare), as well as attempts of exerting economic and financial influence. Characteristic element of modern military conflict (or war) is the fact that the abovementioned measures and forms are usually applied in various options, depending on the region where the war is waged and its participants. Therefore, we have a new form of waging wars, that is, hybrid or asymmetric warfare.

Key words: the art of warfare, hybrid war, waging war, military threats, phenomenon of modern wars.

INTRODUCTION

The changes in the methods of waging modern wars, in the art of warfare and in strategy and tactics were described in numerous research and publications. However, the complexity of the problem of war and military conflict shows that defining and classifying them are very complicated. It comes, above all, from the very nature of war. Despite many efforts, wars and military conflicts have not been eliminated from international relations by any bans or mechanisms of penalization. Unfortunately, violence and power (including armed violence) are still significant tools in relations among the states, nations, ethnic groups etc. Even superficial analysis of theoretical works referring to this issue shows complexity of the problem of war and armed conflict.

Jean-Jacques Babel counted that, starting from 3500 BC, mankind lived without military conflicts for only 292 years. There were about 14550 big and small wars, in which more than 3,66 billion people died or passed away for various reasons, usually related to military actions⁹³. It shows that mankind has always lived in the state of permanent fight, improving both measures and methods of killing. War in its forms was developing as dynamically as mankind. Looking for new and improved methods and forms of waging wars led to development of science, which examined the processes leading to wars, waging them and solving conflicts and crises, that is, war studies and the art of warfare. The art of warfare, in the narrower sense, deals

⁹³ Е.М. Малышева, *Мировые войны и локальные военные конфликты в истории: последствия, уроки*, „Вестник Адыгейского государственного университета”, 2005, № 1, s. 69; Jan Van Helsing, *Story of the Powers that be secret societies and their power in the 20th century*, <http://www.darkgovernment.com/news/story-of-the-powers-that-be/>, [access: 22.08.2017].

with the essence of organizing and commanding military actions at their every level.

Modern military conflicts and wars are a challenge for theoreticians of military science, because they are something new in the history of wars. They are characterized by certain inaccuracy of current ways of comprehending the war, and the ways of waging the so-called traditional wars, in which states or their coalitions were the parties. Numerous and different ideas and visions, as well as propositions of classifications and attempts to carry out subjective and objective analysis of phenomenon of modern wars emerged during discussion on military threats, conflicts and wars. There are various theories on hybrid wars. However, regardless of the names, the goal will always be the one, that is, achieving specific political goal (one or more), using various measures and forms of waging war such as: conventional actions and weapons activities, irregular activities (guerrilla warfare, sabotage), terrorist attacks, criminal organizations, operations in cyberspace, disinformation, propaganda (psychological warfare), as well as the attempts of exerting economic and financial influence. Characteristic element of modern military conflict is the fact that abovementioned measures and forms are usually applied in various options, depending on the region where the war is waged as well as its participants.

NEW WARS: ASYMMETRIC AND HYBRID WARS

The term „new war”, defining new type of violence, is characteristic of conflicts at the turn of 20th and 21st centuries and it is used with relation to the solutions proposed by Mary Kaldor⁹⁴. Kaldor described „new wars” as highly „privatized”, „informal”, that is, „postmodernist”. Due to high degree of violence (degree of lawlessness and cruelty), many of them are defined as „degenerated”. Both state and non-state entities take part in these wars. Ideology of any of the sides of conflict is practically of no importance. It is usually used to achieve unspecified political or military goals as one of the tools of propaganda or psychological actions. Political goal of „new wars” is to take full control over an opponent through exertion of constant pressure, terror and fear. Financing such conflicts is another specific feature. They are not necessarily financed by the states. Funds are usually acquired through criminal activities, hence criminalization of conflicts and contacts with global organized crime groups. According to some theoreticians, the so-called

⁹⁴ M. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge 2012.

„internal wars”, „civil” or „conflicts of low intensity” are included in the notion of “new wars”⁹⁵.

However, the attempts of classifying the phenomenon of modern wars that have been made in last two or three decades seem to be incorrect. These attempts often lead to undermining many arrangements and values in the art of warfare. Clausewitz’s theory of war has been negated for a long time, trying to show that it does not fit in with modern conflicts and wars⁹⁶. Most of his critics forget that: *War is a clash of interests that are solved by the bloodshed – it is the only way that makes it different from other forms of conflicts. Instead of comparing it with art, we may compare it more accurate to trade, which is also a conflict of human interests and actions, which is closer to politics, and politics may be considered as a type o trade on a large scale*⁹⁷. Leaving aside the form of comparison that was used by Clausewitz to emphasize the problem, the paradigm of war as a phenomenon of solving conflicts in human population has not changed and it should be a basis for further deliberations on the nature of modern wars and military conflicts.

ASYMMETRIC WAR/ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT

Asymmetry means disruption or lack of symmetry and it is derived from the Greek language. The term „asymmetric conflict” emerged for the first time in the 1990s in American specialist literature and was one of the attempts of defining new phenomenon that was related to changes occurring in the sphere of military science⁹⁸. After collapse of American concept of technological advantage in the field of broadly defined security, especially military security, closely related to the so-called revolution in the field of military science (RMA)⁹⁹, new and effective ways of commanding military

⁹⁵ Other names of „new wars” that can be found in subject literature are the following; third-generation warfare, wars between people and hybrid wars.

⁹⁶ The most important critics of Clausewitz’s works are, among others, Martin van Creveld and John Keegan.

⁹⁷ Ch. Bassford, *Na palcach wokół trójcy Clausewitza*, „Bellona”, 2017, no. 1., p. 89.

⁹⁸ P. Gawliczek, J. Pawłowski, *Zagrożenia asymetryczne*, Warszawa 2003, pp. 21–23.

⁹⁹ Revolution in military affairs – it is a general term describing phenomena that had the hallmarks of „fundamental change in character and ways of waging military conflict”. The concept of RMA referred to transformation of American armed forces and, in broader perspective, to transformation of military potentials of modern countries since the end of the cold war. The basic assumption of revolution in military affairs was a conviction that technological advantage has become a significant factor conditioning the success during conflict or war. However, changing conditions on the battlefield at the turn of 20th and 21st centuries verified assumptions of the doctrine. Subsequent phases of the so-called „stabilization” operations in Iraq and Afghanistan definitely undermined usefulness of RMA with relation to

(armed) actions were implemented¹⁰⁰. It turned out that neither modern IT systems, nor precise weapon guarantee gaining advantage and defeating an opponent, especially opponents that can effectively oppose stronger opponent without having modern technology (including weaponry). The case of the so-called battle of Mogadishu has become a signal that battlefield has changed again, and the armies in the beginning of the 21st century are not prepared for these changes. As a result of conducted research, the term asymmetric conflict was formulated, and asymmetric conflict takes place, „when the state and its armed forces are confronted with an opponent whose goals, organization, means and methods of action are different from the ones in conventional war. Asymmetric war does not recognize the notion of battlefield, front. It is waged without geographical and chronological continuity”¹⁰¹.

Describing phenomenon of asymmetric conflict/war, German views on this phenomenon must also be mentioned. According to German researchers, war and military conflicts have evolved at the turn of the 20th and 21st century. The phenomenon of war has changed. This phenomenon was taken from rational sphere of losses and profits to the sphere of ideological and emotional causes. Therefore, the war has become a way of life, an end in itself.

During asymmetric war, according to German theoreticians, all possible means are applied, which results in brutalization of actions aimed especially at the civilian population. An important manifestation of asymmetric war is also participation of non-state actors of international relations. Therefore, asymmetric war is characterized by complete blurring the border between war and peace¹⁰².

asymmetric conflicts and threats, A.F. Krepinevich, *Cavalry to Computer; The Pattern Of Military Revolutions*, <http://nationalinterest.org/article/cavalry-to-computer-the-pattern-of-military-revolutions-848?page=1>, [access: 17.08.2017]; R. Kopeć, *Rewolucja w sprawach wojskowych – uniwersalne remedium czy wielka iluzja?*, [in:] *Przeszłość - teraźniejszość - przyszłość: problemy badawcze młodych politologów*, ed. Dominika Mikucka-Wójtowicz, Kraków 2010, pp. 195-196, 202-204; Idem, *Rewolucja w sprawach wojskowych w kontekście zachodniego sposobu prowadzenia wojen*, „Kultura i Polityka”, 2014, no. 16, pp. 69-77.

¹⁰⁰ A. Gruszczyk, *Hybrydowość współczesnych wojen – analiza krytyczna*, [in:] *Asymetria i Hybrydowość. – Stare armie wobec nowych konfliktów*, eds. W. Sokała, B. Zapala, Warszawa b.r.w., p. 9.

¹⁰¹ W. Jaruszewski, *Terroryzm w dobie współczesnych konfliktów*, „Zeszyty Naukowe Wydziału Nauk Ekonomicznych Politechniki Koszalińskiej”, 2013, no. 17, p. 132; T. Szubrycht, *Analiza podobieństw operacji militarnych innych niż wojna oraz działań pozwalających zminimalizowana zagrożenia asymetryczne*, „Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Marynarki Wojennej” 2006, no. 1, p. 144.

¹⁰² P. Gawliczek, J. Pawłowski, *Zagrożenia...*, s. 29–39; A. Wejkszner, *Wojny XXI wieku. Istota współczesnych konfliktów asymetrycznych*, [in:] *Zagrożenia asymetryczne współczesnego*

Krystian Piątkowski claims that potential opponent of a given country that wages a war usually avoids direct confrontation on classic battlefield and applies non-conventional methods such as: terrorism, guerrilla, sabotage, IT, psychological or economic actions. It means that the targets of the attacks are citizens and infrastructure of a given country. Many tools are used in such fights: conventional (e.g. classic explosives, fire with the use of small arms) or non-conventional means (weapon of mass destruction), use of IT, propaganda and financial instruments. According to Piątkowski, asymmetric wars are characterized by five important features that distinguish them from classic conflicts, including: goals, organization, technique, methods of action and range. B. Balcerowicz expressed similar view. He claimed that fundamental differences could be found in the sphere of main goals of the war (armed conflict), methods of taking actions, sources of financing and forms of violence. In his opinion: „in earlier wars, the goals resulted clearly from geopolitics or ideology, whereas, in many new wars, they are focused on acquiring (or consolidating) political identity comprehended in a new way. [...] new political identity – as a goal of the war – is not necessarily oriented towards building the state. [...] Characteristic goal of military actions is achievement of full control over given territory through getting rid of people having different identity”¹⁰³.

It may be said that entity waging asymmetric war wages ex definitione total war aiming at conquering the whole territory, society and resources of the enemy¹⁰⁴.

HYBRID WAR

A term „hybrid war” emerged for the first time in discussions on the conflict between Israel and Lebanon that lasted between July 12 and August 14, 2006. However, it has been popularized by media in the context of conflict in Ukraine. Until the middle of 2014, the term „hybrid war” practically didn’t exist in normative documents, broader theoretical deliberations and official statements of the representatives of the NATO and its directives. Dutch General, Frank van Kappen used an expression „hybrid operations” with reference to actions taken by Russia in Ukraine¹⁰⁵ and hybrid war or hybrid

świata, eds. S. Wojciechowski, R. Fiedler, Poznań 2009, pp. 120–127; J. Pawłowski, *Zagrożenia asymetryczne w wojskowej myśli strategicznej*, pp. 129–140.

¹⁰³ B. Balcerowicz, *Wojna. Kwestie nie tylko terminologiczne*, „Myśl Wojskowa”, 2003 no. 3, pp. 70–71.

¹⁰⁴ K. Piątkowski, *Wojna nowego typu?*, „Polska w Europie”, 2002 no. 1, p. 24.

¹⁰⁵ Until 2014, the events in Ukraine were defined as: „non-linear war or special war”.

threat has become inherent part of modern language and practice. Finally, on July 3, 2014, executive of NATO officially announced that war in Ukraine was a „hybrid war”¹⁰⁶.

However, announcing that such phenomenon describing war exists does not provide conditions for us to clearly define it. Anyway, since the end of the cold war, there is a loose approach to the problem in theoretical research of modern conflicts and wars. In accordance with generally accepted definition: „hybrid is the state of the body, thing,(...) which consists of various elements that often do not match”¹⁰⁷. Therefore, hybrid war combines various possible means and methods of violence, including regular and irregular armed actions, operations in cyberspace as well as economic and psychological actions, information campaigns (propaganda) etc.¹⁰⁸

William J. Nemth formulated different definition. Based on Russian-Chechen wars, he claimed that hybrid nature of this conflict referred not only to the actions taken by Chechen fighters, but also to the model of Chechen society¹⁰⁹.

The concept of „hybrid wars” was also developed by other theoreticians of military science. It seems that two of them had the most significant impact on research on this phenomenon, that is, theory of hybrid war developed by Frank G. Hoffman and current Chief of General Staff of Armed Forces of Russian Federation, Gen. Walery Gierasimow.

The theories of „fourth-generation warfare”, „compound wars” and „unrestricted warfare” were analysed in Nemth’s works¹¹⁰. In case of „fourth-generation warfare”, all future conflicts will be of mixed character. The state of war and peace will coexist. Moreover, the borders between participants of fights and civilians will be disappearing. Moreover, the state will lose monopoly on using violence – which is connected with emergence of non-state

¹⁰⁶ M. Wojnowski, *Mit „wojny hybrydowej”. Konflikt na terenie państwa ukraińskiego w świetle rosyjskiej myśli wojskowej XIX–XXI wieku wojskowej*, „Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego. Wydział Specjalny”, 2015, p. 8.

¹⁰⁷ Ł. Skoneczny, *Wojna hybrydowa – wyzwanie przyszłości? Wybrane zagadnienia*, „Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego. Wydział Specjalny”, 2015, p. 40.

¹⁰⁸ (Mini)Słownik BBN: propozycje nowych terminów z dziedziny bezpieczeństwa, BBN, <http://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/bezpieczenstwo-narodowe/minislownik-bbn-propozy/6035,MINISLOWNIK-BBN-Propozycje-no-wych-terminow-z-dziedziny-bezpieczenstwa.html>, [access: 20.08.2017].

¹⁰⁹ Ł. Skoneczny, *Wojna hybrydowa...*, p. 41.

¹¹⁰ Frank G. Hoffman, *Hybrid vs. Compound War. The Janus choice: Defining today’s multifaceted conflict*, „Armed Forces Journal”, <https://web.archive.org/web/20100917155357/http://armedforcesjournal.com/2009/10/4198658/>, [access: 20.08.2017].

entities on the one side of the conflict¹¹¹. A theory of connecting conventional and irregular actions at strategic, operational and tactical level was taken to the concept of „compound wars”. The last theoretical idea analysed by Hoffman was the so-called „unrestricted warfare”. In this case, emphasis was put on omni-directionality that assumes that all spheres and areas around us will be one battlefield in future conflicts and wars.¹¹²

On the basis of above research, F. Hoffman formulated a controversial formula of hybrid war¹¹³, showing that hybrid wars include methods and forms of various military actions, including conventional actions, irregular tactics and armed groups, terrorist attacks, including mass violence, and criminal activities¹¹⁴.

The deliberations of Western theoreticians¹¹⁵ also aroused interest of Russian scientists and experts, especially in the context of conflict between Russian and Ukraine. It must be mentioned that the term hybrid war was rarely used in specialist Russian literature¹¹⁶. It was more often used by Western experts and journalists, who described conflict in Ukraine. It was them who used the expression of „Russian hybrid warfare” for the first time. However, it is a large simplification¹¹⁷.

Russian view on future wars, expressed by Gen. Gierasimow, comes down to an analysis of international situation in the context of interests of Russia. He says that classic paradigm of war, that is, defeating the armed forces of an opponent, occupying its territory and breaking its will of resistance is replaced with systematic disintegration of the structures of an enemy through realization of „strategy of indirect actions” (rus. стратегия

¹¹¹ Idem, *Conflict in the 21st Century: Rise of the Hybrid Wars*, Arlington 2007, http://www.potomac_institute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf, [access: 20.08.2017], pp. 18-20.

¹¹² Ł. Skoneczny, *Wojna hybrydowa...*, p. 42.

¹¹³ Hoffman and his co-workers claimed that this is new method of waging wars. However, it is a false assumption. Hybrid actions during armed conflicts both in the 20th century and earlier were not taken into consideration, for example, conflict of the Sudetes in 1923, or September campaign in 1939, April campaign in 1941 or war in former Yugoslavia (war in former Yugoslavia was analysed by Hoffman’s team).

¹¹⁴ Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st century...*, p. 29.

¹¹⁵ The phenomena of hybrid nature with reference to wars was also analysed by the following researchers: Col. Daniel T. Lasica, Robert G. Walker, Col. John J. McCuen (McCuen defined hybrid war as combination of symmetric and asymmetric war).

¹¹⁶ The issue of hybrid actions was raised rather with reference to armed actions taken by USA in Iraq or Afghanistan.

¹¹⁷ M. Wojnowski, *Mit „wojny hybrydowej”...*, p. 10.

непрямых действий), using „non-military means” (rus. невоенные средства)¹¹⁸.

Non-military means, according to Gierasimow, may have a form of actions of political, economic, information and humanitarian character. These actions are usually oriented towards political isolation of potential opponent, economic sanctions, land, sea and air blockade and terrorizing through potential use of military power. While analysing American textbooks concerning special actions from the end of 1960s and theory of Yugoslavian special war, we may notice many elements coincident with the concept of the Russian general.

It must be emphasized that methodology of commanding military actions is particularly important in discussed concept of new wars (hybrid wars). Gierasimow assumes that after the stage of political, ideological and economic destabilization of an opponent, that is, application of non-military means, there is another stage - appropriate phase of war of new generation, that is, military operation¹¹⁹.

However, military actions are initiated before main operations. Small, mobile groups of armies and paramilitary organizations may be used for this purpose. Weakening force structures of an opponent at tactical and operational level is followed by the phase of military actions. An assumption of Russian doctrine is manoeuvre fight with the use of non-contact means by combined forces of various types of armies and services, including intelligence services. Therefore, the main goal of war in accordance with Gerasimow concept (doctrine) is destruction of military and economic potential of attacked country using precise strikes against critical infrastructure. The first attack includes armed forces and facilities of an opponent on the whole territory. Such an attack is precisely synchronized in place and time¹²⁰.

It must be emphasized that in the course of military conflict, the armies get information support at all levels of actions, therefore, they will fight in all dimensions: onshore, in the air, water and cyberspace. During conventional phase of the war, psychological operations, sabotage and guerrilla actions - irregular will be continued¹²¹.

¹¹⁸ M. Wojnowski, *Koncepcja „wojny nowej generacji” w ujęciu strategów Sztabu Generalnego Sił Zbrojnych Federacji Rosyjskiej*, „Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego”, 2015, no. 13, pp. 14-15.

¹¹⁹ В. Герасимов, *Ценность науки в предвидении*, „Военно-промышленный курьер”, 2013, № 8, pp. 2-3.; Idem, *Роль Генерального штаба в организации обороны страны в соответствии с новым Положением о Генеральном штабе, утверждённым Президентом Российской Федерации*, „Вестник Академии военных наук”, 2014, № 1, pp. 14-23.

¹²⁰ M. Wojnowski, *Koncepcja „wojny nowej generacji”...*, p. 15.

¹²¹ В. Герасимов, *Ценность науки в предвидении...*, p. 3.

Russian concept of future wars defined as Gierasimow doctrine¹²² is undoubtedly included in a definition proposed by Hoffman and other European theoreticians. However, it is nothing new, but compilation of Russian experiences in waging wars. We may talk about some innovative solutions combining various forms and ways of taking actions at particular levels: strategic, operational and tactical. However, demonizing the capabilities of Russia and its armed forces within the scope of waging this type of war shows current mass fear of both political spheres and Western media. It doesn't mean that we should ignore capabilities and potential of Russian Federation. On the contrary, everything must be done to be prepared for potential conflict.

THE ART OF WARFARE AND ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT AND HYBRID WARS

Since the ancient times, people were looking for effective methods of commanding actions that would allow them to dominate others. Apart from applying improved systems of weaponry, new organizational solutions, new methods and forms of waging wars were implemented. The rules of the art of warfare were worked out in order to face these challenges. Gen. S. Koziej said that: „The rules of the art of warfare are historically formed rules of preparing and commanding armed military actions, being a basis for rational activity of the commands and armies at tactical, operational and strategic levels(...). However, in any case, applying them is an essential condition of gaining, maintaining and making use of quantitative and qualitative advantage (including situational) over an opponent, in order to achieve goal with minimum losses in the shortest possible time”¹²³.

He mentioned the following rules of fight: appropriateness of actions, economy of power, surprise, initiative (activity), manoeuvre, synergy

¹²² Similar views on future wars were expressed by two eminent Russian theoreticians: Col. Siergiej Czekinow and Gen. Siergiej Bogdanow, С.Г. Чекинов, *Центр военно-стратегических исследований Генерального штаба Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации. История и современность*, „Военная мысль” 2010, № 1. Taking assumptions of Gen. Gierasimow into consideration, they presented their own concept of new wars in 2013, С.Г. Чекинов, С.А. Богданов, *О характере и содержании войны нового поколения*, „Военная мысль” 2013, № 10, pp. 13–25; Idem, *Асимметричные действия по обеспечению военной безопасности России*, „Военная мысль” 2010, no. 3, pp. 13–22; Idem, *Влияние непрямых действий на характер современной войны*, „Военная мысль” 2011, no. 6, pp. 3–13.

¹²³ S. Koziej, *Teoria sztuki wojennej*, Warszawa 2011, p. 79.

(cooperation), and maintaining combat readiness¹²⁴. Such and similar rules were already mentioned in antiquity, renaissance and later periods¹²⁵.

Carl von Clausewitz said that „Inventing the gun powder and development of firearm showed that desire to destroy an opponent embodied in the very notion of war wasn't neither stopped, nor repealed by the development of civilization”¹²⁶.

Have classic rules of the art of warfare changed in last two or three decades? Has technological progress largely conditioning the changes that occurred and still occur on modern battlefield had big impact on fighting methods to make us searching for new canons of the art of warfare, omitting or even rejecting the so-called classic Clausewitz list? This list is de facto a list of rules of the art of warfare. These rules included: concentration, target, economy of power, simplicity, surprise, integrity of command, protection, offensive (understood as: activity, aggressiveness, having an initiative) and manoeuvre¹²⁷.

It must be emphasized that no leading country has resigned from theories of classic Clausewitz's work. They are still present both in war and military doctrines, as well as in the process of educating personnel at every level of command. However, it is another issue when we search for such canons that would connect rules from classic list or complement them, adjusting to requirements of modern battlefield.

It should be stressed up that modern art of warfare comes down to knowledge and practical use of armed forces and can be applied in support of the state wit of shaping broadly defined security using military means and other methods (also non-military). Its integral part is still: military strategy, operational art and tactics. Therefore, forecasting and planning the development of armed forces and using them in the period of peace, crisis and war will be analysed.

The changes in political and military goals and the ways of using armed forces in modern wars (military conflicts) lead to changes in the art of warfare at every level. Therefore, the so-called new rules that can be regarded as substitutes or supplementing elements can be added to the existing list.

Activity and gaining advantage on the Internet is a priority of modern battlefield. It makes possible to maintain initiative, control global space, choose place and time of attacks, as well as select proper number of soldiers

¹²⁴ Ibidem, p. 68.

¹²⁵ M. Sułek, *Trzy działy Prakseologii*, „Rocznik Naukowy Wydziału Zarządzania w Ciechanowie”, 2008, t. II, z. 1-2, p. 57.

¹²⁶ C. Clausewitz, *O wojnie*, Warszawa 2010, p. 17.

¹²⁷ Ibidem, p. 143.

and weaponry for a given task. It is also an essential element of information and decision-making process that enables to react in real time. Activity and gaining advantage in cyberspace enables to effectively counteract irregular forms of fight. Flexibility understood as ability to quickly and freely select tools and place of actions should be accompanied by activity and gaining advantage in cyberspace.

We know that an opponent of the world of democracy successfully uses not only primitive killing techniques, but also makes use of network-centric environment. It can be used to attack objects of critical infrastructure (terrorist attacks) and to transfer data and preventive information (intelligence and counter-intelligence), command psychological and misinforming operations, recruit and finance their activity¹²⁸. Therefore, it is necessary to apply the rule of complexity of actions that would combine undertakings related to fight in cyberspace with radio and electronic reconnaissance at all levels and special and conventional actions¹²⁹. The complexity of operations combining various forms of fight is one of basic canons of modern art of warfare.

Since the first decade of 21st century, particular significance is attached to preparations of soldiers taking part in the missions, military and non-military operations within the scope of knowledge of history, tradition, geography and mentality and culture of an area, in which they will fight¹³⁰. Comprehension of these rules is one of the basic factors that guarantee the success. But the very knowledge of cultural factors does not guarantee the success. This knowledge must be turned into practice. There is a lot to do in this sphere of waging war, because adding such subjects to training, working out manuals, textbooks and creating specialist sections (CMIC) will not solve the problem. General conception related to cultural knowledge of area of operations turned out to be a desired step, however, in the long run, it does not always give expected effects. It seems that while analysing particular elements related to cultural aspect of population living in a given area, we keep making the same mistake. We usually apply such tactics and strategy, which is based rather on our expectations and perception of the world than on proper comprehension of character¹³¹ of population of a given country or region. The

¹²⁸ Brian B. Ettrich, *The Principles of War: Are they still applicable?*, Monterrey 2005, pp. 52-53.

¹²⁹ J. Arquilla, D. Ronfeldt, *Networks and netwars*. Santa Monica 2001, s. 43-45; P. Murdock, *Principles of War on the Network-Centric Battlefield: Mass and Economy of Force*, „Parameters”, Spring 2002, vol. 32, no. 1, <http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/articles/02spring/murdock.htm>, [access: 22.08.2017].

¹³⁰ Brian B. Ettrich, *The Principles of War...*, p. 57.

¹³¹ In this case, character should be understood as mentality, tradition, customs and culture of a given group or the whole community.

knowledge about broadly defined cultural features is particularly important when conflict or war is waged in places with two or more communities that are ethnically, culturally or religiously different.

CONCLUSION

The propositions mentioned above are more or less currently present in the practice of actions. However, they haven't been considered as a canon in a theory of the art of warfare yet. Many theoreticians, philosophers and great leaders formulated their rules of the art of warfare; however, no one has ever created one universal list that could be applied in any period and at any level of technological progress. Classic Clausewitz list is constantly supplemented. The following new rules have emerged: mobility, maintaining combat readiness, freedom of action, reconnaissance, originality, morale, constant support, robust command etc.¹³² However, new propositions will definitely be made, just like new concepts and theories referring to the phenomenon of war and military conflict. Mankind will never stop looking for new ways of waging and winning wars, even when machines replace people on a battlefield. People will still make use of experiences of the predecessors, by adopting nineteenth-century or earlier theories and rules, or trying to find new solutions. Why does it happen and will probably happen in the future? The simplest answer is because that's the nature of humanity.

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NOVI TIPOVI RATA - HIBRIDNO I ASIMETRIČNO RATOVANJE - TRAGANJE ZA MODERNIM KANONOM UMETNOSTI RATOVANJA

Andrzej Krzak*

Institut za društvene nauke i bezbednost
Univerzitet „Jan Długosz“, Czestochowa,
Poljska

Bellum omnia contra omnes
/ Rat svih protiv svih /

Apstrakt: Žan-Žak Babel smatra da je, počev od 3500. pne, čovečanstvo živelo bez vojnih sukoba samo 292 godine. Bilo je oko 14550 velikih i malih ratova, u kojima je više od 3,66 milijardi ljudi umrlo ili preminulo iz raznih razloga, obično povezanih sa vojnim akcijama. To pokazuje da je čovečanstvo uvek živelo u stanju trajne borbe, poboljšavajući i

* stanczyk2@o2.pl

mere i metode ubijanja. Rat u svojim oblicima razvijao se dinamično kao i čovečanstvo koristeći i ljudsko iskustvo i ideje. Istraživanje novih i poboljšanih metoda i oblika vođenja rata dovelo je do razvoja nauke, koja je istražila procese koji su vodili do ratova, njihovog vođenja i rešavanja konflikata i kriza, odnosno do studija o ratu i veštine vođenja rata, koje delimično proučavaju suštinu organizovanja i sprovođenja vojnih akcija na svakom nivou. Cilj rada jeste predstavljanje tipologije novog vođenja rata u smislu asimetričnih pretnji i predstavljanje karakteristika specifičnih za hibridne ratove. Autor naglašava da su moderni vojni sukobi i ratovi pravi izazov za teoretičare vojnih nauka, jer su oni nešto novo u istoriji ratova. Odlikuje ih određena nepravilnost u odnosu na trenutno razumevanje rata i načina vođenja tzv. „tradicionalnih ratova“ u kojima su države ili njihove koalicije bile strane u sukobu. Brojne i različite ideje i vizije, kao i predlozi klasifikacija i pokušaji izvođenja subjektivne i objektivne analize fenomena savremenih ratova pojavili su se tokom rasprave o vojnim pretnjama, sukobima i ratovima. Postoje različite teorije o hibridnim ratovima. Autor ističe da se oni vode u cilju postizanja političkog cilja, koristeći različite postupke i oblike vođenja rata, kao što su: konvencionalne aktivnosti, iregularne aktivnosti (gerilski rat, sabotaža), teroristički napadi, kriminalne organizacije, operacije u sajberprostoru, dezinformacije, propagande (psihološki rat), kao i pokušaja vršenja ekonomskog i finansijskog uticaja. Karakterističan element modernog vojnog sukoba (ili rata) jeste činjenica da se navedeni postupci i forme obično primenjuju u različitim opcijama, u zavisnosti od regiona u kojem se vodi rat i njegovih učesnika. Dakle, imamo novi oblik vođenja ratova, odnosno hibridnog ili asimetričnog rata.

Cljučne reči: ratna umjetnost, hibridni rat, vođenje rata, vojne prijetnje, fenomen modernih ratova.

HUMANS AS A WEAPON: ASYMMETRY AND DEMOGRAPHY*

Nebojša Vuković**

Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: At the beginning of the paper, the author briefly considers the terms of war and asymmetry. As an example of the conception of asymmetric warfare, the author states the theses of a French theoretician, Guy Brossollet, on the so-called non-battle. Analyzing the particular elements of the tactics of the Islamist formations in Iraq and Syria, the author finds certain similarities between modular warfare in Brossollet's conception and the manner in which the offensive operations of the army of the Islamic State and other Jihadist militias are conducted. A special emphasis is placed on the conducting of attacks by means of car bombs operated by Islamist suicide fighters. The paper is based on the assertion that, given the fact that they are technically and resourcefully inferior to regular armies (especially those of the West), Islamist movements and military formations use car bombs in an attempt to asymmetrically respond to the supremacy of the adversary. In the author's opinion, the two essential elements – population and ideology – are necessary for such tactics of the Islamist armed formations. Given the fact that the population of the Islamic faith has constantly been increasing and that on average it is relatively young, an assumption can be made that in the decades to come, it will be a rich mobilization source for recruiting thousands of future suicide bombers. The Islamist narration will not disappear, either, given the fact that it is generated from certain radical interpretations of Islam. In other words, Islamism will exist as long as Islam exists. The basic thesis of the paper is based on an insight that the technologically and logistically weaker side in an asymmetric conflict resists with what it abounds in. In this case, Islamist formations in a conflict with secular Muslim and non-Muslim armies abundantly dissipate human resources – humans as a weapon (suicide bombers). Also, the basic thesis comprises the attitude that the tactics of using

* The paper has been realized within the “Serbia in Contemporary International Relations – the Strategic Directions of the Development and Consolidation of the Position of Serbia in International Integrative Processes – Foreign-Policy, International Economic, Legal and Safety Aspects” Project of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, No. 179029

** sonevukovic@gmail.com

car bombs will become one of the dominant in the future due to the given positive demographic conditions (constant growth) within the world's Muslim population.

Keywords: asymmetry, demography, Islam, war, suicide attacks.

WAR AND ASYMMETRY

When multidimensional research in the phenomenon of war is concerned, the most prominent place probably belongs to a French author, Gaston Bouthoul. Not only did this French scientist lay the foundations for the scientific discipline that strictly addresses the phenomenon of war – polemology – but he also comprehensively studied it for several decades and published a plethora of scientific papers on it. Bouthoul singles out several important characteristics of war as a social phenomenon. First of all, war is a collective phenomenon and in that sense it should be differed from individual acts of violence. According to Bouthoul, in comparison with the “universal struggle” or different other forms of mutual conflicting, as well as in relation to individual crimes, war singles out with yet two quite important features – the subjective element (intention) and the political element (organization). Finally, war also has a certain legal character.¹³³ Relying on the determinations by other authors and his own insights into the nature of war, Bouthoul suggests that war should be defined as an armed and bloody fight between organized groups.¹³⁴

During the 20th century, states were most frequently those “organized groups” that were waging wars and signing peace treaties upon their termination. Apart from states (and alliances of states), wars were also being waged by different insurrectional formations, military-political movements and terrorist organizations. No matter what the participants in a war were like, in their mutual conflict, there was always a certain balance of forces between them, implying the parity of power or the supremacy of one of the sides in the conflict. Relying on Saida Bedar's conclusions, Barthélémy Courmont and Darko Ribnikar allege that symmetry is a fight between equal adversaries, dissymmetry is the striving of one of them to gain a qualitative and/or quantitative advantage, whereas asymmetry implies a reverse procedure – taking advantage of all the weaknesses of the adversary and inflicting as big a

¹³³ Gaston Bouthoul, *La guerra* [Barcelona: Oikos-tau, s.a. – ediciones, 1971], 31.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 35.

damage on him as possible.¹³⁵ According to their understanding, asymmetry implies rejecting the rules of the fight imposed by the adversary. That leads towards using less ordinary or completely unordinary forces, weapons, methods and locations (civilians, weapons of mass destruction, guerrilla, terrorism, narrower parts of a city/town, public places).¹³⁶ Essentially, when the weaker side in a conflict is concerned, waging an asymmetric war means that very limited resources and instruments are used to inflict immeasurable and frequently unacceptable human or material losses on the technically and organizationally superior adversary.

One of the conceptions of an asymmetric operation in the conditions of a large-scale conventional war was elaborated on by a French author, Guy Brossollet, in the mid-1970s. In the circumstances of the supremacy of the conventional forces of the former USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organization against the French and NATO forces in Europe, Brossollet ideated a new concept of the defense of France. In that concept, the weaker side dissuades the stronger side from entering into a fight, i.e. it realizes its goal not by getting to grips with the enemy, but by persuading the enemy to withdraw from a conflict. The mentioned dissuasion is pillared by the capabilities of inflicting unacceptable losses on the enemy. Instead of a symmetric and conventional response to the Soviet threat, which would have been extremely risky due to the quantitative inferiority of the French (Western) forces, Brossollet advocated defiance founded on the deep battle array (in comparison with the speed of the invasion of the enemy), on the flexible and light forces (in comparison with the mass of the enemy) and on efficiency (in comparison with the number of the soldiers on the enemy's side).¹³⁷ In Brossollet's conception, the forces that offer resistance combine the operations of alarming and exhausting, and the battle in the classical sense is replaced with a plethora of decentralized, very simple but interrelated operations.¹³⁸ The skeleton of the performance of such operations consists of the modularly organized army. The ground module would consist of about 15 members divided into five groups. Each group would have a field vehicle and the armament that would comprise anti-tank systems, recoilless guns, mortars, lightweight automatic weapons and anti-personnel and anti-tank mines.¹³⁹ One module would be responsible for a zone covering the territory of about twenty square kilometers and its basic task

¹³⁵ Бартедеми Курмон и Дарко Рибникар, *Асиметрични ратови: Сукоби јуче и данас, тероризам и нове претње* [Београд: Новинско-издавачки центар „Војска“, 2003], 18.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹³⁷ Gi Brossole, *Ogled o nebitki* [Београд: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1978], 88.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 89.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 92.

would be to inflict minimal losses on the enemy (three fighting vehicles/ten infantry soldiers). In a fragmentary and rudimentary respect, in the last years, such a conception has been realized in practice by different Islamist formations in the Middle East in fighting against the security forces (the armies and the police) of the secular Arabic regimes and to a lesser extent against foreign expeditionary troops.

ISLAMIST MODULES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

In the Middle East, especially in Syria and Iraq, in the last years, an asymmetric conflict, in which there have been the technically, resourcefully and logistically superior forces of the legitimate regimes on the one side and on the other, in those very same aspects, the inferior different insurrectional Islamist militias, has been taking place. The Jihadist formations have only had distinct prevalence with respect to the level of combat morale. Since in a larger number of important dimensions they have been weaker than their secular adversaries, the Islamist militia, especially the forces of the Islamic State, they have tried to gain prevalence in the theater of operations by using unconventional methods and means and to maintain the initiative during the war. Humans have been the resource they have had a relative abundance of. Apart from the domestic population, in Syria and Iraq, several tens of thousands of volunteers have joined different Jihadist formations from abroad (from North Africa, the other countries of the Middle East, from the territories of the former USSR and from Western Europe). Ideologically indoctrinated, those volunteers have frequently been ready to also deliver suicide bombing attacks, which, apart from inflicting a loss on the enemy, would also imply their own certain death.

Becoming aware of that potential, the commanders of the Islamist militias, especially of the forces of the Islamic State, have begun to massively introduce motor vehicles overloaded with explosive into offensive operations. Suicide volunteers would, then, have operated those vehicles until the moment when the task— crashing against a particular target or activating the explosive in its proximity — had to be done. The targets of such attacks have been: 1) military or police checkpoints; 2) military bases or barracks; and 3) police stations. The data that can be obtained from the interactive database of suicide attacks on the website of the Chicago University testify to the proportions of the application of these tactics. The author of this paper has chosen the following parameters — the country: Iraq, the period: 2015; the armed groups: all; the campaign: the Iraqi rebels against the Iraqi Government and the Allies; the type of the target: security; the weapon: car bomb. The following results were obtained from the responses to the questionnaire with these parameters —

the total number of attacks: 151; the total number of the killed: 1095; the total number of the wounded: 1466. When Syria is concerned, together with the same remaining parameters except for the type of the campaign (the rebels against Syria and the Allies), the following results were obtained – the total number of attacks: 36; the total number of the killed: 364; the total number of the wounded: 310.¹⁴⁰ Otherwise, only those cases for which there is a confirmation from at least two independent sources are registered in this database.

The May 2015 battle for the Iraqi city of Ramadi, when the forces of the Islamic State conquered that place after fighting for several days, can be referred to as a pattern of using motor vehicles with explosive. After the American invasion on Iraq in 2003, during the process of the reconstruction of Iraq's security forces, the United States gave them, among other things, about 3500 Humvee field vehicles. After the great offensive of the Islamic State's forces during the summer of 2014 and the conquering of Mosul, the Jihadists laid their hands on about 2300 of these vehicles.¹⁴¹ Apart from using them for cargo transportation, the members of the Islamic State's formations began to also use them for delivering suicide attacks. During the conquest of Ramadi in 2015, as many as thirty or so motor vehicles (including the Humvees) were transformed into the moving bombs that served as a shock weapon for penetrating the defense of the Iraqi forces that had been forced to withdraw and surrender the city to the Jihadist groups. In that year, apart from Ramadi, the Humvee field vehicles were also used in other locations in the Province of Anbar, in fighting for the oil refinery near the city of Baiji, as well as in Iraqi Kurdistan and in Syria.¹⁴²

The Humvee's advantage over an ordinary passenger vehicle lies in its protection (the armor), which makes it impossible for defenders to eliminate the suicide driver with an ordinary shooting weapon before he comes sufficiently close to the target and activates the explosive. In that sense, the use of armored vehicles such as the Humvee is the last stage in the development of the use of vehicle bombs by the Islamic State and its predecessor Al-Qaeda.¹⁴³ Cars and trucks were used for that purpose in the past.

¹⁴⁰ The data were retrieved from: Suicide Attack Database, http://cpostdata.uchicago.edu/search_new.php, Search carried out on April 7, 2017.

¹⁴¹ Sean D. Naylor, "The Islamic State's Best Weapon Was Born in the USA", *Foreign Policy*, June 4, 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/04/hell-on-wheels/> [Retrieved on April 8, 2017]

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

Although the Humvees had been captured in Iraq, the Islamic State was also abundantly using them in Syria, where they were being used in order to take control of the checkpoints and military bases that relatively quickly surrendered as soon as a vehicle bomb had made an opening in the line of defense.¹⁴⁴

Bearing these facts in mind, a conclusion can be drawn that the mass use of car bombs with suicide drivers is a specific asymmetric tactical procedure practiced by the weaker side in a conflict that only has available in a sufficient extent fanaticized humans at its disposal. By comparing the described procedures carried out by the Islamist militias (first of all the forces of the Islamic State) and Guy Brossollet's conception, certain similarities, as well as major differences, are noticed. When the similarities are concerned, it may be established that the groups of the Humvee field vehicles in a capacity as car bombs attacking the exactly allocated targets also represent modules of their own kind, although they are rudimentary and primitive. These modules, as well as those in Brossollet's conception, should sufficiently harm the opponent and ultimately force the opponent to withdraw, while surprise (unexpectedness) factor simultaneously plays an important role. The psychological effect of their use is in both cases equal to the fighting effect and perhaps even more impressive.

On the other hand, significant differences are also noticeable. According to Brossollet's idea, it is implied that a field vehicle and its crew should survive at least one combat task. In the tactics of the Islamist militias, first of all of the forces of the Islamic State, car bombs and their drivers are disposable. According to Brossollet, the operation of the module is, before all, directed towards the destruction of moving targets (fighting vehicles and the infantry), whereas the Jihadist modules operate against stationary targets (checkpoints/bases/police stations). In Brossollet's conception, the modules operate from a certain distance which is, among other things, contingent upon the firing range of the used armaments, whereas in the tactics of the Islamic State and other Jihadist movements a direct contact of a vehicle loaded with explosive and the target is necessary for the realization of the combat task.

The use of car bombs with suicide drivers, along with a series of other procedures, not only at the military, but also at the political, psychological and propaganda levels, categorizes the warfare of the Islamic State as the so-called Fourth-Generation War, according to the classification done by Colonel

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

Thomas X. Hammes.¹⁴⁵ Apart from Iraq and Syria, the usage of motor vehicles with explosives in offensive operations has also been recorded in Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia and Nigeria.

Although the use of car bombs in the wars waged in Iraq and Syria has brought undeniable successes to the Islamic State, the development of the events in the theater of war in the Middle East during the last two years (losses, the loss of the territory) has been testifying in favour of the fact that the tactics of offensive operations with the vehicles overloaded with explosives with suicidal drivers is not omnipotent. Yet, the basic thesis of this paper states that in potential wars in the decades to come also, this tactical procedure – a fight through the use of car bombs driven by suicide drivers – will be dominant when Islamist militias and movements are concerned.

DEMOGRAPHY AND IDEOLOGY FACTORS

In their study of asymmetric warfare, Courmont and Ribnikar state that asymmetry can be identified as and equalized with the “weapon of the poor”. In other words, as they conclude, those who are inferior “develop various strategies, more or less efficient, whose intention is to achieve satisfactory goals with ‘available means’”.¹⁴⁶ Jihadist movements, like the Islamic State, have numerous enemies, who can be classified into two categories. The secular regimes in Muslim countries, such as the Syrian, the Iraqi or the Egyptian, belong to the first category, and the non-Muslim states that are actively supportive of the mentioned regimes, such as the Russian Federation, belong to the second category. Islamist militias are multiply inferior in comparison with the armed forces of the secular regimes, and in particular in comparison with the armed forces of the non-Muslim countries – the American, the Russian and those similar ones. They do not have an air force, radars or other sophisticated devices. They have to capture other means or purchase them on the “black market”. They have no regular and legal sources of income – they are forced to pillage and carry out criminal activities. They frequently depend on individuals, groups and institutions from the rich countries of the Arabian Peninsula. Their chain of command consists of former or deserter officers, as well as civilians without any military professional qualifications at all.

¹⁴⁵ About the characteristics of the Fourth-Generation War, see in: Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and The Stone: On The War in the 21st Century* [Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2004], 207-223.

¹⁴⁶ Бартелеми Курмон и Дарко Рибникар, *Асиметрични ратови: Сукоби јуче и данас, тероризам и нове претње*, op. cit., 21.

Of the “available means”, fanaticized humans and the ideological charge is what Jihadist movements have to a sufficient extent. Given the current demographic trends, it can be said with determination that the Islamist formations will have at their disposal a far larger mobilization reservoir in decades to come than it is the case today. As early as in his own time, Bouthoul established a fact that no large-scale war could be waged without an appropriate demographic infrastructure.¹⁴⁷ He thought that large-scale wars followed the periods of demographic expansion. He put a special emphasis on the so-called explosive structure – an abundant surplus (excess) of young people which exceeds the number of the jobs offered by an economy.¹⁴⁸ The governing structures in the states, as well as extreme political movements, can frequently resort to the channeling of the frustration of a large number of young people towards their military engagement or forcing migration towards other parts of the world. Youth who lack economic resources (jobs or money) or political resources (representation or other freedoms) are likely to engage themselves in political violence, join a rebel or terrorist group.¹⁴⁹

Which fact can be established when the demographic trends in the Islamic world are concerned? According to the findings of the Pew Research Center, of all religious groups the Muslim population in the world will be growing fastest by 2050. According to the forecasts of this Institute, from 1.6 billion in 2010, the population of the Islamic faith will reach as many as 2.76 billion people in 2050.¹⁵⁰ So, during the four decades, the Muslim population in the world will have increased by over one billion! For the purpose of comparison, the Christian population will have quite a moderate growth – from 2.17 billion (in 2010) to 2.92 billion (in 2050).¹⁵¹ Expressed in percentage, in both 2010 and 2050, the Christian population will account for about 31.4% of the world population. On the other hand, the Muslim population will leap from 23.2% (in 2010) to 29.7% (in 2050).¹⁵²

When the age structure of the world’s population as per religions is looked at, it can be noticed that the Muslim population is the youngest. So, the individuals of up to 15 years of age have had 34% share in the global Muslim

¹⁴⁷ Gaston Bouthoul, *La guerra*, op. cit., 55.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 53.

¹⁴⁹ Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, *The Future Faces of War: Population and National Security* [Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011], 32.

¹⁵⁰ Pew Research Center, *The Future of World Religions: Population, Growth Projections 2010-2050: Why Muslims Are Rising Fastest and the Unaffiliated Are Shrinking as a Share of the World’s Population*, April 2, 2015, http://www.pewforum.org/files/2015/03/PF_15.04.02_ProjectionsFullReport.pdf [Retrieved on: April 10, 2017], 6.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* 6.

¹⁵² *Ibid.* 6.

population in 2010, whereas the world average was 27%.¹⁵³ Currently, many Muslim countries that are politically or from the aspect of engaging in armed conflicts faced with Islamist movements or those in which Islamist ideas enjoy a broad support have on average very young populations.

In Egypt, for example, (data refer to the last year) 31% of the population is under 15 years of age. In the neighboring Sudan, that percentage reaches up to 43%. In Niger, even 50% of the population is under 15 years of age.¹⁵⁴ When Asia is concerned, 30% of the population of Saudi Arabia is younger than 15, 44% in Afghanistan, 36% in Pakistan, and 28% in Indonesia.¹⁵⁵ For the purpose of comparison, the population of those under 15 years of age accounts for 14% in Serbia and even less – 13% in Germany (the European total being 16%).¹⁵⁶

The different age structures in the mentioned countries can be understood with the help of the demographic transition theory. To put it very briefly, demographic transition is the process of moving from the high birth and death rates to the low birth and death rates, from high growth potential to incipient decline.¹⁵⁷ A great majority of states with a Muslim population has just stepped into this process although certain countries have almost reached the end of that tendency, such as Turkey. On the other hand, European countries had already gone through that transformation a long time ago. In any case, in decades to come the Jihadist movements can count on a significant mobilization base – a large number of young people who may be recruited for combat tasks, including the operation of car bombs.

It would certainly be wrong if all Muslims were identified with Islamists and Jihadists. It would be of precious value for this paper if the percentage of the total world's Muslim population that Islamist movements can count on in the sense of a mobilization base could be at least approximately determined. A few years ago, the Pew Research Center conducted an examination with respect to the attitudes of the Muslim population in the world towards certain religious, social and political phenomena.

Although this research cannot be treated as quite a representative one since a larger number of bigger Muslim countries were left out, at least it can

¹⁵³ Ibid. 10.

¹⁵⁴ Population Reference Bureau, 2016 World Population Data Sheet, <http://www.prb.org/pdf16/prb-wpds2016-web-2016.pdf> [Retrieved on: April 14, 2017], 10.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. 12-13.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. 13-14.

¹⁵⁷ John R. Weeks, *Population: An Introduction to Concepts and Issues* [Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002], 100.

offer indications of the manner in which Muslims in the world perceive certain contemporary problems and phenomena and in which percentage. The introduction of Sharia as the official legislation is advocated by 99% of the interviewed in Afghanistan, 84% in Pakistan and 82% in Bangladesh. Except in South Asia, a very high level of support to the introduction of Sharia is recorded in Iraq (91%), in the Palestinian territories (89%), in Egypt (74%) and in Jordan (71%). Malaysia and Indonesia have similar percentages – 86% and 72%, respectively.¹⁵⁸ In contrast with the foregoing high percentages, the percentage of support to suicide bomber attacks is much lower. The attitude that such attacks are “often or sometimes justified” is only supported by 1% of the interviewed in Azerbaijan, 2% in Kazakhstan, 3% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 7% in Indonesia and Iraq. On the other hand, the percentage is not insignificant in the following countries: 13% in Pakistan, 15% in Turkey, 18% in Malaysia, 26% in Bangladesh, 29% in Egypt, 39% in Afghanistan and even 40% in the Palestinian territories.¹⁵⁹

As can be observed, a very high percentage of the respondents are supportive of the introduction of Sharia as the official legislation, which is otherwise one of the most important goals of Islamist movements. Contrary to that, a significantly lower percentage of the population approves of suicide attacks, which ensure one of the most impressive media impacts of action of those very same movements. So, broad Muslim masses are to a great extent supportive of the political goal of the Islamists (the establishment of Sharia), whereas they are to a much lesser extent supportive of the part of their practice (suicide attacks). This conclusion testifies to the fact that it is very difficult to precisely determine in percentage the share that radically enthused Muslims have in the total population of the Islamic creed. What is certain, however, is the fact that the number is by no means insignificant even if we accept that it has a single-digit percentage in comparison with the global Muslim population (given the fact that about 1.8 billion Muslims currently live in the world, this means to say 5% implies a number of about 90 million people).

Apart from demographic trends, certain facts that concern Islam itself as a religion also work in favor of the radical Muslim movements. It is frequently possible to learn from the media that certain Muslim theologians think that certain interpretations of Islam adhered to by Jihadists are wrong or harmful.

¹⁵⁸ Pew Research Center, *The World's Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society*, April 30 2013, <http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/04/worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-full-report.pdf> [Retrieved on: April 14, 2017], 15.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 29.

Yet, in Islam, there is no clearly defined reference authority (individual or collective) whose opinion of a problem or phenomenon all or at least the majority of believers would unconditionally show inclination for, as is the case within the Catholic Church (the Pope) or say orthodox churches (patriarchs/synods). As Bernard Lewis notices, there is neither church nor priesthood in Islam.¹⁶⁰ It means that there is no true clerical hierarchy, either, for which reason and in the broadest meaning of the word, the so-called moderate and radical interpretations of Mohammed's teachings can also have an equal theological legitimacy.

The second important fact that stimulates the creation and expansion of the Jihadist militias and Islamist movements concerns certain teachings/messages from the Islamic tradition, including the Quran itself. Say, as Lewis alleges, according to the Muslim teachings, a jihad is one of the basic commandments of faith, an obligation imposed on all the Muslims by God through revelation.¹⁶¹ However, a question is posed regarding what jihad actually is. In the media, that word is frequently translated as a holy war, which irritates certain Islamic theologians. Although this Arabic word literally means – an effort, an aspiration, a striving or a fight, and although certain Muslim reformers suggest that this term has a moral and spiritual character in the first place – Lewis clearly determines that the obligation of the jihad has been understood in the military sense by the overwhelming majority of classical Islamic theologians, jurists and traditionists.¹⁶² Apart from that, Lewis emphasizes the fact that the basis of the obligation of a jihad lies in the universality of Muslim revelation and that everyone who has accepted that revelation has a duty to convert or at least subordinate those who have not done that yet. This obligation is not limited by space and time and it must last as long as the whole world has accepted the Islamic faith or has submitted itself to the power of the Islamic State.¹⁶³

Such conclusions suggest that in the decades to come, apart from the mobilization (human) potential, the Islamist movements can, in the same degree, also count on the theological (ideological) inspiration (a radical narration) while recruiting future suicide bombers. To put it more briefly, as long as there is Islam (in such an organizational and dogmatic respect) there will also be Islamist movements, as well as the extreme interpretations of the Quran. In any case, in decades to come, the powerful combination of the

¹⁶⁰ Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988], 30.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.* 73.

¹⁶² *Ibid.* 72.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.* 73.

demographic growth of the global Muslim population and the different Islamist discourses from Morocco to Indonesia will make a reliable “infrastructure” for the tactics of suicide attacks that have previously been described.

CONCLUSION

Jihadist militias in the wars and armed conflicts throughout Asia and Africa (from Niger, via Somalia, Syria and Iraq to Afghanistan) are most frequently incapable of conducting regular large-scale military operations against the legal security forces in those states and the foreign troops that support these forces. Therefore, they resort to asymmetric warfare, relying on probably the only one relatively abundant resource they have at their disposal – humans. As is noticed in a paper dedicated to asymmetric warfare, the true asymmetry does not only lie in the differences in the power and the military organization of the warring sides, but also in their tactics, values and goals.¹⁶⁴ The tactical procedure of Jihadist groups in which humans are transformed from weapon operators into a weapon itself (the use of car bombs operated by suicide drivers) undoubtedly belongs to asymmetric warfare.

Bearing in mind the current, as well as future, demographic trends in the Muslim world, it is possible to almost certainly anticipate that in the decades to come this procedure will be dominant in the Jihadist tactics of war waging. Especially in its “civilian” variation (terrorist attacks with motor vehicles loaded with explosive on the buildings where a large number of citizens gather – stadiums, halls, squares – say, in Western Europe), this procedure can produce innumerable victims and immeasurable psychological and political consequences.

The use of car bombs with suicide drivers demonstrates the connectedness between asymmetry and demography. The technologically developed societies of the Northern Hemisphere with pronouncedly negative demographic indicators, such as Japan, have increasingly been considering and operationalizing the introduction of robotics into the armed forces. On the other hand, the technologically undeveloped, but demographically dynamic Muslim world can first of all offer Jihadist militias the “human resources” that these militias have mercilessly been spending. Most probably, the world is entering a period of numerous and long-lasting asymmetric wars in which humans (the population) will be one of the dominant factors.

¹⁶⁴Joaquín Mariano Pellicer Balsalobre, “El recurso humano en la doctrina para los escenarios de guerra asimétrica”, *Documento Marco*, 06/2017, http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_marco/2017/DIEEEM06-2017_Guerra_Asimetrica_JoaquinPellicer.pdf [Retrieved on April 30, 2017], 6.

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LJUDI KAO ORUŽJE: ASIMETRIJA I DEMOGRAFIJA *

Nebojša Vuković**

Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Na početku rada, autor ukratko razmatra pojmove rata i asimetrije. Kao primer koncepcije asimetričnog ratovanja, autor navodi teze francuskog teoretičara Gi Brosolea o tzv. nebitki. Analizirajući pojedine elemente taktike islamističkih formacija u Iraku i Siriji, autor nalazi određene sličnosti između modularnog ratovanja u Brosoleovoj koncepciji i načina izvođenja napadnih operacija vojske Islamske države i drugih džihadističkih milicija. Poseban naglasak je stavljen na izvođenje napada pomoću auto-bombi kojima upravljaju islamistički borci – samoubice. Rad se zasniva na tvrdnji, da islamistički pokreti i vojne formacije, budući da su tehnički i resursno inferiorni u odnosu na regularne armije (posebno na one sa Zapada), upotrebom auto-bombi pokušavaju da asimetrično odgovore na nadmoć protivnika. Prema mišljenju autora, za ovakvu taktiku islamističkih oružanih formacija, neophodna su dva suštinska elementa – populacioni i ideološki. S obzirom da se stanovništvo islamske vere u svetu neprekidno uvećava, i da je u proseku relativno mlado, može da se pretpostavi, da će ono u decenijama koje slede predstavljati bogat mobilizacijski izvor za regrutovanje hiljada budućih bombaša-samoubica. Takođe, islamistička naracija neće nestati s obzirom da se generiše iz određenih radikalnih interpretacija islama. Drugim rečima, dokle god bude islama biće i islamizma. Osnovna teza rada se zasniva na uvidu da se tehnološki i logistički slabija strana u asimetričnom konfliktu odupire sa onim čega ima u izboru. U ovom slučaju, islamističke formacije u sukobu sa sekularnim muslimanskim i nemuslimanskim armijama obilato troše humane resurse – ljude kao oružje (bombaše-samoubice). Takođe, osnovnu tezu čini stav da će taktika upotrebe auto-bombi postati jedna od dominantnih u budućnosti, usled pozitivnih demografskih datosti (konstatnog rasta) u okviru svetske muslimanske populacije.

Ključne reči: asimetrija, demografija, islam, rat, samoubilački napadi.

* Rad je realizovan u okviru projekta „Srbija u savremenim međunarodnim odnosima – strateški pravci razvoja i učvršćivanja položaja Srbije u međunarodnim integrativnim procesima – spoljopolitički, međunarodni ekonomski, pravni i bezbednosni aspekti“ Ministarstva prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije, br. 179029.

** sonevukovic@gmail.com

GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSION OF ASYMMETRIC THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF SERBIA

Dušan Proroković*

Institute for International Politics and Economy, Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: Asymmetric threats undermine national security; it is necessary to anticipate them and act preemptively. In the context of safeguarding national security, key asymmetric threats are: terrorism, depopulation, migration, organized crime, and threats caused by unfavorable economic and social environment. Certain threats characteristically occur in particular regions of the Republic of Serbia, thus pointing at their geopolitical dimension. Particular asymmetric threats threaten the security of the Republic of Serbia as a whole, but above all they threaten individual geographical areas, and it is necessary to tackle this issue from this angle as well. This paper consists of four parts. In the first part, several approaches to the notion of asymmetric threat are presented, along with the definitions. The second part answers the questions of what constitutes national security, how it is affected by geopolitical factors, and why asymmetric threats can have geopolitical features. Particular asymmetric threats and their connections with certain regions of Serbia are described in the third part. The fourth part provides concluding remarks.

Key words: national security, asymmetric threat, geopolitics, terrorism, depopulation, organized crime, economic and social environment.

THE NOTION OF ASYMMETRIC THREAT

The notion of asymmetric threat is increasingly used in political analyses and comments, as well as in various national strategies. For former US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld, who made a major contribution to the affirmation of this term, these are “unconventional threats”. In 2003, he wrote that the United States should develop strategies not only for conventional wars, but also for “detering enemies who rely on the factor of surprise,

* The author has a PhD in political science and works as a lecturer at the Faculty of Diplomacy and Security in Belgrade and as a researcher at the Institute for International Politics and Economy. E-mail: prorokovic@yahoo.co.uk

deception and the pursuit of an asymmetric war in order to achieve their goals. Before plans for major operations and even before plans to run small wars against certain states, the Pentagon should develop a strategy to combat unconventional threats by states or non-state actors who would want to attack American interests.”¹⁶⁵ Therefore it can be said that “asymmetric armed acts are conflicts involving unequal rivals, in which the weaker opponent resorts to the use of unconventional methods of warfare.”¹⁶⁶ In terms of armed conflicts, “asymmetric threats are not new phenomena, and neither is the attention that strategists devote to this issue. In all times, from the pre-modern to the present, the weaker opponent used surprise, technology, innovative tactics, or other approaches, in order to counter the stronger one.”¹⁶⁷ Conflicts may have been sporadic, limited to several actions or stretched indefinitely, turning into “asymmetric wars”. “In other words, it means that war is waged between the opponents that are very different in the amount of power they possess. Such wars are also called asymmetric wars. One party to the conflict has power expressed through the number of troops, combat systems capabilities and their destructive power, economic and industrial power, mass media control, domestic as well as international support, while the other party to the conflict has a limited number of soldiers (without uniforms, as a rule) who have a limited choice of weapons and other assets, but who are determined in their intentions”¹⁶⁸

Certainly, “armed conflicts remain a key aspect of state policy”¹⁶⁹; in armed conflicts “imbalance is something strived for.”¹⁷⁰ However, it is necessary to differentiate between the notions of asymmetric threat, war, and conflict. Undoubtedly, the whole notion of asymmetric threat came from a military context and it primarily concerned asymmetric war. “The notion of asymmetric conflict has been introduced into scientific research by Andrew

¹⁶⁵ Michael Rubin, „Asymmetrical Threat Concept and its Reflections on International Security“, *Middle East Forum, Strategic Research and Study Center*, May 31, 2007, http://www.meforum.org/1696/asymmetrical-threat-concept-and-its-reflections#_ftn3

¹⁶⁶ А. С. Тетерюк, А. С., Я. А. Чижевский, „Асимметричные конфликты в теории международных отношений: современные аспекты изучения“, *Сравнительная политика*, 4 (21), 2015, p.24

¹⁶⁷ Michael Rubin, „Asymmetrical Threat Concept and its Reflections on International Security“, *Middle East Forum, Strategic Research and Study Center*, May 31, 2007, http://www.meforum.org/1696/asymmetrical-threat-concept-and-its-reflections#_ftn3

¹⁶⁸ Др Славољуб Ранђеловић, „Савремени концепт сукоба у инфомационо-комуникационој сфери“, *Војно дело*, Год. LX, Број 1, 2008, pp.140-141

¹⁶⁹ А. С. Тетерюк, А. С., Я. А. Чижевский, „Асимметричные конфликты в теории международных отношений: современные аспекты изучения“, *Сравнительная политика*, 4 (21), 2015, p.24

¹⁷⁰ Бартелеми Курмон, Дарко Рибникар, *Асиметрични ратови, сукоби јуче и данас, тероризам и нове претње*, НИЦ „Војска“, Београд, 2003, p.29

Mac, who published the article entitled “Why Great Powers Lose Small Wars: Politics of Asymmetric Conflict” in 1975.¹⁷¹ Military scholars looked for the answer to the question: how to confront the less armed and less numerous enemies that use unconventional methods of warfare? Despite the fact that the possibility of an armed attack is probably the biggest threat to the security of states, wars are not the only threats. “A threat, in the widest sense, is a conscious intention to cause harm to a person, a property or a right, in order to force the object of the threat to behave in a certain way. A threat is also the intention to cause harm or to punish, as an indication of an unwanted or unpleasant event, or the possibility of causing harm. Compared to challenges and risks, a threat is stronger in its manifestation, with clear indications that harm will be inflicted very soon if rapid response is lacking.”¹⁷² (Tatomir, 2011: 46) Harm can also be inflicted due to the action of other factors, and not only because of the enemy's armed attack. Admiral Vern Clark states that in addition to armed attacks in the form of terrorism, unconventional guerrilla warfare and possible (mis)use of weapons of mass destruction, information wars and cyber warfare are also asymmetric threats¹⁷³. Zoran Dragišić recognizes three groups of asymmetric threats: terrorism, organized crime, and “the consequences of unfavourable economic and social environment and high unemployment” suitable for the spread of various types of extremism.¹⁷⁴

This list can be expanded with new threats because asymmetric threats arise as a result of “the use of new technologies and the increase in the impact of non-traditional threats (organized crime, terrorism, environmental and

¹⁷¹ Лариса В. Дергилазова, „Асимметричный конфликт в современной американской политологии“, *Международные процессы*, Т. 8, № 2 (23), 2010, p. 52.

¹⁷² Драган Татомир, „Процена изазова, ризика, претњи безбедности Републике Србије у функцији планирања употребе Војске Србије“, *Војно дело*, Год. LXIII, Број 2, пролеће 2011, pg 46.

¹⁷³ Vern Clark, „Sea power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities“, *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute*, Conference Paper, Washington D.C., October 2002, pp. 36-37. Steven Metz and Douglas Johnson II describe asymmetric wars in more detail and complement this list with the use of biological and chemical weapons, urban warfare and the “scorched earth strategy”. In: Steven Metz, Douglas V. Johnson II, *Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, Military Strategy*, Strategic Studies Institute: U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks (PA), 2001, p. 1.

¹⁷⁴ Зоран Драгишић, „Безбедносни идентитет Балкана и ЕУ“, *Култура полица*, Год. X, Бр. 22, 2013, pp.149-152. Zoran Dragišić gives special attention to organized crime. “Organized crime, in the circumstances of weak and incomplete states, represents a serious security threat due to political aspirations that main organizers of criminal activity develop. Such political aspirations are fulfilled through corruption which takes over the most lucrative industries; besides the legalization of the money acquired in illegal ways, it blocks the economic basis of institutional strengthening of the state.” *Ibidem*, p. 150.

demographic threats, etc.).”¹⁷⁵ With the continuous development of technologies, the number of current and potential unconventional threats is rising. Ultimately, it depends on how the concept of security is defined, or how certain phenomena are investigated. If, as in the period of the Cold War, focus is on military security, then asymmetric threats are the intentions that can cause an asymmetric war. However, if security is observed in the widest possible perspective, a list of asymmetric threats cannot be conclusive, as new causes of threats keep emerging. Stephen J. Lambakis warns of this as he questions the validity of the entire concept of asymmetric threat. If the interpretations of this notion are too broad, it is impossible to generalize and define asymmetric threats in more clear-cut terms.¹⁷⁶ It is therefore necessary to determine the notion of asymmetric threat in parallel with the level of analysis.

In terms of global security, asymmetric threats are primarily the processes of disrupting the natural balance by excessive resource depletion (the problem here is that although the consequences of their acts are obvious, actors do not initiate these processes in order to harm the planet and humanity, whereas a threat is a conscious intention to harm the security of others). In terms of regional security, asymmetric threats are increasing mass migrations that are changing ethnic and religious structure in different parts of the world. In terms of national security, asymmetric threats differ depending on each state. Of course, global and regional threats endanger not only humanity as a whole, but also states directly, just as destabilization of certain states jeopardizes regional and sometimes even global security. This depends of course on the character of the threats and the importance of the state in the world political system. “Global security and security of Europe are increasingly endangered by the new challenges, risks and threats that have emerged as a result of the negative effects of globalization, national and religious extremism, conflicts over territories and a growing deficit in natural resources. Terrorism, illegal armed groups’ rebellions, national and religious extremism, organized crime, and natural and industrial catastrophes present high security risks and threats on global, regional and national levels. They show a tendency of spilling over from one area to another and therefore can present a security threat to the Republic of Serbia.”¹⁷⁷ As it can be seen from

¹⁷⁵ Снежана Васић, „Утицај међународних безбедносних субјеката на безбедност земаља Западног Балкана“, *Војно дело*, Год. LXVI, Број 3/2014, 2014, p. 8.

¹⁷⁶ Stephen J. Lambakis, „Reconsidering Asymmetric Warfare.“ *Joint Forces Quarterly*, February 2005, pp. 102-108.

¹⁷⁷ Драган Татомир, „Процена изазова, ризика, претњи безбедности Републике Србије у функцији планирања употребе Војске Србије“, *Војно дело*, Год. LXIII, Број 2, пролеће 2011, p.54

the most of the previous quotes, asymmetric threats are usually connected with the state level and aspects of endangering state security. Thereby asymmetric threats cannot be understood only as intentions that can lead to war, but also as processes that endanger national security.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND ASYMMETRIC THREATS

Unlike the notion of asymmetric threat, the term *national security* is more clearly defined. The term *state security* can sometimes be found as a synonym, but this is usually the result of different translations of the term *national security* from English, and it does not change its essence. The term *national security* was introduced into wider use in a 1943 article by Walter Lippmann, who explained it in the context of war, stating that this is a situation “when a nation is certain that it will not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests if it wants to avoid war, or if provoked, it can maintain its legitimate interests by participating in the war.”¹⁷⁸ From this explanation of national security it may be possible to see what the threats to the emergence of an asymmetrical armed conflict are, but not more than that. Lippmann, as well as his contemporaries, saw threats from the perspective of military security. Therefore, in the post-Cold War period there was a growing number of definitions by different authors who gave national security a wider interpretation, for example, that it is “a situation that enables functioning, stability and development of the state, ensures peace, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders, internal order in the country, basic rights and freedoms of citizens, protects their lives, health, property and living space”¹⁷⁹, or “capability of a nation to overcome multidimensional threats regarding the welfare and survival of the state at any time by keeping the balance of all state policy instruments through governance.”¹⁸⁰ In the modern world “the national security policy of a state depends on the type and reach of the state and national interests and on the current and potential threats that endanger or can endanger these interests. The threats can be: political, economic, military, demographic, social, confessional, educational, ecological, and those caused by long-term covert action of retrograde forces in all areas of social life. Problems of defining the term *national security* are fully seen when

¹⁷⁸ Walter, Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*, Little&Brown, Boston, 1943, p. 49

¹⁷⁹ Ladislav Šimák et al., *Terminologický slovník krízového manažmentu*, Fakulta špeciálneho inžinierstva Žilinskej univerzity v Žiline, Žilina, 2006, p.5

¹⁸⁰ Prabhakaran Paleri, *National Security: Imperatives and Challenges*, Tata McGraw Hill, New Delhi, 2008, p.54

values that can be endangered have to be identified and when one has to identify the vital state and national interests that should be protected by elements of the national security system. Most of the contemporary authors who deal with exploring national security claim that vital social, state, and national interests are in fact general needs of the state and its citizens and that they come from general values and goals stated in constitutions of nation states and also from the potential for action and the actual position of each state in international affairs”.¹⁸¹

By safeguarding national security, elementary prerequisites for all other activities at the state level are fulfilled, whether elementary freedoms and rights of citizens, sustainability of the institutional order, or planning for long-term economic development. Without firmly established national security, the achievement of any of the goals set is difficult or at least less attainable. Hence, it is important to monitor and analyze all processes and phenomena that may present an asymmetric threat to national security. At this point, it is necessary to go back to the difference between asymmetric war and asymmetric threats. Stephen Blank asks: Who is the enemy that endangers our national security by asymmetric threats?¹⁸² Can it also be a state? Donald Mrozek describes how the North Vietnamese forces used an asymmetric approach to counter the superiority of the US Air Force and concludes that they succeeded: US forces were able to obstruct certain enemy activities, but not to change the outcome of the war.¹⁸³ Still, this is an example of asymmetric war. Blank points out that what is asymmetric to our security strategies (the author refers to US strategies) can, but does not necessarily have to be, an asymmetric threat. It can be that the enemy is just using different tactics and adapting the organization to the current circumstances, using the available resources accordingly.¹⁸⁴ Such claims are understandable, because from the point of view of the one who is attacked, it is asymmetric, but from the attacker's point of view, there is no asymmetry, but attempts to create symmetry. The weaknesses of the enemy are utilized to disrupt its security and reduce the potential for defense. If our perception of challenges, risks and threats is correct, possible moves of the enemy have been anticipated; there are

¹⁸¹ Радослав Гаџиновић, „Класификација безбедности“, *Наука, безбедност, полиција*, Год. 12, бр. 2. 2007, p.12

¹⁸² Stephen J. Blank, *Rethinking Asymmetric Threats*, Military Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute: U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks (PA), 2003, p.7

¹⁸³ Donald J. Mrozek, „Asymmetric Response to American Air Supremacy in Vietnam“, in: Lloyd J. Matthews (ed), *Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated?*, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 1998, pp. 82-103

¹⁸⁴ Stephen J. Blank, *Rethinking Asymmetric Threats*, Military Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute: U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks (PA), 2003, pp.1-2

no surprises and asymmetric threats, only preemptive action and the elimination of threats. It is therefore necessary to focus on phenomena and processes that endanger national security.

Simply stated, what appears to be a threat (phenomena and processes that may pose a problem to our national security) can only be exploited by the enemy in order to achieve victory in war (using conventional or non-conventional means). For example, criminal structures or certain political and religious groups in the territory of the state can be (mis)used by the enemy to violate our national security. In this context, the emergence of organized crime and legitimization of certain political ideas (separatism, religious fundamentalism directed towards change of order) are also asymmetric threats, besides those who perform these activities. Removing the performers of such activities does not eliminate the threat. “Asymmetric threats and challenges are not suppressed by conventional, symmetric means. These threats need to be addressed by the destruction of their roots and causes.”¹⁸⁵ In order to ensure national security, it is necessary to direct action towards the elimination of the threat as such, which is achieved through the application of measures and resources to stop adverse processes and prevent the recurrence of adverse events. The measures to be applied and the means to be used are defined by the adoption of strategic documents aimed at eliminating the threats.

Regarding national security of the Republic of Serbia, as evident in all strategic documents adopted so far, key asymmetric threats are: terrorism, depopulation, migration, organized crime, and threats caused by unfavorable economic and social environment. It is also noteworthy that certain threats are present in particular parts of the country, which points to their geopolitical aspect.

GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSION OF ASYMMETRIC THREATS

The *geopolitical dimension* of asymmetric threats, but also of other phenomena and processes, implies their frequency or scope of expression in a certain geographically limited area. For a long time geopolitics has been perceived as an “aggressive discipline” aimed at spreading “living space” and securing access to resources.¹⁸⁶ However, since the 1990s this approach has changed significantly. Miloš Knežević states that “spatial metamorphosis and territorial dynamics in different segments of the physical world have re-acknowledged the need for understanding the principles of space policy and

¹⁸⁵ Efrem Radev, „Promene u bezbednosnom okruženju: izmenjena percepcija bezbednosti“, Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku, Beograd, Januar 2011, p. 4.

¹⁸⁶ Vjačeslav Avijucki, *Kontinentalne geopolitike*, Clio, Beograd, 2009, pp. 14-15

increased the importance of understanding it”.¹⁸⁷ He adds that contemporary geopolitics “has been renewed as a particular tendency in exploring and interpreting the macro and micro phenomena of political space, politics in a space and space of politics.”¹⁸⁸ Therefore, as he concludes, “geography is politicized” and “politics is geographycized”.¹⁸⁹ Milomir Stepić also claims that there is an obvious “geography of political processes”¹⁹⁰, and certain phenomena are frequently or exclusively connected with particular geographic areas. The manifestation of these phenomena and processes cannot be characterized as a “geographic dimension”; tentatively, this can be done in the broadest possible (imprecise) context, because the socio-geographical factors are dynamic and rapidly transforming, which affects political processes. Explaining this trend in the case of water resource management in the Middle East, Ahmet Davutoğlu characterizes this as a *geopolitical dependency*.¹⁹¹ The geopolitical dimension of certain processes is conditioned by geopolitical dependence. The approach to and management of water resources, primarily on the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, has its ecological, energy-related, economic and security-related dimensions for the southeast of Turkey, which is reflected on the overall policy of this country, its strategy, foreign policy positioning, etc.

The goals of geopolitical research, therefore, are not only related to foreign policy, macrostrategies and interests of great powers, but also include microgeographic entities within which (in)adequate processes are developing that affect the overall political situation in the country. If, due to negative political or social processes in a region, there are new challenges, risks and threats to the security of the state, which are tentatively referred to as “micro-geopolitical”, it adversely affects its “macro-geopolitics” and entails a series of consequences, worsening the position of the country in international relations. Without solving open “micro-geopolitical” issues, “macro-geopolitics” cannot be planned nor performed. In order to analyze the geopolitical dimension of asymmetric threats, it is necessary to make a distinction between the social and political processes that are associated with a particular geographic area. Undoubtedly, asymmetric threats can come from other states or non-state

¹⁸⁷ Милош Кнежевић, *Призма Геополитике*, Институт за политичке студије, Београд, 2013, р. 35.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, р. 92.

¹⁸⁹ Милош Кнежевић, *Мозаик геополитике. Идентитет – транзиција – српско питање*, Институт за политичке студије, Београд, 2008.

¹⁹⁰ Миломир Степић, *Геополитика: идеје, теорије, концепције*, Институт за политичке студије, Београд, 2016, р. 57.

¹⁹¹ Ахмет Давутоглу, *Стратегијска дубина*, Службени гласник, Београд, 2014, рр. 146-147.

actors; they can be both conventional and unconventional. Can the establishment of armed forces of the so-called Republic of Kosovo, or occasional threats from certain politicians from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina directed towards Serbia or (more often) towards the Republic of Srpska, be considered as an asymmetric threat? The answer is affirmative, of course. However, such threats are directly generated by the development of particular political processes in these geographic units. When threats are a direct consequence of political processes, they can lead up to an asymmetric war. Asymmetric threats that cannot produce an asymmetric war, but nevertheless pose a threat to national security are examined in this paper. They are related to social processes obvious in particular regions, which are then indirectly and gradually reflected on political processes. Numerous studies of the interdependence between social and political processes have confirmed a high degree of their interconnectedness, but there remains the unresolved question of when and to what extent one of these two processes is induced by others, or in other words, when political processes shape the social ones, and vice versa. In fact, this question resembles the chicken and egg dilemma. Due to the limitations of space, this issue cannot be covered in more detail here. Suffice it to merely point to the existence of theoretical grounding for the thesis that social processes gradually affect political processes, regardless of their causes.

Political processes specific to particular geographic areas, viewed from within this context, refer to macro-geopolitics, while social processes are related to micro-geopolitics. These social processes often go beyond the wishes of political structures, i.e. they continue despite attempts at preventing them through institutional action. States adopt strategies and laws, trying to prevent or slow down what they see as negative processes, but they fail. Over time, instead of transforming social processes into political ones, there is a completely reverse phenomenon of social processes shaping the political ones, placing new topics on the agenda for institutions to tackle. The asymmetric threats identified in this paper are of such kind. They are present in a limited geographic area, state institutions fail to influence their transformation, and their action affects national security adversely. Hence the reliance on the definitions from the first part of the paper, where asymmetric threats were described as non-traditional threats such as organized crime, terrorism, poverty, as well as environmental and demographic threats.

The aforementioned asymmetric threats are causal to a certain extent. The emergence of one inevitably leads to the appearance of another. Acceleration of an unfavorable process generates identical development in other cases. Deteriorating economic and social environment is one of the causes of increased migration, both internally, from rural regions to more developed communities, and externally, from Serbia to West European

countries; organized crime ruins the institutions that are left incapable of maintaining order. This weakens trust in the rule of law and affects many social processes. Weakened state structures and the growth of mistrust in institutions are perfectly suited for the propagation of various extremist movements, among which the most radical ones are transformed into terrorist cells. No one invests in communities that are seen as an “extremism nursery”. Economic and social conditions deteriorate even further, and so on. Asymmetric threats therefore jeopardize national security, and in possible armed conflicts these weaknesses can be used in the conduct of operations against the Republic of Serbia. An important characteristic of certain asymmetric threats is their geographical scope. Three threats should be analyzed in this context: terrorism, depopulation (caused by internal migrations) and economic-social environment. Despite the best intention to analyze the threat of organized crime from a similar point of view, this is not possible because of the limited space for the research results presentation, but also because the most likely conclusion would be that it is not feasible. Organized crime is not linked to a single clearly defined area in the territory of the Republic of Serbia (unlike in Italy, for example, where organized criminal structures are primarily active in the regions of Sicily, Naples and Calabria; or in Mexico, where cartels are most active in the states of Sinaloa and Guerrero). Unlike other aforementioned threats, it cannot be concluded that organized crime has a geopolitical dimension.

Terrorism is thus linked with extremist groups’ activities, tied up with radical Islamist movements or with the actions of Albanian paramilitary formations infiltrating Serbia from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, or organized by their supporters in the municipalities of Bujanovac and Preševo. The actions of radical Islamists (members of the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, Al-Nusra, Muslim Brotherhood and similar organizations) present a challenge to the entire international community (however the term is defined). To some extent this can be seen as a global phenomenon and a threat that reaches far beyond national borders. In Serbia there have already been examples of individuals converting to Islam, quickly adopting radical ideas in the new environment, and participating in terrorist acts.¹⁹²

¹⁹² In 2014, media reported that one Goran Pavlović, aged 49, from Belgrade, together with his wife Mirjana (47) and daughter Nevena (23) converted to Islam, and moved to B&H for a short time. The whole family finally ended up in Syria, where he fought in the Jamaican Muhammad Islamic State (Glory to Muhammad) under the name of Abdullah. In addition, in December 2016, Boban Simeonović (36) born in Šarbanovac near Bor, was arrested in Berlin on charges of being part of a group that organized an attack on civilians during a Christmas bazaar in the capital city of Germany.

Table 1: Basic demographic indicators¹⁹³

per 1000 inhabitants	2002	2011	average age	2002	2011
live births	10.6	9.0	of mothers at birth of all children	26.7	28.7
deaths	13.2	14.2	of mothers at birth of the first child	25.1	27.5
population growth	- 2.7	-5.2	of men at death	67.8	71.0
marriages	5.5	4.9	of women at death	72.9	76.1
divorces	1.0	1.1	of grooms at wedding	31.5	33.0
			of brides at wedding	27.6	29.5
dead infants per 1000 live births	10.2	6.3	of grooms/first marriage	28.5	30.5
live births (unmarried parents) per 1000 live births	204.2	239.5	of brides/first marriage	25.1	27.4
divorces per 1000 marriages	189.2	230.4	life expectancy for men	69.6	71.6
total fertility rate	1.6	1.4	life expectancy for women	74.8	76.8

Therefore, such threats can emerge anywhere, and from this perspective, they are most likely to appear in urban centers, where most of the country's inhabitants live. However, it should also be stressed that, logically, Islamic radical groups are most active in the parts of the country where Muslims constitute a large share of the population.

Such is the case primarily with the municipalities of Novi Pazar, Tutin, and Preševo, or seen from a wider perspective, the whole Raška region.

¹⁹³ Michael Rubin, „Asymmetrical Threat Concept and its Reflections on International Security“, *Middle East Forum, Strategic Research and Study Center*, May 31, 2007, http://www.meforum.org/1696/asymmetrical-threat-concept-and-its-reflections#_ftn3.

Although the headquarters of the Furkan mescit¹⁹⁴, from which volunteers were recruited for Syria, was in Novi Pazar, it turned out that the commander of this group was Abid Podbičanin from the village of Velika Župa near Prijepolje.

Therefore, when speaking of terrorism as an asymmetric threat, attention must also be paid to Prijepolje, Sjenica, Priboj, Nova Varoš and Bujanovac.

Depopulation is one of the features of border areas. Two processes affect the decreasing number of inhabitants in certain municipalities: a dramatic decline in the number of newborns and the emigration of the working-age population due to poor economic and social conditions. Comparing the results of the 2002 and 2011 censuses, the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia came to alarming conclusions, stated for the entire territory of the country (without the data for Kosovo and Metohija) and shown in Table 1. According to Goran Penev's projections, if current trends continue, Serbia will have around 5,566,400 inhabitants in 2040, and in 2060 this number will decrease to 4,906,700.¹⁹⁵


Continuous decrease in population and population aging are asymmetric threats to national security, but adverse trends are most evident in some municipalities in the south and east of the country. On the other hand, the number of inhabitants of Belgrade, Novi Sad, Niš and Kragujevac is growing, as can be seen on Map 1.

The largest decrease in population, in terms of relative indicators, was noted in Crna Trava, Babušnica, Trgovište, Medveđa, and Majdanpek (over 20% in the period between the two censuses).

¹⁹⁴ A mescit is a small place of worship, a place where prayer is continually exercised. Most often, it is one room, the size of a small apartment, where Muslims who have similar views on certain issues gather.

¹⁹⁵ Goran Penev, *Projekcije stanovništva Srbije od 2010. do 2060. godine*, Fiskalni savet, Beograd, 2013, p. 17.

Општине и градови према порасту-паду броја становника у периоду 2002-2011.



Map 1: Municipalities and towns according to population increase/decrease in 2002-2011¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁶ Бранислав Турђе, Даниела Арсенић, „Популациона динамика у међуопшном периоду. Просторна дистрибуција становништва“, у: Владимир Никитовић (ур.),

It is also disconcerting that on the north-south axis, from Majdanpek to Crna Trava, population decreased by over 10% in another 18 municipalities in the observed period (Golubac, Veliko Gradište, Malo Crniće, Kučevo and Žagubica west of Majdanpek; Kladovo and Negotin east of Majdanpek; Dimitrovgrad east and Vlasotince west of Crna Trava; between Majdanpek and Babušnica there is a belt of such municipalities, including Bor, Boljevac, Sokobanja, Ražanj, Aleksinac, Knjaževac, Svrlijig, Bela Palanka, and Gadžin Han). To the north-west and north-east of Medveđa there are 3 municipalities where population decrease is also over 10%: Kuršumljija, Blace, Brus, Lebane, Bojnik, and Žitorađa. Decrease in population by over 10% is also noted in northern Banat and partly in southern Banat, in western Bačka, in parts of western Serbia (Mali Zvornik, Ljubovija, Bajina Bašta, Krupanj, Osečina), and in three municipalities in the Raška region (Priboj, Prijepolje, and Nova Varoš). Comparison of the aforementioned data with the figures in Map 2 shows that this threat is most obvious in the south-east part of Serbia (in more than 29 municipalities). Map 2 shows municipalities and towns according to the average annual population growth. Namely, in these areas both problems are evident: in addition to emigration, the number of births, which is below the average, is lower than the number of deaths. This indicates that the existing trend will continue, and in the years to come further depopulation is to be expected in the regions that include most of the territory, or even the entire territory, of the following districts: Bor, Zaječar, Pirot, Jablanica, Pčinja, and Toplica, as well as parts of the Nišavski and Braničevski districts. They all comprise an area of 18,500 km². (For comparison, the area of Montenegro is 13,812 km²).

Besides depopulation, deteriorations of the economic and social environment can also be seen as an asymmetrical threat to the whole territory of Serbia. A socio-economic environment is comprised of the circumstances in which socio-economic processes take place in a given area (socio-economic indicators are mainly observed at the level of local self-government units). Socio-economy is a discipline that studies the effects of economic activity on social processes, i.e. on the behavior of individuals and groups (social dynamics research).¹⁹⁷ Analyzing socio-economic indicators in municipalities in Serbia, Mirjana Rašević and Goran Penev examined the unemployment rate, the number of educational institutions, the level of health care, the share of the

Популација Србије почетком 21. века, Републички завод за статистику, Београд, 2015, стр. 42-62.

¹⁹⁷ Steven Durlauf, H. Peyton Young, „The New Social Economics“, In: Steven N. Durlauf, H. Peyton Young (eds.), *Social Dynamics*, Brookings Institutions Press: MIT Press, Washington D.C.: Cambridge, 2001, pp. 1-11.

households of the elderly, visits to counseling centers for mothers of infants, etc. The data obtained were compared to the national average. Municipalities were classified into different categories accordingly.¹⁹⁸

Map 2 Average rate of natural increase in municipalities and cities, in the period 2002- 2011

Општине и градови према просечној годишњој стопи природног прираштаја у периоду 2002-2011.



Map 2: Municipalities and cities according to the average annual rate of natural increase in the period 2002-2011¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁸ Др Мирјана Рашевић, мр Горан Пенев, „Социоекономски показатељи: картографски приказ по општинама“, *Демографски преглед*, Год. X, број 36/2010, pp. 2-4.

Nebojša Katić states devastating facts: “Serbian GDP, as a standard measure of economic success, does not give cause for celebration. The real growth of the domestic economy in 2016, according to preliminary estimates, amounts to a modest 2.7%. This is a high growth rate for developed economies, but it is more than modest for the countries with a low GDP as the basis for calculation. In 2016, among the countries in the region, only Croatia and Macedonia, their rates being around 2%, had a lower growth rate than Serbia. (According to the IMF categorization, the region to which Serbia belongs includes 11 states and “Kosovo”.) Looking four years back, the picture gets even grimmer: the average growth rate of the Serbian economy was around 1% annually. Croatia excluded, this is the lowest average rate in the region. The situation does not get better when Serbia is compared to itself either. The average annual GDP growth rate from 2001 to 2009 was around 5.9%. When the catastrophic period of 2009 to 2012 is included in the calculation, the average for the period of 2001 to 2012 is about 3.7%. If GDP is measured per capita, Serbia's rank is at the bottom in the region, only Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina lagging behind Serbia. Serbian GDP per capita is for example lower than Croatian GDP by 37%, Bulgarian GDP by 29%, and Romanian GDP by 36%. If Serbia were to develop at a rate continually higher than Bulgarian and Croatian rates by 2 % annually, Serbian GDP per capita would reach Bulgarian and Croatian GDPs per capita in approximately 18 years and 23 years respectively.”²⁰⁰

However, looking at the socio-economic indicators by municipalities and the level of local self-government units' development in comparison to the Serbian average, significant differences can be observed at the local level. The most threatened are 44 underdeveloped local self-governments units, whose level of development is below 60% of the Serbian average: Aleksinac, Babušnica, Bela Palanka, Bojnik, Blace, Bosilegrad, Brus, Bujanovac, Varvarin, Vladičin Han, Vlasotince, Gadžin Han, Golubac, Dimitrovgrad, Doljevac, Žabari, Žagubica, Žitorađa, Knjaževac, Krupanj, Kuršumlija, Kučevo, Lebane, Ljig, Mali Zvornik, Malo Crniće, Medveđa, Merošina, Mionica, Nova Varoš, Opovo, Petrovac na Mlavi, Preševo, Priboj, Prijepolje, Ražanj, Raška, Rekovac, Svrlijig, Sjenica, Surdulica, Trgovište, Tutin, and

¹⁹⁹ Бранислав Ђурђевић, Даниела Арсенић, „Популациона динамика у међупописном периоду. Просторна дистрибуција становништва“, у: Владимир Никитовић (ур.), *Популација Србије почетком 21. века*, Републички завод за статистику, Београд, 2015, рр. 42-62.

²⁰⁰ Nebojša Katić, „Između stvarnosti i iluzija: Bilans stanja ekonomije u Srbiji“, *Le Monde diplomatique* (prilog časopisa *Nedeljnik* od 19/01/2017), 2017, str. 1.

Crna Trava.²⁰¹ As in the case of depopulation, it is noteworthy that these municipalities are grouped in the south-east and south-west of the country. This asymmetric threat is therefore primarily present in these particular geographic areas.

CONCLUSION

Although there is neither a unison stance on the notion of asymmetric threat nor a unison definition of what it implies, it does not mean that the strategies concerning this issue should not be elaborated. In this research, the various views were used in order to examine the geopolitical aspect of asymmetric threats and to make a distinction between political processes that can cause asymmetric wars, and social processes that generate asymmetric threats in particular geographic regions. There are asymmetric threats to national security of the Republic of Serbia. Significantly, two threats concern one region, and as many as three threats concern two regions in Serbia. In southeast Serbia (with the exception of the agglomerations of Niš, Leskovac, Pirot, Zaječar, and Vranje), from the Danube in the north to the Pčinja in the south, increased emigration has been noted, as well as a decline in socio-economic indicators and deterioration of the overall economic and social environment. This area has been experiencing depopulation, with economic activity markedly declining for a relatively long time. In the circumstances of the migrant crisis, volatile ethnic relations, and active organized crime groups, national security is indisputably threatened. An even greater problem is encountered in the southernmost areas of central Serbia as well as in the Raška region, where besides depopulation and economic devastation, an increasing influence of radical Islamic groups has also been observed. The processes that represent asymmetric threats to national security practically involve entire southern and eastern areas of the country. This is, in every respect, far more evident in these areas than in other parts of the country. Hence the necessity for urgent adoption of strategies to solve open issues and remove asymmetric threats. Otherwise, further depopulation and economic decline will leave these areas completely deserted, which will inevitably lead to further shrinking of the territory of the Republic of Serbia, with all the consequences that it brings.

²⁰¹ Nacionalna agencija za regionalni razvoj, „Stepen razvijenosti za 2014. godinu“, Beograd, 2017, <http://www.regionalnirazvoj.gov.rs/Lat/ShowNARRFolder.aspx?mi=171>.

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GEOPOLITIČKA DIMENZIJA ASIMETRIČNIH PRETNJI NACIONALNOJ BEZBEDNOSTI SRBIJE

Dušan Proroković*

Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd,
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Asimetrične pretnje narušavaju nacionalnu bezbednost i zbog toga je neophodno anticipirati ih, a zatim i preventivno delovati. U kontekstu osiguravanja nacionalne bezbednosti ključne asimetrične pretnje su: terorizam, depopulacija, migracije, organizovani kriminal i pretnje uzrokovane nepovoljnim ekonomsko-socijalnim ambijentom. Karakteristično je da se pojedine pretnje javljaju u određenim regionima Republike Srbije, te otuda i ukazivanje na njihovu geopolitičku dimenziju. Ispoljavanje konkretnih asimetričnih pretnji ugrožava bezbednost Republike Srbije u celini, ali pre svega njene pojedine geografske celine, te je ovo pitanje neophodno sagledati i iz tog ugla. Rad se sastoji iz četiri dela. U prvom delu se izlažu različita viđenja pojma asimetrične pretnje i određuje šta se pod njom podrazumeva. Drugi deo je posvećen objašnjavanju šta predstavlja nacionalna bezbednost, kako na nju utiču geopolitički faktori i zašto asimetrične pretnje mogu biti geopolitičkog karaktera. Konkretno asimetrične pretnje i njihova povezanost sa pojedinim regionima Srbije se opisuju u trećem delu. Četvrti deo su zaključna razmatranja.

Ključne reči: nacionalna bezbednost, asimetrična pretnja, geopolitika, terorizam, depopulacija, organizovani kriminal, ekonomsko-socijalni ambijent.

* Autor je predavač na Fakultetu za diplomatiju i bezbednost u Beogradu i istraživač Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu. E-mail: prorokovic@yahoo.co.uk.

HYBRID CHALLENGES IN THE BALKANS

Marios Efthymiopoulos*
American University in the Emirates
United Arab Emirates

Abstract: Modern alliances, regional, or international, short-term or long-term, require resilience, robustness and efficiency in the following fields (not limited to): projection planning, acknowledgement of threat and deployability effectiveness. In an age of hybrid challenges, that are yet to be acknowledged, in a period of strong geostrategic changes, in the Balkans among others, in a constantly changing environment, we seek modern military capacity building, technological advances, robust training but also interoperability of forces both national and international for both command and application in operations. More so, we seek clear strategic leadership and vision that does more to promote regional and international environment strategic cooperation, while understanding current but also future challenges. European Continent countries have completed their dues with reflection to the refugee issue. External hybrid threats can no longer be tolerated as challenges grow and create an environment of incapacity to deal with subject and issues that are of national security concern. The paper will reflect on those challenges. Will seek out and request a strong strategic alignment policy between regional states that do more in both regional and international cases, while at the same time request for more robust involvement in settling standing issues that may be “shelved” and be considered frozen as topics of regional security concern. The paper will ask for more engagement in practical diplomatic and military preparedness, active involvement but also seek out for Serbia’s future in an international environment that so much deserves.

Key words: Interoperability, Resilience, Business Security Continuity, Strategic planning, Hybrid Alliances, Refugee Issues, Balkans, Foreign Policy options.

INTRODUCTION

Modern alliances, regional, or international, short-term or long-term, require resilience, continuity robustness and efficiency in the following fields (not limited to): acknowledgement of threat and deployability effectiveness. In

* marios.panagiotis@aue.ae

an age of hybrid challenges, that are yet to be acknowledged, in a period of strong geostrategic changes, in a constantly changing environment, we seek modern political, civilian, military capacity building, through alliances with the moral capacity, leadership skills, technological advances, robust training but also interoperability of forces both national and international for both command and application in any kind of operations, conventional and unconventional.

In the 21st century work of 4th revolution of technology, where resilience on security is of imperative importance, where cooperation is not an option yet a solution, we seek clear strategic leadership and vision in cooperation, that does more to promote regional and international environment strategic cooperation (i.e the Balkans), while understanding current but also future challenges. Considering emerging unconventional threats that may trouble European countries in total to come, European powers seem to have completed duties having put a 'red line' with reflection to refugee issue.

We are now in the forefront of true asymmetrical challenges that have no conventional method of solution. Threats need to be defined; and threats need to be responded. During the course of this research paper, we reflect on current 'unconventional challenges'; we consider the refugee issue an element of 'game changer for the strategic 'game of thrones of the Balkans'; The issue of refugees has become an unconventional challenge and possibly one of the elements of hybrid threat.

The paper seeks a strong strategic alignment policy between the Balkan states that do more in both regional and international cases considering the emergence and need of unconventional threat, deriving from the otherwise humanitarian issue of a refugee status. The paper requests for more robust involvement in settling standing global issues that directly reflect the increase of refugee flow to Europe; the danger that ISIS, which is real, poses a real threat. ISIS reflection of operation is seen in its currently controlled territories; yet also through its 'lone wolves' related with ISIS operating in democratic and free states.

The unconventional threat of uncontrolled refugees seems to be a "Hybrid Asymmetrical Threat; It needs the attention of Balkan yet also European Leaders; It is an issue that is directly links issues of security, criminal justice, national security and operational military capacity protection of the national and regional borders and the rights of the citizens to leave in freedom and prosperity.

It is a subject that risks to be "shelved" and be considered frozen as just another topic without a solution. The paper asks for practical diplomatic and civilian/military and political levels engagement, pro-active involvement seeking solutions for a truly cooperative, free of movement of people and

goods environment. This topic is of important concern to Serbia considering foreign policy options yet also leadership in the former Yugoslavian Space at the time of change and opportunity.

DEFINING THE STRATEGIC WORLD

One of the emerging and greatest challenges, in today's geostrategic and multipolar world is defining strategic alliances. 17 years inside the 21st century, we evidently notice a great reshuffling of alliances. It is based on more than reason or interest. 'Power and influence', are two important reasons why Alliances reshuffle their 'cards' or are re-aligned with new interests.

According to Randall (2006), on Alliances, "...the greatest challenge is the translation of overwhelming might..." of alliances "...into effective influence". Conditions of the 20th century chess board, according to Brzezinski, (Brzezinski,1997), leveraged power through bilateral and multilateral alliances, that were based on power and influence. Even more so, the creation of Alliances based on Steven Walt', *Origins of Alliances*, (Walt, 1987), assumed a role of power effectiveness but also influence in a world that was back in the days, ready to change, yet again.

In 2017, the world is in a state of alliance fluidity. Alliances are being reshuffled. Alliances have been transpired to be 'hybrid' alliances. As we know they are founded based on elements and objectives of security and strategic affairs and challenges, threats but also opportunities. Alliances are created based on tactical objectivity, political acceptance but also necessity of power and influence, that needs in 2017, to be redefined as challenges and threats themselves are not symmetrical and certainly 'hybrid'. Characteristics of alliances will change. During the research's examination and analysis, key points of old and new characteristics of alliances, will be defined.

The world faces, non-traditional challenges as foresaid that are of 'hybrid nature'. And the paper shall explain the terminology and necessity below. Strong geostrategic changes are coming about. Alliances seem to yet again necessary but actually will be redefined in a 'game' of power projection and influence. Modern alliances, need to seek out strong strategic management. Agility through leadership; long-term rather than short term objectives; robust capacity building, while continue to acquire technological advances. Forecasting the future of alliances agility and operational/tactical training and deliverables. Strong strategic commitment, therefore is required. It will allow for alliances to provide resilience for and in operations; effective engagement in capacity to deliver.

In the European continent, regional and internationally led alliances such as NATO states, EU states and regional partners in the Balkans with

European Inspirations, are committed to long strategic alignment against symmetrical and asymmetrical threats. The commitment should continue, enlarge and evolve. As threats and challenges, have managed to evolve and become hybrid from asymmetrical.

The below paper argues that alliances need to be restructured as emerging challenges have now become hybrid. Even more so when describing or discussing about challenges and threats seen in the Balkan Peninsula. According to Walt, “understanding forces that shape international alliances should be a vital concern for most statesmen” (Walt, 1987). It is high time for alliances to be redefined regionally and internationally; operationally and tactical capacity building considering hybrid capacity to evolve again and again when and where is needed. Alliances need to be clearly and strategically defined. They should last for a long-period of time with a clear consensus and positioning. Countries, members should be operational and political and diplomatically committed. All need to commit strategically and tactically; they need to contribute in meeting demands for strong security resilience and business security continuity.

In 2017, challenges are stakes. They are greater and higher as unconventional threats have become evident. And at this point we can only refer and analyze just a few. Hybrid elements of considerable threat assessment, are distinguished as external but also characterized as internal, multilevel and multidimensional. The threat of massive refugee movement and uncontrolled status is one. The challenge is to be in the forefront and forecast security future apparatus. To establish minority reports that will be effective and operationally viable. To provide solutions before threats become existential and destructive. A strategic alliance plan of ‘hybrid’ targets should be established.

According to Walt, Strategy is a set of hypotheses or predictions” (Walt, 1987). What this research paper suggests is a clear-cut crisis strategic management process, a strategic plan at a time of fiscal austerity, political change, ideological challenges and operational needs for training and capacity building both in civilian and military preparedness.

The research builds on the case that alliances should be strengthened and modernized. Its basic theoretical assumption on Alliances, lays to the work of Steven Walt on Origins of Alliances (Walt 1987). New Theoretical and operational assumptions should stress technological and operational advances. Meet the demands for operational forecasting, yet also should project moral and ethical values on war, peace and resolutions of any conflict. Allow for tangible solutions. Find out methods that war and/or conflict zones to end. Provide tangible solutions for long-lasting actual peace and peacetime security cooperation that will render growth and development a reality.

Evolution of the existing concept of what constitute an alliance is imperative. Evolution to a new modern concept to be put to practice is also imperative. Threats are no more confined in a region and/or area and are not from the many or the one as we foresaid. The possibility of hybrid threats along with non-symmetrical threats like terrorism or weapons of mass destruction or even pandemic disease are more real than ever. Protective action is necessary as protective procedure of managing current crises or managing crisis prior they occur.

National security is a primary necessity of protection but also growth for country/countries and areas. Security is a societal advancement element. It reflects both national security and supranational security (in an alliance) form and format. Their very existence and development require investment, in both, soft and hard skills; adding to them clear-cut strategic management of logistics and fiscal needs and requests.

Security is a pre-requisite for peaceful resolution of current or possible future conflicts. Security is a model of business continuity; in where a strong resilience in both tactical and operational methods and adaptability may lead to solutions in upcoming, current or future conflicts, threats and challenges. Security when properly adopted and adapted should reflect a forecast methodology, which we will need to adopt comprehend and strategize in a new modernized alliance level format, whether international or regional.

The following sub-chapters of this research, introduce and put to the test a theoretical concept of Hybrid Alliances that is created by the author. This is an opportunity to put to the test the theoretical framework at a regional level. As a note to the reader, that a fist part of this research has been tested at the level of military alliance and shared with experts with much success (NMIOTC, Souda Crete Annual Security Conference, June 2017). Information and strategic thinking options have been shared, in the hope that the terminology of ‘Hybrid Alliance’ can further expand so as to become a strategic element of thinking, but also practice in the real world of security, strategy, intelligence and specialized education in the field, among others.

In a new world order, according to Henry Kissinger’s book, alliances are an integrative part. Alliances hold the key for growth and sustainability of a region’s peace, stability but also prosperity. In specific alliances, such as NATO and the EU, sustainability should not be ‘static’ as we will explore below but should include elements of Hybrid use, meaning self-adaptability and self-interoperability. Alliances should reflect the future of cooperation; yet again should also reflect operational success and processes of and for collective success.

In this world of alliances, current and future challenges that we name as hybrid are important to be defined. Threats are mostly unconventional,

militarily, socially and economically. Hybrid challenges come about, versus, traditional symmetrical/asymmetrical threats. The paper explores the necessity of modern and pragmatic strategic thinking in the levels of alliance cooperation, coordination and practical effectiveness.

In turn, we contemplate the importance of leadership and vision for growth in a world of business continuity and security resilience and efficiency. Power and influence are elements that establish strong alliances. Needless to stress, they need to be organized and long-term associated with current but most importantly future challenges.

Leadership during ‘unconventional challenges’ is important. Considering the refugee issue as an unconventional challenge without a real end, for the region of Balkans this may be seen as ‘game changer for the strategic ‘game of thrones of the Balkans’; It will request and require Balkans states to re-align and re-shape.

Considering Balkan options, we suggest a strong strategic alignment or re-alignment policy between member states; An alliance of practical and pragmatic value will do more when considering regional and international cases; considering the emergence and need of the current unconventional threat, that was meant to happen due to ISIS involvement. The refugee issue is however, and we need to clarify this a humanitarian issue that however extends also to a security issue as there is no actual control.

The refugee issue is both a regional and global issue. It directly reflects emerging fear in the European continent through the power of picture and motion picture when see in real-time; further the danger that ISIS, which is real, poses both regional and global or individual threat when completed by the one. ISIS reflection of operation is seen in its currently controlled territories; yet also through its ‘lone wolves’ related with ISIS operating in democratic and free states.

The paper will be completed stressing through lessons learned and proposals, the necessity of strong alignment to long-term strategic planning and management both regional (in the Balkans and international), that does more to provide effectiveness, military agility and interoperability in a world of global interconnectedness. The world needs leadership and leaders to lead. We need diplomatic and operational effectiveness, but also creation of moral values and ethics considering past and current atrocities, experiences that should not come about again and more so agility in respect of human live and respect of life.

As a disclosure, the author stresses that this current research includes views which are independently expressed. They reflect the sole positioning and research of the author. The term ‘Hybrid Alliances’ should be considered as new. It is the first time that is used and reflects a new security terminology

that is current and important as outcome from this research paper. The targeted audience reflect security experts and strategists in the relevant or specialized fields. The research paper is of multidisciplinary approach, yet concentrated in the fields of security and strategy. There is a current need to reflect to current issues but also future challenges that the international led western alliances, such as NATO and the EU or relevantly others, namely a Balkan alliance, may face or will face at this point. The current research paper is and will be a part of a larger research that will be soon after, published on Hybrid Alliances.

HYBRID ALLIANCES

According to Henry Kissinger's book on World Order, "the world or rule-based system, faces challenges", as the 'international community' "...expected all allies to abide by rules". According to Kissinger, for countries "to do their fair share, play by the 21st century rules or to be responsible stakeholders in a common system", there is still no clear definition or practical formulation of what constitutes, according to the reader "fair" contribution to any possible alliance. He further goes on to stress that the international community in invoked "insistently now that any other era". Yet "it presents no clear or agreed set of goals, methods, or limits" (Kissinger, 2015).

According to Walt, alliances depend on what we may call as "nature" of the external threat and as such alliances are formed. In this paper, we assume that alliances happen due to influence, power and opportunity". A possibility of foresight of the future, may actually help create enough 'minority reports' to foresee threats and challenges. As such, as Walt states, States shall no more "bandwagoning, with the source of threat" (Walt 1987), rather we state that alliances shall be ready, through the source of self-adaptiveness and security operational and tactical preparedness and resilience.

As Walt stresses, alliances can hold a behavior based on the external threat (Walt, 1987). In this paper, we assume that alliances have already a 'security culture' attached. As we explain next, due to geographical proximity, interests and diversity of current but also new and future threats, alliances are or can be inevitable. Reasoning is quite clear: interconnectedness.

According to Walt, alliances can hold offensive and aggressive intentions (Walt, 1987). That is true. However, alliances are also dully formed due to opportunity. Alliance creation, may be created for those seeking to become strong or to be stronger, due to their active abilities and competences but also availability and need. Alliances are always necessary. They not only strengthen cultures, but strengthen continuity, business continuity and security resilience.

Alliances cannot be ‘dominated’ from specialized solely characteristics. They are formed to complement methods of interests and of power efficiency that are of mutual importance; understanding the necessity of need, or request to be part of an alliance is an opportunity, as long as foreign and security objectives are clear; a definition of the role that each state will play should be clear.

Alliances, according to the above mentioned can therefore be characterized terminologically as Hybrid. As alliances, cannot be decreed as ‘solid’. History of alliances easily proves such argument. Alliances can either long-term or short-term yet reflecting solely on necessity; they do renew themselves at times of challenge and threat to face consequences. What if alliances were to be reformed with future reports? (Efthymiopoulos, 2012). In the “world order”, according to Kissinger that is yet to be defined, threats will continue to emerge and challenge current alliances: from the threat of terrorism and war, to weapons of mass destruction, climate change and health safety to mention just a few. In a new world order, system of rule of alliances’ operations, tactics and more importantly hybrid strategy, is yet to be defined. In a world order of hybrid adaptiveness capabilities, the system of rule may become clearer and more defined when management skills vision and positioning in operations is clear.

By the end of 2017, in a time of technological advances, smart grids, networks and grids, in times of communication and quick sharing of information, we seek more access to large data gathering and information. As such, alliances are necessary. Alliances bring cultures together and societies grow closer to each other as “slogans” according to Kissinger (Kissinger, 2015). Methods are created and register to present hence-forth, the world as it stands today. In a world of ‘smart dominance and rule’, alliances need to be flexible and multidimensional. Hybrid alliances is the only option that will keep the relevance alive.

HYBRID CHALLENGES

The challenge is to seek out force-command and leadership regionally and globally, with a vision that supersedes current issues, challenges and threats in a world that its order is yet to be defined; where unconventional threats are explicitly seen and shown. In a world of structured Hybrid Alliances, allies seek operational capacity building, power and influence of leadership that acquires and requires strong legitimacy and power effectiveness. Alliances reflect future models of societal global and regional governance with morality, ethics and values. Models should be of hybrid

nature: Self-nurtured and self-adaptive to new challenges or threats facing constantly the threat of instability.

In a modern and constantly self-modernizing society, the method of understanding and cooperative delivery, the approach to alliances, should be simplified, yet applicable on all possible dimensions that alliances are not yet applicable at. Necessary rules of and for political stability and resilience to peace and more so sustainable growth should be applied. In a truly global and interconnected society, alliances, should reflect our societal needs and requests. They should provide clear-cut and simplified rules with foresaid self-adaptive methods; regulations should be robust and resilient; actions should provide effectiveness and political happiness for success but also regional or global security resilience. Alliances should be methodologically and operational of Hybrid capacity-building and delivery.

Current forces and force-command structures of allies are seen to be restrained from rules and regulations of a regional, or global system of rule or relations between two or more states, that was built on the element of competition; where possible threat(s) was anticipated early or was reactionary created with evidence; where the possibility of war or instability was imminent. Currently, alliances change when the threat changes, or may we dare to say, ‘opportunity’ is there or arises. Unconventional threats man-made or created by fault or default, need reactionary movements of joined contribution that allow for old rivalry to be reconsidered, in a time of strategic and geostrategic changes or needs.

Alliances with no hybrid command structure or self-engagement rules and adaptability can be only considered as ‘static’ alliances. Modern Alliance posture and business resilience requires power-base influence, long-term project planning and tactical effectiveness; actual engagement and methodological adaptation to new rules and new dimensions without procedural or political engagement.

Defense as a frame for alliance cooperation, for political and strategic engagement reflects the need for the rule of law and democracy but it does not reflect modern and future threats. Defense methodology is static as is an alliance. It expects things to happen so we may defend. In defense, preventive or pre-emptive methods are of defense nature. But they are not Hybrid. They are not mature enough to operate. They cannot provide for a future foresight ‘strategic minority report’ that will necessitate the adaptability process of what defense should look like in the near future to come, that will elaborate all possible future challenges taking into account symmetrical, asymmetrical threats and now the possibility of Hybrid threats.

Hybrid alliances should be built around the concept of alliance-making. Alliances are not a new phenomenon. From times of Empires, such as

the one of Alexander the Great, the Corinthian Alliance, stands out as similar and reflective to today's NATO Alliance (Efthymiopoulos, 2012). Alliances were flooded with pluralism of Democratic values. Decision-making processes depend and depended on the element of power and interests; created and sustained based on elements that ones' interest may reflect or be the interest of the other one. More so, when the interests reflected or reflect past and current threats. When future is introduced based on interest and power effectiveness.

According to Kaldor, "New Wars" or future wars, are or can be about the claim to power on the basis of "seemingly traditional identities-nation, tribe, religion" (Kaldor, 2014). Agreeing and or accepting the above, equally means that security needs to be re-defined based on sound arguments that are of static defense posture. Methodologically achievable to reach out for tactical training and preparedness. What if, power was not about symmetrical and static threats? What if threat was a module of future approach related with artificial intelligence, robotics, genetics and humanoid development? What this threat would arrive from the one rather the many in a dimensional world above the internet of things? Hybrid threats need hybrid reaction. Through alliance sharing of information and research material, these challenging realities should be faced. More so, when we may become capable to anticipate them in or through an estimate as we already named it as 'strategic minority report'.

Mearsheimer, assures us that in the field of security and or strategy, "security competition is endemic to daily life" (Mearsheimer, 2014). Security should be able to reconstruct it-self, adapt to new and emerging situations both analogic and multi-dimensional. Security, should continue to be provided and states or alliances should continue to be providers. More so, when challenges and/or threats can be considered hybrid.

Military or political alliances are security providers. When security apparatus, need to re-adapt, so should alliances. Security resilience therefore seems to be a necessity. As alliances are constantly and knowingly, challenged, allied members are as well. The question is, are we capable for strong futuristic led leadership that does more to provide sustainability and resilience to allies and member states?

LEADERSHIP AND VISION FOR GROWTH

Leadership requires agility and understanding. It can be taught or be a gift of nature to personality creation. Vision and innovation, standing out at times of grave and tremendous change I believe they may not. Leadership is an asset value. I believe, that leadership cannot be dictated or taught. Skills can be

dictated to a point or extent. Yet true visionary methodology of approach to subject may not.

The importance of leadership and vision for growth in a world of business continuity and security resilience and efficiency is of essence. Leaders need to lead. Take decisions. Learn the importance of alliance interconnectedness and growth. Leaders should be an example. Of character and abilities to hear, learn, decide and implement. Leaders should empower and influence in a positive nature followers and supporters. They should dream and share dreams with what the city or state can be.

A great leader may also be a great marketer; a great manager and a great decision-maker.

All above are elements, we seek in a leader that will not only allow for the establishment of strong alliances but for innovation and future foresight to become an integrative part of alliance success, posture and effective power measurement in what we are yet to define as the world order.

Steven Walt used the Middle East according to his book, due to the fascinating scale of changes happening in and through alliances in between the Arab World. In a world of constant changes in 2017, leadership stands out as the most important asset value for the middle east that is now emerging. Defining the future is not easy. Predicting even more so. But when dreams come true you cannot but to seek to learn how and when. A similar future even brighter considering the geostrategic location can occur in the Balkan Peninsula

THE GULF AND THE UAE AS A COMPARATIVE APPROACH

In comparative approach between the emergence of the Arab Gulf region during the last years, and considering primary experience of the author in the heart of the Arab World, a good example of importance and use for the shaping of the Balkan future seem to be the United Arab Emirates and its allies. The country, stands out as a completely developed country, with a great range of cultural and nationality diversity, where elements such of happiness and tolerance are included as moral values that need to be reached at all levels, civilian and military, two basic elements stand out as key to future success for the United Arab Emirates future: Cultural wish for understanding, retaining traditions, developing constant technological agility and research. Leading regional and world success derives from the simple element of vision without borders in cooperation with other leading partners, allies in pure partnership. A vision and concept of leadership, decision making and process constantly develops and is enhanced. In a constantly challenged world, the era of the Arab World seems to re-shape. In which structured defense and military

alliances are formed in the name of conventional and unconventional threat (regional or global) as methods of facing realistically all and any possible threats. Resilience and persistence is the most important aspect value of success for future generations and regional stability but also political and market oriented sustainable growth.

Interoperability of force structure, command and market development opportunities go hand in hand with the world leaders and international community of UN leading countries. This example clearly shows, evidence of vision, ruler-ship, administrative decision-making processes, political will and more so ability to anticipate what is not yet there, future options, creativity and actual risk assessment.

In a well-defined and visionary and also strategic book “my Vision” His Highness Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates and Ruler of Dubai, envisions sustainability growth and development for the United Arab Emirates, thus becoming an exemplary case of success. His Royal Highness the rule of Dubai, anticipates the future; does not bandwagoning; and suggests development as an element of growth. He “knows and understands that development and constant modernization are difficult”. (Almaktoum, 2015). Yet nothing is “impossible” according to H.H. AlMaktoum.

In the field of visionary leadership, alliances stand out, as a good opportunity for growth and development, based on cooperative security and cooperative growth. Therefore, tactical and operational projection planning, tolerance to diversity of language and cultures is important. Objectivity, a characteristic of consensus building should continue to be an element of leadership and business continuity. Yet foresighting the future is also of essence. Predicting challenges, maybe the sole important aspect of success for alliance continuity and constant change.

As such, resilience with established hybrid alliances is important. Security resilience should include continuity that is not deprived of development through future prediction. Security allocation and vision of leaders should allow for strong leadership in strategic, operational and tactical levels. Quality of decision-making should increase. Influence and national participation in target met objectives is of necessity.

Therefore, strong engagement, rule and posture is of paramount importance to the success of alliances. Minimizing the risk of solitude, and achieving maximum openness and cultural diversity, military and operational success through joined and continued preparedness, collaboration and continued interoperability that will be solely based on the element of ‘yes we can’ and ‘yes we should’.

THE FUTURE OF THE BALKANS. FACING THE THREAT OF UNCONVENTIONAL CHALLENGES

The Balkans in its regional totality, incorporating west and east north and south, is a most important geostrategic region, in which we locate a great diversity of cultures, religions and beliefs. In which elements and methods are observed, constantly reshaped and culturally applied.

Considering both the need of current and future cultural, economic and political development, of practical value, growth and sustainability, while meeting the levels and standards of development, based on the standards of the developed EU, the Balkans stand out as the border line between the West and the East.

By the end of 2017, threats of national security or homeland security concerns still persist. The Balkans face both regional and global challenges where solutions must be reached, to safeguard stability and prosperity. There are global existential threats like the threat ISIS, causing mass refugee movement and displacement.

Massive displacement is a security threat for the integrity and sovereignty of any state, although this case reflects humanitarian concerns due to continued regional wars.

Massive displacement and refugee status' open cases of collective and individual criminal justice seen as of national and international security threat. These are considered as elements of unconventional threat are quite evident.

Considering the massive changes in the Gulf Region, the Middle East and Eurasia region, namely in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan among others, the Balkan states were never ready to receive massive displacement of refugees, seeking normalization of living standards and conditions in post-revolution and regional conflict decade of the 90s.

Balkan and European led states seemed not to also be ready to welcome massive refugees; Utilizing a possible opportunity to integrate those that wished to stay in the Balkans their countries; to re-shape history, throughout integrating massively refugees to their own national and regional way of living.

Consistency of countries' to national and regional economic downfall in Europe and in the Balkans in the last years, did not help utilize such opportunity. Reshaping economic prosperity for Balkan countries seems to be a collective need rather than option; Balkan states need to complete regional and international conflicting elements and find solutions; while at the same time concentrate to create multiple opportunities; considering the possibility of yet again re-shaping possibly borders in a positive way, due to regional threat

assessments created by current unconventional threats, thus creating the opportunity for shaping or re-shaping of geostrategic alliances.

In all cases, there is a necessity to jointly seek out actual practical new forms of alliances that are formed in structure based on long-term ethical and moral values, methodologies of operational capacity building for the region; inheriting standards against unconventional threats, rather than conventional, knowing evidently that massive movement creates also a spirit of uncertainty and fear for either sides, refugees and welcoming states.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Hybrid Alliances need to be formed, shaped and operate. Alliances related with diplomatic but also civilian/military preparedness leading to effective engagement and cooperation. During the course of the research paper we defined Hybrid Alliance necessity, creativity and innovation in strategic thinking, while reflecting on the need to take away current regional challenges, when we know that a greater threat is global imminent and emerging.

During the course of this research, we provided a practical and effective example to prove the value of alliances and more so when alliances are shaped based on hybrid threats. Active involvement of Hybrid Alliances through constructive practical, morally-led cooperation is necessary for the future of stability in the Balkans, seeking, leadership and solutions in a truly globalized environment.

Current security environment, requires at this point continuity and constant change. Change that according to Walt, is defined based on threat. More so when according to this research threat is unconventional, undefined and surely crime is imminent utilizing a humanitarian crisis that is being unfolding for the last 2+ years. This paper defined threat as a non-ending story; challenges will never cease to exist. Challenges and threats cannot define alliances. Rather alliances need to define or predict the future of threat being at the same time self-confident, self-establishing and continuously agile utilizing to the furthest extent business continuity.

Future resilience in alliance formation or sustainability requires strong understanding of growth and development, through opportunities that defines a global, multi-dimensional societal and security culture, where nation, states and regions, can define their own peaceful development and possibly resolution of conflicts inside or outside the sphere of influence.

During the process of this research paper, a theoretical assumption that goes in line with the operational requested future understanding of alliance formation, stated that the future cannot be dictated but can be defined and observed. Future can be predicted when innovative. When alliances are of

hybrid nature, self-determinant and self-adaptive and predictive through 'minority reporting' then alliances can be of long-term strategic planning and of business continuity and security resilient as foresaid.

Hybrid Alliances hold the key for prospective growth in a new geostrategic world complete with challenges and threats that require agility in leadership, strategic, operational and tactical accuracy and preparedness but also deployability effectiveness. By defining alliances, does not mean that alliances will rest and or remain the same forever, as interests change (i.e. Brexit 2016-2017 to 2019).

That is why, characterizing necessary growth in alliance current formation requires, hybrid alliance positioning and posture. Eliminating static formations and decision making to acquire multi-dimensionality in effectiveness and decision-making, simplifying rules and decisions, while adapting to a constantly changing environment without expecting the threat or challenge to 'rise to surface'.

Efficiency, projection planning and future foresight in hybrid challenges in the Balkans is achievable, if only a unity of the Balkans is decided; one that will really and effectively get rid of old-rivalries, face challenges and optimize methodologies for agility against threats, with hybrid alliance formation.

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HIBRIDNI IZAZOVI NA BALKANU

Marios Efthymiopoulos*
Američki Univerzitet u Emiratima
Ujedinjeni Arapski Emirati

Apstrakt: Moderni savezi, regionalni ili međunarodni, kratkoročni ili dugoročni, zahtijevaju otpornost, čvrstinu i efikasnost u sledećim oblastima (nisu ograničeni na): planiranje projekcija, uočavanje pretnje i delotvornost primene. U doba hibridnih izazova, koje tek treba uočiti, u razdoblju snažnih geostrateških promena, na Balkanu između ostalog, u konstantno promenljivom okruženju, tražimo razvoj savremenih vojnih kapaciteta, tehnološki napredak, snažnu obuku ali takođe i interoperabilnost nacionalnih i međunarodnih snaga kako za komandovanje tako i za sprovođenje operacija. Štaviše, zahtevamo jasno strateško vodstvo i viziju koja više podstiče regionalnu i međunarodnu saradnju, pritom razumevajući sadašnje ali i buduće izazove. Države evropskog kontinenta izvršile su svoje obaveze kada se govori o problemu izbeglica. Spoljašnje hibridne pretnje se ne mogu više tolerisati kao izazovi koji se razvijaju i stvaraju ambijent nesposobnosti suočavanja sa temama i problemima koji se tiču nacionalne bezbednosti. Rad će se odnositi na te izazove. Tražiće se i zahtevati snažno strateško usklađivanje politika između regionalnih država koje više rade na regionalnim i međunarodnim slučajevima, a istovremeno zahtevaju snažnije učešće u rešavanju stalnih pitanja koja mogu biti "odložena" i smatrati se zamrznutim problemom od regionalnog bezbednosnog interesa. Rad će zahtijevati veću praktičnu diplomatsku i vojnu spremnost, aktivno učešće ali i potražiti budućnost Srbije u međunarodnom okruženju koje toliko zaslužuje.

Ključne reči: interoperabilnost, otpornost, kontinuitet poslovnog obezbeđenja, strateško planiranje, hibridni savezi, pitanja izbeglica, Balkan, opcije spoljne politike.

* marios.panagiotis@aue.ac

INTRODUCTION TO THE METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH ON ASYMMETRIC THREATS - BALKAN CONTEXT

Danuta Gibas-Krzak*
Jan Dlugosz University in Czestochowa,
Poland

Abstract: The concept of asymmetry on the basis of research carried out under the military strategic thinking or political science is still a novelty. However, it does not mean that the phenomenon of asymmetry in human history did not exist before. We have met with a number of concepts, which more or less define the phenomenon, thus appearing multiplicity of forms, terms and concepts such as: asymmetric war strategy, asymmetric strategy, asymmetrical actions, asymmetrical methods of warfare, an asymmetric approach, asymmetric relations etc. The aim of this paper is to present some methods convenient to explore asymmetric threats taking into consideration the important role of the Balkans in the history of the Old Continent. Beginning from the early years of the 20th century, the Balkans became the flashpoint of numerous conflicts and the long-term wars that had a significant impact on international relations. Threats coming from this part of Europe, and today on the threshold of the new century have been as relevant as 100 years ago. The author of the paper selects the research methods, which could be useful for exploring the asymmetric threats. The wide range of research methods will be applied in international relations, such as an empirical report, based on the description of the various conflicts and their interpretation. Another method is a comparative method involving the analysis of conflicts and wars in order to determine their common features and regularities responsible for their formation. Another method would be modelling, which is the presentation of a particular form of diagrams and graphs of collected data on military and non-military conflicts in order to formulate generalisations and demonstrate the processes during their formation and development. The method of simulation, using computer technologies, allows the prediction of the phenomena and processes based on collected data about conflicts. Thanks to these methods, it would be possible to define precisely the phenomenon of war and peace, creating a new scientific equipment for the prevention of asymmetric threats, conflicts and violence, contributing thus to the further development of science.

* danutakrzak16@gmail.com

Key words: asymmetric threats, ethnic conflicts, the Balkans, the research methods, methodology, scientific equipment, an empirical report, a comparative method, the phenomenon of war and peace.

INTRODUCTION

No comprehensive methodological study on the research on asymmetric threats has been published yet. The studies and articles concerning both history and typology of phenomena related to asymmetric conflicts predominate in the subject literature, however, there is no study that would include these issues with reference to applied research methods. Therefore, the goal of this article is to work out initial methodological assumptions necessary for exploration of phenomenon of asymmetric threats, with particular emphasis on the specificity of the Balkans as a unique region in Europe. The author thinks that the Balkan Peninsula shows particular predilection for becoming the subject of research with reference to phenomenon of asymmetry due to frequency of occurrence of: wars, conflicts and threats of military and non-military character. In the article, the issue of classification of asymmetric threats is raised, paradigm of instability in the Balkan Peninsula and application of scientific methods to examine the phenomenon of asymmetry are presented.

TYOLOGY OF ASYMMETRIC THREATS

It must be emphasized that „asymmetric conflict” as a research problem emerged during exploration of the history of the Vietnam war, while analysing the defeat of American army in the war with Vietcong²⁰². However, the elements of asymmetric activities have been present in the history almost since the dawn of time. Ancient theoretician of war, Sun Tzu emphasized that the following factors are important if we want to win: unpredictability, innovativeness and ability to mislead the enemy²⁰³. Chinese thinker paid also attention to the element of surprise. Deceit and taking advantage of weakness of an adversary have always been the elements of political actions and

²⁰² M. Madej, *Zagrożenia asymetryczne bezpieczeństwa państw obszaru transatlantyckiego*, Warszawa 2007, p. 36.

²⁰³ Sun Tzu, *Sztuka wojny*, Gliwice 2008, p. 65.

victorious wars, which is particularly noticeable in strategy of conduct of the Prince, the main character of Machiavelli's work²⁰⁴.

Such notions, as threats and asymmetric conflicts, are not of purely theoretical origin, because they refer to specific historical events, whereas, their cognitive and explanatory features are very high. They have considerable impact on international environment and political system. The notion of „asymmetric conflicts” has become popular after publishing an article in 1975 by Andrew Mack entitled *Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict*²⁰⁵, in which he examined many armed conflicts, which were different, in his opinion, from classic (old) wars. The fundamental conclusion from analysed publication shows that the stronger opponent does not always easily win. Moreover, the author emphasizes that military struggle on the battlefield should be analysed not only in narrow perspective of calculation of military tactics and techniques, but in terms of political influences on decision-making centres. According to him, the asymmetry is a relational phenomenon occurring in relation between fighting sides. The so-called weaker side of a conflict is not able to pose a direct threat to survival of external power because it has no potential for invasion. Whereas, the stronger side is not only able to attack, but has also potential that allows the occupation of enemy's territory²⁰⁶. The issue of potentials is translated directly into political potential for mobilization, on the weaker side, full mobilization of resources is an essential element, whereas, it is almost impossible on the stronger side. Therefore, it needs to be emphasized that Mack perceives asymmetric relation as a function of asymmetry of resources, and defines resources as the level of industrial and technological capabilities. The key element of asymmetry remains to be the lack of basis for comparing potentials²⁰⁷. In historical perspective, the concept of „small wars”, when there are no rules, is also combined with asymmetry, as opposed to „big wars”, waged between countries, which obey international law²⁰⁸.

Moreover, asymmetry may be referred to a concept of indirect strategy developed by Basil Liddell Hart²⁰⁹. According to this concept, direct

²⁰⁴ N. Machiavelli, *Książę. Rozważania nad pierwszym dziesięcioleciem historii Rzymu Liwiusza*, Warszawa 1987, pp. 86-87.

²⁰⁵ Mack, A., *Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict*, „World Politics”, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Jan., 1975), pp. 175-200.

²⁰⁶ Ibidem, p. 181.

²⁰⁷ Ibidem, p. 182.

²⁰⁸ The concept of „small wars” was introduced to historiography by Carl von Clausewitz, J. Dereń, *Asymetryczność wyzwaniem dla bezpieczeństwa XXI wieku*, [in:] *Metodologia badań bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, T. III, Warszawa 2012, p. 122.

²⁰⁹ M. Madej, *Zagrożenia asymetryczne bezpieczeństwa...*, p. 36.

confrontation with an enemy needs to be avoided and its weakest points should be hit. Therefore, asymmetric features of actions refer, par excellence, to the theory of guerrilla warfare, which is, according to Serbian researchers, classic example of asymmetric activities with theoretically weaker opponent, whereas, actions that are taken are irregular and dynamic²¹⁰. In general, the rule of asymmetry refers to such actions, in which we have to deal with non uniformity, disproportion and fickleness of subjects that are compared. The phenomenon of asymmetry concerns also various military actions, which are characterized by diversity and disproportion of power in a given conflict²¹¹.

The factors, having an impact on asymmetry of armed conflicts, present a set of permanent elements, whose positive or negative aspect has a considerable impact on organisation and methods of achieving goals. The division of actors having an impact on the phenomenon of asymmetry with reference to armed conflicts is the following:

1. Military factors include: potential of armies, weaponry, organisation of army, level of training, duration of war and its range, character of fights, military thought.
2. Civilisational factors include above all: geographical location, political system, legal system, technological progress, the level of economic development, the level of urbanisation.
3. Social factors include: demographic resources, ethnic composition of a given territory (area), economy, culture, ethics, the level of education of society, working environment, involvement in a war, racial prejudices and stereotypes²¹².

However, a lot of meanings are attributed to the phenomenon of asymmetry, because there is no a clear definition accepted by academic circles. The achievements of Polish researchers are very valuable in this field. As it was emphasized by Marek Pietraś, a term „asymmetric”, which occurs in the issues concerning international relations, is applied in various contexts. Therefore, this notion is used too often, especially with reference to Anglo-

²¹⁰ M. Zorić, *Gerilsko ratovanje u Jugoslaviji 1941-1943 godine - forma asimetričkih ratova*, „Vojno Delo”, Leto 2010, p. 362.

²¹¹ P. Gawliczek, J. Pawłowski, *Zagrożenia asymetryczne*, Warszawa 2003, p. 11.

²¹² J. Lasota, *Podejście polemologiczne w rozwiązywaniu problemów bezpieczeństwa globalnego i regionalnego w aspekcie asymetrii konfliktów zbrojnych*, [in:] *Teoretyczno-pragmatyczne aspekty uprawiania polemologii*, eds. M. Huzarski, A. Czupryński, Warszawa 2014, p. 105.

Saxon literature, where you can find „asymmetric threats, conflicts, attacks, challenges, tactics”, etc.²¹³. Piotr Gawliczek and Jacek Pawłowski, analysing asymmetric threats in American, English and German literature, emphasized the diverse character of definition of this notion, which has often a character of strategic vision (particularly in American case). Moreover, non-state actors play an important role and fighting with them is completely different from a conventional war, because armed forces must face new challenges²¹⁴.

Taking various factors into consideration, the following forms of asymmetry can be distinguished:

1. classic asymmetry, which is a classic perspective of asymmetry in qualitative and quantitative dimension and historical reference to differences in potentials.
2. non-classic asymmetry - modernly perceived phenomenon of asymmetry and its multidimensionality allow the issue of conflicts in the global world to be fully presented. It is divided in the following way:
 - a. asymmetry of involvement, it is the involvement of not only armed forces, but of the whole society in waging the war. Closely related to the will to fight, it refers to a situation, in which one of the opponents is mentally prepared for a long fight, whereas, the other opponent wants to finish it as soon as possible.
 - b. civilisational and cultural asymmetry, which is the derivative of asymmetry of involvement. It refers to the perception of phenomenon of war by the sides of a conflict. It can be considered with reference to political system, ethnic and cultural issues.
 - c. technological asymmetry – it refers to the inequality of economic and technological and civilisational potentials between fighting sides.
 - d. system asymmetry – it refers to disproportions connected with fighting methods and its organisation at operational and tactical level. It is particularly related to waging guerrilla warfare²¹⁵.

²¹³ M. Pietraś, *Transnarodowość zagrożeń asymetrycznych*, [in:] *Zagrożenia asymetryczne współczesnego świata*, praca zbiorowa eds. S. Wojciechowski i R. Fiedler, Poznań 2009, p. 74.

²¹⁴ P. Gawliczek, J. Pawłowski, *Zagrożenia...*, pp. 57-67.

²¹⁵ J. Lasota, *Podejście polemologiczne...*, pp. 110-111.

PARADIGM OF INSTABILITY OF THE BALKANS

Deep-rooted- in Polish subject literature thanks to research initiated, above all, by Franciszek Golebski - paradigm of Balkan instability²¹⁶; is reflected in the works of many researchers. Huey L. Kostanick claimed that the Balkans was historically an instable region, full of tensions and conquests that are the consequence of mutual connections between geography and history in the period of Turkish occupation – between 16th century and the beginning of 20th century²¹⁷. Such assessment of the Balkans results from various historical determinants, above all, Byzantine legacy, Turkish-Ottoman legacy and Austro-Hungarian legacy, which had a deep impact on politics, culture and religion of Balkan nations. George Friedman said that: *Each conqueror left a nation or religion and they all hated each other. Every fighting side committed terrible atrocities, and all of them were remembered, as if they occurred yesterday. It is not a region, where the rule forgive and forget would catch on*²¹⁸.

Recent history confirms a thesis on the lack of stability of this region, which is a mix of civilisations. Newly created countries are affected by a syndrome of „shock of the past” and peculiar narcissism, therefore, even after the end of the cold war, there is still a threat of wars and conflicts²¹⁹. The Balkans, at the turn of 21st century, became an archetype of the region characterized by primitive wildness, rapes, nationalisms that lead to the conflicts and wars. F. Stephen Larrabee claimed that combination of factors resulting from the processes of transformations and traditional elements of conflictual character is still present there²²⁰.

To sum up, it must be emphasized that in the 21st century, the Balkans is still an area where superpowers fight for economic, political and cultural influences and it is an important route of energy supplies. In the context of this region, research site seems to be significant, because it proves that it must be considered as a specific area, having natural geographical predispositions and a complex internal and external anthropogenic structure, which determines its geopolitical dynamics. Balkan Peninsula is characterized by particularly clear divisions, permanent territorial claims, divergent zones of interests,

²¹⁶ F. Golebski, *Balkany. Determinanty stabilności*, Warszawa 1982, p. 53 et passim.

²¹⁷ Huey L. Kostanick, *The Geopolitics of the Balkans*, [in:] Ch. and B. Jelavich, *The Balkans in transition*, Berkely – Los Angeles 1963, pp. 1-3.

²¹⁸ G. Friedman, *Następne 100 lat. Prognoza na XXI wiek*, Warszawa 2009, p.48.

²¹⁹ Ljubiša. R. Mitrović, *Balkan. Granica i most među narodima*, Beograd 2000, pp. 9, 12-13 et passim.

²²⁰ Vide: F. Stephen Larrabee, *Balkan Security*, „Adelphi Papers”, 1975, No. 135.

interferences of superpowers and economic polarisation²²¹. Above all, ethnic, cultural and religious divisions are still the most conflicting factors determining its history. What is more, to a large extent, they determine the lines of disputes and conflicts, whereas, mutual relationships between ethnic and national minorities are a significant barrier in the process of stabilisation after the cold war.

PROPAEDEUTICS OF METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH ON ASYMMETRIC THREATS

Application of a methodology characteristic of human sciences (social) exploring the history, culture and laws of societies seems to be justifiable for examination of asymmetric threats. Andrzej Chodubski distinguished many disciplines of these sciences, among others: history, political science, psychology, law, economy and sociology, which are also characterized as empirical disciplines²²². In these sciences, we refer to the facts that are later examined. Two groups of research methods are distinguished. They are divided into general methods: induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis; and into detailed methods: geographical, comparative, statistical, retrogressive, progressive, behavioural and others that are useful for exploration of the issue of asymmetry.

The basic problem in constructing the methods of examining phenomena related to asymmetry results from the fact that social sciences are treated as idiographic, which results in expressing judgments of given events in order to present empirical conclusions about regularities in the analysed structure of the real world. In this case, theory is not a set of ordered mathematical deductions, that is, sentences that can be precisely explained, but also deals with the models and hypotheses that can't be deduced, therefore, not everything can be exactly proven²²³. Therefore, there is not hundred per cent certainty of formulated theses, that's why we may say, in this case, about reductive inference through verification of hypotheses²²⁴.

In the methodology of empirical sciences, it is important to find a solution for a given problem, that is, justification of a hypothesis by using observation. There are two basic methods (general) in empirical sciences that allow us to find confirmation for sentences. The first of them is inductionism,

²²¹ J. Cvijić, *Balkansko poluostrvo i južnoslovenske zemlje. Osnovi antropogeografije*, Beograd 1966, pp. 8-9.

²²² A. Jan Chodubski, *Wstęp do badań politologicznych*, Gdańsk 2004, pp. 19-21.

²²³ B. Krauz- Mozer, *Teorie polityki. Założenia metodologiczne*, Warszawa 2005, pp. 76-79.

²²⁴ A. Jan Chodubski, *Wstęp do badań...*, pp. 22-24.

sometimes called empiricism or reductionism. In the induction method, facts must be collected, described by sentences, finally, conclusions from these facts are presented. A researcher comes from known facts to formulating theoretical statements that should explain these facts. A researcher gets a hypothesis, drawing conclusions using facts, which are not available to experience. In this way, hypotheses are verified and they are treated, in this case, as scientific laws, although they are not fully justified²²⁵.

Whereas, the second method is hypothetism, also called deductionism, which is based on falsification, that is, checking the outcomes of adopted hypothesis. If one of these outcomes turns out to be false, the hypothesis is regarded as falsified. In case of deduction, you move from premises to a conclusion, in accordance with logical implication, because the conclusion results logically from premises²²⁶. It must be emphasized that, for a researcher, the most problematic is the stage of empirical verification, because a researcher can't always check if logical consequences resulting from a formulated hypothesis apply them to reality. Then, you must refer to substitute verification (paraempirical), in which a researcher refers to models or opinions of eminent specialists in a given field²²⁷. In case of examining phenomena of asymmetry, it is difficult to find such a method that would give the highest probability of verifying hypotheses, therefore, you need to refer to holistic approach allowing various research methods belonging to the achievements of human sciences to be applied²²⁸. The methods applied in international relations, that is, empirical research on perception of these relations in many dimensions, within the framework of international system, can be very useful in examining the phenomenon of asymmetry²²⁹. The allies and potential enemies are examined, as well as the character of threats, relations of liking – hostility, motives for action of the main actors, research on the power of the countries are conducted, which reflects international line-up and threats and tensions resulting from it, both military and political. In this case, qualitative research is very important, that is, the assessment of aspirations, interests, friendships, hostility, public feeling, as well as quantitative ones, that is, relations of power, the level of militarization and others. They make it easier to learn the specificity of specific community, allowing characteristic features of

²²⁵ Ibidem, p. 81.

²²⁶ Ibidem, p. 82.

²²⁷ M. Pelc, *Elementy metodologii badań naukowych*, Warszawa 2011, p. 28.

²²⁸ J. Dereń, *Asymetryczność wyzwaniem...*, p. 125 et passim.

²²⁹ M. Sułek, *Prognozowanie i symulacje międzynarodowe*, Warszawa 2010, p. 35.

mass phenomena to be determined and the cause and effect relationships with reference to phenomenon of asymmetry to be explained²³⁰.

One of the most effective methods that enables the presentation of multidimensional perspective of the examined issue is system analysis. It makes use of the conceptual model of examined reality, allowing the presentation of the relations between attributes of the participants of international relations and their place in the structure of international system and consequences of actions for each of them. This method does not determine arbitrary borders of research and shows complexity of relations occurring between the actors in an era of globalisation, when mutual connections between particular subjects are more complicated and more dynamic, especially in the context of new threats in the post-cold war world. This method seems to be very significant for presenting the phenomenon of asymmetry due to examining the actions of sovereign and non-sovereign actors and their mutual relations²³¹. It is particularly effective with reference to exploration of such phenomena as: unconventional threats, international terrorism, transnational organised crime, the use of weapon of mass destruction and technologies by non-state subjects²³².

We must often refer to numbers in the research on conflicts and wars. In this case, statistical materials are very important, therefore, statistical method is very significant in the reconstruction of events. This method is valuable because it allows source materials to be applied. Using it is effective with reference to modern events, but it depends on the amount and character of source materials. This method makes use, to a large extent, of the achievements of economic history and demography²³³.

Another method that enables examination of asymmetric threats is comparative method (analogy), in which similarities between processes and phenomena are found and differences between them are determined. A method of analogy is very effective in case of analysing the causes of wars, evolution of alliances and international organisations. Applying this method allows researcher to present various phenomena and to find similarities between them and differences between presented events and phenomena. In this method, a theory in the documents and source materials are confronted with authentic experiences of participants and observers of conflicts, wars or events related to asymmetric threats.

²³⁰ Ibidem, p. 34.

²³¹ T. Łoś – Nowak, *System międzynarodowy*, [in:] *Współczesne stosunki międzynarodowe*, ed. T. Łoś – Nowak, Wrocław 2010, pp. 96-97.

²³² A. Jan Chodubski, *Wstęp do badań...*, p. 119.

²³³ Ibidem, p. 35.

One of the most effective methods describing phenomenon of asymmetry is also a model - simulation method, that assumes building of a model, which undergoes simulation, that is, activities imitating real events. The subject of analysis is related to the facts that are subject to research procedure, in which special tools are used to examine political phenomena and processes. The hypotheses are verified during logical and substantive criticism of sources, resulting in diagnostic or forecasting statements²³⁴. If you have the output data, limiting conditions and the goal of research, you may find relation between the output data²³⁵. A feature of this method is simultaneous use of analysis and synthesis, taking into account also thinking in the abstract, comparing and generalising²³⁶.

An important method is also decision-making method, in which phenomena and processes are examined from the angle of governing centre, and also decision-making methods as a set of cause and effect connections that relate to a solved problem, political decision through selection of political method and its effect. This method allows phenomena in the broad sense to be captured, carrying out dynamic analyses of transformations occurring in reality, moreover, it allows the causes of the course of a given phenomenon to be explained²³⁷.

Another method is behavioural method, which uses the method of examining political behaviours and the achievements of sociology. In this method, all significant empirical data is analysed in order to find the cause and effect relationships between them. In this case, we must focus on creating explanatory statements by focusing on directly observed data. This method refers to induction, whereas, its fundamental fault is omission of irrational factors in the research and excluding exceptions from examined phenomenon²³⁸.

Geographical method, which is a detailed method of uniquely specialist character is very effective. It is applied mainly to determine the events and relations between them using their location on the map. Moreover, geographical knowledge is used to determine the causes of given phenomena, wars or conflicts. The method allows terrain conditions to be analysed and assessed, which can have an impact on the actions related to asymmetric conflicts (the lie of the land, water obstacles, forest complexes, routes, state of

²³⁴ H. Przybylski, *Politologia. Zarys problematyki*, Katowice – Warszawa 2004, pp. 56-57.

²³⁵ A. Jan Chodubski, *Wstęp do badań...*, p. 129.

²³⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 129-130.

²³⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 130-131.

²³⁸ A. Dybczyński, *Stosunki międzynarodowe w perspektywie teoretycznej*, [in:] *Współczesne stosunki międzynarodowe...*, p. 22.

urbanisation etc.). Any information that is a subject of a research is put on the map in a form of points. The application of geographical method enables, for example, the whole warfare presented on the map to be depicted²³⁹.

Progressive method is based on facts from the examined period. The conclusions are drawn about the effects of these facts after carrying out an analysis. This method assumes developmental inference, whereas, past facts with reference to current situation are examined in the retrogressive method, which enables new hypotheses to be built.

Another effective method examining the phenomenon of asymmetry and new wars can be a case study which, based on examining one selected case or phenomena, can be used for falsification or initial verification of a given theory, and for initial determination of the issues²⁴⁰.

CONCLUSION

It must be emphasized that methodological technique, which is applied in human and empirical sciences is necessary to examine asymmetric phenomena. Therefore, we should apply methods mentioned in the article, which are used to carry out research in the following fields: political science, international relations and national security. The most effective methods include: analysis, geographical and statistical allowing conflicts and threats in geopolitical dimension to be identified. They can also be used in the process of explication of phenomenon of asymmetric in a historical perspective. When it comes to specific conditions of the Balkan Peninsula, it can be assumed that above methods may be applied. The Balkan wars in the 90s were asymmetric on many plans, however, their differentiation from classic wars is based not only on the issue of asymmetry, but also on various features attributed to new wars in a theory of military science. In this case, asymmetry overlaps with properties of specific structure. Therefore, scientific analysis of phenomena related to examining asymmetry of conflicts in this region is difficult.

Case study allows progressive conflicts with a domino effect to be examined, just like Kosovo conflict between Albania and Serbia or other ethnic conflicts, for example, conflict between Albania and Macedonia. Model - simulation method may be used to examine the dynamics of these clashes. System analysis enables defining complicated relations and dynamics between actions taking part in the asymmetric conflicts, taking into consideration the

²³⁹ A. Polak, *Historyczne wyznaczniki polemologii*, [in:] *Metodologiczna tożsamość polemologii*, eds. M. Huzarski, Bogdan M. Szulc, Warszawa 2010, p. 34.

²⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

role of non-state factors and their relationships with sovereign subjects and the effects of these actions in Europe and around the world. It will also allow new asymmetric threats in the post-cold war world, such as: transnational organised crime or international terrorism to be defined.

Another important method is decision-making method, which enables defining the phenomenon of asymmetric in the context of subjects that make decisions. Moreover, comparative method can be used to examine asymmetry. This method allows differences and similarities between processes and phenomena to be identified. Its effectiveness was brought to an analysis of multidimensional causes of wars, as well as evolution of alliances and non-state actors.

It must be emphasized that this article is only an introduction to a complicated issue of examining the phenomenon of asymmetry in a methodological context, which requires separate studies. All complex issues can't be described in one article. Such research is a serious challenge for the world of science. Developing this type of research with reference to the Balkans as a specific region, particularly exposed to new types of threats, can have practical importance. The author of this article hopes that the development of science within this scope will contribute to reduction of various asymmetric threats, which are the challenge for international community, such as: international terrorism, organised crime or drug trafficking. It will also lead to the elimination of many threats, with results in extremist tendencies of ethnic and religious character, which is particularly relevant to post-Yugoslavian countries that were in the phase of political transformation.

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UVOD U METODOLOGIJU ISTRAŽIVANJA ASIMETRIČNIH PRETNJI - BALKANSKI KONTEKST

Danuta Gibas-Krzak *
Univerzitet „Jan Dlugosz“, Czestochowa,
Poljska

Apstrakt: Koncept asimetrije, na osnovu istraživanja sprovedenog u okviru vojnog strateškog mišljenja ili političke nauke, je i dalje novina. Međutim, to ne znači da fenomen asimetrije u ljudskoj istoriji ranije nije postojao. Susretali smo se sa nizom koncepata, koji manje ili više definišu fenomen, pa se pojavljuje mnoštvo oblika, pojmova i koncepata kao što su: asimetrična ratna strategija, asimetrična strategija, asimetrična akcija, asimetrična metoda ratovanja, asimetrični pristup, asimetrični odnosi itd. Cilj ovog rada jeste da predstaviti neke metode pogodne za istraživanje asimetričnih pretnji uzimajući u obzir važnu ulogu Balkana u istoriji Starog kontinenta. Počevši od ranih godina 20. veka, Balkan je postao ključna tačka brojnih sukoba i dugoročnih ratova koji su imali značajan uticaj na međunarodne odnose. Pretnje koje dolaze iz ovog dela Evrope, i danas na pragu novog veka su relevantne kao i pre 100 godina. Autor rada pravi izbor metoda istraživanja, koje bi mogle da budu korisne za istraživanje asimetričnih pretnji. Širok spektar istraživačkih metoda primjenjivaće se u međunarodnim odnosima, kao što je empirijski izvještaj, zasnovan na opisu različitih sukoba i njihovom tumačenju. Druga metoda je uporedni metod koji uključuje analizu sukoba i ratova kako bi se utvrdile njihove zajedničke karakteristike i regularnosti odgovorne za njihovo formiranje. Druga metoda bi bila modeliranje, a to je prezentacija određenog oblika dijagrama i grafikona o prikupljenim podacima o vojnim i nevojnim sukobima kako bi se formulisala generalizacija i demonstrirali procesi u njihovom formiranju i razvoju. Metod simulacije, koristeći računarske tehnologije, omogućava predviđanje fenomena i procesa zasnovanih na prikupljenim podacima o sukobima. Zahvaljujući ovim metodama, moguće je precizno definisati fenomen ratovanja i mira, stvaranje nove naučne opreme za prevenciju asimetričnih pretnji, sukoba i nasilja, doprinoseći daljem razvoju nauke.

Ključne reči: asimetrične pretnje, etnički sukobi, Balkan, istraživačke metode, metodologija, naučna oprema, empirijski izvještaj, uporedna metoda, fenomen rata i mira.

* danutakrzak16@gmail.com

CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE SCOPE OF ASYMMETRIC SECURITY THREATS INVOLVED IN HYBRID WARFARE CONCEPT

Miroslav Mitrović*

Strategic Research Institute, University of Defence, Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: Contemporary geopolitical events indicate that modern conflicts are nonlinear, hybrid and asymmetric. Furthermore, this environment points to a tendency towards displacing the conflicts arena from the classic milieu of very conventional battlefields to the non – convectional arena. Also, critical national infrastructure became a likely primary operational goal of the unconventional opponents. Those characteristics further lead to the necessity of contemporary conceptual analysis of the acting indication of asymmetric security threats and hybrid warfare operations and their impact on national critical infrastructure. Namely, we bear witness that states and non-state actors mostly practice unconventional forms of conflict based on interest positioning. Common notion of contemporary security paradigm with general unconventional forms of threatening is defined as the hybrid security concept. In the scope of critical national infrastructure, hybrid security coercions are an acting form of asymmetric security threats. In the article, the author aims to contribute to answering the following questions: What is hybrid warfare and where is its link with asymmetric security threats? Which part of the Critical National Infrastructure is most vulnerable to asymmetric threats? How to develop the prevention and effective Hybrid anti - measures? The analysis which is offered in the paper is accomplished by using a broad base of scientific and expertise literature, as well as actual indicators related to the situation of the Republic of Serbia regarding Hybrid forms of endangering national critical infrastructure.

Key words: asymmetric security threats, hybrid warfare, national critical infrastructure.

* miroslav.mitrovic@mod.gov.rs

HYBRID SECURITY THREATS – WAR OR CONCEPT?

Hybrid warfare represents the actual expression of primeval aspirations of the strategic advantages of the achievements over the opponent, mainly by non-armed means.²⁴¹ The analysis of contemporary conflicts concludes that they have characteristics of emerged forms of the fourth²⁴² or even the fifth generation of wars²⁴³. In addition, some authors have developed a theory of the so called ‘‘Wars of 6th generation’’²⁴⁴, as well as Asymmetric warfare²⁴⁵.

However, it can be said that the hybrid conflict concept announced in 1989, when Lind predicted an increase in information warfare and psychological operations in future conflicts. Lind argues that ‘‘Psychological operations may become a dominant operational and strategic weapon in the forms of media / information intervention ... [and] the main target will be enemy population’s support of its government and the war. Television news may become a more powerful operational weapon than armored divisions’’.²⁴⁶ Furthermore, some authors²⁴⁷ consider that the last decade of the twentieth century commits to a new era of warfare, with no - limit in terms of assets (armed or unarmed), the consist form of the deployed forces (national, transnational, multinational, non-governmental), as well as with the ambient of appearance attacks (territory, waters, resources, trade, finance, information, media, beliefs, culture, technology, military, political system). According to some theories²⁴⁸, activities that lead to the destabilization of a country or the

²⁴¹ Tzu, S., (2000). *Art of War- Chapter 3: Attack by Stratagem*. Allandale, Leicester, pp. 9.

²⁴² Renz, B., Smith, H., (2016). *Russia And Hybrid Warfare –Going Beyond The Label*. Finnish Prime Minister’s Office, Government’s analysis.

²⁴³ Mitrović, M., (2017). ‘‘Hybrid warfare and asymmetric security threats’’. *Vojno delo*, Beograd, 5/2017.

²⁴⁴ Regarding Vladimir Slipchenko, Russian strategy scholar, US and NATO engagement in 1999 in aggression against FRJ, with predominant characteristics of technical and technology supremacy, is model of 6th Generation of Warfare. See more in: Слипченко, В. (1999). *Война будущего*. Москва: Московский Общественный Научный Фонд.

²⁴⁵ Asymmetric warfare, according to many authors, is not a new phenomenon. According to them, conceptual basis Asymmetric warfare can be observed through the Sun Tzu Wu writing. The basis of the concept of asymmetric warfare represents a model in which the technological and abundance inferior opponent inflicts losses to the opposite side, presenting the results in order to promote their views and objectives tending to evolve new, motivated minded.

²⁴⁶ Lind, W., Nightengale, K., Schmitt, J., Sutton, J., Wilson, G., (1989), ‘‘The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation’’, *Marine Corps Gazette*, Oct. 1989., pp. 26.

²⁴⁷ Qiao, L., Xiangsui, W., (1999). *Unrestricted Warfare*. PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, Beijing.

²⁴⁸ Kofman, M., Rojansky, M. (2015). *A Closer look at Russia’s ‘‘Hybrid War’’*. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Kennan Cable No. 7, April 2015, pp. 5

change of its government, with the aim of establishing the state of disturbing the balance in international relations and the realization of its own interests, predominantly by non-combat means, can be termed as a *hybrid*.

Hybrid security threats gather all phenomena which engage synergy implementation of conventional weapons, unconventional and irregular tactics, terrorist acts and criminal activities, simultaneously acting on one battlefield, with the goal of achieving political objectives.²⁴⁹ This concept of achieving national interests is called the unconventional, political (hybrid) warfare.²⁵⁰ Hybrid security threats are generated to establish the conditions which disrupt the balance of power in international relations and the realization of its own interests, predominantly by non-combat means.²⁵¹

US military doctrinal documents²⁵² recognized that the actual conflicts could not be solved only by military means, and in order to achieve the success, it is necessary to engage all national capacities: diplomatic, informational, military and economic.

Also, according to the Russian military doctrine²⁵³, modern warfare is described as an integrated engagement of military forces and resources which have no military character, with an emphasis on the application of rate information warfare with the goal of achieving political objectives without the direct involvement of military forces, with the aim of shaping the desired response of world public opinion. Furthermore, the Russian doctrine predicts the specific form of modern conflicts in which they will apply an integrated operation of military and political, economic, informational and other non-military activities.²⁵⁴

Taking into account the characteristics and manifestation forms of hybrid forms of endangering national security²⁵⁵, in summary, it could express the main pillars of hybrid operations expressions:²⁵⁶

²⁴⁹ Hofman., F.,G., (2007). *Conflict in the 21st Century-The Rise of Hibrid Wars*. Potomac Instiute for Policy Studies.

²⁵⁰ Hoffman., F., G., (2016). *On Not-So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs. Hybrid Threats*. Retrieved from: <http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybridthreats/>; 12/05/2017.

²⁵¹ Kofman, M., Rojansky, M., (2015), pp. 3.

²⁵² Department of the Army (2008). *Field Manual No. 3-0: Operations*. Washington, DC.

²⁵³ Президент России, Москва, (2010). *Военная доктрина Российской Федерации*. Retrieved from: <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/461>.

²⁵⁴ Президент России, Москва, (2014). *Военная доктрина Российской Федерации*. Retrieved from, http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_172989/.

²⁵⁵ Mitrović, M. (2017). "Hybrid asymmetric warfare and security threats", *Vojno delo*, Belgrade, 5/2017.

²⁵⁶ Mitrovic, M. (2017). "The economic and energy aspects of a hybrid threat to national security". *Vojno delo*, Belgrade, 6/2017.

- Special and psychological operations which represent the armed, conventional-unconventional forms of the engagement of forces and resources.
- Economic, energy and political pressures. Beside the fact that the economy has intensified as a reflection of the state power, not explicitly by military forces, but thus it becomes a key subject of military operations planning, with the overall military strategy relying on the engagement of various economic instruments, while the classic application of the armed forces is projected only when it is absolutely necessary.²⁵⁷
- Information campaigns - media and the Internet (ab)use. The essential aim of this pillow is to make an impact on retained public opinion, deviation of altitudes, changing the existence or adoption of new attitudes, as well as the introduction of doubt, uncertainty and fear. Campaigns are being carried out by the usage of all propaganda instruments, launching half-truths, unchecked sensations, media manipulation, cyberspace attacks, and others. These strong performances of creating public opinion contribute significantly to resultant effects of foreign policy which aims to achieve the strategic dominance in a particular region.²⁵⁸
- Public diplomacy is an activity of low intensity, long-term oriented, directly related to the concept of soft power, in which it is based on intangible and indirect influences, such as culture, social values and ideology.²⁵⁹ Also it is the instrument of communication between professional services, such as diplomats and foreign correspondents, and it is the process of intercultural communication.²⁶⁰ Public diplomacy is an activity which deals with the influence of the foreign public attitude in order to formulate and realize applicants of foreign policy, including international relations beyond traditional diplomacy.²⁶¹

²⁵⁷ Taillard, M. (2012). *Economics and modern warfare*. Palgrave MacMillan.

²⁵⁸ Mitrović, M., (2017). "The potential influence of interest groups on the US Foreign Policy – Case of 'Kosovo' ". *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, No.162 - 163.

²⁵⁹ Nye, J., (1990). "The misleading metaphor of decline". *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 1990.

²⁶⁰ Cull, N. (2006). *Public Diplomacy Before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase*. Retrieved from <https://usepublicdiplomacy.org/blog/public-diplomacy-gullion-evolution-phrase>.

²⁶¹ Mitrović, M., (2017). „Public Diplomacy in Hybrid Warfare paradigm“, *Vojno delo*, Belgrade, 7/2017.

All listed forms of activities have the purpose of destabilizing the country or changing political and government power in it, organized and carried out with the purpose of achieving the strategic interests of outer power centers, in order to establish the state of disruption of balance in international relations, and the realization of their own interests, mostly by non-combat means. On the basis of these theories, it could be concluded that hybrid warfare does not present warfare *per se*, but a form of a conflict concept in which a wide range of military and non-conventional activities are applied, with a purpose of achieving the strategic advantages for applying the entity. Furthermore, raised dilemma point in correlation of hybrid conflict concept and phenomena of asymmetric security threats.

ASYMMETRIC SECURITY THREATS AND THE HYBRID CONCEPT OF CONFLICTS

Regarding some theories, asymmetry principles in warfare are old as the war itself and belong to the mankind warfare history.²⁶² In some scholar's thoughts, the asymmetric warfare concept is recognized as a possibility of technically and by men power weaker opponent to achieve significant losses than other, stronger side, with simultaneous promotion of results in order to mobilize new members.²⁶³ Asymmetry in contemporary security environment could be recognized through disproportionality in technical development of conflicted parties, imbalance in moral power and psychological readiness of units as well as of wider population. Also, an organizational technological asymmetry could be recognized in war perseverance and others which mostly depends on social-psychological characteristics of conflicted parties.²⁶⁴

Some authors, in summarizing the form of a description of asymmetric security threats, indicate its determinants as:²⁶⁵

- New, unorthodox, unusual, surprised and unexpected threats;
- Presence of ultimately new and flexibly developed tactics and capabilities, as well as unconventional technical goods and arms.

²⁶² Metz, S., and Johnson, D., (2001). *Asymmetry And U.S. Military Strategy : Definition, Background, And Strategic Concepts*, Strategic Studies Institute, US.

²⁶³ Renz, B., Smith, H., (2016), pp.5.

²⁶⁴ Metz, S., and Johnson, D., V, (2001), pp. 10.

²⁶⁵ Lambakis, S., Kiras, J., and Kolet, K., (2002). *Understanding "Asymmetric" Threats to the United States*. National Institute for Public Policy, Fairfax.

- Ambient globalizes the security environment with the state and understate security subjects and stake holders;
- Positions and altitudes of security subjects and stake holders regarding global international relations and security issues;
- Classical, convectional approach to the state and under state security and defense issues are relatively obsolete, out-of-date, and do not have appropriate organizational capabilities in defense of asymmetric threats.
- State system of defense shows latent institutional weaknesses, especially in the area of prevention and protection development.

Hybrid warfare and asymmetric security threats, conditionally called asymmetric warfare, are terms which are very close. The main reason for that is in acting forms, targets, nonlinear approach of exposing, unconventional means, distinguishing classical, so called Clausewitz's "shape" of war, as well as often absence (or at least, no clear presence) of state subjects in conflicts. But, regarding some scholars analysis, it is obvious that hybrid and asymmetric warfare have some significant applications especially in contribution to some theories of conflict, subjects, stake holders, aims and goals. The common point of analysis could be established in Hart's view in the best strategic way of winning strategy. Namely, Hart thought that significantly longest and unproductive way is the direct clash of armed capacities, and that the most fecund is strategically indirect approach with different forms of unarmed means, which effectively demolishes psychological and psychical balance of opponent, and leads to his defeat.²⁶⁶ Basically, the logic of hybrid and asymmetric warfare could be recognized through the Chaos and Network centric theories of conflict management. Chaos theory correlates with hybrid and asymmetric warfare basically upon common multivariable process, which at first sight, are not tuned to the same aim. Upon some theories²⁶⁷ which analyses Man's Chaos theory, constructive sub-chaos could be controlled as sub-strategy contests of hybrid warfare.²⁶⁸ The origin of this consideration contributed to the understanding of some contemporary conflicts in the papers

²⁶⁶ Hart, L., (1954). "The Strategy of Indirect Approach". *Internet Archive*, National War College.

²⁶⁷ Korybko, A., (2015). Hybrid Wars: the indirect adaptive approach to regime change, Moscow, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, pp 23.

²⁶⁸ Mann, S., (1992). "Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought", *Parameters*, Autumn 1992.

of Darius²⁶⁹ and Shahskov²⁷⁰. On the other hand, in support of ‘‘chaos’’ rout of asymmetric warfare, we could say that even the origin of asymmetry is connected with the creation of chaos and demolishing the capabilities of states, by acting with the unconventional means directly to the weaken point in national infrastructure. Some analytical works recognized asymmetry as a part or ‘‘small’’ hybrid war. Furthermore, hybrid warfare could be recognized as a chain of different activities, in which asymmetric acts are sublimated among them.²⁷¹

Network-centric warfare theory is also in correlation with hybrid and asymmetric endangerment of security. According to some theories²⁷², network-centric warfare is a conflict basically different from a classical war, in which actors use network forms of organizations, doctrines and strategies, based on modern technologies and cyber space networks. Actors mostly represented by small groups, or even solo players, who coordinate, communicate, and synchronize actions, usually without solid centered core or base. At the same time, the concept is strongly supported with a frequent usage of *soft power* mechanisms, especially in informational campaigns of perception management, public odium shaping and branding the organization, movement or acts.²⁷³ Additionally, asymmetry could be recognized even in a network-based organization, which is acting predominantly as a nonlinear actor, such is Al Qaida. At the same time, this organization is network based asymmetrically organized, communicated, resources, means and support delivered, as well as media and message broadcasting supported.

Through the analysis of subjects, determinants, as well as the aims of acting, it could be concluded that hybrid and asymmetric warfare closely correlate in areas of: conceptual approach of conflict management, acting subjects (which predominantly aren't state centralized), flexibility, adaptability, unconventionality, means and methods, way of acting, choosing targets, communication strategy, mobilization of supporters and new members. At the same time, the hybrid concept of conflict has a wider meaning and inner compositions than the asymmetric way of security endangerment, which

²⁶⁹ Darius, M., (2014). "Iraq and Syria are Burning, "Constructive Chaos" and America's Broader Strategy to Conquer Eurasia." *GlobalResearch.ca*, June 2014.

²⁷⁰ Shahskov, S., (2011). "The theory of 'manageable chaos' put into practice." *Strategic Culture Foundation*, 1 Mar. 2011.

²⁷¹ Mitrović, M. (2017). "Hybrid asymmetric warfare and security threats", *Vojno delo*, Belgrade, 5/2017.

²⁷² Arquilla, J., and Ronfeldt, D., (2001). "The Advent of Netwar (Revisited)." *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.

²⁷³ Cebrowski, A., and Garstka J., (1998). *Network - Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future*. U.S. Naval Institute.

indicates a frequent usage of “war” idiom in a hybrid conflict connotation. Also, hybrid as well as asymmetric security endangerment imposes acts mostly on the most vulnerable, critical society components, resources or infrastructures. We consider both wider socio–psychological, economical, and political components, or more concrete acts against elements of infrastructure, personal safety and daily life activities, with postponed psychological effects.²⁷⁴

CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY PARADIGM

Critical national infrastructure (CNI) could be understood as basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society²⁷⁵, or organizational and physical structures and facilities of such vital importance to a nation's society and economy that their failure or degradation would result in sustained supply shortages, significant disruption of public safety and security, or other dramatic consequences.²⁷⁶ A contemporary approach to the concept of CNI evolves from simplified identification with the general public infrastructure, which becomes, due to the technological development, more sophisticated, and sensitive, for the national high priority core value, which is primarily, a potential aim of hybrid and asymmetric security threats. Thus, during the eighties, CNI was mostly seen through the Public Infrastructures as „a wide array of public facilities and equipment required to provide social services and support private sector economic activity“.²⁷⁷

However, the complexity of geopolitical relations and the disappearance of global military polarization involve the growing threat of hybrid and asymmetric forms which compromise critical infrastructures, particularly with terrorist threats. This development of relations at the global

²⁷⁴ Mitrović, M. (2017). "Hybrid asymmetric warfare and security threats", *Vojno delo*, Belgrade, 5/2017.

²⁷⁵ Editors of the American Heritage Dictionaries, *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, 3rd Ed. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2000.

²⁷⁶ Federal Ministry of the Interior, (2009). *National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP Strategy)*. Federal Republic of Germany, pp 2-7.

²⁷⁷ Namely, in this period the critical infrastructures corpus included roads, bridges, water and sewer systems, airports, ports, and public buildings, and might also include schools, health facilities, jails, recreation facilities, electric power production, fire safety, waste disposal, and communications services. See more: Vaughan, R., and Pollard, R., (1984). *Rebuilding America, Vol. I, Planning and Managing Public Works in the 1980s*. Washington, DC: Council of State Planning Agencies, pp.2.

security stage leads to the present necessity for redefining the understanding of CNI in mid-nineties of the last century, when CNI was viewed through „framework of interdependent networks and systems comprising identifiable industries, institutions (including people and procedures), and distribution capabilities that provide a reliable flow of products and services essential to the defense and economic security of the state“.²⁷⁸ The terrorist attack on the United States on 11 September 2001 contributed significantly to the general approach and attitude to critical national infrastructures. In particular, after taking the attack effect into consideration, it was concluded that all U.S. national security stakeholders, institutions and organizations should devote to prevention and a system for monitoring and maintaining capacities to save CNI from potential new asymmetric, terrorist attacks with hybrid consequences regarding national security and defense capabilities. Elements of CNI officially include all systems in the national infrastructure which are involved in the areas of vital importance to the nation: Agriculture, Food, Water, Public Health, Emergency Services, Government, Defense Industrial Base, Information and Telecommunications, Energy, Transportation, Banking and Finance, Chemical Industry, Postal and Shipping.²⁷⁹

The European Union as a specific form of interesting associated states, whose existence is based on a broad platform of common economic, political, social, market and the human rights and freedom values, certainly recognizes the vulnerability of CNI. Whether we are talking about general, common or special, national capacities, critical infrastructure, from the EU point of view, institutions are noticed as general resources of all EU citizens. Endangering one component of CNI of any EU member causes consequences for the whole community. That's a reason why the EU has approaches to the regulation of access to CNI which is under the authority of the EU Member States, but also, it is recognized as collective resource.²⁸⁰ In this context, the EU defines critical infrastructure as a European infrastructure that consists of physical resources, services, devices, information technology, security, and network infrastructure, security, economic or social well-being: a) two or more Member States, b) three or more Member States.²⁸¹

²⁷⁸ US Federal government, (1996). *Executive Order 13010—Critical Infrastructure Protection*. Federal Register, Vol. 61, No. 138. pp 37347-37350.

²⁷⁹ Office of Homeland Security, (2002). *The National Strategy for Homeland Security*. Washington D.C.

²⁸⁰ Commission Of The European Communities, (12.12.2006), European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, COM (2006) 786 final Brussels, EU.

²⁸¹ EU Council directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection.

Results of the research which was made about CNI vulnerability based on strategy documents of several developed countries (Canada, UK, US, Germany, Norway and Switzerland), indicate that most of them, as most vulnerable parts of CNI recognized elements in the following fields: *energy* (electric, nuclear, gas, oil as well as their installations and transportation facilities), *communication* (telecommunication, informational broadcasting facilities, IT infrastructure) and *public services* (financial, food, water and medical supplying, public information), *transport, security* (nuclear, emergency and rescue services), *government* (institutions, buildings, basic defense industry, defense, police and customs system, public safety). Also, it indicated the existence of variability of priorities, which could be recognized as differences in specification of each country national economy, political and institutional strengths.²⁸²

The Republic of Serbia has a long and demanding path in regulation of CNI, especially in the perspective of ongoing EU integration process. Namely, Serbia, in accordance with the Law on emergency situations since 2009 has made the frame of regulations regarding the vulnerability assessments, sources of potential threat, the possible consequences, needs and possibilities for the implementation of measures and tasks of protection and rescue, which is delegated to the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia.²⁸³ In the same Law, Serbia recognizes CNI, but still without a clear definition of which elements or areas of infrastructure it is all about. In the process of EU integration, the Republic of Serbia should provide in the very near future: identifying National and European critical infrastructure; To perform risk analysis and assessment of the effects of threat; To establish a system of cross-sector criteria, as well as a set of general criteria / rules for assessing the risk of separate part of systems and networks of critical infrastructure; To set up a system of specific criteria / rules and to assess the risk to CNI based on them; To define the criteria and procedures for classified information relating to the National and European critical infrastructure which is conducted in accordance with the EU legislative; To designate a focal point, which is the central body of the state administration conducted communication and coordination with the competent bodies of the EU and other countries; To realize the Plan for

²⁸² Škero, M., and Ateljević, V., (2015). „Zaštita Kritične Infrastrukture i osnovni elementi usklađivanja sa direktivom Saveta Evrope 2008/114/ES“. *Vojno Delo*, 3/2015, Beograd, 192 - 207.

²⁸³ Government of Republic of Serbia, (2009). *Zakon o vanrednim situacijama*. Retrieved from: www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_vanrednim_situacijama.html.

operational approach to protecting CNI; To establish control and penalties measures related to jeopardizing the CNI.²⁸⁴

POSSIBLE FORMS OF ENDANGERMENT OF CNI

Considering the contemporary events which affected the security and defense capabilities of the country, and which do not directly involve armed forces in conventional means of war, but primarily non-classical armed conflict forms and endangerment of national security (such as conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, situation in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, migration crisis, energy crisis, frequently terrorist acts all around the world, etc.), it is possible to develop two main approaches to the assessment of endangerment of CNI as a part of crucial national legitimacy:

- Hybrid operations as a part of Hybrid Warfare. It could be recognized in the field of energy, military technology dependence, IT, media, and economy. Main characteristics are hard clarification, acting forms which correlate with high political actions and influence, as well as diplomatic relation and deep impact on public diplomacy. Furthermore, it can be concluded that domination in this area has states which are recognized as global and regional powers, concerning the small and less developed countries. Critical national infrastructure is the aim of Hybrid warfare, mainly targeted by hybrid operations and asymmetric threats. Prevention of damage, destabilization of functions, partially or even completely losing control or possessing NCI could be recognized in strategically and rationally orientated national policy planning. Namely, small countries with limited resources, and small international influence are just part of the biggest game of influence. By the Hybrid warfare point of view, they are objects and polygon of interests clash in strategic geopolitical arena. Understanding this rational position could help responsible and future orientated nations to prevent endangering, demolition or losing National Critical Infrastructure or a part of it.

- Asymmetric threats, as specific form of nonlinear acting of groups, with a variety of motives and organizational aspects. Mostly recognized forms of acting are different forms of terrorist activities against the CNI, with the purpose to achieve damage, losses of functionality of CNI, impairment of human health and life, security, trust in Government and the introduction of massive panic and fear. By the analysis of parameters of endogenous aspects of CNI, possible vulnerable points, and introducing precaution measures, it is

²⁸⁴ Škero, M., and Ateljević, V., (2015), pp. 206.

possible to conduct effective, but not absolutely exact miserable, predicted, pre effected action against terrorist threat. There are many different definitions concerning asymmetric threats, but it is necessary to find one which can describe²⁸⁵:

- New, unorthodox, surprising, urgent, and unfamiliar threats;
- The historically unique security circumstances facing the institution of security governance;
- Organization vulnerabilities, or lack of defense;
- Institutional weaknesses in executing responses to threats; and,
- New tactics and operations available to potential enemies.

New, asymmetric security issues could be confined to the area related to three dominant security threats, which are not directly connected with the traditional military structures: terrorism, organized crime, and ethnic unrest or conflict.

The priorities of EU security policy towards the region of the Western Balkans (WB), including the application of European conditionality, the pace of the integration of the region, and the European posture towards the resolution of the territorial disputes in the region should all be lined up with a sober and constructive estimate of the nature and volume of the security threat arising from the region. Some research²⁸⁶, that has been done, provides a conclusion that all countries in the Western Balkan region have different methodology in the approach to asymmetric threats analysis in the region. If we recognize the asymmetric threat as the main security threat regarding CNI, we must notice that the main challenge for all countries in the WB is to establish gathering through asymmetric approach. Yet, we still have a potential collision in understanding, because some of the countries do not recognize terrorism as potential risk, threats or crisis generator. That could be the path to potential misunderstanding of terms and a possible different approach. So, the conclusion would be that it is necessary to learn and find common approach to define asymmetric threats, if we want to preserve our regional, Western Balkan CNI. If we look at the possible asymmetric threats from the joint

²⁸⁵ Lambakis, S., Kiras, J., Kolet, K., (2002), *Understanding "Asymmetric" Threats to the United States*, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, Fairfax.

²⁸⁶ Štrbac, K., Mitrović, M., (2011). "Asymmetric Threats-Common Response In Western Balkans". *The Review of International Affairs*, vol. LXII, No 1143, pp. 89-105, Belgrade.

standpoint, we might develop an effective crisis management approach, free of political influence.

Regarding the WB, it's very important to stress regional approach to the aim of EU integration process as the tool against asymmetric threats pointed regarding NCI. The research²⁸⁷ indicates that for Balkan countries it is necessary to have a joint approach to integrations as balanced toll for safety of CNI.

In conclusion of the analysis of CNI endangering forms, it could be sublimated that physical endangerment and availability factor have dominant role. Namely, CNI could be endangered, ruined, destroyed or abused by physical means, by terrorist's acts or diversion, which are predominantly asymmetric forms of security threats, or even the part of wider hybrid operations. The availability is related to the ownership under CNI structures and possibilities of a country to gain full control of the content (gas, oil, coal, mineral, water, etc.) as well as physical part of CNI (pipe lines, delivering routes, reservoirs, mines, etc.). Namely, a country, which does not have a complete legitimate control over vital CNI, is potentially in a very high CNI risk position.

If we elaborate upon the previous hypothesis, the actual position of the Republic of Serbia will be analyzed in the frame of the Western Balkan and Europe. Namely, if we consider that role of CNI, it is not just infrastructure (objects and facilities) by itself, but potentials and resources which are in correlation with it, we could notice that hybrid and asymmetric activities against a state could be noticed in two main pillars:

Economy acts; Economic warfare is not a new idea, and it could be said that it has existed since the war itself. Contemporary economic warfare has forms of sanctions, embargo and other macroeconomic political acts, which have the purpose of conflict management tool, without the usage of armed forces.²⁸⁸ Thus economic means have the purpose to endanger:

- Supplying, by endangerment of availability of common and special resources;
- Trade, by limitation of the exchange which could supply necessary resources;

²⁸⁷ Mišević, T., Mitrović, M., (2011). "Evolving Asymmetric Threats in the Balkans". *NATO Science for Peace and Security Series, E: Human and Security Dynamics*-Vol. 85, Publisher: IOS Press BV, Amsterdam.

²⁸⁸ Taillard, M.,(2012). *Economics and modern warfare*. Palgrave MacMillan.

- Market, by needs - offer manipulations with the purpose of influence on strategic interest.

Listed measures are directed according to general capabilities of the country to react against outer or inner generated forms of security threats. Economic pressures or economical straggle presents the engagement of economy, economical means and science in achieving the advantage in strategic areas of society, and thus in security and defense sectors of the state. Namely, they are involved in achieving inner – state effects, change of state policy, political system, general weaknesses, even defense capabilities, as well as foreign policy effects.²⁸⁹ In the scope of previous listed CNI areas which are recognized in developed countries (energy, communication, public services, government, transport and security) it could be concluded that any economical, hybrid attack could make an impact on the defense and security capabilities of a country. Also, asymmetric threats, for example terrorist attacks, could seriously endanger economy system of a country, and not just psychical damaging of parts of CNI, which is a direct impact. Furthermore, asymmetric threats could seriously damage economy system of a country, by non-direct influence, such are, insecurity regarding direct terrorist threats (an impact in tourism, small business and supported services), bio and animal health attacks (meat and other food production), diseases and contagions (transport), etc. Also, asymmetric threats and attacks could be recognized as a symbiotic part of some hybrid operations. For example it could be the usage analysis of terrorist attacks on so called KLA, during 1998-1999 against and in the vicinity of economy important centers in Kosovo and Metohija, as a part of wider, hybrid operation against Yugoslavia.²⁹⁰

Shortly, hybrid economic acts reflecting a possible negative influence on the whole country, and asymmetric attacks could consider a contribution to the total states CNI capabilities. In this term, asymmetric security threats could be understudied as a part of a hybrid concept of endangerment of states capabilities, which directly correlates with national security and defense.

Energy acts; Energy safety is a relatively new term, which considers different connotations, respectfully from the stand point of suppliers, consumers or transit countries. Oil, gas and electric power are recognized as main factors for energy safety analysis. Energy safety is directly related to geopolitical position of a country and it represents available energy resources, economic growth and political power and influence. Hybrid aspects of

²⁸⁹ Taillard, M.,(2012), pp. 15.

²⁹⁰ Мијалковски, М., (2002), *Тероризам албанских екстремиста*, Београд: Војска.

influence are especially indicated with correlation between energy and defense system of a country. Namely, a military factor is the last attribute which a country could use, after diplomacy, politics and economy efforts fail, in order to achieve energy resources. Also, the armed forces and police are guardians of energy corridors, transportation infrastructure and storages. So, we consider energy safety a part of national security cortex, which indicates that beside asymmetrical, for example terrorist acts, availability of energy resources are dominantly important for the CNI issue. From this point of view, Serbia is energy dependable country. Less of the energy sovereignty has more aspects: Serbia doesn't have national oil or gas companies. Russian „Gasprom“ bought „Naftna industrija Srbije“ in 2008 for 400 million euros, and made a new company „Srbiagas“ in which Russians have 51% of the ownership. Beside production and storage capacities, Russians controls even the land of tubes corridors. As far as oil is concerned, situation is similar. The Serbian oil company „Beopetrol“ was bought in 2003, by Russians „Lukoil“, for 117 million euros, and was overtaken with complete infrastructure and reproduction facilities. Those acts are also recognized as a part of „Russian Energy Offensive“ to South East Europe²⁹¹. Coal as energy resource also has tendency to be in deficit. Namely, more than 60% of Serbia coal reserves are on the territory which is unilaterally, by force taken, and named „The Republic of Kosovo“. More analyses²⁹² show that a secessionist movement of Albanians is supported by some interest groups in US, which had more than clear financial motivation to approach the Serbian coal reserves on Kosovo and Metohija²⁹³. Hybrid forms are recognized in a conceptual way of overall endangered national security, and asymmetry is conducted through stake - holders of endangering, whether we are looking at the paramilitary and terrorist organizations which are proxy used, or on scene where there are corporations and multinational companies, which took possession under national vital CNI structures. In summary, Serbia is energy insecure country from fossil fuels point of view. Moreover, Serbia doesn't have sovereignty

²⁹¹ Strategic Research Institute, Strategic – Security trends in South East Europe till 2020, Belgrade, 2015, p -101 – 109.

²⁹² For example: Flounders, Sara (2000). NATO troops seize mining complex, *Workers World Newspaper*, August 24, 2000; http://iacenter.org/folder04/kosovo_mines2.htm/;28/12/2016; then: Lydall Harold (1989), *Yugoslavia in Crisis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; and: Hedges, Chris (1998). Kosovo War's Glittering Prize Rests Underground. *New York Times*, <https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/soc.culture.bosna-herzgvna/28/12/2016>.

²⁹³ Original name of Autonomous province, whose second part “Metohija” originally means “Country under the administration of the monastery”. The reason for that name is in the fact that the west part of Serbian south Autonomous province, since 12 century till communist regime 1945, belonged to ancient orthodox monasteries in Pec, Djakovica and Prizren.

under the oil, gas and main coil infrastructure, which makes a country deeply vulnerable.

CONCLUSION

CNI is a vulnerable point of national security and defense system. At the same time, hybrid and asymmetric way of endangerment is highly present during the peaceful time. Hybrid is mostly dangerous for the long distance point of view, because of a deep impact, correlation with related buildings, mass psychology shaping and so on. Asymmetric security threats are clear and present danger, with most devastating and psychologically expounding effects, which have a direct influence on the life of population. Both of them are hardly predicted, well camouflaged, long and secretly planned, etc. All above listed lead to the conclusion that CNI is permanent and high priority target of hybrid and asymmetric security threats. From this point of view, it has raised an ultimate necessity for comprehensive approach to the protection of CNI. Asymmetric security threats are in a wide role of national hybrid security endangerment, so it has a great potential influence on the CNI.

Specification of the WB and Serbia as its part, in prevention against hybrid and asymmetric security threats to CNI, correlate with complex history, present and future perspective of all countries in this region. Namely, the Balkan region is viewed as a common market by the investors, common infrastructure has some denominators (Corridor 7, 8 and 10), human resources are important from the standpoint of a unified approach and are counted only at the regional level, the transition problems and the industrial development have a relatively consistent level in all countries in the Balkans. All these reasons indicate the necessity for a common approach to dealing with potential hybrid and asymmetric threats, particularly in the field of solving unemployment and economic development. Specifically, future investments are viewed from the standpoint of the rate for capital risk investment, which is still relatively high in this region. If we take into account that there will no be possibilities for job creation and an increase in employment without investment, it is clear that precondition for the overall stability of the region are achieving a balanced approach to the asymmetric threats and a common response to the challenges. On the other hand, more standardized economic development means that CNI is more protected, because during the integration, we have to obey the rules of EU institutions regarding the protection of CNI, as a vital, essential, part of national and EU community.

The meaning of Comprehensive Approach is to bring all governmental and supranational stakeholders to prevention and crisis management regarding protection of CNI. Supporting tools for this purpose could be: 1) promotion of

shared values as well the understanding of the situation and common aims regarding the preservation of CNI on all levels; 2) development of the structures and planning the processes which can provide support and help in planning and implementation of appropriate reactions in situation when CNI are endangered; 3) establishing relationships and multilateral understanding, through common education, value building, training, exercising, analysis and planning a responding scenario in potential CNI endangered situation.²⁹⁴

We can say that comprehensive and strategically are the synonyms for the approach to the analysis of asymmetric endogenous of CNI in the hybrid concept of conflict. The reasons for that we can see in the various aspects of nature of CNI, stakeholder of safety and preventive role, to the wide range of security risks and threats, as well as risk and threats holders. So, we can conclude that comprehensive should be an organization and action planning of stakeholders of security measures regarding CNI, analyzing types and sources of endangering of CNI (man caused or natural disasters), and, of course, analyze the risk holders (organizations, states and non-states, proxy, natural disasters, environment degradation, pollution, etc).

Having in mind asymmetrical nature of risks and threats for CNI, we can conclude that comprehensive security measures for CNI have the following purposes:

- Development of capabilities for physical protection and legitimated ownership under CNI;
- Low regulation and it's incorporated in standardization forms of controlling and protection of CNI.
- Building the partnerships among the stakeholders of CNI security roles at national as well as regional and international level;
- Implementation of an all-hazards risk management approach through daily based stakeholders communication;
- Advance the timely sharing and protection of information among partners on all levels of CNI security management system.

Comprehensive approach involves strategic based planning process with a purpose to achieve a reliable and appropriate combination of security measures. Aims of those measures are: 1) to address intentional and accidental incidents, 2) to develop business continuity practices which can deal with

²⁹⁴ Mitrovic, Miroslav, Comprehensive Approach to the Asymmetric Endangerment of National Critical Infrastructure (July 10, 2013). Retrived from SSRN: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2942036>.

disruptions and ensure the continuation of essential services, and 3) emergency management planning with the aim to ensure adequate response procedures that should be in place to deal with unforeseen disruptions and natural disasters.

Regarding those aims, comprehensive approach has the purpose to provide a framework for the functions of the multi-level (sector, nation, regional, international) of CNI protection networks, regarding Canadian²⁹⁵ model could include:

- Enabling in-time data availability for all stakeholders;
- Identification of national, regional or sector risks holders and threats by NCI;
- Development time and expert made studies of real danger to CNI; and
- Creating Procedures and practices for the purpose of strengthening the resilience of CNI and their readiness for prevention, mitigation, response and recovery

From the German²⁹⁶ point of view, comprehensive approach can be divided by the nature of causes on: 1) natural events, 2) errors (technical failure or human error), and 3) organized violence activities (terrorism, crime, war). Taking into account the complexity and comprehensiveness, it can be said that the comprehensive strategic approach is necessary because of the need for:

- Open risk communication among the state, companies, citizens and the general public, taking into account the sensitivity of certain information;
- Co-operation among all stakeholders in preventing and managing incidents;
- Greater self-commitment by operators regarding incident prevention and management;
- A greater and self-reliant, self-protection and self-help capability of individuals or institutions affected by the disruption or compromise of critical infrastructure services.

²⁹⁵ Canadian government, (2009). *National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure*, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada.

²⁹⁶ Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Ministry of the Interior, (2009), *National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP Strategy)*, pp 2-7.

At the end, all stakeholders in crisis management process (planning, analyzing, educating, training, lessons-learning, equipping, etc.) in order to provide security and severity of CNI, should work together. Finally, due to the fact that the hybrid warfare concept, as well as asymmetric security threats aim to the perceived vulnerable components and CNI of nation, the most effective defense regarding them, is prevention. Namely, hybrid warfare, as well as asymmetric threats, have the aim to plan, organize and conduct operations which are significantly different from the opponent's ones, with the purpose to maximize own advantage, using the opponent's weaknesses, take the initiative, and the achievement of greater freedom to create activities with the ultimate aim of achieving strategic goals. Based on the above mentioned, the prevention of a state which would proactively commence with the creation of defensive attitude towards hybrid and asymmetrical threats includes a preventive planned operation. Such an approach would imply strategically conceptualized attitude towards the key structures of a state and society, the development of legitimacy and legality of state institutions, strengthening the economy, the establishment and enforcement of legislation, raising the level of general culture and education of the population, media and information environment, verification and highlighting positive moral and ethical values at the level of national social consciousness, etc. Applied in practice, preventive response to hybrid and asymmetric threats, regarding the key national resources, including CNI, involves the development of all the elements of a state and society, such as military capacities and capabilities, the economical, diplomatic information and communications, intelligence and security, legislative and judicial, scientific, educational and administrative resources of the state²⁹⁷.

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²⁹⁷ See more: *Dealing With Today's Asymmetric Threat to U.S. and Global Security*, An Executive Summary of the May 8th 2008 Symposium, 2008 CACI International Inc.

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KRITIČNA NACIONALNA INFRASTRUKTURA SA STANOVIŠTA ASIMETRIČNIH BEZBEDNOSNIH PRETNJI U OKVIRU KONCEPTA HIBRIDNOG RATOVANJA

Miroslav Mitrović*

Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Univerzitet odbrane, Beograd,
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Savremeni geopolitički događaji ukazuju da su aktuelni sukobi po prirodi nelinearni, hibridni i asimetrični. Osim toga, ova nekonvencionalna sredina razvoja sukoba upućuje na fenomen da se aktuelni

* miroslav.mitrovic@mod.gov.rs

sukobi sve više udaljavaju od klasične, konvencionalne teorije ratovanja i da kreiraju ambijent nekonvencionalne paradigme konflikata. Sa tim u vezi, kritična nacionalna infrastruktura, pored ostalih nastavlja da bude sve više jedan od prioriternih operativnih ciljeva novih, nekonvencionalnih napada protivnika. Specifičnosti ranjivosti i važnosti kritične nacionalne infrastrukture, naročito doprinose karakteristike i priroda savremenih hibridnih koncepata sukoba i posebno asimetričnih formi ugrožavanja nacionalne bezbednosti, i njihovi potencijalni efekti na elemente kritične infrastrukture, a time i opšte odbrambene sposobnosti nacije. U aktuelnom trenutku, svedoci smo da državni i nedržavni akteri dominantno i preovlađujuće koriste nekonvencionalne forme konflikata radi ostvarivanja svojih interesa. Ova nekonvencionalnost predstavlja zajednički imenitelj koji obuhvata hibridnost i asimetričnost konflikata. Može se reći da je kritična nacionalna infrastruktura cilj delovanja asimetričnih formi ugrožavanja bezbednosti kao deo hibridnog koncepta sukoba. U radu su iznesena razmatranja koja imaju za cilj da doprinesu iznalaženju dela odgovora na pitanja: Šta je hibrid rat i gde je njena veza sa asimetričnim pretnjama bezbednosti? Koji deo kritične nacionalne infrastrukture je najugroženiji od strane asimetričnih bezbednosnih pretnji? Kako razviti prevenciji u zaštiti kritične nacionalne infrastrukture? Analiza je zasnovana na širokoj bati naučne, stručne i normativno-pravne literature, kao i analizi aktuelnog stanja u Republici Srbiji u vezi sa navedenom temom.

Ključne reči: asimetrične bezbednosne pretnje, hibridno ratovanje, kritična nacionalna infrastruktura.

**SECURITY STRATEGY - AN ATTEMPT OF CONCEPTUAL
DEFINITION AND DETERMINATION OF ASSYMETRIC AND
TRANSNATIONAL FORMS OF THREATS**

Sladjan Milosavljević*

Faculty for ingeenering management in Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Hatidža Beriša**

Military Academy, University of Defence,
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: One of the crucial problems that Serbia has been facing in the last two decades, among others, was the problem of (re)defining the most important strategic-doctrinal commitments in the sphere of security, that is, the principles, goals and tasks of a security strategy in the protection of vital national interests, among more intensive and present asymmetric forms of threats. The dynamics and heterogeneity of security and geopolitical processes in the localities have determined the situation in the domestic scientific and professional literature that the phenomenon of the security strategy has not been processed in a satisfactory and coherent way (whether it has been explored fragmentarily or within broader thematic units, or what was often the case, with delayed implementation of the commitments that "cascaded" onto current events). The aim of this paper is to try to conceptually define the security strategy and its theoretical background, which implies the systematization of theoretical knowledge and determination of strategic-doctrinal commitments related to the emergence of asymmetric forms of threats. Practically, the aim of this paper is to draw attention to actual issues which have larger interest and meaning, to better understanding this problem and its bearing on the public, and eventually to find prospects to improve some of its segments, considering the specifics of our country and its security environment, and international norms and standards which are in function of the realization of the global and regional security. The paper also points to the fact that, through the process of adopting the most important strategic-doctrinal documents, Serbia has managed to articulate and define the basic principles and goals of its security strategy, the realization of which is to a great extent conditioned, in addition to the internal and very complicated

* sladjanmil@gmail.com

** hatidza.berisa@mod.gov.rs

external factors that exist in the sphere of regional politics. As the important problems in the implementation of the security strategy, internal and external security processes are identified, considering the new forms of (asymmetric) threats to the security of the Republic of Serbia, changes in the strategic environment, changes in other countries and alliances' strategies, as in geopolitical configuration in this region.

Key words: security strategy, Republic of Serbia, asymmetric threats, international relations

INTRODUCTORY CONSIDERATIONS

With the end of the Cold War, the possibility of military conflicts of larger proportions occurring has been reduced to a minimum. The expansion of the concept of security in theoretical thought beyond the military component is conditioned by a number of factors. Among them, the process of globalization, or disparities that it carries, is certainly one of the most important. The conceptual definition of security in the past has primarily emphasized the military dimension, while today most of the literature emphasizes the non-military aspects of the expansion, primarily on the economic and social spheres. There have also been major changes in the content, scope, impact and intensity of the operation of the internal and external security factors, both on the internal and global levels.²⁹⁸ Nowadays, most countries base their security on a dynamic foreign policy, advocating respect for the principles of international law and opposing any use of force, threats of force and all forms of pressure. In accordance with such a perception, the security strategies of the states do not only include military components, but primarily narrate the "non-war" problems, from economic and social, through educational, health and ecological, to foreign policy. Countries perceive security and basic risks and threats similarly, especially when it comes to the socio-economic issues, corruption, environmental aspects of security, etc. The nature of contemporary, "non-military" forms of endangering in the guise of asymmetric security threats (terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, ethnic and religious extremism) or transnational (drug trafficking, organized crime, weapons smuggling, illegal immigration, threats to the flow of vital resources - oil and gas) is such that their content, scope, intensity of activity and forms of manifestation can be difficult to fully limit and control, since they go beyond the geographical, political and cultural-civilization boundaries.

²⁹⁸ Кузнецов, В., Социология безопасности, РАН, Москва, 2003.;

The diversity, complexity and interdependence of the contemporary security threats cause the intensification of the relations of international actors in terms of their cooperation and coordination of activities on their elimination.²⁹⁹ They are not easily noticeable, nor can their bearers be easily identified, and their clear categorization is not possible. Carriers of threat may be diverse: hostile states, military alliances, terrorists, individuals, industrial entities, political activists, criminal organizations, etc. Each of these is motivated by different goals, limited by different levels of resources, their own abilities and the ability of the system to defend itself. Also, it is difficult to predict their potential intentions and real ability to endanger security.³⁰⁰ Motivation of actors, available resources and potential risks to the security of the state are very different. In modern conditions, the approach to evaluation and defining the sources of asymmetric security threats has been changed. Therefore, the influence of the asymmetric form of threats on the states strategic-doctrinal response, institutional throw incorporation of the most important strategic acts, vary in scope, meaning and intensity are conditioned by a large number of (geo)politic and security factors.

In contemporary conditions, the approach to assessing and defining the sources of security threats has been drastically changed. The biggest change in the perception and assessment of the state of security lies in the fact that the prevailing opinion today is that the main threats are primarily within the state itself, that is, in the functioning of internal factors and that they pose a greater risk than the external threats. In the contemporary conditions, there is a whole range of new forms of endangerment, such as religious extremism, the expansion of militant nationalism, Islamic religious fundamentalism, ethnically motivated separatism, the efforts to create ideas on the creation of ethnically "clean" states through ethnic conflicts and conflicts with other ethnic groups or with central government, the existence of economic, political and social risks; low level of living standards of citizens; gray economy, corruption within the state authorities, great disparities in the level of income of the population, weakness of state institutions, passivity of state bodies and lack of coordination in their functioning; the criminalization of society and the "purging" of state structures from criminal elements; the underdevelopment of liberal market conditions, the incompleteness of the modernization process, the poor state of agriculture and the underdevelopment of rural areas; deterioration of the demographic situation; deterioration of the state of the armed forces;

²⁹⁹ Vatis, M., A., Cyber attacks during the war on terrorism: a predictive analysis, Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth College, September 22, 2001, (<http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu>, 22.02.2011.);

³⁰⁰ Арбатov, А., Безопасност: Российский выбор, ЭПИ центр, Москва 1999.;

regional separatism; the deterioration of the rights of national minorities, the deterioration of the ecological situation, the lack of drinking water, the drainage of natural resources, problems related to water pollution and the disposal and destruction of hazardous waste, etc. In addition to the internal ones, there is also a large number of the new, so called external sources of security threats: local and regional tensions and conflicts related to border disputes; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; ethnic, religious and nationalist conflicts in the region, massive illegal immigration; transnational terrorism; the prevalence of conventional weapons among the population of neighboring countries; ecological threats facing countries in the immediate strategic security environment, etc. In order to preserve their security and effectively counteract these forms of threats, the states define their strategic-doctrinal defenses in the security sphere, which are operationalized through the adoption of appropriate strategies or concepts of security.

SECURITY STRATEGY - THE THEORETICAL BASIS AND THE ATTEMPT OF CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION

In scientific and professional literature, there is no single, generally accepted definition of security strategy because of the lack of a generally accepted definition of the concept of security itself. The authors generally agree that it is a very complex, contextualized, interdependent and multidimensional phenomenon, which can be defined only through a comprehensive and multi-disciplinary approach. In theory, the theoreticians who deal with this issue are unanimous in assessing that the problem of over-defined security strategy must be overcome and that the concept must be narrowed down to be acceptable and meaningful. In other words, defining the concept of a security strategy must correspond to its specific definition in the context of identifying relevant, reliable and measurable security state indicators at the national, regional and subnational level³⁰¹. There are a number of definitions of the security strategy of domestic and foreign authors, with great and significant differences and disagreements in defining this phenomenon, which are primarily a consequence of a one-sided approach to this phenomenon, mainly from the aspect of favoring the methods of those scientific disciplines that some authors primarily deal with. Therefore, the definitions of the term signified as the "security strategy" syntax are too

³⁰¹ In scientific and professional literature, as well as in strategic doctrinal documents, it is noticeable that different countries define the concept of security differently, primarily depending on their own national interests;

narrow, since they do not include all the segments (aspects) of this phenomenon, or they are simply aspects of this comprehension and include too broad meaning, so that the precision and meaningfulness of the notion itself is lost. As an illustration of this attitude, various definitions of this term will be presented, which can be found in the scientific-professional literature and/or strategic-doctrinal documents of individual countries.

Taking into account the practical and educational need to know the definitions of the basic concepts and syntagms, without going into wider and detailed consideration and evaluation of the validity of these definitions, it is necessary to precisely define the conceptual-categorical apparatus precisely. In other words, it is necessary first to nominally define the basic concepts and syntagms, to analyse of the available knowledge about these concepts in theoretical, scientific-professional literature and lexicographic-encyclopedic sources, and then to determine precisely and describe the correlation between these concepts as well as their practical reflection, in a programmatic and functional sense, in the elaboration of the highest doctrinal documents of the states in the field of security. As pointed out, the precise theoretical determination, or the definition of the "security strategy" syntagm, is hampered by the fact that there are no universally acceptable definitions of the term "strategies" and the term "security", as well as the existence of different theoretical approaches in defining the content and scope of these terms. What predominates in the scientific and professional literature is that the content and scope of these terms are essentially altered and expanded nowadays with relation to the previous, traditional and classical understanding of their concepts in the military context and the identification with the military rategation and armed forms of endangerment. In addition, it is important to distinguish the theoretical - doctrinal and applied - the practical aspect of these concepts and their labeling with different terms and syntagms in the modern world. It is precisely because of the correct understanding and understanding of the meanings of particular terms, concepts and syntagms, or conceptual categorical apparatus, which constitutes a security strategy, that it is necessary to present the views of a number of authors, that is, their definitions of terms used in theoretical papers and doctrinal documents around the world. In attempting to nominally define the "security strategy" syntagm, it is necessary to define and define the subject-language meaning of the terms "strategies" and "security".³⁰²

³⁰² Milosavljević, S., Rusija i „mir“. Strategija bezbednosti Ruske Federacije: geopolitički, energetska i vojni aspekt, Akademska misao – Inovacioni centar Fakulteta bezbednosti, Beograd, 2014, pp. 25-39.;

AN ATTEMPT OF CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF “STRATEGY”

Today, the term "strategy" is a term with multiple meanings, it is used to indicate a far wider concept than the original meaning associated with the skill of warfare, that is, the conduct of the army and the conduct of war operations. The word "strategy" (greek: "strategia") consists of the root of the "stratos", which means "army" and suffix "ago" which means leading, and that is why its original meaning is attached to the skill of keeping the army in war circumstances. The term "strategy" was first used in the narrow sense for "the skill of running the army and warfare," but in time, the initial meaning was changed in accordance with the development of knowledge about the phenomenon of social conflicts, so that much of the use of this term outside of military activity, in almost all spheres and at all levels of state and public life (in the social sphere, in the sphere of economics, politics, technology, sports, demography, etc.).

In lexicographic and encyclopaedic sources (dictionaries, lexicons, military and general encyclopaedias, etc.), the meaning of the term "strategies" is multifaceted and in general terms it is determined most often "as a way to reach the most rational path and achieve certain goals", but it is also defined with military aspect, as the skill of war, that is, the skills of leading the army in the war. The military encyclopedia defines the strategy as "a system of scientific knowledge and skills (theory and practice) on the preparation and conduct of war and the use of force in order to achieve certain military, political or economic goals".³⁰³ The Dictionary of the Serbo-Croatian literary language dictates the dual meaning of the term "strategies", as "a branch of the war skill that deals with the preparation and conduct of the war as a whole" and as "the skill of leading a struggle in society, in politics".³⁰⁴ Almost identical definitions of the term "strategy" can be found in the Encyclopaedia of the Lexicographic Institute, in which the "strategy" is defined as "military leadership", that is, "a branch of the war skill, which deals with the application and use of the armed forces as a whole".³⁰⁵ Also, the general encyclopedia that defines "strategy" as "the skill of running the army and the main discipline of martial arts." And in the Foreign Words and Glossary, the term "strategies" is defined in many ways as "the science of keeping the army; the skill of warfare; book on the skill of warfare; "whereas the word" strategist "(greek „strategos“)

³⁰³ The subject of the strategy is the basic legitimacy of the war, especially its essential element - armed struggle, but also other forms of manifesting military force ... (Vojna enciklopedija, Beograd, 1975, p. 171);

³⁰⁴ Rečnik srpskohrvatskog književnog jezika, Matica srpska, Novi Sad, 1976, p. 18;

³⁰⁵ Opća enciklopedija, Jugoslovenski leksikografski zavod, Zagreb, 1982, p. 693.;

is defined as "the expert in the art of warfare or military commanders".³⁰⁶ The same definition can be found in the Great Dictionary of Foreign Words,³⁰⁷ while the Small Encyclopedia of Education lists the two meanings of this term, namely "Science and Skills" whose goal is to determine the main point of the attack in order to achieve success and achieve the goal.³⁰⁸ Also, the Organizational Business Lexicon lists the three meanings of the term "strategies" with a somewhat broader and more comprehensive definition.³⁰⁹ A particularly comprehensive and meaningful definition of the strategy is found in the New Larus Encyclopedia,³¹⁰ but it is largely similar to the stated definition of the term "strategy" in the Military Encyclopedia.

In theory and scientific-professional literature, as well as in strategic doctrinal documents, the term "strategy" is predominantly defined in the broader sense, including, in addition to the military aspect, other spheres in society. Thus, John Wylie defines the strategy as "a plan of action designed to achieve a goal, which is a set of measures to achieve it".³¹¹ In his work "Introduction to Strategy" Andre Bofr, states that "the strategy of dialectics skills is two or more opposing wills, using force, to resolve their conflict".³¹² In the same work, the author also mentioned the definition of the strategy of Alfred Yodel, as an example of expressing the overstatement and predominance of the military sphere, subordinated to all other segments of the state and society, all in order to achieve war success. Thus, he states that "the strategy is the highest activity of leadership (command) in the war, which includes foreign and internal politics, military operations and war economy, propaganda and the conduct of nations, and all these elements of war must be harmonized in order to achieve the political goal of war." In the "War 3-0 Guidebook," the US Military Academy "West Point", it is said that "strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other

³⁰⁶ Vujaklija, M., Leksikon stranih reči i izraza, Prosveta, Beograd, 2006, p. 850.;

³⁰⁷ Strategy, as science, explore and constructs political, economics, and special military elements preparing and conducting the war. (...) Strategy has triple meaning: military art, science of conducting the war and practical High command... (Kljajić, B, Veliki rječnik stranih riječi, Zora, Zagreb, 1974, p. 1249.);

³⁰⁸ Mala enciklopedija prosvete, Prosveta, Beograd, 1978, pp. 321-22.

³⁰⁹ Kukoleča, S, Organizaciono poslovni leksikon, Rad, Beograd, 1986, p.461.

³¹⁰ Strategy is a system of scientific knowledge and art on highest level about certain social activity: politics sphere, conducting the war and arm combat, economic politics, diplomacy, international affairs and other... (Larusova enciklopedija Vuk Karadžić, Beograd, 1978, p.1689.);

³¹¹ Wylie, J, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control, New Brunswick, USA, 1967, p. 91.;

³¹² Bofr, A., Uvod u strategiju, VIZ, Beograd, 1968, p. 25.;

instruments of national power in a synchronized way in order to secure national and multinational goals.³¹³ Erich Eder defines the strategy as "planned, targeted preparedness and coordinated implementation of all political, diplomatic, economic, technological and scientific-intellectual forces of a state, as well as its military forces in peace, crisis and war."³¹⁴ Certain definitions of the strategy of foreign authors can be found in the part of our author T. Mirković, "Army in the Foreign Policy of the USA".³¹⁵ Our author, Dr Mitar Kovač, concludes that the word "strategy" has evolved from the original significance from the conduct of the military, to the skill of conducting the war, and today it represents a system of knowledge, rules and principles that encompass conflicts as a whole in order to achieve strategic goals.³¹⁶ For the sake of illustration, in the earlier period, both in Russian and Soviet literature, the strategy was understood in a traditional traditional meaning with a narrowed scope and content of the notion of a war and an armed struggle. Under the strategy, military strategy as an integral part of the martial art was intended to prepare the country and its armed forces for war, depending on the nature of the war and strategic actions.

SECURITY TERM – DEFINING CONCEPTUAL DETERMINANTES

When it comes to the term "security", due to a series of historical circumstances, the word nowadays has become one of the most frequent and most exploited terms. In a colloquial understanding, the term security is understood as the desired state of non-existence of threats, a state characterized by the absence of danger and fear, as a state of stability and security reached, and the imperative of their realization. The security phenomenon appears in a multitude of forms and contexts, causing its various forms and contents. Etymologically, the term "security" derives from the Latin word "securitas - atis", which means absence of danger, safety, security,

³¹³ Uputstvo za ratnu službu 3-0, Vojna akademija „Vest Point“, jun, 2001, prema: Kovač M., Strategijska i doktrinarna dokumenta nacionalne bezbednosti. Teorijske osnove, Svet knjige, Beograd, 2003, p.21.;

³¹⁴ Eder, E., Definition und Gebrauch des Begriffes „Strategie“, Osterreichische Militarische Zeitschrift, 2/98, pp. 121-8.;

³¹⁵ John Collins: Strategy is art and science of using sources of national power to achieve wanted levels and control types considering threats that appear... (Mirković, T., Vojnska u spoljnoj politici SAD, Vojno delo, No.4-5, 1996, p. 53-5.);

³¹⁶ Strategy can be defined as summary of statements in the form of rules, principles and norms, which are used to implement long term managerial action in function of developing and securing the national values... (Kovač, M., Strategijska i doktrinarna dokumenta nacionalne bezbednosti. ..., pp.15-6.);

certainty, self - confidence, fearlessness, protection ("securus" - safe, firm, loyal, loyal, true, etc.). In the Serbian language, the term „bezbednost“,³¹⁷ is used, derived from the word "bezbedno" (which denotes the absence of danger – protection, freedom from fear, threats and physical violence, etc.). Although in science there is no consensus regarding the unique approach to the security phenomenon, and even less in view of the existence of a uniquely and generally accepted definition of security, which is conditioned by the complexity of content and characteristics of the notion itself, there is certainty in the scientific-professional public that the term "security" (as well as the term "strategies") is a term with multiple meanings, that is, it is used to denote a much broader notion of its traditional meaning, related to survival and protection in countries primarily from war threats and external threats.

However, despite the lack of a generally accepted definition of the concept of security, there is a general consensus that it is a socially constructed concept that acquires its specific meaning only within a particular social context, that is, security can not be separated from the general context in which the state and society exist and function (contextuality – as an essential feature of the concept of security). By the term "security", nowadays the desired state of the system, which is achieved by eliminating the threats and risks that come from inside and outside the system is indicated. Summarizing the above views, it can be concluded that security is a term with multiple meanings and that in the most general sense it implies freedom from fear, threats and physical violence. However, security also includes moral, ideological and normative elements that have always made it difficult to define it precisely.³¹⁸ Therefore, it is a socially constructed concept that acquires a specific meaning only within a given social context.

In the earlier period, security was the exclusivity of the state, but changes in international relations, in the last decade of the last century, conditioned (and imposed) a radical change in the theory and practice of security, above all the principles and concepts of national and international security. Today, security, as a multilayer, in a multitude of different ways, a structured phenomenon, which includes all spheres of state and social

³¹⁷ In the Croatian and Bosnian languages the term "sigurnost", in Russia term „безопасность“, in German is "Sicherheit", in the Italian "sicurezza" (from the word "sicuramente"), while the terms "securite" and "surete" are used in French. In English, two terms "security" and "safety" are used (the former is used in terms of "national security" – derived from the word "secure" - safe, and primarily refers to the protection and achievement of national national interests, while the term "safety" means activities aimed at eliminating security threats or preventing an undesirable security situation)... (Stajić, LJ., Osnovi sistema bezbednosti, Pravni fakultet, Novi Sad, 2008, pp. 21-3.);

³¹⁸ Kovač, M., Strategijska i doktrinarna dokumenta nacionalne bezbednosti, ..., p.69.;

existence, does not only represent the state of an entity in the context of the absence of threats and fears, but an instrumental, separate, indivisible value, as a way of achieving something and achieving it. In addition to the state, political and military sphere, it also contains social, economic, cultural, moral, ideological, normative and other elements. From this aspect, it can be concluded that security is indivisible (integral) and that it represents the basic attribute of each state from the aspect of its protective function. Under modern conditions, security has become the subject of theoretical preoccupations of a large number of authors and theoreticians of all profiles and orientations, which has resulted in the consideration and detection of the security phenomenon in a substantially broader contexts, as well as the emergence of a large number of different theoretical approaches. The presence of one-sidedness (monocclusion) and disagreement in explaining the concept of security, which can be seen, is not be surprising, since safety (its causes and consequences) is a social phenomenon, to that extent complex that it can not be explained from the perspective of any particular scientific discipline. Only by looking at the results obtained by scientists and theoreticians in various fields of science (starting with sociology, psychology, political science, through international relations, geopolitics, legal sciences, economics, military and other scientific disciplines) the presence of a spectrum can be noticed, all significant areas of human life in which there is a phenomenon of security and which are therefore important for its research. It will be concluded that only multidisciplinary research of security phenomena, which includes not only the mentioned but also other academic disciplines, they can provide certain insights that could, in their complexity, be closer to the structure of this phenomenon, its multi-dimensional character, numerous forms of appearance, the complexity of the conditions and causes that lead to its occurrence, and the complex consequences (multidimensionality and complexity – characteristics of the concept of security). All this determines and complicates the scientific study, reflection and knowledge of the concept, content, scope and significance of the security.³¹⁹

A large number of authors and theoreticians who are studying the security phenomenon, predominantly from the point of view of the scientific disciplines they primarily deal with, using special, more or less different methods, attempt to fundamentally illuminate this phenomenon, to discover and explain different aspects and concepts of this phenomenon, with unilateralism and disagreement which are very common. There are many attempts to define the concept of security in theoretical papers and scientific-

³¹⁹ Milosavljević, S., *Rusija i „mir“*, ..., pp. 25-39.;

professional literature. Summarizing these definitions, their analysis and comparison, they are just verifying that there are extensive and significant differences in its definition. Some authors, referring precisely to the fact that under modern conditions, the "boundaries of the security field problem are constantly expanding", state that the concept of security (i.e. "border extension", prim aut SM) is unambiguously followed, with inadequate security definitions.³²⁰ The above argumentation results in the definitions of the concept of security or the inability to capture all of its contents and / or aspects of observation, or are too broad, so that the concept of security is lost in the width of the phenomenon. Similar opinion is that of David Baldwin, who thinks that, in the conceptual sense, the notion of security is so controversial that it is not even remotely possible to reach agreement on its meaning.³²¹

Berry Buzan defines security as "the ability of the state and society to preserve their independence and integrity," stressing that the notion of security itself is insufficiently explored and too broad, and that the content of security is ambivalent and very controversial.³²² A similar standpoint is that of Joseph Nay,³²³ who believes that security is determined, on one hand, by perceived threats and threats from which values and goods are protected, and on the other, the actual ability to protect and preserve them. While some authors define security as a state of the state protection from all forms of danger, i.e. Arnold Volfers defines the term mentioned as the absence of a threat to the adopted values, or the absence of fear that these values will be compromised.³²⁴ Therefore, based on the presented attitudes of undisputed authorities in theoretical and scientific-research thought, it can be concluded that there is a general consensus that the problem of unidentified definition of the concept of security is omnipresent, and that the security framework is questionable because of its breadth and multidimensionality. In other words, virtually none of the above definitions can be detailed enough so as to include all the aspects and elements of the security phenomenon that are relevant in a specific (spatial and time-specific) case.

³²⁰ Simić, D., *Nauka o bezbednosti – savremeni pristupi bezbednosti*, SL SRJ, FPN, Beograd, 2002, pp. 58-9.;

³²¹ Baldwin, D., „The Concept of Security“, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.23, No.1, 1997, p. 3-26.

³²² Buzan, B., *People, State and Fear*, Pearson Longman, London, 1991.;

³²³ Security is like oxigen, it's easy to take it for granted until you are left without it, and then you can't think on anything else... (Naj, DŽ, *Kako razumeti međunarodne sukobe*, Stubovi kulture, Beograd, 2006, p. 251.);

³²⁴ Jevtić, Z, Stojanović, S, „Različiti tretmani bezbednosti“, Vladimir Cvetković (pr.), Rizik, moć, zaštita: uvođenje u nauke bezbednosti, SG - FB, Beograd, 2010, p. 628.;

However, the proliferation of security theories and concepts did not result in the constitution of a reliable, generally accepted model in the interpretation of the security phenomenon, on the contrary. The amplitude of theoretical considerations ranges from the traditional approach to understanding the concept of security, and so on. a state-centric model for the interpretation of the concept (according to which the state, its vital national interests and its power to realize and protect those interests continue to be in the epicenter of a security dilemma, with terms such as military and economic power, sovereignty, national interests determining for security, the guarantor of the state), to a wide range of more liberal approaches that revise the traditional definition of security and shift the focus to the then dominant state-centered concept from the state to the individual and the community (accommodating the aspects of the nation – national, regional and global security in transnational frameworks and putting emphasis on the security of personality). The new reality of international relations in the 21st century, or the process of globalization, joint action and cooperation in all spheres and at all levels, have forced the shift of the focus from the traditionalistic concept of security to a whole range of new concepts and security models. On the other hand, this certainly does not mean that the traditional, realistic concept of security comprehension will be completely suppressed by the transnational perception, because the national states remain the most important subjects of international relations, despite the fact that they are more and more designing and treating their security more integrally, achieving it in the context of the wider interests. States can no longer exercise their security exclusively within the framework of national intrusions and the narrowly understood concept of national security. Based on the facts and arguments presented, it can be concluded that the contemporary understanding of security has been extended both to the extent and content, from the state, its national interests and military power to all spheres of social life, including moral, ideological and normative aspects, which additionally complicates precise definition of the given term.³²⁵

As noted, during the development of the international community, security models have changed and evolved so that the term "security" has a multiple meaning nowadays, and it is used to indicate a far wider term than "traditional", the original meaning associated with the military segment – the

³²⁵ Paradigms and institutional security models were changed during international community growth. Through the lense of history, security is inextricably tied with the state and its military sector. However, security has gradually expended onto the social and political spheres... (Avramov, S., *Bezbednost u XXI veku*, SIMVON, Beograd, 2001, p. 423.)

state, the absence of conflict (war).³²⁶ In this sense, the semantic definition of the term "security" as well as other terms and terms relevant to this work (such as "endangering", "strategy") and syntagms ("security strategy", "security policy", "security interests", "strategic security environment", etc.) would be the first step in the standardization of other terms with a related meaning. In other words, the definition of the related concepts of a higher and lower level of generality is necessary in order to clearly distinguish them and achieve consistency in researching the scope and content of various types of security phenomena and processes. Striving to establish the new security concepts makes only one side of the security dimension, while the other side represents the institutional frameworks through which this security is realized, as well as the definition of reference security objects. Security is a complex system, which encompasses a wide range of activities and measures aimed at preserving and protecting vital interests and values for the state and society.

The very process of creating a security system in contemporary conditions is extremely complex, and its transformation into a new quality, from a functional, organizational and normative aspect, is determined by linking the political, economic, social, cultural and legal dimensions, without which it is impossible to carry out the complete construction of the given system. Today, however, this process is not uniform, but it acts asymmetrically and varies by intensity and effects, which is a direct consequence of the fact that security processes are articulated at several levels: local, regional, international and transnational, based on different standards, which implies the conclusion that one cannot speak of coherent and universal models and patterns of the security system. The presented analysis and the individual consideration of the terms "strategies" and "security" are only the first stage in attempting to nominally define the security strategy "synthesis", is the term designated by this syntagm. The security strategy is a program concept that is represented in all countries of the international community. As with the aforementioned individual consideration of the terms "strategies" and "security", it is necessary to present an attempt to define the security strategies of the relevant domestic and foreign scientists and theorists dealing with this issue.

³²⁶ There are different divisions of security according to the classification criteria... (Stajić, L.J., Gaćinović, R., Uvod u studije bezbednosti, Draslar partner, Beograd, 2007, p. 35.); However, no matter what the approach is to perception of security level and attempting classification according to different criteria, in epicenter of security dilemma is always the country, which is its key link... (the author's cur)

CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF „SECURITY STRATEGY“ SYNTAGM

Thus, some authors define the "security strategy" syntagm as a coordinated use of all means and exploiting all possibilities for preserving political and security goals, against all security threats.³²⁷ The domestic theoretician, Mitar Kovač, thinks that the "security strategy" has a threefold meaning and at the same time represents: (1) a program point of view for the realization of the function of state security; (2) the field of practical operation of the state security system; and (3) a doctrinal document of the state, which programmatically directs the activity of the security entities. From this aspect, the security strategy is a system of complementary norms (...) that directly relate to the security system and the realization of the security functions of the state in the political, economic, legal, technological, informative, military and religious areas. It is essentially an integral doctrine from which the starting points for the engagement of all security subsystems in the protection of the state in peace and war arise.³²⁸ In other words, it is a set of statements, in the form of rules, principles and norms used in making long-term management actions in the state security system.³²⁹ For example, in the Russian National Security Concept of 2000, this syntagm is defined as "a way of achieving the security of an individual, society and state from external and internal threats, in all spheres of life (...) defining the essential directions of state policy." In the "National Security Strategy RF until 2020" from 2009, it is stated that the security strategy is an adopted system of strategic priorities, goals and measures in the field of domestic and foreign policies, which determine the state of national security and the level of sustainable development of the state in the long-term perspectives.³³⁰ The Czech Security Strategy similarly defines this syntagm, stating that it represents "the basic doctrinal document for the implementation of a security policy that identifies security risks and national interests, in the function of achieving development, economic prosperity and security, of all external and internal threats."³³¹ The essential characteristic and

³²⁷ E. Eder, Definition und Gebrauch des Begriffes „Strategie“, Österreichische Militarische Zeitschrift, 2/98, p. 75.;

³²⁸ Kovač, M., Strategijska i doktrinarna dokumenta nacionalne bezbednosti, ..., pp. 72-82.

³²⁹ Концепция национальной безопасности Российской Федерации, от 10. января 2000 г., № 24, (<http://www.fas.ogr/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/gazeta012400.htm>, 18.11.2011.);

³³⁰ Стратегия национальной безопасности РФ до 2020 года, от 12. мая 2009 г., № 537 (Неправительственный совет национальной безопасности России, www.nsnbr.ru, 15.03.2011.);

³³¹ Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, „Nase vojsko“, Prague, 1999.;

"lack" of these definitions is the overlap of the functional-doctrinal aspect, with the neglect of the program-theoretical concept.

The security strategy is implemented through the security policy. It is therefore necessary to define some related and boundary terms, terms, and syntagms used in theoretical papers and doctrinal documents, such as, for example, "national security", "national interests", "security policy", etc. The "national security" syntagm could be defined as an objective state of the state in terms of the ability of state authorities and institutions to undertake measures and activities in order to protect national interests in the field of foreign and internal politics, economy, defense, education and other areas of social life. For example, in Russian strategic documents, national security is primarily understood as the security of its multi-ethnic population, "as the bearer of state sovereignty". In these documents, "national security" is defined as the state of protection of personality, society and state from internal and external threats, which ensures the provision of constitutional rights and freedoms, a decent level of quality and living standards of citizens, sovereignty, territorial integrity, sustainable development, defense and security of the States. From the above definition, the shift of the focus from the previous so-called state-centric security concept to the so-called societal discourse can be noticed, which emphasizes the citizens and the community at the forefront. In other words, there has been a change in the traditional security paradigm in terms of transition from an earlier exclusive emphasis on the security of the state and territory, to putting a much stronger emphasis on the security of the citizens. In accordance with the new concept of security, the central and only role of the state in the earlier security paradigm is nowadays complemented by a wide range of actors in identifying and removing security threats. National interests are variable categories and represent the most comprehensive program choices of state authorities and relevant political entities in order to achieve and protect the highest social values (sovereignty, territorial integrity, economic prosperity, freedoms and rights of citizens, democratic achievements of society, etc.). Simply put, national interest can be determined as a value of importance for the survival of the nation, for whose protection the state engages all available resources. Therefore, each state defines its national interests very carefully, and they are reflected in different ways and are rarely in conflict with the interests of other subjects of the world politics. Security interests, as a type of state interest, are based on an objective perception of danger and in analogy to national interests, are defined as the state authorities' choices, aimed at protecting the highest values and interests. For their realization, different security goals are defined, which are realized by implementing a security policy. Security policy, as an instrument of the security strategy, is realized through a functional aspect of the state and can be

defined as a system of concrete measures and activities of the state bodies and institutions, in order to achieve security goals. As a complex and lasting process, it depends on the military-political and geostrategic position of the state, its political and economic relations with other subjects of the world politics, of the kind of state interest; as well as from real and potential threats that threaten them.³³²

A REVIEW OF THE GEOPOLITICAL ASPECT OF STRATEGIC AND DOCTRINAL DETERMINATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA AND ITS (GEO)STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

In the last two decades, the political, economic and security situation in the Balkans has been determined by a large number of factors, conditioning some of the general characteristics of the region (such as political instability and high degree of conflict) that have an objective historical character. At the same time, political instability is a cause for mixing and penetration of the influence of great powers, which further complicates the situation in the region. Their interest in the Balkans can be explained primarily by its geographical and geostrategic position. The control of the Balkan Peninsula in the past enabled the control of transcontinental communication and transport routes. From this aspect, the Balkans can be seen as part of a unique Euro-Asian geopolitical space. These facts conditioned the special importance and role of the Balkans in the sphere of achieving European security, which additionally complicates the situation in the context of increasing the competition of large and regional forces for the establishment of a control over the region, as well as the competition among the countries of the region for leadership status. It is precisely in the context of the competition of global actors in the region that the Balkans have a high security significance, while at the same time, from an inter-political point of view, at the end of the past and the beginning of this century, the Balkans is one of the most innocuous points on the planet. In its centuries-old history, the Balkans has always been the scene of territorial, ethnic and religious conflicts, with the ubiquitous interest of great powers. Therefore, it is not surprising that today this space remains a polygon of conflicting interests of the largest geopolitical players, so most of today's internal political problems in this region and accumulated conflict potential have an objective character and drag the roots from both recent and distant past. The Balkans has not lost its significance and role even in 21st century, despite the turbulent events in the last decade of the last century,

³³² Kovač, M., *Strategijska i doktrinarna dokumenta nacionalne bezbednosti. ...*, p. 70.;

which were followed by the breakup of the SFRY, the creation of new independent states and new territorial and ethnic conflicts. This situation is by no means alleviated by the fact that some Balkan region's authors, due to its political instability and developments from the 1990s, as well as the current tensions in the region, have been characterized as a segment of the "global instability zone" extending from the Central African space to the Southeast Asia.³³³ From the security point of view, the Balkans today represent a chronic source of preoccupation and concern of the European states, which creates a situation in which towards the end of the second decade of the XXI century, the importance of the region is growing.

Following the turbulent period of war conflicts in the post-Yugoslav territory, throughout the 1990s and the beginning of the first decade of the new century Serbia found itself in a major systemic crisis that shook all segments of the state and social life (political, economic, social, cultural); this was especially noticeable in the security sphere. Serbia's geostrategic position is worsened as a direct consequence of the major changes in its strategic security environment, in foreign policy and security strategies of other countries, due to the strengthening of the power and influence of individual regional powers, as well as the inability of Serbia to design its full capacity of political, economic and military power in the security processes in the Balkans. During the first decade of the 21st century, preconditions for the beginning of the process of political consolidation and stabilization of economic opportunities were created, which also significantly determined the security component of the Serbian state. In addition, the structural factors of the Serbian policy towards the neighbors have had an explicit influence on the achievement and protection of vital national interests of the state and its position in the regional and world politics.

In Serbia, security is treated not only as a "state of the absence of danger", but also as an institutional value in the function of achieving citizens' well-being and sustainable development of our country. In the earlier period, the perception of the primary forms of threat to security was that they were of an external nature and were limited to a military component and a war as the dominant threat. Today, one of the basic specificities of the security concepts is reflected in the fact that the meaning of the concept of security is broadly expanded, with the recognition that true security is linked to the development of political and civic values. New security concepts recognize problems in almost all spheres of life as phenomena that can endanger the highest values

³³³ „Мир после кризиса. Глобальные тенденции – 2025: меняющийся мир“, Доклад Национального разведывательного совета США, Москва, 2009, pp. 127-8.;

and interests, recognizing that security is only possible by achieving a full parity of its "internal" and "external" dimensions.

With huge political changes in the area, the list of security threats has also changed, as well as the overall understanding of security. Serbia has been constantly facing the need to redefine its security system and in the last two decades, significant changes have occurred in that sphere, but it is notable that there was no continuity in the process. The reorganization of the defense subsystem and the modernization of the Serbian Army, as a vital state interest, are practically carried out by the breakdown of joint states (SFRY - FRY - SCG) and dictated not only by the security but also by a large number of other factors (economic, demographic, social). Today, at the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, there has not yet been enough scientifically-theoretical knowledge that has significantly increased the power of science to reliably predict the future outburst of security phenomena and processes in the area. Therefore, the future of the modern Balkan security "galimatias" offers uncertainty regarding its structure, the relationship between the elements of the system and their interaction, as well as the development of regional security processes. Based on the above stated views, it can be concluded that the collapse of the real power of the Serbian state in all segments, as well as the problems it faced in the early years of the post-Yugoslav era, significantly influenced its security, or its ability to preserve and protect vital interests and respond effectively to current security challenges on the internal and foreign policy plan in the full capacity. Therefore, the Serbian security strategy, as an integral software platform that defines the involvement of all state subsystems in the protection of national security, although doctrinally-normative and institutionally structured, have not provided satisfactory results in response to real threats.

In addition to the practical-functional aspect (in this sense, this is the most general strategic and doctrinal document of the state), our security strategy is also the broadest theoretical-program concept – the point of view for the implementation of a security policy. On a theoretical and scientific basis,³³⁴ it identifies security threats and defines mid-term and long-term national interests in order to achieve the security of the state and the nation. In other words, Serbia through its security strategy directs available resources in the protection of national interests and the achievement of the most favorable position in the regional framework. At the same time, the security strategy,

³³⁴ Фельдман, Д. М., „Модели международной безопасности: выбор для российской элиты“, Национальные интересы и проблемы безопасности в меняющемся мире, ИМЭМО РАН, Москва, 2003.;

since it is a program of our country's policy, based on a theoretical and cognitive, scientific basis, requires a much greater participation of academic circles in its formulation, definition and writing, which in our practice so far has been extremely questionable.

INSTEAD OF THE CONCLUSION

Summarizing the previously stated views and opinions, conclusion can be drawn that our security strategy is based on the scientific-theoretical bases and mid-term tendencies of the development of the security situation in the region, with relation to the interests, capabilities and needs of our country, and in this context, it is a reliable program framework for the implementation of a security policy.³³⁵ In addition, the Serbian Security Strategy is based on a realistic matrix, that is, on real understanding and understanding of a wide range of the most important internal and external security problems, as well as on the realistic perception of the situation and events in the regional relations. Goals and resources are also defined realistically.³³⁶ The security of our country, due to the previously expressed attitudes about the events in the region in the near and far past, is very specific and from that aspect, it is extremely difficult to precisely identify and define all its factors, and it is even more difficult to determine the reliability of analyzes and predictions of the content, scope and the intensity of their actions on the security of Serbia. For these reasons, internal and external factors that determine the security of Serbia must be seen realistically, from the aspect of regional (geo) political and security processes, that is, by analyzing the position and role of our country in them. Serbia has, today, identified essential external factors that are generating threats to its security, of which the most significant are: regional political tensions; the instability of the political and security situation in the region, the possibility of outbreaks and escalation of conflicts in the immediate environment, the migration crisis, etc.

The concept of security in our country has been explained for a long time by solid geopolitical terms, where there was no point in realizing that true security is connected with the development of political and civic values. In the last quarter of a century, there has been a major change in the perception of the security of our country, which has been largely influenced by the emergence of new (non-military) forms of endangerment and a major change in the strategic

³³⁵ Based on the security strategy, as a unified software platform, the security system of the state and its subsystems, whose functioning provides efficient protection of state interests ... (the author's cur);

³³⁶ Simić, D., *Svetska politika, Udruženje za studije SAD u Srbiji, Beograd, 2009, p. 182.*;

security environment. Changes in the concept of security, with the extension of the meaning of this term beyond the military component, had direct implications for the redefinition of Serbia's security strategy. Analyzing the strategic documents regulating the security problems of our country, it can be concluded that the terminology itself differs significantly with relation to the relevant acts from the previous period. All of these facts imply the conclusion that the perception of security in our country has gradually evolved and has undergone significant changes. Also, that for successful conducting of the security strategy of Serbia these are the basic criteria, meaning that there are institutional and normative instructions, but that there is space for efficiency improvement in the functional meaning. From that aspect, the reorganization of the security sector and its defense sub-system (through reform and modernization) represent the vital interest of the Serbian state, defined by the security strategy and strategic-doctrinal documents of a lower hierarchical level. Therefore, although the military potential of Serbia represents an important factor of the security strategy, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for being efficient and effective in practice,³³⁷ in the process of providing the security of national interests and enforcing the projected position and role within the regional frames.

The state of security in the (geo) strategic environment of our country, as well as its projection in the near future, are extremely complex and dynamic, burdened with the turbulent past, uncertain future, current and historical contradictions, unresolved conflicts and opposing interests, vowed old geopolitical aspirations. The current situation is still considered "relatively stable", although apparently conserved conflict potential, in an immediate security environment, threatens to undermine the security of the Balkan region and the wider European areas by its deconcentration. In recent years, the Balkans has become increasingly important as a geopolitically significant area dominated by security issues, which, in the mid-term perspective, can again become a neuralgic point on the old continent. In addition, the very complex

³³⁷ We should mention the fact that is explicitly related to the security strategy, that in the beginning of the last decade of the last century, in the conditions of a drastic reduction of the danger of the outbreak of a conflict of global proportions, the thesis of a number of authors emerged from the thesis of a number of authors on the increasing defunkcionalization of the military factor, that is, the military factor, as an element of the structure of state (so-called hard) power, in the function of achieving strategic national interests represents a historical past. However, in the last two decades, the tendencies of frequent unilateral and non-selective action and the application of force in international relations have denied such an attitude (illusion). The importance and role of the military factor is not only suppressed and reduced, on the contrary, the military factor (along with the economic and political) has retained the primacy in the state power hierarchy and continues to play one of the decisive roles in achieving the political goals.;

political and security situation additionally complicates the influence of non-regional actors, namely "global geopolitical players" (USA, EU and Russia), which greatly influence the political, economic and security processes, while defining the individual interests of the countries of the region, thus explicitly their security strategies. Given the specificity and complexity of the situation in the countries of the region (including our country) and bearing in mind the political and security features of the Balkan region, as well as almost determining influence of non-regional actors on the policies of the countries of the region and the definition of a regional security strategy, the prediction, or the prediction of trends in that area in the near future, is a very complex and uncertain process.

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STRATEGIJA BEZBEDNOSTI – POKUŠAJ POJMOVNOG ODREĐENJA I DETERMINISANOST ASIMETRIČNIM I TRANSNACIONALNIM FORMAMA UGROŽAVANJA

Sladjan Milosavljevic*

Fakultet za inženjerski menadžment, Beograd,
Republika Srbija

Hatidža Beriša**

Vojna akademija, Univerzitet odbrane,
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Jedan od suštinskih problema sa kojima se suočila Srbija u poslednje dve decenije, bio je i problem (re)definisanja najvažnijih strategijsko-doktrinarnih opredeljenja u sferi bezbednosti, odnosno principa, ciljeva i zadataka bezbednosne strategije u zaštiti vitalnih nacionalnih interesa, između ostalog i usled sve izraženijih i prisutnijih asimetričnih formi njihovog ugrožavanja. Dinamičnost i heterogenost bezbednosnih procesa na ovim prostorima determinisali su situaciju da u domaćoj naučnoj i stručnoj literaturi fenomen bezbednosne strategije obrađen u ne baš zadovoljavajućoj meri i na koherentan način (bilo da je istraživao fragmentarno ili u okviru širih tematskih celina, ili se, što je često bio slučaj, kasnilo sa implementacijom opredeljenja koja su „kaskala“ za aktuelnim događajima). Cilj rada je pokušaj pojmovnog određenja strategije bezbednosti, što podrazumeva sistematizaciju postojećih teorijskih saznanja i determinisanost strategijsko-doktrinarnih opredeljenja sve izraženijom pojavom asimetričnih oblika ugrožavanja. Na praktičnom nivou, rad može doprineti skretanju pažnje na aktuelnu temu koja je od šireg interesovanja i značaja, boljem razumevanju ove problematike i njeno približavanje široj javnosti, kao i eventualno iznalaženje mogućnosti za poboljšanje pojedinih njenih segmenata, uvažavajući pritom posebnosti naše zemlje i specifičnosti bezbednosnog okruženja, ali i međunarodne norme i standarde koji su u funkciji ostvarivanja regionalne i globalne bezbednosti. Rad ukazuje i na činjenicu da je Srbija, kroz proces donošenja najznačajnijih strategijsko-doktrinarnih dokumenata, uspela da definiše osnovne principe i ciljeve svoje bezbednosne strategije, čije je ostvarivanje u velikoj meri uslovljeno, pored unutrašnjih i veoma kompleksnim eksternim faktorima koji egzistiraju u sferi regionalne politike. Kao značajan problem u ostvarivanju

* sladjanmil@gmail.com

** hatidza.berisa@mod.gov.rs

bezbedonosne strategije, identifikovane su eksterni i interni bezbedonosne procesi u vezi sa pojavom novih oblika (asimetričnog) ugrožavanja bezbednosti R Srbije, promenama u stratezijskom okruženju, u strategijama drugih država i saveza, kao i u geopolitičkoj konfiguraciji na ovdašnjim prostorima.

Ključne reči: strategija bezbednosti, asimetrične pretnje, R. Srbija, međunarodni odnosi.

STRATEGIC CONTEXT
OF CONTEMPORARY
ASYMMETRICAL THREATS

ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE AND TERRORISM

Miroslav Talić*

National Defence School, Military Academy, University of Defence
Republic of Serbia

Saša Antanasijević**

Serbian Armed Force, Republic of Serbia

Abstract: Terrorism as a form of organized criminal and politically motivated violence has since its onsets represented a threat to the world. It is manifested in various ways and forms and has become a global world problem, bearing in mind that it, as a rule, never remains isolated in a certain area, rather spreads quickly further and branches out to other regions. The precondition for countering terrorist acts successfully is to know the possible causes of terrorism. Eliminating all causes of terrorism is virtually impossible, due to their numbers and variety and the fact that they are sometimes unknown.

Therefore, the aim of this paper is to demonstrate that one of the main features of the modern armed conflicts is asymmetry, viz. that the conflicts (wars) of today are actually asymmetric wars. In these conflicts, one side is inferior; thus, being unable to win the conflict using conventional warfare, the weaker side resorts to terrorist acts.

Modern terrorism is a social phenomenon that is seen as completely novel, due to its manifestations. Furthermore, its main characteristic is its global nature, in other words susceptibility to terrorist acts of any country, in any of its locations and at any time anywhere on the planet.

Special attention will be paid to asymmetry as the dominant characteristic of the wars of today; then the emergence of terrorism to which the inferior side of the conflict may turn, which further indicates that the focus of this paper will be on determining the connection between asymmetric warfare, as a cause on the one hand and the appearance of terrorism as a consequence on the other.

Key words: asymmetry, asymmetric warfare, terrorism, classification of terrorism, wars of today, political violence, war.

* miroslav.talijan@va.mod.gov.rs

** sasa.antanasijevic@vs.rs

INTRODUCTION

Towards the end of the twentieth century, terrorism has become a global threat that threatens peace, security and the progress not only of individual regimes and states, but of all nations and regions. That is why the phenomenon of terrorism and the fight against terrorism have long been the focus of scientific research not only at the national level of the vulnerable states, but also international and many non-governmental and governmental organizations.

Terrorism, as a politically motivated violence, represents a threat to the world; it is manifested in various ways, in different forms and has grown into a global problem. The precondition for successful counteraction to terrorist acts is the knowledge of possible causes of terrorism. To elimination of all causes that are linked to the occurrence of terrorism is virtually impossible.

Therefore, the aim of this paper is to show that one of the main features of the modern armed conflicts is asymmetry, viz. that the conflicts (wars) of today are actually *asymmetric warfare*. In them, one side is inferior, and thus unable to achieve victory in the conflict by means of conventional warfare, the weaker party resorts to terrorist acts as a way of fighting.

In order to show cause-and-effect connections between asymmetric warfare on the one hand, i.e. the existence of asymmetry with relation to the ratio of forces and terrorism on the other, which is precisely caused by the disproportion of forces, the notion of asymmetry, that is, asymmetrical warfare, which plays a dominant role and represents one of the causes of terrorism in the contemporary world.³³⁸

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS

Global geopolitical, economic and security changes that emerged towards the end of 20th century opened the door to new ways of conducting armed conflicts, as well as the creation of new concepts of security, whose role is indisputable in creating a global redistribution of military, political and economic power.

³³⁸ For some causes of terrorism see: Jevtić D, *Bezbednosne posledice procesa globalizacije posle Hladnog rata*, Faculty of Political Sciences, doctoral thesis, Belgrade, 2017, pp. 337-341.

Historical – comparative analysis of the armed conflicts conducted over the past thirty years³³⁹ marks the qualitative changes that have significantly influenced the creation of new forms of warfare. The greatest influence on the creation of new forms of warfare has been induced by the modern scientific and technological achievements, as well as solutions thus provided in the domain of developing of sophisticated weapon systems and military equipment.

It can be said that the common denominator for all the modern armed conflicts is the introduction of new forms of warfare in which the sophistication of the weapon systems plays a decisive role in achieving the goals and creating a different physiognomy of the armed conflicts. The essence of the new forms of armed conflict is depicted in the following characteristics: *asymmetry, non-linearity, multidimensionality, precision, distribution, simultaneity and integrity*.

Talking about *asymmetry*³⁴⁰ implies talking about something that is not proportionate. Symmetry is characterized by "real proportions", as is the case in architecture, while asymmetry is a purposeful absence of symmetry.

In the defence sciences, very few people understand the formal definition of asymmetry. The main reason for this is that the official doctrines of many countries have not yet defined such a concept. Some lexicons define this term as a mathematical one: "*the relationship between things that do not have common measurability*"; Russian vocabulary defines it as "*the absence of symmetrical destruction*"; the Chinese speaking region does not define such a word, but uses the term non-symmetrical.

This problem was examined by Stephen Metz and Douglas Johnson of the US Military War College who defined asymmetry as: organizing, acting and thinking differently from enemies in order to maximize the advantage of one side in the conflict, exploit the enemy's weaknesses, keeping the initiative and achieving greater freedom in performing actions³⁴¹.

Armed conflicts, in general, can be *symmetrical, dys-symmetrical, asymmetrical* or a *combination* of these three types.

In modern armed conflicts, asymmetry is best seen through the technological gap and the complete material and technical superiority of one side in the conflict. As a final consequence, asymmetry as a characteristic

³³⁹ Libia 1986 and 2011, The Gulf Wars 1991-2003, NATO aggression on Yugoslavia 1999.

³⁴⁰ Gramatically and ethimologically - a + symetria, in Greek means the absence of symmetry, disproportion, inequality, disharmony...

³⁴¹ Metz S. and D.V. Johnson II.; Asymmetry and U.S. Military strategy, Definition, background, and strategic Concepts, 2001.

shifts the conventional symmetrical armed conflicts into the sphere of dissymmetry.

Modern military theorists increasingly emphasize the *non-linearity* as a significant feature of the modern armed conflicts. In his time Clausevic emphasized the effects of *coincidence* in warfare. His most important work, “On War” is full of examples of what is nowadays called non-linearity, namely the possibility that a person who has the least importance in his actions leads to significant results, as well as the impossibility to fully understand the events or precisely predict the outcomes. Today, new non-linear sciences³⁴² are finally opening up a space for understanding these non-linear aspects of warfare, as well as other areas of human activity.

The concept of modern armed conflicts was foreseen and defined by a team of American analysts, including William Linda in an article published in the Bulletin of the Marine Corps Gazette, entitled “The Changing Face of War: Towards the Fourth Generation”. Generally speaking, 4GW³⁴³ seems to be widespread and in many ways undefined ... It will be non-linear, in the sense that it will not have a clearly defined battlefield or front line. The difference between “civilian” and “military” will disappear³⁴⁴.

The fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined. “the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as manufacturing industries)”³⁴⁵.

The main characteristic of non-linearity as a feature of modern armed conflicts is reflected in the fact that in the area of combat operations there is no clear distinction between the front, depth and rear. Unlike conventional wars

³⁴² Theory of complexity, science of chaos, nonlinear dynamics, etc.

³⁴³ The Fourth Generation war.

³⁴⁴ William S. Lind, Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton, Gary I. Wilson: The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, Marine Corps Gazette, 1989.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

of the XX century³⁴⁶, the modern armed conflicts are waged in a non-linear sphere and conditions that some military theorists refer to as chaos.³⁴⁷

Being a participant in a non-linear armed conflict entails performing offensive actions in several directions at the tactical and operational levels. Nonlinear operations, in contrast to linear ones, are more based on manoeuvre and dynamics and do not have a stable front, flanks or rear. The non-linear tactics requires rapid and covert manoeuvres, ambushes, false acts, incursions and the like.

The significance of technology in modern warfare and the nature of its influence is perceived through two seemingly opposite forms directing military thinkers towards linearity. Throughout history, technology has served as a means to increase mortality in the war, until the emergence of nuclear weapons capable of killing millions of people indiscriminately. Nowadays, it is no longer about attempting to kill as many enemies as possible, but to “kill” the enemy’s capability to act as a coherent military force – preventing the leadership from controlling its forces by creating a pace of operations that surpasses the enemy’s ability to react and exposing its troops to acts which physically and psychologically destabilize it. Progress in military technology has created an almost completely opposite trend that leads to considering war in a linear fashion. By creating “superior” forces, the military technology performs the most precise identification of goals ever and fires missiles to achieve precise results using limited resources.

All these condition the course of the war, as well as its outcome, to be largely unpredictable. It could be said that unpredictability is a key determinant of the modern strategic environment, which seems to have become evident to all following the terrorist attack on the United States on 11 September; in the strategic documents of almost all states, unpredictability is indicated as the fundamental characteristic of the strategic environment.

Multidimensionality, as a characteristic, determines the introduction, in addition to the traditional dimensions of space, combat action in the electromagnetic spectrum and the dimension of the human factor. In the armed conflicts, forces are equipped with the most sophisticated technologies and equipment and the threat to the human is brought to minimum (cruising missiles, drones, dropping of ordnance at distances outside the range of the anti-aircraft systems). Preparations are intense with a special emphasis on

³⁴⁶ Position warfare in WW1, when the breakthrough through the frontlines of the enemy were rare and the result of tactical errors of the enemy, and the combat actions on the frontline in the WW2, where breakthroughs were caused by innovations in the application of mobile weapon systems, as well as the flexibility in defensive combat actions.

³⁴⁷ For chaos and nonlinearity see: Talijan Momčilo, Talijan Miroslav, Opšti bezbednosni menadžment, High School of Internal Affairs, Banjaluka, 2011, pp. 133-134.

asserting the public globally of the justification of entering the conflict. Multidimensionality in the arena (of operations) means that all the dimensions of the arena (from virtual to real) are affected by the operation, which is made possible by the modern command and information systems (in such the operations are most often of the S4I level)³⁴⁸.

Precision is a feature related to the development of modern ordnance. It was conditioned by the development and use of “smart” airborne weapons throughout the battlefield. Accuracy in engagement and action enables engaging the military and other forces (groups, individuals) to locate the goal, ensure the appropriate command and control, achieve the desired effect, assess the success of the action, and retain the capability to re-strike with the necessary precision³⁴⁹.

Distribution refers to the conduct of effective combat operations across the entire battlefield, everywhere and where it is necessary to achieve the decisive effects against the grouping of forces at one point, as was the case in the frontal approach in conducting the armed combat.

Simultaneity, as a feature, is related to the dynamics of combat operations. Namely, the actions are conducted parallelly throughout the entire battlefield, not just at the front and are in function of the culmination of combat and non-combat activities aimed at destroying the decisive points.

Integrating all forces into a joined command and control system with timely and reliable information, is also characteristic when sophisticated forces in contemporary armed conflicts are used. This feature is determined by *integration*. Contemporary operations are fully integrated with joint, multinational and non-governmental partners. This integration in operations allows the military and other forces to utilize all combat and non-combat resources in accordance with the situation and the space of action.

The military actions in combat operations are increasingly performed in the depth, width and height of the arena. Such operations are *distributed*, which means that they are implemented in the location and at a time when it is necessary. They most often begin with actions from and within the airspace all over the depths of the territory of the other (invaded) side (“conquest of space”).

³⁴⁸ The arena of the operation exceeds the standard physical dimensions: width, depth and height. It includes parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. The space is also defined by the human dimension. It includes not only the soldiers, but also the civilian population where the operations are conducted, as well as the time dimension. The actions should be carried out at the speed that is best for the implementation of the plan of your own forces.

³⁴⁹ The operations of the military forces is characterized by synchronized attacks throughout the area of engagement. They demand great precision, and it is enabled through three developmental possibilities: digitization, combining combat information and simulation.

Simultaneity, as the next characteristic, is reflected in the capability of simultaneous action on the chosen goals in several different directions, most often at the pace and order that the other side can not withstand³⁵⁰.

It can be concluded that in the conditions of asymmetry, the main characteristic is that of the transition from total annihilation of the enemy to the destruction of objects that enable the enemy to operate, then the immediate contact of the conflicted armed forces is increasingly replaced by combat action from larger distances thus eliminating the clear line of separation to the front, depth and rear, and ultimately along with the “physical” engagement against the armed forces and settlements, the role of information warfare is increased.

The contemporary operations do not exclude linearity either, since the era of the exhausting trench wars is long gone and the goal of each commander has become to use the capabilities of their units in an effective and efficient manner, in as short time as possible, to strike the identified centre of gravity of the enemy thus causing the enemy’s defeat, providing a more immediate chance for developing and modernizing his own forces.

DETERMINATION OF THE ASSYMETRIC WARFARE

Historical experiences show that when one of the conflicting sides in a war possesses great potentials, while asymmetric forces are developed around it to make to master it more easily. These forces can arise both from political struggle and from ethnic rivalries or social demands. Accordingly, to say that there has been a “big turn” following the events in New York and Washington³⁵¹ may seem farfetched, bearing in mind that asymmetry has existed even before these events, just like terrorism has³⁵².

The imbalance of power is, as a rule, the desired state in armed conflicts. The arms race, whether it is a face-off of two opponents or related to a multipolar world, reflects the tendency to dominate the others in a quantitative sense, as if the battles were won by mere numbers in the confrontation of forces.

Thus, asymmetrical wars emerged throughout the history, as opponents were rarely evenly matched³⁵³. Only the 19th century battles were

³⁵⁰ The concept of decentralized operations, which are multidimensional, precise, distributed and non-linear, allows for the possibility of performing simultaneous operations throughout the area of engagement of the forces. Instead of one, spatially concentrated (ordered) attack, a series of attacks is carried out, as simultaneously as possible.

³⁵¹ Terrorist attack 11 September 2001.

³⁵² Kurmon B, Ribnikar D, *Asimetrični ratovi: Sukobi juče i danas, terorizam i nove pretnje*, NIC Vojska, Belgrade, 2003, p. 132.

³⁵³ The mythological origin of asymmetry can be attributed to young David, victorious near Jerusalem against the Philistine Goliath. Using a simple sling, he hit the enemy in the head,

waged in accordance with the rules defined by Klausevic, and especially those in the First World War were classic examples of symmetrical wars in which the ratio of the conflicting sides was approximately equal and where the victory depended on the circumstances. The greatest battles in World War I lasted for months and it was difficult to conclude who had actually won, bearing in mind that the losses and destruction on both sides were equal.

Asymmetry turns everything at its disposal weapons, which is often also unpredictable. An example of the most asymmetrical means used during a siege, a true pearl of genialness, undoubtedly remains the Trojan horse. Initially purely defensive in character, with the success of the guerrilla asymmetry discovered in itself the offensive attributes and traits, which allowed it to play a significant role in overthrowing the regime and bringing the power of the “national liberation” movement into power.

Asymmetry concept. – In both foreign and domestic literature, and especially in dictionaries, the notion of *asymmetry* denotes disproportion, inconsistency, inequality³⁵⁴, unevenness, therefore, something contrary to the notion of *symmetry*. Thus, etymologically, the word asymmetry was created by joining the prefix “a” and the word symmetry. The word itself comes from the Greek, viz. French word a+*symmetria* and denotes the absence of symmetry, namely the lack of proportion, i.e. asymmetry³⁵⁵.

Judging by the multiple applications of the term, especially in the defense sciences, which mainly refer to “non-fair combat”, “attack on the weak point of the opponent”, “cyber warfare or electronic warfare”, “media war”, “war using weapons of mass destruction” and so, very few people understand the formal definition of asymmetry.

In the US military understanding of the concept of asymmetry, it is considered that it exclusively refers to the numbers, equipment with modern weapons and combat power. Thus they believe that the USA is the most asymmetrical military force in the world since there is no other state which can match its fighting power.

"without a sword in his hand." This duel symbolizes the victory of heroism over arms and mind over power.

³⁵⁴ Asymmetry exists in the sphere of economic inequalities where they influence the increase in security challenges and can indirectly affect the instability and conflict and can increase the prospects for recruiting potential terrorists in certain socio-economic and political conditions and circumstances – Jevtić D, „Povećanje ekonomskih nejednakosti kao izazov bezbednosti“, Vojno delo, Summer/2014, Belgrade, 2014, pp. 114-128.

³⁵⁵ Oxford English Dictionary, Fifth Edition on CD rom, version 2.0.

In the modern world, and in particular keeping track of the modern armed conflicts, it can be concluded that it is not enough to deal only with the notion of asymmetry³⁵⁶, and that it is necessary to derive characteristic terms containing the word asymmetry, and the most significant ones are asymmetric threats, symmetrical war, dissymmetrical war and asymmetrical.

*Asymmetric threats*³⁵⁷: the dangers and threats that come from smaller enemies who are not able to fight on equal terms against the superior enemy, but usually attack the weak points that escape the control and attention of the enemy armed forces³⁵⁸.

Symmetrical warfare – two confronted enemies possess armed forces that are similar in all aspects, such as strength, doctrine and material resources and have similar tactical, operational and strategic goals.

Dissymmetrical warfare: one of the conflicting sides is superior with respect to the means or structure of forces, doctrines and material resources, but both sides are striving for the same political and military goals.

Asymmetric warfare can also be defined in a number of ways; however it is most commonly linked to:

(1) The situation where one of the enemies is unable or unwilling to lead a war with a similar composition of forces, doctrine and material resources, and has different political and military goals than its enemy.³⁵⁹

(2) Warfare in which forces of different arms are facing-off, such as the ratio between aviation and naval forces. A conflict in which one side is using low-tech methods of fighting against high-tech armed forces.³⁶⁰

(3) Surprise attacks of small, poorly armed groups on modern, sophisticated armed forces.³⁶¹

When speaking of asymmetry there are two basic subcategories, the dimensions and forms of asymmetry.

Dimensions of asymmetry. – Strategic asymmetries can be positive and negative, short-term or long-term, of low or high risk, material or psychological³⁶².

³⁵⁶ See: Delibašić D, Talić M, Jevtić D, „Fizionomija savremenih oružanih sukoba kroz prizmu oružanog sukoba u Ukrajini“, *Vojno delo*, No. 1/2017, p. 25.

³⁵⁷ Military Dictionary, USA, taken from: www.airforcehelper2000.netfirms.com/afh04.htm, 29 June 2017.

³⁵⁸ Such attacks and threats are considered terrorist acts by the USA.

³⁵⁹ Military Dictionary, USA, taken from: www.airforcehelper2000.netfirms.com/afh04.htm, 29 June 2017.

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

³⁶¹ Oxford English Dictionary, Fifth Edition, on CD-ROM, version 2.0.

Positive asymmetry is characterized by stressing the military strategy of e.g. USA, superiority of training, command and technology. It entails constant sustaining of this superiority and its application in countering asymmetric threats. *Negative asymmetry* is a void, a gap (in the sense of system vulnerability), that the enemy can take advantage of for attack. In other words, it is merely a form of asymmetrical threat, regarding the fact that asymmetry is mainly considered in negative context.

The term *short-term* or *long-term asymmetry* is linked to the adaptability of the enemy to turn short-term asymmetry, that is mainly present in the history of warfare, and turn it into a long-term manner if confrontation.

Asymmetry with *lower* or *higher risk* can be interpreted as predictability and measurability of the response to the asymmetrical threat. For e.g., superiority of the training or command systems are due to reduce the risk from failure in real situations.

Material and *psychological asymmetry* are closely linked terms. Namely, the advantage in the material sense imminently improves the psychological dimension. In the same fashion, the asymmetrical threats tend to use their methods, manifestations and means to undermine the psychological aspect of asymmetry.

Forms of asymmetry. – The Western theory recognizes six most important forms of asymmetry: method, technology, will, normative, organization and patience³⁶³.

Method entails using different operational concepts or tactical doctrines than the enemy. *Technology* is related to adequate and full exploitation of advanced technology is suppressing the asymmetrical threats. This form does not allow for the errors and mistakes from the past to be repeated, where in spite of their fantastic technological advantages, the great forces were defeated, even disgraced and lost wars (Vietnam War, intervention in Somalia, Chechnya war etc.).

Asymmetry of *will* matters when decisions on which the preservation of the vital state interests sometimes depends have to be made. It is related to unfaltering attitude in crisis situations and is characteristic of the state i.e. management at the strategic level. At the operational and tactical levels its equivalent is *morale* and it can have a crucial influence on the outcome of conflicts. As Napoleon held: “In war the moral is to the material as three to

³⁶² Mec S. & Johnson D.: *Asymmetry and US Military strategy: Definition, background, and strategic Concepts*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*

one”. This form is closely related to *normative asymmetry* when speaking of conflicts with different ethnic, moral and legal standards. This has recently become one of the most significant forms in cases when it is necessary to confront an opponent who uses such means that for the United States constitute a violation of the established norms.

Organizational asymmetry was an important aspect throughout the history of warfare. Innovation with regard to the organization of the armed forces could once have made the necessary overthrow in conflicts. In the wars of the future, regular armed forces could be organized, for example, using networking principle instead of a hierarchical one, which could bring a corresponding advantage in conflicts. *Patience* as a form can be interpreted as the time perspective for future conflicts. Nowadays, the USA predominantly plans its operations to resolve the crisis situations over a very short period of time; however, as with Afghanistan or Iraq, the crisis can take longer than planned with the adversary itself preparing for the crisis to be a long and exhausting conflict that at some point can turn into success organizes thus.

Modern interpretations of asymmetry. – When it comes to the present, namely the interpretation of the asymmetry of the age, the study of the US National Defense Institute which claims that the modern threats are low-level or asymmetric ones, since people cannot understand them sufficiently should be mentioned. If the enemy does not oppose in the manner the other side expects it to, and in that sense the fighting power is increased, then an asymmetric enemy automatically emerges. Asymmetric threats and techniques are a version of an unfair war, which almost always includes the element of *surprise* throughout all its operational and strategic dimensions, with the constant threat that the weapons of mass destruction may be used in the way that the US did not plan for. In conclusion, one interesting point is highlighted: if the United States are getting so heavily armed, and if they are the world’s largest military force, does this mean that in relation to the US, any armed conflict is asymmetrical?

In his book “Asymmetric Warfare, Old Method, New Concept” retired American Brigadier General, David Grange, wrote that asymmetry can best be understood as a strategy, tactic, or method of warfare or conflict that stands off from the norms of conflicts of symmetrical sides³⁶⁴.

In the new security environment, the world is faced with a rise in low-intensity conflicts. Actors in these conflicts include an increasing number of extremist groups, and their arsenal involves chemical, biological, radiological

³⁶⁴ David L, *Asymmetric Warfare, Old Method, New Concept*, ROA National Security Report, 2001.

(non-nuclear) and nuclear weapons. Attacks in the informational or cyberspace represent a separate category of threats.

In an asymmetric war, the tendency is to use personal comparative advantage in relation to some relative weaknesses of the enemy. An asymmetric threat implies that one side, for one reason or another, is not able to oppose the opponent in a conventional way, using the same or similar means and weapons, and therefore chooses an asymmetric approach.

Asymmetric attacks are usually taking advantage of the vulnerability of the enemies, and may be manifested in a variety of ways, with tactical or strategic action. At the strategic level, the fears of the civilian population are exploited in order to further weaken the support for the democratic processes, the work of governments is undermined and cooperation, alliances or partnerships disturbed. At the tactical level, tactics that the Western world has difficulty in countering and almost impossible to prevent are developed (terrorist, suicidal or even electronic attacks), also once again by exploiting the fears of the civilian population that they may become targets of an attack.

The question arises: What then should be the reaction in order to match the increasingly frequent and decisive asymmetric threats, and also what are the weak points, in fact, the “cracks” in the American system of “hype-force” and other military forces on the rise? This very reaction could appear in the form of increased number of terrorist attacks since, as previously said, a trained, equipped and assiduous group of people, terrorists in this case, could prolong the conflict and cause it to enter the sphere of infinity.

Although asymmetric wars are not a recent phenomenon, it would be pretentious to believe that in the near future they might disappear. Antiterrorist measures undertaken by for example, The United States and many other countries, including the Republic of Serbia, will not prevent the development of asymmetric capabilities, while technology will simultaneously contribute to the acquisition of additional power and lead to deepening imbalances among various actors in the international relations. Similarly, the question is whether the solution lies in the military response or, on the contrary, this response only further adds to the sense of frustration.³⁶⁵

The fact is that in contemporary armed conflicts, the asymmetry of warfare conditions the emergence of terrorism, since the inability to achieve victory in conflict by conventional warfare, and due to the inferiority of one side in the conflict and the appearance of asymmetry in terms of technology,

³⁶⁵ Kurmon B, Ribnikar D, *Asimetrični ratovi: Sukobi juče i danas, terorizam i nove pretnje*, NIC Vojaska, Belgrade, 2003, p. 142.

power and use of the armed forces, the weaker parties choose to continue the conflict by resorting to terrorist acts as a way of struggle.

Therefore, the following conclusion can be drawn: that the use of military potential was inevitable, whether it arose as a result of indirect or direct confrontations of at least two parties in the past. In each of them, a trace of asymmetry can be found. It is therefore necessary to constantly draw conclusions and to develop the theory of war skills based on the experiences of previous wars (*lessons learned*).

It is probable that in the future, many conflicts that the world would be facing would basically be asymmetric; namely they can be expected to arrive simultaneously from various sources. For example, it is particularly worrying that classical terrorist attacks or low-intensity conflicts will in the future be accompanied by cyber attacks that can damage or destroy vital commercial, military, or governmental information and/or communication systems. In this way, every world power can suffer enormous damage from a well trained, equipped and assertive group of people, especially if that group of people opts for the execution of purely terrorist acts. The effects of such (terrorist) actions are far greater than the funds invested in it, without mentioning the inability of an adequate response, and even the identification of the group.

DETERMINATION OF TERRORISM

What we refer to as terrorism has actually been in existence ever since 19th century. Even the term Terrorism itself has been skewed proper to the definitive establishment of terrorism as a separate political phenomenon. It was initially used to denote both real and imitative revolutionary terror and some other, related forms of political violence, and only later to denote what is nowadays understood as terrorism. Therefore, in an understandable research quest to establish the beginning of everything, and terrorism, it is necessary to be more than careful and desist from going into improvisation and superficiality³⁶⁶.

Although terrorism is a “plague” of the order established within the modern civilization, there is still no generally recognized and universal definition of terrorism, since it is not easy to define terrorism. However, the issue of terrorism is in the focus of numerous sciences and scientific disciplines, thus placing the definition of the notion of terrorism within multidisciplinary field.

³⁶⁶ Simeunović, D, „Kritički ogled o utvrđivanju vremena nastanka terorizma i njegovim pretečama“, Vojno delo, Spring 2010, Belgrade, p. 325.

The term “terrorism” originates from the Latin word “terror” – an intense fear, horror, and French word *terrera* – causing fear; therefore it represents a method of deliberate and systematic use of violence in order to develop fear, for the purpose of achieving personal, political and other ideological goals.

The term “*terrorism*” (lat.) is derived from the term “terror” and its etymological meaning refers to organized and systematic application of violent measures. In political terms, terrorism is an act of violence that is applied for political reasons in order to intimidate and ruthlessly crush the resistance of the one against whom this violence is applied.³⁶⁷ Furthermore, “terrorism is organized and systematic application of measures and violence with the intention of provoking fear and personal insecurity of the citizens, violating the authority of the state or achieving certain political goals.” Thus “terrorism is a doctrine and method of struggle for achieving certain goals by systemic use of violence.”³⁶⁸

In defining terrorism, interests and emotions are largely involved. “The emotional element in determining terrorism is not merely a reflection of the phenomenon, but it also has a useful function, primarily on the mobilization plan”³⁶⁹. Terrorism is often brought down to ordinary crime, and most often for ideological reasons and for easier accounting with it, “thus achieving the non-recognition of the status of political actors for terrorists, but the phenomenon remains obscured in its political dimension and, therefore, is not sufficiently explained”³⁷⁰.

The term terrorism in its contemporary application most often has a political undertone and it is also connected with the position in power, that is, the struggle for power or the conquest of power. Terrorists proclaim themselves benevolent freedom fighters and although they do not wear uniforms or military insignia, they wish to be treated as prisoners of war in case they are captured. For terrorists it is not solely about the act of violence, but the political echo of it.

Administrative definition of terrorism.– Out of administrative definitions,³⁷¹ the one worth mentioning is the definition of the European Union (2002), which reads that terrorism “may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a Government or international

³⁶⁷ Politička enciklopedija, Savremena administracija, Belgrade, 1975.

³⁶⁸ Vojni leksikon, VIZ, Belgrade, 1981, p. 622.

³⁶⁹ Simeunović, D, Terorizam, Faculty of Law, Belgrade, p. 19.

³⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 20.

³⁷¹ Administrative definitions are those that are the product of certain state or international institutions.

organization to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization by attacks upon a person's life or physical integrity of a person, kidnapping, hostage taking, seizure of aircraft or ships or manufacture, possession, or transport of weapons or explosives“.

The situation is similar in other states. Thus the State Department of the US defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents”. On the other hand, the FBI uses a different format in defining terrorism: “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political, social or ideological objectives”.

The lack of administrative definitions of terrorism is in reflection of the ideological political attitudes of the state or some other leadership – in the general sense, or in comparison with an actual situation, which makes such a definition less general and less applicable to a new, and in many ways a different situation.

Definition of terrorism by foreign authors.- According to Dutch scientists Alex P. Schmidt and Albert J. Jongman, the analysis of 109 definitions of terrorism has yielded eight main entries related to terrorism, and these are (according to the representation in definitions): violence, application of force; political; fear, terror; threat; psychological effects and expected reactions; unclear links between targets and victims; intentional, planned, organized action; way of fighting; strategy; tactics.

Weinberg, Pedazur and Hirsch-Hoefler have given their definition of terrorism: “Terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role.”³⁷²

The essence of terrorism is intimidation, in order to establish a sense of insecurity and anxiety, and *fear is only effective if it is intense and continuous*³⁷³. It is a “format of war”; however unlike the classical war it is unique in its application of armed forces against targets that would otherwise be exempted in ordinary wars and also in the fact that its outcomes have little to do with what is traditionally imminent in war. Fear is always both the product and aim of terrorism. For Charles Kegley it is to “cause fear” which in addition to

³⁷² Weinberg, Leonard et al.: *The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism, Terrorism and Political, Violence*, 2004, pp. 777.

³⁷³ Simeunović D, *Ibid.*

aspiring towards publicity, aims at drawing attention and winning the affection for the terrorist goals as well as death of a large number of people, that have become the main characteristics of terrorism following 11 September 2001.

Professor of Political Sciences with the George Washington University, Nathan Brown defines terrorism as violent acts against one or more persons with the intention of the act being to intimidate one or more persons and in that way achieve the realization of one or more of its political objectives.³⁷⁴

Terrorism as defined in the literature of the Republic of Serbia.-

There are multiple definitions of terrorism in use in the Republic of Serbia. According to the Lexicon of Criminalistics, “terrorism is a form of organized criminal activity characterized by performing acts of violence, committing assassinations and abductions, placing explosive devices and causing fires and generally engaging in dangerous acts.” Also, terrorism is a method of deliberate and systematic use of violence for the sake of causing fear among people. It is carried out by state authorities or organized groups in order to achieve certain political goals³⁷⁵.

Furthermore, it can be said that terrorism is a covert activity, since neither before nor after the terrorist act has been committed it is not easy to discover the identity of neither the instructing nor the implementing party, unless the terrorist organization itself assumes responsibility for the act. This fact points to the complexity of monitoring and assessing terrorist activities, as well as the limited capacity for providing a rapid and effective response, as there is no clear idea of the capabilities, goals and methods related to those performing terrorist acts³⁷⁶.

In order to satisfy the principles of *integrity* and *comprehensiveness* in the definition of terrorism, while respecting the specificity of the phenomenon itself, in determining the scientific definition of terrorism, all the essential features of this phenomenon must be carefully selected and should be separated from non-essential (less important) properties. Otherwise, the definition will lose its meaning by merely enumerating the numerous notions without clearly indicating the *essence*.

Terrorism is a complex form of political violence, which is organized, individually or (more seldom) institutionalized. It is characterized by intimidating violent physical and psychological methods of political struggle which, usually in the times of political and economic crises, and rarely in the

³⁷⁴ Dimitrijević V, Terorizam, Radnička štampa, Belgrade, 1982, p. 37.

³⁷⁵ Leksikon bezbednosti, Privredapublik, Belgrade, 1989.

³⁷⁶ Talić M.: Bezbednosni menadžment u suprotstavljanju i borbi protiv terorizma (Monograph), Military Academy, Belgrade, 2010, pp. 166-168.

conditions of achieved economic and political stability of society, systematically attempts to achieve “large goals”.³⁷⁷

In the opinion of Professor Dragan Simeunović, with whom most authors fully agree, an up-to-date definition of terrorism that follows the principle of precise identification of the appropriate reality, could at this time read: *“As a multidimensional political phenomenon, contemporary terrorism”³⁷⁸ can be defined theoretically in the most general sense as the complex form of an organized group, and rarely individual or institutional political violence marked by not only frightening physical and psychological, but also sophisticated technological methods of political struggle that are usually in times of political and economic crises, and rarely in conditions of established economic and political stability of a society, applied systematically in order to achieve the “large goals” in a morbidly spectacular manner, and inappropriate to the given conditions, above all the social situation and historical circumstances of those who exercise it as a political strategy*“.³⁷⁹

Terrorism uses methods such as psychological propaganda in order to cause fear, confusion and chaos, as well as to achieve certain publicity, the abuse of the Internet for terrorist purposes, abductions, blackmail, psycho-physical abuse, assassinations, sabotage, diversions, suicide attacks, individual and mass murders. The realization of “large goals” in a morbidly spectacular manner is also achieved through the use of extremely brutal methods, where brutality is a feature of terrorism in multiple correlations with the immorality of those implementing it.

In the most general sense, terrorism always represents political violence, but it is important to emphasize that not every political violence can be considered terrorism. The threat of force, coercion, pressure, psycho-physical abuse, political assassination, assassination and diversion are seen as the basic forms of political violence. The complex forms of political violence are terror, violent protests, uprisings, riots, unrests, subversions, rebellions, war and terrorism. It can therefore be concluded that terrorism appears in the vortex of social violence as one of the complex forms of political violence.

The essence of terrorism is manifested in provoking the sense of disgust within a society, which organized groups achieve by persuasion, intimidation and fear of murders and mutilation of innocents.

³⁷⁷ Simeunović, D, *Savremeni terorizam, Jugoslovenski pogled*, NIP Poslovna politika, Belgrade, 1990, p. 45.

³⁷⁸ For specificities of contemporary terrorism see: Talijan M, *Bezbednosni menadžment u suprotstavljanju terorizmu i borbi protiv terorizma*, Medija centar „Obrana”, MoD of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, 2010, pp. 5-8.

³⁷⁹ *Ibid*, p. 43.

It can be concluded that terrorism is the greatest danger of the modern age, but excessive and non-selective retaliation by force is unacceptable since it also provokes counter-reaction. Countering terrorism through the use of military force is inadequate, Fatić points out, and adds “the military response to a megaterorist threat induces precisely its escalation, namely the overly aggressive responses to classical terrorist threats have to a degree caused megaterorism ... The greatest mistake in responding to megaterorism (by USA and other influential powers) is the acceptance of a warring model of military aggression, which gives terrorists the legitimacy they did not previously possess.”³⁸⁰

One thing is certain, fight against terrorism, in the contemporary sense of the word, is bound to last long, if it is at all possible to say that it may eventually end.

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AS ONE OF THE CAUSES OF TERRORISM

Asymmetric conflicts or wars are becoming common practice. In the last thirty years, a whole series of conflicts of different intensity have taken place, in which one of or multiple actors had fallen into the category of the so-called non-state actors. These conflicts, at least initially evolved in accordance with the rules of war, and it was only later, when the pronounced superiority of one side in the conflict came into play that the activity of the terrorist groups was introduced into the conflict. This is the case with Somalia, Chechnya, Palestine, Colombia, Algeria, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Sudan, Yemen and others. All the mentioned non-state actors in conflicts tend to impose violent methods as the dominant state factor. In such efforts, they are significantly limited by their actual capabilities and resources. However, the impact they achieve, as well as the immediate and indirect consequences that they cause, far exceed the frameworks of the countries and regions in which they operate³⁸¹.

US-Iraqi War.- The conflict in the Middle East began with the Iraq-Iran war. After the Iranian Revolution and Homeini's promise that the Islamic Revolution would spread to secular Iraq, Iraq headed by Saddam Hussein, decided to attack Iran. The war between the two states lasted from 1980 to 1988³⁸².

³⁸⁰ Jevtić D, *Bezbednosne posledice procesa globalizacije posle Hladnog rata*, Faculty of Political Sciences, doctoral thesis, Belgrade, 2017, p. 340.

³⁸¹ Popović B, „Novi globalni terorizam“, collection of papers, Nacionalna i globalna bezbednost, Belgrade, 2005, p. 14.

³⁸² During the war, Iraq received support from the USA, first in weapons, and when Iraq started using NBC weapons against the Kurds, the USA did not interfere observing the carnage as something not worth mentioning.

After this war, a new conflict began in 1990, when Iraq, convinced that Kuwait was drawing up their oil reserves from a common oil field on the interstate border, performed an invasion and annexation of Kuwait. The United States wanted to remain neutral in this conflict by sticking to the decisions not to interfere into any conflict among the Arab countries.

However, such a state did not last long, as the Iraq-Iran war showed how much conflict in the oil-rich Middle East region is detrimental to the global oil prices, and the US strategists estimated that if wars were to spread to the Arabian lands of the Persian Gulf, things could get out of control. It was precisely this scenario that led the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; then the United States established a coalition for the liberation of Kuwait and launched an attack on Iraq, in which Iraqi forces were defeated.

However, the real war began in 2003. On one side was Iraq, but enfeebled by sanctions and occasional bombardment, and on the other US, which after Afghanistan focused their attention on Iraq. It was obvious what kind of asymmetric conflict this would be, as the initial situation already fully indicated how things would evolve.

The United States claimed the cause for their interference to have been that Iraq had allegedly failed to cooperate with UN inspectors on the destruction of weapons of mass destruction. The actual reasons for the invasion were much more serious in nature, which is that although Iraq was weakened by sanctions, it still had a relatively strong armed forces, held oil fields under control, Saddam Hussein, the head of the state, was a serious obstacle for achieving the US interests and that was something that the USA could not allow. In addition, Iraqi oil stocks were ripe for “picking” by private companies, meaning that oil has always been and remained the only reason for instigating this action.

The American occupation of Iraq led to a massive increase in world terrorism, and the multiplication of terrorism in Iraq, although there was no trace of terrorism before the war which was obvious. The resistance to the occupation had united many of the priorly segregated groups. The rise of extremism and the birth of terrorism in Iraq has definitely had its milestone in the US illegal invasion, and is a product of the *asymmetric conflict*.³⁸³

During the occupation in Iraq, a large number of various actors were active against the occupiers, one of the more prominent of which was the Iraqi Al-Qaeda (AQI), formed in 2004 when a number of Sunni extremist groups

³⁸³ For more information see: Jevtić D, Talić M, Vračar M, "Kultura rata i pretpostavke kulture mira kao osnove ostvarivanja bezbednosti", collection of papers: Savremeni bezbednosni rizici i pretnje njihov uticaj na bezbednost država regiona, Faculty of Security and Defence, Banjaluka, 2016, pp. 119-120.

declared al-Qaida's faith. At the same time, AQI was fighting against the Americans and the Shiite paramilitaries; it received another blow when some other Sunni groups decided to move from battle to the political field. Therefore, in 2006 AQI partnered with the Sunni brothers in radicalism and founded the Mujahedin Shura Council, which later evolved into the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in the same year. The ISI became the first phase of what is now called the "Islamic State", and has been developing over the years, leading resistance first against the occupying forces and later against the Shiite government following the occupying forces withdrawal from Iraq in 2011.

Conflict between Turkey and Armenia.- The brutal persecutions of Armenian and other Christian people in the Ottoman Empire began towards the end of the 19th century during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, and they culminated after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution and the arrival of the Young Turks.

During 1915 Russia and Turkey entered the First World War as enemies, and the Turks considered the Armenians as the Russian supporters. On 24 April 1915 mass arrests of Armenian intellectuals by the Turkish authorities began, as well as the adoption of the controversial anti-Iranian Tehcir law (Turkish tehcir = deportation) on 29 May 1915 resulted in an event that became known as the Genocide of the Armenians.

Over the period between 1915 and 1917, in massacres against the Armenians, between 600.000 and over one million Armenians were killed³⁸⁴. The Turkish authorities have never acknowledged that this had actually happened, but they persistently spoke about civil war and bilateral conflicts³⁸⁵.

Although much later, with relation to the committed crime, as a form of retaliation, the Armenian terrorist organization ASALA (the Armenian Liberation Army), which operated between 1973 and 1994 was established and responsible for the killing of 36 Turkish diplomats³⁸⁶.

In 1979 and 1980 it was one of the most active militant groups in the region, and it had only one goal, which was to revenge on Turkey for the genocide committed against the members of that nation during the breakup of the Ottoman Empire in 1915. One of their most significant attacks occurred on

³⁸⁴ Precise number of victims in the genocide against the Armenians is virtually impossible to determine; however, most historians agree with the estimates that the numbers are between 800.000 and not more than 1.5 billion Armenians.

³⁸⁵ The state of Armenia and the Armenian diaspora around the world have initiated a comprehensive action of official recognition of these events from WW1 as genocide. In Armenia, on 24 April the Day of the Martyrs is commemorated (Day of the genocide over the Armenians).

³⁸⁶ Its members assassinated the Turkish Ambassador Galip Balkar in Belgrade on 9 March 1983.

7 August 1982, when a bomb explosion and a shooting that followed in Ankara left 11 killed and 63 injured people.

Although the genocide against the Armenians can not be considered a classic Turkish-Armenian conflict, as the opposing side in this war was nonexistent, the asymmetry was most definitely represented, as indicated by the number of victims on the Armenian side. Turkey is persistent in defending its claim that this was a civil war, in which there was also the participation of the Armenian counterpart and victims on both sides, which is very difficult to prove and even if was a true claim, it only reinforces the position pointing to the existence of asymmetry, not only mirrored in the superiority of the number of participants in the conflict, but also by the terrifying methods used for fighting against the Armenian Christians. Mass killings, massacres, rapes, murders of women and children, the powerless and sick, and if experiments on humans are also added to the list, it becomes clear that these are horrific actions that deviate from all norms of warfare and bring this conflict into the sphere of *asymmetrical*. The establishment of the ASALA, the Armenian terrorist organization, with the basic goal of taking revenge for the genocide committed against the Armenian population, can even be referred to as counter terrorism, since the methods used by the Turks against the Armenians are in no way different from the methods used by terrorist organizations whose cruelty and brutality they even far exceed.

War in Afghanistan.- The best example of how an asymmetric war can not only turn into terrorism but also lead to mobilizing terrorist organizations operating in different geographical areas to unit, is the war between the USSR and Afghanistan.³⁸⁷

This war lasted from 1979 to 1989 and established a milestone in the development of the Islamic terrorism. Until the beginning of the war, the Islamic terrorist organizations and some Islamic countries sponsoring terrorist operated largely independently and there was neither a clear link nor synchronized activity among them. However, after this war, the Islamic terrorism emerged more powerful financially, in human resources, technically, organizationally and in every other way. In Islamic fundamentalist circles, the war in Afghanistan has been perceived as a “holy war” and fundamentalists from numerous Islamic countries, especially Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Sudan and Tunisia arrived in Afghanistan. In pursuance of their interests in that part of the world, the United States began using covert

³⁸⁷ It is more proper to say that the USSR fought a war against the lokal insurgent armed formations in Afghanistan.

operations to arm the mujahidins, train and organize them. The personnel and the remaining financial and other resources have been secured by the Islamic fundamentalist circles.

The entire operation, on behalf of the Islamic fundamentalists, was led by *Makatab Al-Khidamat* or *MAK-Services-Office*, headed by Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azam and supported by the intelligence services from Iran, Pakistan, Sudan and Syria. Iran, along with the United States, was the main force behind arming mujahideen. *Makatab al-Khidamat* coordinated the financial aid sent by various Islamic organizations, recruited fighters throughout the Islamic world and sent them to training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan, coordinated activities with the CIA and invented new sources of income. Islamic terrorists have emerged from this war more experienced, organized, technically equipped, financially capable, enriched with knowledge and with clearer ideas.

In this war, on the basis of the idea of the All-Islamic fraternity, there was a need to organize a network that would connect all Islamic terrorist organizations into one. This terrorist organization would have *global* (global action), *multinational* (gathering Islamists regardless of the country of origin), *economic* (self-sustaining), *religious* (spreading and imposing Islam) and *political* features (with the goal of the whole world becoming a single Islamic state – Umma) and *paramilitary organizations* (using all forms of non-conventional activities including terrorism). This organization would position and promote itself as a protector of Islam and all Muslims regardless of the place where they lived. On the basis of these experiences and ideas, in 1988, a contracting organization called *Al-Qaida* was established as a global multinational network connecting various Islamic fundamentalist-terrorist organizations from numerous countries into one organization.

Al-Qaeda is secretly sponsored by the intelligence services of the countries sponsoring terrorism.³⁸⁸ *Al-Qaida* has succeeded in developing a kind of doctrine of terrorism based on a wide spectrum of unconventional actions. It can also be taken to be synonymous of the global terrorism as it now requires no state as a base, shelter or source of finance. It operates worldwide and has cells in most countries. The number of its members is unknown, and it is estimated at several thousand. Since the founding of *Al-Qaeda*, its activities

³⁸⁸ This course of events was influenced by America interfering into the war in Afghanistan using the method of covert actions. In order to achieve her interests in that part of the world the USA, via the secret services, armed the Mujahedins, organized and conducted training with them, provided them knowledge, technology and money. Personnel, fighters and the rest of the financial resources are provided by fundamentalist circles, especially some of the most developed Muslim countries.

are very broad and extend throughout the world. It summons to holy war, proclaims martyrdom and is responsible for numerous suicide and other terrorist attacks.

It can be said that following the war in Afghanistan there is a new chapter in the operation and organization of Islamic terrorism, namely that this terrorism, as a manifestation of political violence, has been a true winner of the war, not the people of Afghanistan or the Americans involved in it by means of covert actions.

The already mentioned principle of asymmetrical warfare whose objective is an attempt to exploit its own comparative advantage in relation to some relative weakness of the opponent, has led to an asymmetric threat implicating that one side, for one reason or another, unable to confront the opponent in a conventional way using the same or similar capabilities and weapons, chooses an asymmetric approach, and ultimately an asymmetrical conflict can turn into a acts of terrorism.

CONCLUSION

It can never be said with certainty that something good will come from wars. The vast majority of recent wars have been fought in direct conflict with international norms and UN resolutions. Although there are norms and regulations concerning wars, the problem is that their actual role is completely limited and they usually serve as a fake mask for immorality, brutality and barbarism in modern wars. However, what can be said with certainty is that the capabilities that are to be used in war are meant for killing and destruction and that they can not serve for achieving morally justified goals.

Striving to achieve the proper goals using all means available and at all costs, with the aim of preventing and minimizing the proper losses, will lead to maximum engagement of resources at the initial stage of war, using sophisticated techniques and long-range ordnance. Thus war will assume asymmetrical properties before it even starts and make the other side in the conflict delve into the sphere of unconventional warfare, while the most coercive and persistent will seek to infinitely extend the state of war by use of terrorist activities.

Imposing of Western values, viz. insisting on respecting the human rights on the one hand, and the gross violation of these with the widely used term “collateral damage” on the other, with the already mentioned disproportion in terms of military, economic, political and any other power, may in the future only deepen the gap between “big” and “small” states, thereby inducing the existing extremist organizations to oppose terrorism, as

an attempt to prolong the struggle in the circumstances in which they will have greater chances of success.

By establishing the UN, the system of collective security and the emergence of the international community as a global one, the basis at the international level that the preservation of international security can only be achieved through the elimination of the causes of war has been accepted. The elimination of the causes of wars is possible through the establishment of conditions in which the struggle of the great powers for primacy will be prevented through the introduction of actual multilateralism in international relations, with multiple centers of power, established on the basis of coexistence and cooperation. Such a concept and the created conditions in international politics can provide undeveloped and small countries with greater opportunities and a better position for development and prosperity in peaceful conditions.³⁸⁹ Therefore, the aspiration of certain centers of power towards further divisions into blocks and imperial ambitions, in combination with marginalization of the UN system, would have a negative impact on the long-term possibility for achieving international peace and stability and the elimination of crises and conflicts, while asymmetry and terrorism are bound to take more radical and new forms.

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ASIMETRIČNO RATOVANJE I TERORIZAM

Miroslav Talijan*

Škola nacionalne odbrane, Vojna akademija, Univerzitet odbrane,
Republika Srbija

Saša Antanasijević**

Vojska Srbije, Republika Srbija

Abstrakt: Terorizam kao oblik organizovanog i politički motivisanog nasilja od svog nastanka predstavlja pretnju širom sveta, ispoljava se na različite načine i u različitim oblicima, a sada već postaje globalni svetski problem, s obzirom na to da kao pojavni oblik u jednoj sredini, po pravilu nikada ne ostaje izolovan na određenom prostoru, već se veoma brzo širi i grana i na druge prostore. Preduslov uspešnog suprotstavljanja terorističkim dejstvima jeste poznavanje mogućih uzroka terorizma. Otklanjanje svih uzroka koji uslovljavaju pojavu terorizma praktično je nemoguće, zbog toga što su oni mnogobrojni, različiti, pa i nepoznati.

Zbog toga je cilj ovog rada da prikaže, kako je jedna od glavnih karakteristika savremenih oružanih sukoba asimetrija, odnosno da su sukobi (ratovi) današnjice zapravo asimetrični ratovi. U njima je jedna strana u sukobu inferiorna, a usled nemogućnosti da se pobeda u sukobu ostvari konvencionalnim ratovanjem, slabija strana kao način borbe bira izvođenje terorističkih akata.

Savremeni terorizam predstavlja društveni fenomen koji se doživljava kao potpuno nova pojava, s obzirom na način njegovog ispoljavanja. Pri tome, osnovnu karakteristiku čini njegov globalni karakter, odnosno mogućnost ugroženosti terorističkim aktom u bilo kojoj zemlji, na bilo kom mestu i u bilo koje vreme na planeti.

Posebna pažnja u radu biće posvećena asimetričnosti kao dominantnoj karakteristici ratova današnjice, zatim pojavi terorizma kome može pribeći inferiornija strana u sukobu, što ukazuje da će sušitna rada biti na utvrđivanju povezanosti između asimetričnog ratovanja, kao uzroka sa jedne strane i pojave terorizma kao posledice sa druge strane.

Ključne reči: asimetrija, asimetrično ratovanje, terorizam, klasifikacija terorizma, ratovi današnjice, političko nasilje, rat.

* miroslav.talijan@va.mod.gov.rs

** sasa.antasijevic@vs.rs

SUB-STATEHOOD AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES ON ASYMMETRIC THREATS

Miloš Šolaja *

Faculty of Political Science, University of Banja Luka,
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Abstract: Processes and changes in a space of post-socialist federations have brought geopolitical recomposition of their territories on ethno-national bases. New independent countries have posed questions of territorial definition, sovereignty and survival of newly-established states in international relations defined in accordance with the principles of liberal internationalism. Tendencies for international recognition of ethnic partition of territories and national sovereignty on territories of some of the newly recognized members of international community are what caused wars on their territories. Internal wars, characterized as ethnic, civil, even religious, were restituted as symmetric conflicts shaped through ethnically founded armed troops as an ‘expression of statehood’. Ethnic specificities enabled constitutional and institutional characteristics of states that were not able to achieve international recognition due to standards of membership in United Nations. These states, named *de facto states*, *states within states*, *states in shadow* or other terms in more numerous cases were more efficient in legal and executive power than recognized metropolitan states which realize external but not internal sovereignty in foreign relations. Another sort of ethnic collectivization defines “new” national minorities as a consequence of a break up of multiethnic federations. Both kinds of ethnic collectivization become a part of asymmetric threats and asymmetric strategies defined by actors in international environment – dominantly states and international organizations – but also unitarian self-defined political elites of formally recognized metropolitan states which are, for difference of *de facto states*, usually named as *quasi-states*. The research presented in this work should show responses on asymmetric threats that could be asymmetric strategies of sub-state communities which relate to state-shaped, territorialized and institutionalized communities as well as self-determined autonomies and identities based on a state possible to characterized as a ‘post-modern state’ (state of post-moderna). Answers on sub-state of national collectivities on asymmetric threats, dispersed in few states, could become strategic responses of entire national communities. These responses underpin progressive processes in economy,

* msolaja@teol.net

education, development, public diplomacy, international relations and communication with other communities as key answers by some of them on asymmetric threats.

Key words: strategy, nation, asymmetry, state, sub-statehood, conflict

INTRODUCTION

South East Europe is the region historically known due to wars, clashes, conflicts, misunderstandings, divisions. "Dictionary of International relations" coins notion 'balkanization' based on the notion of 'the Balkans' as the Region explained through fragmentation of space in the "region of independent or quasi-independent mutually hostile centres of power".³⁹⁰ Same term is defined in the Oxford "Concise Dictionary of Politics" which assumes division "state in smaller territorial units". The term tends to imply policy of 'divide and rule' whereby the strength of unified country is diluted by a creation of internal division. "The term come to prominence in the aftermath of the First World War but has contemporary resonance in the right of recent Balkan politics".³⁹¹ In the same Dictionary the term "Balkan politics" is characterized by the fact that "Since the collapse of European communism in 1989 – 91 the Balkans has been ore at the forefront of European and world affairs at any time since the First World War. For this reason the evolution of Balkan Politics has been determined as much by external as internal factors."³⁹² A proof of this attitude is the fact that the first intervention in the internal policies of some country happened in former Yugoslavia a the first preventive UN troops deployed on the borders of Macedonia 1992 as the first UN units peace intervention in Europe; the first armed NATO intervention since founding 1949 happened in the Region and that the most number of casualties, refugees and displaced persons happened just in this area too. The collapse of socialist countries in Central, East and South East Europe led to the outset of transformation and redefining of the orientation of values of societies from socialist model of social cohesion towards neighbourhood defined by features and values of the liberal democracy. Classic national states with high degree of national homogeneity were developing much faster and easier due to different

³⁹⁰ Evans, Graham; Newnham, Jeffrey (1998), *Dictionary of International Relations*, London, Penguin Books, p 45.

³⁹¹ McLean, Iain; McMillan, Alistair (2003), *Concise Dictionary of Politics*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 36.

³⁹² *Ibidem*, p.36.

models and established interior consensus in terms of constitutional system and design of political system, particularly in terms of economic and political model of functional society. The most complicated transitional models featured multinational federations that passed through processes of disintegration and territorial self-determination as a cornerstone of gaining independency. On the space of the Soviet Union emerged fifteen new independent countries from which twelve of, sometimes even less of, decided to join to membership in Community of independent States (CIS) as a relatively 'soft' multilateral framework instead former Soviet State. A similar peaceful principle of disintegration was followed between Czech Republic and Slovakia since January 1st, 1993.

Disintegration of the Socialist Federal Yugoslavia occurred due to the impact of both internal economic, political and ethnic and external subjects and factors. Although the Balkans (or South East Europe) has never been the most important political arena in the European history but rather exclusively periphery, at the beginning of 90s of XX century it was brought to the focus of the global powers as the first armed conflict on the European soil after the Second World War. Essentially, there were series of local wars and territorial disputes between former Yugoslav republics and separate territorial entities inside them. Disputes were focused on national and ethnic conflicts sparked by the necessity for territorial definition of the national space. Dimensions of ethno-national conflict, unfolded in the last years of Yugoslavia as federation, was raised to such level that it was impossible to figure out a peaceful and stable political solution. Failure in finding a peaceful solution brought about attempts to dissolute states by 'hard power' which resulted in wars between institutionalized armed forces as a sort of classic – symmetric – war within a regional frame. The outset of a series of declarations of new independent countries launched certain questions they were not on the agenda in their inter-relations while they were part of Yugoslavia as federal republics. These issues had to deal with question of borders and territories indicating intensions to fortify or build statehood with defence as functional system and armed forces which played a key role as the main pillar of economic and political powers. Traditional national myths and new myths of 'delivering nations in war and blood' emerged as primordial myths of state founding particularly in the areas where a tradition of statehood did not exist or a time-distance since the last national state (not necessarily national, as the process of nation forming in the Region started very late) or just traces of statehood building as their political goal that changed perception of the form of the state but not the essence. Forging state 'in blood' enabled establishing the necessarily identity base according to the principle of 'blood and soil'. Without the armed forces as a symbol of statehood and the heavenly myth of the realization of national interests it would not be possible to talk or even think about establishing a national state. Territorial issues did not

stayed open just within the former Yugoslav republics – the new independent countries that emerged, but also inside some of them.

On December 19th, 1991, the Republic of Srpska Krajina (autonomous separated region in Croatia during the war 1991 – 95) declared independence within the territory of the post-Yugoslav Republic of Croatia according to its Constitution. The Republic of Srpska (initially the Serbian Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina) declared independence within the territory of the post-Yugoslav Bosnia and Herzegovina on January 9th, 1992. A similar process happened in the Autonomous Republic of Western Bosnia in the autumn of 1994. All three state-shaped political entities initially, as part of the political system of ‘state’ institutions, formed defence systems including the armed forces as the most characteristic institution of security and defence. A similar way of shaping and implementing defence and security could be found in the Croatian Council of Defence (HVO) over the period 1992 – 94, the Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK) 1998 – 99 and National Defence Army (ONA) in Macedonia 2000. All of these armed forces or military formations practically immediately started wars and other kinds of armed conflicts. War on the Balkans was de facto a series of symmetric wars waged by recognized or non-recognized states and sub-states between 1991 and 2000.

EMERGENCE OF FEATURES OF ASYMMETRY IN THE BALKAN WARS

Asymmetric war is a characteristic of the conflict in which the strategies and tactics of the opposite sides in conflict significantly differ due to the difference in terms of power. Intending to realize goals that served as the motive for conflict in the first place with as little loss and investment as possible strategies and tactic are adopted which tend to use own advantages in unarmed warfare, but even more often the disadvantages of the opponent. As a kind of warfare, has been implemented more frequently in 70s of the previous century, *asymmetric war* was revitalized in 90s, after the Cold War as the only possible response to the American military force that was left without an adequate opponent in the eventual symmetric warfare. Conflicts increasingly started to occur through engagement of unequal forces. Therefore, the strategic concepts have been in a certain way oriented towards particular advantages as well as counterpart’s weaknesses. Symmetry could reasonably be established exclusively in the sphere of nuclear weapon on the principle of “*mutual assured destruction*” (MAD). “In the conventional sphere, symmetrical forces

were potentially a recipe for mutual exhaustion“.³⁹³ *Asymmetric warfare* has been established as the only possible kind of warfare between unequal adversaries.

„The real interest in asymmetrical warfare occurred in situations where the two sides sought to fight in completely different sorts of war, particularly when Americans persevered with their vision of regular warfare while the opponents either resorted to weapons of mass destruction or adopted forms of irregular warfare“.³⁹⁴ As far as collision of ‘hard power’ or nuclear conflict of great powers became virtually impossible, warfare is more often transferred to non-conventional and asymmetric means. Due to the increased visibility of *asymmetric warfare* as well as other characteristics of the changed manner of warfare a common name for these is “military tactics of the modern times”. As far as forms and tactics of this kind of warfare do not necessarily imply the application of military activities, one of the important tactical elements would be demilitarization. This position provides the opportunity for the use of a wide scope of activities which take advantage of fear, hopelessness, confusion, disturbed values and other processes in the socio-psychological sphere.

Since the very beginning wars between post-Yugoslav countries demonstrated the characteristics clearly demonstrating the sporadic appearance of asymmetry in war-fighting. To begin with, it was about the role of the international community as a factor of war particular subjects took advantage of in order to realize their objectives. The term ‘international community’ from 90s of 20th century was dominantly synonymous of the USA and EU politics towards former socialist countries. For the recently declared countries – former Yugoslav republics, the most important war objectives were internationally recognized independency, geopolitical definition and territorial sovereignty. The process at the same time went hand in hand with the process of ‘transition’ which meant breaking up with the previous social-economic system of self-management ‘contracted economy’ and polycentric planning into political party pluralist representative democracy instead of mono-party political government. Transition at the territory of the former Yugoslavia is characterized as an ‘unwilling transition’, dominantly representing a direct consequence and resuming of process of transformation of socialism into liberal capitalism which was increasingly accelerated throughout the Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, Council for Mutual Economy Cooperation and disintegration of the Soviet Union. In the beginning of the process former socialist states declared orientation to

³⁹³ Freedman, Lawrence (2013), *Strategy: a History*, New York, Oxford University Press, p 220.

³⁹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 221.

cooperate with the USA and membership in the European Economy Community (EEC) through which the western countries achieved a definite geopolitical and geostrategic victory without military activities. Due to the fact that Germany united, the contact line between East and West on the Odra and Nyssa rivers was significantly moved further to the East and closer to Russia. Transition in Yugoslavia began with an array of initial multiparty elections which legitimized the changes of the political system. This very act indicated a move towards the community of the western countries characterized by the very liberal democracy and market economy. The newly declared countries posed as their primary goal the separation from Yugoslavia and break of any connection with former federal units based on keeping political cleavages based on principle 'non-Serbs against Serbs' thus achieving the political support of the leading western countries supporting the 'democratic changes'. Support was an expression of the western countries' politics that, through fragmentation of Yugoslavia, implemented possibility of easier control, prevention of maintaining non-liberal social values they encountered in Serbia and Montenegro but also minimizing the possibility of strategic advantage of Russia in the perceivable future. Thus a victory based on principles of asymmetric warfare has already been achieved.

Balkan nations that succeeded in establishing their independence and territorial integrity as a primary goal used the western support in order to achieve advantage in mutual relations. They strove to realize this goal by engaging the lobbying agencies with the overall support of the national Diaspora. Target groups of the lobbying activities were organizations, informal groups and individuals with influence in the USA Congress decision making, individuals in the USA government or some powerful NGOs like the Council on Foreign Relations. "The United States of America had to find out a way to recognize Croatia in order to silence the Croatian lobby in their own country, however without losing the prestige in the process".³⁹⁵ Power was also sought in Europe through attempts to influence the institutions of the European Union as well individual countries, particularly those which were powerful and influential. In that group Germany stood out, as after the unification of the Federal Republic of Germany and Democratic Republic of Germany extraordinary political power was achieved predominantly based on its economic power. "In addition to this, the purpose of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia for Germany and for the United States in case of Bosnia and Herzegovina was neither to prevent further atrocities nor to influence the

³⁹⁵ Vudvord, Suzan (1996), *Balkanska tragedija, kaos i raspad posle hladnog rata* Beograd, Filip Višnjić str. 277.

situation in Yugoslavia, but rather relenting under domestic pressure working in favour of Croatian sovereignty, acquiring acknowledgement for their ministers of foreign affairs (Gencsher and Baker) and assertion of power and leadership in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance”.³⁹⁶ The same is confirmed by the fact that “Germany ignored recommendations of the Robert Badentaire Commission which reported that Croatia had not fulfilled the conditions to be recognized”.³⁹⁷

Another way of spreading the influence was via the media and forming the international public opinion. Processes in this sphere were ultimately anti-Serb caused by political interests of western countries in the international community. On the other hand, the media were already established as members of the media market and it is well-known that they are biased as result of the paid programs and editorial orientations. The Western media created programs, political stereotypes, pejorative anti-Serb political vocabulary firmly setting the international public opinion as dominantly anti-Serb, equalizing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Serbs as the main source of the ideological socialist totalitarianism and opponents of the “West and free society”. The media impact went so far as to claim at one point that the UN Security Council has 17 members – 15 countries and also *CNN and the New York Times*, as their influence on the decision making was decisive. Thus the new states achieved the second asymmetric advantage in the post-Yugoslav conflicts.

The compatibility of politics of the Western countries and separatist politics of the former Yugoslav republics towards Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was obvious and the results of this could relatively easy have been underestimated. Much more important for the separated republics than the consequences of wars at the territory of the former Yugoslavia was creating the impression of war victory reflected in the asymmetry in international relations in a series of ‘patrimonial’ wars, the way to reach this goal being through identification of interests between the western powers and western Yugoslav republics, although it is impossible to talk about any side leaving victorious from this war. Military conflicts and territorial dedications at the ex-Yugoslav territory were concluded through a series of peace plans and peaceful solutions based on relations of symmetric power. Following the rejection of certain peace plans, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended with the Dayton Peace Accords after three weeks of negotiations in the United States and official signing in Paris in 1995. The

³⁹⁶ Ibidem, p. 278.

³⁹⁷ Ibidem, p. 275.

wars in Croatia and the surrounding territories ended with the Erdut Agreement which included a 'peaceful reintegration' of the East Slavonia (Eastern area in Croatia near the Serbian border), controlled by the Republic of Srpska Krajina government. NATO aggression on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ended with the United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 and Military-technical Agreement from Kumanovo (Macedonia), in June 1999. The armed rebellion of Albanians in western Macedonia ended by Ohrid Agreement 2001 and special 'Bedentaire majority' as a sort of constitutional arrangement for conscionable type of functioning of Macedonia.

The final internationally regulated peace agreements in the Balkans reflects the international legitimization of the regional geopolitical order which is characterised by increasing the number of the Balkan countries from six to ten (or eleven which depends on whether Turkey is considered a Balkan Country), mutual opposition and the issue of the regional primacy, trans-border national issues which are preceded by the word "Great" (Serbia, Croatia, Albania as well as the emerging Bosnjak question). "Essentially, the problem was conceived as a problem of borders and territory and not of political and social organization."³⁹⁸ The same source states that the modern local wars are a segment of the contemporary globalized war which is "based on its dependence on the appetite and foreign support, lower level of participation and orientation on the civilians, is directed rather towards the fragmentation than consolidation of political authorities".³⁹⁹

The institutional consequence of the political solutions are agreements of regional arms control as the expression of the regional "balance of power" in line with the obligations assumed according to the Dayton Peace Accords for the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Following the negotiations in Vienna, January 1996, the Agreement of Sub-Regional Control of Armament was signed in Florence, Italy, 14 June 1996. The regional balance of arms regulated relations in the triangle FR Yugoslavia – Bosnia and Herzegovina – Croatia accepting proportions in armament noted in Dayton Peace Accords on principle 5:2:2 which reflected the population of the respective countries.⁴⁰⁰ Over the period 1996 to 2000, the arms balance reflected the equality of military potentials of FR Yugoslavia with the Republic of Srpska on one hand and Croatia with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the other. After the implementation of the defence reform in

³⁹⁸ Kaldor, Mary (2001), *New & Old Wars: Organized violence in a Global Era*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, p. 59.

³⁹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 57

⁴⁰⁰ OSCE Handbook for the Implementation of Agreement of Sub-Regional Control http://www.oscebih.org/documents/osce_bih_doc_2010092008311001eng.pdf.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, which established a single and unified defence system, the proportions of armament were modified since actors appeared in new forms and new actors emerged (Albania and Kosovo) as subjects of regional balance of military powers. The only part that remained unchanged is the principle of *symmetry* of 'hard power' between the regional actors. Thus the question of *asymmetric warfare* was now present, as well as other forms of war waging, particularly in the framework of the contemporary model known as the *fourth generation of warfare*.

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AFTER 90s BALKAN WARS

Fragmentation of the Balkan territories has not remained limited only on states but has also been manifested in the internal state divisions. The most distinct geopolitical shift put Bosnia and Herzegovina in focus with its design as community of two entities after three years of internal war. Moreover, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided on ten regions (cantons, županija's). Republika Srpska and regions in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina have the authority of executive institutions which enable them to be characterized as *de facto states*. According to the Scot Pegg Analysis "de facto states" fulfil the majority of criteria on international subjectivity defined in the Criteria from Montevideo, 1933. First, they possess organized political leadership and enjoy significant support of the population. Second, the political leadership has enough capacity in order to provide system of state and public service for their population. Third, they have had control of the entire or at least bigger portion of the territory over the period of at least two years; a period decisive enough to prove that some territory possesses a certain level of permanent governing. Fourth, '*de facto states*' see themselves capable enough to establish relations with other countries. Fifth, they actively request international recognition of their sovereignty. Sixth, they usually do not succeed in providing recognition of broader sovereignty and mainly stay unrecognized by the international society of sovereign states, although there are plenty of recognized states that have never effectively controlled the territory of their country nor organized efficient government for their population; nevertheless, they have been internationally recognized in spite of their inefficiency. On the other hand, "de facto states" remain unrecognized regardless of their efficiency or effectiveness or how capable their governments are to control the territory and implement the power of state."⁴⁰¹

⁴⁰¹ Pegg, Scot (2008) *The Impact of De Facto States on International Law and the International Community* May 2008. P. 15.

The reasons for emerging of the ‘*de facto states*’ at the territory of the post-socialist Yugoslav federation can be traced to the ethnic differences as the bases for defining national identity, defining political and economic systems different from the state on whose territory they have been established in which the ethno-national elites have dominant a role. “What the international community does not want to see is previously described process of establishing ethnic states, since fact remains that these new state-entities were built on economic exclusion, ethnic cleansing and genocide, and that while promoting such policies they cannot become normal and civil states...the ‘national question’ cannot be resolved by endless multiplication of ethnic states but only by detour that will pass through a civil democratic state, that protects collectives and its individual citizens equally regardless their ethnicity, religion or political belief.”⁴⁰²

Historical factors for the emergence of *de facto states* in the post-communist territories could be the following:

- Opposition on part of new the ‘metropolitan’ states, internationally recognized former Soviet and Yugoslav republics to recognize sovereignty on parts of their territories;
- wars between ‘sides’ in terms of recognition of the principle of status of sovereignty, actually situation of mutual subversion of sovereignty, non-recognition of territorial integrity between *de facto* states and quasi-metropolitan states;
- ethnic cleansing and either voluntary or forced displacing of population from conflict-zones;
- significant percentage or absolute majority of the citizens of the unrecognized states, which do not belong to metropolitan states are unrecognized by self-declared independent entities;
- the form of social order and political system also characteristic of the unrecognized states is the republican presidential system; there are however clear intentions to have the parliamentary system prevail, which could be seen as attempt for the de-sovereignization of that states;
- international mediation;⁴⁰³

⁴⁰² Iveković, Ivan (2001) *Ethnic and Regional Conflicts in Yugoslavia and Transcaucasia: A Political Economy of Ethnonational Mobilisation*, Longo Editore Ravenna p. 180.

⁴⁰³ Колеров, Модест (2008) *Без СССР*, Москва. Регнум, стр 28 – 29.

NATO bombing of the FR Yugoslavia enabled the establishing of Kosovo as the *de facto state* with relatively high level of international recognition in spite of not achieving the United Nation membership yet. Namely, full international recognition has not been reached regardless of the well developed bilateral and to a certain degree multilateral relations. Establishing of the statehood of Kosovo could be considered the result of an asymmetric warfare. The best illustration for this conclusion is comparison with the de-sovereignization of Republika Srpska. Comparison can be taken as ‘double diametrically opposed’ standards. From unrecognized sovereignty of Republika Srpska with an independent armed force as an expression of statehood has been relinquished due to the intervention of international institutions, primarily the Office of the High Representative. Contrary to this, what was initially a group of rebels with very disputable political motives, Kosovo has become the second country of Albanian majority in the Balkans, striving to gain the status of UN member in order to realize full international independence and recognition. At the same moment *de facto states* such are the Republika Srpska Krajina or the Autonomous Region of the Western Bosnia has disappeared both territorially and politically.

Changes in the *symmetric* regional order were established immediately after the Dayton Peace Accords settlement led to changes of the previously established order due to the implementation of the *asymmetric methods on strategic, operational and tactical levels*. Independence of Republika Srpska as a ‘side’ in setting up the regional balance of armed forces was merged into Bosnia and Herzegovina as representative of a unified defence system and single armed forces. At the same time, Kosovo which due to the Copenhagen Criteria (1933) can not achieve full statehood being unable to establish an armed force in order to assume a position as an active partner within the *symmetric* military arrangements in the ‘region’.

ASYMMETRIC WAR AND “DE FACTO STATES” IN THE BALKANS

Post-Yugoslav wars in the Balkans ended when the decision by the United States of America was made to do this. The Dayton Peace Accord from 1995 that defined a new geopolitical division of the Balkans can be taken as the decisive point in legitimizing the regional conflict and peace regardless of the subsequent NATO bombarding of the FR Yugoslavia in 1999 and the conflict in Macedonia in 2000. Although the war between sides was *symmetric war* it de facto had *elements of asymmetry* provided by the international players. Elements of asymmetry are: breaking the international embargo on

armament which enabled the sides to arm themselves; direct illegal arming of sides in the conflict from former socialist East countries; political propaganda and support to separatist republics; unilateral condemnation of war sides (in the case of former Yugoslavia that means the FR Yugoslavia, dominantly Serbia, and the Republika Srpska) which included imposing of economic sanctions and embargo. *Asymmetry* was provided by political support to allies in the Balkans. From the outset of the crisis the United States and EU supported the separatist Western Yugoslav republics Slovenia and Croatia taking them as ‘democratic’. At the moment of Bill Clinton’s ascension to presidency in 2001, George W. Bush (senior) strongly warned Serbia’s President Slobodan Milošević not to interfere in the ‘internal problems of Kosovo’.

The question would be what *asymmetry* is in this case, what are the objectives of wars and such approach? The regional order based on territorial mark off and the balance of the military forces has been established without the intention to defeat any country. Accusations for attempts to establish ‘Great Serbia’ represent a typical arsenal of *asymmetric warfare* purposefully denying the internal requests for independence of some regions and autonomy of Serb communities, dominantly in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The result of wars at these two republics was ethnic cleansing of the territories in Croatia including the historical area traditionally settled by Serbs and known as ‘Vojna Krajina’ (Military Border Region) which was at the time under direct government of Austrian Tsarist family as the main barrier to Ottomans penetration. In Bosnia and Herzegovina it was the legalization of the state-shaped sovereignty⁴⁰⁴ and, in to a great extent independent, Republika Srpska, legalized by Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution incorporated as the Annex IV oh the Dayton Peace Accords. Republika Srpska has encompassed normative and institutionalized political system which functions independently in the most numerous areas of social regulation but only partly in a frame of proportional participation in the common institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a case of any disarrangement in internal relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska has enough capacities institutionally to take over all functions if an independent state, regardless of the format, extent and quality of the international recognition.

On the territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina a certain number of Serbs remained and they can be categorized as follows: opinionated

⁴⁰⁴ Term ‘sovereignty’ has been taken from the Constitution of Republika Srpska through constitutional changes imposed by High Representative 2002 based on the initiative of the international community.

advocates of citizens' Bosnia and Herzegovina, those who stayed there unwillingly; returnees that got back due to their convictions, returnees who did not have other existential solution, Serb refugees that retained their property and, finally, Serb refugees that tend more or less to get rid of their property either by selling or exchanging it but have retained certain benefits (pensions, working rights etc.). In such a constellation of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina where cantons are de facto states, Serbs have been a constitutive nation since 2002; through the constitutional changes imposed by the High Representative they would become an important element in decision making. Although Serbs have not been able to establish their national delegation in the House of Peoples in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, having provided only 13 out of the required 17 delegates, the fact is that remain along with Republika Srpska and its role within the common institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina act an important factor of decision making as well as contributing to the quality of political relations.

CONCLUSION

Asymmetric warfare in the Balkans, particularly at the territory of the former Yugoslavia, has not finished. The relations among the national states (including the three-national Bosnia and Herzegovina) have not been fully defined even through the international agreements, which continues to provide space for the continuation of *asymmetric warfare* the main war goal of which is assuring the support of the international community and challenging the adversaries and their national objectives. In the process of challenging and disputing the focus is predominantly on Serbia, since Croatia, Albania and Kosovo as well as Montenegro and Macedonia wish to undermine her stability and position of the most important country in the Balkans. A manifestation of the *asymmetric actions* can be seen in the more intensive armament of Serbia and Croatia whose mutual relations establish the baseline for the regional order. Serbian advantage lies is the possibility to rely on some of the *de facto* states in the Region. To begin with, there is Republika Srpska, and also Serbs as a constitutive nation in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus Serbia can count on two entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbs in other former Yugoslav republics. It is certain that the collective institutional mechanisms of Serbs in Montenegro as well as the strong Serb minority policy in Croatia and Macedonia can be established as *elements of asymmetric warfare* through attempts to realize their minority rights and active role in the process of decision making. A good example is Croatia where Serbs have on multiple occasions participated in the political decision making and been the element of stability of governments. The potential of the *asymmetric pressure*

on neighbouring countries have certainly not been used to their full potential, due to the failure to establish the Parliament and Government of Republika Srpska Krajina on exterritorial fundaments. It would mean strengthening of constitutional pressure of Serbian state-shaped entities that not only by their existence but even more through economic development, national security systems, representing Serbs as communities within their respective states and abroad, intensified cultural creative activity and other objectives altogether represent an element of the implementation of the national defence strategies through *asymmetric modules of activity*.

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SUBDRŽAVNOST I STRATEŠKI ODGOVORI NA ASIMETRIČNE PRETNJE

Miloš Šolaja *

Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Banjoj Luci,
Bosna i Hercegovina

Apstrakt: Procesi i promene na prostoru postsocijalističkih federacija donele su geopolitičko prekomponovanje njihovih prostora na etno-nacionalnim osnovama. Nove nezavisne države postavile su pitanja teritorijalnog određenja, suvereniteta i opstanka novonastalih država u međunarodnim odnosima definisanim na osnovama liberalističkog internacionalizma. Na teritoriji jednog broja međunarodno priznatih novonastalih članica međunarodne zajednice, pojavile su se težnje za etničkim definisanjem teritorija i nacionalne suverenosti, što je bilo uzrok niza ratova na prostorima novih država. Unutrašnji ratovi, koji se karakterišu kao građanski, etnički, neki i religijski, bili su postavljeni na osnove unutrašnjih simetričnih sukoba na osnovama uspostavljanja etnički utemeljenih oružanih formacija kao izraz državnosti. Time su etničke posebnosti dobijale konstitucionalne i institucionalne karakteristike država koje nisu uspele da postignu međunarodno priznanje u skladu sa standardom koji se ogleda u članstvu u Ujedinjenim nacijama. Ove države, nazvane *de facto države*, *države u državi*, *države u sjenci* i drugim terminima, u većem broju slučajeva imaju efektivnije sisteme zakonodavne i izvršne vlasti od priznatih metropolskih država koje ostvaruju spoljnopolitički suverenitet, ali ne i unutrašnji. Drugi oblik etničke kolektivizacije jeste definisanje „novih“ nacionalnih manjina kao posledice raspada multietničkih federacija. Oba oblika etničke kolektivizacije postaju deo procesa asimetričnih pretnji i asimetričnih strategija koje definišu subjekti u međunarodnom okruženju – države i međunarodne organizacije – ali i unitaristički samodefinisane političke elite formalno priznatih metropolskih država koje se u odnosu na „države u državi“ najčešće karakterišu terminom „kvazi-države“. Istraživanje u ovom radu treba da pokaže da odgovori na asimetrične pretnje mogu da budu i asimetrične strategije subdržavnih zajednica, što se odnosi i na državno-oblikovane teritorijalizovane i institucionalizovane zajednice, ali i na etničke samoodređene autonomije i identitete na osnovama funkcionisanja države koja može da se karakteriše kao 'država postmoderne'. Odgovori na asimetrične pretnje subdržavnih

* msolaja@teol.net

kolektivneta nacija, podeljenih u više država, postaju i strateški odgovori nacionalnih zajednica u celini. Ti odgovori podrazumevaju progresivne procese u ekonomiji, obrazovanju, razvoju, javnoj diplomatiji, međunarodnim odnosima i komunikaciji s drugim zajednicama kao neke od ključnih odgovora na asimetrične pretnje.

Ključne reči: strategija, nacija, asimetrija, država, subdržavnost, konflikt.

CYBER WARFARE: NEW TYPE OR WARFARE OR ADDITIONAL ELEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Igor Novaković*

International and Security Affairs Centre – ISAC fund, Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Irina Rizmal**

Masters candidate at the University College of London,
Great Britain

Abstract: Cyber-attacks represent a new type of security threats, arising as a result of advancements in the field of information technologies, having the potential to change the dominant perception of conflicts. Since this threat is relatively new, and continues to evolve and change, it is difficult to foresee its future forms of development and potential manifestations of its use in conflicts. However, one should bear in mind that both the EU and NATO, as well as the USA, have already defined cyber space as a new military domain. The article discusses how conflicts are changing with the rise of this new domain, differing from conventional ones in both methods and means, and independent of norms of international law regarding the armed conflict/war. However, that does not mean that this new type of conflict is any less dangerous. Although belonging to the virtual sphere, cyber-attacks can leave considerable physical consequences. This article employs a comparative analysis of approaches to this topic, and then considers the perspectives of further developments in the cyber warfare, namely if there are possibilities for cyber to become a separate branch of war-waging, or, if it will remain only an additional element of conventional warfare, as it has already become with the advent of the so-called “hybrid warfare”. This analysis represents a contribution to the discussion on the challenges of cyber in the future, providing a better insight into the potential challenges for our state in the present day and in the near future.

Key words: asymmetric threats, cyber space, cyber-attacks, cyber warfare, hybrid warfare

* Research Director, International and Security Affairs Centre – ISAC fund. E-mail: igor.novakovic@isac-fund.org.

** independent researcher and Masters candidate at the University College of London. E-mail: irina.rizmal@gmail.com.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past several years, cyber-attacks and cyber warfare became some of the most employed terms in debates on the future of conflicts and developing new approaches to security. Although in most countries decision-makers shaping modern international affairs increasingly place focus on “cyber” when it comes to security and defence policies, this field has not yet received enough attention in academic circles. In any case, cyber has been recognised by states as “the next big thing in security”, seeing investment primarily in offensive cyber capabilities and the establishment of military cyber units for nearly two decades now. On the other hand, the academic literature has focused on debates over the efficiency of cyber-attacks and whether these pose a genuine threat as a new, completely independent form of warfare or not. In Serbia today, as is also the case when it comes to other asymmetric threats, this debate has been only somewhat opened, both in expert circles as well as in the public sphere.

The wider public in Serbia “became aware” of the challenges of cyber warfare with the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, with the advent of the term “hybrid warfare”. This term is employed primarily by the “Western” media to describe Russia’s engagement in the conflict in Ukraine, highlighting Russia’s activities in the cyber sphere as one of its elements, focusing primarily the spread of disinformation as well as inflicting damage to strategic, viz, key infrastructure, critical for the functioning of the Ukrainian state. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) defines hybrid war as a blend of conventional and unconventional, regular and irregular, and information and cyber warfare.⁴⁰⁵ Hybrid warfare, therefore, implies exploiting the full-spectrum (or some of its parts) of modern warfare and is not restricted solely to conventional means.⁴⁰⁶ In this context, cyber warfare is understood as one option further complementing conventional warfare, enabling conflicts between states to also take place in the cyber sphere. However, the question arising is whether cyber warfare can exist as an independent form of warfare, autonomous from conventional forms? In this paper, we try to provide an answer whether there is a chance for such developments. The underlying hypothesis is that cyber-attacks will, in the near future, most likely remain a complimentary tool for conventional interstate conflicts, that is, that it will mainly be employed within the wider concept of hybrid warfare. Independent

⁴⁰⁵ Van Puyvelde, Damien. Hybrid war – does it even exist?. NATO Review. <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/Also-in-2015/hybrid-modern-future-warfare-russia-ukraine/EN/> (accessed March 14, 2017).

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

cyber-attacks will be present in smaller numbers, but will take place in controlled conditions, with the aim of the attacker to achieve a specific effect (panic, intimidation, deterrence, and the like), without the use of conventional forces. In order to test the hypothesis, we consider several approaches to the question of cyber warfare, primarily within the context of how they relate to conventional, Cold War forms of war-waging. For the purpose of this paper, focus is placed solely on cyber-attacks between states, directed towards information systems, networks and the information resident on them⁴⁰⁷, which can be independent or feature as elements of an attack in which conventional methods are also employed.

DEFINING CYBER WARFARE

To date, only a limited number of authors attempted to explain the nature of cyber-attacks, with no clear conclusion on what the nature of these is to be like in the future.⁴⁰⁸ From a historical perspective, every technological development produced new concepts that had become core for national security thinkers. After air power, nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, and the definition of space as a potential conflict domain, ‘cyber’ has become a new buzz word in security literature. Although the initial creators of the Internet, as a global network introducing cyber as a phenomenon, saw only the positive aspects in terms of networking and easier exchange of data, cyber also brought on a sheer volume of new security challenges and threats, among other, the threat of interstate conflict in the cyber sphere. There is general agreement that cyber-attacks pose a genuine threat to national security, branded as a state’s “perfect strategic weapon”, creating new ways of going to war.⁴⁰⁹ A mere overview of changes in how leading world powers, as well as international political and security organisations, approach this field, suggests significant preparations for potential conflicts in this sphere are underway. Estimates show that over 140 nations are developing offensive cyber capabilities, while a

⁴⁰⁷ Iasiello, Emilio. Are Cyber Weapons Effective Military Tools? *Military and Strategic Affairs* 7 no.1 (2015), 24

⁴⁰⁸ See Libicki, Martin C. Cyber War as a Confidence Game, *Strategic Studies Quarterly* no. 5 (2011); Liff, Adam P. Cyberwar: A New ‘Absolute Weapon’? The Proliferation of Cyberwarfare Capabilities and Interstate War. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 35 no.3(2012); Rid, Thomas. Cyberwar and Peace. *Foreign Affairs* 92 no.6 (2013); Iasiello, Are Cyber Weapons Effective Military Tools?; Adams, John A. Jr. *Cyber Blackout: When the lights go out-Nation at Risk* (Friesen Press, 2015)

⁴⁰⁹ See Geers, Kenneth. Sun Tzu and Cyber War (NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2010); Libicki, Cyber War as a Confidence Game; Schmidt, Eric & Cohen, Jared. *The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of People, Nations and Business* (John Murray Publishers, 2013); Segal, Adam. *Cyber Blackout: When the lights go out-Nation at Risk*

significant number of countries are also building military cyber units.⁴¹⁰ The United Kingdom was the first country to officially confirm it is developing “a full spectrum military cyber capability, including strike capability”⁴¹¹. Clarke and Knake define cyber warfare as “unauthorized penetration by, on behalf of, or in support of, a government into another nation’s computer or network, or any other activity affecting a computer system, in which the purpose is to add, alter, or falsify data, or cause the disruption of or damage to a computer, or network device, or the objects a computer system controls”⁴¹².

It seems, however, that this definition is too wide, as not all conflicts between states can be considered as acts of war, varying both in approach as well as intentions, intensity and, most certainly, consequences. In this sense, Singer and Friedman explain that, while drafting the UN Charter, things like “the interruption of postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communications” were addressed and although considered as serious, were nevertheless not defined as an act of war.⁴¹³ Joseph Nye believes that only acts that have effects that “amplify or are equivalent to major kinetic (conventional) violence”⁴¹⁴ can be considered as acts of cyber war. Singer and Friedman believe there are two criteria deciding whether a specific attack can be considered an act of war. The first is whether the attack featured an appropriate level of force corresponding to conventional war, while the second is the existence of orientation and measurability, that is, the existence of a “directed and deliberate connection between causes and consequences”. In other words, there needs to be a clear indication that a given attack is part of a wider approach of a given state aimed at compromising the functioning a target state’s systems, including the security of its citizens, and that the amount of force used corresponds to that in conventional warfare.

However, even when fulfilled, it is questionable whether these criteria are enough for provisions of international law to come into force, as it is extremely challenging to apply these to conflicts in cyberspace. Starting with the Charter of the United Nations (UN) which sees interstate conflicts as violating territorial integrity and sovereignty of one state by another state or

⁴¹⁰ Iasiello, Are Cyber Weapons Effective Military Tools? 54

⁴¹¹ Statement of the UK Defence Minister Philip Hammond, New cyber reserve unit created. UK Ministry of Defence. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/reserves-head-up-new-cyber-unit> (приступљено 25. мај 2017).

⁴¹² Clarke, Richard A. & Knake, Robert K. *Cyber War. The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It*, (Harper Collins e books, 2010) 109

⁴¹³ Singer, Peter W. & Friedman, Allan. *Cybersecurity and Cyberwar. What everyone needs to know*, (Oxford University Press, 2014) 124.

⁴¹⁴ Nye, Joseph S. Jr, Nuclear Lessons for Cybersecurity. *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 5 no.4 (2011) 21.

groups of states, in the case of conflict in cyberspace we are immediately faced with the problem of this definition's applicability. Cyber conflicts do not necessarily imply the use of physical force, nor do they inevitably take place in a specific geographical space (although they can leave consequences).⁴¹⁵ Some authors define different instances when cyber-attacks can be defined as an act of war, that is, when international law can be applied. Most notable is the "Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare", put together by international law experts of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence following the famous cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007.

However, despite the existence of such a document, there is a lack of will at the international level to accept the principles it suggests. It is important to note that cyber is still a new field in which states are still experimenting and exploring new capacities and opportunities it opens, especially in the offensive domain, posing thus as the "new gunpowder" of the twenty-first century.⁴¹⁶ States do not want to share information about their capacities and activities in the cyber sphere, which is why it is extremely difficult to mobilise political will at the international level to significantly regulate the use of cyberspace, at least in the near future. On the other hand, some states, like Russia, actively advocate for international regulation of cyberspace, that is, conclusion of new agreements regulating activities within this sphere, while, according to Clarke and Knake, the United States of America (USA) are the main opposition of such a process.⁴¹⁷ As long as cyberspace remains unregulated, it will be difficult to define specific types of cyber-attacks in international relations carried out independently, without the use of other methods of war-waging – as concrete attempts of cyber warfare.

CYBER WARFARE IN RELATION TO CONVENTIONAL CONFLICTS IN THE COLD WAR ERA

The greatest challenge for analysing the phenomenon of cyber warfare is the fact that examples of attacks carried out against states in the cyber domain have been relatively rare to date. Most conscientious are the following: attacks against governmental websites and financial institutions in Estonia in 2007; Israeli attack on Syrian air defence systems, that is, the military air

⁴¹⁵ Singer & Friedman, *Cybersecurity and Cyberwar. What everyone needs to know* 124

⁴¹⁶ Peter Round, director of capability, armament and technology at the European Defence Agency, cited in Cyber security directive held up in face of "Wild West". Euractiv. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/cyber-security-directive-held-up-in-face-of-wild-west-internet/> (accessed May 25, 2017)

⁴¹⁷ Clarke & Knake, *Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It* 106

traffic control the same year; Russian attack on governmental and media websites and financial institutions in Georgia in 2008; the allegedly American-Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities through planting the “Stuxnet” worm in 2010; North Korean attacks on South Korea in 2009, 2011 and 2013 and the Russian attack on Ukrainian electric grids in 2015. This leaves us with relatively limited material for detailed analysis. The only possible way in which the nature of cyber warfare can be examined at present is thus to compare certain parameters of conventional warfare from the last period prior to the development of cyber weapons (tentatively, Cold War warfare), with the characteristics of known cyber-attacks characterised as instances of cyber war in the media. These parameters include: attribution or the potential to identify the attacker; signalling and deterrence; giving up on first use; and the length of conflict.

Attribution. Providing “evidence” that a state initiated an attack is still practically impossible to do with certainty, which leaves attribution, or the detection of the perpetrator of a cyber-attack, as an often complicated task. The attacker has at his disposal plenty of opportunities to “cover his tracks” on the network. Attacks are usually conducted over a network of computers controlled through a virus or worm, a so-called botnet network of devices (zombie network) commonly situated at a different territory from that of the attacker and “unaware” of participating in the attack. Furthermore, states are still developing capacities for cyber warfare in secrecy, and it is mainly in secrecy that they also carry out attacks on other states, making it difficult to determine who the attacker is, unless the state itself takes responsibility. To date, the majority of states suspected of carrying out cyber-attacks have denied taking part, and only detailed, digital “forensics” can provide limited indication and mainly circumstantial evidence. For example, during the cyber-attack on Estonia in April 2007, the surrounding context suggested the attack came from Russia. Namely, in February the same year a dispute broke out in Tallinn between radical Estonians and ethnic Russian over the preservation of a monument dedicated to the Soviet Army in the city’s centre, culminating in late April 2007. The monument was not demolished, being dislocated instead, but the dispute caused serious tensions with Russia, who did not look favourably to such a revision of the past. During the crisis’ culmination, internet websites of around a hundred of key institutions, organisations and public service providers in Estonia – one of the most networked countries in Europe and the world – were swamped with access requests to such an extent that some servers stopped working and shut down, that is, they were hit with a

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack.⁴¹⁸ It was later determined that the attack involved over a million devices, the greatest DDoS attack ever seen until then. Estonia pleaded to NATO for help, whose experts tried to determine with whom the “infected devices” communicated during the course of the attack. “Digital forensics” determined that the central computer managing the botnet network was located in Russia and that the programme code was written on a “Cyrillic keyboard”.⁴¹⁹ Although the Estonian government publicly claimed Russia was behind the attack at the very outset, and despite experts concluding that the epicentre of the attack was in Russia, there have been no direct consequences, as “NATO’s political leaders judged that the cyber-attacks were not an act of war”⁴²⁰. Moscow denied involvement in the attack on Estonia, while some government officials, after learning that experts had determined the attack originated in Russia, admitted it was possible that “patriotic-minded Russians, angered by Estonia’s actions, had taken the matter into their own hands”. This episode in itself shows how difficult it is to unequivocally determine responsibility in the case of a cyber-attack. What this also means is that, with the lack of attribution, retaliation outside of the cyber sphere is virtually impossible, as it is practically impossible to create the political conditions to label a country as the culprit for a given cyber-attack, not to mention interpreting the attack as an instance of cyber warfare.

Signalling and deterrence. When it comes to signalling and deterrence, possibilities for states are limited due to several obvious obstacles for successful application of such approaches in a way made possible with conventional and nuclear weapons during the Cold War. The first obstacle is certainly the fact that the process of capacity development for waging wars in cyberspace is carried out in secrecy in most cases. The second is the fact that in the case of cyber-attacks, there is no awareness of how potentially dangerous such attacks are, that is, there is still no “demonstration effect” as was the case with nuclear weapons and their use on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.⁴²¹ As citizens are mostly unaware of the dangers stemming from the cyber sphere, it is potentially difficult to use both signalling and deterrence, that is, it is difficult to convince publics that such a conflict would be

⁴¹⁸ Clarke&Knake, *Cyber War. The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It*, 14

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

⁴²⁰ Singer& Friedman, *Cybersecurity and Cyberwar. What everyone needs to know* 122-123. However, a direct consequence was the creation of the previously mentioned “Tallinn Manual” and, according to the authors, NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division made a short film about this event titled “War in Cyberspace”.

⁴²¹ Clarke &Knake, *Cyber War. The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It* 92

“expensive”.⁴²² In effect, as public awareness on the risks and threats of potential future conflicts in the cyber sphere is low, public pressure on decision-makers, partly necessary for a successful strategy of deterrence, is still lacking. A third obstacle is the fact that cyber weapons can mainly be used only once, meaning the opponent can generally develop defences from such weapons following the first attack⁴²³ by building up and updating their own systems (and also share these with others). Therefore, states are reluctant to use the most sophisticated and possibly most dangerous cyber weapons they own, which could, in case of full-blown war, combined with conventional tools, potentially bring an advantage. The fourth obstacle is the fact that in the case of cyber weapons it is difficult to even predict the effect these could achieve in a potential conflict (which is a crucial aspect of communication for signalling and deterrence), for two reasons. First is the matter of what sort of defensive, that is, offensive capacities the state which is a potential target has at its disposal, whether it is defensively strong enough to deter or reduce the strength of the attack, and to what extent can its offensive capacities inflict damage on the attacker during a potential counter-attack. Capacity development in the cyber sphere opens unexpected new opportunities for smaller states, too, as a relatively cheaper and more accessible source of relative power compared to conventional types of attack. This enables militarily less developed states to develop capacities to inflict significant damage upon larger states. As a result of all factors listed, attacks in the cyber sphere are (still) mainly of lower intensity (and if directed against states, it is primarily to do with retaliation for political decisions and moves in the physical world), while states rather prepare the ground and “sow” weapons that can, potentially, be used in the case of “a more serious conflict”. The second reason is the fact that one country’s defences are not dependent solely on the creation of domestic defence capacities, but also on the “interconnectedness” of the state as such. In other words, unlike conventional weapons, the effects of which can be clearly predicted as these are generally equal everywhere (while the consequences certainly depend on the defence of those attacked and preparedness for the attack), in the case of cyber there is significant difference in the context of applicability of cyber-attacks on each state. The more a state is “interconnected”, the greater the opportunity for a cyber-attack to have effects, and thus signalisation and deterrence make sense. Therefore, cyber warfare is, as a sophisticated branch of war-waging, best used

⁴²² Segal, *The Hacked World Order: How nations fight, trade, maneuver and manipulate in the digital age* 29

⁴²³ Clarke & Knake, *Cyber War. The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It* 94

against states that are largely “interconnected”, that is, where the key systems – both military and civilian – are automated and dependent on management via networks. As a result, states with the greatest cyber capacities are also most likely to be targets, although these will, expectedly, also invest in cyber defence the most. The limited opportunities of using cyber warfare, solely on “interconnected” territories, significantly limits its use value as a potentially key or even a self-sufficient branch of warfare. Hence both signalling and deterrence also have quite a small use value, except when it comes to defence capacities.

In this sense, new trends have come to the fore lately, when it comes to signalling and deterrence, seeing representatives of states, instead of communicating the development of specific cyber weapons and the consequences these may bring, primarily focus on strengthening cyber defence capabilities. As US Deputy Secretary of Defence, William Lynn III, stated, “deterrence will necessarily be based more on denying any benefit to attackers than on imposing costs (for an attack) through retaliation”⁴²⁴.

However, cyber-attacks can be used to deter opponents from activities in other domains, outside of the cyber sphere. An example of this is the allegedly American-Israeli “Stuxnet” worm attack in 2010 on Iranian uranium enrichment facilities, which were practically destroyed and a clear message to Iran to give up on this programme sent. The already mentioned Russian attack on Estonia can also be interpreted as a form of deterrence, not from an attack on Russia per se, but from disputes with the ethnic Russian population in Estonia. Such attacks, if successful, can send a strong enough signal to deter certain states from specific activities, although this is rather far from using strategies of signalling and deterrence in the case of cyber warfare as such.

First use of weapons. Finally, what cyber-attacks have brought about is the revisiting of the role of states as unitary actors. Despite international organisations such as the UN, EU, NATO and OSCE working on common responses to the challenges of cyber warfare, states are increasingly developing their own military cyber commands and investing in establishing their own, independent, offensive cyber capacity. In this sense, the development of the sphere and importance of cyber inverted traditional approaches to security towards an “each state for itself” framework. Instead of contemplating a Cold War-like ‘No First Use Declaration’, as we have seen, states are specifically focused on such first use in the cyber sphere, which may

⁴²⁴ Cited in Segal, *The Hacked World Order: How nations fight, trade, maneuver and manipulate in the digital age* 83.

cripple the opponent and disable the systems that could otherwise be used to launch a counter-attack.

Time dimension and conflict. When it comes to the time dimension of conflicts, cyber conflicts and cyber wars cannot be seen in the context of classic conflicts where a clear line can be drawn between the state of war, or the duration of conflict, and peace. Each of the abovementioned attacks was only the peak of a series of activities most likely unfolding way before the conflict started, only to have the final manifestation taking place following contextualisation of the problem. That is, anticipating a problem in the future, states that carried out the cyber-attack, most likely penetrated “enemy systems” way before the manifestation phase, implanting viruses, worms and logic bombs. At the time of crisis outbreak, the time of actual use, these tools had been activated, or saw their effect increased to the maximum, in order to reach the desired effect. Therefore, cyber warfare actually enables the situation in which, in the words of Joel Brenner, former head of counterintelligence under the US Director of National Intelligence, we are “(...) in a constant state of conflict among nations that rarely gets to open warfare (...) and we have to get used to is that even countries like China, with which we are certainly not at war, are in intensive cyber conflict with us”⁴²⁵. Therefore, conflicts in cyber space constantly unfold and do not necessarily have negative implications for interstate relations at a given moment. Their real purpose (aside from intelligence activities and industrial espionage efforts) is to create the preconditions for the moment of conflict eruption, when the cyber sphere could be employed as one of the domains where the conflict would unfold and where there is a possibility that one side would have a key advantage.

HYBRID CONFLICTS AND CYBER WARFARE

The use of cyber weapons is far more visible and effective when employed in parallel with other kinetic, that is, conventional arms. In such cases, attacks in the cyber sphere are primarily used for disabling defence systems of both conventional and cyber defence in part or in their entirety, by spreading propaganda through attacks (which can be of various types) on websites of institutions and the media, intimidating civilian populations through the destruction or disabling of critical civilian infrastructure, and so on. In this sense, for example, the Israeli cyber-attack on Syria in 2007 was used for disabling air defence, as a result of which the air attack on

⁴²⁵ Cited in Singer& Friedman, *Cybersecurity and Cyberwar. What everyone needs to know* 121.

installations was suspected to have been used for nuclear arms development that followed the next day encountered no resistance. In fact, it was completely unexpected.⁴²⁶ Similarly, the Russian 2008 attack during the war in Georgia, launched simultaneously with the conventional conflict, had significant effects in terms of spreading propaganda and panic by attacking media and government websites. In both cases, cyber was a useful tool for one of the parties to the conflict, bringing about a desired outcome in both cases. The use itself was relatively painless, since neither government, due to ongoing conflict, had the need to conceal its actions. This means that cyber warfare will, in any case, almost certainly continue to manifest itself through hybrid conflicts.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen in this paper, interstate conflicts limited exclusively to the cyber sphere currently unfold in parallel with normal, everyday interstate relations. As a parallel dimension, cyber makes limited conflicts in the cyber sphere possible, while at the same time maintaining unhindered political and economic cooperation in the physical world. These do not grow into war, nor are they generally seen as such, because, in spite of generally reasonable doubt, it is extremely difficult to carry out attribution. Cyber weapons are generally not used for strategies of signalling and deterrence, primarily because states are unsure of their own strength, or that of their opponents in the cyber sphere, and most importantly, there is rarely awareness among the publics of opposing countries on the potential consequences of cyber-attacks and how serious these can be. However, it is clear that cyber-attacks will certainly remain an element upgrading conventional warfare, significantly complementing and increasing its effects, primarily related to civilian populations, but only to a limited extent. In other words, it is very unlikely that cyber will become a key or even a self-sufficient branch of warfare in the near future, but will primarily be used as a complementary force in ongoing conflicts. Even if attacks do take place, these will primarily be of a demonstrational character (signalling and deterrence) for limited, indirect goals.

However, if we look back, cyber, as a new form of international conflict, appeared on the scene only a little over a decade ago, coming fully into the spotlight in 2007. In such a short period, this potential form of conflict

⁴²⁶ Clarke&Knake, *Cyber War. The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It* 10

has more than demonstrated its ability to become a far more serious testing ground for future wars than it is today.

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SAJBER RATOVANJE: NOVA VRSTA RATOVANJA ILI DODATNI ELEMENT KONVENCIONALNOM RATOVANJU

Igor Novaković*

Centar za međunarodne i bezbednosne poslove – ISAC fond,
Beograd, Srbija

Irina Rizmal**

student postdiplomskih studija na University College of London,
Velika Britanija

Apstrakt: Sajber napadi predstavljaju novu vrstu bezbednosne pretnje stvorenu napretkom na polju informacionih tehnologija, koja ima potencijal da preokrene dominantno shvatanje sukoba. Kako je pretnja relativno nova i ubrzano se razvija i menja, teško je predvideti forme njenog daljeg razvoja i potencijalne načine iskazivanja konfliktima. Međutim, treba imati u vidu da je već danas sajber prostor označen kao domen ratovanja od strane i Evropske unije i NATO, ali i od Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. U članku su razmotreni načini promene konflikata sa pojavom ovog novog domena, koji se razlikuju od standardnih po sredstvima i pristupima, i koji praktično ne zavise od međunarodno-pravnih normi koje se tiču oružanog sukoba, odnosno rata. Međutim, to ne znači da je ova vrsta sukoba manje opasna. Iako pripadaju virtuelnoj sferi, sajber napadi mogu da ostave znatne fizičke posledice. U članku je primenjena komparativna analiza dosadašnjih pristupa ovoj tematici, a potom su i razmotrene perspektive daljeg razvoja sajber ratovanja, odnosno da li postoje mogućnosti za dalji razvoj u pravcu posebne grane ratovanja ili će sukobi u sajber prostoru ostati samo dodatni element konvencionalnim vrstama ratovanja, kao što su već postali pojavom hibridnog rata. Ova analiza predstavlja prilog razmatranju prirode sajber izazova u budućnosti, i samim tim omogućava bolji uvid u potencijalne bezbednosne izazove za našu državu danas i bližoj budućnosti.

Ključne reči: asimetrične pretnje, sajber prostor, sajber napadi, sajber rat, hibridni rat.

* igor.novakovic@isac-fund.org.

** irina.rizmal@gmail.com

**ASYMMETRIC THREATS AND SECURITY OF THE
WESTERN BALKANS WITH A SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

Duško Vejnović*

European Defence Center, Banja Luka,
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Predrag Obrenović**

European Defence Center, Banja Luka,
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Abstract: The prospect of large-scale armed conflicts in the future is reduced to the lowest possible level. However, all forms of extremism, political, religious, cultural, radicalism, terrorism, etc., have appeared as a consequence of inequalities, primarily sociologically studied, that have emerged in international relations at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. The emergence of extremism has allowed the strengthening of the religious and national identity that led to the collapse of multicultural and multinational states primarily through internal ethnic and religious wars. Based on all of the foregoing, the aim of this paper is to show how new forms, such as radicalism, extremism, terrorism, organized crime, corruption, ethnic and religious intolerance, migration threaten and affect the security of the Western Balkans, and therefore Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state that was and is facing a large number of new threats to its security.

Key words: threat, extremism, radicalism, terrorism, ethnic and national identity, organized crime, criminality.

INTRODUCTION

The unexpected developments in international relations after the Cold War were almost everyday occurrence. They are characterized by a number of uncertain situations in various regions of the world, among which the region of the Western Balkans is particularly emphasized. They were of such an intensity that they led to a serious suspicion of the previously established and practiced forms of international relations and required their re-examination.

* defendo@blic.net

** predragobrenovic@yahoo.com

Therefore, it is not surprising that the whole world today is experiencing a deep sense of insecurity and that today nobody can say that he is safe, or clearly formulate the nature, sources, patterns and boundaries of endangering individual (human), state and global security. A situation has arisen where uncertainty has become a norm and a matter of frustration. For this reason, the optimism that appeared at the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century, which was based on the ending of cold-war threats and a new wave of democracy, appears today, as a list of desires and stunning illusions.

Modern theories of international relations and security point to serious and various dilemmas about the interpretation of newly emerging categories of the current state of international security and the solution of new challenges, and they are even more uncertain about their future development. A picture of international relations and security, which was described by Rozenau in the first years after the Cold War in the following words, "whatever may be the arrangements that have replaced the bipolarity of US–Soviet rivalry, they are at best incipient structures and, at worst, they may simply be widespread disarray"⁴²⁷ is more current today than almost three decades ago when Rozenau formulated it. Therefore, all comparisons of factors and parameters of international relations and security before and after the Cold War clearly indicate that there has been a profound change in the global political and security scene, including the nature of the security threats and risks.

Social changes in the last two decades of the twentieth century carried on the wings of neoliberalism have led to a turbulent situation in all the spheres of human society, and especially in security, politics, economy, law, etc. These changes have enabled the creation of networks of dangerous, continuous, ubiquitous and less visible challenges, threats, whose changing nature and multiplied variations make it difficult to define them. Today, the literature deals with the division and classification of new challenges and threats, and according to one of the classifications, current challenges and threats to global security are classified into: terrorist (national and transnational scale), proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; threats from unstable regimes; local and transnational networks of crime, trafficking in human beings, weapons, narcotics and, which is the most common phenomenon, combined threats, in which transnational networks of ethno-religious fanatics integrate more extreme elements of destructive power, all of which are today called asymmetric threats to individual, regional and global security.

⁴²⁷ Cited by, Simić R. D., *Nauka o bezbjednosti*, Javno preduzeće Službeni list, SRJ Beograd, Belgrade 2002, p.21

ASYMMETRIC THREATS AND WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY

Before we consider how the asymmetric threats affect the security of the Western Balkans, we will define the concept of the Western Balkans as well as the concept of threats and asymmetric threats in the context of this paper.

The Balkan Peninsula was named after a mountain in Bulgaria called Stara planina. The name of this mountain has its roots in the Greek word *Aimos*, or Latin *Haemys*, meaning the mountain. Accordingly, on all old geographical maps, this mountain range is marked by its Latin, or Greek, name. The name of the Balkans is of Turkish origin and also, denotes the mountain. On geographical maps, the word Balkan as the mark of the Stara planina in Bulgaria appeared only in the 17th century, but taking into account the fact that Turkish tribes had lived in this area even before the Ottoman penetration, the name Balkan as the name for the mentioned mountain, was probably adopted well before that time. Serbian geographer Jovan Cvijic, who published in 1918 in Paris his work "South Slavic countries: The Basics of Anthropogeography" played the most important role in the revitalization of the name of the Balkans. This Cvijic's work enabled the creation of a homogeneous geographical regionalization that emphasizes a "logical unity" of the territory of the newly formed state (the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), where distinct peoples of different historical and cultural identities live. In contemporary international relations and a large number of EU documents relating to the Western Balkans region, it primarily refers to all countries created after the breakup of the former Yugoslavia excluding Slovenia, but including Albania. Despite its frequent use in international relations, the term Western Balkans cannot be found in any political dictionary as yet. So, when it comes to the concept of the Western Balkans, we must bear in mind that this is a new concept trying to describe the strategy of the European Union and other international regional organizations towards the region of the former Yugoslavia, with the exception of Slovenia and the addition of Albania, "... which is then identified with a geographical indication of the same spatial scope"⁴²⁸.

Traditional security implied that military threats and subversions are the greatest threats to society and the state, today, security challenges, risks and threats are rather internal, than external and rather non-military, than military,

⁴²⁸ Milardović, A., *Zapadni Balkan: pojam, ideje i dokumenti o rekonstrukciji Balkana u procesu globalizacije*, Pan liber, Osijek, Zagreb, Split, 2000, p. 37

originating more from non-state actors, than from sovereign states. Today, our world is dominated by political threats, economic threats, man-caused environmental threats and social threats. Modern phenomena of security threats have many characteristics, which are inherent to several threatening phenomena: unlawfulness, immorality, multicausality, multifacetedness, indicativity, individuality, dynamism, elasticity, interactivity, (un)measurability, (un)predictability, multiplicity of standards of qualification and treatment, destructiveness, complexity and insufficient research. In security practice, the following features of most contemporary security problems can be observed:

- Organization, as more and more organized actions of several carriers of security threats;
- There is a noticeable trend in which the massive scale of the threatening phenomena is inversely proportional to the degree of their destructiveness;
- Constant increase in the volume and content of the occurrence of security threats, as well as the number of their carriers.
- There are no states or societies that are not faced with some threats of a natural, social or technical and technological character;
- More and more threatening phenomena are prepared in one, and implemented in another country; the perpetrators of threats are persons from several countries, or are from one country and operate in the territory of several states;
- Mobility, reflected in the easy and fast spatial mobility of threat carriers using modern traffic telecommunication means;
- High profitability, through illegal realization of enormous revenues. Thus, organized crime has become an informal center of transnational financial power;
- Increase in destructiveness, i.e. increasing detrimental consequences for international security, security of the state, society and individuals;
- Violence, closely linked with destructiveness, relates primarily to the increasingly brutal application of threats. It implies an increase in violent crime;
- Latency, or the secrecy of the actions of security threat carriers, which leads to their "invisibility" and the creation of the illusion that they do not exist;
- A large dark number that, as a result of latency, implies that a large number of threatening events remain unknown to security institutions.

- Insufficient efficiency of national and international informal and formal social reactions, which occurs as a consequence of these characteristics, and others.

Under the term threat in the context of this work, we refer to, in the broadest sense, a conscious intention to cause damage to a person, property or right, in order to compel the object of threat to fulfill an imposed behavior. The threat is also an intention to inflict damage or punishment, as well as an indication of unwanted and unpleasant event, or the possibility of inflicting evil. Likewise, threat is a kind of pressure from a position of force intending to intimidate or exhaust the opposing side, in order to force some concessions, and can also be defined as the capacity to increase an intention.

Modern theorists of international relations and security estimate that classical military conflicts between states, i.e. so-called conventional wars in the coming period have a very small possibility of occurrence, while on the contrary, the non-military forms of security threats arising from unconventional forms of threats such as terrorism, interethnic conflicts within multiethnic and multireligious states, organized crime, population migrations caused by war conflicts and environmental degradation, gain more and more importance on the daily basis and claim more and more victims. The new threats of the unconventional and non-traditional nature emphasize the problem of the so-called "non-military threat to security", or an armed conflict that does follow international conventions and rules, and, as such, can be considered "irregular" or asymmetrical.

In modern theory, for now, there is still no commonly accepted definition of the term asymmetric threat. Analyzing various works by both Western and Eastern authors, it is evident that asymmetric threat is defined as a set of diffuse threats coming from very weak and technically poorly equipped subjects. One such definition of the term asymmetric threat is "..... A threat emanating from the potential use of dissimilar means or methods to circumvent or negate an opponent's strengths while exploiting his weaknesses to obtain a disproportionate result"⁴²⁹. However, such and similar definitions lead to wrong perception, because in modern conflict, not only technically weaker opponents resort to asymmetric threats. Countries that are the world's leaders in technological development, in their defense doctrine, anticipate asymmetric approaches to the opponent's side. For the purpose of confirming such a thesis, analyses of Western authors, increasingly emphasize the

⁴²⁹APP – 6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, NATO Standardization Agency, 2010., *cmp. 2-A-20*

example of the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China, who published a number of studies on the use of asymmetric threats and the possibility of an asymmetric action in a possible conflict with the West. Such an approach envisages the use of various computer attacks (hacker attacks), the use of mass media communications, urban guerrilla warfare, and similar approaches to a possible global conflict. This approach is based on the knowledge that, in any possible conflict with a potential opponent on the same or higher level of technological development, victory cannot be expected if only classic methods of warfare are used. By applying these measures, which are also referred to in literature as "unlimited warfare", we see an increasing desire of technically extremely advanced states to respond very energetically and efficiently to the threats of opponents that use all scientific and technical achievements in development of new types of weapons. There is a growing tendency to define asymmetric approach to a new conflict, global or regional, as a regular and systematic use of any strategy, tactics, weapon, or specially trained personnel, to neutralize or fully eliminate the objective advantage of the opposing side. Such an approach leads to the perception of asymmetric threats as a way of action with the goal of full elimination of opponent's objective abilities and advantages simultaneous with exploiting its current disadvantages through the use of means, techniques and methods, the use of which has so far not been customary in a conflict.

The most common division of asymmetric threats that we encounter in literature is the division by source, area of origin and form. Among the sources of asymmetric threats, according to Western authors, are individuals, various extremist groups and states. Observing this division, one could say that the only clear situation is with the state. Specifically, analyses and studies of Western authors, especially American, deal more and more with the term *rogue state*, a rebellious state. This term in these analyses primarily refers to countries that, through their activities, help various terrorist activities across the globe. However, it could be said that in the latest analyses of Western authors, all countries of the world that do not fit into the proclaimed system of the values of the neoliberal world are beginning to be called rogue states. Asymmetric threats can arise in all five areas where conflicts occur, including land, water, air, space, and, of course, the youngest among them, the cyberspace. Asymmetric security threats to certain subjects of international relations often appear in forms that are very difficult to distinguish from each other, intertwined and difficult to separate from each other. However, in the literature we can encounter various forms of asymmetric threats that can be divided into terrorism with all of its forms, organized crime, low intensity wars, various economic and other constraints directed towards individual subjects of international relations.

Among asymmetric conflicts or as some contemporary theorists call them "wars of the 4th generation", such as Lind, and Echeverry, the centrally located place has terrorism in all its manifest forms, as an extreme form of the use of armed actions that is usually undertaken by the military, economic, political weaker side. However, in addition to terrorism, organized crime and corruption, the greatest security threat for the countries of the Western Balkans are ethnic frictions frozen in the past, or unresolved territorial disputes between Serbs and Croats, Serbs and Albanians, Albanians and Macedonians, Bosnians and Serbs. So, in the upcoming period, there will be pronounced problem of extreme nationalism and religious extremism, and a realistic danger of renewal of ethnic-religious conflicts if it is the interest of great powers. In other words, the process of violent resolution of frozen conflicts could be triggered. In addition to frozen ethnic-religious conflicts, the Western Balkans as a whole is also facing the following distinct threats: instability, as a product of the transition processes of transition to market economy, which is further aggravated by the economic lag of this region behind the developed world. By its geostrategic position, this region is located on the important routes between Europe and Asia (which are at the same time the routes for transportation of oil, gas, but also illegal trade in weapons, narcotics, human trafficking, migration routes, etc, and these routes can also be used for transit of terrorist groups and assets for carrying out terrorist actions, which has happened in the past). In this area, there are still efforts for secession, autonomy and independence of certain ethnic groups, which, with a relatively high concentration of military capacities, makes the overall security situation more complicated. Finally, as we have seen, the question of the impact of asymmetric threats on the security of the Western Balkans directly correlates with economic and political conditions, as well as with issues of demonstration of economic and political power. It seems, however, that this close relationship is more pronounced in small and poor state communities (where a gap is created between small and economic and political elite and an entire army of the unemployed and impoverished citizens, as it is the case in the Western Balkans) than in politically organized and economically superior countries. An illustration of this thesis can be Bosnia and Herzegovina, which officially opted for the path to Europe and Euro-Atlantic integration. The road, it could be said, is obviously long and difficult, but on this path Bosnia and Herzegovina moves at the speed of a snail, not only that it does not help the problems to be solved, but seems to be more than the country can deal with. Therefore, the next part of the paper will be dedicated to the security threats to Bosnia and Herzegovina as a key country for the security of the Western Balkans.

ASYMMETRIC THREATS TO SECURITY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Bosnia and Herzegovina is an indispensable factor in geopolitical and geostrategic relations in the Western Balkans. The lack of political culture and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina is clearly evident, and the need for quick and effective reforms, as well as the building of state institutions' systems, as regulated by the Dayton Peace Agreement, is an imperative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international community which, through numerous international institutions, and primarily through the Office of the High Representative (OHR), has an impact on state and entity institutions for the purpose of implementing the Agreement. The Dayton Peace Agreement is an international document, which must be consistently implemented. This agreement provides a realistic framework for the construction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a complex community of two equal entities and three constituent peoples. Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks have lived together for centuries in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and now no one has the right to claim it exclusively for himself. In the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, significant results have been achieved, first of all in the strengthening of peace, reconstruction and creation of preconditions for normal living. Respect and protection of human rights, strengthening of democratic institutions of government, as well as of political culture, dialogue, tolerance, democracy, strengthening the rule of law and the increase of responsibility of those performing public functions should be priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Bosnia and Herzegovina will be a modern country when it effectively organizes people's real-life interests, control the chaos of interests and translate the irrational conflict of interest into harmony. The basis of a modern, legal, democratic and civilized Bosnia and Herzegovina should be strict rules of conduct and citizens' awareness that they must be respected. This requires universal wisdom in the organization and leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state. In order to keep Bosnia and Herzegovina's stability at a higher level, it is necessary to reduce repression and to strengthen the educational role of the state. The basic functions and goals of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state should be to strengthen the power of the community, to strengthen the individual's freedom in the community and to reduce repression and to strengthen the educational role of the state. Aristotle often emphasized "... that the motive of legality is general, and the motive of illegality is an

individual benefit"⁴³⁰, just as Plato for good countries takes those governed by law, and for the poor ones those where the law is not respected in governance. Unlike most of the countries in the world, that have a greater number of external threats to their own security relative to the internal ones, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it seems to us that the situation is drastically different. Namely, internal threats to security are stronger and more pronounced than those that come from abroad. The internal threats to security of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, as we have seen, is an extremely complex state, additionally burdened by certain internal problems that are a consequence of the four-year long ethnic and religious war, include:

- Residual political and social animosities, arising as a result of the war from 1992 to 1995 which, even after two decades since the end of the war, have not been suppressed, but, on the contrary, every day they are more and more distinguished and stimulated by various elements advocating various types of nationalist extremism;
- Slow implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement;
- The problems of political transition, which result in slow development of efficient and effective executive, legislative and judicial authorities;
- The problems of transition to a market economy, which result in a low level of domestic and foreign investments, favor the gray economy and the black market;
- Slowness in the implementation of successful privatization process, technological lag of production capacities and uneven dynamics of war reconstruction of damaged infrastructure;
- Porous borders, which enable the trafficking of narcotics, weapons and humans, and facilitate successful concealment and transit of international criminals and terrorists;
- The problems of unemployment, which cause the highly educated young people to leave the country, which contributes to the increase of general poverty, social stratification and social instability; an increased poverty among the retired people and other groups, requiring more social care;
- Excessive quantities of weapons and ammunition in inadequate storage facilities, or held by civilian population, as a result of war events;

⁴³⁰ Cited by: dr. Vejnović, D. and Obrenović P., *Defendologic (protective, security, defensive) Challenges in International Relations with a View of Bosnia and Herzegovina* (2nd revised edition in honor of the Anniversary of Defendology), Grafoparir DOO, Banja Luka, 2016, p. 213.

- Large number of landmines and unexploded ordnance on the territory of the whole country, which presents a physical danger for the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while at the same time it is an obstacle to the development of agriculture, tourism and foreign investments; and
- Various environmental challenges, including natural and technological catastrophes, problems with the management of technological, communal and military waste, degradation of arable land and forest resources, water and air pollution, and slow development and application of the accepted standards and conventions for environmental protection also present a serious danger to the social, political and any other stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In order to successfully respond to threats to its own security and thereby contribute to building the security capabilities of the Western Balkan region, Bosnia and Herzegovina's function as a state should enable the coexistence of individual interests, through rules to prevent, reduce and mitigate conflicts. Social control, control of individuals, groups and society as a whole is an imperative for Bosnian society as a whole. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a modern state, should provide its citizens with the maximum possible freedom, guarantee and ensure a minimum of justice and equality, and a certain degree of general social security. It should minimize coercion and maximize consent, in given socio-historical conditions. To that end, all peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina should cooperate on:

- Prevention and ending of tensions and crises as a prerequisite for lasting stability. This implies the conclusion and application of mutual multilateral and bilateral agreements and the implementation of local measures to eliminate existing potential causes of conflict,
- Implementation of a mature, democratic political process based on free and fair elections, based on the rule of law and full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right of people to belong to national minorities, the right to free and independent media, legislative institutions accountable to their electoral units, independent judiciary, and the deepening and strengthening of civil society,
- Creation of peaceful and good neighborly relations in the region by strictly respecting the principles of the Helsinki Charter, building trust and reconciliation. Also, cooperation should be enhanced and the work of the forum on regional confidence-building measures and mechanisms for cooperation in the field of security stimulated,

- Creation of active market economies, based on sound macro-politics, as well as markets open to expansive foreign trade and private sector investments, efficient and clear customs and commercial regulatory regimes, the development of strong capital markets and diversified ownership, which implies privatization, which will expand a circle of prosperity for all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
- Development of economic cooperation in the region, as well as cooperation between the region and other parts of the world and Europe, including free trade zones, promotion of unhindered contacts among citizens,
- To combat all forms of asymmetric threats to individual and regional security, such as organized crime, corruption, terrorism and all forms of extremism and illegal activities,
- Prevention of violent displacement of population caused by war, persecution and civil conflicts, as well as migration caused by poverty,
- Ensuring the safe and free return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes. By sharing the burden of refugees with them, Bosnia and Herzegovina will in this way help to the countries of the region,
- Creation of conditions for full integration into political, economic and security structures of their choice.

CONCLUSION

Taking into account the current state of affairs on the world stage, we can say that large scale war-fighting between states or military alliances, as we know it from the history of human civilization, is mainly a thing of the past and currently minimized. Although there is a very small possibility of the outbreak of great wars, new forms of endangering individual, regional and global security, or as they were lately named, asymmetric threats, have caused the majority of the world's population to feel unsafe and vulnerable, which leads to more closed societies, in spite of technological achievements in exchange information. Those closed forms of the Archaic spirit are certainly an obstacle for broader integration processes and tolerance among the three peoples and their cultures in Bosnia and Herzegovina: instead of democratic negotiations and common life, each nation highlights its own freedom-loving traditions and national heroes. Fear of the living governs the law, fear of the dead governs the myth—the dead as the moral policemen of society. As long as this idea is the guiding principle in the development of society in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not only will threats to its security be reduced to the minimum, but also will be even more prominent and every day stronger.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is an indispensable factor in geopolitical and geo-strategic relations on the territory of Southeast Europe. The lack of political security in Bosnia and Herzegovina is evident, which can have unexpected security challenges across the region. Therefore, Bosnia and Herzegovina must be in need of quick and effective reforms and the building of state institutions' systems, as regulated by the Dayton Peace Accords, with the aim of securing long-term peace and stability. The Dayton Peace Agreement is an international document, which must be implemented consistently. It provides a realistic and currently the only framework for the construction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a complex community of two equal entities and three constituent peoples. Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs lived together for centuries in Bosnia and Herzegovina and now no one has the right to claim it exclusively for himself today. In the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, significant results have been achieved, first of all in the strengthening of peace, reconstruction and the creation of preconditions for a normal life. Respect and protection of human rights, strengthening of democratic institutions of government, strengthening of political culture, dialogue, tolerance, democracy, building a rule of law and raising accountability in the performance of public functions should be priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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**ASIMETRIČNE PRETNJE I BEZBEDNOST ZAPADNOG
BALKANA SA SPECIJALNIM OSVRTOM
NA BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU**

Duško Vejnović*

European Defence Center, Banja Luka,
Bosna i Hercegovina

Predrag Obrenović**

European Defence Center, Banja Luka,
Bosna i Hercegovina

Apstrakt: Perspektiva velikih oružanih sukoba u budućnosti smanjena je na najniži mogući nivo. Međutim, svi oblici ekstremizma, političkog, verskog, kulturnog, radikalizma, terorizma i slično pojavili su se kao posledica nejednakosti, pre svega sociolološki razmatranih, koje su se pojavile u međunarodnim odnosima krajem 20. i početkom 21. veka. Pojava ekstremizma omogućila je jačanje verskog i nacionalnog identiteta koji je doveo do kolapsa multikulturalnih i multinacionalnih država pre svega kroz unutrašnje etničke i verske ratove. Na osnovu svega navedenog, cilj ovog rada jeste da pokaže kako nove forme, poput radikalizma, ekstremizma, terorizma, organizovanog kriminala, korupcije, etničke i verske netolerancije, migracije, ugrožavaju i utiču na bezbednost zapadnog Balkana, te stoga i na Bosnu i Hercegovinu kao državu koja se suočavala i još uvek se suočava sa velikim brojem novih pretnji njenoj bezbednosti.

Ključne reči: pretnja, ekstremizam, radikalizam, terorizam, etnički i nacionalni identitet, organizovani kriminal, kriminal.

* defendo@blic.net

** predragobrenovic@yahoo.com

CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES OF SERBIA AND ASYMMETRIC SECURITY THREATS*

Dragan Đukanović**

Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: The current foreign policy position of Serbia is deeply linked to its security. In this sense, despite proclaimed European orientation of Serbia, there are many security challenges related to, primarily, strengthening of the "non-EU" actors in the political sense, such as Turkey, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China. Current NATO enlargement in the region of the Western Balkans, i.e. Montenegro (June 2017), will also contribute to the new role and position of the Republic of Serbia in regional and European relations.

Therefore, the author will try to offer an answer to the question whether Serbia needs a long-term foreign policy strategy, as a document that will prioritize the external level and establish a clear positioning of the country in the contemporary international relations. In this regard, it will be noted how Serbia can be positioned both in regional and in European, as well as at the global level. A special emphasis is placed on the observation of the numerous forms of asymmetric threats to the security in the Western Balkans and in Serbia. Therefore, the author analyses how the current migrant crisis, as well as the phenomenon of terrorism and organized crime, affect the definition of the main goals of foreign policy activities of the Republic of Serbia.

Serbia is a member of Global Anti-Terrorist Coalition after 2001 and on the regional level manages to be a credible and active participant primarily for its European partners. Therefore, Serbia has received confirmation of its role from the current administration in Berlin, which is very important in the context of the country's entry into the membership of the European Union.

Key words: foreign policy, Serbia, strategy, asymmetric threats, terrorism, organized crime.

* The paper has been carried out within the project *Political Identity of Serbia in regional and global context* of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, No. OI 179076 for the 2011–2017 period.

** dragan.djukanovic@fpm.bg.ac.rs

INTRODUCTION

The foreign policy of the Republic of Serbia, unlike other countries in the surroundings, was not "rounded up" and defined in a separate strategy document after 2000.⁴³¹ Namely, unlike almost all neighboring countries, Serbia failed to define its foreign policy priorities, goals and tasks, among other things, thanks to the fact that there was no real basis for a wider social consensus on its core determinants.⁴³² On the other hand, although the Serbia's foreign policy has not been defined within a specific strategic document, its dynamics in the past decade has been linked to the monitoring of world events, and in particular the reality of asymmetric threats to security. This was particularly noticeable after September 11, 2001, (the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington).⁴³³ At that time, the Republic of Serbia, still a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, joined the newly formed anti-terrorist coalition, which was confirmed on several occasions by signing of certain legal acts, as well as concrete activities.⁴³⁴ Moreover, the authorities in Belgrade have repeatedly pointed out that they are firmly oriented towards the suppression of terrorism, as well as organized crime.⁴³⁵

CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY POSITION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

The geostrategic position of the Republic of Serbia has been conditioned by the fact that it is potentially highly susceptible to certain asymmetric challenges of security, primarily to terrorism, and in the past several years to the migrant crises.⁴³⁶ The obvious pro-European orientation of the authorities in Belgrade has often been, in the course of the past seventeen years, i.e. since the country's involvement in the Stabilization and Association Process while still a part of the FRY, preceded by numerous internal

⁴³¹ Đukanović, Dragan. 2010. Spoljnopolitičke orijentacije država Zapadnog Balkana: uporedna analiza. *Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka* (4), 4: 295–313.

⁴³² Đukanović, Dragan. 2016. *Balkan na posthladnoratovskom raskršću (1989–2016)*. Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Službeni glasnik: 107–137.

⁴³³ See: Vlada Republike Srbije. 2009. Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti Republike Srbije: 18–21.

⁴³⁴ U. S. Department of State. 2015. *Country Reports on Terrorism*. Chapter 2. Country Reports: Europe Overview. Dostupno na: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257516.htm> (05.05.2017).

⁴³⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁴³⁶ Mikac, Robert i Dragović, Filip. 2017. Masovne migracije: izazovi, posljedice i put naprijed. *Forum za sigurnosne studije – FoSS* (1), 1: 130–152.

reconsiderations.⁴³⁷ In that way Serbia's position was conditioned with revitalizing, i.e. the re-animation of certain actors, which in the historical context were influential in the Balkans. In this regard, it should be pointed out that the role of the Russian Federation, the Turkish Republic and the People's Republic of China is increasing in the Balkans, and especially in its western part.⁴³⁸ Consequently, in this part of Europe, where the constructors of the modern geopolitical concept entitled the "Western Balkans" have not yet completed the "job" (the European Union and the United States), any scenario that excludes the accelerated entry of these countries into the European Union, but also into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (with the exception of "military neutral" Serbia) can actually lead to a significant instability. The "inclusion" of the Western Balkans in modern Europe, as well as its departure from the status of the evidently deepest European periphery, will help in real terms to establish a long-term period of peace and regional stability.⁴³⁹

The region of the Western Balkans, however, is not completely headed this way, bearing in mind the problems concerning an internal and very deep crisis, first of all in the European Union, as well as, in recent times a rather unpredictable foreign policy of the United States after assuming the power of President Donald Trump in January 2017.⁴⁴⁰ The Union is obviously still unable to actually absorb the Western Balkans as a whole due to the problems caused by Brexit, the unresolved challenges of the massive arrival of migrants and the deepening of its own institutional and financial crisis, although its officials are aware that postponing this process can lead to regional instability in the southeast of Europe.⁴⁴¹

The role of Serbia is quite predictable because its foreign policy position has not changed over the past few years, and this country has again emphasized the priority of its own membership in the European Union and

⁴³⁷ Đukanović, Dragan. 2016. *Balkan na posthladnoratovskom raskršću (1989–2016)*. op. cit.: 68–72.

⁴³⁸ Đukanović, Dragan and Gjurovski, Marjan. (Re)Balkanization of the Western Balkans: New Challenges on Security in the Region, in: Đorđević, Branislav, Tsukimura, Taro and Lađevac, Ivona (eds). *Globalized World: Advantage or Disadvantage*, Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics, Doshisha: Global Resource Management, Doshisha University: 87–107.

⁴³⁹ Đukanović, Dragan. 2015. Zapadni Balkan – stalni usud evropske periferije. *Međunarodni problemi*. (67), 4: 349–364.

⁴⁴⁰ Haockenos, Paul. 2017. Trump's Foreign Policy is more than Chaotic Mess. *International Politics and Society*. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Dostupno na: <http://www.ips-journal.eu/> (07.05.2017).

⁴⁴¹ *Blic*. TANJUG. 2017. Han: Na Balkanu dovoljna samo jedna varnica. Beograd: 11. februar 2017. Dostupno na: <http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/han-na-balkanu-dovoljna-samo-jedna-varnica/jwtj3sq> (07.05.2017).

more intensive links with some of the most influential actors of this organization (primarily with the Federal Republic of Germany). However, it is undisputed that such a foreign policy course can be called into question if the Russian Federation, as the "traditional partner" of Serbia, continues to have an essentially different opinion from the European Union and the United States on issues of relations in the contemporary Europe.⁴⁴² This type of influence was visible during the crisis in Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea peninsula in 2014. If the deepening of the crisis in the relations between Moscow and Brussels arises during the coming period, this could also mean that the Russian Federation might expect from Serbia to stop the process of European integration. How strong Moscow's role in the Western Balkans is, in a wider sense, was visible during the process of Montenegro's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty, when the authorities of the Russian Federation on several occasions indicated that they opposed its NATO membership.⁴⁴³

Turkey's policy towards the Western Balkans shows, on the other hand, a sharp imbalance towards the local actors. With undecided support for the Albanian-Bosniak "factor" in the Balkans and not so good attitude towards other actors (Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro), the Turkish role in this part of Europe is discredited in a certain way, despite the fact that through several trilateral initiatives a poor state of bilateral relations was temporarily overcome.⁴⁴⁴ However, the results of these efforts were very limited without such a range that would substantially make a breakthrough in the bilateral relations between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as between the authorities in Zagreb and Sarajevo.⁴⁴⁵ Strengthening of the authoritarian tendencies of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the strengthening of pan-Islamic elements in this country will only indirectly and directly destabilize the Western Balkans, which in the foreign policy concept of Turkey has been gaining an even more important position in the past decade. In fact, the increasingly uncensored neo-ottomanism of the authorities in Ankara, attempts to influence the authorities in Tirana, Sarajevo and Pristina, as well as with Albanian actors in Macedonia, can produce unrealistic self-perceptions of the Albanian and Bosniak political elites, in terms of their

⁴⁴² Đurić, Maja. 2016. Koketna Srbija: Namigivanje Rusiji, u zagrljaju Brisela. *NI*. Beograd: 26. decembar 2016. Dostupno na: rs.n1info.com/a217220/Vesti/Vesti/Srbija-izmedju-Istoka-i-Zapada.html (07/05/2017).

⁴⁴³ Iv. P. 2017. Rusija pokušava da destabilizuje Crnu Goru. *Pobjeda* (73): 18385. Podgorica. 1. mart 2017: 3.

⁴⁴⁴ Đukanović, Dragan. 2016. *Balkan na posthladnoratovskom raskršću (1989–2016)*. op. cit.: 132–137.

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibidem*.

exclusive attachment to the patronage of Turkey towards them, and in reality the absence of ideas about European origin and ethnogenesis of these peoples.⁴⁴⁶

It is precisely in this context that Serbia's foreign policy, in spite of the recognition of the importance of good relations with the Republic of Turkey, and above all because of its undeniable influence in the Bosniak minority corpus in this country, cannot, in the long run, rely on Ankara's sincere efforts to improve relations in the Western Balkans. Turkey, therefore, will continue its own political influence, which, however, will not correspond with an increased degree of economic investment. On the other hand, the People's Republic of China will try to secure the opportunities, primarily on its most sensitive Balkan part⁴⁴⁷ through the projected new "Silk Road". This primarily relates to the space between the most important Greek port of Piraeus (which is in majority Chinese ownership) along the territory of the Republic of Macedonia, towards the Republic of Serbia, and then towards Hungary and the "heart of Europe", i.e. Central Europe and the Federal Republic of Germany. In this sense, the most significant problems can be the instability in Macedonia, both on the interethnic plan of "heated" relations between the Macedonians and Albanians, as well as the rather radical conflict between the ruling VMRO-DPMNE and the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia, which goes beyond traditional political framework.

Despite the objectively reduced geostrategic position due to the surrounding of the member states of the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance, Serbia can improve this situation to a certain extent, primarily due to the aforementioned Chinese project. However, ideas that would involve the sale of some of the existing ports or the construction of a special Chinese port on the Danube River would certainly not be welcomed by the Federal Republic of Germany, but also by Austria.⁴⁴⁸ Therefore, this suggests that this more favorable geopolitical (re) positioning of Serbia in the context of the Chinese "Silk Road" has also important limitations.

Serbia, as noted, does not actually have a defined short-term or long-term foreign policy strategy. Also, over the past few years, and especially after the escalation of the crisis in Ukraine (after 2014), it has not made progress in its own contractual obligation to harmonize its foreign policy with the

⁴⁴⁶ Davutoglu, Ahmet. 2014. *Strategijska dubina: Međunarodni položaj Turske*. Beograd: Službeni glasnik: 273–298.

⁴⁴⁷ Poulain, Loic. 2011. China's New Balkan Strategy. *Central Europe Watch*. (1), 1: 1–7.

⁴⁴⁸ B92. TANJUG. 2015. Port on Danube to be built with Chinese Company. Belgrade: April 17, 2015. Dostupno na: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/business.php?yyyy=2015&mm=04&dd=17&nav_id=93844 (07/05/2017).

instrument of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union.⁴⁴⁹

When it comes to the global level of relations, Serbia fully supported all efforts in the fight against terrorism. Its role is well recognized, both at the level of bilateral relations with the United States, and in the work of numerous international organizations (United Nations, Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, etc.). Also, during the past and in the current decade, Serbia participated in a large number of joint actions to detect threats related to terrorism and organized crime. Some of these activities were based on bilateral and multilateral activities, and some were realized through the coordination of activities within certain regional initiatives.⁴⁵⁰ The existing foreign policy challenges of Serbia, aimed at the potential repositioning of the country in a very dynamic and exceedingly unpredictable regional, European and global environment, will not affect the country's essential commitment to fighting all asymmetric security challenges, and primarily the international terrorism. It is important to point out that with Montenegro's entry into the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on 5 June 2017 the Western Balkans will undergo a significant change in the security sense.⁴⁵¹ In this way, the circle of the "central" Balkan countries, which are not members of this alliance, will be significantly narrowed (Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina). On the other hand, this can mean that the Western Balkans will be perceived differently in the wider Western public, i.e. not in a traditionally rather bad way.⁴⁵²

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES OF THE EXTERNAL POLICY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA AND ASYMMETRIC SECURITY THREATS

Serbian foreign policy has been facing great challenges over the past several years. Namely, it first had to give a certain response to the events in

⁴⁴⁹ Đukanović, Dragan. 2015. The Process of Institutionalization of the EU's CFSP in the Western Balkans Countries during the Ukraine Crisis, *Croatian International Relations Review*. (21), 72: 81–106.

⁴⁵⁰ Perry, Valeri. 2016. *Initiatives to Prevent/Counter Violent Extremism in South East Europe: A Survey of Regional Issues, Initiatives and Opportunities*. Sarajevo: Regional Cooperation Council: 11–21.

⁴⁵¹ Đukanović, Jelena. 2017. Istorijsko DA putu na Zapad. *Pobjeda* (73), 1844. Podgorica. 29. april 2017: 2–3.

⁴⁵² Đukanović, Dragan. 2015. Videnja Balkana u savremenom evropskom geopolitičkom okruženju. u: Kolarić, Dragana (ur.). *Suprostavljanje samvremenim oblicima kriminaliteta – analize stanja, evropski standardi i mere za unapređenje*. Beograd: Kriminalističko-policijska akademija: 245–255.

Ukraine in 2013 and 2014, but also to harmonize the activities related to the current migrant crisis. In fact, this crisis is just one of the unpredictable aspects of asymmetric challenges to the national security of Serbia, but also of the entire region. The entry of a large number of refugees and migrants, with no valid potential for their identification, caused certain problems among Serbian citizens, as well as an objective obsession with the occurrence of organized terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, investigations into individual terrorist attacks that took place in the course of 2015 and 2016 in the European Union show that their perpetrators were passing through the "West Balkan route", or via Turkey, Greece, via Macedonia and Serbia to Austria, Germany and other countries of Western Europe.⁴⁵³

Only the united action of the interior ministries of the countries of the Southeastern Europe, with the exception of Greece, in March 2016 succeeded in de facto stopping the extremely large wave of the entry of refugees and migrants into the European Union due to the strong coordination.⁴⁵⁴ Certainly, in this action, there was a significant coordination between foreign ministries of the countries in the region, with the primary goal of coordinating numerous operational activities to stop the penetration of a large number of refugees in the Union.

Unfortunately, in 2015 even the Western Balkans has found itself in problems related to the phenomenon of terrorism. In that context, the potential ethnic Albanian rebellion in Macedonia in the vicinity of Kumanovo, which was aimed at a substantial interruption of the traffic communication between this country and Serbia was successfully suppressed. Moreover, it was quite evident that the eventual success of this action of Albanian insurgents would cause the coordination of similar actions in the wider Western Balkans region, including the western parts of Macedonia and southern Serbia.⁴⁵⁵ Also, the assault of a radical Islamist on the Republika Srpska Interior Ministry members during the same year was a serious threat to the already shaky and unstable state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴⁵⁶ The aim of this act of a member

⁴⁵³ *HRSvijet.net*. 2016. Balkanska ruta – put migranata, terorista i oružja. Dostupno na: <http://hrsvijet.net/index.php/vijesti/133-svijet/45333-balkanska-ruta-put-migranata-terorista-i-naoruzanja> (06.05.2017).

⁴⁵⁴ *Vesti online*. 2016. EU zatvara balkansku rutu za migrante?. Frankfurt: 6. mart 2016. Dostupno na: <http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Svet/556732/EU-zatvara-balkansku-rutu-za-migrante> (22.04.2017).

⁴⁵⁵ B92. 2015. Zašto su teroristi ušli u Kumanovo? Beograd: 15. maj 2015. Dostupno na: http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/tema.php?yyyy=2015&mm=05&nav_id=992381 (22.04.2017).

⁴⁵⁶ *Newsweek*. 2015. Teroristički napad u Zvorniku: Nedrin Ibrić ubio policajca i ranio dvojicu. Beograd: 28. april 2015. Dostupno na: <http://www.newsweek.rs/svet/49398-islamista-izvrzio-teroristicki-napad-u-zvorniku-i-ubio-policajca-foto.html> (22.04.2017).

of the Wahhabi movement was to show the deep unwillingness of the Bosniak-Muslim population in the eastern parts of the Republika Srpska to accept the full existence of this entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the following period, we will also be confronted with a wave of terrorist activities in the European Union, but it is not possible to expect the same radicalization of the population and the appearance of similar activities in the countries of the Western Balkans. Naturally, potentially smaller and punctual activities can occur in certain countries and areas of the Western Balkans, but without potential broader terrorist activities. In this sense, a considerable potential is the continuing incitement of Great Albanian ideas, which in the course of April 2017 led to the condemnation of both European Union officials and US ambassadors serving in the Western Balkans.⁴⁵⁷ Such very dangerous scenarios, which do not have significant support from the leading factors of world politics, can lead to instability in the Western Balkans, and above all in Macedonia, then in the south of central Serbia, as well as in northern Kosovo and certain parts of Montenegro.

In this respect, the Republic of Serbia reacts quite restrained and with the absence of additional radicalization of the local circumstances. Moreover, its foreign policy position implies the condemnation of the formation of ethnic mega-states in the Western Balkans, and indirectly gets the support of the European Union, as well as the United States of America. In this role of the actor that influences the stabilization and normalization of the Western Balkan relations, Serbia has managed to build a completely new foreign policy image.

This fact was significantly confirmed in 2015, i.e. when Serbia held the presidency of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), at a very difficult time when still ongoing Ukrainian crisis fundamentally shook the relations of the global "West" (The European Union and The United States) and the "East" (The Russian Federation).

Also, one of the very important activities related to the asymmetric threats to Serbia's security is organized crime. It was prominent in the Western Balkans over the last months and went beyond the existing interstate borders. In the previous period, when it comes to organized crime in the Western Balkans, it was primarily related to illegal trafficking in drugs, weapons and humans. On the other hand, in recent years, organized crime in the sphere of

⁴⁵⁷ See: TANJUG. 2017. Skot: Velika Albanija 'mala grudva', ali prteti da postane 'politička lavina'. Beograd: 26. april 2017. i MONDO/Agencije. 2017. Ambasador SAD: Neoprezne priče o 'ujedinjenju'. Beograd: 21. april 2017. Dostupno na: <http://mondo.rs/a1001756/Info/Srbija/Ambasadro-u-Pristini-Delavi-SAD-protiv-neopreznih-prica-o-ujedinjenju-Kosova-i-Albanije.html> (05.05.2017).

economy and economic activities in the Western Balkans has become more pronounced. Organized crime is a very significant challenge for the future of the entire Western Balkans region because some predictions show that in the upcoming period, it may become so dangerous that its structures and bearers will actually dominate the political and other spheres in the countries of this part of Europe.⁴⁵⁸ In order to prevent such a negative scenario, Serbia should give additional impetus to numerous regional initiatives dealing with the suppression of organized crime and corruption.

There are, of course, other problems that can affect the foreign policy position of Serbia in the coming period. There are problems related to the potential collapse of the very important regional economic entities, such as the Croatian Agrokor, which can cause serious economic problems due to potential mass dismissals of employees. Therefore, there are coordinated activities of some line ministries of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Slovenia in order to prevent significantly negative scenarios. The sudden release of around 60,000 employees in all countries of the region would constitute a considerable socioeconomic "bomb".⁴⁵⁹ That is why the coordination of activities in the sector is vital for the countries of the Western Balkans region in order to prevent major social riots.⁴⁶⁰ It should also be noted that the ruin of this economic giant alone would drag into its numerous partners and thus cause a spiral of economic uncertainty, not only in Croatia but also much wider.

In addition, there are also the dangers of occurrence of certain types of environmental terrorism in the region, which could also cause widespread consequences. In this respect, the constant coordination of Serbia's activities with other Western Balkan countries, as well as the forums for interstate cooperation / regional initiatives, is essential. One should not neglect the numerous announcements of potential ecological migrations, which would include the mass movement of the population from Africa to Europe due to drastic changes in climatic conditions.

A dynamic foreign policy activity of Serbia in the inter-state cooperation in the Danube region is also very important, where a significant

⁴⁵⁸ The National Intelligence Council. 2008. *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*.

⁴⁵⁹ Šošarić, Tomislav. 2017. Regija osluškuje šta se događa s Agrokorom. *Al Jazeera Balkans*. Sarajevo: 12. mart 2017. Dostupno na: <http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/regija-osluskuje-sta-se-dogada-s-agrokorom> (22.04.2017).

⁴⁶⁰ NSPM. 2017. Srbija, Slovenija, BiH i Crna Gora formiraju ministarski tim oko Agrokoru. Beograd: 19. april 2017. Dostupno na: <http://www.nspm.rs/hronika/srbija-slovenija-bih-i-crna-gora-formiraju-ministarski-tim-zemalja-oko-agrokora.html> (22.04.2017).

engagement of the country should take place precisely on strengthening the components of cooperation with the countries of Central Europe, primarily gathered around the Visegrad Group (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary) but also with Austria, as an actor strengthening his own role in the Southeast Europe. The use of all the possibilities of the Danube cooperation is not quite adequately exploited when it comes to Serbia and its international and foreign political position. Serbia, during the "escalation" of the migration crisis in 2015, was largely a "victim" of a rather xenophobic policy of this circle of the European states towards migrants, which also threatened that the country would be in a rather unsafe zone with a large number of dissatisfied migrants to whom the access to the European Union was denied, but also the return to Macedonia, Greece and Turkey.

CONCLUSION

It can be concluded that over the past five years, Serbia has managed, although faced with a number of challenges, to improve its own foreign policy image, but also to stay on the course of European integration and the improvement of very complex relations in the Western Balkans and South East Europe. Moreover, in spite of the real absence of the foreign policy strategy, Serbia has managed to maintain equidistant *vis-à-vis* very influential actors of international politics, especially in 2014 and 2015, and also to prevent that such a position causes significant problems.

Nevertheless, future foreign policy activities of Serbia must be focused on the current challenges of potential asymmetric security challenges. A potential new escalation of the migrant crisis, if the current Turkish authorities decide to let through the new "wave" of refugees to Europe, should be followed by the emergency action of Serbia in coordinated foreign policy with Hungary, Croatia, and Austria. This potential challenge for Serbia's security, but also to the countries of the region, is very significant. Also, Serbia can further coordinate its activities with a wider environment, when it comes to the fight against terrorism. Religiously motivated terrorism can appear in certain forms in the Serbian environment, which also requires the coordination of activities with the European Union, but also with all neighbors. In particular, in this respect, the "vulnerable" areas are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, as well as the southwestern parts of Serbia and the northern parts of Montenegro.

Nevertheless, Montenegro's recent entry into the North Atlantic Alliance points to the fact that the Western Balkans region is not completely "forgotten" by the "West". On the contrary, after a fairly dramatic geopolitical game between the official Moscow and the „West“, during 2015 and 2016,

regarding the membership of this small Western Balkan and Mediterranean country into NATO, it turned out that the global conflict of interest in this part of Europe continues. This, in fact, implies the realization of a plan in which the United States, still de facto the most powerful country on the global level, sees the region of the Western Balkans as a part of Europe that needs to be fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community of states and permanently free from the influence of the Russian Federation and to a certain degree from other non-European actors.

Serbia's position in this respect, however, remains unchanged thanks to the proclaimed military neutrality in 2007.⁴⁶¹ However, after the end of the process of Euro-Atlantic integration of the whole region of the Western Balkans (in the perspective of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia) it is quite likely that from the official Belgrade will be expected to take a clearer distance from the Russian Federation and its increasingly visible aspirations when it comes to potential strengthening of Russian political influence in the Western Balkans. On the other hand, in the process of European integration, Serbia will be expected to make a more significant coordination of its foreign policy activities with the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. This process will also require an essential, not only a proclaimed, agreement with the European "foreign policy course", which implies a potential and final "selection" of one of the currently confrontational geopolitical sides (East-West). Of course, this could additionally affect the security of Serbia itself, bearing in mind the undoubtedly enhanced influence of certain global actors in Serbia, primarily the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the People's Republic of China.

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AKTUELNI SPOLJNOPOLITIČKI IZAZOVI SRBIJE I ASIMETRIČNE PRETNJE BEZBEDNOSTI

Dragan Đukanović*

Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu,
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Trenutna spoljnopolitička pozicija Srbije povezana je tesno sa njenom bezbednošću. U tom smislu i pored proklamovane evropske orijentacije Republike Srbije, pojavljuju se brojni izazovi vezani za, prevashodno, jačanje „ne-EU“ aktera u političkom smislu, a poput Republike Turske, Ruske Federacije ili Narodne Republike Kine. Štaviše, i nedavno širenje NATO u regionu, a pre svega na Crnu Goru (28. april 2017. godine), odraziće se suštinski i na poziciju Srbije.

Zato će autor pokušati da ponudi odgovor na pitanje da li je Srbiji neophodna dugoročna spoljnopolitička strategija, kao dokument koji će odrediti prioritete na spoljnom planu i utvrditi jasno pozicioniranje zemlje u savremenim međunarodnim odnosima. S tim u vezi on će istaći i način na koji Srbija može biti pozicionirana, kako u regionalnim, tako i u evropskim i globalnim razmerama. Poseban akcenat u radu je stavljen na brojne asimetrične oblike ugrožavanja bezbednosti u regionu Zapadnog Balkana, kao i u Srbiji. Zato se analizira koliko aktuelna migrantska kriza, potom pojava terorističkih aktivnosti i organizovanog kriminala zapravo utiču i na definisanje osnovnih ciljeva spoljnopolitičke aktivnosti Republike Srbije.

Srbija se uspešno nakon 2001. godine priključina svetskoj antiterorističkoj koaliciji, i na regionalnom planu uspeva da bude kredibilan partner pre svega svojih evropskih partnera. U kontekstu Srbije ona je potvrdila takve uloge dobila i od aktuelne administracije u Berlinu, što jeste veoma značajno u kontekstu ulaska zemlje u članstvo Evropske unije.

Ključne reči: spoljna politika, Srbija, strategija, asimetrične pretnje, terorizam, organizovani kriminal.

* dragan.djukanovic@fpn.bg.ac.rs

INFORMATION WAR AND ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS

Milan Miljković*

Office of the National Security Council and Classified Information
Protection of the Government of the Republic of Serbia,
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: The principles of “the new generation“ warfare, such as 1) from a war with conventional forces to specially prepared forces and commercial irregular groupings 2) from direct clash to contactless war, 3) from war in the physical environment to a war in the human consciousness and in cyberspace; 4) from symmetric to asymmetric warfare, indicate the topicality of *asymmetric conflict and information operations*.

This new concept of asymmetric warfare, which converts the ancient idea of “breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting“ into reality, constitutes an entire system of methods, tasks and units, whose ultimate aim is to exercise influence on perception and behaviour of the adversary’s leadership, population and international community on all levels.

Key words: new generation warfare, asymmetric conflicts, information operations.

„NEW GENERATION“ WARFARE FEATURES

Present-day conflicts differ from one another by structure of their participants, weapons used, forms and manner of operations carried out by units engaged. The experiences of NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia, which marked the beginning of an epoch of so-called contactless or long-distance wars, have not been extensively implemented in practice due to the limitations imposed by geographic and economic features of such war, given that the price of conflict generally plays an important role when choosing the manner in which to conduct military actions. During the operation in Lybia, a no-fly zone was established in parallel with a naval blockade in combination with the joint military actions carried out by private military companies from NATO member nations and the armed opposition formations. During the conflicts that took place in the Middle East during the “Arab spring“ mass media and social networks were used, as well as means and units of

* milan.miljkovic@nsa.gov.rs

information-psychological and information-technical warfare, so that a mobilizing capability of social networks came to light globally for the first time. After those events, it became clear once again that acquiring information superiority is a pre-requisite for a success of combat operations. The conflict in Syria has become a self-evident example of using hybrid methods. It featured concurrent implementation of conventional and non-conventional actions of both military and non-military character. In its initial phase, internal Syrian contradictions were transformed into the opposition military action which subsequently acquired an organized character with a help from foreign instructors and an active information support. Later on, terrorist groups, supplied and directed from abroad,⁴⁶² were engaged in the actions against the government troops.

An analysis of characteristic features and development tendencies of present-day conflicts shows that armed combat is an essential content of wars in the contemporary age and will do so in the foreseeable future. In some conflicts it is almost a conventional armed combat, whereas in others one side wages an armed combat in the form of counter terrorism operation while its adversary carries out operations carried by illegal and irregular armed formations and terrorist structures. On the other hand it should be mentioned that conflicts happening at the beginning of 21st century indicate that the emphasis has shifted to an extensive application of political, economic, diplomatic, information-based and other non-military measures for the use of force, also including protest potentials of population, which means a growing domination of asymmetric and non-conventional forms of conflicts, especially in the information domain.

As a consequence, modern warfare is based on the idea that the adversary's mind is the main battlefield of military and non-military contest. It aims to impose decisions and activities on the adversary's military and civilian population that are in line with the aggressor's interest, and to the detriment of the adversary's government and nation. As a result, new generations of warfare are predominantly information-based and psychological in nature, and thus conducive to information superiority, control over the adversary's units and armed systems, depressive state of mind and falling fighting spirit. The application of such operations reduces the need for engaging significant military forces in attack operations.

⁴⁶² V. Gerasimov, *The Value of Science in Anticipation*, VPK news, 27 February 2014. Accessed 2 July 2014, <http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632>. Translated and created by Dr. G. Scott Gorman, School of Advanced Military Studies

It can be concluded that although the recent military conflicts were based on known strategies, their extent along with a simultaneous operationalisation of asymmetric actions constituted a novelty in the military practice. It is for that reason that contemporary theoreticians suggest that the key difference between the conventional and “new generation“ warfares rests on a conceptual transition: 1) from direct destruction to direct influence; 2) from direct annihilation of the adversary to its inner decay; 3) from a war with weapons and technology to a culture war; 4) from a war with conventional forces to specially prepared forces and commercial or irregular groupings; 5) from traditional (3D) battleground to information/psychological warfare and war of perception; 7) from a compartmented war to a total war; 8) from war in the physical environment to a war in the human consciousness and cyberspace; 9) from symmetric to asymmetric war by simultaneous and coordinated implementation of political, economic, information, technological and ecological campaigns, and 10) from war in a defined period of time to a state of permanent war as a natural condition in every nation’s life.⁴⁶³

Asymmetric warfare has become an integral part of conventional combat operations. Rather than being intended for direct destruction of the adversary’s armed forces, the purpose of asymmetric warfare is, among other things, to inflict blows to the adversary’s military and civil information and communications structure, whereby place and role of information operations are brought to the fore.

ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Information operations are essentially of military origin, so that definitions of information operations are primarily found in security and military doctrinal documents of the Western nations and China whereas theoreticians in the Russian Federation use the term “information operations“ or “information war“ (информационная война).

Information operations are comprised of activities ranging from measures to prevent the adversary from exploiting information to those to ensure integrity, availability, and interoperability of friendly information resources. According to the *objective of action* information operations are

⁴⁶³ J. Berzins, Russia’s New Generation Warfare, October 11, 2016, [http://www.thepotomacfoundation.org/The New Generation of Russian Warfare](http://www.thepotomacfoundation.org/The%20New%20Generation%20of%20Russian%20Warfare)The Potomac Foundation.htm

divided into: 1) offensive information operations, and 2) defensive information operations.⁴⁶⁴

Offensive information operations imply use of different techniques with the support of intelligence factor with a view of disabling the adversary's leadership to make relevant decisions. The above-mentioned activities include operational security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic war, physical attack (destruction), as well as attacks on the computer network.⁴⁶⁵ The ultimate target of offensive information operations are the processes of human decision making.

In the Western doctrinal theory defensive informations are defined as activities applied for protection of one own's information and information systems. Defensive information operations are used to ensure access to timely, accurate and relevant information.

When considering the division of information operations according to the means of execution, it is important to take into account the approach of Russian theoreticians who take the view that information operations are conducted in the military, political, economic and social spheres, and are applied through a whole set of activities of relevance to the national security.⁴⁶⁶ Russian authors are of the opinion that the security of information sphere is a complex and an essentially multi-layered problem. It is also the object of interdisciplinary technological and humanitarian scientific reseraches.⁴⁶⁷ For that reason, Russian theoreticians argue that according to the resources used information operations can be divided into operations conducted by: 1) information-technical means (assailing national critical infrastructure facilities with cyber attacks), and 2) information-perceptive means (propaganda, adversary's perception management, disinformation, psychological operations and deception).⁴⁶⁸

⁴⁶⁴ Source: Arquilla J., Ronfeldt D.: „Mrežni i kiber rat“, RAND korporacija, an extract from the sudy published in *Comparative Strategy*, Volume 12, 1995. p.141-165.

⁴⁶⁵ According to: Joint Pub 3-13: Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, US Army Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998.

⁴⁶⁶ According to: Sinkovski, S.: „Informaciona bezbednost - komponenta nacionalne bezbednosti, Beograd“, *Vojno delo*, 2/2005, p. 49.

⁴⁶⁷ Petrović, L.: „Informaciona bezbednost - pravni, ekonomski i tehnički aspekt“, *Informaciona bezbednost 2012 – naučno-stručni skup*, Beograd, p. 3.

⁴⁶⁸ Thomas L. T.: “Russian Views on Information-based Warfare“, *Airpower Journal* (Special Edition 1996), pp. 25-35.

APPLICATION OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN THE PRESENT-DAY MILITARY THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Rather than being a new kind of war, asymmetric warfare is a method of waging war being present in the world history since the beginning of organized warfare; it has been taking on new forms of its operationalisation under present-day conditions. The understanding of asymmetry is reflected in one of the Chinese definitions of asymmetric strategy – its asymmetric feature relates to the use of different methods of ensuring supremacy over the adversary.⁴⁶⁹

Non-linear warfare, which represents a simultaneous combination and engagement of a number of military and non-military resources in a conflict, is closely related to the concept of asymmetric warfare. Non-linear warfare consists of various elements of conventional and non-conventional military actions, political and economic activities, irregular tactics and units, terrorist actions, including indiscriminate violence and duress, and also criminal actions.⁴⁷⁰

When it comes to the area of conventional warfare, the characteristic examples of using asymmetry in the contemporary military theory are as follows: the modernization of the People's Republic of China military, experiences from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Armed Forces operations during the conflict with NATO in 1999, and so-called "Gerasimov doctrine" (2013) created by General Valeriy Gerasimov, the Russian chief of the Generalstaff and the related experiences from its implementation during the recent conflicts in Ukraine.

ROLE OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN THE MODERNISATION OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (PLA)

The book entitled "Unlimited Warfare", which argues in favour of winning a victory over a potential adversary by attacking not only its armed forces but also all elements of its national power i.e. the adversary's political,

⁴⁶⁹ Reisdorff, Nicholas R., *Winning the Hundred Battles: China and Asymmetric Warfare*, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 2003, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁷⁰ Frank Hoffman, "Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars," (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007).

economic and information infrastructure represents perhaps the best example of the Chinese thinking of asymmetric warfare.⁴⁷¹

In the military sense, the Chinese understanding of asymmetry stems from the fact that despite its modernization over the last three decades, its military is still incapable of winning a military victory in the event of a direct conventional warfare with China's chief potential adversary - the U.S. Armed Forces, according to the Chinese standpoint. In this connection, instead of attempting to streamline all PLA branches, China has decided to combine modernization of particular branches of its military (thus giving priority to cyber operations units, airforce and the navy, and putting the land force in the last place) with development of specific methods of action against a potentially superior adversary based on the exploitation of vulnerabilities and deficiencies of potential adversaries. In the meantime PLA had to identify the areas of developing its capabilities that can be relatively quickly streamlined without investing large resources, and by which massive losses can be inflicted to the superior adversary. The above mentioned process represents the essence of developing PLA asymmetric warfare capabilities.⁴⁷²

Some Chinese analysts hold the view that there is currently no need for developing a modern mechanized army capable of opposing the U.S. armed forces. Instead, in PLA circles an information warfare concept is attached an increasing importance, which constitutes the core of the ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA). The Chinese information warfare concept is based on four components: 1) *delivering precise blows* - by using precisely guided weapon systems for attacking the adversary's command posts and communication hubs in order to paralyse its military forces on the battleground, 2) *electronic warfare*, 3) *psychological warfare and deception* - performing propaganda campaign with a view of undermining the adversary population's fighting spirit, attempts of influencing upon the adversary fighters' morale, and isolating a conflict (preventing the third party to engage in the conflict in question), and 4) *attacks on computer networks* - making direct assaults on the adversary's entire information structure that can be executed by asymmetric attacks and forces.⁴⁷³

The Chinese military doctrine puts an emphasis on use of asymmetric warfare against a superior adversary, and the key method of waging war is

⁴⁷¹ Liang, Qiao i Xiaosui, Wang, *Unlimited Warfare*, Beijing 1999.

⁴⁷² Barić S., *Vojne strategije i asimetrično ratovanje*, National Security and the Future, 4 (11) 2010. Zagreb. p. 12-163.

⁴⁷³ See Mulvenon, J. „The PLA and Information Warfare”. Published in: Mulverton, J H., Yang, Richard H., *The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age*, RAND, Santa Monica 1998., pp. 175-186.

information (cyber) warfare, which represents a way to deliver a decisive blow to the adversary without taking risks related to the use of weapon systems, application of which will cause unacceptable collateral damage.

Information warfare should enable the Chinese military to apply tactics called “sashoujian” (assassin’s mace)⁴⁷⁴ in the Chinese technical literature. This picturesque term describes application of weapon or tactics that deals a blow to the adversary by careful application of sudden calculated moves to bring about the change in the force ratio between the two adversaries. These strikes are based on ignoring customary rules of warfare in order to equalize the force ratio between the stronger and the weaker adversaries. Therefore, the matter concerns asymmetric warfare methods by which the stronger adversary should be dealt a decisive blow with an incapacitating effect.

Information (cyber) warfare is becoming a strategic alternative for China, taking into account its assessments that China will not prevail in a conventional military confrontation with the U.S. In this sense, China looks on cyber attacks and cyber espionage as components of an integral strategy by which it is planning to win the technically superior adversary.⁴⁷⁵

ASYMMETRIC-INFORMATION WARFARE DURING 1999 NATO BOMBING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (FRY)

The Yugoslav Armed Forces action during the 1999 NATO bombing in Kosovo and Metohija can be quoted as an example of the information and asymmetric warfare. Due to the impossibility of responding to NATO airstrikes, the Yugoslav Armed Forces resorted to asymmetric means to oppose the Alliance. In the course of the aggression it put to good use its own media, foreign journalists, security services and the Internet to influence the general public across the world and achieve its political objective - maintaining the national sovereignty and territorial integrity. In addition to turning to the Internet for propaganda purposes, it also served for carrying out operations in cyberspace in the form of distributed denial of Service attacks (DDoS). At the beginning of the bombing more than 2.000 virus infected

⁴⁷⁴ See: Bruzdinski, Jason E., “Demystifying Shashoujian: China’s “Assassin’s Mace” Concept”, *Civil-Military Change in China: Elites, Institutes, and Ideas after the 16th Party Congress*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College 2004., pp. 309-364.

⁴⁷⁵ M. Miljković, „Ocene SAD o sposobnosti Narodno-oslobodilačke armije Kine (NOAK) za izvođenje sajber špijunaže“, *Vojno delo*, Beograd, leto/2012., pp. 81-97.

emails were sent to NATO addresses.⁴⁷⁶ The Alliance websites also suffered cyber attacks during the second week of the war. In this way domestic hacktivists managed to temporarily incapacitate the above site by bombing it with *ping* attacks.⁴⁷⁷ Such attacks compelled NATO to provide extra material and human resources to improve the security of the computer systems, Moreover these attacks forced the U.S. Department of Defence to enact a regulation prohibiting the access to Serbian websites in order to prevent so-called “mapping” i.e. indentifying U.S. official websites.⁴⁷⁸ After the aggression was over, NATO experts released detailed researches on the information aspect of that conflict, which suggest that the Yugoslav Armed Forces won the information war, given that they managed to achieve information superiority during the conflict.⁴⁷⁹

ASYMMETRIC ASPECTS OF THE PRESENT-DAY MILITARY THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE RUSSION FEDERATION

So-called “Gerasimov doctrine“ (2013) by General Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, is a concept that applies the postulates of “new generation“ warfare which has brought about changes in terms of means and domains for carrying out military operations because it implies a whole-of-society approach and a shift towards use of asymmetric and non-military means, as well as non-traditional domains of warfare.

The core feature of General Gerasimov’s concept is a swift destruction, disarrangement or take-over of control over communications, economy, infrastructure and political institutions in order to disrupt the adversary’s command process. Experts assess that this concept represents a modern version of warfare as proclaimed by Georgii Isserson, a leading Soviet war theoretician before the World War II.⁴⁸⁰ General Gerasimov added to the Isserson’s concept the application of asymmetric and indirect actions by military-civilian components, special operations and information operations,

⁴⁷⁶ Hubbard Z.: “Information Warfare in Kosovo“, Journal of Electronic Defense, November 1999, Vol. 22, No. 11, p. 11.

⁴⁷⁷ A ping attack is committed by exposing a server to a large number of queries within a short period of time. As a result, the server gets overloaded with more queries than its envisaged capacity can handle, which causes a congestion outage of the computer system.

⁴⁷⁸ Harmon A.: “Serbs’ Revenge: NATO Web Site Zapped“, New York Times, April 1, 1999, p. A14.

⁴⁷⁹ Larsen A. W.: Serbian Information Operations During Operation Allied Force, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 2000.

⁴⁸⁰ Georgii S. Isserson, ‘The Evolution of Operational Art,’ translation Bruce W. Menning (Fort Leavenworth, SAMS Theoretical Special Edition, 2005) p. 38-77.

whose application aims to weaken the economy and destroy the adversary's key infrastructure in an area of operations.⁴⁸¹ Therefore the new operational concept is only a continuation of earlier concepts, however this time with an added application of asymmetric means not only in the physical but also in the information domain.

In order to attain the proclaimed aims of that concept, the Russian Federation and its Armed Forces have developed unique asymmetric units to apply the military and non-military means, such as special forces, proxy forces, civilian media and cyber units whose combined engagement will influence all adversary's actors, disturb its communications and destabilise the region where an operation is conducted in order to achieve the operational objective.

In practice, the application of the operational concept represents a purely non-military asymmetric warfare that comprises information, moral, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, legal and economic measures, as part of a more extensive operational plan. Their application aims to create favorable political, economic and military conditions, and adjust them on the terrain for the start of an operation. This includes generating discontent and alienating the adversary's population from national institutions by exploiting the issues of a low level of socio-economic development and a high level of corruption, as well as other open problems.

General Gerasimov gives the operational concept a descriptive name: "The role of non-military methods in the resolution of interstate conflicts".⁴⁸² It consists of six phases: 1) concealment of operation origin, 2) escalation, 3) outbreak of conflict, 4) crisis, 5) resolution of conflict, and 6) restoration of peace.

The above operational concept draws on military and non-military means that it employs simultaneously and rapidly across all physical and information domains (areas of combat actions) by applying asymmetric and indirect activities. By using information operations the attacker weakens and diminishes the adversary's combat abilities and readiness, creates chaos, seizes vital facilities and terrain and isolates the adversary's leadership. Although the concept includes the use of conventional force, which is superior and conducive to an almost certain victory, it is not implied *a priori*. A military conflict is considered and assessed as an undesirable activity conducted as required, and for strictly defined objectives and missions. This operational

⁴⁸¹ V. Gerasimov, *The Value of Science in Anticipation*, VPK news, 27 February 2014. Accessed 2 July 2014, <http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632>. Translated and created by Dr. G. Scott Gorman, School of Advanced Military Studies.

⁴⁸² Ibid.

concepts aims to win a psychological victory rather than to prevail in the physical domain. It is not desirable for a military action to have the lead role; instead, information operations are launched to achieve the second and third order effects in order to “seize“ areas being the object of the conflict.

Russian information operations during the military activities in Ukraine featured a high degree of asymmetry, sophistication and complexity. Instead of adopting and applying a single information operation strategy, the Russian military theory and practice point to the need to apply various and asymmetric strategies and techniques according to different target groups, adversary nations and armed forces.

CONCLUSION

The present-day military theory understands war as a continuous process, and treats a military operation as part of that process - its acute phase, but not the most important one as evident in the concepts of asymmetric and non-linear warfares. It is important to note that the term “continuous war“ implies the existence of a permanent adversary. In the current geopolitical situation and the information age the adversary system of values, culture, political system, ideology, moral and information systems constitute important “targets” and objects of action in such conflicts.

In modern conflicts, asymmetric actions have reached the point where they are extensively used thus enabling cancellation of the adversary’s advantage. Such actions include the application of special operation forces, information operations and the internal opposition tasked with creating an operational front within the entire inland territory of the adversary’s state.⁴⁸³ The application of asymmetric warfare leads to the situation where modern militaries are forced to engage in conflicts without front lines for which many of them are unprepared, given that they have been primarily trained in conventional warfare.⁴⁸⁴

The use of information means for achieving political and strategic aims of a conflict has been on the rise, and in many cases it has beaten out the military force in its effectiveness.⁴⁸⁵

⁴⁸³ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁴ Colonel-General Anatoly Zaitsev, *Partisan Warfare: The modern army should know how to fight without front lines*, MIC Media in English Translation, 3 September 2014), <http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/21649>.

⁴⁸⁵ General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of General Staff, Russian Federation, “The Value of Science in Foresight: New Challenges Require Rethinking on the Forms and Methods of Warfare,” given as a lecture at a closed Voroshilov General Staff Academy conference, and

Information space opens up extensive asymmetric possibilities for diminishing combat potentials of a stronger and richer adversary.⁴⁸⁶ The following cyberspace features are suitable for application of information and cyber weapons in asymmetric attacks: 1) possibility for remote access, 2) difficulties in indentifying an attacker, and attributing responsibility for an attack, and 3) low prices of high-tech products that are freely available on the market.

“The soft dimension“ of information operations i.e. its information-perceptive aspect (propaganda, deception and misinformation) demands much less financial resources, taking into account that lots of poor countries have a long tradition of studying the skills of management perception on tactical and operational levels.

Information weapons can be exploited towards the adversary objective more rapidly in relation to other kinds of weapons with a capability of causing the required damage to the adversary within a definite period of time; it is inexpensive enough, simple for production and its mass production is possible in comparison with other kinds of weapons in the same class.⁴⁸⁷ Its widespread use and availability are well suited for application of the old “armed people” concept in the asymmetric warfare.

It should also be recalled that a victory is achieved not only by a nation’s material means but also by its spiritual resources, unity and striving to stand up against an aggression with all its might. On the other hand, taking action against the adversary’s population, as one of the most important objectives (given that population constitutes the center of gravity of the resistance and whose behaviour crucially influences the course of events) is possible by using a great number of asymmetric operations on the information level.

Theoreticians have thus concluded that information warfare will play a crucial role in present-day and future conflicts.⁴⁸⁸ The objectives of coming wars will not be achieved if information superiority over the opposing side has not been achieved. The framework for asymmetric and hybrid warfares and non-linear conflicts, as presented by the Russian military experts, Chekinov and Bogdanov, builds on an effective application of information operations at

reprinted in Military Industrial Kurier, (27 Feb. 2013), http://vpknews.ru/sites/default/files/pdf/VPK_08_476.pdf.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 7, 8.

⁴⁸⁸ Col. S.G. Chekinov and Lt. Gen. S.A. Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War, *Voyenna mysl*, No.4, October 2013, http://www.eastviewpress.com/Files/MT_FROM%20THE%20CURRENT%20ISSUE_No.4_2013.pdf

the beginning of a conflict to create favorable conditions for carrying out military operations. Here is one of their arguments: new generation warfares are predominantly information-based and psychological in nature because in this way information superiority and control over the adversary's units and weapon systems are attained, as well as the adversary's depressed psychological state and falling fighting spirit caused. The application of these operations reduces the need for a more considerable military engagement in attack operations.⁴⁸⁹

The highly efficient application of information operations in asymmetric conflicts has resulted in decreased level of conventional forces engagement. Owing to that a significant number of nations are likely to incorporate asymmetric warfare in their military doctrines and operations. It can be expected that the major nations having resources for executing sustainable military operations (especially, against an equal adversary) will draw on principles and means of hybrid and asymmetric warfare to reach their strategic aims within a short period of time, and in such a way as to prevent the efficient response from the opposing side and international community. For that reason it is of crucial importance that military thinkers and strategicians should improve their understanding of asymmetric war, as well as develop and prepare a practical response to the adversary application of asymmetric warfare on the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

A nation's unpreparedness to defend itself from an asymmetric scenario poses a challenge to its security and defence nowadays. It is usually a result of a simplified defence strategy. However, national security demands a multilevel approach. Nations should develop comprehensive, multilayered and asymmetric defence plans.

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INFORMACIONI RAT I ASIMETRIČNI SUKOBI

Milan Miljković*

Kancelarija Saveta za nacionalnu bezbednost i
zaštitu tajnih podataka Vlade Republike Srbije,
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Principi „nove generacije ratovanja“, kao što su 1) iz rata sa konvencionalnim snagama u sukob sa specijalno pripremljenim snagama i neregularnim grupama, 2) od direktnog sukoba ka beskontaknom ratu, 3) iz rata u fizičkom okruženju do rata u ljudskoj svesti i u sajber prostoru; 4) od simetričnog do asimetričnog rata, ukazuju na aktuelnost *asimetričnih sukoba i informacionih operacija*.

Ovaj novi koncept asimetričnog ratovanja, koji aktuelizuje drevnu ideju o „razbijanju otpora neprijatelja bez borbe“, predstavlja u stvari celi sistem metoda, zadataka i sastava čiji je krajnji cilj uticaj na percepciju i ponašanje protivničkog rukovodstva, stanovništva i međunarodne zajednica na svim nivoima.

Ključne reči: nova generacija ratovanja, asimetrični sukobi, informacione operacije.

* milan.miljkovic@nsa.gov.rs

TERRORISM AS ASYMMETRIC THREAT AND ASYMMETRIC COUNTERTERRORISM RESPONSES

Žarko Čulibrk*

Faculty of Security and Protection, Banja Luka,
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Abstract: The main topic of this scientific paper is terrorism as asymmetric threat in general as well as some of asymmetric counterterrorism responses. In the process of writing this paper, the methods generally used have been literature review, content analysis and comparative analysis. This paper gives both linguistic determination and scientific determination of asymmetry and related terms, such as symmetry and dissymmetry. This linguistic determination is given for both the Serbian language area and the English language area, and scientific determination is given from the standpoint of sciences of defense, security and protection. This paper gives a brief history of asymmetric warfare, beginning with the fight between David and Goliath, and Trojan horse episode, up to Yugoslav partisans and guerrilla movements after World War II. Definition of terror and terrorism has been given from both linguistic and scientific point of view, wherein the reference sources have been used from the Serbian language area and English language area. The relationship terrorism–asymmetry has been briefly explained, terrorism as an asymmetric threat has been explained and asymmetric counterterrorism responses have been described as well. This paper presents terrorism as an asymmetrical shape of warfare, with emphasis on certain terrorist trends. Particular asymmetric counterterrorism responses have been mentioned, along with stating the conclusions on their success. The aim of this paper is to show dangers coming from terrorism threat, as one of the forms of asymmetrical threats.

Key words: asymmetry, asymmetric threats, asymmetric warfare, terrorism, counterterrorism.

* culibrk.zarko@fbzbl.net

INTRODUCTION

Phenomenon of terrorism as asymmetric warfare, especially internationally present suicide terrorism, its connection and intertwining, have forced many countries to try to create an appropriate strategy for fighting terrorism holders. Terrorism is a form of asymmetric warfare, which is used by a variety of ethnic, religious and ideological extremist groups. That is why all countries that have problems with terrorism or are direct or indirect targets of terrorist and fundamentalist organizations and groups, develop specific strategies to defend themselves against terrorist attacks, including methods of asymmetric counterterrorism. Terrorist organizations operate on different levels of terrorism. Sometimes terrorists attack only civilian targets, sometimes state institutions, often outside the country whose government is the target of the ultimate demands of these terrorist organizations and groups. As for counterterrorism, there are many similarities in selection of appropriate strategies in defense against terrorist attacks among different countries, but there are also differences with regard to the different level of power and varying degrees of vulnerability.

In this paper we will try to define asymmetry and related terms, to give a brief history of asymmetric warfare, to describe terrorism as asymmetric threat, and to describe asymmetric counterterrorism responses. Understanding of asymmetrical warfare is significant for understanding of terrorism as asymmetrical threat.

DEFINITION OF AN ASYMMETRY

Defining the concept of an asymmetry and related terms, such as symmetry and dissymmetry, can be considered from two aspects - the language aspect and the scientific and professional aspect. Language aspect refers to definition of these terms from the viewpoint of linguistic sciences. Scientific-professional aspect involves definition of the concept of the asymmetry (and related terms) from the perspective of sciences of defense, security and protection.

Let's start from the linguistic point of view. Klaić says that symmetry (Greek *symmetria* – a real proportion, harmony, measure) is the harmony, proportionality, consistency, lawful schedule of points or parts of the object in space where one half of the object is like a mirror image of the other half of the object.⁴⁹⁰ According to Klajn and Šipka, symmetry (Greek *symmetria*) is a

⁴⁹⁰ Klaić, Bratoljub. *Veliki rječnik stranih riječi*. Zagreb: Zora, 1974, 1203.

balanced ratio of the individual parts of a whole, compliance, stacking.⁴⁹¹ It is said in Cambridge dictionary that the symmetry is the quality of having parts that match each other; or similarity of shape or contents.⁴⁹² The Oxford dictionary says that the symmetry is the exact match in size and shape between two halves, parts or sides of sth; the quality of being very similar or equal.⁴⁹³ According to Klaić, asymmetry (Greek a – no + symmetry) is inconsistency, inequality, unevenness, disproportionality,⁴⁹⁴ according to Klajn and Šipka, asymmetry is lack of symmetry, inconsistency.⁴⁹⁵ It is said in Cambridge dictionary that asymmetry means without symmetry; two halves, sides or parts which are not exactly the same in shape and size.⁴⁹⁶ In the Oxford dictionary, the asymmetry is when two sides or parts are not the same in size or shape; sth not equal.⁴⁹⁷ Klaić, Klajn and Šipka do not mention dissymmetry. The term dissymmetry can not be found either in Cambridge dictionary, nor in Oxford dictionary.

From the standpoint of sciences of defense, security and protection, symmetry is seen as a struggle of equal opponents, dissymmetry as an effort of one of the opponents to gain a qualitative and/or quantitative advantage, while asymmetry corresponds to the reverse procedure – to take advantage of all the weaknesses of opponents and inflict him as much a pity.⁴⁹⁸

Dissymmetry can be openly demonstrated resolve for creation of a comprehensive strategy which, in order to achieve that objective, tends to outweigh the resources. This kind of resolve is usually demonstrated by states, so the aspiration to dissymmetry can be linked to a political decision. Aware of their supremacy, and in order to prove their superiority in a conflict, the United States do not hesitate to use dissymmetric means. Thus, dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 and then on Nagasaki is a perfect example of dissymmetry, since Japan did not have the same military means.

⁴⁹¹ Klajn, Ivan, and Milan Šipka. *Veliki rečnik stranih reči i izraza*. Novi Sad: Prometej, 2006, 1131.

⁴⁹² Procter, Paul, ed. *Cambridge International Dictionary of English*. Cambridge University Press, 1995, 1480.

⁴⁹³ Hornby, Albert Sidney. *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 1319.

⁴⁹⁴ Klaić, Bratoljub. *Veliki rječnik stranih riječi*. Zagreb: Zora, 1974, 103.

⁴⁹⁵ Klajn, Ivan, and Milan Šipka. *Veliki rečnik stranih reči i izraza*. Novi Sad: Prometej, 2006, 151.

⁴⁹⁶ Procter, Paul, ed. *Cambridge International Dictionary of English*. Cambridge University Press, 1995, 75.

⁴⁹⁷ Hornby, Albert Sidney. *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 64.

⁴⁹⁸ Kurmon, Bartelemi, and Darko Ribnikar. *Asimetrični ratovi*. Beograd: Novinsko-izdavački centar "Vojska", 2003, 18.

The superiority of the forces means not only dissymmetry in military means, but also a better coordination in communication during a war as a whole. Unlike asymmetry, dissymmetry is usually associated with a country strategy, not the strategy of some non-state groups. Dissymmetry is exclusive privilege of the powerful ones.⁴⁹⁹ However, there are some authors who call a conflict involving two entities such as states, with unequal overall resources, e.g., military power and economic resources, an asymmetric conflict.⁵⁰⁰

Asymmetry implies rejection of the rules of engagement imposed by the opponent, thus making all operations completely unpredictable. This assumes the simultaneous use of forces out of their basic purpose and, in particular, those forces which are not suspected (such as civilians), then the use of weapons against which means of protection are not always adapted (NBC weapons), the use of methods that negate conventional warfare (guerrilla, terrorism), the use of conflict sites that can not be predicted (downtowns, public places) and the use of the surprise factor, whereby the latter is the most important characteristic. Using simple technical means, asymmetry can identify itself with the "weapon of the poor."⁵⁰¹ Asymmetric warfare is a warfare in which an opponent leverages inferior tactical or operational strength, against the vulnerabilities of a superior opponent, to achieve disproportionate effect with the aim of undermining the opponent's will, in order to achieve the asymmetric actor's strategic objectives.⁵⁰² In short, asymmetry can be described by means of Sun Tzu Wu learning that the enemy should be convinced that it controls the situation, so afterwards it can be more easily outwitted.⁵⁰³

HISTORY OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

According to Kurmon and Ribnikar,⁵⁰⁴ mythological origins of asymmetry may be linked to the episode of the fight between Israelis and

⁴⁹⁹ Kurmon, Bartelemi, and Darko Ribnikar. *Asimetrični ratovi*. Beograd: Novinsko-izdavački centar "Vojska", 2003, 18-20.

⁵⁰⁰ O'Leary, Margaret. *The Dictionary of Homeland Security and Defense*. New York - Lincoln - Shanghai: iUniverse, 2006, 37.

⁵⁰¹ Kurmon, Bartelemi, and Darko Ribnikar. *Asimetrični ratovi*. Beograd: Novinsko-izdavački centar "Vojska", 2003, 20.

⁵⁰² O'Leary, Margaret. *The Dictionary of Homeland Security and Defense*. New York - Lincoln - Shanghai: iUniverse, 2006, 37.

⁵⁰³ Kurmon, Bartelemi, and Darko Ribnikar. *Asimetrični ratovi*. Beograd: Novinsko-izdavački centar "Vojska", 2003, 13.

⁵⁰⁴ Kurmon, Bartelemi, and Darko Ribnikar. *Asimetrični ratovi*. Beograd: Novinsko-izdavački centar "Vojska", 2003, 17, 22.

Philistines when, in combat one on one, David beat Goliath when he hit him with a sling and thus killed him. The balance of powers was uneven, but still the weaker opponent won. Since that time the believers became aware of the fact that they would be able to defeat the opponent if the issue they defended were just, no matter which means used. Another example of asymmetric warfare is the episode of the Trojan horse in the war between the Trojans and Achaeans, when the Trojans seized a wooden figure of a horse as a reward for the successful defense of Troy. The warriors who were hidden in the wooden Trojan horse's belly sneaked out during night thus enabling Achaeans to enter the city and take it.

In modern age asymmetric warfare is associated with guerrilla and terrorist activities. Guerrilla warfare is a particularly good example of asymmetric warfare; the very word guerrilla means „little war“ in Spanish. Guerrilla fighters are generally fewer in number and possess fewer and less powerful weapons than the opposing force. Guerrilla tactics includes ambushes, avoiding open battle, cutting communication lines, and generally harassing the enemy. Guerrilla warfare has been waged throughout history, and includes both military operations carried out against the rear of an enemy's army and operations carried out by local population against the occupying force. Aim of guerrilla fighters is destruction of the enemy's will to sustain the costs of continuing the war.⁵⁰⁵

During World War II a large number of liberation movements were developed on the occupied territories and one of the biggest was the partisan movement on the territory of our country, the initial name of which had been guerrilla movement. After World War II, asymmetric warfare was usually associated with anti-colonial movements and the liberation from colonial invaders, especially in African and Asian countries. The colonial powers had to withdraw from Algeria, Indochina, Indonesia and other areas, not as a result of defeat in battle but because of lack of will to continue the war. Henry Kissinger emphasized that „the guerrilla win if they do not lose. The conventional armies lose if they do not win.“⁵⁰⁶ Characteristic of guerrilla warfare is the area in which the war is being waged. There is no war in an area that is easily accessible for regular forces (colonial troops, for example). Such a war is fought in deserts, jungles, swamps and mountains.

⁵⁰⁵ Kushner, Harvey W. Encyclopedia of Terrorism. Thousand Oaks - London - New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003, 55-56.

⁵⁰⁶ Kushner, Harvey W. Encyclopedia of Terrorism. Thousand Oaks - London - New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003, 54, 56.

TERRORISM AS AN ASYMMETRIC THREAT

Violence, which has the characteristics of terrorism and terror, is an integral part of the policy, i.e. a form of communication between numerous basic subjects of the international community (the states) and the entities within individual countries during the XIX and XX century. At the beginning of this century it has reached frightening proportions of destruction and human casualties.⁵⁰⁷ To understand terrorism, it is necessary to start from the term terror. These two concepts are often considered to be the same thing, although there is a difference between them.

The term "terror" (from the French *terreur* – sowing fear) implies the action of organized violence for political purposes, intimidation and ruthless crackdown of resistance against which the terror is implemented.⁵⁰⁸ Terrorism is an organized and systematic implementation of measures of violence with the intention to cause fear and personal insecurity among citizens, undermine the authority of the state, or achieve some political goals.⁵⁰⁹ According to Ivan Klajn and Milan Šipka, terror (from Latin *terrere* – feared) means the rule of violence; persecution, physical harm and destruction of the opponent, it means - tyranny. Terrorism is systematic use of violence and intimidation (persecution, oppression, murder), usually for political purposes or for money extortion.⁵¹⁰ In his *Veliki rječnik stranih riječi* Bratoljub Klaić states that terror (from the Latin word *terror* – the fear, the horror) is infliction of fear, evocation of fear and fright, horror, dread, anger. It is use of violence down to the physical destruction of the opponent; reign of fear. Terrorism is use of terror, reign of frightening, tyranny. Terrorism is destruction of the opponent with the cruelest means (persecution, oppression, murder).⁵¹¹ Terror (from the Latin *terror*) is a strong fear that paralyzes, horror or use of force and violence in order to establish power, tyranny. Terrorism is violence done by some organization in order to create an atmosphere of insecurity and destruction of the existing government.⁵¹² Terrorism is doctrine and method of struggle for specific goals by systematic use of violence.⁵¹³ It is said in *Cambridge Dictionary* that terror is extreme fear, i.e. violent action causing that fear.

⁵⁰⁷ Mijalkovski, Milan. *Terorizam*. Beograd: Fakultet civilne odbrane, 2004, 5.

⁵⁰⁸ *Politička enciklopedija*. Beograd: Savremena administracija, 1975, 1071.

⁵⁰⁹ *Vojni leksikon*. Beograd: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1981, 622.

⁵¹⁰ Klajn, Ivan, and Milan Šipka. *Veliki rečnik stranih reči i izraza*. Novi Sad: Prometej, 2006, 1232.

⁵¹¹ Klaić, Bratoljub. *Veliki rječnik stranih riječi*. Zagreb: Zora, 1974, 1329-1330.

⁵¹² *Nova Larus enciklopedija*. Beograd: JRJ, 1999, 1829.

⁵¹³ Vujaklija, Milan. *Leksikon stranih reči*. Beograd: Prosveta, 1970, 947.

Terrorism is a violent action for political purposes, or violent action threats for political purposes.⁵¹⁴ Similar explanation is given in *Oxford Dictionary*. Terror is a feeling of extreme fear; situation or things that make you very afraid; violent action or violent action threat that is intended to cause fear, usually for political purposes. Terrorism is use of violence in order to achieve political aims or to force a government to respond.⁵¹⁵ According to Harvey Kushner, there are numerous definitions for the word terrorism as well as numerous methods of its performing. The term *terrorism* means different things to different people, and trying to define or classify terrorism to everyone's satisfaction proves almost impossible. Most definitions of terrorism hinge on three factors: the methods (violence), the targets (civilian or government), and the purposes (to instill fear and force political or social change). He emphasizes state terrorism as a special kind of terrorism saying that terrorism is something that a government does to its citizens for a variety of reasons: to maintain political power, to put down struggles of liberation, or to pacify populations after an annexation.⁵¹⁶ A common problem in the definition of terrorism is that many authors confuse the terms terror and terrorism and consider them synonymous.

We can conclude that *terrorism poses a threat of violence or an act of violence against life and health, against property and against environment, in order to achieve certain political goals (ideological, ethnic, religious)*.

Terrorist tactics, such as hijackings and suicide bombings, are also considered to be asymmetrical, both because they tend to involve a smaller, weaker group attacking a stronger one and because attacks on civilians are by definition one-way warfare.⁵¹⁷ Groups lacking the ability to take power either militarily or politically may resort to terrorist attack within the heart of the state. Of course, terrorist attacks in cities attract more media coverage than those in rural areas; car bombs, assassinations, bombs left in crowded public places are common tactics in urban terrorism.⁵¹⁸ Thus, terrorist acts must be covered by

⁵¹⁴ Procter, Paul, ed. Cambridge International Dictionary of English. Cambridge University Press, 1995, 1504-1505.

⁵¹⁵ Hornby, Albert Sidney. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 1342.

⁵¹⁶ Kushner, Harvey W. Encyclopedia of Terrorism. Thousand Oaks - London - New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003, 359-360.

⁵¹⁷ Kushner, Harvey W. Encyclopedia of Terrorism. Thousand Oaks - London - New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003, 54.

⁵¹⁸ Kushner, Harvey W. Encyclopedia of Terrorism. Thousand Oaks - London - New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003, 56.

media, which means that they must be of good quality, but not necessarily numerous.⁵¹⁹

Asymmetry can be seen in the willingness of the opposing parties to use their resources. As long as the survival of its state is not at risk, the nation under attack is politically unable to use its full military power, and thus fights a limited war, while terrorists commit themselves and their resources to a total war.⁵²⁰

Some authors believe that, in the same way as for a war, it can be said that terrorism is continuation of politics by other means. However, unlike a war that is lead by countries, terrorism is a form of fighting that is reserved for non-state groups. It is a form of illegal conflict, in which there are no rules. Briefly, the terrorism could be summarized in a few words: "Hit hard, with few resources!"⁵²¹ The simpler assets of terrorist actions are the more difficult and complex their prevention is.⁵²²

FUTURE OF TERRORISM

A special form of terrorist activities is suicide terrorism, which is simultaneously a special form of asymmetric warfare, which has increasing perspective to be one of the primary means of asymmetric warfare in the future. *Suicide terrorism is an attack on a military or civilian target, in which the attacker intends to kill others, knowing that he/she would certainly (or most likely) kill himself/herself.*⁵²³ Meaning of suicide terrorism includes a vehicle (or boat) stuffed with explosives, passenger aircraft filled with fuel, as well as the individuals who wear belts with explosive or drive vehicles. Readiness of people to sacrifice their own lives for the sake of "higher goals" makes this forms of terrorism much more dangerous. The asymmetry provided by suicide terrorism provide to terrorist groups enables more efficient operation and easier achievement of certain goals. The thing that defines suicide terrorism from the scientific point of view is dimensions of suicide terrorism and its basic characteristics.

⁵¹⁹ Kurmon, Bartelemi, and Darko Ribnikar. *Asimetrični ratovi*. Beograd: Novinsko-izdavački centar "Vojska", 2003, 124.


⁵²⁰ Kushner, Harvey W. *Encyclopedia of Terrorism*. Thousand Oaks - London - New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003, 56.

⁵²¹ Kurmon, Bartelemi, and Darko Ribnikar. *Asimetrični ratovi*. Beograd: Novinsko-izdavački centar "Vojska", 2003, 123-124.

⁵²² Kurmon, Bartelemi, and Darko Ribnikar. *Asimetrični ratovi*. Beograd: Novinsko-izdavački centar "Vojska", 2003, 136.

⁵²³ Čulibrk, Žarko. "Odbrana od samoubilačkih terorističkih napada." Beograd: Fakultet bezbednosti, 2009, 22.

Dimensions of suicide terrorism constitute basic elements of terrorist activities, and they are subjects or participants of terrorist attacks, strategy of carrying out their attacks (mode of action) and consequences caused by a suicide attack. It means that suicide terrorism can be considered in relation to three dimensions: participants (subjects), effects (actions) and consequences. All the three dimensions of suicide terrorism are complex and can be further resolved (Figure 1).



*Figure 1: Dimensions of Suicide Terrorism*⁵²⁴

There are three main subjects that can be seen in functioning of suicide terrorism: perpetrators (terrorists), victims and the third party. Perpetrators (suicide terrorists) are the main levers in a suicide terrorism, because without them there would be no suicide terrorism. Victims of suicide terrorists can be seen as direct (secondary) victims against whom direct violence is performed

⁵²⁴ Source: Author

(direct terrorist attack) and as indirect (primary) victims which should be intimidated to the point when they would give up and fulfill demands of the terrorists. Third party consists of make a community of people inside or outside the country where are performed suicide terrorist attacks.

When talking about the effects (action), the suicidal terrorist attacks are not necessarily the ones with causing large number of victims, but they do cause constant tension among the population and the expectation of disaster, which suits to the terrorists. This dimension of terrorism consists of mechanism of attack, type of target, amount of violence and degree of surprise.

The consequences after the terrorist attacks are mainly related to primary (indirect) and secondary (direct) victims of violence. Consequences upon direct (secondary) victims of violence can be physical suffering of the population and mental damages. Consequences upon indirect (primary) victims of violence can be disruption of social relations, tension, disturbance of the economy, physical damage of infrastructure and environmental destruction.

Suicide terrorism is an attempt of certain group or organization to achieve their goals by using suicide violence. Consequently, there are certain characteristics of suicide terrorism, such as illegality, immorality, cruelty, and so on. Illegality means that every terrorist action is prohibited and its execution is a criminal offense. Immorality implies that terrorists neither act according to the basic social norms, nor according to basic norms of law. They act based on their own value system. Collectivity means that a suicide terrorist act can not be carried out by only one person. Direct perpetrator of an attack may be one person, but organized groups or organizations always stand behind that person. That is the issue which makes difference between terrorists and murderers, or common criminals. Namely, terrorists carry out an attack in order to achieve their own political goals. The attacks performed by murderers and common criminals are consequences of their personal frustrations or incompatibility, ie. a consequence of greed and personal goals, although such attacks sometimes look like terrorism, whether in relation to the means used (hand grenade attack) or target (politicians, influential people), while terrorists carry out their operations with the intention to reach their political goal.

Cruelty means disproportionate intensive use of force to cause certain behavior of people, which is contrary to the will and personal beliefs of these people. Such violence can be directed against government officials and selected entities from government departments and institutions or against the citizens, in order to cause distrust in the authorities and fear among the citizens. This puts pressure on the government to comply with the demands of terrorists. Fanaticism represents a blind adherence of certain members of a

terrorist collective to ideological, political, religious or other ideas and their violence towards those whose beliefs are different. Visible characteristics of fanatics are intolerance, hatred and violence toward others. In recent years, religious fanaticism is the one that is most expressed, while in the period before the 1990s ideological and ethnic terrorism were dominant. Two things show danger of religious fanaticism phenomenon. First, devices used by fanatics are intimidating (an example are suicide bombers). Another thing that describes cruelty of religious fanaticism, is its distribution. Religious fanatics destroyed the World Trade Center, and today they are fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. It is well-known fact that they participated in terrorist attacks in Kosovo and Metohija, in crimes against Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina etc. Ultimativity is another characteristic of them. Ultimatum is a rare form of communication among countries, but ultimatum, which is a requirement whose noncompliance carries the penalty, is means often used by terrorists. Due to performing of brutal and violent campaigns, terrorists have "credibility" to set up an ultimatum, since their way of communication with those who they do not agree with is well known. Irrationality means that way of work of many terrorist groups mystifies the objectives that this group has, in order to intensify fanaticism and prevent conscious consideration of the achievement of objectives. This is typical for many terrorist collectivities, "whose management, based on subjective assessments, not the real situation, believes that status of stakeholders on whose behalf the demands are presented is not properly regulated in their home country or in the international community."⁵²⁵ Unpredictability means that there is no target that cannot be attacked, which may erode the country's credibility both internally and externally. Terrorists are always one step ahead of security structures, given that suicide attacks can be performed in any place at any time. Unpredictability results in enormous difficulties for the country to sufficiently secure all potential terrorist targets.

Confidentiality is another characteristic. Since suicide terrorism requires thorough preparation, detailed planning and precise implementation of the attack, terrorists pay a lot of attention to confidentiality, because awareness of potential victims about any phase of the attack would endanger work of the terrorist organization. Tragic openness is characteristic opposite of secrecy, but in the sense that terrorists are "transparent" when performing operations. Namely, after the suicide act, they take responsibility and then they threaten to continue with violent actions until their demands are met. Cost-effectiveness is a characteristic that means attaining greater successes with fewer people and resources.

⁵²⁵ Mijalkovski, Milan. *Terorizam*, Beograd: Fakultet civilne odbrane, 2004, p. 17.

It should be said that the first suicide terrorist attacks generally were performed by leftist terrorist groups, and that this form of terrorist activities, with the assassinations and bombings, has remained a substantial part of these groups tactics. There is possibility of strengthening left-wing terrorism in future. The growing gap between rich and poor and the growing stratification among classes confirm this statement. It is possible that in the future there will be a lot of dissatisfaction among the disenfranchised masses which will, being so angry, take the same means as terrorists. Likewise, it is possible that use of computer systems and global computer networks in the future will be intensified for terrorist goals.

ASYMMETRIC COUNTERTERRORISM RESPONSES

Finally, let us say a few words about asymmetric counterterrorism responses, which will be described through the examples of Israel. Besides symmetrical (various forms of physical and technical protection) and disymmetrical ways of defense against terrorist attacks (bombings and rocket attacks on Palestinian settlements), an idea appeared in Israel to use asymmetrical tactics as means of defence against suicide terrorists, which includes committing assassination of the leaders of terrorist groups.

Data collected by Israeli authorities that in 2003 3838 terrorist attacks against Israel were carried out, in which 213 Israelis were injured (163 civilians and 50 members of the security forces),⁵²⁶ hinted the dynamics of the conflict between Israel and Palestinian groups Islamic Jihad and Hamas, which carried out their attacks attacks mainly through their suicide members.

Faced with the constant suicide attacks in mid-March 2004, in response to a double suicide bombing in the Ashdod port near the Gaza Strip, when 10 Israelis were killed,⁵²⁷ Israeli authorities decided to destroy Palestinian movement Hamas, first by killing members of its leadership. This decision was influenced by statistics that, from 2001 to 2004, 377 Israelis were killed by Hamas in 425 attacks.⁵²⁸ Implementation of the decision began on March 22 in the morning, when Israelis with a helicopter missile hit the car in front of a mosque in Gaza, in which was a founder and spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. Seven other people were killed seven other

⁵²⁶ 2003 *Terrorism Review*, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 8 2004.

⁵²⁷ *Suicide bombing at Ashdod Port*, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 14, 2004.

⁵²⁸ Hamas Leader Responsible for death of 377 Israelis Killed, Israeli Mission to The European Union, March 22, 2004.

people.⁵²⁹ This was not the first case of the killing of a terrorist leader, and in 2004 such attacks were intensified; even 202 killings were committed that year, but there were fewer suicide attacks (Figure 2).




Figure 2: The Ratio between the Number of Anti-Terrorist Assassinations and the Number of Suicide Attacks (2000-2005)⁵³⁰

CONCLUSION

It is almost impossible to predict terrorism as an asymmetric threat but it is especially difficult to predict suicide terrorism. Terrorism has existed since time of Zealots and the Assassins, and modern suicide attacks have been carried out for 25 years, and it is very likely that they will be present in the future and that they will affect political scene, both in individual countries and on the international level. Terrorism is a method of struggle in which the weak

⁵²⁹ Bennet, James. Leader of Hamas Killed by Missile in Israeli Strike, The New York Times, March 22, 2004

⁵³⁰ *The University of Texas at Austin– Suicide_Terrorism_F06-Countering.pdf*

can stand a lot stronger "opponent". Likewise, suicide attacks are relatively cheap and cost-effective for terrorists because they cause fear and panic among the attacked population, as well as pain and suffering, which will continue unless the requirements of terrorists are fulfilled. Besides, suicide attacks leave psychological and other consequences with the people who experienced them. Divorce, suicide, depression and isolation from the society are some of the consequences American soldiers who fought in Iraq and Afghanistan suffer. After coming home, these soldiers began to consume alcohol and drugs; they were having marital problems, as well as problems in communication with other people. Future terrorist attacks could to a great extent be related to use of the world's computer network as well. Internet forums, real "market" for extreme ideas, have become "invisible hand" that can organize terrorist attacks around the world.

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TERORIZAM KAO ASIMETRIČNA PRETNJA I ASIMETRIČNI PROTIVTERORISTIČKI ODGOVORI

Žarko Ćulibrk*

Fakultet za bezbednost i zaštitu, Banja Luka,
Bosna i Hercegovina

Apstrakt: Za osnovnu temu rada uzet je terorizam kao asimetrična prijetnja, te pojedini asimetrični protivteroristički odgovori. Tokom izrade ovog rada korištene su uglavnom metoda pregleda literature i metoda analize sadržaja, kao i metoda komparativne analize. Dato je jezičko određenje, a dato je i naučno određenje asimetrije i srodnih pojmova, kao što su simetrija i disimetrija. Jezičko određenje dato je za srpsko govorno područje i englesko govorno područje. Naučno određenje dato je sa aspekta nauka odbrane, bezbednosti i zaštite. Prikazan je kratak istorijat asimetričnog ratovanja, počevši od borbe Davida i Golijata i Trojanskog konja, pa do jugoslovenskih partizana i gerilskih pokreta nakon Drugog svjetskog rata. Dato je određenje

* culibrk.zarko@fbzbl.net

terora i terorizma, kako sa jezičkog stanovišta, tako i sa naučnog aspekta, pri čemu su korišteni referentni izvori, kako oni sa srpskog govornog područja, tako i izvori sa engleskog govornog područja. Ukratko je objašnjen odnos *terorizam–asimetrija*, opisan je terorizam kao asimetrična prijetnja, a opisani su i asimetrični protivteroristički odgovori. U radu je prikazan terorizam kao asimetrični oblik ratovanja, uz isticanje određenih terorističkih pravaca. Takođe, spomenuti su i pojedini asimetrični protivteroristički odgovori, uz iznošenje zaključaka o njihovoj uspešnosti. Cilj ovog naučnog rada jeste da se pokaže opasnost od terorizma, kao jednog od oblika asimetričnih pretnji.

Cljučne reči: asimetrija, asimetrična pretnja; asimetrično ratovanje, terorizam, protivteroristička borba.

A STRATEGIC APPROACH IN PREVENTION OF ORGANIZED CRIME

Branislav Milosavljevic^{*}

Strategic Research Institute, University of Defence, Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Ljupka Petrevska^{**}

Faculty of Business Studies and Law,
Union – Nikola Tesla University, Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: Modern organized crime expresses tendencies of permanent development of new forms of manifestation, as well as constant adaptation to newly emerging social conditions and concrete circumstances. The modalities of certain forms of organized crime are complex as a result of the growing connection between organized criminal groups at a regional and global plan. Since one of the main features of organized crime is ability to adapt to emerging social circumstances, as the basic prerequisite for its effective suppression there is need for a strategic approach in order to create conditions for the preventive action of the competent state authorities. In this regard, one can notice, both at the global and local level, efforts aimed at encouraging the introduction and use of the strategic approach aimed at crime control, in particular its more serious forms, such as organized crime. The strategic approach implies previously created organized crime threat assessment in order to define other elements of the strategy required for its consistent implementation. The primary goal of the strategy is to achieve optimal control over the existence and operation of organized crime. The paper deals with basic considerations related to the strategy development and organized crime prevention, and besides general considerations, special emphasis is given to organized crime threat assessment at the national level.

Key words: organized crime, strategic approach, prevention, assessment, strategy implementation

^{*} branislav.milosavljevic@mod.gov.rs

^{**} ljupka.petrevska@fbsp.edu.rs

INTRODUCTION

The operation of organized crime on almost all forms of social and public life in modern conditions is certain. In this respect, there is no disagreement either between the scientific or the general public. Therefore it can be said that there is unity in the view that the phenomenon of organized crime in modern society presents one of the greatest threats to overall stability and security. Significant diversity of conditions and benefits for strengthening organized crime at the national and international plan, additionally complicate efficient solution to this problem. The danger that this extremely complex and very specific negative social phenomenon produces concerning the value of the state and society is not exclusively contained in the specific criminal act, but also in the possibility to, directly or indirectly, influence state decisions in the economic or political sphere. Depending on the way of organizing, internal organization, set goals, method of engagement and quality of established relationships, we can see different forms of organized crime manifestation on the internal and international plan. Vitality and intensity of the organized crime manifestation depend on the capabilities of its personnel and their success in using the favorable conditions present in the socio-political and economic relations of the country. On the other hand, the vitality and intensity of organized crime depend on the determination and efficiency of the state and its organs to vigorously and effectively resist it. The diversity of organized crime forms presents an additional problem in researching this phenomenon.

ORGANIZED CRIME DEFINITION

Defining organized crime is the first and, at the same time, the most important step in constituting strategy in order to oppose this phenomenon. A complete and precise definition of this term establishes a strong and stable basis for further consideration of the subject phenomenon from different aspects. The lack or a multitude of different approaches to determining organized crime leads to discrepancies and disagreements regarding its existence, extent, forms and degree of danger, as well as the establishment of an adequate and lawful social reaction. However, even a passing look concerning the definition says enough about plurality of different approaches, multitude of definitions and wealth of definitions. At the same time, this wealth reveals, as a deeper background, the absence of general consent to what is meant by this term. By synthesizing different definitions of this phenomenon, organized crime is defined as „a permanent criminal enterprise that is rationally realized in order to gain profit in an illegal way and to meet certain society needs (prostitution, gambling, usury, etc.), and its operation

continuity is realized by using force, threats, monopoly control and (or) corruption of public officials⁵³¹. A more complete definition of organized crime determines this phenomenon as a non-ideological association of a number of individuals, who have very close social interactions, organized on a hierarchical basis, which consists of at least three levels (ranks) in order to secure profit and power, thanks to their participation in illegal and legal activities. Among definitions that contribute to confusion on the conceptual plan, a particular place belongs to the fact that the organized crime term has at least two different meanings. The first approach gives central place to a group of people who undertake certain criminal activities and, in order to achieve their goals, establish appropriate organization based on a network of relationships based on subordination and hierarchy. Another approach is the one by which the key to understanding organized crime is not the answer to the question „who?“, but „what?“ - operations that can be considered organized crime⁵³².

On the other hand, the introduction of the terms „international“, „cross-border“, „multinational“ and „transnational“ organized crime additionally made it difficult to find (wander) adequate definition of the phenomenon concerned.

Even United Nations played a significant role in the search for an adequate term concerning organized crime. Thus, at the international conference in Palermo, the UN Convention on the Fight against Transnational Organized Crime was adopted, and it included organized crime as a structured group which consisted of three or more members which has been acting for a longer time with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes for the purpose of gaining profit. However, this approach only additionally complicated the process of more fully determining the term of organized crime, since it influenced the conclusion that all forms of organized crime can be called transnational, which in fact is a delusion because a significant amount of organized criminal operations is not of transnational character, which must not be forgotten when determining this phenomenon. So far, the foregoing confirms that organized crime exists as one of the most dangerous forms of threatening contemporary society, but in order to undertake activities that will reduce the risk of its operating, it is very important that we have a

⁵³¹ Albanese J.S: North American Organised Crime, Global Crime, Vol 6, No.1, 2004, p.10, dostupno na: http://jayalbanese.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/AlbaneseNAorganisedcrimeglobalcrime.35194323.pdf

⁵³² Ignjatović Đ.: Organizovani kriminalitete u XXI veku-kontraverze i dileme, u: *Suzbijanje organizovanog kriminala kao preduslov vladavine prava*, zbornik radova, Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd, 2016, str. 17

clear idea of what can actually be marked as organized crime or in other words to say something about the stated dilemma „who” or „what”.

Table 1: Determination of organized crime in the legislation of individual states

STATE	ORGANIZATION (WHO?)	OPERATION (WHAT?)
Bosnia and Herzegovina ⁵³³	Organized group consisting of at least three persons, which exists for certain period of time	Operation for the purpose of committing one or more criminal offenses for which a punishment of imprisonment of three years or more severe punishment may be imposed by law
FYROM ⁵³⁴	Organized group consisting of at least three persons, which operates for certain period of time	The realization of a direct or indirect financial or other type of material benefit, as well as other criminal offenses for which a sentence of imprisonment of at least four years is issued
Turkey ⁵³⁵	Organized group consisting of at least three persons, which operates for certain period of time	Illegal use, production and trafficking of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and substances necessary for their production, smuggling of weapons, ammunition, nuclear and radioactive materials, cultural and natural goods, migrants and human trafficking, organs and tissues, forgery, fraud, money laundering, corruption and high-tech crime

⁵³³ Krivični zakon BiH *Službeni glasnik*, br. 3/03, 32/03, 37/03, 54/04, 61/04, 30/05, 53/06 i 55/06.

⁵³⁴ Кривичниот законик „Службен весник на Република Македонија“ број 37/96, 80/99, 4/02, 43/03, 19/04, 81/05, 60/06, 73/06, 7 /08 , 139/08 , 114/09, 51/11, 135/11, 185/2011, 142/2012, 166/2012, 55/2013, čl.122.

⁵³⁵ Criminal Code of the Republic of Turkey, articl. 220, dostupno na : <http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-code>.

However, this should not be a dilemma, because in the case of organized crime, we should focus primarily on operation. The operation of organized crime is also a factor that connects the members of the criminal organization and at the same time determines the time of their operation. Otherwise, the criminal organization does not have the purpose of its existence and operation.

BASIC ORIENTATIONS CONCERNING STRATEGIC APPROACH TO ORGANIZED CRIME OPPOSING

Modern organized crime expresses tendencies to permanently develop new forms of manifestation, constantly adapting to newly emerging social conditions and concrete circumstances. Initially, organized crime manifested itself in the activities of forbidden goods trade, prostitution, gambling, the provision of various prohibited services with pronounced conflicts and armed clashes with competitive criminal organizations. Today, organized crime operates in the conditions of the market economy and within the current social relations. Illegal activities, especially cross-border organized crime, are directed to the area of smuggling drugs, weapons, ammunition, cultural goods, excise goods, people, radioactive materials, forgery of documents and money. At the same time, one should not forget its operation in the field of money laundering, that is, investing the achieved profit into legal affairs, which certainly negatively affects the socio-economic system of the state⁵³⁶.

The modalities of certain forms of organized crime are complex as a result of the growing connection between organized criminal groups on a regional and global plan. Criminal groups are formed independently of ethnic principles and are governed solely by the motive of illegal acquisition of profit. With the growing development of the international economic and other ties, organized crime gets new forms, using increasingly diverse methods and tools. Today's forms of organized crime are much more complex and include wider geographical frames, but also more sophisticated forms of manifestation, which are sometimes difficult to recognize.

With the development of information technology, many types of crime have been somewhat improved because the latest information and telecommunications technologies are increasingly being used both in the commission of criminal offenses and in the establishment of links and mutual communication between members of criminal groups. Bearing in mind the rapid

⁵³⁶ Milosavljević B., Blagojević V.: Indikatori postojanja i delovanja organizovanog kriminala, *Vojno delo br.5*, Beograd, 2016, str. 154-157.

development of technological and informational systems, as well as the traffic development, there is danger of spreading various forms of security threats, and above all organized crime, in view of the great financial power and organizational structure that certain criminal organizations have. However, one should not forget about the danger not only to national security, but also within the international plan, if there are no adequate measures. To what extent organized crime is vital and in which intensity it will manifest, depends on both the ability of its personnel and the success of using favorable socio-political and economic conditions, as well as the determination of the state and its organs to vigorously and effectively resist it. The occurrence of organized crime is perceived, first in Italy at the end of the XIX century, in the organizational forms of the mafia. In Sicily, this word means a complex of small associations, connected with the laws of secrecy and „omerta”, which by using private forms of justice threatens to replace state institutions⁵³⁷.

At the beginning of the 20th century, there are also similarities of criminal organizations with legitimate business organizations. This similarity was particularly related to their structure, for example executive bodies, accounting, support staff and others. „The rapid development of this socially dangerous phenomenon began in the early 20th century in the United States, too. Organized criminal groups that offered alcohol, gambling and prostitution were initially composed of Irishmen, then Jews, and in the end they were dominated by Italians”⁵³⁸. Historically viewed organized crime was not of universal character but significantly of regional character, and as a complex social phenomenon it is mainly related to certain social circumstances and conditions that present a suitable environment for its creation and further development⁵³⁹.

In addition to the stated reasons that define the long-term directions of operation in opposing organized crime, there is also ability of the phenomenon to survive especially in some „extraordinary circumstances, especially when organized crime encounters an energetic reaction of the competent state authorities”. Centuries - old survival on the world scene indicates that this phenomenon can not be completely suppressed but only somewhat reduced to a tolerable measure. To achieve this goal, a long-lasting combat composed of a series of activities, together with the general social consensus in support of this combat, is needed.

⁵³⁷ Williams P.: *Cooperation between the organized crime groups*, Chicago, 2002, p.17.

⁵³⁸ Ignjatović Đ.: *Organizovani kriminalitet – drugi deo*, Policijska akademija, Beograd 1998, str. 33.

⁵³⁹ Škulić M.: *Organizovani kriminalitet: pojam, pojavni oblici, krivična dela i krivični postupak*, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2015, crp. 130.

ORGANIZED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT

Threat assessment plays a crucial role in creating a strategic approach to fighting organized crime, possible lack of assessment reduces the possibility for an effective reaction of the competent state authorities⁵⁴⁰. The assessment of threats from organized crime is a primary stage in the development of the strategy in question. On the other hand, the assessment can be viewed as a key tool of the state and organized approach in decision making, prioritization and resource allocation. The assessment can also be viewed as an analytical document whose special part includes the prediction of crime and future threats and recommendations on what to do in order to reduce the predicted number of crimes. At the same time, an adequate assessment also influences the timely establishment of appropriate mechanisms for enhancing cooperation among a large number of state entities that prioritize the fight against organized crime, as well as those that may be involved in fighting organized crime (for example, finances and revision, customs services, etc.). For primary subjects in opposing organized crime, assessment is an extremely important tool because it points to new tendencies and predicts their movement, helps in choosing priorities, and chooses the best ways to oppose this phenomenon⁵⁴¹. When it comes to the pre-evaluation analysis, it usually focuses on organized criminal groups, areas of serious criminal offenses and an environment that can affect the risk of whether organized crime operation will be increased⁵⁴². When it comes to determining organized crime, there are no dilemmas because the accepted criterion is that it is about a co-operation of more than two individuals who are active in a longer or indefinite period and there is suspicion or conviction for acts of organized crime⁵⁴³.

⁵⁴⁰ Na značaj strateške procene ukazuje i zahtev, koji je u okviru pristupnih pregovora s Evropskom unijom postavljen Republici Srbiji, da mora do 2015. godine da izradi stratešku procenu pretnje od teškog i organizovanog kriminala. Videti: *Procena pretnje od teškog i organizovanog kriminala*, MUP Republike Srbije, Beograd, 2015, crp. 1.

⁵⁴¹ *Guidance on the use and preparation of serious and organized crime threat assessments - The SOCTA Handbook*, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, 2010, available: https://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Organized_Crime/SOCTA_Manual_2010.pdf p. 6.

⁵⁴² *Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) □ Methodology*, Council of the European Union, General Secretariat, 12159/12, Brussels, 4 July 2012, available: <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/jan/eu-council-socta-methodology.pdf>, p.7

⁵⁴³ *Council Framework Decision, 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime*, article1, dostupno na: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:300:0042:0045:EN:PDF>.

When it comes to the environment, one starts from the general fact that crime is a reflection of the society factors, either of those which contribute to the conduct or of those which prevent the manifestation of criminal activity. However, when it comes to determining factors relevant to organized crime⁵⁴⁴ there are certain dilemmas. The offered factors are quite broadly defined without clear system, which among other things greatly complicates the process of collecting and classifying data of importance for the analysis and assessment of the organized crime existence and operation. Without prejudice to their importance, however, it is necessary to include those factors which have a much greater significance than those presented.

An important factor that implies the different possibilities of manifesting organized crime from the transit area to the ultimate destination for certain products or services of criminal groups is the geographical position of the state. However, the state cannot change its geographical position, but it is able to monitor the trends of organized crime in the environment of predicting the future manifestation of this phenomenon in order to take adequate measures. An example is the area of Southeast Europe as a link between Asia and Europe, which is suitable for the development of smuggling chains, so we can also speak of a typical profit area for the operation of organized crime exponents. Within this space, special attention should be paid to one of the most organized, strongest and largest groups that holds a high position in the world hierarchy of smuggling chains of narcotic drugs. It is an Albanian mafia consisting solely of Albanians from the territory of the Republic of Serbia - the area of the AP Kosovo and Metohia and the municipalities Bujanovac and Presevo, as well as from the Republic of Albania. The development of the Albanian mafia in this region was caused by the fact that one of the most important heroin trafficking routes towards Western European countries, more commonly known as the „Balkan heroin route”, as well as part of the European network of illegal migrations, passes through our country⁵⁴⁵.

For a more complete understanding of the origin and operation of organized crime in a certain space, from the aspect of the possibility of manifesting this phenomenon, the analysis and assessment of historical factors are very important. In this regard, it is necessary to take into consideration whether criminal groups existed in a certain area in the past. If criminal groups existed in a certain area, the probability of organized crime operation will be

⁵⁴⁴ *Serious and organised crime threat assessment (SOCTA-2017) - Crime in the age of technology*, available: https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/.../socta2017_0.pd, p. 41

⁵⁴⁵ Mijalković S., Bajagić M.: *Organizovani kriminal i terorizam, fenomenološki i bezbednosni aspekt*, Kriminalističko-policijska akademija, Beograd, 2012, str. 107

increased in the coming period. A long history of smuggling, tax evasion and the like increase the possibility of organized crime operation, which at the same time requires special efforts in order to prevent them. In addition, certain events from near history such as wars or ethnic violence and conflicts that result in a deep division within a country or region affect the possibility to manifest organized crime. Historical factors are crucial in planning new laws or regulations in order to oppose organized crime⁵⁴⁶.

Cultural factor can have a great impact on the possibility to manifest and operate organized crime in a particular area. Both historical and cultural factor change very slowly, which requires a strategic approach in promoting new social values in a certain space. Among other things, the cultural factor includes social tolerance to corruption and the use of narcotics, the position and status of certain categories (women, children) and others. The existence of the mentioned factors in a given area increases the possibility of manifesting the volume of drug trafficking, prostitution and human trafficking. The factor has a special significance in the preventive approach to opposing organized crime, so it must be taken into account when planning preventive measures. The most obvious influence of the factor can be seen on the case of Albania. Albanians predominantly live in fraternity which is also an „economic and military unit”, and each house has a master who is also a „commander”. In addition, the traditional closure of the Albanian family and its strict hierarchical patriarchal structure contributed, to a certain extent, to the expansion of the Albanian mafia in wider areas, too⁵⁴⁷. However, the assessment which includes these elements cannot be considered complete. It would be suitable to analyze even the national capacities, which are an important factor in controlling organized crime, within the above factors. Namely, if the system is not regulated in the normative, organizational, personnel and material sense then they do not have positive effects on the prevention of the existence and operation of organized crime at the national level. Without the intention to diminish the importance of these factors, the state still has the most important role in opposing different forms of organized crime operation. Namely, the state, through appropriate measures, can directly influence the application of the principles of legality as well as the equal treatment of all perpetrators of crimes, regardless of their status, position in society and power. In this way, a greater degree of efficiency in controlling the

⁵⁴⁶ Albanese J.S.: *The Prediction and Control of Organized Crime: A Risk Assessment Instrument for Targeting Law Enforcement Efforts*, dostupno na: <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/199047.pdf>, p.18.

⁵⁴⁷ Škulić M.: *Organizovani kriminalitet: pojam, pojavni oblici, krivična dela i krivični postupak*, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2015, str 150-152.

current forms of organized crime is achieved. On the other hand, the insufficient influence of the state through different mechanisms provides organized criminal groups with profit. At the same time, organized crime indirectly acts on state structures through various types of threats, corruption and infiltration into society.

At the end of the last century, during the period of organized crime expansion in the territory of the former SFRY, the legislation was not able to respond to the challenge of organized crime, which, at the very least contributed to its expansion. On the one hand, the laws which regulated the mechanisms of economic activity were unable to prevent the infiltration of illegal into legal business. On the other hand, state institutions were not able to deal with the dangers of organized crime. To make the absurd greater, criminal and criminal procedural laws did not include this criminal phenomenon, and the lack of special investigative techniques, special procedural subjects and authorities, as well as specialized agencies for the fight against organized crime was evident. In such situation, it was difficult to achieve appropriate results in the prevention of organized crime. Therefore, concerning this factor it is extremely important to analyze and assess the efficiency of state bodies, from courts to local self-government in the implementation of laws, the level of corruption, as well as the extent to which some institutions abuse their authorities, as well as possible changes in legislation related to illegal trafficking and taxes changes.

Regarding the above, it is necessary to analyze and assess the implementation of law, and in particular the degree to which members of the police and other organs, in charge with opposing organized crime, are trained and capable for adequate operation. For the successful functioning of the legal state, it is crucial to ensure the efficient implementation of laws, and in particular by the entities in charge of opposing organized crime. Police, prosecutors and courts have the most important role but also a great responsibility concerning organized crime fight, which they can hardly justify if their work is not based on consistent law implementation. That is why it is very important that the activities of the most important subjects are legally framed and that they are aimed at prevention of various forms of criminal behavior. On the other hand, the expectations of a democratic society and consistent respect for the principles of the legal state include transparency of state bodies, legality and orientation towards the interests of the society as a whole, while respecting the proclaimed human rights. Justice has its role in preventing the manifestation of organized crime. The justice has to be regulated and capable to achieve equal justice application in accordance with

the dynamics of social changes that include reinforced operation of various criminal groups⁵⁴⁸.

One of the basic conditions of economic and any other development is a state which has an independent and impartial court. However, the occurrence of untimely resolution of court cases leads to corruption, that is, the abuse of legal and public authorities in order to obtain unlawful material gain. In the area in which it relies on organized crime, corruption is a special security challenge. It not only jeopardizes the fundamental values of society and slows down the integration and transition processes, it also leads to a decline in confidence in the state institutions, making it difficult to implement essential reforms, it slows down economic development and influx of foreign investments. The state of crime and especially organized crime discourages foreign investors from the disadvantaged market, because in such conditions, they can not gain profit in a legal way, as well as because of the possibility of extortion and corruption. For an objective analysis and assessment of the above mentioned factor, it is necessary to specifically look at the level of training and competence of the police and other competent authorities in opposing organized crime (the application of special investigative methods in controlling organized crime), the conditions of police work (encouraging loyalty to the profession, the level of wages), the level of corruption in the police (to what extent it implements a law without bribery and extortion) and the level of policy influence on the work of the police and whether the state authorities interfere with the work of the police in carrying out the investigations.

STRATEGIC APPROACH AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME

Under the term strategy, in the most general sense, it is understood that the definition of long-term operating directions allows achieving the goals of the organization through different patterns of decisions about the use of resources in the whole organization. In other words, the strategy presents the direction and scope of the organization over a longer time, which provides an advantage for the organization through the configuration of resources in a dynamic environment in order to realize the expectations of the stakeholders⁵⁴⁹. The Strategy foresees, in a longer period of time, possible trends and directions for the development of organized crime and defines the

⁵⁴⁸ Milosavljević B.: Organizovani kriminal: preventivni pristup, *Međunarodni problemi*, br. 2-3, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2016, str. 201-212.

⁵⁴⁹ Johanson G., Scholes K.: *Exploring corporate strategy*, Harlow, Essex, Person Education, UK, 2002, p. 34.

appropriate basic goals and possibilities of the state for its prevention and reduction to the least possible extent. It also defines policy, direction and methodology of state authorities with the aim of:

- developing a proactive approach in the fight against organized crime,
- increasing efficiency in the fight against organized crime by appropriately implementing preventive and repressive actions, as well as seizing property resulting from the commission of a criminal offense,
- harmonizing national legislation with international standards in the field of fight against organized crime,
- strengthening capacities (human and material-technical) of all state bodies involved in the fight against organized crime,
- strengthening cooperation at the national, regional and international level and
- strengthening cooperation between state authorities, private sector and civil society⁵⁵⁰.

When it comes to the national strategy for opposing organized crime, then we can talk about a dynamic program for organized crime fight as an imperative of today in which all actors should play their role, with no episodic roles. For that reason, it is of utmost importance to achieve the political consensus of all democratic forces to combat one of the major threats to the state security. Goals that should be achieved by the actions of state agencies aimed at preventing and combating crime are very important for the strategy of the operation. Certainly it will not look the same if the authorities decide to choose an unrealistic goal, such as the complete elimination of crimes from society is. Not only is such a task nowadays impossible to achieve, but such an orientation leads to the creation of a oversized system of organs of formal social control, but also a massive threat to citizens' rights. A much more realistic goal is to reduce crime to proportions that society is willing to tolerate. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to carry out the procedures in all areas of anti-criminal activities of state bodies.

Given that organized crime presents the most complex and dangerous type of crime in every society and one of the biggest threats to modern humanity, many countries have opted for a strategic approach through national

⁵⁵⁰ Nacionalna strategije za borbu protiv organizovanog kriminala „*Službeni glasnik RS*“ br. 23/2009.

strategies to fight organized crime. In addition, countries are developing national capacities and potentials for an effective fight against all forms of organized crime, in particular against various forms of corruptive linking and the influence of its holders in the state authority structures. Through the state strategy, they determine the policy in the field of establishing an effective system for the fight against organized crime, through defining strategic goals, roles and responsibility and state entities. It also defines frameworks for the development of implementation plans, creating additional conditions for more efficient involvement of the Republic of Serbia in the regional, European and world concept of the fight against organized crime.

It should also be noted that the strategy must include entities of formal social control that must be adapted to the goals contained in the state response strategy. Therefore, it is extremely important that a certain consensus on the priorities in their work is achieved in the society, that is, about types of crimes that pose the greatest danger to society, which is why their counteraction and prevention within the available resources must be given the highest importance⁵⁵¹. Such priorities are determined by the national security strategy and the opposition to organized crime and terrorism is of particular importance. A strategy that seeks to influence the control of socially dangerous behavior shows that the action of state organs in most cases is primarily directed at preventing the future conduct of criminal offenses. The basis of the strategy of opposing organized crime is the idea of prevention.

The term "prevention" means an early reaction before manifestation of a certain adverse event. In principle, prevention contains planned and organized actions and procedures that attempt to completely or partially eliminate the occurrence and the impact of adverse events. From the perspective of organized crime, prevention includes certain measures that reduce or otherwise contribute to the quantitative and qualitative reduction of its actions and the sense of insecurity of citizens, either through direct deterrence from criminal activities or through policy and interventions designed to reduce potential for crime and causes of crime. Prevention implies that the listed activities realization should "include the work of the government, competent state authorities, local government authorities, civil sector, scientific and wider public, as well as the media support". The primary requirement for effective prevention involves identifying the most effective methods and tools in preventing criminal offenses. Its supplementary

⁵⁵¹ Dwight C.S., Ralph F. S.: The Use of Strategies in Organized Crime Control, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 61, Issue 1*, Northwestern University School of Law, 1970, p. 101, available: <http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5643&context=jclc>.

objectives are pretty broad and they spread from identifying the advantages and disadvantages of existing preventive methods and tools and their improvement, to identifying current problems that diminish the crime prevention system effectiveness and finding opportunities to overcome them. In general, prevention presupposes the use of all measures and means for mobilizing individuals, social groups, organizations and institutions aimed at preventing occurrences that are inconsistent with proclaimed positive norms, which in their essence harm the society as a whole.⁵⁵²

In its scope, prevention is more comprehensive and wider than repression, but less popular because its results are not so visible and they can be noticed after a certain and often perennial period. Prevention is primarily aimed at neutralizing the conditions and causes that create and encourage the manifestation of organized crime. In order to achieve prevention, it is of particular importance that the strategy provides possible trends and directions for the development of organized crime and defines appropriate basic goals and possibilities of the state for its prevention and reduction to the smallest possible extent. However, there is no uniform approach in the prevention of organized crime because different societies have different possibilities to prevent the activities of organized criminal groups, and on the other hand there is no universal matrix for organized crime.

CONCLUSION

The facts stated in the paper clearly and unequivocally show that in defining organized crime the only justified approach is the one that proceeds from the way in which criminal activity is exposed. A different approach that focuses on a criminal organization blurs the activity of a qualified organization as well as the consequences of such action. Such an approach by which „people are more important than their activities” has inter alia the consequences on criminal policy that are manifested in the changes of the legal provisions, as well as in the structure and manner of functioning of the entities in charge of opposing organized crime. Priority is given to criminal activity, and in this part the differences are negligible and relate only to a different approach to this definition. Current trends in opposing organized crime indicate that successful opposition to this phenomenon cannot be achieved without the wide involvement of various social and state authorities, organizations, specialized institutions and the public in the widest sense. This primarily means long-term planning, programming and undertaking various

⁵⁵² Krivokapić V.: *Prevenција kriminaliteta*, Policijska akademija, Beograd, 2002, str. 37.

measures that affect the conditions and causes of the manifestation of organized crime. In this part, there is a need for strategy as a long-term program, which involves engagement of the necessary resources for achieving certain goals. On the other hand, the phenomenon of organized crime originates from social, economic, cultural and political circumstances that are dominant in a certain time and space. In addition, tradition and culture as significant social categories certainly have their importance. These factors must be taken into consideration as the starting point for any strategic approach, whereby they are not constant but change over time. By early discovery, based on system analysis, it is easier to determine what is constant, what has changed, what changes, and what could change in the future. Scanning the environment is a continuous process that builds the basis for defining recommendations on priorities and strategies for opposing organized crime. If we want to prevent the occurrence of organized crime in a certain area, we must have an objective assessment, which will foresee its manifestation. However, this is not at all easy, but there remains the possibility to discover certain regularities that do not have the character of social laws, but are of a probable character, that is more or less probable.

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STRATEGIJSKI PRISTUP U PREVENCIJI ORGANIZOVANOG KRIMINALA

Branislav Milosavljević*

Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Uiverzitet odbrane, Beograd,
Republika Srbija

Ljupka Petrevska**

Fakultet za poslovne studije i pravo,
Univerzitet Union – Nikola Tesla, Beograd,
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Savremeni organizovani kriminal ispoljava tendencije permanentnog razvijanja novih formi ispoljavanja kao i neprestano prilagođavanje novonastalim društvenim uslovima i konkretnim okolnostima. Modaliteti pojedinih oblika organizovanog kriminala su složeni kao posledica sve izraženije povezanosti organizovanih kriminalnih grupa na regionalnom i globalnom planu. Budući da je jedna od glavnih karakteristika organizovanog kriminala sposobnost adaptacije u novonastalim društvenim okolnostima, kao osnovna pretpostavka za njegovo efikasno suzbijanje nameće se potreba strategijskog pristupa u cilju stvaranja uslova za preventivno delovanje nadležnih državnih organa. S tim u vezi mogu se uočiti od globalnog do lokalnog nivoa naponi usmereni podsticanju uvođenja i korišćenja strateškog pristupa u kontroli kriminala, naročito njegovih težih oblika, kao što je organizovani kriminal. Strategijski pristup podrazumeva prehodno izradu procene ugroženosti organizovanim kriminalom na osnovu koje se definišu ostali elementi strategije potrebni za njeno dosledno sprovođenje. Primarni cilj strategije je ostvarivanje optimalne kontrole nad postojanjem i delovanjem organizovanog kriminala. U radu su data osnovna razmatranja vezana za izradu strategije i prevencije organizovanog kriminala, a pored opštih razmatranja, poseban akcenat je dat na proceni ugroženosti organizovanim kriminalom na nacionalnom nivou.

Ključne reči: organizovani kriminal, strategijski pristup, prevencija, procena, sprovođenje strategije.

* branislav.milosavljevic@mod.gov.rs

** ljupka.petrevska@fbsp.edu.rs

FIGHT AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE STATES OF THE REGION AND EU MEMBER STATES*

Vanda Božić**

Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb,
Republic of Croatia

Željko Nikač***

The Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies, Beograd,
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: In addition to terrorism, organized crime today is a first-rate global problem that equally endangers the security of developed and underdeveloped countries of the world. In response to all the challenges, risks and threats arising from the perpetration of organized crime, strong anti-criminal solidarity of states has been established in the international community. The absence of a single definition of the concept of organized crime and its elements was not an obstacle for states to initiate the adoption of the International Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. On this basis, the states have harmonized their national legislations, formed special bodies to combat organized crime, and started to apply special investigative techniques and methods. At the multilateral, regional and bilateral level, states and international organizations have realized criminal-law cooperation in combating organized crime and its most severe forms. Cooperation between the EU and the countries of the Region is of particular importance given that Europe is a crossroads of trafficking routes for drugs, weapons, narcotics and human beings. The problem is gaining importance with the escalation of the migrant crisis that threatens to collapse the legal system and the achievements of human civilization. In the final part of the paper, proposals are made de lege

* The paper is written in support of the Croatian Science Foundation and the approved project No. 1949. "Multidisciplinary Research Cluster on Crime in Transition - Trafficking in Human Beings, Corruption and Economic Crime". Paper is also the result of work on the project "Development of institutional capacities, standards and procedures for combating organized crime and terrorism in the conditions of international integration" Serbian Ministry of Science no. 179045 and activities at the Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies, Internal Scientific Research Project Management of the police organization in the prevention and suppression of threats to security in the Republic of Serbia, 2015-2019.

** vanda.bozic@pravo.hr

*** zeljko.nikac@kpa.edu.rs

ferenda for the improvement of the legal framework and the forms of cooperation in suppressing the manifest forms of organized crime.

Key words: *UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (CATOC), special bodies and techniques, suppression of criminal offences, cooperation between the EU and the Region.*

INTRODUCTION

Organized crime is today alongside terrorism, one of the most dangerous challenges of the modern world that threatens to collapse the achievements of human civilization and the rule of law. Since its inception, early in the last century, organized crime has progressed rapidly and has even become a system of life in a large number of developing countries.

The most significant manifestations of organized crime nowadays have gained completely new forms of criminal offences, which are characterized by new and increasingly difficult modes of execution, which causes enormous damage to the community. The essential characteristic of criminal offences of organized crime is reflected in the difficulty of detecting offenders because perpetrators are members of organized criminal groups. The problem is even more pronounced and underlined due to the lack of a single legal regulation, inadequate criminal operational tools and specialized personnel to prove the criminal offences of organized crime. Among the most difficult forms of organized crime is drug trafficking, weapons trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, human trafficking, cybercrime and corruption.

At the international level, there is awareness on the need for a common fight against organized crime and the further development of international criminal and state cooperation between states and international organizations. The cooperation has been established and improved on the multilateral, bilateral and regional level, which in our case primarily applies to the countries of the Region and EU member states.

The adoption of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN CATOC Palermo Convention, 2000)⁵⁵³ is undoubtedly the most important step in the fight against all forms of organized crime. The Convention stipulates the obligation of the signatory states to harmonize their national criminal legislation, prescribes criminal offences of organized crime, provides special investigative methods and techniques for the detection of

⁵⁵³ UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2225.

criminal offences, and establishes specialized bodies for the fight against organized crime. In the context of the application of the provisions of the Palermo Convention, the following Additional protocols supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime were also adopted: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (I), Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (II) and Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (III).

EU member states are particularly affected by the most severe forms of organized crime because of their economic power, geographic position and contemporary migration processes. Organized crime groups target their actions towards EU countries in an effort to make extreme profits in a swift and efficient way, abusing the right to free flow of people, goods, services and capital. Countries of our Region are also on this route, through which the most significant (criminal) ways of trafficking and smuggling of people, narcotics and weapons go. In combating the criminal offences of organized crime, states of the Region have been referred to close cooperation with member states and specialized EU bodies. This is also supported by the fact that some of the countries of the region are EU members themselves. The most important forms of assistance and cooperation relate to the handling of applications, taking of procedural legal actions, exchange of information, joint police operation and work of joint investigative teams.

PROBLEM OF DEFINING THE TERM ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE ABSENCE OF A SINGLE DEFINITION

Organized crime is the most dangerous and toughest form of associating multiple persons with the intent of perpetrating a criminal offence.⁵⁵⁴ Unfortunately, in doctrine and practice, there is no single definition of the concept of organized crime and its elements and characteristics. Distinctions in the definition of the term exist both in relation to individual legal systems and in relation to the specific states in their dealing with the dangers of criminal offences of organized crime. The problem gains in importance in countries where, for internal political reasons, for many years

⁵⁵⁴ Božić V, *Suzbijanje organiziranog kriminaliteta u svjetlu pozitivnog kaznenog zakonodavstva Republike Hrvatske*, Zbornik radova «Suzbijanje organizovanog kriminala kao preduslov vladavine prava,» Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd, 2016, p. 285-300.

the existence of organized crime has been neglected, thus neglecting its disastrous consequences.

Organized crime was first seen in the wider sense as a form of professional crime, which implies the commission of criminal offences in a professional manner and in the performance of an activity.⁵⁵⁵ The initial definition of the concept of organized crime slowly evolved over time in accordance with the social changes, demands and needs of today's modern age. Today, there are numerous notions of the concept of organized crime, its features and elements. In our view, one of the more comprehensive and generally accepted views is the understanding reached by the US Presidential Commission in 1967 after the killing of President Kennedy and evidence of mafia's involvement in this crime. In its Report, the Commission states that organized crime groups are involved in any illegal activity with maximum profits, and with minimal risk of disclosure. Activities include market of goods and services that fit a wider range of citizens, even when it comes to illegal services and goods. Executors of criminal activities are organizations with a large number of members who act unified as large systems with established division of labour and planning of activities over a long period.⁵⁵⁶

The Federal Criminal Police Commission of Germany, in 1974, held a similar view that organized crime is conscious and willing joint action, involving the division of labour of a number of persons for the purpose of committing criminal offences, with the use of infrastructure in order to achieve high financial gains as quickly as possible.⁵⁵⁷ Of particular relevance are the indications identified by the Commission in relation to organized crime, among which are: planning and manner of perpetration of criminal offences, national and international character of criminal offences and perpetrators, hierarchy of relations within the criminal group, conspiracy, criminal solidarity, disruption of justice and corruption.⁵⁵⁸

In the doctrine, there are numerous different theoretical definitions of the concept of organized crime, its characteristics and elements.⁵⁵⁹ In our opinion, it is necessary to accept an extensive interpretation, according to which organized crime is an organized criminal activity by a criminal

⁵⁵⁵ See also: Krainski N, *Kriminalna psihologija*, Beograd, 1934.

⁵⁵⁶ More: Vodinelic V, *Kriminalitet sa mrežnom strukturom i organizovani kriminalitet profita*, Bezbednost, No.1, Beograd, 1992.

⁵⁵⁷ Steinke W, *Das organisierte Verbrechen*, Der Kriminalist No.2, 1982, p.80-98

⁵⁵⁸ See more in: Božić V, Nikač Ž, Simić B, *Borba protiv organizovanog kriminaliteta s osvrtom na permanentnu edukaciju policijskih službenika*, KPA Beograd, Zbornik radova, Tom 2, Tara 2017.

⁵⁵⁹ More: Ignjatović Đ, *Organizovani kriminalitet-drugi deo*, Policijska akademija, Beograd, 1998, also: Bošković M, *Organizovani kriminalitet*, Policijska akademija, Beograd, 1998.

organization with a properly established hierarchy of relationships, division of labor, network structure, methodology of action which implies systematicity, conspiracy, corruption and connection with parts of state structures with the aim of achieving extra profits, avoiding criminal responsibility and legalizing criminal proceeds. Regarding the fulfilment of the conditions for the existence of criminal offences in the field of organized crime, we consider that it is necessary to respect the legally established conditions of the Palermo Convention, with which the provisions of the national criminal law of most states have been harmonized.⁵⁶⁰

Organized crime groups differ according to the type of internal organization and the mode of action and are divided into classical, professional and adaptable model of criminal organization.⁵⁶¹ According to the geographical criterion and the distribution of organized crime at the national and international levels, today the most famous in the world are Italian, Russian, Nigerian, Chinese and Japanese mafia organizations. As a consequence of the transition in the countries of the former socialist bloc, the mafia of the post-communist society emerges,⁵⁶² which today largely assumes the primacy from the earlier criminal organizations. The same case happened with the countries of the Region that, in addition to the transitional problems were also affected by the consequences of warfare, which was conducive to the development of transnational organized crime and its most difficult forms.

CRIMINAL OFFENCES OF ORGANIZED CRIME CRIMINALIZED BY THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

The UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) with Supplementary Protocols I-III concerning Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants and Illegal Arms Trade, provides for the harmonization of national legislations, the application of special investigative techniques and the establishment of special investigative bodies.

⁵⁶⁰ *Law on the Office for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime* is adopted in the Republic of Croatia (ZUSKOK), OG RH 76/09, 116/10, 145/10, 57/11, 136/12, 148/13. In the Republic of Serbia is adopted *Law on organization and jurisdiction of state authorities in fighting organized crime, corruption and other especially serious crimes* (ZONDOSOK), OG RS 42/02, 27/03, 39/03, 67/03, 29/04, 58/04, 45/05, 61/05, 72/09, 72/11, 101/11, 32/13.

⁵⁶¹ More: Sačić Ž, *Organizirani kriminalitet u Hrvatskoj*, MUP RH, Zagreb, 1997.

⁵⁶² More: Fatić A, *Kriminal i društvena kontrola u istočnoj Evropi*, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 1997.

The Convention prescribes the obligation on member states to criminalize criminal offences of organized crime committed with intent in their national criminal law.⁵⁶³ This primarily refers to the following criminal offences: participation in an organized criminal group, money laundering, corruption, responsibility of legal persons for participation in serious crimes, interference with justice, confiscation of the proceeds of criminal offences and the confiscation of property, equipment or other means that were used or intended to be used in execution of criminal offences of organized crime.⁵⁶⁴ Supplementary Protocols, brought about in the context of the application of the Convention, among other things indicate certain forms of organized crime related to Trafficking in Persons, Women and Children,⁵⁶⁵ Smuggling of Migrants⁵⁶⁶ and Illegal Arms Trade.⁵⁶⁷

In the process of harmonization of national criminal legislations, the signatory states have accepted and incorporated into their national legislation criminal offences that criminalize the most severe forms of organized crime. The Republic of Croatia adopted the *Law on the Ratification of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and Supplementary Protocols* on 24 January 2003,⁵⁶⁸ and the Convention entered into force on 29 September 2003. The Republic of Serbia adopted the *Law on the Ratification of the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and Supplementary Protocols*,⁵⁶⁹ on 22 June 2001, which came into force on 30 June 2001.

⁵⁶³ Nikač Ž, *Palermo konvencija i Dopunski Protokoli u funkciji suzbijanja organizovanog kriminala*, Zbornik KPA, Projekat MPNTR, KPA, Beograd, 2015, p.265-290.

⁵⁶⁴ Op.cit. in note 1. art.6-12.

⁵⁶⁵ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UN CATOC, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2225.

⁵⁶⁶ Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the UN CATOC, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2225.

⁵⁶⁷ Protocol against the Illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the UN CATOC, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2225.

⁵⁶⁸ Law on Ratification of UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Act, OG, IA No 14/02, 13/03, 11/04.

⁵⁶⁹ Law on Ratification of United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Act, OG SFRJ, IA No 6/01.

a) The provisions of the applicable Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia prescribe several criminal offences of organized crime.⁵⁷⁰ Among the most important criminal offences are: *Criminal Association (Art. 328)*,⁵⁷¹ *Criminal Offence Within a Criminal Association (Art. 329)*, *Prohibition of Evidence (Art. 306)* and *Coercion against the Judicial Officer (Art. 312)*.

Criminal Legislation of the Republic of Croatia, in accordance with the Convention, provides for the following criminal offences of corruption: *Giving and Receiving Bribes (Art. 293 and 294)*,⁵⁷² *Giving and Receiving Bribes in Economic Business (Articles 252 and 253)*, *Trading in Influence (Art. 295)*, *Bribing for Trading in Influence (Art. 296)*, *Illegal Convenience (art (Art. 251)*, *Abuse in the Public Procurement Procedure (Art. 254)*, *Abuse of Position and Authority (Art. 291)*, *Receiving and Giving Bribes in Bankruptcy Proceedings (Art. 251)*, *Bribing Agents (art. 339)*, *Money Laundering (Art. 265)*.⁵⁷³

Protocol I, CC RC provides for the criminal offence of smuggling of people under the title *Criminal Entry, Movement and Stay in the Republic of Croatia, another EU Member State or Signatory of the Schengen Agreement (Art. 326)*,⁵⁷⁴ while according to Protocol II, CC RC criminalizes the criminal offence of *Trafficking in Human Beings (Art. 106)*.⁵⁷⁵

⁵⁷⁰ Criminal code of the Republic of Croatia, OG No 125/11, 144/12, 56/15, 61/15.

⁵⁷¹ Criminal Association is made of at least three people who have joined with the common purpose of committing one or more criminal offences for which a prison sentence of three years or more is prescribed, and it does not include the association of persons accidentally for directly committing one offence. The leadership and organization of a criminal association is punishable by a prison sentence of six months to five years. Participation in a criminal association, as well as taking action that is not a criminal offence but for which a perpetrator knows that will contribute to the attainment of the purpose of the criminal association as well as financial or other support of a criminal association, although the perpetrator has not yet committed any criminal offence, is punishable by imprisonment for up to three years.

⁵⁷² Božić V, *Koruptivno kazneno djelo davanja mita kao nezakonita protuusluga za uslugu*, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Kragujevcu, Institut za društvene i pravne nauke, 2016, p. 829-846. See also: Božić V, *Kazneno djelo primanja mita kroz prizmu korupcije između ugovornih liječnika obiteljske medicine i tvornice lijekova*, Godišnjak Akademije pravnih znanosti Hrvatske, 2015, p.101-150.

⁵⁷³ Božić V, Kesić T, *Kaznenopravni odgovori na korupciju uz prijedloge de lege ferenda*, KPA Beograd, Zbornik radova Evropske integracije: pravda, sloboda i bezbednost, Tara, 2016, p.455-483.

⁵⁷⁴ Božić V, Lisičar H, Mudrić M: *Kaznenopravni aspekti krijumčarenja ljudi u Republici Hrvatskoj s osvrtom na mediteransku krizu – analiza stanja i preporuke de lege ferenda*, Pravni život, 2015, p. 283-301.

⁵⁷⁵ Božić V, *Krijumčarenje ljudi i trgovanje ljudima u hrvatskom kaznenom zakonodavstvu i sudskoj praksi (analiza stanja de lege lata uz prijedloge de lege ferenda)*, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Rijeci, 2/2015, v. 36, p. 845-874.

The criminal offence of the criminal association is aligned with Art. 2 of the *Framework Decision EU 2008/841/PUP* as of 24 October 2008.⁵⁷⁶ Criminal offences of money laundering and the confiscation of property gains have been aligned with the *Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and the Council* of 3 April 2014 *on the freezing and confiscation of instruments and proceeds of crime in the European Union*.⁵⁷⁷ At the time of the adoption of the new CC RH, the legislator considered the possibility of introducing a new name of the criminal offence *Obstruction of the judiciary* in accordance with international documents, but decided to leave the old name *Coercion Towards a Judicial Official*.

Law on liability of legal persons for criminal offences of the Republic of Croatia,⁵⁷⁸ provisions of the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Act and the Law on the Office for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime state provisions regulating the liability of legal persons for participation in serious crimes involving an organized criminal group.

b) Provisions of the applicable Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia⁵⁷⁹ also prescribe the criminal offences of Organized Crime. Among the most important offences are: *Association for the Execution of Criminal Offences (Art. 346)*, *Prevention and Obstruction of Evidence (Art. 336)*, *Obstruction of Justice (Art. 336b)* and *Money Laundering (Art. 231)*.

The Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia criminalizes the following criminal offences of corruption: *Misuse of Official Position (Art. 359)*, *Trading in Influence (Art. 366)*, *Receiving a Bribe (Art. 367)*, *Giving a Bribe (Art. 368)* *Misuse of the Position of a Responsible Person (Art. 234)* and *Misuse Related to Public Procurement (Art. 234. a)*.⁵⁸⁰

While the Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia has left the term *group* and speaks about the *association*, the Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia defines a group of people of at least three persons associated with a permanent or occasional perpetration of criminal offences. Associated persons

⁵⁷⁶ Framework Decision EU 2008/841/PUP, 24.10.2008, SL L 300, 11.11.2008.

⁵⁷⁷ Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union L 127/39.

⁵⁷⁸ A legal person shall be punished for the criminal offence committed by a responsible person if it violates a duty of a legal person, or if a legal person has or should obtain unlawful property gain for themselves or others. Art. 3/1 *Law on liability of legal persons for criminal offences of the Republic of Croatia*, OG 151/03, 110/07, 45/11, 143/12.

⁵⁷⁹ Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia, OG 85/05, 88/05, 107/05, 72/09, 111/09, 121/12, 104/13, 108/14, 94/16.

⁵⁸⁰ Op.cit. in note 21.

do not have to have defined roles, continuity of membership, or a developed structure.⁵⁸¹ CCRS incriminates the organization of a group, but not the leadership of a criminal group itself. Unlike the CC RS, the CC RH does not distinguish between a *group whose purpose is to carry out criminal offences* and an *organized crime group*, but speaks of a concept of *criminal association*.

Table 1: Comparative representation of basic forms of criminal offences in Croatia and Serbia according to Palermo Convention⁵⁸²

CRIMINAL OFFENCES RH	CRIMINAL OFFENCES RS
Art.328. Criminal Association	Art. 346. Associating for the purpose of performing criminal offences
Art. 265 Money laundering	Art. 231. Money laundering
Art. 306. Preventing Evidence	Art. 336. Preventing and hindering evidence
Art. 312. Coercion against a judicial official	Art. 336. b. Obstruction of justice
Art. 294. Giving bribe	Art. 368. Giving bribe
Art. 293. Receiving bribe	Art. 367. Receiving bribe
Art. 295. Trading with influence	Art. 366. Trading with influence
Art. 254. Misuse in the Public Procurement Procedure	Art. 234. a. Misuse related to public procurement
Art. 291. Misuse of position and authority	Art. 359. Misuse of official position
Art. 326. Illegal entry, movement and residence in the Republic of Croatia, another EU Member State or Signatory of the Schengen Agreement	Art. 350. Unauthorized crossing of the state border and smuggling of people
Art. 106. Human trafficking	Art. 388. Human trafficking

Law on liability of legal persons for criminal offences of the Republic of Serbia⁵⁸³ and Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia envisages responsibility of legal entities for criminal acts of organized crime.

Unauthorized crossing of the state border and smuggling of people (Art. 350) is a criminal offence harmonized with Protocol Palermo Convention. Smuggling of people is treated as a criminal offence and in the case of an

⁵⁸¹ Op.cit. in note 27. Art. 112/2.

⁵⁸² Op.cit. in note 18, 27

⁵⁸³ Law on liability of legal persons for criminal offences of the Republic of Serbia, OG No 97/08

independent and arbitrary crossing of the state border without permission, under arms or by using violence. *Human trafficking (Art. 388)* is a criminal offence in accordance with the Protocol II of the Palermo Convention.⁵⁸⁴

CRIMINAL JUSTICE COOPERATION BETWEEN REGIONAL STATES AND EU MEMBERS IN COMBATING ORGANIZED CRIME

The fight against organized crime is not only a national internal issue of states but it implies international cooperation of states and international organizations on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis. In this regard, the international criminal and legal cooperation of states carried out through specialized bodies is of particular importance.⁵⁸⁵

The *legislative framework* is the basis for suppressing the criminal offences of organized and other forms of crime. As stated, the States Parties to Palermo Convention have agreed to harmonize their national legislation, provide for special investigative techniques and specialized institutional bodies for the suppression of organized crime. It is understandable that the United States and the other developed countries have done the most in this area as they have first met with this monster and adopted significant legal solutions and mechanisms for combating organized crime and developed legal practice and established mutual criminal justice cooperation. The following major legislation has been adopted in the United States: *Organized Crime Control Act, 1970, i.e. the RICO Act* (Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Statute), *Witnesses Protection Act, Money Laundering Act*.⁵⁸⁶ The same procedure was followed by Italy, which adopted the “*Anti-mafia act*” (Law on Organized Crime No. 646/1982), as well as Germany, which passed the *Organized Crime Law* (1992).⁵⁸⁷ Other developed states and countries in transition have reacted in a similar way, particularly those affected by the most severe forms of organized crime.

Following the example of developed countries, Serbia in 2003 adopted the *Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of Government Authorities in Suppression of Organized Crime, Corruption and Other Severe Criminal*

⁵⁸⁴ More: Božić V, *Comparative legislative analysis of criminal legislation of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Serbia in terms of human trafficking as the most brutal violations of fundamental human rights*, Thematic Conference Proceedings of International Significance *Archibald Reiss Days*, 2016, Vol.1, p. 261-277

⁵⁸⁵ Nikač Ž, *Međunarodna policijska saradnja*, KPA, Beograd, 2015, p. 48-55.

⁵⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸⁷ *Op.cit.* in note 9. p. 25–34.

Offences (ZONDOSOK),⁵⁸⁸ while Croatia in 2009 passed the *Law on the Office for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime (ZUSKOK)*.⁵⁸⁹ The process laws in criminal matters in both states regulate general and special evidentiary actions used to suppress the emerging forms of organized crime.

In addition to the Palermo Convention, the international legal framework for combating organized crime also includes numerous international documents available at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. Concerning the format, those are international treaties, agreements, memoranda of cooperation, conventions, resolutions and declarations.⁵⁹⁰

The operational aspect of the fight against organized crime includes measures and actions of police and judicial bodies at the domestic and international level. The core aspects of this activity are the collection and exchange of operational information, joint police operations, joint investigative teams and other mechanisms of criminal cooperation in the fight against organized crime. Of particular importance is the international criminal justice cooperation that takes place through judicial bodies such as the specialized prosecutor's offices for organized crime and through international associations of prosecutors (SEEPAG – *Southeast European Prosecutors Advisory Group* and WBPB – *Western Balkans Prosecutors Network*).⁵⁹¹

The prerequisite for dealing with cases of organized crime is cooperation between security services and police of the states of the region, as well as other surrounding countries. Significant cooperation has been established in the Region of South East Europe following the signing of the Agreement on International Police Cooperation of the states of the Region of 2006 in Vienna.⁵⁹² Cooperation was further promoted through the SELEC organization, founded in 2009 with its headquarters in Bucharest, which brings together liaison officers from the police, customs and other specialized bodies of member states.⁵⁹³ On a broader plan, the cooperation of the countries of the Region with the EU and its specialized bodies is of great importance, since some of the countries of the region are already members of the EU, while

⁵⁸⁸ *Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of Government Authorities in Suppression of Organized Crime, Corruption and Other Severe Criminal Offences (ZONDOSOK)*, OG RS 42/02, 27/03, 39/03, 67/03, 29/04, 58/04, 45/05, 61/05, 72/09, 72/11, 101/11, 32/13.

⁵⁸⁹ *Law on the Office for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime (ZUSKOK)*, OG RH 76/09, 116/10, 145/10, 57/11, 136/12, 148/13.

⁵⁹⁰ More: Nikač Ž, Juras D, *Međunarodna policijska saradnja u JIE u funkciji bezbednosti*, Institut za uporedno pravo, Strani pravni život No.3, Beograd, 2015.

⁵⁹¹ Lopandić D, Kronja J, *Regionalne inicijative i multilateralna saradnja na Balkanu*, Evropski pokret Srbija i Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Beograd, 2010, p.211-212.

⁵⁹² More available at: <http://www.pccseesecretariat.si/>, (01.06.2017).

⁵⁹³ More available at: <http://www.selec.org/>, (01.06.2017).

others are in the process of accession. In this regard, cooperation of judicial and police bodies with EUROPOL, EUROJUST and other bodies of the Union is extremely important. This cooperation is legally regulated by the conclusion of an agreement on the strategic and operational cooperation of the countries of the Region with the EU bodies.⁵⁹⁴

On the multilateral plan, certainly the most significant is the cooperation that takes place through INTERPOL as a specialized international organization of criminal police. At its headquarters, Interpol is composed of departments dealing with combating the most serious forms of transnational organized crime in the areas of drug trafficking, arms trade, human trafficking, cyber crime, corruption.⁵⁹⁵ An important place in the Interpol system belongs to the National Central Bureaus (NCB) of member states that coordinate activities in the joint fight against crime. International

Criminal Justice Cooperation is particularly significant today, given the current issue of illegal migrations caused by the war in Syria, Afghanistan and other countries of the Middle East and South Africa. Cooperation is necessary in the fight against organized crime and terrorism that are closely related, given the fact that the proceeds from illegal drug trafficking provide funding for terrorist activities.

CONCLUSION

In addition to terrorism, organized crime today is an indisputable first-rate security problem of contemporary society that has a transnational character and equally endangers the interests of developed countries, those developing and especially the countries in transition. The most difficult manifestations, such as trafficking in human beings, narcotics, weapons, high-tech crime, various forms of smuggling, in addition to the great insecurity and public disturbance, seriously undermine fundamental human rights and civil liberties. Furthermore, organized crime seeks to undermine the democratic values of the developed world, the rule of law and legal security, as state bodies are often powerless in the fight against organized crime. Another aspect

⁵⁹⁴ *Law on Confirmation of the Agreement on Strategic Cooperation between the Republic of Serbia and the European Police Office*, OG RS, IC No. 38/09, *Law on Confirmation of the Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between the Republic of Serbia and the European Police Bureaus*, available at: <http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/cir/pdf/zakoni/2014/1614-14.pdf>. (01.06.2017) *Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between the Republic of Croatia and the European Police Office*, OG RH, No.07/06.

⁵⁹⁵ More available at: www.interpol.int. (01.06.2017).

of this problem is corruption, used by the perpetrators of organized crime with an aim of avoiding criminal responsibility and the preservation of illegally acquired criminal proceeds.

The adoption of the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) and the Supplementary Protocols I-III, concerning the Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (I), Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (II) and Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (III), was of decisive importance in the fight against organized crime and its most serious forms. UN CATOC has mandated States Parties to harmonize national criminal legislation, criminalize criminal offences of organized crime, provide special investigative techniques and methods for proving these offences and establish specialized bodies for combating organized crime. Legislative solutions adopted by this Convention are largely the result of good legal practices and solutions of developed countries, on the basis of which the other countries have largely aligned their national legislation. Serbia and Croatia acted in the same way and aligned their national legislation with the provisions of the Convention.

Organized crime today has a transnational character, so the fight against the most difficult forms of crime is not performed at the national level only, but primarily at the international level, with the participation of states and specialized international organizations. At the international level, measures and actions are undertaken at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. In this regard, the cooperation of the states of our Region in the fight against organized crime, which is favoured by the proximity of the territory, related languages, cultures, customs and other elements, is of special importance. In response to the profitable association of organized crime groups, the states of the Region have expressed strong anticriminal solidarity and legally articulated the future cooperation through a special Agreement on International Police Cooperation (2006), as well as other aspects of international criminal justice cooperation. This led to solving of a large number of the most serious criminal offences (e.g. the assassination of the Prime Minister of Serbia in Belgrade, the murder of a journalists of a journal Nacional in Zagreb) and the prosecution of perpetrators, and above all to an increase of mutual trust and solidarity among the states of the Region. International Criminal Justice Assistance and Co-operation are rounded up with the activities that take place in the cooperation of the states through Interpol and Europol, today the most famous organizations in the world for the fight against organized crime.

We propose *de lege ferenda* to critically consider the current legislative solutions and especially their application in practice. In the previous

period, the convalidation and legalization of several good criminal operational mechanisms for proving the most serious criminal offences such as polygraphic investigation, targeted searches, computer tests, banking searches, which was done through solutions in complementary regulations and blanket norms (police law). In any case, the solutions must be in the spirit of the protection of fundamental human rights, civil liberties and other universal values of international documents. In this regard, we believe that the mechanisms of international criminal assistance and cooperation should be facilitated with regard to intensifying exchanges of information, participation in joint investigative teams and other forms of anti-criminal solidarity and partnership.

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BORBA PROTIV ORGANIZOVANOG KRIMINALITETA NA PODRUČJU DRŽAVA REGIONA I ČLANICA EU*

Vanda Božić**

Pravni fakultet, Sveučilište u Zagrebu,
Republika Hrvatska

Željko Nikač***

Kriminalističko-policijska akademija, Beograd,
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Pored terorizma, u današnje vreme, organizovani kriminalitet predstavlja prvorazredni globalni problem koji podjednako ugrožava sigurnost razvijenih i nerazvijenih država svijeta. U odgovoru na sve izazove, rizike i pretnje koji dolaze izvršenjem krivičnih dela organizovanog kriminaliteta u međunarodnoj zajednici je uspostavljena snažna antikriminalna solidarnost država. Odsustvo jedinstvenog određenja pojma organizovanog kriminaliteta i njegovih elemenata nije bila smetnja da države iniciraju usvajanje međunarodne Konvencije protiv transnacionalnog organizovanog kriminaliteta. Na toj osnovi države su uskladile nacionalno zakonodavstvo, formirale specijalizovane organe za suzbijanje organizovanog kriminaliteta i počele primenjivati specijalne istražne tehnike i metode. Na multilateralnom, regionalnom i bilateralnom planu države i međunarodne organizacije ostvarile su krivičnopravnu saradnju na suzbijanju organizovanog kriminaliteta i njegovih najtežih pojava oblika. Od posebnog značaja je uspostavljena saradnja država EU i država Regiona s obzirom da je Evropa raskrsnica kriminalnih puteva za trgovinu drogama, oružjem, narkoticima, ali i ljudima. Problem dobija na značenju eskalacijom migrantske krize koja preta da uruši pravni sistem i tekovine ljudske civilizacije. U završnom delu rada dati su predlozi de lege ferenda za unapređenje pravnog okvira i vidova saradnje u suzbijanju pojava oblika organizovanog kriminaliteta.

* Rad je pisan u okviru potpore Hrvatske zaklade za znanost i odobrenog projekta pod br.1949. „Multidisciplinary Research Cluster on Crime in Transition - Trafficking in Human Beings, Corruption and Economic Crime.“ Rad je i rezultat rada na projektu „Razvoj institucionalnih kapaciteta, standarda i procedura za suprotstavljanje organizovanom kriminalu i terorizmu u uslovima međunarodnih integracija,“ MPNTR RS br.179045 i aktivnosti na Internom naučno-istraživačkom projektu KPA Upravljanje policijskom organizacijom u sprečavanju i suzbijanju pretnji bezbednosti u Republici Srbiji, 2015-2019.

** vanda.bozic@pravo.hr

*** zeljko.nikac@kpa.edu.rs

Ključne reči: Konvencija UN protiv transnacionalnog organizovanog kriminaliteta, specijalni organi i tehnike, suzbijanje krivičnih dela, saradnja država EU i Regiona.

**GEOPOLITICS OF MIGRANT CRISIS AND SECURITY RISKS
AS THE FORMS OF OFFENSIVE ASYMMETRIC THREATS
IN THE BALKANS***

Ljubiša Despotović**

The Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Aleksandar Gajić***

The Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: The current migrant crisis has brought up various, complex problems in contemporary Europe. Besides economic-inclusive problems, security problems are the most visible and the most dangerous for all European political communities. Serbia - like other Balkan states - is also endangered, because it stands on the way of migrant influx into Europe that is bringing the long list of potential threats generated by the growth of organized Islamic movements on this territory. Terrorists are using the Balkan area as the mobilization territory for Syrian war theatre or for distending potential internal geopolitical hotspots (such as Raška and Preševo regions or Kosovo and Metohija province). Serbia's complete geopolitical surrounding is complicating security risks, such as the activities of Albanian organizations in Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro or Islamic movements in Bosnia and Montenegro. Radical Islamists and their government and non-government sponsors are conceptualizing various forms of offensive activities such as the infiltration, organization of terrorist acts, hiding terrorists, mobilization, formation of the new radical Islamic cells etc. All of those activities can be described as forms of asymmetric warfare. In this paper we will try to show how the great geopolitical changes contribute to the creation of new unstable circumstances that are used for the recruitment of Islamist militants. We will also try to indicate some of the ways the terrorist organizations are being financed and what are the security risks that are brought up to the Balkans by migrant influx. Specifically interesting aspect of the migrant crisis lies in the fact that migrants are coming to Serbia from territories of EU member states

* This paper was created within the project of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia, No. 179014.

** despotlj@stcable.net

*** romero@eunet.rs

(Greece and Bulgaria) that implicates inability of the EU to solve the current problems.

Key words: geopolitics, the Balkans, migrant crisis, asymmetric threats, security risks, Serbia.

Even Samuel Huntington, who wrote his first article in the early 90's of the last century about the clash of civilizations (which became the basis of his famous book "The Clash of Civilizations" published in 1996) couldn't predict the level of accuracy of his analysis of development of international relations seen through the confrontations and conflicts of various civilizations based on their historical and religious traditions.⁵⁹⁶ Only when the large masses of immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa streamed into the Europe, we started to notice the importance of Huntington's synthetic thinking and to distinguish them from manipulative media spins about the refugees and to place them into the context of clashes between civilizations that are based on both religious and interest perspectives. All those conflicts are originating from the disputes between different values which are the basis of different social, cultural and civilization systems. After the short period of "culture shock" of western public opinion due to the sudden arrival of large numbers of Muslim immigrants, new expert analysis started to emerge with the intention to explain current processes mainly from leftist and liberal ideological perspectives.

Many of those EU experts that incline towards globalist, postmodernist-normative way of thinking have affirmatively described phenomenology of immigration as the part of migratory waves that are transcending existing states boundaries and borders and that have mostly positive impact on the economical and cultural landscape of the place of their arrival. Beside the first approach of the theoretical valuation of migration as the concomitant phenomenon of globalization, there are two more models of explanations of immigration processes. First one is giving the analysis of demographical and cultural effects of immigration, while the second approach is focused on the observation of the economic aspects of the immigrant

⁵⁹⁶ Article "The Clash of Civilizations" was published in magazine Foreign Affairs, no.3. New York, while book was published named „Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order“ in New York in 1996 (Serbian translation: Hantington Samuel, *Sukob civilizacija i preoblikovanje svetskog poretka*, CID, Podgorica, 1998).

population's integration and the efficacy of their acculturation.⁵⁹⁷ “In its postmodern and liberal form, the first – normative approach is the most usual: it values, in a negative way, the state's sovereignty, borders and the binary perceptions of “Us” and “Them” (in this case – “citizens” and “immigrants” as persons with a different legal status) and has an affirmative view of mass migration as a means for dissolving the sovereignty of the state and many other binary distinctions, including those connected to the questions of the status. For liberals, the principle of universal freedom is stronger than the domicile status and all other legal differences, whereas the right to move is stronger than any state's legal norms.”⁵⁹⁸ All those strongly ideological profiled analyses were avoiding geopolitical and security approaches of explanation of the EU migrant crisis; they were consciously overseeing large geopolitical changes in the Middle East that came with the victory of western, Atlantis side in Cold War and the large security threats that were emerging from it in the shape of terrorism based on religious fundamentalism.

As the Atlantist hegemony in Post-Cold War period was stronger, the phenomenon of “the asymmetry of power” that grew beside was more evident. That asymmetry provoked the response from the rest of the world (due to Bzezinski's concept of “West and the Rest) and especially in its Islam part that concentrated most of its powers to provide all possible “asymmetric forms of resistance”. Formula “West and the Rest” was replaced by “The Islam and the Rest” or - in its more conflict variant - “The Islam versus the Rest” which was in Huntington's model directly described as “Bloody borders of Islam”.⁵⁹⁹ Analytical confusion in the West (that is just a small intellectual part of the atmosphere of the “geopolitics of chaos”) missed to notice that the Islam civilization has entered the process of its planetary awakening.⁶⁰⁰ Western analytics also kept secret that Islam civilization has shown significant success in becoming independent center of geopolitical power in the world that is gradually but unstoppable emancipating itself from the previously imposed role of the instrument of Atlantism in its struggle with the other Great Powers in Eurasia such as Russia, China, India, Iran etc.⁶⁰¹ Serbian researcher

⁵⁹⁷ See Gajić Aleksandar, “*Geopolitika sirijskih migracija i EU*”, *Kultura polisa* br. 29, Novi Sad, 2016, pp. 77.

⁵⁹⁸ Gajić Aleksandar, “Geopolitical aspects of EU migrant Crisis”, in *Spatial Demarcations – Between the Politics of Fear and the Effects on the Purse* (ed. Đerić Gordana), Institut za evropske studije, Beograd, 2016, pp. 97.

⁵⁹⁹ Stepić Milomir, „*Geopolitički aspekti emigracione erupcije iz bliskoistočne „velike pukotine*““, *Nacionaln interes*, br. 1/2016, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 2016, pp. 29.

⁶⁰⁰ See Hofman Brus, *Unutrašnji terorizam*, Narodna knjiga, Beograd, 2002, pp. 87.

⁶⁰¹ „Postmodern global expansion of Islam is taking its place due to the religious conversion of non-Muslims, oil and gas wealth of some Muslim states, demographical explosion and

professor Miroljub Jeftić gives his explanation that political science in the whole Western world missed to estimate the real significance of Islam religion, its ambitions and interests due to its own globalist conceptions that were blindly defending premises of so called “political correctness” and multiculturalism. Only in the last few years some of the highest ranking western politicians such as Merkel, Cameron or Sarkozy have judged the concept of multiculturalisms as unsustainable and unsuitable for their societies.

Frequent attempts of some European states like Germany and France to lead their foreign policies based on their own national interests was treated by Washington as unacceptable contestation of US leading position and endangerment of their control of western part of Eurasian Rimland. “All of the EU member states can be provisionally divided into two geopolitical groups: the Atlantists on the one hand, and the Mitteleuropeans on the other. Anglo-American Atlantists are trying to preserve their hegemonic status gained in World Wars and the Cold War, when – through the defending of the western part of Europe from the Soviet Union – they successfully achieved its geopolitical restrains and control. Mitteleuropean Continentalists, on the other hand, want to accomplish the main goal of theirs they failed to achieve in both World Wars: the creation of their own, autonomous geopolitical sphere of influence between the “World Sea” and the “World Mainland” – this time not by confrontation, but rather through cooperation with their former adversaries. The historical observations of the origins and the development of the EU prove that the Atlantist influence has always been more dominant.”⁶⁰² Atlantists used Euro-integrations as a way to impose their geo-strategy of both surrounding of Russian Heartland and the control of western part of Rimland. That hidden conflict “inside the family” in the West is important for the geopolitical school of thinking that supposes that Washington - by using the actions of various fractions of radical Islamic militants – controls and even punishes some of its European Allies, if they strayed away from them and their influence.⁶⁰³ Therefore, professor Stepić posed a right question: “Isn’t the “pumping” of Muslim immigrants aimed at the holding off the Europe’s geopolitical emancipation? Of course, those US interests must be necessary

migrations“, Stepić Milomir, *Geopolitika*, Institut za geopolitičke studije, Beograd, 2016, pp. 420.

⁶⁰² Gajić Aleksandar, “*Geopolitical aspects of EU migrant Crisis*”, in *Spatial Demarcations – Between the Politics of Fear and the Effects on the Purse* (ed. Đerić Gordana), Institut za evropske studije, Beograd, 2016, pp. 104.

⁶⁰³ See De Val Aleksandar, *Islam i Sjedinjene države – alijansa protiv Evrope*, Službeni list SRJ; Beograd, 1998

composed with the interests of pan-Islamist movement that has unconcealed unfriendly and even vengeful intentions towards Western civilization as a whole, considering it as military and politically aggressive and culturally retrograde.⁶⁰⁴

ISLAM FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS

Besides the definition of the wider geopolitical and cultural context of inter-civilization conflicts, we must mention a few more aspects and conditions that were necessary for the realization of the direction of immigrant routes and the outbreak of migrant crisis. One among them is the process of territorial re-composition of the large parts of North Africa and the Middle East through the destabilization and fragmentation of some Muslim states in that Area known as “Arab spring”. In its geopolitical sense, “The Arab spring” represents the destabilization of the area in the central part of Rimland on its North African, Mediterranean brim, as well as the Middle East up to the periphery of the Indian subcontinent. Geopolitical destabilization has its reflections on Sub-Saharan Africa, which is also exposed to the processes of dynamic instability, and Central Asia, previously stabilized by the actions of the continental powers coalition (Russia, China) and the regional actors at the beginning of the 21st century. The internal roots of the destabilization were socio-economic problems, ideological quarrels, a demographical boom, the movement of the rural population to urban centers, the way of life changes introduced by abrupt modernization, environmental changes, ethnical and confessional clashes, the crisis of identity etc. the external reasons for the destabilization can mainly be found in the rivalries among the great powers in this part of the world.

According to the research of Zoran Milošević, the plan for the fragmentation of Islam world – from Morocco to Pakistan, is stretching over 2000 miles - was conceptualized by historian Bernard Lewis, who was receiving direct instructions from Pentagon.⁶⁰⁵ Lewis was the author who coined terms such as „Islamic fundamentalism“ and who wrote about the coming „Clash of Civilizations“ long before Samuel Huntington. Under his supervision, the precise geographic maps of all countries that were provided for fragmentation were drawn at the beginning of 1980`s. Later, in 1983, those maps were voted in the secret session of US Congress and became the basis

⁶⁰⁴ Stepić Milomir, *Geopolitika*, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 2016, pp. 420.

⁶⁰⁵ Milošević Zoran, *Religija i identitet: budućnostmuslimana u EU*, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 2012, pp. 97.

for the American foreign policy for the coming decades.⁶⁰⁶ This plan anticipated future divisions of Saudi Arabia in two entities – first, with the concentration of most Islamic „holy places“ foreseen as the state similar to Vatican, while the second part was planned to be divided between Jordan and Yemen. North African countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Libya and Egypt were destined for fragmentation, Iraq and Syria for division into three or more parts, while Kuwait, Oman and UAE were planned for total dissolution. Liban was planned for cantonization.⁶⁰⁷ Redesign and „refreshment“ of Bernard Lewis’s plan was made by the American colonel Ralph Peters in his work published in „Armed Forces Journal“ in June 2006 that was entitled „Bloody Borders“. From such destabilized, divided and antagonized Islam world it was not very hard to induce masses of migrant population and to direct their movement toward European continent “Chaotic process of ethno-religious conflicts, demographical explosion and mass migration are just the part of comprehensive global anarchy that used as a threat to the rest of the world presented by Bzezinski in the case of the destruction of Unipolar order and dethroning of the USA from the position of “the indispensable nation””.⁶⁰⁸

One of the main roles in the game of destabilization of the Middle East was surprisingly given to Qatar. This country, with the weak capacities for modern state (with 1.9 million citizens, but only 250 000 of original inhabitants, while all the rest are immigrants) has very good relations with the USA. There are two large US military bases on Qatar soil and its state officials gave all the assistance they could during the US intervention in Iraq. Qatar’s role is also interesting in the realization of the plan of the destabilization of Europe and its help to the infiltration of radical Islamic organization from Balkan into the European continent.⁶⁰⁹ On the surface, Qatar has many infrastructural investment project (for instance: in Paris) or in purchasing sport clubs (like Paris Saint Germain) in Europe. Many of those businesses are just covers for arms dealing produced in Europe, mostly in Poland, or for “ideological investments” in financial Jihad, whose main goal is to provide the full employment mostly to Sunni Muslims residing in European countries. Main Qatar investments in Europe are going through project named “European Islam” (whose contributor and associate is Mustafa Cerić, Grand Mufti of Bosnia). Project’s main task is to improve religious propaganda, to enlist lobbyist, mostly European politicians, and to create image of difference and

⁶⁰⁶ Ibidem, pp. 100.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibidem, pp. 101-102.

⁶⁰⁸ Stepić Milomir, „Geopolitički aspekti emigracione erupcije iz bliskoistočne „velike pukotine““, Nacionaln interes, br. 1/2016, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 2016, pp. 32.

⁶⁰⁹ Nišić Svetozar, Globalna sila i bezbednost Balkana, VIZ; Beograd, 2002, pp. 132.

acceptability of “European Islam” to the Europe’s public. European authorities brought conclusions that those subversive activities of Qatar investors “are security threat, while there are (mostly since the beginning of the crisis in EU) also some opinions that are welcoming all investments, even those from Qatar.”⁶¹⁰

„WEAPONS OF MASS MIGRATION” AS A FORM OF ASYMMETRIC THREAT

The syntagm “weapons of mass migration” gives us clear and direct meaning of the essence of contemporary migration movements, in which the demographic surplus of population is being used as population weapon. By guided vectors of infiltration, Muslim immigration is destabilizing countries marked as civilization adversaries of Islam with the same precision as marked in the sentence that “terrorism is atomic bomb of the poor” that emphasized both their asymmetric character and large destructive potential.⁶¹¹ We share the opinion that “migration weapon” has respectable potential of offensive asymmetric tool that is being used in processes if mass immigration influx in the western societies. Its offensive and destructive capacity represents serious threat for all societies and political communities that are marked as targets of infiltration. Its destructive potential shows itself through the terrorist actions that all have the tone of “the holy terror” because of its religious input and through its closed grid organization which is simulating forms of civil organizations and initiatives. We tend to call this form of functioning “Islamic civil society” that is very similar to the way of organization that Vatican is using for decades (so called Roman-Catholic civil society or “Catholic Action”) that is intended for the subversion of those states that have Roman-Catholic minority.⁶¹²

Even though it seems like oxymoron – because Islam rejects democracy as acceptable form of political existence in the predominantly Muslim countries⁶¹³ – the syntagm „Islamic civil society“ represents characteristic of Islamic political flexibility that is being used as asymmetric

⁶¹⁰ Milošević Zoran, *Religija i identitet: budućnostmuslimana u EU*, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 2012, pp. 93.

⁶¹¹ „Today, religious imperative of terrorism is the strongest characteristic of terrorist activities.“ Hofman Brus, *Unutrašnji terorizam*, Narodna knjiga, Beograd, 2002, pp.78.

⁶¹² See Despotovic Ljubiša, *Srpska geopolitička paradigma*, Kairos, Sremski Karlovci, 2012, pp. 106.

⁶¹³ Subotić Milovan, „Ekstremističke tendencije kao prepreka u (pre)oblikovanju političkog identiteta Srbija”, *Kultura polisa*, br. 21, Novi Sad, 2013, pp. 174.

instrument of operation in the context of democratic, civil order of western European countries. „Islamic civil society“ is a part of Islamists tactic in which the democracy (with its evident weakness and crisis in it neoliberal model) is being used as an instrument against democratical societies with its final goal to achieve Islamists strategic supremacy in the European continent. In European intellectual and political circles term „Euro-Arabia“ is frequently used to indicate achieved level of islamization of the Western Europe. Muslim immigration contributes up to 90% of population growth in most EU countries since 1990. 30% of young inhabitants in France (under age 30) are Muslims. In Holland, more than 50% of newborn are Muslims. In the last three decades Great Britain has experienced growth of Muslims more than 50 times. There are 23 millions Muslim citizens in Russia, so Muslims make one fifth of Russia's population. In Belgium, 25% of newborn children are Muslims...“Brussels has become the largest Muslim city in Europe inhabited by 300 000 active Muslim believers. In Brussels, Islam community controls more people than Roman Catholic Church, all political parties and professional associations combined. At the beginning of 2012 there were 2000 active Muslim organizations and 77 mosques in Brussels.”⁶¹⁴ So, that is the typical way of transforming organizations that originated in the western model of civil society into the Islamic organization with religious, non-civil substance.

Flexibility and adaptability of their organization's forms show us that Islamists have carefully studied both weaknesses and advantages of democratic societies (such as human rights corpus and freedoms) and that they are skillfully using them to defeat democracy by democratic means. “Islamist are experiencing the democratic system as a weakness of European man that can be used for the retaking of power when – through demographic explosion and intensive immigration critical mass is being reached; then they can be able to misuse democracy against the civilization, societies and citizens that created and practiced it. There is and there can be no tolerance between democracy and Islamism. And it is not because European democratic societies don't want tolerance, but because it is contrary to the “spirit of Islam” and its interest is seen as the conquest and Islamization of those societies.”⁶¹⁵

Historical origins of asymmetry in theoretical literature were often placed in defensive set of resistance toward outer aggression. They are highlighting the relations between symmetry and asymmetry as co-relative (which means – the larger the disproportion of power is on the one side, there

⁶¹⁴ Milošević Zoran, *Religija i identitet: budućnostmuslimana u EU*, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 2012, pp. 119.

⁶¹⁵ Despotović Ljubiša, „Geopolitički i demografski aspekti aktuelne migrantske krize“, *Kultura polisa* br. 31, Novi Sad, 2016, pp. 17.

is larger number of instruments, techniques and approaches on the other side that are trying to give asymmetrical response). “By using technically simple instruments, asymmetry can be identified with the “weapons of the poor” that is offering - to the numerous participants with limited resources - possibility to inflict completely disproportionate damage.”⁶¹⁶ In the current circumstances, Islamists are trying to use so called “offensive asymmetric instruments” like: infiltration inside the structures of western societies with the intention to organize terrorist’s activities, activities of dissimulation by using different forms of actions like those used by civil societies that are established for the preservation of Muslim’s cultural traditions and particularities in non-Islamic surroundings, mobilizations of supporters and sympathizers for their inclusion in the radical Islamic networks and etc.

All of those activities are taking place outside predominantly Islam states and areas that are mostly not under the direct military occupation of some Western country. In opposite case, that praxis will be considered as defensive form of resistance to the occupation. Therefore, we treat mentioned forms of asymmetric activities in Balkan and EU countries as the offensive instruments that are creating preconditions for the next, more radical phase of Islamists activities, when the critical mass of Muslim population is reached and when the open confrontation - including the forms of religious violence and wars - can be set in motion. In the Balkans, that phase is much closer to its final realization. It is easier achievable because of previous Islam penetration through Balkan bridgehead. Islamists are skillfully using that “historical heritage” including the forces of domicile Pan-Islamist movements to perform some field actions. All of that provides them with a new “quality” in order to transfer the center of gravity of war to the opponent’s territory, far away from its own area of power.

THE BALKANS AS THE BASIS AND SPRINGBOARD OF RADICAL ISLAM TOWARDS WESTERN EUROPE

Muslim factor in the Balkan Peninsula has become a significant subject for the realization of interests of Islamists that are directed against Europe. Methodology of their actions is diversified, radical and uncompromising. They are going from the acceptance of the ideas and activities of radical Islam, creation of the new synthetic national identities all to the well-known forms of territorial separatism. Islamist strategists sought the Balkan area as the zone of their special interest, hardly trying to find new

⁶¹⁶ Bertelemi Kumron, Ribnikar Darko, *Asimetrični ratovi*, NIC Vojska, Beograd, 2003, pp. 20.

followers along its Islamized part of population that are identifying themselves with Islamic main task: the establishment of one global Caliphate. The idea of pan-Islamic unity has found many supporters among local Muslims. Therefore, the Balkans provides good conditions for the establishment of Jihad front against Europe. Today Bosnia and Herzegovina became one of the most important areas for the recruitment and repatriation of radical Islamist fighters, returners from the battlegrounds in Iraq and Syria. During the ethnic and civil conflict in ex Yugoslavia, West has “fallen to observe the truth that in the 90’s Bosnia played the identical role in global Jihad as Afghanistan during the 80’s, when it served as suitable ground for leading the war against infidels and for the providing shelter and polygon for the next generation of militants.”⁶¹⁷

We can only mention Bin Laden and Al Qaeda to point out the level of presence of Islam radicalism in Bosnia.⁶¹⁸ Praxis of „breeding“ global Jihad during the Bosnian war was continued after the end of conflict. It was even more intensified. Security expert for Islamic terrorism, Dževad Galijašević points out that „by protecting their organizations, covering up their actions and paralyzing the security system, Bakir Izetbegović and his party SDA are protecting and supporting terrorists in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They are providing terrorists with counter-intelligence protection; they are paralyzing justice system and obstructing local media that are dealing with this subject.”⁶¹⁹ Galijašević also indicates at the civilization conflict that is situated behind marked processes and gauges that „hiding and covering the terrorist threat, providing help to terrorist cells is civilization betrayal and betrayal of all people who strife for peace and stability. Especially, this is treason of Republika Srpska, Serbian entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is being very threatened by Islamistic radicalism and fanatics from Sarajevo that were raised on the basis of Izetbegović’s doctrine of „full scale war“.”⁶²⁰

All the preconditions for such situations were fulfilled in Bosnia during the 90’s: the existence of the armed conflict involving local Muslims and the growth of local movement of “Islamic awakening”. Even Alija Izetbegovic was not hiding his intentions. In 1991, a year before civil war in Bosnia broke he said: “If there is no fundamentalism in Bosnia right now, it doesn’t mean that there will never be some. In free and sovereign Bosnia, there will be no fundamentalism, but - if someone tries to subdue it - there will be

⁶¹⁷ Šindler Džon, *Nesveti teror*, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2009, pp. 8.

⁶¹⁸ See Petrović Piroćanac Zoran, *Al Kaida*, Evro, Beograd, 2002, pp. 160.

⁶¹⁹ Galijašević also points at the fact that, in statistic comparisation, the recuited numbers of Jihadist in Bosnia is few times larger than those in Arab countries (Bosina has 273 Jihadist per million of its citizens).

⁶²⁰ Večernje novosti, 07.03.2017

not only fundamentalism, but endless terrorism.”⁶²¹ Once started, process of re-Islamization meant not only multidimensional renewal of Muslims identities (religious, cultural and political) in the Balkans, but the basis for radicalized political Islam that - in the form of ideology and program of Islamization - was planned for the realization in all zones recognized by Islamists leaders as potentially Islamic.⁶²²

All of that was done with the tacit support of western governments and their security structures that are now experiencing security “boomerang” in the form of violence in their own backyard. Their inability to deal with situation caused by Islamist extremist is stunning: they are showing constant and outstanding disorganization, incompetence and irresolution. Even brutal and massive terrorist attacks in Paris, Nice, Brussels, Berlin and London failed to provoke their adequate measures of prevention and defense. Their security and political confusion is directly influencing the countries that are pretending for the full EU membership and that are located near the EU. The example of the Republic of Serbia is quite obvious: main problems with the immigrants are coming into our country from the territory of EU members and not directly from the Middle East and North Africa. Migrants are arriving to Serbia through transit routes that should be effectively protected by EU member states – Greece and Bulgaria. Danger can be even more enlarged if migrants influx into the western EU members start to slowdown and they begin to show more discontent with the situation. More problems can be induced if the immigrants start to connect and coordinate themselves with domestic radicalized Muslim population in Kosovo and Methohija, Raško-polimska area, Preševo valley and etc. Risks of classic terrorist actions inside Serbia (in the mass youth manifestation such as Exit, Guča etc) are not out of the table. Possible success in those attacks might bring considerable media attention and prestige to domestic Islamist fanatics in the whole Islam world. All of that might bring opening of the new polygon for future terrorist actions of Jihadists in the Balkans.⁶²³

Situation becomes more transparent when we include quite reasonable and justified anti-immigration policy of Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban in our analytical observation. Hungary is leading such policy (contrary to the fact that it is EU and NATO member) because it is resolute to efficiently protect itself from the destructive processes of radical Islamization of Europe

⁶²¹ Elsezer, *Kako je džihad stigao na Balkan*, Jasen, Beograd 2006, pp. 42.

⁶²² Despotović Ljubiša, *Geopolitika destrukcije*, Kairos, Sremski Karlovci, 2015, pp. 90.

⁶²³ See Despotović Ljubiša, *Srpska geopolitička paradigma*, Kairos, Sremski Karlovci, 2012, pp. 227.

which is even more generated and accelerated by new immigrant waves.⁶²⁴ With Islamization and De-Christianization on the rise, every day more and more is visible the dishonest contribution of corrupted European elites to processes that are destroying their own societies, culture and basic civilization values. All they care about are their own current, short term interests. “As it was stated in a secret report of French government from year 2000, there is no other alternative but to invite 75 millions of immigrants to Europe. That is the high price for the preservation of EU. French experts were admitting that this will bring serious problems in such a hybrid society in the near future.”⁶²⁵

Besides the involvement of alienated European elites, there are some other states interested in organizing transfer of migrants (Turkey, for instance). There are also some non-state actors coming from the global NGO world or from the ranks of big financial capital who are seeking their own opportunities connected with destabilization of the Balkan region and the whole Europe. Jelena Larnova is a researcher who supposed that “operation refugees is organized, financed and supported by the alliance of various non-governmental and other organizations connected with secret services, financial, large media and other circles (...) Similar opinion is expressed by Victor Orban, Hungarian Prime minister, who accused George Soros for financing mass migration through the territory of his country.”⁶²⁶

CONCLUSION

During the last two decades, significant geopolitical changes in the Middle East area of Rimland have produced two large political processes. First among them is constitution of „Islam world“ as a new geopolitical center of power with large potentials to transgress the zone of its previous influence and to jeopardize vital interest of some other large geopolitical players. Second process is related to the direction of large immigrant population that serves as an instrument of offensive asymmetric warfare which threatens to destabilize the security and the basis of democratic political system of countries in both Balkan and Central and Western Europe. Additional peril lies in the chronic incompetence of the government of EU countries to find adequate response to such forms of asymmetric threats. The same fate threatens the states of the Balkans, whether they are EU members or just candidates for it. Political

⁶²⁴ See Milošević Zoran, „*Ko je isplanirao preseljavanje izbeglica sa Bliskog istoka u EU?*“, Nacionalni interes, br. 1/2016, Institut za političke studije, 2016, pp.151-153.

⁶²⁵ Ibidem, pp. 157.

⁶²⁶ Gajić Aleksandar, Geopolitika sirijskih migracija i EU, Kultura polisa, br. 29, Novi Sad, 2016, pp. 89.

future, their historical identity and even a survival of the state will depend on their resolute to confront the *geopolitics of destruction* generated by both radical Islam and their sponsor, some parts of „deep State“ in Washington. It is one and only possible way for them to minimize numerous asymmetric threats and find adequate formula of civilizational answer to the induced crisis.

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GEOPOLITIKA MIGRANTSKE KRIZE I BEZBEDNOSNI RIZICI KAO OBLICI OFANZIVNE ASIMETRIČNE PRETNJE NA BALKANU*

Ljubiša Despotović**

Institut za političke studije, Beograd, Republika Srbija

Aleksandar Gajić***

Institut za političke studije, Beograd, Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Aktuelna migrantska kriza je donela brojne, složene probleme anoj Evropi. Pored problema ekonomske inkluzije, bezbednosni problemi su najvidljiviji i njojopasniji za sve evropske političke zajednice. Srbija – kao i ostale balkanske države – je takođe ugrožena zato što se nalazi na putu migrantskog priliva u Evropu koji sa sobom nosi dugu listu mogućih pretnji stvorenih porastom ograničanih islamističkih pokreta na njenoj teritoriji. Teroristi koriste prostor Balkana kao mobilizacionu teritoriju za sirijski ratni teatar ili za raspirivanje potencijalnih unutrašnjih geopolitičkih „vrelih tačaka“ (kao što su Raška ili Preševska dolina, ili pokrajina Kosovo i Metohija). Ukupno geopolitičko okruženje Srbije uslužnjava bezbednosne rizike, kao što su aktivnost albanskih organizacija u Makedoniji, Albaniji i Crnoj Gori ili islamističkih pokreta u Bosni i Crnoj Gori. Radikalni islamisti, njihove vlade i nevladini sponzori konceptualizuju različite vidove ofanzivnih aktivnosti kao što su infiltracija, organizovanja terorističkih radnji, skrivanja terorista, mobilizacije, formiranja novih islamističkih ćelija itd. Sve ove aktivnosti mogu se opisati kao vidovi asimetričnog ratovanja. U ovom radu pokušaćemo da pokažemo kako krupne geopolitičke promene doprinose nastanku novih, nestabilnih okolnosti koji se koriste za regrutovanje islamističkih militantata. Takođe ćemo pokušati da označimo neke od načina na koji se terorističke organizacije finansiraju i kakvi su bezbednosni rizici preneti na Balkan sa prilivom migranata. Posebno interesantan aspekt migrantske krize leži u činjenica da migranti pristižu na teritoriju Srbije sa teritorija država članica EU (Grčke i Bugarske) koji impliciraju nesposobnost EU da reši postojeće probleme.

Ključne reči: geopolitika, Balkan, migrantska kriza, asimetrične pretnje, bezbednosni rizik, Srbija.

* Rad je nastao u okviru projekta 179014 koga finansira Ministarstvo za prosvetu i nauku Republike Srbije.

** despotlj@stcable.net

*** romero@eunet.rs

THE MIGRANT CRISIS IN EUROPE AS A SECURITY THREAT TO THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

Mitar Kovač*

Eurasian Security Forum, Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Brankica Potkonjak-Lukić**

Strategic Planning Department, Ministry of Defence,
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: The migrant crisis in Europe is mainly a consequence of wars (military interventions and civil wars) planned by the leading countries of the West. These wars, realized in forms of military interventions or civil wars, are in their every respect events that, like a boomerang, shook mostly the very foundations of Europe, but also all the countries located on migrants' routes. In addition to the fact that these wars represent a security threat to lives of the population of these countries, they also make social conditions for satisfying their everyday needs unbearable. The migrant crisis is continuous and because of its scope it is usually qualified by the term "migration of people". Consequences of such a migrant crisis are enormous in sociological, security and political terms. Even today, they are obvious in many aspects, having significant reflection on international relations, interstate relations, the EU, NATO, especially on the leading EU and NATO member states, such as the USA, UK, Germany and France. The European Union has been losing its internal cohesion in finding the adequate way for resolving the migrant crisis. Both NATO and the EU have shown total inability to protect vital interests of European nation states. Consequences for the EU countries, but also for the rest of transit countries, especially for the Republic of Serbia, as a country with a large fluctuation of migrants, have been different. Because of insincere attitude of the EU, the region of the so called the Western Balkans is becoming a "reservation for migrants". In the years ahead, the migrant crisis could become a significant security threat to the Republic of Serbia and could influence its stability, as well as the internal ethnic and religious relations.

Key words: migrant crisis, security threat, European Union, Serbia.

* mitar.kovac21@gmail.com

** brankica.lukic-potkonjak@mod.gov.rs

INTRODUCTION

We are witnessing a permanent threat to fundamental rights to peace, freedom and protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the countries around the world. It seems that almost all the efforts of the modern world in terms of raising the level of international respect, tolerance and spreading human solidarity have been in vain. “Migration of people”, as the leading geo-politicians called migration of population from some countries of North Africa and the Middle East, best confirms this statement.

It is interesting to note that the violent demonstrations and civil wars have been induced only in those states of the Middle East and North Africa that did not accept the neo-colonial position in relation to the West. Only the Arab states that were allies of the leading NATO countries were spared from the “Arab Spring”, hence they were seriously involved in breaking and destabilization of other Arab states in the region. These are, first of all, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar. Turkey has a special role in this process of destabilization of the Middle East, especially in the civil war in Syria.

Direct outcome of the “Arab Spring” was the movement of a multimillion wave of refugees towards the Western Europe countries that resulted in the migrant crisis with significant and different implications for the security of the Western European countries that are, predominantly, the ultimate goal of the refugees, but also for the security of transit countries through which they have to go in order to reach their final destinations. It turned out that the refugee columns have been accompanied by various negative phenomena, such as organized crime, war, terrorism, and social and political upheavals in the countries through which they travel and in which they come. The presence of the large number of migrants in the long term causes fear and anxiety of the local population. Such problems can be found also in Serbia, especially in the south of Serbia, Belgrade and in the border regions towards Hungary and Croatia.

THE MIGRANT CRISIS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

In many EU countries refugees are perceived as a threat to security, economy, social stability and the health care system, which further implies a reasonable growing of hostility of the local population, and an increase in xenophobia, racism and strengthening of national movements, because extremists among refugees bring discomfort, restlessness and threaten personal safety, especially of the young generation in Europe.

The fears of people in Europe are quite justifiable, because the large-scale migration from Arab and Islamic states threaten the vital interests of free states and people. Consequently, many domestic and foreign scholars dealing with security rightfully consider migrations, i.e. “migrant crisis”, as the most important and the largest outcome of the “Arab Spring” and military interventions of the NATO and its leading members, especially the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey and Germany. This attitude has led to the “boomerang effect” in terms of outcomes, affecting precisely those states themselves that have generated the greatest disaster in the countries which they have destroyed. In that regard, so far, the US has suffered the least consequences, because they are quite far away to be a migrant goal, but also because globalization and financial power centres and foundations aim to “Americanize Europe” and to make nation states, as traditional institutions with the “conservative” and archaic system of values, to disappear.

Tunisian Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation, as a protest of a desperate man against the violence and corruption of the police and local authorities, is considered to be a “precipitous incident” (a phrase used by Hans Toh), a sudden event that tied for itself a rage of a large number of people deprived of their rights. This act was seen as a symbol of the necessary fight against social injustice, but also as a direct cause of collective action that will lead to social and political changes, i.e., a “wave of revolutions” which started, from the roots, to change socio-political structure of some states in North Africa and the Middle East. The wave of so called “revolutions” that began in Tunisia, very quickly transferred to other North African and Middle Eastern countries, and it was collectively called “the Arab Spring”. “And when that happens, essentially harmless situation transmits itself in time and place for the destructive retaliation or violent incident in gigantic proportions”.⁶²⁷

Outcomes of “the Arab Spring” are different: (1) In some countries, the army and police crushed protests (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain); (2) in Morocco, Jordan, Qatar, Oman and Lebanon there were some political changes that satisfied the requirements of protestors; (3) in others, there have been an armed conflict (Yemen, Iraq) and a civil war (Libya and Syria); (4) in countries where the protests first started, there were elections and changes of governments (Tunisia and Egypt). Then the wave of returning to the “old regimes” came, as it was the case in Egypt or the outbreak of civil wars and foreign interventions (Libya and Syria), without the approval of official authorities or with the call for military assistance, that was issued by the Syrian official government to Russian Federation. Turkey and many leading

⁶²⁷ Ханс Тох, *Насилници*, Београд: Просвета, 1978, p. 281.

countries of the West have been assisting the armed rebellion forces, the so-called moderate opposition, or the so called Free Syrian Army, demanding ultimately that the only solution would be the resignation of the legal authorities, in order to bring such a political establishment that will unconditionally comply with the requirements of the West. At the same time, the overall military, diplomatic and political support have been given to insurgent and rebel groups, including those that directly carry out terrorism and that have been guided by the ideology of extremist Islam and work closely with Al Qaeda or Islamic State.

By their joint action, Islamic movements and organizations have created the so-called Islamic State, which does not recognize state borders and uses the most brutal methods of terror and terrorist activities. It has already been obvious that the so-called Islamic state would not exist without significant logistics and military assistance provided by some of the leading NATO powers, which fight against it more in a declarative way. There are more and more indicators that suggest that the Islamic state was created in order to: (1) destroy countries that have been marked as specific targets for aggression; (2) create new puppet-states; (3) destroy peoples' democratic regimes and to install anti-peoples' regimes and (4) sell oil and gas under price, and to bring, under special conditions, leading energy corporations in the post-war period. Along this way, only Syria has resisted for a long period, and with the help of Russia it has managed to gradually return its sovereignty and national dignity.

Syria was supposed to fail, to become fragmented, and the Russian influence was also supposed to be eliminated and the integration of corporate capacities of oil and gas ensured, in order to provide the Europe, through Turkey, with these resources from the Middle East and to eliminate Russian energy influence in Europe. This is the US strategy in the Middle East, aiming to marginalize Russian influence. Therefore, regarding Syria, Russia has no alternative; it should remain just there in the long run if it wants to be a world power, prevent the pressure of NATO on its borders and ensure stability and development of its economy based on energy. After Montenegro became a NATO member, Syria remained the only country where Russian naval fleet may have a base and control the Mediterranean. Costs and suffering of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Syria are priceless, because in the long run they promote Russia in the world as a fair country that protects endangered peoples and states. In Syria, Russia defends its freedom and dignity. This image of the righteous state is spreading also among the leading countries of NATO and the EU.

In spite of media propaganda, the West can no longer hide the truth and the fact that it considers Russia as a threat. It is so clear and so funny that

the very regimes that produce this propaganda do not believe that it is true. These regimes are becoming more and more aware that Russia is consistent, that they have to respect it and need to talk with Russia on an equal basis. Western sanctions are a relict of the past and should be abolished as soon as possible, because they will have a devastating effect on social conditions in Europe, as well as the future of the EU. From these reasons, national movements in Europe have strengthened and they do not want any more to follow blindly the instructions of the United States and the neo-liberal system of values. Therefore, the EU irreversibly disappears and no prospects.

The US themselves, with their aggressive strategy and influenced by mega-capital, induced instability in Europe, the EU, the Balkan region and the USA led to a large number of casualties, refugee waves, economic and demographic decline and to social instability and fear. Fear has become a feature of life in Europe today, and that was exactly the goal of terrorists.

With regard to security, the following consequences of the “Arab Spring” should be pointed out: (1) “democratic elections” in irregular conditions; (2) forcible replacement of long-lasting regimes; (3) destabilization of Arabic and Islamic countries from Afghanistan to the North African; (4) occurrence of prolonged civil wars and (5) non-resolution of problems initiated by the “Arab Spring”. All these consequences have encouraged the development and the impact of extreme Islam and the emergence of the migrant crisis, which are security risks and threats to many countries in North Africa, the Middle East and Europe.

From the aspect of the European states security, the most significant consequences of the “Arab Spring” are terrorism and the migrant crisis, currently two of the biggest risks and threats to their security. For all the countries of the Old Continent, terrorism and the migrant crisis constitute the essence of security challenges; some other security challenges, that are certainly deeper political and social challenges for Europe, are closely related to them, among which the following stand out: (1) rise of extremism; (2) inefficiency of the EU institutions in resolving the migrant crisis; (3) deterioration of relations between the EU towards the countries of the Arab world, as well as to the countries on the Balkan route, where the Greater Albania project has been tolerated and adequate measures have not been taken by the EU. On the contrary, the project is nourished by a mild or no operation of Brussels and the United States.

Not a small number of security scholars and analysts believe that migration is one of the new “weapons” for waging contemporary conflicts, that is to say, it is only one of the manifestations of applying the concept of “hybrid warfare”. It is believed that migrations are one of the ways or methods to achieve important geopolitical objectives of the great powers. The

agreement between the EU and Turkey on migrants demonstrates that migration is guided and that they can be controlled. The Agreement entered into force on 20th July 2016. Based on this agreement, the EU has committed itself to “speed up” Turkey's accession process to the EU and that it will provide Turkey with donation in amount of EUR 3 billion, while Turkey promised to keep about 2.7 million refugees on its territory and to receive part of migrants to be returned from Greece.⁶²⁸ Both sides were not sincere and demonstrated the treason under the deal, so it has no practical function or meaning.

This theory on orchestrated migration of peoples is also supported by the fact that migrants from the affected areas do not go to rich countries from the region, such as for example: United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Qatar, but solely to the EU. Therefore, on the one hand, it can be concluded that, directing the “migration of people” outside the territory of North Africa and the Middle East is the way to release natural resources from state control and indulge them to large multinational corporations, whose seats are in the leading countries of the West. After “migration of people”, the peace will be established through military presence and demilitarization and marginalization of military effectives in the Middle East.

Thereby, conflict areas, which a leading American theorist of globalization Zbigniew Brzezinski long ago designated as regions of “geopolitical earthquakes and instability in the future”, would permanently be translated into a state of controlled “prosperity and development”. It should be known that the so-called theory of Zbigniew Brzezinski, as can be seen in Figure 1, resulted in laboratories of intelligence services of the leading colonial powers of the West, which on the basis of this theory and forcible globalization built the so-called new world order. Therefore, the theory of Zbigniew Brzezinski is an instrumented classical theory and the basis for applied strategy of the US, NATO and the EU. Its reflections are more than obvious, as a result of strategies and modes of operation of the United States and other leading countries of the West. With the end of conflicts in the Middle East and by putting the territory under full control, these power centres are planned to master the natural resources and to move the Islamic State and terrorists to the Caucasus and the countries that are in the zone of instability (Fig. 1).

On the other hand, the US want, by using migrants, to exert further pressure on some “unreliable” partners in the EU, and to weaken their

⁶²⁸ Kelly M. Greenhill, “Migration as a Weapon in Theory and in Practice, *Military review* (6) 2016, pp 27-36..

economic, and thus political and security powers, causing the EU and other countries to seek a solution “under one flag” for controlling, and then breaking Russia. Accordingly, it is logical that the majority of migrants wants to permanently settle in the economically and politically most powerful EU countries, Germany, France and the Scandinavian countries.




Figure 1: Prediction of Brzezinski on security unstable areas in Eurasia⁶²⁹

Globalization theorists believe that migrations are only a logical sequence of events of the globalization process, and that the demographic imbalances and inequality of life chances are their main cause. Also, they assess that the 21st century will be the “century of migrations” and stand in favour of the fact that at its beginning there were more migrants than ever before in history, unlike the 20th century, which has largely been characterized by refugees as actors of migration processes. Then, the refugees from the territory of the former Yugoslavia and from other crises initiated the process of migration, which is still current only because of the difficult social situation. Therefore, a huge number of qualified higher educated personnel went to

⁶²⁹ Збигњев Бжежински, *Велика шаховска плоча*, Бања Лука: Романов, 2001, p. 118.

Western countries, further impoverishing and small and underdeveloped countries, making them colonies with dirty technology and simple labour force.

MIGRANT ROUTES AND THEIR GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Conflicts that have occurred in weakened states of North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia (Libya, Syria, Northern Iraq, and Afghanistan) have forced millions of people to move and thus make the region of Southeast Europe to become one of the busiest migration routes in Europe. The name of this migration route is the Eastern Mediterranean and it is mostly used by migrants from Afghanistan, Somalia, Eritrea and Syria.




Figure 2: Overview of the number of illegal migrants by migration routes

The Eastern Mediterranean migratory route has two directions: (1) *Turkey - Greece - Macedonia - Serbia – the EU*, a route known as the *Western*

Balkan Route, or just as *the Balkan route*; and 2) *Turkey – Greece – Albania – Montenegro – EU*, noting that Albania and Montenegro are rarely used as a transit countries, but the transfer of migrants to Italy by sea routes from the refugee camps in Turkey and Greece has been performed directly. In addition to these migration routes, the following are also shown: *Central Mediterranean* migration route, which has mainly been used by migrants from Libya and Nigeria, direction *Libya – island of Lampedusa – Italy*; and *Western Mediterranean* migration route that has been used by migrants from Libya and Tunisia, direction: *Morocco – Gibraltar – Spain*.

In the records of Frontex there are 8 migrant routes, and in addition to the above mentioned, there are Eastern Borders, loop route Albania – Greece, Western Balkan, West African (Western Mediterranean) and Black Sea migration route.



Figure 3: The Eastern Mediterranean route

In 2014, the EU had a total of 33 million people, or about 7% of the total EU population who were not born in the EU, which implies that they were once immigrants. In the period from 2010 to 2013, about 1.4 million people have migrated to the EU, but this figure only applies to asylum seekers and refugees, or people who have entered the EU using regular migration procedures.

In attempts to enter the EU, a large number of migrants have lost their lives. On 17th November 2016, Frontex published the information that in the

period from 1st January to 16th November 2016, 4.500 migrants lost their lives on the sea migration routes only.

During the creation and development of the migrant crisis, the EU failed to offer a comprehensive response to the situation, taking into account different and often conflicting positions of its member states. For Southeast European countries a priority was to speed up the transit of migrants through their territory, and any attempt to limit this process, such as Hungary attempts to close the border, was faced with diplomatic reactions of neighbouring countries. Hungary has exhibited all national consistency and accountability in accordance with its national interests. By similar practice of Austria, Slovenia and Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia have become victims of the migrant crisis. Germany is largely responsible for such a situation, because, in essence, it has the positive public media attitude towards migrants, especially to those who are educated and who came bringing capital, while it wants to stop uneducated migrant population in the Balkans and try to get them socialized there. Also, secretly, through the EU, it provides assistance to Hungary, Austria, Slovenia and Croatia to strengthen their forces and systems for border control.

REFLECTIONS OF THE MIGRANT CRISIS ON SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

Tense and conflicted interests of some of the great powers go to such an extent that the violent changes of government have been modelled and the frozen conflicts have been activated, while strengthening religious and national extremism. In that process, Serbia and the Serbian people as a whole will be confronted with major security challenges and threats in order to protect their national interests.⁶³⁰ Accordingly, the thought of Jovan Cvijić who once said: “Who is to blame that we built our state in the middle of the imperial road”, remains current.

Relations between Croatia and Serbia, as well as relations between Croatia and Hungary were in a crisis because of migrants and their crossing the borders of the Balkan states. Some countries have decided to raise the “fence” in order to stop the influx of migrants, starting with Hungary, to Slovenia and Austria. As a result of the closure of the borders, there was a certain number of migrants cumulated who remained, ”stuck” in the countries of the Western Balkan route. Figure 4 shows closed state borders of the

⁶³⁰ Митар Ковач, „Интереси великих сила на простору Балкана”, *Зборник радова са научног скупа „Србија и стратегијска раскршћа“*, „ИСИКС 2016“, Београд, р. 415.

countries that are located on the Western Balkan route, as well as alternative routes of transit.

By closing the borders and by the agreement reached in February 2016 between the EU and Turkey, the number of migrants in the EU countries, especially in the Western Balkan route, decreased. Their number only increased on sea migration routes or on Central Mediterranean and West Mediterranean routes.



Figure 4: Alternative Balkan route

Migrations, especially illegal ones, have enormous repercussions for the security of the states on the migrant route, as well as the countries of final destination. Between four and five million of migrants each year enters into some foreign country, and at the same time, the number of illegal border crossings varies between 30% and 50%. They necessarily bring with them an increase in danger for the local population from infectious diseases, crime and terrorism. For the host country, they can, due to an excessive influx of cheap labour force and unexpectedly large social benefits, constitute a source of destabilization of its economic security. Migrant smuggling and human trafficking have become mass criminal offences in the so-called first migrant destinations, and also a source of vast illegal and non-taxable incomes.⁶³¹

⁶³¹ Драган Симеуновић, „Миграције као узрок политичких аномалија у Европи“, научно-стручни скуп *Ирегуларне миграције: уводно предавање*, Вршац, 2015.

The issue of reception of migrants and refugees leads to tensions and divisions not only at the level of the international community, but also within the EU and its leading members. At the meeting in Prague in September 2015, representatives of the so-called "Eastern bloc" of the EU: Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, rejected the plan of the European Commission on "redistribution of migrants by quotas". The migrant crisis has divided public opinion in Europe. The part of the public perceive migrants as a danger, given that migration is interpreted as the destruction of European cultural identity through planned migrations of Islamic populations for further Islamization of Europe. Also, the attitudes of the part of the public are based on the fear of increasing risks and threats of terrorist attacks, as well as increasing the number of criminal acts and other forms of violence committed by migrants. This is the majority opinion in Europe that is based on objective reasons.

One aspect of endangering the national security of the Republic of Serbia refers to social disorganization in critical areas, traffic interruption, blockade of border crossings, disrupting public order and peace to a greater extent, clashes between police and migrants. Different criminal activities may also be linked to the refugee crisis. Today, the key problem of migrant crisis in the Balkans is human smuggling. Illegal crossings across the state border constitute a violation of state sovereignty because it challenges the state's ability to assert control over its territory.

The migrant crisis is also an economic threat to national security of the Republic of Serbia. Migrants may be the cause of economic difficulties and they certainly are a burden on the country's budget and influence the reduction of labour costs in an already unstable economic environment. It is evident that poor countries and countries in transition, such as the Republic of Serbia, do not have enough economic capacity and the available infrastructure to be a shelter for tens of thousands of migrants, because it represents a latent threat to their development, stability and prosperity.

Given that some of the migrants were directly involved in war operations, and that they have been trained for the execution of combat operations in rural and urban areas, there is a real possibility of performing individual acts of terrorism on objects and high value targets, *inter alia*, with the aim of causing fear and panic among the population. Therefore, we can say that the migrant crisis poses a threat to the national security of the Republic of Serbia. Assumptions of the intelligence and security organs of the leading EU countries in terms of the duration of the crisis are of particular concern. It is anticipated that the crisis will last for a long time, in two periods: (1) from March to November 2016; and (2) from March to November 2017, when the

total inflow of about 3 million migrants in Europe is expected, and the Republic of Serbia should continue to be a transit country.

Thousands of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants, including children, who travel on a dangerous route through the Balkans, remain in Macedonia and Serbia in the “trap”, without adequate protection and perspective. There is a lot of indicators that speak in favour of the thesis that “the crisis, from the Middle East, over the migrants, has been moving to the Balkans” and that the so-called international community, at some point, when large masses of migrants “got stuck in the Balkans” will offer financial assistance and benefits for the ruling national elites of the failed states in the Balkans, to agree to settle large numbers of migrants in these countries, especially in the so-called Western Balkans. Throughout the process, due to the large number of refugees, the international institutions and UN bodies would be involved. In this way, the Western Balkan countries would be further destabilized and forced to accept an imposed solution. This is perfectly well known and planned by leading Western countries which have been preparing a strategy for that time.

In preparing this strategy Germany participate very actively but covertly, under the leadership of Angela Merkel, who is declared for the rights of refugees in order to have the moral justification to put pressure on the countries of the Western Balkans. She, essentially, tacitly supported measures of Hungary, Slovenia, Austria and Croatia to protect well their national borders, in order to, in the active period of the migrant crisis next year, make a “reserve for migrants in the Western Balkans”. For these reasons, on several occasions, the EU authorities have offered financial assistance to Serbia to build new facilities for the reception and accommodation of migrants.

The media in the West sometimes foster and justify this strategy in order to protect the EU, and to make the so-called Western Balkans a “reserve for migrants”, and these states for a long time or never would be admitted into the EU. Also, the West perceives this space as a zone of traditional neo-Ottomanism and Turkish national interests in the Balkans. Such a solution for the migrant crisis would suit the US, EU, UK and Turkey. Looking from a long-term aspect, Islam would become dominant in the Balkans, and Russia's interests would be permanently suppressed from the Balkans. This would result in a strong demographic mass of Islamists for projected wars in the east. By the implementation of such a strategy for solving the migrant crisis, Serbia, as well as its vital national interests would be threatened more than by war. Therefore, Serbia must understand that the coming period is essential for its national security and that it should not be allowed that, as a consequence of backdoor decisions and strategies of the West, it becomes a victim of the migrant crisis.

Commissariat for Refugees of the Republic of Serbia often comes to unreasonable decisions and threatens the local environments on the migrant route. There have been multiple unfortunate events whose consequences were killing, wounding, rape, pedophilia and the like. No lives are safe in the city centres, let alone in the towns and villages near the border on migrant routes. Thus, for example, Zaječar City Council did not give approval to the Commissariat for Refugees for the implementation of the decision to open a reception centre for migrants in Gamzigrad spa resort.

It can be expected that the migrant crisis will continue in the future, whereby, because of the manifested disunity within the EU, the Western Balkans, as a “reserve for migrants”, would become the only acceptable solution. This is reflected in the attitude of the authorities in Germany and in other Central European states towards Roma by constantly returning them to Serbia. States on the Balkan migration route would be endangered, first of all Serbia and Macedonia. Serbia has done the least to prepare and organize its border in the south to Macedonia and to the southeast, towards Bulgaria. Aid provided by certain European countries in manpower and joint patrols, such as Austria and Slovakia, is symbolic.

Hungary's determination to fully protect its borders and to make them impermeable, and then also Croatia, directly threatens the Republic of Serbia in terms of the number of migrants who, in the event of massive inflows can be found “stuck” in its territory. In such a situation, it can not be expected from the EU authorities to find understanding and enable migrants to continue moving towards Central Europe. On the contrary, the most likely option is that the EU, in such a situation, will offer financial resources for keeping migrants in the so called Western Balkans. Serbia should be aware of these dangers and of the EU strategy in case that Turkey releases this great wave of migrants. It would indeed be a “migrant tsunami” for the states of the so-called Western Balkans, especially for Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Montenegro.

There is no doubt that, if such a scenario happens, such a number of migrants would change the system of values, ethnic and religious structure of the population. Orthodox countries must be aware of this, so that their nations would not become a minority in their own territory. In this way, even without the war, gradual substantial loss of sovereignty of these states could happen on the account of the formation of a new “Islamic state”. Moreover, we should bear in mind the possibility, that in the future, migrants from the EU who are not able to fit in and socialize in the Western system of values and those whose behaviour and actions are based on an extreme nationalist and religious fanaticism could be deported to the so-called Western Balkan space.

CONCLUSION

Explosive population growth on the planet, with a reduction of resources in underdeveloped countries and developing countries, the widening gap between rich and poor and intolerable and inhumane living conditions of much of the world's population, crises and wars, besides the danger of internal migrations and various conflicts, have led to a mass migration of people to other states, regions and other continents. These are mass migrations, causing social and security shocks, and are often referred to as a “migration of people”. In this context, today's disturbing social and racial reactions may be small compared with what it can be expected in the future.

The most significant causes of mass migrations of the population are mainly security, social and economic in nature. These causes are mainly induced by the crisis, wars and military interventions of the leading countries of the West, which are exclusively governed by the values and logic of neoliberal capitalism. The supreme value in this system is money (capital), and not a man. The chaos induced in many regions of the world has pushed the millions of poor, displaced, deprived from their rights and threatened people to leave their home countries in search of a new life. Among emigrants, there are a lot of young people who were, as members of terrorist organizations and movements, directly involved in armed conflicts. Therefore, some authors believe that an increased number of migrants seriously undermines the security of states in which they are coming and qualifies them as a direct threat to security, because the migrant crisis has been increasingly instrumentalized and managed from certain Western power centres.

Greece, Serbia and Macedonia suffer the greatest pressure of the migrant crisis in Europe, as a result of the failure of the EU migration policy, the inability of NATO and the intentions of informal power centres in the US and UK to manage the security situation in the Middle East and in Europe over migrants.

There are a lot of indicators which suggest that Germany, through its “satellites”, primarily through Hungary, Croatia and Austria physically block the passage of migrants to its territory and that its intention is to bring Greece and the rest of the Balkans in a hopeless position. For these reasons, Serbia should urgently start to arrange the part of its state border on selected routes, strengthen its security forces and get ready to handle each new wave of migrants and the continuation of the crisis in 2017 and 2018. The strategy of the US, UK and Germany regarding the migrant crisis is clear, as by using NATO forces, they do nothing to calm the source of the crisis, to end the civil war, and to, by engaging NATO naval forces, prevent the passage of migrants

to Europe. In the future, we can expect that most migrants will move outside the border crossing, to avoid keeping on prepared obstacles and blockades.

Therefore, the preparation of the security system should continue in full strength, so that, if Turkey releases the huge waves of migrants in a short period of time, we can be better prepared for that fatal time for the national security of the Republic of Serbia.

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MIGRANTSKA KRIZA U EVROPI KAO BEZBEDNOSNA PRETNJA REPUBLICI SRBIJI

Mitar Kovač*

Evroazijski bezbednosni forum, Beograd,
Republika Srbija

Brankica Potkonjak-Lukić**

Uprava za strategijsko planiranje, Ministarstvo odbrane,
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Migrantska kriza u Evropi je većinom posledica ratova (vojnih intervencija i građanskih ratova) planiranih od strane vodećih zemalja Zapada. Ti ratovi, realizovani u formi vojnih intervencija ili građanskih ratova, događaji su koji su iz temelja, kao bumerang, potresli najviše Evropu, ali i sve zemlje koje se nalaze na migrantskim rutama. Osim što predstavljaju bezbednosnu pretnju za život stanovnika tih država, ti ratovi čine socijalne uslove zadovoljavanja njihovih svakodnevnih potreba nepodnošljivim. Migrantska kriza je kontinuirana i tih je razmera da se često označava sintagmom „seoba naroda”. Posledice takve migrantske krize su ogromne u sociološkom, bezbednosnom i političkom smislu. One su već danas u mnogim aspektima očigledne i značajno se reflektuju na međunarodne odnose, međudržavne odnose, EU, NATO, posebno na vodeće članice EU i NATO, kao što su SAD, Velika Britanija, Nemačka i Francuska. Evropska Unija gubi unutrašnju koheziju po pitanju pronalazjenja adekvatnog načina rešavanja migrantske krize. NATO i EU su pokazale potpunu nesposobnost da zaštite vitalne interese nacionalnih država Evrope. Posledice po zemlje EU, ali i ostale tranzitne zemlje, a posebno po Republiku Srbiju kao zemlju sa velikom fluktuacijom migranata, su različite. Prostor tzv. zapadnog Balkana, zbog neiskrenog odnosa EU, postaje „rezervat za migrante”. Migrantska kriza u narednim godinama može postati značajna bezbednosna pretnja Republici Srbiji i uticati na njenu stabilnost, kao i na stanje etničkih i verskih odnosa.

Ključne reči: migrantska kriza, bezbednosna pretnja, Evropska unija, Srbija.

* mitar.kovac21@gmail.com

** brankica.lukic-potkonjak@mod.gov.rs

**RECENT TENDENCIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
REGARDING THE REGULATION OF MIGRATIONS
INDUCED BY ARMED CONFLICTS***

Dragan Knežević*

Ministry of Labor, Employment, Veterans' Affairs and Social Affairs,
Republic of Serbia

Jovanka Šaranović**

The Strategic Research Institute, University of Defence,
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: The appearance of displaced persons caused by armed conflicts are not new, but have existed almost long as wars, which provoked them. Civilians, being not combatants, but affected by hostilities (in)directly, are the major victims of armed conflicts protected by IV Geneva Convention of 1949 and its Additional Protocols of 1977 and 2005. They are very often forced to leave their habitual places in search for a shelter whether inside their countries or abroad. Lately, the number of such men and women in a motion for (temporary) protection (asylum) has reached more than 10 million. By irregular crossing of international borders, through smuggling, and involved in trafficking in human beings – they disarrange stability and security of transit and/or host countries strongly. Such occurrences have been so frequent at the beginning of the 21st century that one can ask a question if migrants are consequence or instrument of (asymmetric) warfare. In a situation when for a mass displacement, the norms of Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 are implemented rarely – the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution of September 19th 2016 confirming New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants demonstrates a valuable international outcome in the regulation of migrations and in the protection for seekers of (temporary) asylum/sanctuary, as well as for the reaffirmation of standards in the preservation of peace for countries concerned.

Key words: civilians, migrants, forced or involuntary displacement, armed conflicts, international law, United Nations (UN), asymmetric warfare

* The opinions expressed in this article are exclusively personal capacities of authors.

* dragan_knezevic@yahoo.com

** The Head of the Strategic Research Institute, University of Defence. E-mail: jovanka.saranovic@mod.gov.rs

Distinguishing individuals in armed conflicts between those who take part in hostilities (combatants) and persons not involved in fighting (*hors de combat*) (being civilians dominantly), is one of the fundamental rules of international humanitarian law together with the principle of the limited use of instruments and methods of warfare.⁶³² A respect and the protection of civilians are covered by the most relevant sources of international law regarding regulations in armed conflicts (*ius in bello*) and, in particular, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12th 1949 (IV Geneva Convention). This international treaty was drafted just after the Second World War and it was the answer of international community on large number of civilian casualties caused by comprehensive military operations and the extensive utilization of force. Later, three Protocols to the Geneva Conventions were adopted amending and innovating international humanitarian law (IHL) for international armed conflicts (Additional Protocol I) and non-international armed conflicts (Additional Protocol II) in 1977; as well as by Additional Protocol III in 2005. However, a time after their coming into force indicated that they have been not successful in terms of more efficient ensuring of displacement caused by consequences of warfare, namely the migration of civilians threatened by military violence. This period has been characterized, among others, by an enormous increase of this category.⁶³³ Their figures are calculated in millions today, but international agreements in domain of refugee law (*hard law*) are not applicable for situations of mass influx of population in pursuit for shelter entirely, but rather oriented to the solutions and granting of asylum on individual basis in a procedure, which is strict and time consuming.

In general, migrations are diverged on voluntary (connected with economic, touristic, social motives) and forced (as a result of state of emergency produced by man or nature). Within force migration

⁶³² K. Watkin, *21st Century Conflict and International Humanitarian Law: Status Quo of Change?*, In: International Law Series, Vol. 15, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden Boston, 2007, p. 275

⁶³³ According to the figures of the Global Report on Internal Displacement (May 2016), publicized by the Norwegian Refugee Council, there were 8.6 million internally displaced persons caused by armed conflicts in 2015 only. The Report indicates (page 9) that the last 13 years this number has increased constantly having a daily rate of 14 thousand men and women uprooted from their habitual places because of war affects exclusively. The average daily increase was observed in the period 2008-2015 especially when 20 thousand internally displaced persons were recorded per day testifying about the intensification of conflicts and violence in the world as it was incited by the Global Report.

(displacement),⁶³⁴ Holly E. Reed and Bernadette Ludwig from Queens College in New York observe four kinds: 1) conflict induced displacement, 2) environmental or disaster induced displacement; 3) development induced displacement (economic development projects such as dams, mining); and 4) human trafficking.⁶³⁵ Such movements could be executed within territory of one country or could include crossing of one or more borders at official sites (border crossing points) in respect to all legal bounds (visa regime or similar) or be irregular (takes place when a person enters or lives in a country of which he or she is not a citizen, in violation of its immigration laws and regulations).⁶³⁶ Since 1951, forced international migrants have been entitled to the procedure assigned to refugees in accordance with the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.⁶³⁷ In a meantime, some other vulnerable categories have emerged within similar context such as internally displaced people, persons fled due to natural catastrophes, victims of human trafficking and

⁶³⁴ There are few terms used for the assumption of the mass involuntary movement of population. The forced displacement is related to “across border (e.g. refugee exodus/influx) or internal (e.g. due to disasters or armed conflict) – is usually more of a collective, unplanned, involuntary phenomenon due to a sudden-onset crisis; the displace must move as a temporarily coping mechanism, but with the intent to return as conditions allow (...) displacement normally involves relief and ‘care and maintenance’ operations, combined with efforts aiming at collective durable solutions, with return often the one of predilection; also, in principle, the displacement of population must be prevented.” – T. Linde, *Humanitarian Assistance to Migrants Irrespective of their Status—Towards a Non-Categorical Approach*, In: ICRC Review, Vol. 91, Number 875, Geneva, 2009, p.575

⁶³⁵ H. E. Reed and B.Ludwig, *Forced Migration*, In: International Handbook of Migration and Population Distribution, Vol. 6, Springer, 2016, p.606

⁶³⁶ S.Castles *et al.*, *Irregular Migration: Causes, Patterns and Strategies*, In: Global Migration Issues, Vol. 1, Springer, 2012, p.119. There is a practice of States and their authorities to treat migrants differently. “The selectivity means privileging certain people as suitable for entry and residence and rejecting others. (...) this creates another paradox: asylum seekers have a right to apply for asylum, but cannot enter a country legally to do so, and therefore have to enter in an irregular way, sometimes using people smugglers (...) differentiation on the basis of gender is also common. Irregular migration is very common in occupation seen as ‘typically female’”. – S.Castles *et al.*, *Op. cit.*, p. 119.

If the aim was to protect public order by defending borders, “the result is arbitrariness in some places and some areas, and a total failure to meet the broader challenges effectively.” – D. Bigo, *Immigration Controls and Free Movement in Europe*, In: ICRC Review, Vol. 91, Number 875, Geneva 2009, p.591

⁶³⁷ The Convention defines the status of refugee in Article 1(A) imposing that this person will be an applicant who “as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”

others for whom the mentioned Convention has been not adequate as it became clear at the end of XX century and by the appearance of migrants from the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.⁶³⁸

“If they had been ‘conventional’ refugees they would have had equal access to the welfare state and the labour markets of their host nations as any other citizen or long-term resident. Due to political and economic reasons mainstream politicians no longer endorsed this policy.”⁶³⁹

Thus, the approach of the forced migration was introduced,⁶⁴⁰ in a close relation with the displacement, comprising also situation of armed conflict as one of major cause for mass movement of population. The apprehension of subjects who are in a chain of such a phenomenon is not uniform and there are several terms associated with them – from refugees, uprooted, displaced, asylum seekers, fled persons, migrants, people in motion – as a result, they will be all scrutinized here with identical meaning.

EXTRACONVENTIONAL TREATMENT AND THE RESPECT FOR MIGRANTS CAUSED BY ARMED CONFLICTS (*SOFT LAW*)

Contemporary international law has been qualified, among others, by the lack of more comprehensive treaty regulations addressed to displaced persons affected by wars and, therefore, as Carl Levy from Goldsmiths College in London implied – “in the developed world it was Western Europe, which adopted the UNHCR recommendations as the template for refugee and asylum policy.”⁶⁴¹ Indeed, since 1975, the UNHCR (through the activities of its Executive Committee)⁶⁴² has organized regular annual meetings prior to the promulgation of conclusions about the most important and essential issues concerning exile, migrations and the displacement. In this regard, the Executive Committee (ExCom) normally notes, stresses, recognizes,

⁶³⁸ C. Levy, *The Geneva Convention and the European Union: A Fraught Relationship*, In: *The Refugee Convention at Fifty, A View from Forced Migration Studies*, Lanham Boulder New York Oxford, 2003, p.130

⁶³⁹ C. Levy, *Op. cit.*, p.131

⁶⁴⁰ T. Linde, *Op. cit.*, p.569

⁶⁴¹ C. Levy, *Op. cit.*, p.130

⁶⁴² UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) founded the Executive Committee of the Programme of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in 1958 by own Resolution 672(XXV) and the governing body formally came into existence on January 1st 1959. Although established by ECOSOC, the Executive Committee functions as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly and reports directly to the General Assembly for consideration in the Third Committee. The Executive Committee does not substitute for the policy-making functions of the General Assembly or ECOSOC, but has its own executive and advisory prerogatives.

encourages, deploras, underlines, recommends, urges... – tries, in fact, to fill a gap in a respect and the treatment of displaced persons “at a time when there is a trend to search for more legal regulation of conflicts involving armed groups through means such as using the law applicable to international armed conflicts by analogy or turning to human rights law.”⁶⁴³

At such a state of affairs and expectancy for more concrete provisions for the forced migrations, Conclusions of the UNHCR ExCom addressed to mass influx of uprooted men and women are substantial. For instance, Conclusion 15(XXX) of the ExCom from 1979 noted that the displaced individuals should always receive at least temporary refuge (protection) advocating for this solution further in 1980 and 1981 by Conclusions 19(XXXI) and 23(XXXII) respectively. Conclusion 35(XXXV) from 1984 recognized the value of registering and issuing appropriate documentations to refugees in large-scale flow situations. Hence, the temporary shelter or temporary protection became a scheme acceptable (tolerated) by States and applicable for persons in forced/involuntary movement as the result of hostilities defined by Conclusion 74(XLV) from 1994, by which the ExCom: “(r) *considers* that temporary protection, which has been described by the High Commissioner in the context of the Comprehensive Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in the former Yugoslavia as including admission to safety, respect for basic human rights, protection against refoulement, and safe return when conditions permit to the country of origin, can be of value as a pragmatic and flexible method of affording international protection of a temporary nature in situations of conflict or persecution involving large scale outflows.”

Conclusion 22(XXXII) (Protection of Asylum Seekers in Situations of Large Scale Influx) from 1981 was the most ambitious effort of the UNHCR ExCom to exempt migrants in mass displacement from additional abuses and to set minimum standards in their treatment, namely: (a) non-penalization or exposition to any unfavourable treatment solely on the ground that their presence in the country is considered unlawful; (b) enjoyment of the fundamental civil rights internationally recognized; (c) reception of the basic necessities of life including food, shelter and basic sanitary and health facilities; (d) exclusion from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; (e) prohibition of discrimination on personal attributes; (f) consideration as persons before the law; (g) lodging (location) determined by their safety and security needs; (h) respect of family unity; (i) tracing of relatives; (j) adequate provision for the protection of minors and unaccompanied children; (k)

⁶⁴³ S. Radin, *The Current Relevance of the Recognition of Belligerency*, In: *Armed Conflict and International Law: In Search for Human Face*, the Hague, 2013, p.149

sending and receiving of mail; (l) permission for assistance from friends and relatives; (m) registration of births, deaths and marriages; (n) obtaining of satisfactory durable solutions; (o) permission to transfer assets which they have brought into a territory of the obtained durable solution; and (p) facilitation of voluntary repatriation.

The Conclusion underlined the necessity of international solidarity, burden-sharing and obligations of States, which were covered more profoundly by Conclusion 100(LV) (International Cooperation and Burden and Responsibility Sharing in Mass Influx Situations) from 2004. It was, actually, appertaining to relations between States in the domain of forced migrations and their role and employment in the preservation of security and stability. Thus, it recommended to States, the UNHCR and other relevant actors to: (i) provide emergency financial and technical assistance; (ii) implement coordination mechanisms consisted of Inter-Agency Standing Committee and country team members; (iii) establish an effective consultation mechanism involving affected States, other interested States, relevant UN system actors for the development of strategies and approaches to address the refugee crisis; (iv) strengthen existing mechanisms to ensure necessity funds and other material and technical assistance; (v) provide support to host countries, especially developing countries; (vi) mobilize adequate resources to support and assist host States in maintaining the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum including disarmament of armed elements and the identification, separation and internment of combatants; (vii) establish adequate mechanisms and special procedures for individual refugee status determination for assessing claims of those combatants who have genuinely and permanently renounced military activities and seek for asylum; (viii) assure the security of refugee camps; and (ix) develop criteria and modalities for humanitarian transfer or evacuation to other countries fully consistent with international guidelines on the evacuation of children. In addition, the Conclusion 100(LV) recommended in Paragraph (m) further actions to address and facilitate durable solutions, with a view to burden and responsibility sharing, to be directed, as appropriate, in the form of voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement in third countries.⁶⁴⁴

⁶⁴⁴ The Conclusions processed some other areas relevant for the protection of the large-scale migrants, too. For example, these instruments of the UNHCR ExCom targeted:

1) Causes of Population Displacement – Initially approached in 1981 by indicating cases of large or mass influx of refugees and extending the list of possible causes of their exile owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part of, or the whole of their country of origin or nationality as Conclusion 22(XXXII) specified. Conclusion 75(XLV) from 1994 noted that many and varied causes of

So, the extraconventional alignment of the displacement (*soft law*) or the respect and the treatment of the large scale migrants caused by armed conflicts has been based upon a balance between the provision of protection and assistance to the vulnerable persons and, on the other hand, on needs and interests of States (and their international organizations) being more or less involved in certain case of population in forced movement.⁶⁴⁵ They resort to

involuntary internal displacement and of refugee movements are often similar, and that the problems of both refugees and the internally displaced often call for similar measures with respect to prevention, protection, humanitarian assistance and solutions. In Conclusion 85(XLVII) from 1996, the ExCom deplored that serious and repeated violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which are one of the principal reasons for refugee flows, continue both in peace and in times of armed conflict.

2) Illegal Entry – Conclusion 85(XLIX) from 1989 asked States concerned to avoid whenever possible detention of asylum-seekers together with common criminals.

3) Interception – In fact, this has been a measure addressed to the prevention of possible or false asylum seekers to come into contact with authorities in charge of asylum determination procedure who should or must consider their applications for (temporary) protection. As it was stated in the Conclusion 97(LIV) (Conclusion on Protection Safeguards in Interception Measures) from 2003, States should: (i) prevent embarkation of persons on an international journey, (ii) prevent further onward international travel by persons who have commenced their journey, or (iii) assert control of vessels where there are reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is transporting persons contrary to international or national maritime law. Besides that, the ExCom recommended procedures in the protection of women and children and the return of those whom requests for asylum were denied by the mentioned Conclusion.

4) Regular Migrations – Conclusion 74(XLV) from 1994 recognized that applications for asylum by large number of irregular migrants who are not in need of international protection continue to pose serious problems in certain regions. States were asked to address the problem of misuse or the abuse of refugee status determination procedure (Conclusion 87(L) from 1999), especially in terms of the efficient and expeditious return of persons found not to be in the need of international protection (Conclusion 96(LIV) from 2003).

5) Conclusions Specific to Military or Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps and Settlements – This issue became relevant in connection with camps for the accommodation of displaced persons during conflicts in Southern Africa in the 80s of the XX century. Conclusion 27(XXXIII) from 1982, followed by Conclusion 45(XXXVII) from 1986, expressed a grave concern for the large number of victims and material damage inflicted by the various military and armed attacks on refugee camps and settlements which continue to occur. The ExCom strongly urged States to abstain from these violations, which are against the principles of international law and, therefore, cannot be justified (Conclusion 48(XXXVIII) from 1987).

⁶⁴⁵ There are attempts of non-confronting these two issues, but to interpret that their existence points out on one much wider phenomenon. Stephen Castles, Magdalena Arias Cubas, Chulhyo Kim and Derya Ozkul from Sydney University consider that the forced migrations “should be seen not as a threat to state security, but as a result of the human insecurity that arises through global inequality (...) in the past, some analysts have argued that facilitating development in migrants’ countries of origin might reduce international migration (...) however, more recent migration research has shown that development actually increases migration, by giving people the resources to move.” – S.Castles *et al.*, *Op. cit.*, p. 145-146.

protect their territories (referring to (the law of) the neutrality or non-belligerency even in situations when they are bound to condemn an aggression in accordance with the UN Charter)⁶⁴⁶ through the implementation of measures at frontiers, which are on their disposal.⁶⁴⁷ Even under such conditions, it is

⁶⁴⁶ The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I recognize and distinguish neutral States, namely countries, which are not parties to any international armed conflict. The law of neutrality exists and its regulations were codified within the scope of the II Hague Peace Conference of 1907 (V Convention regarding the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land and XIII Convention concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War). As a result, each State has a right to be regarded or act as neutral, non-belligerent or not to be a(n) (adjunct) party to any conflict neither to support some adversaries. Taking into account 1907 and later progressive development of international law, and an adoption and the implementation of norms of the UN Charter in particular – changes have occurred leading to the recognition of States' obligations to renounce own passivity, but be (pro)active and condemn an aggression. Of course, it doesn't mean that they can not preserve position of "third party" and the law of neutrality has been quite explicit in this regard as professor Wolf Heintschel von Heinegg from the Europa-Universität Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder) and the US Naval War College in Newport emphasized: "The object and purpose of the law of neutrality is to protect States from the harmful effects of an ongoing international armed conflict and, by subjecting neutral States to certain legal obligations, to prevent an escalation of the conflict. This body of law does not replace the law of peace, but rather establishes legal limitations that the belligerents may not transgress (...) post-World War II State practice reveals that the law of neutrality has, in principle, applied in every international armed conflict irrespective of whether neutral States wished to be bound by it or not." – W. Heintschel von Heinegg, "Benevolent" *Third States in International Armed Conflicts: The Myth of the Irrelevance of the Law of Neutrality*, In: International Law Series, Vol. 15, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden Boston, 2007, p.560

⁶⁴⁷ For instance, the EU has invested a lot in the context of controlling migrations in the basin of Mediterranean. Since the Council meeting in Seville 2002, the EU has intensified its activities aimed to enhancing of external borders and this strategy could be summarised in: A. Harmonizing measures to combat illegal migration; B. Progressive operationalisation of coordinated and integrated administration of external borders; and C. Integration of immigration policy in the relation of the Union with third countries. In November 2004, the so-called Hague Program was announced for 2005-2010 setting the following priorities for the Commission: (a) development of a common European asylum system with a common asylum procedure and a uniform status for those granted asylum; (b) definition of measures for foreigners to work legally in the EU; (c) reinforcement of partnerships with third countries to tackle illegal immigration better; (d) establishment of a common policy to expel and return illegal immigrants to their countries of origin; (e) use of biometrics and information systems; and (f) establishment of a European framework to guarantee the successful integration of migrants into host societies. At the end, the *Frontex* was formed, namely the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG). – H. Koff and G. Naranjo Giraldo, *Living on the Edge*, In: The History of Migration in Europe, London and New York, 2015, pp.237-239.

Being aware about complicated affairs and examples of the restrictive conducting of responsible officials towards asylum seekers during exhausting procedure in the EU countries, it's really surprising that asylum seekers (forced migrants) from Syria, Iraq and other States and territories affected by military violence have insisted so hardly to reach shelter in the EU since 2015. In the EU, the Dublin Convention entered into force on September 1st 1997 and was amended in 2003

important to point out the imperativeness of the principle of the respect of the victims of war emanated from the IV Geneva Convention. Therefore, the UNHCR ExCom (together with States) will continue to issue Conclusions in order to address the cases of the forced displaced persons affected by armed conflicts until a general consensus about more efficient and the human management of the mass involuntary migrations and their outcomes induced by wars will be agreed through appropriate international treaty-making mechanism(s) in order to substitute temporary protection.⁶⁴⁸

and 2008 when, among others, it was renamed to the Dublin Regulations. Basic intention of this legal instrument was to regulate a unified asylum determination procedure in the EU countries, the protection of asylum seekers, offered services, etc. The most important rule inaugurated by the Dublin Regulations refers to the obligation of an asylum seeker to apply for the procedure in the first EU country entered by him/her. The Regulations were criticized from an early beginning, but the EU had rejected intractably any argument and persisted on its implementation. However, in 2015 and under intensive pressure of almost one million migrants from the war in Syria, the EU suspended partially provisions of the Regulations in order to adjust itself (and member States) to the mass influx of foreign population. Experts as well as general public considered that this decision was admittance that “the Dublin system” is not functional as it has been denoted for almost two decades. As a result, and because of “the traditionally restrictive approach toward regular migration, the European Union has failed to attract skilled migrants, while being a major destination for irregular migrants and asylum seekers.” – D. J. Besharov and M. H. Lopez (Eds.), *Adjusting to a World in Motion*, Oxford, 2016, p.180

⁶⁴⁸ Assuredly, it’s not a matter of (internally and externally) displaced persons caused by armed conflicts exclusively. On contrary, this is much broader question and it covers amending of obsolete regulations and rules in terms of armed conflicts in accordance with reality. The progressive development of IHL is a subject discussed by scholars quite long, but without any firm outcome. For Brig. General Kenneth Watkin (Rt’d), professor of international law at the United States Naval War College, the problem is “whether existing law adequately reflects the complexity and scope of contemporary armed conflict even though many of the challenges are not new (...) in respect of the new challenges, is the law properly positioned to deal with the effects of the changing nature of warfare?” – K. Watkin, *Op. cit.*, p.280-281. He pointed out also that there has been a strong resistance to such changes and that they even come from the International Committee of the Red Cross, which is “guardian” of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. He put an accent on the significant number of unresolved issues and areas, which could be enhanced by a more detailed articulation of the law, such as “the status and treatment of persons who are not lawful combatants; the interface between human rights law and international humanitarian law; clarifying the interface between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*; and addressing the degree to which the present positive law regime fully addresses the nature of contemporary armed conflict.” – K. Watkin, *Op.cit.*, p.284

THE FORCED DISPLACEMENT CAUSED BY ARMED CONFLICTS
IN INTERNATIONAL TREATIES (*HARD LAW*)

It was stressed several times here that the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 and its Optional Protocol of 1967 are individually oriented and that procedures stipulated by them are implemented on a case-to-case basis, namely from one asylum seeker to another one on the Eurocentric nature.⁶⁴⁹ Nevertheless, the Convention imposed one general rule by the prohibition of deportation/expulsion (*non-refoulement*) or the return of migrants to territories where their lives and/or personal integrities might be endangered. The Article 33 of the Convention regulates:

- 1) “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
- 2) The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.”

The rule has proceeded further to become the constitutive part of customary law and suitable for all known situations in liaison to refugees and displaced persons (individual and large-scale).⁶⁵⁰ It is considered as a cogent and peremptory in international law.⁶⁵¹ Therefore, *non-refoulement* is bedrock

⁶⁴⁹ C. Levy, *Op. cit.*, p.131

⁶⁵⁰ The UNHCR ExCom Conclusion 82(XLVIII) from 1997 offered wider understanding of the principle of *non-refoulement*, which prohibits expulsion and return of refugees in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where their lives or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, whether or not they have been formally granted refugee status, or of persons in respect of whom there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to torture, as set forth in the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

⁶⁵¹ For more about it at: J. Allain, *The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-Refoulement*, Int. J. of Refugee Law 13, 2002; R. Bruin and K. Wouters, *Terrorism and the Non-Derogability of Non-Refoulement*, Int. J. of Refugee Law 15, 2003; P. Chan, *The Protection of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: Non-Refoulement under Customary International Law*, Int. J. of Hum. Rights 10, 2006; G. Danilenko, *Law-Making in the International Community*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, London, 1993; A. Duffy, *Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-Refoulement in International Law*, Int. J. of Refugee Law 20, 2003; A. Farmer, *Non-Refoulement and Jus*

concept for the forced migrants,⁶⁵² transposed to numerous national legislations.⁶⁵³

Regarding the core of forced migrations, namely the mass movement of population with international elements – there are multilateral treaties applicable to this category such as: International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea of 1974 and International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue of 1979. Both legal instruments regulate an aid and assistance to people in distress and they include migrants in vessels in seeking for sanctuary, too.⁶⁵⁴ By UN General Assembly Resolution 55/25 from November 15th 2000, UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, and Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition were adopted. They are classified as the main set of rules of universal character related to smuggling and human trafficking imposing restrictive measures for subjects of smuggling and, in particular, for traffickers in human beings and smugglers. Uncomfortable with such an alignment and in order to advocate for more protection for the forced migrants – the UNHCR ExCom promulgated Conclusion 97(LIV) in 2003 noting that:

Cogens: Limiting Anti-Terror Measures that Threaten Refugee Protection, Georgetown Immigration Law J, 2008; T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, *Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law and the Globalisation of Migration Control*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013; G. Goodwin-Gill and J. Mc Adam, *The Refugee in International Law*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; E. Lauterpacht and D. Bethlehem, *The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement*, In: E. Feller, T. Volker and F. Nicholson (Eds.) *Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR's Global Consultations on International Protection*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003; J. Moore, *Protection against the Forced Return of War Refugees: an Interdisciplinary Consensus on Humanitarian Non-Refoulement*, In: D. Cantor and J-F. Durieux (Eds.) *Refugee from Inhumanity? War Refugees and International Humanitarian Law*, Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2014; R. Wallace, *The Principle of Non-Refoulement in International Refugee Law*, In: V. Chetail and C. Bauloz (Eds.), *Research Handbook on International Law and Migration*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2014.

⁶⁵² C. Levy, *Op. cit.*, p.131

⁶⁵³ For instance: Article 6 of the Asylum Act of the Republic of Serbia of 2007 (“Official Gazette of the RS”, Number 109/07); Article 115 of Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 2011 (S.C.2011, c.27, 29); Article 9 of the Presidential Decree 3301 of May 6th 1992 of the Republic of Ecuador; Section 212(a)14-(h)1 of the United States Refugee Act of 1980 (“Public Law, 96-212”, March 17, 1980); Article 5 of the Refugee Act of 1996 of the Republic of Ireland (last amended in 2003); Article 7 of the Act on Asylum of the Republic of Albania of 1998 (No.8432).

⁶⁵⁴ S. Buckel, *The Rights of the Irregularized*, In: *Irregularisation of Migration in Contemporary Europe*, London New York, 2015, p. 144.

“(vi) intercepted asylum-seekers and refugees should not become liable to criminal prosecution under the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea or Air for the fact of having been the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of the Protocol.”

In addition, the Conclusion 97(LIV) is relevant as the compilation of all possible manifestations of the forced migrations and the recognition of common protection and assistance for affected persons regardless of their flows’ causes (integrated approach), namely:

“The persistence of armed conflict, the complexity of current forms of persecution, ongoing security challenges, mixed population flows, the high costs that may be connected with hosting asylum-seekers and refugees and of maintaining individual asylum systems, the growth in trafficking and smuggling of persons, the problems of safeguarding asylum systems against abuse and of excluding those not entitled to refugee protection, as well as the lack of resolution of long-standing refugee situations.”

Trafficking in human beings is one of the gravest (transnational) crime requiring precautions in conducting investigations by paying attention to the victims and their exclusion from a prosecution and punishment, but stay focused on traffickers (criminals). On the other hand, smuggling is oftenly utilized method by the forcibly displaced persons caused by military violence (and their family members) to reach safe territories today,⁶⁵⁵ and, paradoxically, smugglers do save lives.⁶⁵⁶ But, smugglers must be prosecuted and not amnesty-granted. Hence, François Crépeau, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, notified that persons constrained to use smugglers’ services should be treated differently from criminals:

“The word ‘smuggling’ is used to equate symbolically the smuggling of persons with the traditional smuggling of goods (...) this is precisely done to avoid the concept of its intricate human elements, in situations where we should insist on the vulnerability of persons who need to escape violence and have little other choice than to use the services of those who can, for a lot of money, take them where safety lies.”⁶⁵⁷

⁶⁵⁵ The Convention and thereto Protocols provided legal definition of smuggled migrants and victims of trafficking in human beings, namely smuggled migrants are persons who use people-smuggling organisations to obtain illegal entry to a State and trafficked migrants are persons who are transported across international borders, often against their will, for the purpose of exploitation or/and forced labour. – S.Castles *et al.*, *Op. cit.*, p.123

⁶⁵⁶ F. Crepeau, *The Fight against Migrant Smuggling: Migration Containment over Refugee Protection*, In: *The Refugee Convention at Fifty, A View from Forced Migration Studies*, Lanham Boulder New York Oxford, 2003, p. 181.

⁶⁵⁷ F. Crepeau, *Op. cit.*, p.181-182

Therefore, it should not surprise if some future elaboration/drafting of a status and the treatment of internally and/or externally displaced people caused by armed conflict would take into consideration the demonstrated opinion (*de lege ferenda*).

Article 17 of the IV Geneva Convention provides measures associated with the evacuation of inhabitants from besieged or encircled areas (mostly urban) and regulates that the parties to the conflict shall endeavour to conclude local agreements for the removal of wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity cases. The Convention does not stipulate the evacuation as compulsory, but belligerents should nevertheless regard this provision as a very strong recommendation to arrange for evacuation whenever it is in the interest of the civilian population and the military situation makes it possible.⁶⁵⁸ The protection is envisaged for transports of evacuees on land and sea (Article 21) as well as in the air (Article 22), although flights over enemy or enemy-occupied territories are prohibited unless agreed in advance by belligerents. In addition to Article 48, Part III Section II of the Convention (Arts. 35–46 Aliens in the Territory of a Party to the Conflict) regulates conducting towards individuals who do not belong to any side, but befallen on areas controlled by them, refugees in particular (Article 44). The treatment of refugees and stateless persons is covered also by Article 73 of the Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions specifying that these men and women shall be not considered as participants in a conflict.

The central issue encompassed by the IV Geneva Convention is occupation and the liabilities of Occupying Power, which seizes and (effectively) controls certain territory populated by (enemy) civilians. From that perspective, Article 49 (Deportations, Transfers, Evacuations) stipulates in general:

“Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.

Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacuations may not involve the displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied territory except when for material reasons it is impossible to avoid such displacement.

⁶⁵⁸ *Commentary, IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*, ICRC, Geneva, 1958, p.139

Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.

(...)

The Protecting Power shall be informed of any transfers and evacuations as soon as they have taken place.

The Occupying Power shall not detain protected persons in an area particularly exposed to the dangers of war unless the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand.

The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.”

During the Convention’s drafting process, it was proposed initially that any shifting of population has to be prohibited⁶⁵⁹ (although, evacuations were permissible based on local agreements between belligerents as it was elaborated *supra*). Finally, it was accepted that some categories (minorities or members of political groups) may leave occupied territories. For others, the prohibition of forced transfers is mandatory,⁶⁶⁰ otherwise it is understood as grave breach of the Convention (Article 147) and the act of war crimes as it was reconfirmed by Article 85(4.a) of the Additional Protocol I.

For non-international armed conflicts, Article 17 (Prohibition of Forced Movement of Civilians) of the Additional Protocol II implies that civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with the conflict. Thus, it is matter of “territory” rather than “own country”, which is more convenient term for the usage in liaison to recent armed conflicts when certain population could be in migration within one State (internal displacement) or few States (external displacement).⁶⁶¹ The notion of “enforcement” is in close relation with the already mentioned territorial distinction, but also in a correlation with the issuing of commanding orders: “In determining whether displacement was forced, only unlawful violence, e.g. violence which is indiscriminate or specifically directed against the civilian population, should be taken into account. Indeed, the flight of the civilian population from lawful military operations, where parties have taken precautions to spare civilians and civilian objects, can hardly be equated to forced displacement caused by coercion of civilians.”⁶⁶²

⁶⁵⁹ *Commentary, IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*, ICRC, Geneva, 1958, p.279

⁶⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶¹ Y. Sandoz *et al*, *Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949*, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, p.1474

⁶⁶² J. Willms, *Without Order, Anything Goes? The Prohibition of Forced Displacement in Non-International Armed Conflict*, In: ICRC Review, Vol. 91, Number 875, Geneva 2009, p.565

It is important to emphasize that the liabilities of parties to a conflict in the cases of the forced mass displacement or population's self-organized migration in search for a shelter and protection are recognized differently from their obligations covering internees incited also by the IV Geneva Convention (Arts. 41–43 and Part III Section IV). In terms of transferring of population, Article 132(2) ought to be scrutinized. It demands from parties to a conflict to endeavour during the course of hostilities, to conclude agreements for (...) the accommodation in a neutral country of certain classes of internees, in particular children, pregnant women and mothers with infants and young children, wounded and sick, and internees who have been detained for a long time. Through the requested procedure (transfer to third country), the status of interned persons will be not modified, but a question is what will happen after hostilities? Indeed, the durable solutions are imminent to refugees and displaced persons who have a right to obtain for places/areas of their living resumptions – to stay on a host territory (local integration), decide to go to third one (resettlement) or return to once own (repatriation). By analogy, the internees should be also entitled to express their personal affections towards (possible) sustainable options and that was not arranged in 1949 by the provisions of the IV Geneva Convention.⁶⁶³

In connection with the presented issues from IHL, Article 8(2.e-viii) (War Crimes) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (entered into force on July 1st 2002) provides that, for non-international conflicts, ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand – shall be meant as a war crime. But, even under permissible circumstances, the exception based on the quoted Article has a temporary/limited lasting, unlike forced migration, which can persist longer than a conflict that provoked it. It seems that the specified obligation is incomplete demanding further clarifications through the practice/jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court.⁶⁶⁴ Regarding international armed conflicts,

⁶⁶³ *Commentary, IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*, ICRC, Geneva, 1958, p.513-514

⁶⁶⁴ For that purpose, the Rome Statute envisages a particular proceeding by Article 9 (Elements of Crimes):

1. Elements of Crimes shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application of Articles 6, 7 and 8. They shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly of States Parties.
2. Amendments to the Elements of Crimes may be proposed by:
 - (a) Any State Party;
 - (b) The judges acting by an absolute majority;
 - (c) The Prosecutor.

the Rome Statute determines that the war crimes will be, among others, acts of unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement (Article 8 (2.a-viii)) and the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it keeps, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory (Article 8(2.b-viii)). Beside that, Article 7 (applicable for both international and non-international armed conflicts), qualifies deportation or forcible transfer of population as a crime against humanity (Paragraph 1(d)). Despite that all brought issues from IHL are related to the civilians in the displacement induced by armed conflicts on territories of hostile parties, they are not adequate entirely for the forced migrants befallen within jurisdictions of third countries (non-belligerents). Therefore, there is a demand addressed to international community and its members to consider an urgent regulatory response regarding ten million people in motion from affects of warfare, who have been more and more inserted into the state of protracted displacement, which is difficult to overcome.⁶⁶⁵ In this process, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants of 2016 indicates new tendencies on international arena.

NEW YORK DECLARATION FOR REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS (2016)

By its Resolution A/RES/71/1 of September 19th 2016, the UN General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. As it was acknowledged by the Declaration's Point 4, forced displacement and irregular migration in large movements often present complex challenges and, thus, benefits and opportunities of safe, orderly and regular migration are substantial. Large movements of refugees and migrants have political, economic, social, developmental, humanitarian and human rights ramifications, which cross all borders. These are global phenomena that call for global approaches and global solutions. No one State can manage such

Such amendments shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly of States Parties.

3. The Elements of Crimes and amendments thereto shall be consistent with this Statute.

⁶⁶⁵ "Protracted internal displacement situations are those in which the processes of finding durable solutions have stalled and/or internally displaced persons are marginalised as a consequence of violations or a lack of protection of human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights. Factors such as the amount of time in displacement or the number of people affected are not a primary consideration in determining whether a situation is protracted." – N. M. Birkeland, *Internal Displacement: Global Trends in Conflict-Induced Displacement*, In: ICRC Review, Vol. 91, Number 875, Geneva, 2009, p.494

movements on its own (Point 7). Expressing a need for all human beings to live in dignity and safety and recalling UN Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, as well as distinguishing refugees (uprooted population caused by states of emergency such as armed conflicts) and migrants (economic and development reasons) – it recognizes the very large number of people who are displaced within national borders and the possibility that such persons might seek protection and assistance in other countries as refugees or migrants (Point 20). As a result, the Declaration promulgates *Commitments* of the UN and member States sorted on: 1) refugees and migrants cumulatively; 2) migrants only; and 3) refugees exclusively. Simultaneously, liabilities of international law entities are reaffirmed specifying that the Declaration will be implemented in consistency with their rights and duties. The Declaration has two annexes, namely Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (Annex I) and Towards a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (Annex II).

Drafted on a compliance between the protection of people in distress and (self-centred) interests and appreciations of the UN member States, first complement of Commitments from the Declaration (Pts. 22–40) acknowledges, on one hand, needs of women, children, members of ethnic and religious minorities, victims of violence, elderly and, on the other hand, a necessity to implement border control procedures in conformity with applicable obligations under international law (international human rights law and refugee law). Battling transnational organized crime, terrorism and illicit trade is crucial as well as States' duties to take measures in preventing illegal border crossing, although there is a right of anyone to seek asylum, including irregular migrants (Point 27). Regional cooperation and controlled navigation by States and relevant international actors are encouraged. Combating xenophobia, racism and discrimination, improvement of data collection mechanisms in respect to international obligations related to privacy are also addressed.

Next set of Commitments (Pts. 41–63) is associated with migrants as they are defined by the Declaration. This part is not connected with the forced displacement caused by armed conflicts. However, the issue of return and readmission should be notified and the reaffirmation of everyone's right to leave any country, including his or her own, and to return to his or her country, but, also, that each has a sovereign right to determine whom to admit to its territory (Point 42). The Declaration welcomes the provision of temporary protection against return to migrants who do not qualify for refugee status and who are unable to return home owing to conditions in their countries (Point 53).

The last group of the Declaration's Commitments (Pts. 64–87) is appertaining precisely to the forced displacement and, at the very beginning, it

is recognized that displacement could be reduced if IHL were respected by all parties to armed conflicts (Point 64). Emphasizing norms of international refugee law, international human rights law and IHL in strengthening the protection of refugees (Point 66), it adheres to the fundamental meaning to the principle of *non-refoulement* (Point 67). The forced displacement can lead to statelessness (Point 72). Administrative barriers should be eased, with a view to accelerating refugee admission procedures to the extent possible (Point 70). States are encouraged to access to civil registration and documentation for refugees (Point 71). The Declaration notifies increasingly implemented urban accommodation for refugees and only a minority is in camps (Point 73). A particular part of the Declaration is addressed to durable solutions (Pts. 75–79). This set of Commitments from the UN General Assembly instrument is concluded by the request for different kinds of assistance assigned to displaced persons such as: humanitarian aid (Point 80), quality primary and secondary education as well as promotion of tertiary education (Pts. 81 and 82), basic health needs (Point 83) and opening of labour markets to refugees with the recognition of the potential of young people (Point 84). In order to meet the posed challenges, close coordination is required among a range of humanitarian and development actors (Point 85).

The Annex I of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants of 2016 stresses that in large-scale refugee movements, the principles of international cooperation and on burden- and responsibility-sharing are inevitable and in a basis of any action. Therefore, the UNHCR is mandated by Annex I to develop and initiate the comprehensive refugee response framework (Pts.1 and 2), which should normally contain measures of:

- 1) Receiving States (in terms of identification and registration, preservation of family unity, protection of children, gender equality, access to drinking water and food, adequate accommodation and psycho-social support, immediate birth registration, safety, maintaining the civilian and humanitarian nature of refugee camps and settlements and ensuring of the credibility of asylum systems);
- 2) Other States for urgent and on-going needs (related to the mobilization of adequate financial and other resources for the development of funding mechanisms), as well as host States (in granting prompt and unhindered access to humanitarian assistance, its delivery, empowerment of refugees through the support of local civil society partners);
- 3) States, the Office of the UNHCR (in order to provide adequate resources and programmes that should benefit refugees and the host country and communities);
- 4) In the context of durable solutions:

- countries/territories of the last permanent habitual residence (return in safety and dignity, the obligation to receive back their nationals, provision of necessary identification and travel documents, socio-economic reintegration of returnees, the restitution of property),
 - third countries or other territories and the UNHCR (voluntary and informed repatriation, rehabilitation and reconstruction, fostering reconciliation and dialogue, development planning incorporating the specific needs of returnees),
 - host countries and territories concerned (provision of legal stay, fostering self-reliance of refugees, investment in building human capital), and
 - third countries or territories (encouraging private sector engagement and broadening the criteria for resettlement and humanitarian admission programmes); and
- 5) in general, the UNHCR and all States are invited to evaluate the detailed practical application of the comprehensive refugee response framework in next two years (2018/19).

The Annex II is oriented to migrants in situations, which are not induced by any of emergency. Therefore, from its content, the promotion of holistic approaches that take into account the causes and consequences of the phenomenon should be noted only (Point 7).

Essentially, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants of 2016 is a collection of international standards and recorded common practices in the treatment of displaced persons.⁶⁶⁶ It covers almost all areas and issues relevant to the forced migrants caused by armed conflicts as well as specific relations between belligerent States/territories (and their *de facto* authorities) and non-belligerent States/territories in the context of the internal and external displacements induced by hostilities and military violence. Hence, the Declaration's Commitments and Points should be considered as guidelines for further development in (re)solving and (re)arranging the status of civilians in armed conflicts since they had crossed in mass frontier of own country long time ago and, in such a situation, there has been very few norms of the IV

⁶⁶⁶ Basically, it is a document classified as *soft law* and it is defined as “an important body of non-treaty standards usually adopted within the framework of the United Nations system (declarations, bodies of principles, standard minimum roles, etc.). Although not legally binding, *soft law* serves to interpret and elaborate treaty provisions and to develop new standards in emerging areas of international law”. – K. Watkin, *Op. cit.*, p.294

Geneva Convention and Additional Protocols, which regulate their position and respect. As a result, the Declaration is (recent) invitation to take steps in progressive codification of international law for the sake of displaced civilians/victims of war. As it was implied much earlier by Nina Birkeland from Norwegian Refugee Council, the law-making procedure should take into account above all: protection of physical and personal integrity (threatened occasionally by attacks on refugee settlements in Darfur, Kenya and Chad), basic living necessities (already anchored in existing international human rights and IHL), other social, economic and cultural rights (the right of displaced individuals to an adequate standard of living), civil and political rights (inaccessibility to personal documents lost in flight being a problem in 20 cases/countries in 2008 only), vulnerability of women, children, elderly, minorities.⁶⁶⁷ In addition and in accordance with sustainable and durable solutions, some other issues should be attached such as: border control,⁶⁶⁸ situation at high sea and granting of amnesty after the termination of hostilities.⁶⁶⁹ By the revision of the existing international treaties in regulation of armed conflicts and, in particular, those addressed to the status and the protection of civilians – the involvement and liabilities of third (neutral) entities and their *de facto* authorities ought to be accomplished. Through appropriate adjustments, this initiative should make allowances to the conduction of hostilities in contemporary armed conflicts and details, which were not actualized in 1949 and 1977:

“The relevance and the credibility of international humanitarian law will depend not only on better implementation of existing law, but also on significant innovation designed to address emerging international humanitarian law issues.”⁶⁷⁰

⁶⁶⁷ N. M. Birkeland, *Op. Cit.*, p.499-504

⁶⁶⁸ J. Doomernik and M. Jandl (Eds.), *Modes of Migration Regulation and Control in Europe*, Amsterdam, 2008, p.205

⁶⁶⁹ Conclusion 101(LV) of UNHCR ExCom from 2004 recognized “(g) the utility of amnesties in encouraging voluntary repatriation and recommends that countries of origin issue amnesty declarations granting returning refugees immunity from prosecution for having left or remaining outside the country of origin; and further recognizes, however, that amnesties should not be extended to returning refugees charged with, inter alia, a serious violation of international humanitarian law, or genocide, or a crime against humanity, or a crime constituting a serious violation of human rights, or a serious common crime involving death or serious bodily harm, committed prior to or during exile.”

⁶⁷⁰ K. Watkin, *Op. cit.*, p.296

CONCERNMENT TOWARDS THE FORCED DISPLACEMENT
IN TERMS OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

While policies that view refugees primarily as a threat can obscure the legal protection to which refugees are entitled, the fact remains that refugee situations can become violent and States may have legitimate concerns about this possibility.⁶⁷¹ This issue has been additionally complicated by trends in modern warfare, featured by asymmetry of any kind,⁶⁷² including normative one *apropos* fact that different legal or policy norms govern the belligerents.⁶⁷³ After the terrorist attack on September 11th 2001 in New York, the label of “asymmetric war” has come to represent an influential perspective and has impacted on how we think about wars, potentially even testing IHL.⁶⁷⁴ In this regard, the area and consequences of forced displacement associated with the

⁶⁷¹ S. Allen, *Harboring or Protecting? Militarized Refugees, State Responsibility, and the Evolution of Self-Defense*, Praxis the Fletcher Journal of Human Security, Vol. XXV, Medford, 2010, p. 15.

⁶⁷² It is about incompatibility of military hardware, non-harmonized methods of warfare, diametrical strategies, disparity in capacities etc. Armed conflicts based on stipulated characteristics have always existed and specified differences led to the capitalisation of situations in the field by one or more parties to conflicts. However, in modern time this disproportionality has been clearly prominent in wars waged by traditional (powerful) States against sides with inferior military potentials and, in theory (as well as in a practice) such conflicts were assigned as: “irregular warfare, small wars, low-intensity conflicts, military operations other than war (MOOTW), special operations, counterinsurgencies, guerrilla warfare, counterterrorism, covert wars, and unconventional warfare, as well as stability operations, peacekeeping operations.” – R. Sarkar, *A Fearful Symmetry, The New Soldier in the Age of Asymmetric Conflict*, Santa Barbara Denver and Oxford, 2010, p. 7.

“In the realm of military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing, and thinking *differently* than opponents in order to maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action. It can be *political-strategic, military-strategic, operational, or a combination* of these. It can entail different *methods, technologies, values, organisations, time perspectives*, or some *combination* of these. It can be *short-term or long-term*. It can be *deliberate or by default*. It can be *discrete* or pursued in *conjunction with* symmetric approaches. It can have both *psychological and physical dimensions*.” – S. Metz and D. V. Johnson II, *Asymmetry and US Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concept*, January 2010, p.5-6.

For more about it at: Col. T. L. Thomas (Rt’d), *Deciphering Asymmetry’s Word Game*, Military Review, July-August 2001; M. N. Schmitt, *Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law*, Air Force Law Review, Vol. 62, 2008; Col. C. J. Ancker III (Rt’d) and Lt. Col. M. D. Burke (Rt’d), *Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare*, Military Review, July-August 2003; A. Lele, *Asymmetric Warfare: A State vs Non-State Conflict*, Revista Oasis, No.20, Bogota, 2014.

⁶⁷³ M. N. Schmitt, *Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law*, Air Force Law Review, Vol. 62, 2008, p. 6.

⁶⁷⁴ A. Di Lellio and E. Castano, *The Danger of “New Norms” and the Continuing Relevance of IHL in the Post-9/11 Era*, ICRC Review, Vol.97, Geneva, 2016, p. 1278.

status and protection of civilians in armed conflicts (as it was stressed several times *supra*) has been brought to ordeal by the asymmetric approach in conducting hostilities today,⁶⁷⁵ and, especially, in terms of: 1) a new role of

⁶⁷⁵ “Asymmetric warfare clearly constitutes a challenge to the international legal order and to its underlying values. While it does not justify a deviation from the well established rules and principles of the law of armed conflict, it is necessary to strengthen that law by all means available (...) despite the potential political implications, the application of military force *in accordance with the law of armed conflict* is the first way to respond to the threats posed by asymmetric warfare.” – W. Heintschel von Heinegg, *Asymmetric Warfare: How to Respond?*, In: *International Law and the Changing Character of War*, US Naval and War College, *International Law Studies*, Vol. 87, 2011, p. 477.

“Asymmetrical wars do not fit in (...) the traditional concept of international humanitarian law. It is debatable whether the challenges of asymmetrical war can be met with the current law of war (...) and whether the State-based model enshrined the Peace of Westphalia, which was designed to put an end to the privatization of wars in the seventeenth century, is not losing its relevance.” – T. Pfanner, *Asymmetrical Warfare from the Perspective of Humanitarian Law and Humanitarian Action*, *ICRC Review*, Vol. 87, No. 857, Geneva, 2005, p. 158.

In abundance of challenges imposed to IHL by the asymmetry in armed conflicts, it would be valuable to present the most prominent:

1) Relativisation of the Principle of Reciprocity – This principle has basic significance in the implementation of law applicable in armed conflicts creating well-grounded assumption that adversary will conduct similarly or on the same way. “The expectation of reciprocity as a fundamental motivation for respecting the law is often misplaced and honorable fighting is replaced by perfidious behaviour; covert operations are becoming the substitute for open battles.” – T. Pfanner, *Op. cit.*, p. 173. “Parties agree to limit their actions during hostilities because they will benefit when their opponent does the same (...) when asymmetry disrupts the presumption and one side violates the agreed rules, the practical incentive for compliance by the other fades.” – M. Schmitt, *Op. cit.*, p. 42.

2) Redefinition of Relations Based on Military Necessity and the Principle of Humanity – These two polarities conceive the essence of the rule that means and methods of warfare are not limited. The respect of protected persons in armed conflicts must be achieved whereby “the element of military necessity must be balanced against the principle of humanity, and that there is no such elasticity in the laws of war that military necessity can be claimed as a reason to deviate from accepted humanitarian standards (...) asymmetric conflict arguably entails a certain risk of the emergence of a modern-day *Krighesräson*.” – R. Geiss, *Asymmetric Conflict Structures*, *ICRC Review*, Vol. 88, No. 864, Geneva, 2006, p. 767.

3) Indefiniteness of the Concept of Modern Armed Conflict – Capital instruments of *ius in bello* distinguish international and non-international armed conflicts and, consequently, sets of rules applicable in two war-like situations respectively. The Rome Statute of International Criminal Court reaffirms such a dichotomy. At contemporary asymmetric wars, when, *inter alia*, participants/parties in conflict are not clearly observed (intentionally or unintentionally) – a matter of legal norms and their implementation become questionable. As a result, the notion of “transnational” emerges frequently as an attribute for the conceptualisation of modern armed conflicts and in order to overlap on-going state of affairs. In addition, there is a reference on Prosecutor v. Tadić of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 and Para. 70 of the Decision of the Defence Motion for Interlocutory

population and civilian casualties and the appearance of an unclear or part time combatant who mixes in with and has the approval of some or all civilians (child and women soldiers, suicide missions, human shields); 2) the reappearance of ethnic cleansing policies; and 3) the growing privatisation of war both by military powers (the use of security companies) and insurgent groups.⁶⁷⁶ From that point of view, Sarah Kenyon Lischer from the Wake Forest University in North Carolina recognizes three bodies of displaced individuals, namely refugees in the asymmetric form of belligerency: 1) *situational refugees* flee their homes to escape the intolerable conditions and general destruction wrought by civil war, not due to any specific persecution or premeditated strategy (these refugees express a willingness to return home as soon as peace and stability are established); 2) *persecuted refugees* escape ethnic cleansing, genocide or other oppressive policies and they are subjects for generating groups for political and military actions; and 3) *state-in-exile refugees* containing political and military leaders, who organize the refugee crisis as a strategy to avoid defeat in civil war.⁶⁷⁷

Appeal on Jurisdiction of October 2nd 1994 (IT-94-1) specifying that “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to be applied in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.”

4) Terrorism – “International humanitarian law should not be overstretched. It cannot be extended to situations other than those it is intended to cover without giving wrong directives. This is particularly relevant for the fight against international terrorism, which despite many warlike aspects does not necessarily amount to an ‘armed conflict’ in the current sense of the law of war.” – T. Pfanner, *Op. cit.*, p. 173.

5) Dual-Purpose Objects – The distinction of military objects and civilian installations is one of the basic principles in conducting hostilities recognized by IHL. For international armed conflicts, Part IV Section I (Arts. 48–67) of the Additional Protocol I is addressed to the protection of civilian objects and precautions for an attack (Article 52(2) defines a military object) as well as to activities of the Civil Defence. Article 48 of the Protocol regulates that “in order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.” In asymmetric warfare, the infrastructure is a subject to this dualism in particular, including radio and TV broadcasting network.

⁶⁷⁶ A. Segura i Mas, *The Refugee Crisis and New Armed Conflicts*, University of Barcelona, 2016, p. 6.

⁶⁷⁷ S. K. Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries, Refugee Camp, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid*, Ithaca and London, 2005, p. 10.

Needless to say that stipulated categories are not covered by any treaty regulation in international law applicable in armed conflicts. In order to achieve it, *ius in bello* should not have particular obstacles regardless the existence of one specific approach and interest in warfare (asymmetry), because the fundamental concepts and principles of the laws of war have been designed as prophylactic mechanisms flexible enough to outlast changes in the way in which wars are waged.⁶⁷⁸ Hence, the involuntary civilian migrants caused by armed conflicts must benefit from the expressed attitude and States should be more engaged in order to:

“explicitly acknowledge that there is a growing merger of applicable international humanitarian law (IHL) to *all* armed conflicts (...) recognize that international human rights law (IHRL) is increasingly perceived as also applying extraterritorially and during armed conflict, and that the *lex specialis* approach to the application of IHRL does not mean that IHRL ceases *completely* to be considered during hostilities.”⁶⁷⁹

With a view to meet the stipulated objectives, there are regional treaties relevant for the subject discussed here so far.⁶⁸⁰ Some of their determinations are before norms of universal legal instruments and, accordingly, could be incorporated into future outcomes of (re)codification of the international regulations on status and the treatment of civilians in armed conflicts in the forced internal and/or external (and/or combined) displacement. These persons should be not isolated into special category and scrutinized by exclusive agreement,⁶⁸¹ but:

“It is now time for international humanitarian law to acknowledge the fact that international armed conflicts have also evolved. In particular, the practice of deportations and forcible transfers by a state of its own nationals should be recognized as such and regulated.”⁶⁸²

⁶⁷⁸ R. Geiss, *Op. cit.*, p. 759.

⁶⁷⁹ E. Lieblich with O. Alterman, *Transnational Asymmetric Conflict under International Humanitarian Law: Key Contemporary Challenges*, Tel Aviv, 2015, p. 175.

⁶⁸⁰ It's a matter of the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (entered into force on June 20th 1974) and Cartagena Declaration on Refugees of the Organization of American States from 1984.

⁶⁸¹ “Issues of internal displacement, refugees and armed conflict, each taken separately, are already contentious issues, especially as they touch upon aspects of the law within the realm of states’ domestic jurisdiction. It is therefore highly unlikely that states would agree to the adoption of a binding instrument which would combine such sensitive subjects and potentially mean relinquishing part of their sovereignty.” – M. Jacques, *Armed Conflict and Displacement*, Cambridge, 2012, p. 256.

⁶⁸² M. Jacques, *Op. cit.*, p. 255.

The emergence of some unique form in waging hostilities, which relies on asymmetry in capacities, readiness and comprehensions of belligerents, can be only perceived that IHL continues to need a triggering mechanism that can be neutrally applied, irrespective of the deeper reasons and justifications for the armed conflict.⁶⁸³ Thus, asymmetrical conflict consequently does not entail the non-applicability of the minimum requirements of IHL.⁶⁸⁴ On the contrary, it creates opportunities for more (pro)active involvement of the international law entities in regulating the forced displacement caused by armed conflicts in order to prevent classification of involuntary migrants as threats, but victims with their humanitarian and other needs.

CONCLUSION

The interventions in *ius in bello* set of rules are, *ergo*, needful in terms of further strengthening of protection and the respect of civilians with a major segment consisted of forced migrants in modern armed conflicts. At the beginning of XXI century, inadequate allotment of international treaty norms has been addressed to the displaced persons in comparison with requests and situation in the field. Moreover, there is an absence of any grave recognition of their specific conditions generated by dynamism in warfare and its constant modifications and new shapes. Efforts of UNHCR to set up just an acceptable treatment towards this population in coordination with States and international organizations (temporary protection) – can not be regarded as a sustainable solution, although Conclusions of the UNHCR ExCom might be used as a qualitative material for future legal arrangements of one quite sensitive subject. Therefore, it is necessary to consolidate appropriate legal provisions in protection and the respect of migrants in war, including compensations for their involuntary created setting. Concerning it, there are certain expectations from the International Criminal Court and its jurisprudence in order to contribute for the motion of this question from momentum of stagnancy. In addition, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants of 2016 increases hopes that a consensus among States in connection with onward enhancement of civilians in armed conflicts and, concretely, displaced persons is feasible (progressive development). This process could be accelerated by growths and modalities in fighting featured by asymmetry recently with the appearance of migrants as (abused) instruments in the actualization of durable

⁶⁸³ A. Paulus and M. Vashakmadze, *Asymmetrical War and the Notion of Armed Conflict – a Tentative Conceptualization*, ICRC Review, Vol.91, No.873, Geneva, 2009, p. 125.

⁶⁸⁴ A. Paulus and M. Vashakmadze, *Op. Cit.*, p. 122.

goals. This fact should not discourage anyone, but it ought to be utilized as a justification for an initiative about a right period for the adjustment of rules in armed conflicts addressed to civil and displaced persons, which should cover, on all accounts, more intensive concernment in and the role of third/neutral jurisdictions and not belligerents only.

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SAVREMENE TENDENCIJE U MEĐUNARODNOM PRAVU U VEZI REGULISANJA MIGRACIJA IZAZVANIH ORUŽANIM SUKOBIMA*

Dragan Knežević*

Ministarstvo za rad, zapošljavanje, boračka i socijalna pitanja,
Republika Srbija

Jovanka Šaranović**

Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Univerzitet odbrane,
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Pojave raseljenih lica usled oružanih sukoba nisu nove i gotovo da postoje onoliko dugo koliko i sami ratovi. Civili, koji ne učestvuju u neprijateljstvima, ali koje ratovanja (ne)posredno ugrožavaju, glavne su žrtve oružanih sukoba i zaštićeni su IV Ženevskom konvencijom iz 1949. godine i njenim Dopunskim protokolima iz 1977. i 2005. godine. Veoma često su primorani (nevoljni) da napuste svoja mesta prebivališta i pronađu zaštitu kako unutar svojih zemalja, tako i izvan njihovih teritorija. U poslednje vreme, broj žena i muškaraca u potrazi za (privremenom) zaštitom (azilom) iznosi više desetina miliona. Neregularnim prelascima međunarodnih granica, krijumčarenjem, kao i trgovinom ljudima – snažno remete stabilnost i bezbednost zemalja tranzita i destinacije. Toliko su takve pojave početkom XXI veka učestale da se sve više postavlja pitanje – da li su migranti posledica ili sredstvo (asimetričnog) ratovanja? U situaciji kada se kod ovakvih masovnih migrantskih talasa Konvencija o statusu izbeglica iz 1951. godine sa teškoćama primenjuje, usvajanje Rezolucije Generalne skupštine UN 19. septembra 2016. godine, kojom je potvrđena Njujorška deklaracija o izbeglicama i migrantima – spada u važne međunarodne rezultate na polju regulisanja migracija i zaštite tražilaca (privremenog) azila/utočišta, kao i reafirmaciju standarda u očuvanju mira ugroženih zemalja.

Ključne reči: građanska lica, migranti, prisilna ili nevoljna raseljanost, oružani sukob, međunarodno pravo, asimetrično ratovanje.

* Stavovi u ovom članku izražavaju isključivo mišljenja autora.

* dragan_knezevic@yahoo.com

** Direktorica Instituta za strategijska istraživanja, Univerziteta odbrane. E-mail: jovanka.saranovic@mod.gov.rs

STRATEGIC AND LEGAL ASYMETRICITY OF MIGRATION AS A FORM OF EMERGENCY

Dalibor Kekić*

Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies, Belgrade,
The Republic of Serbia

Miloš Milenković**

Sector for Emergency Management, Ministry of Interior,
The Republic of Serbia

Abstract: In the last few years, there have been numerous migrations caused by migratory crisis in the Middle East. A large number of countries on the territory of the European continent have felt the consequences of these movements, having been confronted with a large number of people that had to be temporarily or permanently taken care for and provided with all necessary living conditions. Among these countries, there was the Republic of Serbia. A large number of migrants, mainly from the Middle East, passed through the territory of Serbia, continuing their journey to the countries of Western Europe. However, they stayed in detention centres across Serbia for a certain period. As those centres often did not have sufficient capacity for all migrants, they gathered and stayed on public land. That is why there was the need to hire competent security services for the purpose of possible protection of people, material and cultural goods. There are some examples showing that in some situations the competent authorities did not have sufficient capacity to respond to all the risks and threats caused by the stay of migrants in Serbia. Based on these parameters, characteristics of emergency are recognized. The current National Search and Rescue Strategy and the Law on Emergency do not recognize the threats caused by migratory movements as a potential form of emergency. In this way, the possibility of using the adopted procedures related to the functioning of the search and rescue system in case of declaration of emergency, or hiring additional forces if necessary is excluded. Given that migratory movements are expected in the future, it is necessary to eliminate this disadvantage in order to minimize risk.

Key words: migration, emergency, strategy, law.

* dalibor.kekic@kpa.edu.rs

** milos10jul@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION

International and domestic strategic and legal documents in the field of emergency management recognize several different types of risks. They are mostly divided into natural, on the one hand, and technical and technological on the other. When we speak about the risks of a natural character, earthquakes, floods, snowstorms, blizzards, droughts and others are the most frequent ones. Regarding technical and technological risks, the most common are fires, explosions and chemical accidents. However, in recent years, new risks that can be regarded as emergency have emerged, threatening the population and material and cultural goods. These risks are usually not related to the natural circumstances. Terrorist threats, sometimes with the use of biological agents, are just some of the modern methods used in an attempt to provoke security problems, cause a large number of casualties and inflict enormous material damage. Modern risks are primarily aimed at causing fear and panic among people. Consequently, people leave their home in order to find a safe environment that will give them protection and provide normal conditions for life and work.

The terms that are more and more likely to be heard in everyday life are migration, migratory movements, migrants and the like. The term migration (Lat. *Migratio*) is used to denote different forms of mobility, both humans and animals.⁶⁸⁵ The events in the Middle East in the last few years have been the problem not only for the people leaving that territory with the hope to find a safe environment, but also for the countries that they pass through towards their final destination. On the other hand, many countries on the so-called “migratory route” were not ready to accept such a large number of people with numerous needs. In addition to the lack of readiness in terms of the resources and capacities for accommodation and care of migrants, in the countries where these people are temporarily or permanently accommodated, there are undefined legal and strategic issues regarding migratory actions. Namely, in the beginning, the estimations did not indicate that the problem with migrants would escalate to such an extent. In addition, a small number of experts expected that the process would last for so long, or that the end of this process would not be visible. The Republic of Serbia, due to its geographical position, is among the countries that are on the migratory route to the Western Europe. Their final destination countries are Germany, Austria, France and the others, where they can stay for a longer period and get the conditions for a

⁶⁸⁵ Mijalkovic S., Zarkovic M.: *Illegal Migration and Trafficking*, The Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies, Belgrade, 2012

normal life through various social programs. In order to reach these countries, there is a long and hard road ahead of them, on which the territory of the Republic of Serbia is located, as well.

Legislation in Serbia recognizes migratory movements through a certain law and bylaws. They clearly define the terms, obligations of the Republic of Serbia, special processes, institutional competences and other issues related to migratory movements. However, there were situations with regard to the large number of migrants in the territory of the Republic of Serbia, concerning care and security, which indicate that there were elements of emergency being recognized. The current strategic and legal documents in the field of emergency in the Republic of Serbia show the non-recognition of migration and migratory movements as one of the risks based on which an emergency situation can be declared on part of the territory or the entire territory of the Republic of Serbia. The aim of the paper is to point to the aspects of migration that create the need to recognize this area in the field of emergency management, from both a strategic and legal point of view.

NATIONAL SEARCH AND RESCUE STRATEGY, LAW ON EMERGENCY SITUATIONS AND MIGRATION

Pursuant to Article 99, Paragraph 1, Item 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Article 9 of the Law on Emergency Situations (“Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, No. 111/09) and Article 190 of the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly (“Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia” No. 52/10 and 13/11), the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, at the Second Sitting of the Second Regular Session in 2011, held on November 17, 2011, adopted the National Search and Rescue Strategy.⁶⁸⁶ The National Search and Rescue Strategy contain five strategic areas, most of them relating to reducing the risk of natural disasters and other disasters. Each of the strategic areas has its own goals. They are clearly defined and refer to the improvement of the search and rescue system in the Republic of Serbia. For example, the first strategic area emphasizes the importance of reducing risks, both at national and local levels. The goals identified within this field clearly indicate the way in which further activities are to be carried out. It is stated that it is necessary to provide an adequate normative framework for an integrated search and rescue system in line with international regulations.⁶⁸⁷

⁶⁸⁶ National Search and Rescue Strategy (2011) “Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, no. 86/2011

⁶⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

If we look into the current strategy related to the area of search and rescue, no term is found regarding migration and migratory movements. In addition, no strategic area, as well as a goal, indicates that there is a risk of a large number of migrants who can stay in the territory of the Republic of Serbia at the same time, thus causing threat and jeopardizing the safety of citizens from several aspects. There are risks identified from the point of view of natural disasters, such as the risks of earthquakes, floods, landslides and erosion, unfavourable and dangerous atmospheric phenomena, epidemics, plant diseases, epizootics. On the other hand, the risks of technical and technological accidents are also recognized in this document, such as fires and explosions, chemical accidents, nuclear and radiation accidents, terrorist acts. It is concluded that migratory movements of people are not recognized as a potential risk. It should also be noted that, on adoption, the current National Search and Rescue Strategy was defined for a five-year period. As this deadline expired, it remains in place until a new one that should be harmonized with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction is adopted.

The Law on Emergency Situations was adopted in 2009 and underwent certain changes in 2011 and 2012. After many years of non-existence of any legal document in the field of emergencies, this law determines the organization of search and rescue system, emergency management, declaration of emergency situation, civil protection measures and tasks, financing of search and rescue system, as well as penal provisions for non-compliance with legal provisions. For many years, due to the lack of legal provisions, the area of emergency management has been violated. However, the adoption of this law has improved the situation in this area. For the purposes of the paper, it is necessary to define the concept of emergency. Emergency is the situation where the risks and threats or consequences of disasters, emergencies and other dangers to the population, the environment and material goods are of such scale and intensity that their occurrence or consequences cannot be prevented or remedied by the regular operation of the competent authorities and services, which means that for their mitigation and elimination, it is necessary to use special measures, forces and resources with a strengthened regime of work.⁶⁸⁸ Based on this definition, we should conclude that in case of an emergency situation, the competent services could not respond to the situation with regular operations, but other entities that have adequate capacities have also to be used. The analysis of the law shows the absence of any article indicating the possibility of the emergence of danger to

⁶⁸⁸ Law on Emergency Situations, "Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia", no. 111/09, 92/11, 93/12.

people and material and cultural heritage due to migrations and illegal movement of people.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRATION IN THE DOMAIN OF EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

Practical experience indicates that migrations have the characteristics of emergency situations. In the last few years, a large number of migrants have stayed on the territory of the Republic of Serbia, on their way to the Western Europe. The large migration flow from the Middle East and Africa to Europe started in 2011, and has been particularly intensified since 2014, reaching so far unprecedented levels in 2015, and greatly exceeding the projected number of migrants for 2015, which was designated in the United Nations documents in 2013. The rate of migration growth is, generally speaking, on a global scale far greater than expected. Just two years ago it was assumed that the total number of migrants in the world in 2015 would reach a maximum figure of 237 million, which is a serious growth compared to 1990, when the total number of migrants in the world was “only” 154 million.⁶⁸⁹ The Republic of Serbia has also felt the consequences of pronounced migratory movements from the Middle East and Africa. In addition, migration from these areas had several phases. The richest population from vulnerable Middle East countries first started migration flows using the plane as a way of transport to the desired destination. They did not pose great difficulties to domestic institutions and there were no elements that would point to an emergency situation. However, after that, there was the “wave” of the poorer population who did not have the financial resources to transfer by plane to the desired destination. They used other means of transport, such as buses, trains, private cars, and so on. The problem started when a large number of migrants at the same time tried to cross over the territory of Serbia as soon as possible and continue their further journey. In such circumstances, they had the need for basic living conditions. For a very short period, these people had to be provided with food, medicines, accommodation, doctors' care, and alike. As time passed, it was increasingly difficult to provide them with these conditions, while the additional problem was bad weather, cold and rainy days. The competent institutions and ministries had a difficult task to solve the current situation with migrants. Namely, given the fact that on their route and upon entering the destination

⁶⁸⁹ UN, Key Trends in International Migration, Expert Group Meeting on the Post-2015 Era: Implication for the Global Research Agenda on Population Development, New York, 10 April 2015.

country, illegal migrants usually avoid meetings with competent state institutions, as well as those concerned with health care issues, they do not undergo any medical check-ups. As it has been said, in this way, passing through the transit countries or during their stay in the destination country, illegal migrants can also transmit some infectious disease. Through contact with the local population, they can contribute to the spread of the infectious disease. Staying in an improvised settlement and without basic sanitary conditions and adequate nutrition and health care, illegal migrants have constantly been at increased risk of getting some contagious diseases. This can be a serious problem for the local population, as well.⁶⁹⁰

Before pointing to the aspects of migration indicating that this modern phenomenon must be seen as one of the forms of emergency situation in the territory of the Republic of Serbia, it is necessary to emphasize the asymmetry of migration and the necessity that, as such, it is incorporated in the strategic and normative regulation dealing with the emergency situations. Firstly, migrations do not have a clearly defined duration period.

On the other hand, the risks that trigger the need to declare an emergency situation, such as floods and earthquakes, carry with them a certainty that with the disaster recovery which will start after the danger, the conditions for life will be normalized. However, in this respect, the first characteristic of the asymmetry of migration in the field of emergency situations is clearly emphasized. After the introduction of an emergency situation, it is common practice to expect the situation to be normalised as soon as possible and the emergency situation automatically abolished on a part of the territory or the whole territory of the Republic of Serbia. In addition, there are rare examples that the emergency situation is declared for a longer period, such as a few months or a year. In the case of migration, once the elements for the declaration of an emergency situation are recognised, the asymmetry in this case would probably be manifested, and the emergency situation would last for a longer period of time. Furthermore, the problems with a large number of migrants who have stayed in the territory of the Republic of Serbia for a longer period, point to several more features of the asymmetry of this geopolitical issue in the field of emergency situations. Namely, the “route” of migrants’ movement was such that several towns and municipalities were involved in providing all necessary assistance to migrants. The question arises as to whether, if an emergency situation was to be declared, it should have been done previously for each local municipality

⁶⁹⁰ Mijalkovic S., Zarkovic M.: *Illegal Migration and Trafficking*, The Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies, Belgrade, 2012.

separately or for the entire territory of the Republic of Serbia. Generally, emergency situation management is not the same in case of declaring it in the territory of a local municipality or the entire territory of the state. In case of a large number of migrants staying on the territory of the Republic of Serbia, there is no possibility of direct threat to people, material and cultural goods. On the other hand, in case of natural disasters and other accidents, one of the main, if not the most important characteristics, is the direct threat to people, material and cultural goods due to floods, earthquakes, fires and explosions, and the like. In case of migration and longer stay of foreign citizens in the territory of the Republic of Serbia, who seek for their refuge in the Western Europe, the likelihood of direct threat to the domestic population is little. Namely, there is a possibility of threat due to criminal activities carried out by migrants. However, the previous fact does not mean a large number of casualties and material damage arising from the risks that are the reasons for the declaration of an emergency. In this way, the given asymmetric characteristics of migration in the field of emergency situations must be taken into account.

Considering the current legislation on emergency situations, it is necessary to determine whether there are elements to consider the stay of a large number of migrants in the territory of the Republic of Serbia as an emergency situation. In the previous chapter, the definition of an emergency situation is given. As mentioned, it refers to the situation when the competent institutions do not have sufficient resources to respond to the dangers from the point of view of natural disasters and other accidents that threaten people, material and cultural goods. When problems with migrants began, it was clear that the competent institutions do not have sufficient resources to respond to the situation. Based on the Law on Migration Management, “temporary accommodation in a collective centre, food and necessary clothing and footwear is provided by the Commissariat, either alone or in cooperation with a local municipality or the Red Cross organization or by engaging appropriate service providers”.⁶⁹¹ Namely, “professional and other tasks related to migration management determined by this Law and related administrative tasks are performed by the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration.”⁶⁹²

During the period when a large number of migrants stayed on the territory of the Republic of Serbia, the Commissariat indicated that it was not able to handle with its own capacities to provide all that was necessary. Help was provided by all institutions and organizations that have resources to help

⁶⁹¹ Law on Migration Management, “Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, no. 107/12.

⁶⁹² *Ibid*

migrants. In addition to the Red Cross and local municipalities, various international and non-governmental organizations were involved in the process of care. Therefore, from this aspect and due to the inability of the relevant institutions in the field of migration to provide an adequate response, there was a need to engage additional forces. These are all elements that point to the possibility of equivalence with emergency situations. Caring for vulnerable population, as a special process, is recognized as one of the tasks of civil protection under the Law on Emergency Situations. Caring for vulnerable population, casualties, refugees and evacuated people in emergency situations includes provision of emergency accommodation, health care, food and drink supply, merging separated families, psychological support and creating other living conditions. Caring for vulnerable population, casualties, refugees and evacuated people in emergency situations is directly managed by emergency headquarters and civil protection officers, or their deputies, until conditions are created in which further care will be taken by the competent authorities. The planning of caring for vulnerable population, casualties, refugees and evacuated people in emergency situations is carried out by the competent authority of the local municipality, in cooperation with the emergency headquarters and in accordance with the Plan of Search and Rescue in emergency situations.⁶⁹³ Based on all of the above, it can be seen that all segments of care were used during the stay of a large number of migrants on the territory of the Republic of Serbia. It was necessary, in a very short period of time and under the label “urgent”, to provide them with everything necessary to have normal living conditions.

In addition, the emphasis was also put on the local government, which had to be involved in solving problems with migrants. An example is the City of Belgrade, which through its city administration tried to provide everything that is necessary for people who stayed near the railway and bus stations, as well as in the city parks. There are also examples that some local municipalities have called meetings of emergency headquarters due to the newly created situation. However, due to the non-recognition of migration, at the strategic and legal level, there was no possibility for the declaration of an emergency situation in the part or the entire territory, which was an additional problem. Namely, as the law itself defines, the additional accommodation and caring for migrants created the need for engagement of additional facilities, whose primary activity is in the sphere of catering and sports. Practically, some groups had to be accommodated in additional reception centres that were

⁶⁹³ Law on Emergency Situations, “Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, no. 111/09, 92/11, 93/12.

opened as needed, for which purpose the capacities of other companies and legal entities were used. It is similarly done in case of an emergency situation. There were examples in the territory of the City of Belgrade that migrants attacked the local population and, using coercion, tried to alienate their assets. Hundreds of migrants from Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan and Palestine stayed in Backi Breg, near Sombor, for forty days, leaving great damage behind. The refugees literally destroyed numerous cottages in a place located on the border with Hungary. They were brought into this border area by people smugglers, and after the arrest of the main smuggler, the Libyan, and three of his accomplices, the migrants suddenly disappeared.⁶⁹⁴ These are just some examples of the vulnerability of local population.

STRATEGIC AND LEGAL RECOGNITION OF MIGRATION AS EMERGENCY SITUATION

The current National Search and Rescue Strategy was valid until 2016. Since the new strategic document has not yet come into force, it is expected that this will happen in the upcoming period. In addition, on the international level, the Sendai Disaster Risk Reduction Framework for the period 2015-2030 has been adopted. The new National Search and Rescue Strategy should also be harmonised with this document. In this respect, it is necessary to use the opportunity and as one of the new risks recognize the migration and the possibility of simultaneous stay of a large number of migrants in the territory of the Republic of Serbia. By analyzing the Sendai Framework, it can be concluded that this document did not recognize migratory movements as a possibility of causing danger to people and material and cultural goods, or that an emergency situation could arise from such events. Consideration should also be given to the time when the Sendai framework was developed. During this period, the migratory movements and the problems and threats associated with them were not emphasized. It is recommended that, in the future National Search and Rescue Strategy, the potential threat from migration and migratory movements should be briefly defined. Namely, it would give the possibility to specify the new risk in the new legal documents and by-laws, which refers to the field of emergency management.

Based on the negative experiences from the previous period, mostly related to the floods in May 2014, the need for a new legal framework related to emergency management and disaster risk reduction was identified.

⁶⁹⁴ Retrieved on 22.04.2017 from: <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/hronika/aktuelno.291.html:654411-Migranti-pljackaju-vikendice-oko-Sombora>.

Accordingly, in 2015, the Government of the Republic of Serbia proposed a draft law on reducing the risk of natural and other disasters and emergency management. This law envisaged a lot of news, and one of the most important is the organizational allocation of the Emergency Management Sector from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Directorate for Risk Management and Emergency Situations that would be directly subordinated to the Government. Until now, the draft law has been in the process of further implementation and possible adoption by the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. By looking into this draft law, no term or article of law, concerning the potential threat from migratory movements that can cause danger and the possibility of declaring an emergency situation, can be found. As this law has not been adopted yet, it is necessary to consider further definition of the potential threat of migratory movements. The question arises in which part of the law, and in which way, it would be most appropriate to recognize the simultaneous stay of a large number of migrants in the territory of the Republic of Serbia as a potential risk. It is recommended that in the part where the meaning of the term is defined, terminological definition of natural and other disasters should be given. Namely, it is pointed out that “natural and other disasters are a natural or an event caused by a human activity whose effects endanger life and health of a large number of people, and damage material goods and the environment on a larger scale (flood, earthquake, landslide, long-term drought, ice and/or strong windstorm, fire, epidemics, heavy soil, water and air pollution, technical and technological accident, war destruction, terrorism, etc.) ...”.⁶⁹⁵ In this part, after the terrorism, migratory movements and simultaneous stay of a large number of migrants should be added. In this way, the significance of this new potential threat would be emphasized in the terminological definition.

Furthermore, migration should be implemented in the legislation on emergency situations by recognizing their asymmetric content in this area. This would imply that in the part of the law referring to the declaration of an emergency situation it is specified that in the event of migration and prolonged stay of migrants in the territory of the Republic of Serbia, an emergency situation may be declared for a longer period, or until the migrants cross the border and find themselves under the jurisdiction of other states. In addition, it should be possible for local municipalities to declare an emergency situation in case they cannot provide adequate conditions for a large number of migrants who stay in their territory longer.

⁶⁹⁵ Draft Law on risk reduction of natural and other disasters and emergency management, 2015.

When problems with migrants occur, some civil protection tasks that are carried out during an emergency situation are identified. The most important thing here is the care and the basic medical and psychological help. In the part of the new law that refers to these tasks of civil protection, the need for care and first medical and psychological assistance to migrants staying in the territory of the Republic of Serbia and are expected to stay for a longer period, as it was the case in the past, should be noted. In this way, there would be a legal basis for declaring an emergency situation in case of repeated problems related to a large number of migrants and thereby activating legal entities that could provide the necessary assistance in providing food, water, accommodation, sanitary and hygienic conditions, and the like.

In addition to the strategy and the law, the risk of simultaneous stay of a large number of migrants in the territory of the Republic of Serbia should also be recognized in the Manual on the Methodology for the assessment of the risk from vulnerability to natural disasters and other accidents and emergency search and rescue plans. This manual contains precisely defined risks that need to be identified and analyzed. This manual has recently been adopted and represents an updated document based on the previous methodology guidance.

CONCLUSION

Migration and migratory movements present a modern phenomenon whose escalation is even expected in the coming period. Estimations for the coming period do not indicate that the number of people who seek to find better conditions for living and flee from their motherland due to war and other conflicts will decrease. The Republic of Serbia, due to its geographical position, is on the “migratory route” of people leaving the territory of the Middle East and seeking better living conditions in the territory of the Western Europe. Certain laws define migration management. However, some situations from the past indicate the great difficulties in case of the prolonged stay of a large number of migrants in the territory of our country, related to the lack of capacity for accommodation, food, water, medical care and the like. All these characteristics are very similar to the situations when an emergency situation is declared due to natural disasters and technical and technological accidents. There are also certain asymmetries of migration in the field of emergency situations. Based on the analysis of the current emergency strategy and law, it is clear that migration problems are not recognized as a potential threat and risk. In the following period, consideration should be given to the possibility of recognizing this security risk in strategic and legal documents relating to emergency management in order to provide a basis for easier coordination of

available resources and reduce the threats arising from the simultaneous gathering of a large number of migrants to a minimum.

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STRATEGIJSKA I ZAKONSKA ASIMETRIČNOST MIGRACIJA KAO OBLIKA VANREDNE SITUACIJE

Dalibor Kekić*

Kriminalističko-policijska akademija, Beograd,
Republika Srbija

Miloš Milenković**

Sektor za vanredne situacije, Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova,
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Poslednjih nekoliko godina izražena su migratorna kretanja uslovljena migratornom krizom sa Bliskog istoka. Veliki broj zemalja na tlu evropskog kontinenta osetio je posledice ovih kretanja, suočivši se sa velikim

* dalibor.kekic@kpa.edu.rs

** milos10jul@gmail.com

brojem ljudi koje je trebalo privremeno ili za stalno zbrinuti i obezbediti im sve neophodne životne uslove. Među tim zemljama našla se i Republika Srbija. Veliki broj migranata, uglavnom sa Bliskog istoka, prošao je kroz teritoriju Srbije, nastavljajući svoj dalji put ka zemljama zapadne Evrope. Međutim, određeni vremenski period oni su se zadržavali u prihvatnim centrima širom Srbije, koji često nisu raspolagali sa dovoljnim kapacitetima za sve migrante pa je neretko dolazilo do njihovog okupljanja i boravka na javnim površinama. Na taj način javljala se potreba za angažovanjem nadležnih bezbednosnih službi u cilju eventualne potrebe za zaštitom građana, materijalnih i kulturnih dobara. Primeri iz prakse ukazuju i na mogućnost da nadležne službe u nekim situacijama nisu raspolagale sa dovoljnim kapacitetima da odgovore na sve rizike i opasnosti prouzrokovane zadržavanjem migranata u Srbiji. Po ovim parametrima prepoznaju se odlike vanredne situacije. Aktualna Nacionalna strategija zaštite i spasavanja, kao i Zakon o vanrednim situacijama, ne prepoznaju opasnosti izazvane migratornim kretanjima kao potencijalni oblik vanredne situacije. Na taj način isključuje se primena usvojenih procedura koje se vezuju za funkcionisanje sistema zaštite i spasavanja u slučaju proglašenja vanredne situacije, odnosno angažovanja dodatnih snaga prema potrebi. S obzirom da se očekuju migratorna kretanja i u budućnosti, potrebno je ovaj nedostatak otkloniti u cilju minimiziranja rizika.

Ključne reči: migracije, vanredne situacije, strategija, zakon.

UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Vanja Rokvić*

Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: The purpose of this review paper is to present a contemporary and asymmetric security environment wherein the UN peacekeeping operations take place. By analyzing the official UN reports and academic papers it has been found that a growing number of peacekeeping operations are being undertaken in the circumstances of the existing conflicts and asymmetric threats expressed in the form of violent extremism and terrorism. The UN personnel are increasingly becoming the target of terrorist or malicious acts, and in the mission in Mali alone, more than 70 peacekeepers lost their lives in the past four years. Therefore debates have been initiated on the extension of the peacekeeping operations mandate to include anti-terrorist actions. The author concludes that peacekeeping operations are not designed to combat terrorism. To be able to confront these threats, they need better equipment, technology, training and intelligence capacities.

Key words: contemporary security environment, asymmetric threats, malicious acts, UN peacekeeping operations.

INTRODUCTION

The increasing number of internal armed conflicts in the aftermath of the Cold War as well as the emergence of new, asymmetric security threats, have greatly influenced the character of UN peacekeeping operations and their implementation. A large number of peacekeeping operations today are carried out in the circumstances of an armed conflict that has not yet ended, or where there is ‘no peace to keep’, as well as in the circumstances of civilians and peacekeepers being exposed to asymmetric threats. An example of such operations is the multidimensional mission in Mali - MINUSMA (*Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali*), which is considered the most dangerous UN mission. In the past four years more than

* vanjarokvic@fb.bg.ac.rs

70 peacekeepers were killed on this mission. In order to find a solution for the asymmetric and other challenges confronted by peacekeeping operations at the end of 2014, a *High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations* was established. The Panel's report states that "UN troops should not undertake military counter-terrorism operations"⁶⁹⁶. This raises the question of how peacekeeping operations should respond to these threats in order to protect both civilians and own personnel? To obtain answers to this question, professional and academic debates were initiated, the outcome of which will be presented in this paper, after an overview of contemporary and asymmetric security environments in which peacekeeping operations are established, as well as the threats faced by UN personnel on the ground.

THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

According to Ulrich Beck, modern society has become a risk society, in the sense that it is being preoccupied with the research, prevention and risks management, which it itself created.⁶⁹⁷ There are a large number of risks that modern society faces, which are classified into six groups in the *UN Report on the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*: wars between states; wars and violence within a country; poverty, infectious diseases, and the degradation of the environment; nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons; terrorism; transnational organized crime.⁶⁹⁸ The UN Security Council in the post-Cold War period identified new risks and threats that may endanger international peace and security. According to Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, the first threat is defined in Resolution 688 (1991). The resolution expressed concern about the repression against the civilian population in Iraq and the mass movement of Kurdish refugees outside the borders of Iraq,⁶⁹⁹ which was recognized as a threat to peace and stability in the region as well as a threat to international peace and security.⁷⁰⁰ Later, the Security Council

⁶⁹⁶ Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf (accessed April 29, 2017).

⁶⁹⁷ Ulrich Beck, "Living in the world risk society", *Economy and Society* 35/3 (2006):332.

⁶⁹⁸ UN Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, "A more secure world: Our shared responsibility", 2004, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf (, accessed April 30, 2017).

⁶⁹⁹ UN Security Council S/RES 688, 1991, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/24/IMG/NR059624.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed May 02, 2017).

⁷⁰⁰ Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, S, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010):49.

identified further threats to international peace and security. Some of them are infectious diseases such as HIV⁷⁰¹ and Ebola⁷⁰², terrorism⁷⁰³, the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons⁷⁰⁴, and others.

Although each of these risks and threats significantly affects international security, research shows that the armed conflicts within states are “the most marked security phenomenon since the end of the Cold War.”⁷⁰⁵ According to the *2016 Global Peace Index Report* the last decade saw a historical decline in the periods of world peace⁷⁰⁶, and research by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute shows that in 2015 there were 50 active armed conflicts (22% more than in 2014), of which 49 were conflicts within states.⁷⁰⁷

The basic characteristics of conflicts in the post-Cold War period are a large number of civilian fatalities, refugees and displaced persons.⁷⁰⁸ These are what Lind calls the fourth generation conflicts, in which states mainly fight non-state actors (Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Boko Haram, etc.).⁷⁰⁹ Martin van Creveld claims that these conflicts, in which soldiers will only partially participate, will predominantly be led by terrorists, looters, and bandits.⁷¹⁰

The Geneva Declaration on Global Burden of the Armed Violence states that more than 740,000 people a year die directly or indirectly due to an

⁷⁰¹ UN Security Council S/RES/1308, 2000, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00efd10.html> (accessed May 02, 2017).

⁷⁰² UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2177, 2014, <http://www.ifrc.org/docs/IDRL/UN%20SC%20Res.pdf> (accessed May 02, 2017).

⁷⁰³ UN Security Council S/RES/1373, 2001, [http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2012/docs/United%20Nations%20Security%20Council%20Resolution%201373%20\(2001\).pdf](http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2012/docs/United%20Nations%20Security%20Council%20Resolution%201373%20(2001).pdf) (accessed May 02, 2017).

⁷⁰⁴ UN Security Council S/RES/1540, 2004, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1540%282004%29 (accessed May 02, 2017).

⁷⁰⁵ ICISS. “The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty”. (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001):4.

⁷⁰⁶ Institute for Economics & Peace. “Global Peace Index 2016”, http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/02/GPI-2016-Report_2.pdf (accessed Jun 01, 2017).

⁷⁰⁷ SIPRI Yearbook 2015, *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015): 201-202.

⁷⁰⁸ Edward Newman, „The ‘New Wars’ Debate: A Historical Perspective Is Needed”, *Security Dialogue*, 35/2 (2004):175.

⁷⁰⁹ William S. Lind, W, „Understanding Fourth Generation War”, January 15, 2004, <http://www.antiwar.com/lind/?articleid=> (accessed May 11, 2017).

⁷¹⁰ Martin Van Creveld, *Transformacija rata* (Beograd: JP Službeni glasnik i Fakultet bezbednosti, 2010):183

armed conflict; more than 540,000 deaths are of violent nature, and more than 200,000 people die every year in conflict zones from non-violent causes, such as malnutrition, dysentery and other infectious diseases.⁷¹¹ Contemporary armed conflicts are marked by a large number of refugees and internally displaced persons. UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that the year 2013 was the first year since the end of World War II in which the number of forcibly displaced people at the global level has exceeded 50 million. More than half of forcibly displaced persons are women, and sexual and gender based violence is often used as a tactic of displacement, but also as a method of warfare. According to a study conducted by the *DCAF*, sexual violence has been documented in 51 countries that have experienced armed conflict in the last 20 years.⁷¹²

All those characteristics of armed conflicts significantly influenced the UN and other organizations in their efforts for peaceful settlements. During the debate on trends in peacekeeping operations in 2014, the then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon identified three key challenges for peacekeeping operations: 1) an environment in which there is no peace to keep; 2) the existence of asymmetric and unconventional threats, and 3) the absence of clearly recognized sides in the conflict and the lack of a sustainable political process.⁷¹³ According to Samantha Power, “peacekeepers in the 21st century missions face unprecedented risks . . . because we are asking them . . . to take on more responsibilities in more places and in more complex conflicts than at any time in history”.⁷¹⁴

According to the *2015 Global Terrorism Index Report*, the level of terrorist activity globally has increased significantly over the past 10 years,⁷¹⁵ and two thirds of peacekeepers are deployed in operations in countries affected

⁷¹¹ Geneva Declaration. „Global Burden of the Armed Violence“, 2008, <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/Global-Burden-of-Armed-Violence-full-report.pdf> (accessed April 30, 2017).

⁷¹² Megan Bastic, Karin Grimm and Rahel Kunz, *Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts, Global Overview and Implications for the Security Sector* (Geneva: DCAF, 2007).

⁷¹³ United Nations Secretary-General, Secretary-General's Remarks at Security Council Open Debate on Trends in United Nations Peacekeeping, 2014, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2014-06-11/secretary-generals-remarks-security-council-open-debate-trends> (accessed May 06, 2017).

⁷¹⁴ Jaïr Van Der Lijn and Timo Smit, “PEACEKEEPERS UNDER THREAT? FATALITY TRENDS IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS”, *SIPRI Policy Brief*, September 2015, <http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIPB1509.pdf> (accessed May 19, 2017).

⁷¹⁵ Institute for Economics and Peace. “Global Terrorism Index 2015”, <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf> (accessed Jun 01, 2017).

by terrorism.⁷¹⁶ UN personnel have always been targeted. In 1961 (after the establishment of the Mission in the Congo) 105 peacekeepers were killed in malicious attacks worldwide. A Canadian Buffalo 115461 aircraft with nine Canadian peacekeepers aboard was shot down over Syria by a missile in 1974. A large number of peacekeepers were killed during the operation in Somalia in 1993, in Rwanda in 1994, and elsewhere. However, a terrorist truck bomb attack in Baghdad on the 19th of August, 2003, indicated a change in tactics and the nature of the threats faced by the United Nations. In the attack on the Canal Hotel in Iraq, housing the UN headquarters, 22 people were killed and more than 150 were injured. Later, on the 11th of December, 2007, in the attack on the UN premises in Algiers, 17 UN personnel were killed. In 2011, in the attack on the UN headquarters in Abuja, 23 UN personnel lost their lives. In the 2013 attack on the UN camp in Mogadishu, 15 UN employees lost their lives. In 2014, in a terrorist attack on a restaurant in Kabul, 4 UN personnel were killed. In a car bomb attack in Somalia in 2014, four UNICEF personnel died. In addition to terrorist attacks, UN personnel are faced with other threats and challenges that will be presented below.

UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN A COMPLEX SECURITY ENVIRONMENT


Since the establishment of the first monitoring mission in 1948, and the first mission during the Suez crisis in 1956 with the deployment of armed forces, peacekeeping operations have been significantly transformed. The reason for the transformation was the emergence of new risks and security threats, an increasing number of internal conflicts, as well as UN failures in Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1994) and Bosnia (1995). In order to identify the weaknesses of peacekeeping operations and introduce measures to overcome them, the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations was organized in 2000. This Panel was chaired by former Foreign Minister of Algeria, Lakhdar Brahimi. The panel report that outlined recommendations for the improvement of peacekeeping operations is therefore known as the "Brahimi Report".⁷¹⁷ After the "Brahimi Report" was submitted, the number of peacekeeping

⁷¹⁶ Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, Security Council open debate highlights rapidly growing 'asymmetrical threats' to United Nations peace operations, 2016, <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/blog/2016/11/07/security-council-open-debate-highlights-rapidly-growing-asymmetrical-threats-to-united-nations-peace-operations/> (accessed May 16, 2017)

⁷¹⁷ "Brahimi Report" Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 2000, http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/brahimi_report.shtml (accessed April 30, 2017).

operations has increased, the mandates of the peacekeeping operations have changed, and so has the strength and composition of the units.⁷¹⁸

Unlike traditional peacekeeping operations that were put in place after the end of hostilities and the signing of peace agreements, modern peacekeeping operations are established in the circumstances of an ongoing armed conflict, or "where there is no peace to keep,"⁷¹⁹ as well as in the circumstances of civilians and peacekeepers being exposed to asymmetric threats.



*Figure 1: Number of UNPK fatalities caused by malicious act, 1948-2016*⁷²⁰

In the last 70 years more than 3,300 UN personnel lost their lives in peacekeeping operations. UN statistics list three causes of death: malicious acts, accidents, and illness. According to the UN *Malicious Acts Insurance Policy*, malicious acts occur as a consequence of war, an invasion, hostilities, effects of enemy forces, regardless of whether a war is proclaimed or not; a civil war; a revolution; a rebellion; riots; sabotage; explosive devices; terrorist activities.⁷²¹ Rogers and Kennedy state that these attacks can be defined as all

⁷¹⁸ Data for 2016: 39 missions (16 peacekeeping and 23 political missions) with 125,000 uniformed personnel.

⁷¹⁹ Dennis Jett, "What Can Peacekeepers Do If There Is No Peace to Keep?" *Middle East Policy*, 23/4 (2016): 149-158.

⁷²⁰ Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'Fatalities by Year and Incident Type', 2017, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/documents/stats_5apr.pdf (accessed May 16, 2017).

⁷²¹ United Nations Development Programme. "Malicious Acts Insurance Policy". UNDP/ADM/2003/14, 4 February 2003, sas.undp.org/Documents/MAIP_Guidelines_2003.doc (accessed May 16, 2017).

acts that are not accidents and do not result from a disease, but were caused intentionally by malicious actors.⁷²²

In fact, UN personnel in peacekeeping operations are facing a number of threats and challenges, such as the kidnapping on the Golan Heights, ambush attacks in the Central African Republic, the shooting down of a helicopter in South Sudan, as well as numerous terrorist attacks with improvised explosive devices and landmines in Mali, the earthquake in Haiti, the epidemic of Ebola in Liberia. Analyzing the peacekeeper fatalities, Rogers and Kennedy conclude that from 1948 to 2012 most deaths were caused by accidents and natural disasters, from friendly fire to earthquakes.⁷²³




Figure 2: Percentage of UNPK fatalities, 1948-2012⁷²⁴

According to the *Report of the Secretary-General on safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel*, civilian UN personnel are exposed to threats such as violence, abduction, robbery, burglary, sexual assault, intimidation and harassment, detention and arrests, which often lead to death.⁷²⁵

⁷²² James I Rogers, and Caroline Kennedy, “Dying for Peace? Fatality Trends for United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel”, *International Peacekeeping*, 21/5 (2014).

⁷²³ James I Rogers, and Caroline Kennedy, “Dying for Peace? Fatality Trends for United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel”, *International Peacekeeping*, 21/5 (2014).

⁷²⁴ Ibid.

⁷²⁵ Report of the Secretary-General on safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel (A/71/395), <http://reliefweb.int/report/world/safety-and->

Table 1: United Nations civilian personnel affected by security incidents from 2010 to June 2016⁷²⁶

United Nations civilian personnel affected by security incidents from 2010 to June 2016							
Category of incident	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Fatalities resulting from acts of violence	5	26	19	18	15	23	5
Injuries resulting from acts of violence	68	145	112	82	65	99	33
Abduction	12	21	31	17	6	21	1
Robbery	239	417	408	314	530	511	242
Burglary of residence	385	418	493	322	430	380	150
Sexual assault	9	5	4	4	8	12	13
Intimidation	210	224	209	81	149	228	107
Harassment	17	46	52	27	146	177	67
Arrest and detention	211	195	165	138	128	69	39

security-humanitarian-personnel-and-protection-united-nations-personnel-11 (accessed May 16, 2017).

⁷²⁶ Ibid.

At the same time, death toll from terrorist attacks shows an upward trend, especially for the mission in Mali, which is considered the most dangerous mission in UN history. According to the *UN Security Council Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali*, the mission was established in the "complex security environment that includes asymmetric threats".⁷²⁷ These threats originate from a large number of extremist and terrorist organizations, such as Ansar Dine, Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, Arab Movement of Azawad, an African jihadist movement Al-Mourabitoune, a militant Islamist group Macina Liberation Front, and others. Since the establishment of MINUSMA, on the 1st of July, 2013, UNMAS (*UN Mine Action Service*) has recorded 369 attacks with improvised explosive devices,⁷²⁸ and according to the official UN statistics, 71 members of the mission lost their lives from 2013 until the end of 2016, as a result of terrorist attacks. The specific feature of this mission is reflected in the fact that this is the first mission carried out in parallel with a counter-terrorism operation: *Operation Barkhan* (originally *Operation Serval*), conducted by France.

The unstable security situation has significantly been worsened by poverty. According to the indicators of *2016 Human Development Report*, Mali is one of the poorest countries, at the 175 position out of 188 countries covered by the report.⁷²⁹ All this contributed to the development of transnational organized crime, primarily drug trafficking. It is believed that West Africa has become a major transit route for cocaine from South America (Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia) to Europe, as well as for heroin and other synthetic drugs (in 2011, 30 tons of cocaine and 400 kilograms of heroin were transferred by this route).⁷³⁰ In addition to drug trafficking, arms trafficking also features significantly, as well as kidnapping for ransom.

Bearing in mind the complex and asymmetric environment in which to carry out the missions, a number of professional and academic debates ensued on the question of whether the mandate of peacekeeping operations should be extended to include the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. In

⁷²⁷ UN Security Council Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali S/2016/498, 2017, <http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/report-secretary-general-situation-mali-s2016498> (accessed May 12).

⁷²⁸ UN Mine Actions Gateway/Mali, available at: <http://www.mineaction.org/programmes/mali>

⁷²⁹ The Human Development Report 2016 'Human Development for Everyone', <http://hdr.undp.org/en/2016-report> (accessed May 27, 2017).

⁷³⁰ SIPRI Yearbook 2015, *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015):173.

December 2015, the then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced the *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism*, in which it was recommended to „integrate preventing violent extremism into relevant activities of United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions in accordance with their mandate”.⁷³¹ However, the *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations* stated that compared to asymmetric threats "UN troops should not undertake military counter-terrorism operations".⁷³² A study conducted by researchers at Princeton University, which included interviews with mission personnel in the field, indicates that anti-terrorist actions would be contrary to one of the basic principles of peacekeeping operations – impartiality, and that through such actions the UN could be perceived as "anti-Islamic".⁷³³

Thus, the question is what actions can be undertaken by UN forces in asymmetric security environment and how to protect the personnel and fulfil the mission's mandate? In order to answer the question, the UN Secretary General convened the *High-Level Independent Panel* to review the "Brahimi Report" on the 31st of October, 2014. The result of the Panel's work was a new report that was submitted in 2015. This report identified four major changes that need to be taken into account in the future establishment and deployment of peacekeeping operations: 1) the design and implementation of peacekeeping operations must be guided by politics, since sustainable peace cannot be achieved through military and technical involvement alone, but through appropriate political solutions; 2) a wide range of UN peacekeeping operations should be used in a more flexible way, and a system of rapid deployment of forces should be developed; 3) global-regional partnerships strengthening is needed in order to respond to increasingly challenging crises; 4) UN peacekeeping operations should be more “field-focused and people-centered.”⁷³⁴ The answer to the question of response to terrorist threats that the report provides will be presented below.

⁷³¹ Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, 2015, https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/sites/www.un.org/counterterrorism.ctitf/files/plan_action.pdf (accessed May 30, 2017).

⁷³² Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf (accessed April 29, 2017).

⁷³³ Mauricio Artñano et al. *Adapting and Evolving: The Implications of Transnational Terrorism for UN Field Missions* (Woodrow Wilson School Princeton University, 2014).

⁷³⁴ Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf (accessed April 29, 2017).

UN PEACEKEEPING ACTION TO COUNTER ASYMMETRIC THREATS

Within the UN, there are many bodies which were formed with the aim of combating terrorism and violent extremism. Thus, in 2001, Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee was set up by the Security Council Committee's Resolution 1373, and in 2005, UN Secretary-General established the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, within whose framework the Counter Terrorism Centre was established in 2011. Numerous resolutions have also been adopted as well as plans and strategies for the fight against terrorism. However, when it comes to the UN response to terrorist threats to peacekeeping operations, there is agreement that the mandate of peacekeeping operations, regardless of the circumstances in which they take place, should not be extended to counter-terrorism operations. This is clearly outlined in the High-Level Independent Panel's report. The Panel's position is that the UN peacekeeping operations, because of their composition and character, are inappropriate for military counter-terrorism operations, primarily because these operations do not have the appropriate equipment, intelligence, logistics, skills and specialist military training. The report also points out that when missions are deployed jointly with counter-terrorism actions by other forces, the roles of all actors present in the field must be clearly delineated.⁷³⁵

In November 2016, the Security Council held an "open debate on peace operation: facing asymmetric threats". In the debate, 59 countries expressed the views that are generally in agreement with the Panel's recommendations that UN peacekeeping operations are neither prepared nor equipped to carry out counter-terrorism operations, but that they certainly must adapt to changes in the security environment, which include the threat of violent extremism and terrorism. The participants also agreed on the necessity of better understanding of the causes of extremism and destabilisation, the necessity of intelligence sharing improvement, economic and social development, and the prevention of conflicts.⁷³⁶ In the debate, the view of the EU was also expressed (including EU membership candidate countries). In the EU statement it was stressed that a response to asymmetric threats required

⁷³⁵ Ibid.

⁷³⁶ Security Council Open Debate: "Maintaining International Peace and Security- Peace Operations and Asymmetrical Threats, November 7, 2016, <http://www.peacewomen.org/security-council/security-council-open-debate-maintenance-international-peace-and-security-peace> (accessed Jun 01, 2017).

"better integration of modern technology and intelligence capabilities into peace operations"⁷³⁷.

A comprehensive study of the implications of transnational terrorism for UN field missions, conducted at Princeton University, points out that the UN should work more on prevention activities, information gathering, and information analysis.⁷³⁸ The report on *Safety and security in the United Nations system* also stressed that the UN must act preventively in order to respond to threats such as terrorism, and that security of personnel can be improved through the promotion and acceptance of the security culture, the "cornerstone of any security system"⁷³⁹.

CONCLUSION

The contemporary security environment is shaped by a large number of security challenges and threats, among which internal armed conflicts and asymmetric threats in the form of violent extremism and terrorism stand out as the most important ones in the 21st century. Peacekeeping operations are carried out in the circumstances of internal conflicts and terrorism, and UN personnel are often exposed to deliberate attacks with fatal consequences. As many as two thirds of peacekeepers have been deployed on missions in countries affected by terrorism, and one of the most dangerous UN missions is considered to be the mission in Mali. In the past four years, as a result of terrorist attacks carried out using improvised explosive devices in Mali, more than 70 peacekeepers lost their life. Numerous debates have therefore been organised on whether the mandate of peacekeeping operations should be extended to include the fight against terrorism and violent extremism, as it is quite certain that in the future peacekeepers will increasingly deal with such threats.

The stance on peacekeepers' participation in counterterrorism operations is almost unison: UN forces should not undertake military anti-terrorist actions. However, to implement the mandate successfully and protect civilians and its own personnel, the UN must provide its forces on the ground with appropriate

⁷³⁷ EU Statement – United Nations Security Council: Peacekeeping Operations Facing Asymmetrical Threats, 2016, <http://eu-un.europa.eu/eu-statement-united-nations-security-council-peacekeeping-operations-facing-asymmetrical-threats/> (accessed May 13, 2017).

⁷³⁸ Mauricio Artiñano et al. *Adapting and Evolving: The Implications of Transnational Terrorism for UN Field Missions* (Princeton: Woodrow Wilson School Princeton University, 2014).

⁷³⁹ Jorge Flores Callejas and Jean Wesley Cazeau, *Safety and security in the United Nations system* (Geneva: United Nations Joint Inspection Unit, 2016): v.

equipment, technology, logistics, and training, as well as significantly improve intelligence capacity and information sharing.

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MIROVNE OPERACIJE UJEDINJENIH NACIJA U SAVREMENOM BEZBEDNOSNOM OKRUŽENJU

Vanja Rokvić*

Fakultet bezbednosti, Univerzitet u Beogradu,
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Svrha ovog preglednog rada je prikazivanje savremenog bezbednosnog i asimetričnog okruženja u kojem se odvijaju mirovne operacije UN. Analizom sadržaja zvaničnih izveštaja UN i akademskih radova je ustanovljeno da se sve veći broj mirovnih operacija uspostavlja u uslovima postojećeg sukoba i asimetričnih pretnji izraženih u vidu nasilnog ekstremizma i terorizma. Osoblje UN sve češće je meta terorističkih napada, a samo u misiji u Maliju u protekle četiri godine smrtno je stradalo više od 70 mirovnjaka. Stoga su pokrenute rasprave o proširenju mandata mirovnih operacija na protivterorističke akcije. U radu je zaključeno da mirovne operacije nisu dizajnirane za borbu protiv terorizma, već da se ovakvim pretnjama trebaju suprotstaviti boljom opremom, tehnologijom, treningom i razvojem obaveštajnih kapaciteta.

Ključne reči: savremeno bezbednosno okruženje, asimetrične pretnje, namerni napadi, mirovne operacije UN.

* vanjarokvic@fb.bg.ac.rs

ANALYSIS ASYMMETRIC THREATS ON CORRIDOR 10 AS ONE OF THE KEY SERBIAN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Duško Tomić*

Faculty of Security and Strategic Studies
American University in the Emirates, Dubai,
United Arab Emirates

Proda Šećerov

Faculty of Engineering Management, University Union Nikola Tesla,
Belgrade, Republic of Serbia

Abstract: The focus of this study is to prove priority needs, opportunities and obligations for corporate (integrated or joint) risk assessment (dangers and consequences), and then, to create, design and establish new integrated model system as a proactive response to such perceived risk, or to establish the model of integrated management system in emergency situations at the regional corridor 10 (K-10), on the route which passes through Republic of Serbia. The study identified techniques and methods that could indicate possible solution of creating and producing new models. By using methods and techniques of Fuzzy Logic (FL) and Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), a unique method and model of Fuzzy Neural System (FN system) is defined, created and presented in this paper. Model of FN system takes into account modern requirements for definition of intelligent solutions of dynamic models for decision making. It would support the operational establishment of integrated management in emergency situations in the zone of road route K-10 and point to the possibility of wider use of this model.

Key words: risk management, Emergency situations management, the risk scale, regional corridors, fuzzy logic, neural network, fuzzy-neural systems.

INTRODUCTION

It is impossible to find the spot on the earth that is not endangered by some risk factors that can cause accidents and disasters, known as emergency situations. By timely consideration, estimation, analysis, predictions and forecasts in all phases of emergency situation, as well as organization and

* tomic.dusko@gmail.com

establishment of functionally integrated management systems in emergency situations, danger, and in particular consequences, can be substantially reduced by preventive actions and reactively limited, which significantly affects the decrease of the rate of victims and damage, and thus the preservation of human capital and economic development.

Taking into account multi-disciplinary results of earlier scientific researches and international experiences and best practices, this preliminary study should be interpreted as an attempt, desire, need and the contribution to investigate the risk factors in the zone of the regional road corridor 10 route, *image 1*, which alone, or joint, affect the overall traffic safety, and vice versa.




Image1: Zone of Pan-European corridor 10 route through the Republic of Serbia

Therefore, the results of this study should be considered narrow and wide through the understanding and prediction of corporate (joint) effect and impact that risk factors have on consequences and vulnerability of certain sections of road route K-10, and through the generation of standard proactive operating response procedures, as a contribution to the procedure of identification and detection of traffic "black spots" on the road, and wide, as a tool that contributes to the prevention of road safety in the Republic of Serbia.

MODEL OF RISK ASSESMENT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF INTEGRATED PROTECTION SYSTEM ON THE REGIONAL CORRIDOR 10

Problems of consideration, analysis and forecasts of risk are very complex, because of the multidisciplinary character, and the answers are sometimes even more complex, because of the multifunctional character.

Complexity of the problem under consideration becomes more complicated if the risk can not be defined precisely or measured. Nowadays it is “accepted that no single methodology, method, technique or program support can ever completely define risk, or measure and predict it with absolute precision and accuracy”⁷⁴⁰. The risk can only be safely considered and treated as an undetermined category, characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, ambiguity and imprecision. Therefore, the risk can be considered and processed using an artificial neural network (ANN) in the fuzzy neural system (FNS). Such an approach provides an approximation of input (of composite risks-KMR) on the output (of corporate risks-KoR and corporate vulnerability-GEHVI). Therefore, the focus in this paper is not the presentation of problems (risk factors in the area of road route K-10), but the consideration of possible methodologies and solution models (of FN system) in risk assessment and establishment of proactive systems of integrated protection of road route at the regional K- 10.

During the preliminary study in the area of road route K-10⁷⁴¹, two categories of risk factors, challenges and dangers (hereinafter just risk) are found:

- **Category A or INPUT K-10:** This category includes all non-localized and localized risks arising in the zone of road route K-10. These external risk factors objectively affect traffic safety.
- **Category B or OUTPUT K-10:** This category represents the internal risk factors that are generated by exploitation and have a retroactive effect on the area of road route K-10, and have an indirect impact on road safety.

Both categories of risk factors can be identified through the indicators that are expressed in quantitative and qualitative scales. This fact poses a problem of considering the joint relations and influence in the process of calculating the corporate risk and corporate vulnerability. This problem is solved in many ways, and the way that is in this paper discussed and proposed, is consideration and use of methods and techniques of Fuzzy Logic - FL and Artificial Neural Networks - ANN. By using these methods and techniques a

⁷⁴⁰ Robert S. Kaplan is a Professor in the Baker Foundation at Harvard Business School and president of professional practice in Palladium Group, in 1997.

⁷⁴¹ Action research on road route K-10 conducted by Andrej Secerov, Faculty of Technical Sciences, Department for Traffic Engineering, 2005-2009.

single method and model of FN system is defined, created and presented, which can be implemented as an integrated information system to support proactive decision-making in the wider assessment of the effects on road safety.

Integrated management system in emergency situations, established in any organizational form, is a complex dynamic **User Balance System (UBS)**⁷⁴², with multidisciplinary problems (at the input), and multifunctional solutions (at the output). It is the user balance system that characterizes the logic of human thought and reasoning. This model of risk assessment and establishment of integrated protection on regional corridor K-10, is implemented in three functional units, in 15 steps. Each of these steps takes place in a time period from t_0 to t_{14} , Image 2.




Image 2: Schematic presentation of functional units and steps

1st Functional unit represents the System of early warning to emergency and is implemented in 9 steps:

Step 1: Identification of set KmR and classification of subsets R_t ($1-n$), R_i ($1-n$) and R_p ($1-n$), by sections of route K-10;

⁷⁴² Source: Ian Lerche, Walter Glaesser „Environmental Risk Assessment“, Springer, 2006; User Balance System (UBS), is a contemporary concept of creating management in complex dynamic systems in which functional integration of problem and solution should be provided for system users.

Step 2: Making a cadastre, codifying and creating a database (RDBMS) by sections, georeferencing in GIS format and establishing input data monitoring in *SCADA* system;

Step 3: Fuzzification of input data from the cluster subsets $\{R_t (1-n), R_i (1-n), R_p (1-n)\}$

Step 4: Defining architecture, structure and functional algorithm of FN system

Step 5: Defining domino effect through fuzzy relations in the first hidden layer **S1**;

Step 6: Defining synergetic effect through fuzzy relations in the second hidden layer **S2**;

Step 7: Defining cumulative effect through fuzzy relations in the third hidden layer **S3**;

Step 8: Defining output layer **S4**: corporate risk (*KoR*) and corporate vulnerability (*GEHVI*);

Step 9: Defuzzification and defining of risk scale of output layer *S4*: *KoR* and *GEHVI*.

2nd Functional unit represents the System of proactive response and is implemented in 4 steps:

Step 10: Standard operating procedures of the system of proactive response of integrated protection at every level of quarter-scale;

Step 11: Defining *crisp* point at every level of risk and generating of proactive procedure;

Step 12: Optimizing reaction of proactive response system for integrated protection;

Step 13: Diagram of georeferential data for *KoR* and *GEHVI* on sections of the road K-10;

3rd Functional unit represents the system for checking procedures and improvement of the system. It is applied in two steps:

Step14: Checking the reliability and safety of generated procedures in the proactive response system;

Step15: Checking the corporate reliability and safety of FN system.

All indicators of expected risk factors, that could cause dangers and consequences to traffic safety⁷⁴³ typical for a zone of road route of regional K-10 (in closer zone of 100m and further of 10 km) are defined within a single risk cadastre from the real system. Data are systematized within a single set of composite risks - *KMR*. Such defined set of *KMR* is then categorized into three clusters or subsets of risk, *Image 3*:

1. $\sum Rt$ – permanent risks and dangers (earthquakes, landslides, torrential floods, snowdrifts, etc.) which are difficult to examine fully and remove, and only some measures can be taken to diminish the danger and consequences. The following risk factors are identified and codified by type as follows:

- *rt1* – Seismological risk factors;
- *rt2* – The risks of flooding;
- *rt3* - The risks of landslides and avalanches;
- *rt4* - The risks of storms and hail;
- *rt5* - The risks of ice with snow storms and snow drifts;
- *rt6* - The risks of extreme heat and draught;
- *rt7* - The risks of forest fires;

2. $\sum Ri$ – installed risks and dangers (refineries, factories and plants for production of dangerous substances, storages for fuel, explosive, ammunition, etc.). These are all installations and facilities built and installed by man's planned activities, as well as the retroactive effects that these risk factors bring and install to the zone of road route through the Republic of Serbia. The following risk factors are identified and codified by type as follows:

- *ri1* – Traffic safety risks;
- *ri2* - The risks of possible chemical accidents;
- *ri3* - The risks of possible explosion and fire of the installed dangerous substances;
- *ri4* - The risks of possible nuclear or radioactive radiation (Radiological risk);
- *ri5* – Risk factors of non-ionizing electromagnetic radiation;

⁷⁴³ It is based on the strategy of the document *Guidelines for Risk Assessment in the EU from 1996, (Document COM (95), European Council Directive 89/391/ECC)* and methodology of the EU strategy document *Guidelines for doing business with EU*, part relating to traffic.

- **ri6** – The mutual influence of risk factors on road and rail route corridors;
 - **ri7** – Potential risk factors of civil and military air transport on road corridor;
 - **ri8** – Negative retroaction of risk factors resulting from the exploitation of corridor K-10 as installed risks- the induced risk;
3. $\sum R_p$ – variable risks and dangers (traffic accidents, fires, explosions, traffic accidents during the transport of dangerous substances, excessive pollution, etc.). The following risk factors are identified and codified by type as follows:
- rp1** – Risk factors in transportation of dangerous substances;
 - rp2** – Non-localized risk factors (excessive pollution);
 - rp3** - Risk factors of consequences of terrorism;
 - rp4** - Risk factors of protest gathering and blockade of corridor sections.




Image 3: Composite risks and subsets or clusters of risk factors

Thus defined statistic data are georeferenced and form a single georeferential database for subsets **DBMS-Rt**, **DBMS-Ri** and **DBMS-Rp**, and a unified relational database – **RDBMS** for **KmR** by sections of the real system of road route K-10, and it is schematically shown in *image 4*.




Image 4: Forming of data base

Data in georeferential database are expressed through quantitative and qualitative indicators within several scales and systems, and for that reason the fuzzification of these data within the fuzzification matrix must be done, in order to observe possible interaction of relations and joint action through domino effect, synergetic effect and cumulative effect to calculate results: of

corporate risk- **KoR** and corporate vulnerability - GEHVI⁷⁴⁴, and then prioritize the undertaking of response –integrated protection procedure. The Logic and scale of REHRA II method and methodology are used in fuzzification. Thus fuzzified data make the first input layer– **S₀**, image 5-1 i 5-2.




Image 5-1: Process and matrix of fuzzification

⁷⁴⁴ GEHVI (General Environment and Health Vulnerability Index by REHRA II methodology – Rapid Environment and Health Risk Assessment, represents the corporate index of vulnerability (of health, environment, economy and cultural and historical property).




Image 5-2: Process and matrix of fuzzification

The next step is to define fuzzy neural system (FNS), and artificial neural network (ANN). Taking into account the current scientific knowledge about the effects of joint risk factors actions (domino, synergetic and cumulative effect) with software support of MATLAB, non-recurring ANN, with input layer S_0 and output layer S_4 and three hidden layers S_1 , S_2 , S_3 are defined. The input layer S_0 has three nodes (S_{01} , S_{02} , S_{03}). Output layer S_4 has two nodes (S_{41} , S_{42}) and the hidden layers S_1 , S_2 , S_3 have four nodes each: S_1 - (S_{11} , S_{12} , S_{13} , S_{14}), S_2 - (S_{21} , S_{22} , S_{23} , S_{24}), S_3 - (S_{31} , S_{32} , S_{33} , S_{34}), image 6.




Image 6: Architecture and structure ANN

The next step is to define the first joint effect of risk factor- domino effect, through domino fuzzy relations in the first hidden layer S_1 . Domino fuzzy effect is observed and defined in the output vectors of hidden nodes: S_{11} - health, S_{12} – environmental, S_{13} – the economy and S_{14} – cultural and historical property. Defining the domino fuzzy relations is done during the training process of FN system for each section, image 7-1 i 7-2.




Image 7-1: Functional procedure for the formation of the hidden layer S_1 and hidden nodes S_{11} , S_{12} , S_{13} , S_{14}




Image 7-2: Functional procedure for the formation of the hidden layer S_2 and hidden nodes S_{11} , S_{12} , S_{13} , S_{14}

The next step is to define the second joint effect of risk factor – a synergetic effect, through the synergetic fuzzy relations in the second hidden layer S2. The synergetic fuzzy effect is observed and defined in the output vectors of hidden nodes: S21-health, S22 -environmental, S23- the economy and S24 -its cultural and historical property. Defining the synergetic fuzzy relations is done during the training process of FN system for each section, image 8-1 i 8-2




Image 8-1: Functional procedure for the formation of the hidden layer S2 and hidden nodes S21, S22, S23, S24




Image 8-2: Functional procedure for the formation of the hidden layer S_2 and hidden nodes S_{21} , S_{22} , S_{23} , S_{24}

Formation of the output vector of hidden node S_{21} , and synergetic fuzzy effect on health, is calculated through synergetic fuzzy relations. By the same analogy other output vectors in hidden nodes S_{22} , S_{23} , S_{24} are formed. The next step is to define the third joint effect of risk factor– the cumulative effect is done through cumulative fuzzy relations in the third hidden layer S_3 . The cumulative fuzzy effect is observed and defined in the output vectors of hidden nodes: S_{31} - health, S_{32} – environmental, S_{33} - economy and S_{34} – the cultural and historical property. Defining of the cumulative fuzzy relations is done during the FN system training process for each section, *image 9-1 I 9-2*. The cumulative effect within the third hidden layer S_3 can be done in three ways:

1. First solution: Fuzzy relations are time-limited functions without input $I(t)$
2. Second solution: Fuzzy relations are time-limited functions with input $I(t)$
3. Third solution: With input of genetic algorithm-complex.




Image 9-1: Functional procedure for forming of the hidden layer S_3 and hidden nodes S_{31} , S_{32} , S_{33} , S_{34} Without the input of time-limited function $I(t)$




Image 9-2: Functional procedure for forming of the hidden layer S_3 and hidden nodes S_{31} , S_{32} , S_{33} , S_{34} Without the input of time-limited function $I(t)$

In the next step logic and principles of REHRA II methods are used to define the output layer S4 by defining a vector of output nodes S41 of corporate risk KoR and S42 corporate vulnerabilities - GEHVI, *image 10-1 I 10-2*, and then, defuzzification of these values is done by using matrix defuzzification, *image 11*. Thus calculated values are the output from ANN of formed FN system.




Image 10-1: Output layer S4 and output nodes S41 and S42




Image 10-2: Output layer S4 and output nodes S41 and S42





Image 11: Matrix of defuzzification

Output values represent the corporate risks and corporate vulnerabilities by sections of corridor K-10, *image 12*.



*Image 12: State diagram of **KoR** and **GEHVI** by sections (1÷83) of road route K-10*

The resulting data in the next step generate five types or **species of standard operating procedures (SOP)** for Emergency Management, *Image 13*:

1. Standby procedures
2. Action procedures
3. Recovery procedures
4. Rehabilitation procedures
5. Procedure of international cooperation




Image 13: Standard operating procedures in the system of proactive response of integrated protection

Proactive activation of SOP procedures is achieved by defining *crisp point* – the level of each section of road route K-10, image 14-1 I 14-2.




Image 14: Defining crisp point – the level by sections of the road K-10 for KoR and GEHVI

In the event that the values of corporate risk -*KoR* are the same in several sections, the priority of engagement is determined by the *crisp* level of corporate vulnerability - *GEHVI*. Priority in the response is shown in one example, in the table of priorities on the map in GIS, where the real data *KoR* and *GEHVI* are shown, image 15-1 i 15-2.

Деони це К-10	А KoR	Б GEHVI	(fp)	Приоритет
1	2	3	4	5
1	1,2	2,6	7,96	13
2	2,1	1,6	4,66	14
3	3,4	7,5	59,65	5
4	4,3	9,1	87,11	1 
5	9,0	8,3	77,89	2  
6	9,2	3,9	23,24	12
7	1,9	7,5	58,15	6
8	3,4	6,1	40,61	8
9	4,3	8,1	69,91	4
10	5,1	4,4	24,46	11
11	8,2	4,6	29,36	9
12	9,0	8,0	73,00	3   
13	5,1	6,1	42,31	7
14	3,4	4,6	24,56	10

Image 15-1: Diagram of georeferenced data for Kor and GEHVI in GIS by sections of K-10




Image 15-2: Diagram of georeferenced data for Kor and GEHVI in GIS by sections of K-10

Dynamic training is performed in such applied system, and then, Monte Carlo method is used for checking of procedures and system reliability by sections of K-10, image 16-1 and 16-2.




Image 16-1: Checking of reliability and safety of generated procedures and FN systems by sections of K-10




Image 16-2: Checking of reliability and safety of generated procedures and FN systems by sections of K-10

For each anticoincidence for particular section (red point), the repair procedure is done through new training of FN system, processing ANN - Σ , through fuzzy relations in the hidden layers, by adjusting the coefficient of fuzzy weight $W(1-n)$ and parameters of activation threshold $Q(1-n)$ in the hidden nodes. If this fails, calculation and correction of *crisp* point-level to a particular section is done.

THE RESULTS

The analysis of algorithms for modelling flow and functional modelling of FN system has shown that the new model of FN system can provide the following:

- Data collection of risk factors from multiple sources: analysis, evaluation, forecast, monitoring, supervision and presentation in real time.
- A realistic approximation of the input and output values through fuzzification and defuzzification.
- Mapping of input risk factors levels in the output values: a corporate risk and corporate vulnerability.
- The use of linear functions in fuzzy relations and in the hidden layers, which provides a domino effect, synergetic and cumulative effect of a reasonable extent, with the correction of fuzzy weight coefficient $W(1-n)$ and activation threshold parameter $Q(1-n)$.
- The new model of FN system provides the required parameters in the output:
 - Corporate risk **KoR**,
 - Corporate vulnerability **GEHVI**.
- Defining a *crisp* point provides generating of proactive procedures for obtained values of corporate risk **KoR** and corporate vulnerability **GEHVI**.
- These two parameters provide timely planning of forming the emergency mobile teams and their location near the section with the most risk factors in a given period.
- The above solution provides the elements for establishing the System for early warning of risk factors as a possible emergency situation and the System of proactive response.
- Establishment of the Procedures checking system provides the function of learning FN systems, and improvement of the integrated model of risk assessment and establishment of integrated protection system on a regional corridor 10 through Serbia.

- Providing needed legislation to establish a new model of FN system, provides a real opportunity to establish a functional operational integration as a modern model of integrated emergency management at the regional corridor K-10 through the Republic of Serbia.
- The model of new FN system can be viewed as a possible model that can be expanded (multiplied) to the risk assessment with other critical national structures.
- Establishment of operational and functional integration with the user's passenger information system within the *ITS* network.
- The new established model of FN system provides operational data exchange on possible risk factors that have regional significance, and also data exchange in real time, thus creating conditions to enable cooperation and assistance in disasters.
- Preliminary results enable initiating of a pilot project for the establishment of the Emergency situations management on road route of the regional corridor K-10.

CONCLUSIONS

Thus developed new model of FN system points to the conclusion of the following options that FN system can provide:

- IT support to the model of establishment and connection of monitoring and control of risk factors on road route K-10
- Planning of preventive and timely preparation of Plans for response actions in emergency situations on the road route K-10 with the priorities, by sections and zones of responsibility for the road route K-10 , of the district and at national level.
- The necessary conditions for timely decision-making on the formation and dislocation of the subjects of response actions (necessary forces and means) to the zone of most affected section of K-10 (permanently or temporarily forming of teams - operating groups: according to the crisis periods of seasons or the risk factors).
- Making decisions on the relocation of certain teams that would be on call in the vicinity of the most affected areas after receiving information about alarms (as mobile teams).
- Timely preparation and verification of operational procedures for adequate response and engagement by the sections (prevention procedures, action procedures, procedures for recovery and rehabilitation procedures).

- Preventive making of plans for alternative transportation route (bypass), in the case of blocking certain sections of the route of K-10.
- Timely information to inform passengers on the route of the anticipated risk factors (ice, blizzards, fog, etc.), as well as giving advice, recommendations or orders.
- If necessary, quick starting of procedures of a wider involvement of international aid.
- Quick and effective informing of people in charge about the anticipated dangers and possible consequences.
- Quick and effective informing of public about the affected section of the route K-10 and beyond.
- Starting the sectoral or selective system of information and alert only in the zone of affected section of K-10.
- Significant and necessary input data for traffic Information and Telecommunication System (ITS) - **TRAFIS Road** for road traffic management for all users of the road route K-10, as well as for establishing systems for passenger information - **PASIS (PASsenger Information System)**.

Such establishment of integrated units of draft risk assessment model and establishment of the integrated protection on a regional corridor K-10, on the road through Republic of Serbia, should contribute to creating the necessary conditions to support rapid regional integration of traffic-transformation systems at the level of South-eastern Europe, as a necessary condition for implementation of accepted international obligations and for Serbia accession to full EU membership.

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ANALIZA ASIMETRIČNA NEDELJA NA KORIDORU 10 KAO JEDNA KLJUČNE INFRASTRUKTURE SRPSKE

Duško Tomić*

Faculty of Security and Strategic Studies
American University in the Emirates, Dubai,
Ujedinjeni Arapski Emirati

Proda Šećerov

Fakultet za inženjerski menadžment, Univerzitet Union - Nikola Tesla,
Beograd, Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Fokus ovog istraživanja jeste da se dokažu prioritete potrebe, mogućnosti i obaveze za korporativnu (integriranih ili zajedničkih) procenu rizika (opasnosti i posledica), a zatim da se kreiraju, dizajniraju i uspostave novi integrirani modeli sistema kao proaktivni odgovor na takve uočene rizike ili da se uspostavi model integriranog sistema upravljanja u vanrednim situacijama na regionalnom koridoru 10 (K-10), na ruti koja prolazi kroz Republiku Srbiju. Studija je identifikovala tehnike i metode koje bi mogle ukazati na moguće rešenje kreiranje i proizvodnje novih modela. Koristeći metode i tehnike fazi logike (Fuzzi Logic - FL) i veštačke neuronske mreže (Artificial Neural Networks - ANN), definisana je, urađena i predstavljena

* tomic.dusko@gmail.com

jedinstvena metoda i model Fuzzi Neural Sistem (FN sistema) u ovom radu. Model FN sistema uzima u obzir savremene zahteve za definicijom inteligentnih rešenja dinamičkih modela za donošenje odluka. To bi podržalo operativno uspostavljanje integrisanog upravljanja u vanrednim situacijama u zoni putne saobraćajnice K-10 i ukazao na mogućnost šire upotrebe ovog modela.

Ključne reči: upravljanje rizikom, upravljanje vanrednim situacijama, skala rizika, regionalni koridori, fuzzi logika, neuralna mreža, fuzzi-neuralni sistemi.

FINANCING OF COMBATANTS IN ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS

Stephan U. Breu*

Swiss Centre for International Humanitarian Law,
Switzerland

Abstract: Identifying the flow of financing of asymmetric combatants especially in fourth-generation warfare proves to be very demanding. Whereas «traditional» banking channels might be possible to control to a certain extent (i.e. SWIFT transfers), fund transfers through charitable organisations or state sponsoring of terrorism are much more difficult to monitor. Knowing the potential for law-enforcement and intelligence agencies to monitor SWIFT activities and other electronic means of transfer, other parallel remittance systems (Hawala) have taken a much more important role in financing combatants in asymmetric conflicts. In future, the anonymity and minimal documentation of such transfers will be even surpassed by the possible use of cryptocurrencies.

The financing systems of combatants in asymmetric conflicts demonstrate a flexible and adaptive approach. However, as all these channels are mostly used for legal transfers between legitimate partners, any heavy regime of new regulations would make all transactions costlier and less convenient. Such negative economic impact is opposing the need of monitoring the financing of asymmetric opponent groups. To solve this situation, the focus should lie on the attempts to make the risk of detection of such transfers higher for the parties involved. Without interfering too strongly with the financing channels, this process asks for improved compliance and cooperation on all levels and capacity. With the increasing importance of cryptocurrencies, a completely new field of complex problems is arising through the implied anonymity and complexity or sheer impossibility to track transfers in the dark net. As regulations in this new financial market will be difficult to enforce, it is necessary to establish international cooperation and capacity building to implement some possibilities for law-enforcement and intelligence entities to monitor the illegal flows of capital.

Key words: financing, regulations, compliance, hawala, cryptocurrencies.

* info@breu.com

INTRODUCTION

The threat level within our European and International societies has changed dramatically after the 9/11 attack and the following military interventions mainly led by the American Security Apparatus and its “War on Terror”. Therefore, we could observe the emerging of new terrorist organisations like the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” which, with its goal to establish a “Caliphate” as a state-like organisation, asked for enormous financial sources to support its massive operational activities in different regions in the Middle East. The revenues⁷⁴⁵ of the Islamic State in the year of 2016 are estimated around \$870m.⁷⁴⁶ The Islamic State can be seen as a good example to try to understand the mechanism and new developments in financing combatants in asymmetric conflicts.

Accessing financial resources for ISIL and similar organisations is getting more and more difficult as programs like the “Terrorist Finance Tracking Program – TFTP”⁷⁴⁷ of the United States Government are monitoring bank-to-bank transactions e.g. SWIFT-transactions very closely. More difficult to monitor are covered transfers between and through non-profit organizations which cannot be assigned directly to any combatant organisation or its sympathizers. In addition, parallel remittance systems (Hawala) have developed which are also not monitored easily through any government agency. A very modern way of transferring financial means is offered by different new cryptocurrencies, which makes it nearly impossible to follow the financial flow of such funding.

⁷⁴⁵ The Report of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on „Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) published in February 2015. <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financing-of-the-terrorist-organisation-ISIL.pdf> lists as main revenue sources of ISIL sources a) proceeds from the occupation of territory, b) kidnapping for ransom, c) donations by or through non-profit organizations, d) material support provided by foreign fighters and finally e) fund rising through modern communication networks.

⁷⁴⁶ For more information regarding financing of ISIL please refer to the Report of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), King’s College London, on „Caliphate in Decline: An Estimate of Islamic State’s Financial Fortunes“ published in 2017. <http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICSR-Report-Caliphate-in-Decline-An-Estimate-of-Islamic-States-Financial-Fortunes.pdf>

⁷⁴⁷ For more information on the “Terrorist Finance Tracking Program – TFTP” see the webpage of the U.S. Department of the Treasury – Resource Center <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Terrorist-Finance-Tracking/Pages/ftfp.aspx>

In this paper, I do not want to look further into financing of international paramilitary and mercenary organizations that are mainly used by the established global players to have asymmetric influence in different hot spots worldwide as these organizations do normally not have any problem getting their “expenses” financed through official channels.

FINANCING DONATIONS BY OR THROUGH NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

The history of financing international terrorist groups is a long one. Charitable contributions are a historical part of Muslim solidarity and as such are also a core pillar of the Muslim faith. A lot of the established charitable and service organizations serving such groups and their sympathizers grew out of the support for Mujahedeen organizations to fight the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. Intensive efforts from the international community have raised awareness of such actions but there is still a long way to go. As most of the international active Non-Profit Organizations are not involved in any dubious activities it is very demanding finding the real “Black Sheep” as it is very easy to establish new schemes for covering the financing activities of asymmetric combatants. In addition, the charity sector is sometimes abused by terrorists in order to fund-raise through unsuspecting communities who do not have the abilities to control the end up of their donations properly. The 2014 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) report round that NPOs most at risk of being misused are “those engaged in service activities which are operating in close proximity to an active terrorist threat” and those “that send funds to counterpart or correspondent NPOs located in or close to where terrorists operate”.⁷⁴⁸ In the United Kingdom there have been a number of incidents with connections between terrorists organizations and NPOs. For example three men were “convicted of terrorism offences in the UK fraudulently posed as volunteers for Muslim Aid, one of the largest British Muslim NGO’s, collecting up to £14,000 from the public”.⁷⁴⁹

⁷⁴⁸ FATF – Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks, <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Emerging-Terrorist-Financing-Risks.pdf>.

⁷⁴⁹ The Guardian, March 5, 2015 – “Banks block charity donations over terrorism funding fears, <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/mar/05/banks-block-charity-donations-over-terrorism-funding-fears>

In the Netherlands there has been found large bulks of cash sent to Syria⁷⁵⁰ and French individuals have been charged with collecting EURO 60,000 to 100,000 for terrorist activities.⁷⁵¹ Any monitoring regulations should be kept in a focus of not decreasing the potential volume of legitimate transfers as well as not making transfers less convenient, more complex, slower or even costlier. Such restrictions would disturb the legitimate activities of the majorities of bona fide NGO's engaged in organizing civil society's support for development of humankind. Onerous restrictions would even affect the international money transfer system sustainably causing problems for international trade. Existing regulations for banks and financial institutions and FATF-styled regional bodies have shown a certain effect in decreasing the flow of finances to asymmetric combatants but due to insufficient coordination and non-compliance to international regulations by some highly exposed high-risk institutions there is still a considerable part of financing organized through NGO's. Moreover, as noted recently by UK authorities, de-risking by withdrawing bank services to charities may mean "charitable funds may go underground, increasingly transacted in cash, or moved off-shore via cash couriers or alternative remittance systems".⁷⁵²

The Strategy of the OSCE on countering financing of terrorism is guided by the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy which calls for the implementation of the international standards embodied in the Forty Recommendations on Money-Laundering and Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing of the Financial Action Task Force, recognizing that States may require assistance in implementing them and encourages international co-operation in this regard.⁷⁵³

A comprehensive conclusion of the OSCE as a solid background and reference to understanding of the risk, disseminating good practices and

⁷⁵⁰ FATF – International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf

⁷⁵¹ Dan Bilefsky "Charity in France Is Accused of Being a Front for Financing Terrorism in Syria" published in The New York Times, December 4, 2014ATF – International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation<https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/05/world/charity-in-france-is-accused-of-being-a-front-for-financing-terrorism-in-syria.html?mcubz=1>

⁷⁵² HM Treasury/HM Home Office, UK national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing (October 2015)https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/468210/UK_NRA_October_2015_final_web.pdf

⁷⁵³ Thomas Wuchte, OSCE Head on Anti-Terrorism Issues, Presentation at the meeting of the OSCE Security Committee in July 2013

supporting the implementation of global and regional commitments to fight all forms of terrorism financing can be found in the report “To Protect and Prevent: Outcomes of a Global Dialogue to Counter Terrorist Abuse of the Non-profit Sector” published by CGCC Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation.⁷⁵⁴

As these transactions from NPOs are recorded in the international financial system, there is at least a chance to make the risk of discovery higher for the parties involved. However, in addition to regulations and monitoring, the heightened awareness of this problem by the civil society must be increased and easy reporting of suspicious practices and information should be implemented.

FINANCING THROUGH INFORMAL TRANSFER SYSTEMS (OFTEN REFERRED AS HAWALA)

Hawala, meaning “transfer” or “trust” in Arabic, is deeply rooted in the Arabic, African and South Asia community for centuries. It is also known as “hundi”, “xawala”, “pheikwan” or “feiqian” in different areas. It is an effective value transfer system outside the traditional banking and financial channels and remittance systems. Basically, it is a system that is less expensive, swifter, more reliable, more convenient and less bureaucratic than formal remittance systems. The whole system is based on trust for the involved brokers called “Hawaladars”, whose business survival depends on their reputation. As a system based on national, ethnic and family relations it depends more on absolute trust between the parties involved than on legal documents. Hawala has also been called “The Working Man’s Bitcoin”⁷⁵⁵ in the past. Using cash couriers to transfer cash money may be challenging for transferring higher amounts or may lack speed and ask for considerable strategic planning. Nevertheless it can be seen as the “simplest and oldest way of moving value”⁷⁵⁶. The schemes for cash couriers vary from very easy to very complex depending on the number of couriers involved and borders to

⁷⁵⁴ CGCC Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation “To Protect and Prevent: Outcomes of a Global Dialogue to Counter Terrorist Abuse of the Nonprofit Sector” published in June 2013

http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/CGCC_Prevent-Protect-Report_pgs.pdf

⁷⁵⁵ Alex Mayyasi “Hawala: The Working Man’s Bitcoin” published in *Priceconomics* in February 2014: “It’s an alternative monetary system that operates largely outside government control, avoids large transaction fees by circumventing banks, and has associations with money laundering and the illegal drug trade.”

⁷⁵⁶ Nikos Passas, “Informal Value Transfer Systems, Terrorism and Money Laundering,” report to the *National Institute of Justice*, 2003

cross but in general asymmetric combatants tend to involve only trusted persons to increase security for the transfer. For these reasons, it is particularly difficult for law and security agencies to monitor or track such transfers. As long as the transfer and information are forwarded person-to-person, there are not any footmarks in the international transfer system and no track history so transactions can only be blocked at handing over or through controls of subjects at border crossings or routine controls. Even the increased awareness of civil society cannot really have a major impact on such transactions as an integral part of various informal transfer systems worldwide is that often they have strong ethnic, religious and traditional ties and work through large ethnic diasporas. These informal transfer systems have been existing since the early medieval period in Europe or even before this time in India.⁷⁵⁷ As such, it is still the preferred way of sending money to families for a lot of immigrants and foreign workers. Most of the people using these systems are not doing it for any dubious reason but use it as the most convenient way to support the families at home as the systems per se are not illegal. However, the Report of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) from 2015 names Hawala or other informal value transfer systems a popular method of transferring money for terrorism.⁷⁵⁸ Most Hawala systems are also considerably cheaper than the modern remittance systems that are charging up to 9 % of the amount transferred. There are no contracts that also make it impossible to take any hawaladars to court if any problems occur, as there are only scribbled records of the hawaladars. As most transfers are not registered we can only estimate the amounts transferred through these systems and the part that is used to finance asymmetric combatants and their sympathizers.

To increase the security risk of discovery of dubious transfers is particularly becoming difficult in a time where we tend to open our borders for the free crossing of goods, people and capital. To identify suspicious individuals at checkpoints or border crossings would ask for a highly risk-

⁷⁵⁷ Patrick M. Jost and Harjit Singh Sandhu, “The hawala alternative remittance system and its role in money laundering” published by Interpol General Secretariat, Lyon, January 2000 says “Hawala predates 'traditional' or 'western' banking (the first 'western bank' in India was the Bank of Hindustan, established in Calcutta around 1770). Prior to this, the operations of “sarafs” and “potedars”, who were primarily moneychangers (and essentially the predecessors of the hawaladars discussed in this paper) were a fundamental component of the commercial and financial infrastructures.” <http://www.nmta.us/assets/docs/hawala.pdf>

⁷⁵⁸ Oftedal Emilie, “The financing of jihadi terrorist cells in Europe” published by Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) in January 2015 says: “While the hawala system is rarely used to transfer money within a small terrorist cell or within Europe, for example, it has been a popular method of transferring funds from European jihadi cells to terror groups abroad.” <http://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/14-02234.pdf>

orientated and deep co-operation between international security agencies and organizations exchanging information on on-going observations and operations, which of course is not in the ethos of some of these organizations. Given the underground profile of these systems and also the FATF-recommendations regarding combating alternative remittances to regulate and license Hawaladars might not really help to identify the misuse of the system as asymmetric combatants will try to use unofficial unregistered Hawaladars of their trust to undergo monitoring and discovery.

FINANCING THROUGH CRYPTOCURRENCIES

A very new development in financing asymmetric combatants is financing through the use of Cryptocurrencies or Virtual Currencies. It might be right that this channel of financing is not – yet – widely used by dubious organisations. But considering the increasing pressure on the existing financing channels it might well be very tempting to sidestep to this opportunity. So the European Banking Authority classified the terrorist use of Cryptocurrencies as a high priority risk.⁷⁵⁹ But to become a major source of financing some major disadvantages of Cryptocurrencies need to be reduced. First, any transfer in cryptocurrencies is relatively time-consuming today. But new concepts of cryptocurrencies offering faster transfer and higher security and anonymity are on the way. Secondly, the acceptance of digital cash is not very well developed in the areas where the headquarters of most asymmetric combatants and terrorist organizations are, and internet access is often slow and unreliable.

In addition, here we see a sustainable development of infrastructure and increasing acceptance of virtual currencies worldwide. Today it might be difficult to buy guns or explosives with virtual currencies but given the developments in “Dark Net” it might soon be quite different. Third, it is still challenging to transfer higher amounts through the cryptocurrencies systems today. But if cryptocurrencies are used to cover costs for financing basic supplies of smaller cells of asymmetric combatants or terrorists detecting such

⁷⁵⁹ EBA European Banking Authority “EBA Opinion on Virtual Currencies” published by EBA in July 2014 states on page 33 “Criminals or terrorists use the VC remittance systems and accounts for financing purposes (C03): The risk arises because, as a means of payment, VC schemes are not confined to, and are accepted across, jurisdictional borders. VC transactions require nothing more than internet access, the VC infrastructure is often spread across globe, making it difficult to intercept transactions, and VC transactions tend not to be reversible. The priority of the risk is high.”<https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-2014-08+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf>

transactions might nearly be impossible. According to the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment Report from 2014, 75 % of the jihadi plots studied in Europe from 1994 to 2013 cost less than USD 10,000 to execute.⁷⁶⁰

Also notice that as of January 2017 that the Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorist Finance Agency of Indonesia has published the first public allegation of terrorists using cryptocurrencies.⁷⁶¹ On the other hand, this example shows that security and anonymity has not yet reached a level that would make cryptocurrencies a priority choice of asymmetric combatants and terrorist organizations. Most cryptocurrencies rely on public ledger – i.e. block chain – and it has shown that law enforcement agencies have a number of ways to uncover participants in dubious transfers. As the cryptographic addresses of the sender and the recipient are recorded, with enough investigative resources the real identities can be uncovered. Nevertheless, there are new Cryptocurrencies like “Monero” which offer a much higher anonymity than Bitcoin as market leader and are getting a bigger share of the worldwide market. Moreover, compared to traditional transfer methods, Cryptocurrency transfers offer a decisive economic advantage as they show very low transmitting costs.⁷⁶²

Since May 2017, a US congressional subcommittee is developing a bill to study the use of digital currencies by terrorist.⁷⁶³

Maybe the most important reason why asymmetric combatants and terrorists have not yet used Cryptocurrencies on a wider scale it that they still do not need to do so. The other models for transfers and financing are still too easy to use and readily available so there is no need today to invest heavily in new, complicated techniques. However, for sure the work of Security and Law Enforcement Agencies will become more challenging in the near future with

⁷⁶⁰ Oftedal Emilie, “The financing of jihadi terrorist cells in Europe” published by Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) January 2015
<http://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/14-02234.pdf>

⁷⁶¹ According to Indonesian Security Agencies a suspected member of ISIL was sending Bitcoins to fellow members to avoid using the formal financial system
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-paypal-used-to-finance-terrorism-indonesian-agency-says-1483964198>

⁷⁶² Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, “Federal Council report on virtual currencies in response to the Schwaab and Weibel postulates” published June 2014
<https://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/35355.pdf>

⁷⁶³ 115th Congress 1st Session Miss Kathleen Rice from New York introduced the following bill to direct the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis to develop and disseminate a threat assessment regarding terrorist use of virtual currency. This Act may be cited as the “Homeland Security Assessment of Terrorists Use of Virtual Currencies Act”.

new cybercurrencies with deeper security and anonymity levels and through use of the Dark Net.

CONCLUSION

In general, it can be said that the challenges for Security and Law Enforcement Agencies to monitor and discover illegitimate transfers from peer-to-peer is increasing more and more. All regulations and recommendations regarding such transfers have to bear in mind that all the financial systems described here are mainly used by innocent people and are having a positive influence on economic growth and stability.

Therefore, any regulations have to avoid making the use of these systems unnecessarily more complicated, more time consuming or more expensive so as not to damage the economic development or civil society engagement at a whole. Finally, such strategy could push the existing systems more under ground as they are essential for millions of people and families and this would make them even more difficult to monitor.

Technically, it has to be an increased focus on more deep co-operation between international security and law enforcement organizations like advocated by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) not only aiming to freeze terrorist's assets but also to identify suspects and enable purposeful search for targeted suspects and controls in the internet and at check-points at airports and border crossings. Especially the capacities of the Cyber Investigators will have to be sustainably increased regarding the potential developments of Cryptocurrencies and the inherent difficulties to regulate such.

In addition, the awareness of the Civil Society and the Management of Non-Profit-Organisations should be increased and there should be easy accessible reporting points for suspicious activities. There is a strong need for an ongoing dialogue among stakeholders to share perspectives and build consensus to prevent terrorist abuse. All stakeholders are aware of the problem but there is a significant need for capacity building regarding all parties involved.

Finally, any regulations and standards have to be internationally coordinated and have to stay flexible to react on any development of these remittance systems, which asks for ongoing international analysis and monitoring of evolution and market changes.

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FINANSIRANJE BORACA U ASIMETRIČNIM SUKOBIMA

Stephan U. Breu*

Švajcarski centar za međunarodno humanitarno pravo,
Švajcarska

Apstrakt: Identifikacija toka finansiranja boraca u asimetričnim sukobima, posebno u ratu četvrte generacije, pokazuje se veoma zahtevnim. Budući da „tradicionalni“ bankarski kanali mogu biti u mogućnosti da kontrolišu u određenoj meri (npr. SWIFT transfer), transfer sredstava preko dobrotvornih organizacija ili državno sponzorstvo terorizma mnogo je teže nadgledati. Poznavajući potencijale za sprovođenje zakona i obaveštajnih agencija da nadgledaju SWIFT aktivnosti i druga elektronska sredstva prenosa, drugi paralelni sistemi doznaka (Havala) su preuzeli mnogo važniju ulogu u finansiranju boraca u asimetričnim sukobima. U budućnosti, anonimnost i minimalna dokumentacija takvih transfera čak će biti prevaziđena mogućom upotrebom kriptokvučnih podataka.

Sistem finansiranja boraca u asimetričnim konfliktima pokazuje fleksibilan i prilagodljiv pristup. Međutim, dok se svi ovi kanali uglavnom koriste za legalne transfere između legitimnih partnera, svaki otežavajući režim novih propisa učinio bi sve transakcije skupljim i manje povoljnim. Takav negativan ekonomski uticaj je suprotan potrebama praćenja finansiranja asimetričnih protivničkih grupa. Da bi se rešila ova situacija, fokus treba da bude na pokušaju da rizik od otkrivanja takvih transfera bude veći za uključene strane. Bez suvišnog mešanja u kanale finansiranja, ovaj proces zahteva poboljšanje usaglašenosti i saradnje na svim nivoima i kapacitetima. Sa rastućom važnošću kriptokvučnih vrednosti, potpuno novo polje složenih problema proizilazi iz implicitne anonimnosti i složenosti ili čiste nemogućnosti praćenja transfera u tamnoj mreži. Budući da će propisi na ovom novom finansijskom tržištu biti teški za sprovođenje, neophodno je uspostaviti međunarodnu saradnju i izgradnju kapaciteta za primenu nekih mogućnosti za sprovođenje zakona i obaveštajnih službi za praćenje ilegalnih tokova kapitala.

Ključne reči: finansiranje, propisi, usaglašenost, havala, kriptokutencije.

* info@breu.com

ИНФОРМАЦИОННО-ПСИХОЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ КОМПОНЕНТ «ГИБРИДНОЙ» ВОЙНЫ И КИБЕРПРОСТРАНСТВО

Николай Бузин^{*}

Научно-исследовательский институт
Вооруженных Сил Республики Беларусь,
Беларусь

Сергей Мусиенко^{**}

Аналитический центр ЕсооМ
Беларусь

Аннотация: Начиная с 2014 года по настоящее время средства массовой информации буквально соревнуются в количестве публикаций о «гибридной» войне. Само понятие, растиражированное в печати, воспринимается как «страшилка», пугающая европейских обывателей. Небывалый интерес, подогреваемый ведущими мировыми информационными агентствами, заставил обратиться к вопросу и разобраться в истоках столь пристального к нему внимания. При этом акцент сделан на информационно-психологический аспект «нового» явления и пространство, через которое информация поступает к потребителю.

Ключевые слова: информационно-психологический аспект, гибридной войне, киберпространство.

Что же такое «гибридная» война, которая так напугала Запад? В рамках Брюссельского форума (Brussels Forum) 2015 года определение ей дал генерал Филипп Бридлав, на тот момент верховный главнокомандующий силами НАТО в Европе. По его мнению, это война из нескольких компонентов. Во-первых, дипломатическая война, направленная на подрыв международных договоров и разрушение союзов, лишение государства международных механизмов опоры. Во-вторых, мобилизация информационных средств и других инструментов влияния на умы людей для создания и поддержания ложной картины событий. В-третьих, собственно военный компонент. Он остается относительно неизменным. Новое в том, что принадлежащие государству

* niivs@mod.mil.by

** ecooom@gmail.com

войска используются анонимно, скрытно, и государство не признает их применения. Наконец, экономическая война, экономическое давление... Гибридная война — все это вместе...[1].

Однако в предлагаемом определении нет ничего нового. Все озвученные элементы характерны для большинства войн и вооруженных конфликтов начиная с глубокой древности. Вопрос объявления войны на рубеже XX – XXI веков потерял свою актуальность. События в Югославии, Ираке, Сирии яркие тому подтверждения. В свою очередь, советники, добровольцы, наемники, и инструктора позволили обезличить принадлежность воинских континентов. Что касается экономического давления, то этот рычаг международных отношений широко используется как в мирное, так и в военное время всеми государствами. Вместе с тем, вопросы *информационно-психологического воздействия* на умы людей для создания и поддержания ложной картины событий приобрели в современном мире поистине определяющее значение.

ИНФОРМАЦИОННО-ПСИХОЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ АСПЕКТ

Усилиями средств массовой информации само понятие «гибридная» война тесно увязано с конкретным субъектом международной политики – Российской Федерацией и ее действиями в Крыму (2014 г.). Сегодня термин получил широкое распространение для описания современных военных конфликтов и гипотетических способов противоборства будущего. Насколько же это клише соответствует действительности?

Как и большинство современных военно-политических понятий, термин «гибридная война» имеет англоязычное происхождение, а его возникновение относится к 90-м годам прошлого столетия.

Изначально термин гибридная война (англ. hybrid warfare) был использован в США для описания военной стратегии, объединяющей в себе обычную войну, малую войну и кибервойну. В дискуссиях о сути явления, длившейся ни один год, приняли участие военные, политики, исследователи и ученые. Среди них Билл Неметт, подполковник Корпуса морской пехоты США, Нейтан Фрайер, сотрудник Центра стратегических и международных исследований, полковник ВС США Джек Мак Куэн, Дэвид Килкаллен, Фрэнк Хоффман и другие. Вместе с тем четкого обоснованного толкования понятия так и не было выработано, что позволило различным авторам по-своему интерпретировать его содержание. При этом даже суть явления передается различными дефинициями: вид партизанской войны, метод

действий в асимметричной войне, определение современного конфликта, действия врага.

Все предлагаемые подходы в той или иной мере описывают отдельные черты понятия, однако с точки зрения научного осмысления не содержат отличий, характеризующих его как *форму отражения явления*, обладающую новыми, присущими только ему качествами. Однако это не помешало разработать концепцию «гибридной» войны, автором которой считается упомянутый выше Фрэнк Г. Хоффман, бывший офицер морской пехоты, а ныне научный сотрудник министерства обороны США. Он еще в 2007 году опубликовал монографию с красноречивым названием «Конфликт в XXI столетии. Появление гибридной войны», в которой представил свой взгляд на данную проблему. По Хоффману, конфликты будут мультимодальными (ведущимися разными способами) и многовариантными, а угрозы могут характеризоваться как гибридное сочетание традиционных и иррегулярных тактик, методов террора и криминала, децентрализованного планирования и исполнения, использования всех имеющихся средств, как простых, так и высокотехнологичных. Кроме того отмечалось, что «гибридные» войны могут быть мультиузловыми (проводимыми как государствами, так и негосударственными акторами).

Следует отметить, что данные теоретические заключения возникли не на пустом месте, а явились трансформацией ранее существовавших концепций. Среди них теории: «*стратегического паралича*» Дж. Уордена (1990 г.), «*обезглавливания*» профессора М.Либицки (1995 г.), «*шока и трепета*», разработанной под руководством Харлана Уллмана и Джеймса Уэйдома (1996 г.), «*операций по достижению эффективности*» Эдварда Смита (2002 г.). Суть которых заключалась в минимизации затрат на достижение конечных результатов противоборства путем морально-психологического разоружения политического руководства противника, применения всего спектра средств от физического устранения до дискредитации в глазах собственного народа и мировой общественности, создания условий невозможности адекватного реагирования [2].

Эти «теоретические» концепции, разработанные военными исследователями, оперативно реализовывались практиками в реальных военных конфликтах (табл.1).

Все выше рассмотренные теории тесно увязаны с положениями американской концепции «мягкой силы», которая в XXI веке трансформировалась в концепцию «умной силы». Ее основной идеей является сочетание жесткого (силового или экономического) принуждения и мягкой силы для формирования выигрышной стратегии

[3]. К инструментарию мягкой силы принято относить управляемые кризисы, создаваемые посредством цветных революций, всевозможные (в том числе финансовые и экономические) санкции, политико-информационное давление, продвижение собственных культурно-психологических ценностей. По сути, весь перечень является *информационно-психологическим*.

Таблица 1 – Динамика внедрения новых концепций в практику войск (США)

№ п/п	Название концепции (теории)	Автор (разработчик)	Первое опубликованное	Год	Реализация в практике войск
1.	«Стратегического паралича»	Джон Уорден	«Воздушная компания»	1990	«Буря в пустыне» Ирак 1990-1991 гг, Югославия 1999 г.
2.	«Обезглавливания»	Мартин Либицки	Что такое информационная война? National Defense University	1995	Югославия 1999 г., Ирак 2003 .
3.	«Шока и трепета»	Харлан Уллман, Джеймс Уэйд	«Шок и трепет: достижение стремительно доминирования», National Defense University	1996	Ирак 2003 г.
4.	«Гибридных войн»	Фрэнк Г. Хоффман	Конфликт в XXI столетии. Появление гибридной войны	2007	Ливия 2011 г. Сирия 2014 г.

Возвращаясь к определению «гибридной» войны Ф.Бридлива следует констатировать, что именно эти составляющие являются основой

для реализации двух из трех компонентов «нового» вида вооруженного противоборства. С точки зрения политологии происходит симбиоз невоенных и военных методов (способов) разрешения межгосударственных противоречий. При этом для достижения целей используются все имеющиеся силы и средства, объединяются усилия теоретиков, политиков, практиков.

История свидетельствует, что во главу любой экспансии всегда закладывалась, как правило, благая теоретическая (религиозная, политическая, социальная) идея. Среди них: обращение в истинную веру язычников (неверных), продвижение культурных ценностей и «цивилизация» отсталых народов, распространение идей равенства и братства, создание расово чистых государств и, наконец, демократизация всего мира. Именно последняя идея является доминирующей в конце XX начале XXI веков и «фетишем» для главного «демократизатора» – США. Именно в этом государстве еще в 1973 году общественным деятелем и профессором Гарвардского университета Дж.Шарпом были разработаны основы технологии цветных революций, которые с успехом применялись во многих государствах - объектах «демократизации». Именно США, позиционируя себя, как мирового лидера, настойчиво продвигают американские ценности, среди которых наравне со свободой и неприкосновенностью частной собственности, уживаются гомосексуализм (содомия) и лесбиянство, политкорректность и расизм, толерантность и воинствующий шовинизм, веротерпимость и религиозный экстремизм. При этом экспансия ведется последовательно и по всем направлениям. В военной сфере она реализуется в форме «гибридной» войны, в которую трансформируется традиционное вооруженное противоборство.

Как было показано выше «гибридная» война это не более чем продолжение современной политики, только с применением военного компонента. Ее характерными признаками являются скрытые агрессивные действия, позволяющие инициаторам быть официально не причастными к происходящему. Завуалированное, но при этом бескомпромиссное противоборство во всех его видах (политическом, экономическом, информационном, идеологическом, вооруженном и другом). Решительность политических целей, при сосредоточении усилий на смене политического курса путем принуждения к этому законного правительства или его свержения и приведения к власти лояльных сил. Комплексное использование наемников, частных военных компаний, регулярных и иррегулярных вооруженных формирований. Ведение «классических» боевых действий с использованием методов партизанской борьбы и терроризма в интересах дестабилизации

социально-политической и экономической обстановки. Широкое применение приемов и методов «стратегии не прямых действий» [4].

Однако основу инструментария «гибридной» войны составляют элементы «мягкой» силы, позволяющие добиться не столько физического поражения (уничтожения) и нанесения материального ущерба, сколько изменения поведения, признания приемлемым вариант развития обстановки на когнитивном (рационально-ментальном) уровне восприятия. Задолго до открытой фазы противостояния осуществляются три формы воздействия: информационная обработка населения и национальной элиты государства с целью дискредитации традиционной системы ценностей и национальной культуры; экономическая и финансовая экспансия, формирование зависимости от внешних займов; поощрение национального сепаратизма. В их рамках реализуются положения теории виртуальных конструкций, когда в результате целенаправленного манипулирования информацией индивид начинает действовать на основе искусственно создаваемых вымышленных потребностей, не осознавая факта нанесения себе и государству ущерба. Для эффективной реализации данного сценария необходим «исходный материал» (социум), обладающий невысоким образовательным уровнем, усредненными потребностями, не способный творчески мыслить и поддающийся информационному воздействию. Эта задача решается путем упрощения и универсализации программ обучения, навязывания стандартов образования (в том числе Болонских) и создания идеальных условий для работы в собственных исследовательских (научно-педагогических) структурах для талантливых иностранцев. Таким образом, именно информационно-психологическое воздействие, а не военный компонент является определяющим в рамках «гибридной» войны.

Следует отметить, что США проводят согласованную и целенаправленную политику по продвижению собственных интересов, делая упор на инструментарий мягкой силы. Подтверждением тому являются единые концептуальные подходы, отражаемые в политических и военных документах. Термин «гибридные угрозы» использовался в трех последних четырехлетних американских обзорах по обороне, вышедших в 2006, 2010 и 2014 годах. Для координации деятельности по уточнению национальной стратегии глобального развития в декабре 2010 года и феврале 2015 года были подготовлены концептуальные документы «Четырехлетний обзор дипломатии и развития – 2010 (2015 – соответственно)», представляющие собой руководства по применению мягкой силы, как ключевого компонента реализации внешнеполитического курса США. Одной из сфер, через которую

осуществляется комплексное воздействие на индивидуума и общество в целом, является киберпространство, которое «поглощает» ранее самостоятельные области: информации, коммуникаций, развлечений и другие.

КИБЕРПРОСТРАНСТВО, КАК СФЕРА «ГИБРИДНОЙ» ВОЙНЫ

Согласно положениям наставления Комитета Начальников Штабов Министерства обороны США JP3-12 киберпространство это «глобальная область информационной сферы, представляющая собой взаимозависимую сеть элементов информационных технологий, инфраструктуры и массивов данных, включая глобальную сеть Интернет, телекоммуникационные сети, компьютерные системы, а также процессоры и контроллеры, встроенные в технические средства» [5]. По сути, данное определение охватывает все элементы виртуального (информационного) пространства.

Принимая во внимание то, что современный мир является информационным по своей сути, подобный подход полностью оправдан. Наряду с привычным физическим (материальным) пространством сегодня сформировано и реально существует информационное (виртуальное). Основным предметом труда большинства людей являются информация и знания, а орудием – информационные технологии. Именно информация, циркулирующая в системах, позволяет осуществлять комплексное воздействие на объекты, реализовывать определенные программы. Она становится средством, позволяющим минимизировать затраты на достижение поставленных целей, в том числе в сфере межгосударственных отношений и противоборства. Не случайно именно информационное пространство превратилось в арену ожесточенного противостояния. Причем, оперирование на данном поле осуществляется по двум основным направлениям: информационно-психологическому (когнитивному) и информационно-техническому (программно-технологическому).

Объектами воздействия в рамках первого выступают личность, общество и государство, как информационно-психологические единицы, способные воспринимать и перерабатывать информацию. Цель оперирующей стороны – сформировать требуемое мировоззрение, принципы, идеалы, модели поведения. По сути, осуществить переформатирование индивидуального и группового сознания с учетом психологических особенностей. Для этого используются средства массовой информации, формальные и неформальные объединения, светские и религиозные течения, другой инструментарий, позволяющий

реализовать этапы психологического программирования. Именно данное направление является определяющим с точки зрения конечного эффекта и позволяет реализовать функцию «манипулирования сознанием».

Само понятие «гибридная война» является порождением информационного противоборства. Важнейшим средством достижения поставленных целей в ее рамках выступают информационные операции, тесным образом увязанные с другими элементами воздействия. Теоретические основы применения, а также силы и средства заблаговременно разработаны и созданы в США (табл. 2) [6]. Как правило, вооруженному вмешательству предшествует мощная информационно-пропагандистская кампания с привлечением всех имеющихся сил и средств.

Таблица 2 – Система информационно-психологического воздействия в интересах решения военно-политических задач США

Показатели	Информационные операции	Психологические операции	Общественная дипломатия	Связи с общественностью
<i>Наличие специализированных органов управления</i>	Органы управления военными операциями	Отделы/секции психологических операций	Органы управления по вопросам общественной дипломатии	Отделы/секции по связям с общественностью
<i>Цели деятельности</i>	Достижение информационного превосходства над противником в интересах реализации собственных планов			
<i>Общая направленность деятельности</i>	Формирование благоприятной информационной среды	Воздействие на сознание и деятельность целевых аудиторий	Формирование общественного мнения	Информирование населения о целях деятельности и решаемых задачах

<i>Целевая аудитория</i>	Общество в целом (руководство, население, армия и др.) своих, дружественных и враждебных стран	Информационные источники, органы управления различных уровней, население, силовые структуры противника	Руководство дружественных стран, международные и неправительственные организации	Местные органы власти, население вовлеченных в конфликт стран, их средства массовой информации
<i>Направления деятельности</i>	Добывание, обработка и распространение текущей информации	Обработка и распространение специальной информации	Распространение представленной информации	Распространение представленной информации
<i>Категории информационных материалов</i>	Заслуживающие доверие и обработанные сообщения	Отобранная и обработанная специальная информация	Вся разрешенная информация	Вся разрешенная информация
<i>Результаты деятельности</i>	Достижение свободы действий в информационном пространстве, защита своей информации и подавление информационных структур противника	Достижение необходимого поведения целевых аудиторий и принятие ими требующихся решений	Установление устойчивого взаимодействия и взаимопонимания со всеми участниками урегулирования кризисных ситуаций	Повышение доверия к оперирующей стороне

Второй компонент (информационно-технический) направлен на разработку технологий, позволяющих оперировать в киберпространстве, воздействовать на информацию, инфраструктуру, массивы данных. Хакерские атаки, вредоносные вирусы, информационные вбросы и хищение конфиденциальных данных, - все это элементы

информационно-технического воздействия. Однако они являются следствием глобальной информатизации, охватившей планету на рубеже XX – XXI веков, у истоков которой стояли США. Обладая мощнейшим технологическим потенциалом, Соединенные штаты своевременно оценили коммерческие выгоды от реализации данного проекта и всячески способствовали его реализации.

Развитие технологий подстегивает рынок и позволяет формировать выгодную конъюнктуру. Государства, обладающие меньшим научно-технологическим потенциалом, вынуждены отдавать реальные богатства (природные ресурсы, материальные активы) в обмен на виртуальный продукт [7].

Сегодня информация становится универсальным средством достижения экономических, политических и военных целей. Проявляется тенденция возрастания зависимости общества и отдельного индивида от виртуального мира, что, в свою очередь, оказывает влияние на изменение традиционных представлений человека о себе, окружающем мире, своем месте в нем.

Понимая значимость киберпространства для функционирования современного общества, ведущие государства мира активно осваивают его пределы. Важное место в этом процессе принадлежит науке. Тысячи ученых и десятки коллективов задействованы для решения задач в данной сфере.

Еще в 1996 году американский военный эксперт Р.Банкер представил концепцию *Force XXI*, в которой подразделял театр военных действий на два элемента – традиционное пространство и киберпространство. Причем отмечалось, что последнее «имеет более важное значение» [8]. Эта идея получила дальнейшее развитие в работах ряда специалистов и отдельных комплексных исследованиях.

Знаковым событием в данной области считается отчет «Глобальный курс информационной революции: общие вопросы и региональные различия», выполненный в 2003 году специалистами корпорация РЭНД по заказу правительства США. В его рамках проведен анализ характера воздействия информационных технологий и информационной революции на экономическую, финансовую, политическую, культурную, социальную и иные сферы жизнедеятельности современного общества, осуществлен прогноз развития ситуации на ближайшие 10-20 лет. Его положения нашли отражение в *Национальной стратегии по защите киберпространства США*, являющейся частью Стратегии обеспечения национальной безопасности [9], опубликованной в этом же году.

Официальным признанием значимости виртуального мира для обеспечения обороноспособности, стало закрепление ряда положений в руководящих документах государственного уровня. В 2002 году решение об активизации усилий на расширение возможностей страны по ведению борьбы в киберпространстве было отражено в Национальной военной стратегии Китая. В 2003 году аналогичная стратегия была принята в США. В 2005 году Германия принимает Государственный план защиты информационной инфраструктуры, что предопределяет бурное развитие данного направления в Европе и закрепления положений в национальных законодательствах.

Все государства мира активно осваивали киберпространство, однако интенсивность этой деятельности существенно возросла в конце 2010 года, когда впервые в мировой практике вирус «Стакнет» использовался в качестве кибероружия, а последствия его применения носили катастрофический характер для ядерной программы Ирана.

В июле 2011 года Пентагон принял *Стратегию действий министерства обороны США в киберпространстве*. Основной формой борьбы в нем является операция, которая определяется как совокупность согласованных и взаимосвязанных по цели, задачам, месту и времени информационных воздействий на объекты государственного или военного назначения противника, проводимых по единому замыслу и плану, как в мирное, так и в военное время. Основным объектом воздействия являются компьютерные сети, а программные и технические средства, применяемые для этого, названы *кибероружием*. В качестве основных задач определены: временное отключение от компьютерной сети критически важных узлов коммуникационной инфраструктуры; блокирование компьютерных операций и функций; нарушение работы и вывод из строя автоматизированных систем управления и связи противника; искажение и фальсификация информации, распространение дезинформации [10]. Кибератака законодательно приравнена к вооруженному нападению, и США закрепили за собой право нанесения реального ответного удара.

Аналогичное положение нашло отражение в одном из итоговых документов 27-го саммита НАТО «Обязательствах по обеспечению киберобороны», подписанных в Варшаве в 2016 году, где *киберпространство отнесено к перечню сфер ведения военных действий*. Это открывает новую страницу в истории развития вооруженного противоборства.

Отличительной особенностью виртуального пространства является *практически полная анонимность участников*. Крайне сложно определить, кто провел ту или иную акцию, о чем свидетельствует

отсутствие официальных претензий со стороны государств-жертв кибератак. Можно констатировать, что сегодня хулиганский инцидент с участием дилетанта, ученого-экспериментатора или провокатора может послужить поводом для эскалации вооруженного противостояния [11]. Тем более, что подобная вероятность нашла отражение в руководящем документе мощнейшего военно-политического блока.

Уже сегодня, специализированными подразделениями по кибербезопасности официально располагают несколько десятков стран, а неофициально – более сотни. При этом, исходя из роста напряженности в IT сфере, их деятельность не ограничивается только защитой информации. В соответствии с рейтингом, опубликованным компанией Zecurion Analytics, США выделяют наибольший объем финансирования на содержание группировки сил, предназначенной для ведения операций в киберпространстве (табл. 3) [12]. Составители отмечают, что оценки проводились на основе анализа статей военных бюджетов, содержания стратегий кибербезопасности, уставных документов, справочной информации международных организаций и данных конфиденциальных источников.

Таблица – 3. Государства, обладающие наибольшим бюджетом для ведения операций в киберпространстве

Место в рейтинге	Страна	Расходы на содержание киберсил (млн. долл. США)	Численность группировки (чел.)
1	США	7000	9000
2	Китай	1500	20000
3	Великобритания	450	2000
4	Южная Корея	400	700
5	Россия	300	1000
6	Германия	250	1000
7	Франция	220	800
8	Северная Корея	200	4000
9	Израиль	150	1000

Среди государств, не представленных в рейтинге, достаточно высоким потенциалом в рассматриваемой области обладают Иран, Эстония, Япония. В последние годы появились неправительственные

структуры (зачастую транснациональные), обладающие существенными возможностями по воздействию через киберпространство.

Тесное взаимное проникновение сфер информационно-психологической и кибернетической, их коммуникативные связи и средства воздействия, диктуют необходимость комплексного подхода к вопросам нейтрализации угроз. Оба направления являются исключительно важными и значимыми для обеспечения национальной безопасности.

Сегодня ведущие государства мира активно используют теоретические наработки и современные информационные технологии не только для привнесения в общество требуемых взглядов на отдельные проблемы, но и формируют новую систему ценностей и новое мировоззрение. Иными словами, объектом деструктивного информационно-психологического воздействия является *менталитет населения*, а задачей – нанесение ущерба духовно-нравственной жизни народов, его исторической и культурной памяти, мировоззрению, морально-нравственным идеалам. Важнейшая цель этого процесса – формирование общества потребления, лишённого внутреннего стержня и не способного противостоять информационно-психологической экспансии. Она достигается комплексным воздействием на объект всеми имеющимися средствами и приводит к искажению когнитивной сферы, что является основой для дальнейшего продвижения «демократии», ревизии основополагающих устоев общества и решения собственных проблем за счет других государств. В том случае, если результата не удастся достигнуть только инструментами мягкой силы, используются военно-политические рычаги, одним из которых является «гибридная» война (современный вариант межгосударственного вооруженного противоборства). «Гибридные угрозы», имеющие весьма расплывчатые характеристики, могут выступать в качестве повода либо предлога для инициирования конфликта, а законодательное приравнивание кибератак к вооруженному нападению в США и НАТО, выводящее их на один уровень с военным столкновением, обуславливает вероятность втягивания стран в вооруженное противоборство через виртуальное пространство.

В этих условиях государственная система и ее военная составляющая должны обладать необходимым инструментарием и возможностями по нейтрализации современных и перспективных угроз национальной безопасности в соответствующей сфере ответственности. Причем, высокотехнологичные направления следует развивать самостоятельно, реализуя весь имеющийся потенциал, используя принципы асимметрии и разумной достаточности.

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**INFORMACIONO-PSIHOLOŠKA KOMPONENTA
„HIBRIDNOG RATOVANJA“ I SAJBER PROSTORA**

Nikolay Buzin

Naučno-istraživački institut oružanih snaga
Republike Belorusije, Belorusija

Sergey Musienko

Analitički centar ECOOM,
Belorusija

Apstrakt: Od 2014. godine pa nadalje, masovni mediji bukvalno se takmiče u broju publikacija o „hibridnom ratu“. Sam koncept, koji se odražava u štampi, doživljava se kao „strašilo“, zastrašujući evropske stanovnike. Neverovatan interes, koji su izazvali vodeće svetske agencije za informisanje, prisilio nas je da rešimo ovo pitanje i razumemo izvore takve pažnje. Istovremeno, naglasak je na informacijsko-psihološkom aspektu „novih“ fenomena i prostora kroz koji se informacije isporučuju potrošaču.

Ključne reči: informativno-psihološki aspekt, hibridni rat, sajber prostor.

*RELEVANCE OF
CLASSICAL STRATEGIC
THOUGHT*

CLASSICAL STRATEGIC THOUGHT AND CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Božidar Forca*

Faculty of Business Studies and Law,
Union – Nikola Tesla University, Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: The term “strategy” comes from the military context. In its development, this concept has extended into the domain of public (state/grand/national) strategy or multistrategy, that generally determines the way of accomplishing own interests and goals. One of the key aspects of general (national) strategy is security, the strategy of national security standing out as a separate entity. Classical strategic thought, theoretically and practically, has power at its centre, with “hard” power and “soft” power at its extremes. The world has entered the 21st century with an expectation of prolonged periods of peace and security as a basic condition for survival and development. There is a relatively widespread viewpoint, or a belief even, that new theoretical and practical strategic directions surpass the classical ones, and that the attitude towards power loses its primacy when it comes to safety. However, the reality of contemporary international relations indicates that classical strategic thought has not been abandoned, and that it is retaking centre stage after a period of low-key existence, of course with new modalities of its relation to security, from global, regional, and local perspectives.

Key words: strategy, international security, realism, liberalism, constructivism.

INTRODUCTION

The 20th century is a historical accumulation of the development of humankind. The end of the Cold War, in the last decade of the previous century, represents a general criterion of that development, formulated as “before” and “beyond”. In the 20th century, the turnover of technological revolutions took less time than the lifespan of significant inventions in previous centuries. Man has flown to space. On the other hand, the

* bozidar.forca@fppsp.edu.rs

consequences of two world wars warned humankind of endangerment. A formal expression of the international community, represented by the fragile League of Nations between the two world wars, and by the United Nations Organisation after the Second World War, was left powerless faced by global antagonism of the most powerful nations' and their coalitions' conflicting interests. The Cold War, as the consequence of the Second World War, or even its continuation, ended in the symbolic act of the destruction of the Berlin Wall (1989). The world approached the 21st century hoping that a period of peace and stability was ahead. However, as Leo Tolstoy wrote in *War and Peace*: "the sea has calmed a little, until a new tempest"⁷⁶⁴. Projections for a new global conflict between superpowers and their blocs, that had been envisaged for decades, dissipated into a corpus of challenges, risks, and security threats.

Theoretical considerations of security, in the form of academic security studies, have developed after the Second World War. Based for the most part on the analysis and consequences of the war, they were indeed initially called *strategic studies*. A dominant school of thought within strategic studies during the Cold War was *realism*. Even during the Cold War, and especially after its symbolic ending, other research trends, sometimes seen as alternative, also developed⁷⁶⁵.

The first decade of the 21st century brought the temporarily "frozen" antagonisms between the 20th century great powers back into the focus of international relations, now with the emergence of new "major players" (Brzezinski) on the global scene. Conflicts predominantly take place in the so-called third-world countries, with global powers' active participation. The "tectonic shifts" resulting from the destruction of the Berlin Wall, reflected in the globalization of world relations, bring great powers' confrontations back into focus. Many even claim that the world is very close to a new major conflict. Theoretically and practically, they revive realism and liberalism, now in the form of their modalities.

The subject matter of this paper is the analysis of the relation between classical strategic thought and the contemporary security situation. The paper therefore discusses two issues: (1) classical strategic thought and (2) the contemporary security situation.

⁷⁶⁴ Tolstoj, N.L., *Rat i mir*, Nova knjiga, Beograd, 2016.

⁷⁶⁵ See *Uvod u studije bezbednosti (Introduction to Security Studies)*, edited by Paul D. Williams, Official Review and Faculty of Security Studies, Belgrade, 2012, for further information.

CLASSICAL STRATEGIC THOUGHT

It is not completely certain when the term *strategy* was first used, but it beyond doubt comes from the military context. Academician Očić claims that the word *strategy* derives from the position of a *strategos* in ancient Athens⁷⁶⁶. Through the centuries, strategy was exclusively linked to the military context and military leadership in war. War was understood as an armed military conflict, both theoretically and practically. Two key factors of war were subject of strategy and battlefield warfighting in the history of warfare: *military power* and *speed of manoeuvre*. From a one-on-one duel, using the weapons available at the time, armed conflict reached the stages of million-strong armies fighting in the 20th century. Until the First World War, it was military power, expressed in the number of soldiers and fire power, that was prioritized over speed of manoeuvre. Well-positioned fortified defence was more important than offence. Poison gas and the machine gun in the First World War are the strategic idea in the making: *technology against masses of people*. Development of science and technology between the two world wars causes shifts in strategy, related to understanding warfare and applying new technologies for the purposes of war. Results of the industrial revolution (Toffler's second wave) surpass the agricultural way of life and work (Toffler's first wave), especially in the battlefield. The tank and the airplane, together with communications, are the essence of the strategic idea of *blitzkrieg* (a war as fast as lightning), that Germany and the Rome-Berlin-Tokio Axis use, starting the Second World War, and gaining significant advantage over their opponents in the early years of the war. Fire power remains significant, but increasing emphasis is put on speed of manoeuvre. Troops and fire manoeuvre make offence more significant than defence. The Allies' overwhelming military supremacy over the Axis decides the outcome of the Second World War, whose formal ending is marked by the use of a weapon with enormous destructive power, such as had never been known before: the nuclear bomb⁷⁶⁷.

The end of the Second World War did not prevent antagonism worldwide, nor did it dispell fears of new global conflicts. On the contrary, the USA and the USSR, that had been allies in the war on fascism, entered the Cold

⁷⁶⁶ Očić, Č. *Strategija razvoja: zamisli i ostvarenja (Development Strategy: Ideas and Accomplishments)* in "Moguće strategije razvoja Srbije" (Examining Development Strategies in Serbia, Conference Proceedings), Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Belgrade, 2014, p 12.

⁷⁶⁷ The USA dropped two nuclear bombs on Japan. Hiroshima was hit on August the 6th, 1945, and Nagasaki on August the 9th of the same year. Around 200,000 people died. Material destruction was immense, and the consequences of irradiation were devastating.

War, a period qualified as bipolarism in international relations. Claims can be found in the literature that the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, did not in fact only represent a demand for Japan's unconditional surrender (Germany had by then already signed capitulation), but also a threat to the USSR and the expansion of its influence. Namely, the European countries through which the Red Army advanced towards Germany, including the part of Germany that was later to become East Germany, came under the influence of the USSR and formed the so-called socialist bloc (or communist, according to some). Even the leaders of powers which once held colonies, Churchill for example, proposed that the West should immediately "settle the score" with the East. It did not happen.

A substitute for an open conflict between the West, led by the USA, and the East, headed by the USSR, was *the Cold War*. One of the key characteristics of the Cold War was an arms race, the like of which had never before been recorded in history. As for the nuclear weapons themselves, Žaklina Novičić writes in her analysis: "Due to secrecy concerning information on nuclear weapons, a reliable estimation of the current size of these countries' nuclear arsenals is not possible, but to sketch at least an approximation to their proportions, the following data may serve the purpose: the USA has 5.968 strategic warheads, 1.000 operational tactical weapons, and around 3.000 spare tactical and strategic warheads; Russia has 4.978 strategic warheads, around 3.500 operational tactical warheads, and over 11.000 spare tactical and strategic warheads; China has around 300 strategic warheads and 120 tactical warheads; France has around 350 strategic warheads; Great Britain has fewer than 200 strategic warheads"⁷⁶⁸.

Although the USA and the USSR did not enter a direct conflict during the Cold War, the two countries, both directly and indirectly, participated in numerous local and regional wars in the world, which became somewhat of a testing ground for new weapons and strategic concepts, on one hand, but also for weapons trade, one of the main branches of great powers' economy, on the other. Various data on the number of wars worldwide in the time of bipolarism can be found in the literature, such as: (a) General M. Čušić states the fact that from 1945 till 1986 there were over 550 military conflicts and interventions worldwide. The same author quotes The General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces concerning the fact that from 1945 till 1975 there were 468 local wars and military conflicts worldwide, which took place in 69 countries, with the participation of 81 countries' armed forces; (b) Milosav Simić, PhD, claims

⁷⁶⁸ Novičić, Ž., *Nuklearno oružje u međunarodnoj politici (Nuclear Weapons in International Politics)*, Međunarodna politika 4, Belgrade, 2005, p 508.

that from 1945 till 1982 there were 25 wars, 23 military interventions, 17 civil wars and 20 border conflicts worldwide; (c) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) noted 160 military conflicts worldwide in the years 1945 to 1989; (d) according to Ištvan Kende, there were on average 11,5 wars worldwide in a year, from the end of the Second World War until the 1980s; (e) SIPRI listed 31 armed conflicts taking place in 1990 alone; (f) Slobodan Mikić claims that 97 wars were waged from 1945 till 1970 worldwide⁷⁶⁹.

It is believed that the term military-industrial complex (MIC), by now abandoned, originates in the Second World War, but that it was first used by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, on the 17th of January, 1961. It is estimated that the production of weapons and military equipment and trade in them during the Cold War reached its maximum of 250 billion dollars in 1988. Thereafter, due to the cessation of the Cold War and a partial decrease in arms race, great powers focused on the selling of arms to the so-called third-world countries. According to some sources, the biggest exporters sold around 162 billion dollars' worth of armaments to other countries from 1988 to 1992. Around 66% of the exports were from Russia (\$43.6 billion) and the USA (\$63.4 billion)⁷⁷⁰.

Although security had been researched and discussed since the beginning of human society, academic (scientific) research began after the Second World War, with the emergence of security studies, initially in the USA and the Western countries, and later on in the rest of the world as well. Academic security studies have been termed in various ways since their emergence. According to Paul Williams, they were called *national security studies* in the USA, whereas in Great Britain the predominant term was *strategic studies*. However, Paul Williams' position is that international relations are the disciplinary domain of academic security studies; in other words, these studies are a discipline within, or part of, international relations⁷⁷¹. Other scholars also claim that academic security studies initially developed independently, and later became part of international relations science. Strategic thought has expanded from its basis, focusing on the use of the military in war, through academic security studies, into strategic thought on the relation between the state and war.

The key school of thought in academic security studies during the Cold War was *realism*. According to numerous scholars, realism gained

⁷⁶⁹ Forca, B., *Vojni faktor međunarodnih odnosa i njegov uticaj na razvoj Vojske Jugoslavije (The Military Factor in International Relations and its Influence on the Development of the Army of Yugoslavia)*, doctoral dissertation, Military Academy, Belgrade, 2003, p 1.

⁷⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p 135.

⁷⁷¹ *Ibid.*

significance for three main reasons: (1) the collapse of liberalism as a theory between the two world wars, (2) the experience of the Second World War, and (3) the relations between great powers after the Second World War. Both realism and liberalism are considered to be classical security studies, therefore deserving further analysis.

Table 1: Realistic and liberal security systems⁷⁷²

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION	REALISTIC SYSTEM (alliance)	LIBERAL SYSTEM (legal community)
Structure of international system	Material; static; archaic; self-help systems	Social; dynamic; governance without government
Approach to security	Increase of power	Integration
Basic principles of strategy	Saber-rattling; allies control	Democratisation; conflict resolution; rule of law
Functional range	Military issues only	Areas of multiple issues
Provenance criteria	Strategic relevance	Democratic system of governance
Structure of internal power	Sustainable division of power; hegemonic	Symmetrical; high level of interdependence

Starting from the fact that the notion of security is understood and interpreted in very wide terms and that it does not have a universal definition, different scholars, for the purposes of differentiating among security studies, established key security issues as the classification criteria for these studies.

⁷⁷² *Introduction to Security Studies*, op. cit., page 88.

Regarding these key security issues, the claims by Professors David Baldwin and Paul Williams are most often quoted. David Baldwin established the following key security issues: security for whom; security – for which values; how much security; from which threats; by which means; at what cost and in which time⁷⁷³. On the other hand, Paul Williams established four basic security issues: (1) what is security; (2) whose security are we talking about; (3) what can be construed as a security issue, and (4) how can security be achieved⁷⁷⁴. Generally speaking, Williams' list of security issues has been adopted by a majority of scholars.

Since an analysis of realistic and liberal studies would require much more space, only their basic principles will be stated in this paper. The authors of *Introduction to Security Studies* use several basic criteria to show the relation between realism and liberalism (Table 1).

Realism. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, written in 1948 by Hans Morgenthau, is considered to be an undisputed standard in political realism. There are various classifications of the realism theory into its models. In *Introduction to Security Studies*, the realism theory is classified into six research programmes: (1) classical realism, (2) neoclassical realism, (3) realism of rise and fall, (4) neorealism, (5) offensive structural realism, and (6) defensive structural realism⁷⁷⁵.

The 1950s and 1960s are considered to be the golden age of security studies, especially realism. From “nuclear intimidation” to “nuclear revenge”, civil institutions (faculties and institutes) in cooperation with military strategists in the West as well as in the East, published strategic projections of intimidation and threats directed at the opposing bloc. Hundreds of thousands of nuclear warheads in the USA and the USSR pointed each towards the cities in the other country. Classical realism puts into focus the state and its power, primarily military power, because the military threat is the main challenge, and the military power is the main guarantee of security. In accordance with Williams' key security issues, the answers provided by classical realism are: (1) *what is security*: security is a synonym for accumulation of power. In other words, security is understood in material terms as a commodity, and the way to achieve security is the following: the more power (especially military power) the more secure people become; (2) *whose security*: under the strong influence of the US *National Security Act* (1947), an idea that security in international

⁷⁷³ See further in Ejodus, F., *Medjunarodna bezbednost, teorije, sektori i nivoi (International Security, Theories, Sectors, and Levels)*, Službeni glasnik i BCBP, Belgrade, 2011.

⁷⁷⁴ *Uvod u studije bezbednosti (Introduction to Security Studies)*, op.cit., p 44.

⁷⁷⁵ *Introduction to Security Studies*, op.cit., p 56.

politics is a synonym for “national security” (the security of the state) became influential; (3) *what can be considered to be a security issue*: an armed conflict and a threat to use military power, and (4) *how can security be achieved*: through superiority, especially military superiority.

Other models (research directions) in realism use classical realism as a basis and offer certain fresh views on security in international relations. Kenneth Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* (1979) is considered to be a theoretical foundation for *neorealism*. Waltz adopted the basic premises of classical realism, according to which states are the main units of political organisation, and military power is the most important factor in international relations. However, unlike classical realists, who maintained that states primarily aspire to acquire and increase power, Waltz put forward a thesis according to which the primary interest of states is to survive as sovereign and autonomous entities in the international system. They are not driven by unalterable characteristics of corrupt human nature and a quest for power, as classical realists had claimed, but by anarchy, the ordering principle of the international structure. In relation to division of capabilities, the number of great powers and the related blocs, Waltz distinguishes between bipolar and multipolar systems, claiming that bipolarity is more beneficial to world security.

Defensive structural realism evolved from *neorealism*, but developed some differences. Paul Williams states three basic differences: (1) There is no more microbasis to state behaviour, but only the RATIONAL CHOICE, (2) The balance of offence and defence, as a complex variable. A complex of conditions has a preference for DEFENCE, and (3) Maintenance of balance (status quo) is the main form of state behaviour⁷⁷⁶. Stephen Walt, probably the most famous representative of defensive structural realism, wrote about *balance of threats* in his works from 1987 to 2000. According to Walt, “In anarchy, states form alliances to protect themselves. Their behavior is determined by perceived threats, and the power of the others is but one element in their calculus. The states that maintain status quo can take a relatively opportunistic view on threats. In the world that keeps a balance, the best policies are those that express alliance and good will. An attempt by a state to become secure through increase of its power is utterly futile. States should strive for “the right measure, and not all-encompassing power”⁷⁷⁷.

Offensive realists do not agree with defensive realists about “the right measure of power”. What they advocate instead is “summoning up as much

⁷⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid.

power as possible” in relation to other states (regional hegemony). States build their power thoughtfully when they try to calculate when to step up, and when to withdraw. They expand when they come across weakness and indeterminateness, and they withdraw when they are faced with strength and determination. Those who approach the increase of their power thoughtfully, achieve regional hegemony by combining reason and strength.⁷⁷⁸ The most famous representative of this theory is John Mearsheimer. In “*The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*” (2001) he in fact explained this theory in the so-called *five basic premises*:

1. The international system is anarchic;
2. Great powers possess certain offensive military capability and they can harm one another;
3. States can never be sure of the intentions of another state;
4. Survival is the primary goal of great powers, and
5. Great powers are rational actors. Utter security can only be achieved by the strongest state in the system.⁷⁷⁹

Realism of rise and fall claims that theory and practice of the international system are determined by the will of the most powerful state and by other states’ (great powers’) aspirations towards that position. It explains how the rise and fall occur and what the consequences of those processes are; in other words, it explains great powers’ wars. Regarding the decrease in the gap between the greatest power and others powers, the leading power will calculate a need for preventive action. If it does not succeed, the challenger will resort to war to push the current leading power away. The theory of rise and fall, but for a different purpose – the explanation of the US *Strategy (doctrine) of AirLand Battle* – was developed by husband and wife Alvin and Heidi Toffler in their *War and Antiwar*⁷⁸⁰. Namely, the Tofflers take a position that different levels of development (civilisational waves: agricultural, industrial, and information age) inevitably lead to conflict, in which the more developed state wins. This theory led to the emergence of new conflict-related terms, such as *symmetry*, *dissymmetry*, and *asymmetry*. *Symmetry* per se implies a conflict between relatively equal parties in terms of their overall (military) power. *Dyssymmetry* is a marked advantage on one of the parties to

⁷⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁰ Toffler Alvin H., *Rat i antirat (War and Antiwar)*, CID, Podgorica, 1998.

a conflict, maximally utilized: for example, using powerful rocket systems to effect fire on the opponent from a distance, without direct combat contact. *Asymmetry* is resorted to by weaker agents, which confront the obviously superior opponent using the resources and ways available. A significant number of scholars claim that US hegemony (dyssymetry) in fact caused terrorism, as an asymmetrical form of confronting this hegemony⁷⁸¹.

Finally, *neoclassical realists* offer a synthesis of classical realism and structural realism to explain state behavior in terms of foreign policies. Besides international political factors, such as a balance of power, they also include internal political variables, which neorealists completely excluded from the analysis, since they treated the state as a “black box”. The internal political variables can be human nature, as classical realists assume, but also other factors, such as the political system, ideology, and ambition. Their theory assumes a balance of interests, and claims that in foreign policy states make decisions taking into account an amalgam of power and interests⁷⁸².

Liberalism. There is a different approach to understanding research directions in theory of liberalism. Some claim that there are two schools of thought: (1) *classical (or Kantian) realism*, and (2) *neoliberal structuralism*⁷⁸³. Others distinguish between *Theory of liberal peace* (TLP) and *Theory of democratic peace* (TDP) within *classical realism*. There is a third approach, identical to the second direction in the previous classification: *neoliberal structuralism*⁷⁸⁴. Although in the period between the two world wars liberals dominated international relations studies, after the Second World War their place was taken by realists⁷⁸⁵.

Theory of liberal peace (TLP) emerged as a reaction to mercantilism of the 18th century. English philosopher Adam Smith was among the first authors to relate free market to peace, as he did in *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, published in 1776. He claimed that the forces of market, metaphorically represented as “the invisible hand”, besides increasing the wealth of nations, also decrease tensions between them. The 20th century liberals, such as Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises, also believed that free trade and peace “go hand in hand”. This thesis was summed up

⁷⁸¹ Forca, B., *Vojni faktor medjunarodnih odnosa i njegov uticaj na razvoj Vojske Jugoslavije (The Military Factor in International Relations and Its Influence on the Development of the Army of Yugoslavia)*, doctoral dissertation, Military Academy, Belgrade, 2003

⁷⁸² *Introduction to Security Studies*, op.cit.

⁷⁸³ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁴ Russet and Walker (in): Ejodus, F., op.cit., p 81.

⁷⁸⁵ Ibid.

vividly, though in a somewhat banal way, by Thomas Friedman, one of the most famous contemporary advocates of neoliberalism, who claimed that the people in countries with McDonald's "don't like to fight wars. They like to wait in line for burgers."⁷⁸⁶

Theory of democratic peace (TDP) assumes that that democracy is crucial to the preservation of peace. A forerunner of this school of thought was German philosopher Immanuel Kant, who put forward the monadic theory of democratic peace in *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795). The basic hypothesis of this theory, which has mostly been abandoned by now, is that democracies are less belligerent than the states with undemocratic form of rule. It was Michael Doyle, who in his 1983 essay *Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs*, launched a dyadic theory of democratic peace into the centre of academic debate on international relations. He went on to claim that there are almost no cases of two democratic states waging a war on each other. According to Jack Levy, the claim that democracies do not wage wars on each other comes closest to an empirical law within international relations studies.⁷⁸⁷ There are two approaches to proving the thesis that democratic states do not wage wars on each other. The first one sees the decisive significance in the existence of democratic institutions. The second one puts primary significance on norms and values of democracy.

Theories of liberal and democratic peace focus on the factors within states, primarily free market and democratic governance, which lead to peaceful foreign policy. Unlike them, *neoliberal institutionalists* emphasize the role of international institutions in the preservation of peace. They share with realists the premises of anarchic structure of international relations, but they maintain that international institutions are not founded to protect individual national interest of the most powerful states, but to protect common interests of all states that cooperate. States, they claim, are ready to cooperate, because absolute gains mean more to them than relative gains. International institutions ease security tensions among states and make peaceful resolution of disputes possible⁷⁸⁸.

Liberal institutionalists claim that the world is characterized by complex interdependence, or in other words, a network of transactions among states, markets, and individuals. With this in mind, they claim that the state, although the central actor in international relations, is not always or not necessarily the best level of analysis in international politics and security

⁷⁸⁶ Ejdus, F., op.cit., p 81.

⁷⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁸ Ibid.

studies. *Neoliberal institutionalists* also claim that states prefer international cooperation over conflict, for several reasons. *The first* reason for cooperation is the “quid pro quo” policy. *The second* reason for cooperation among states, according to Axelrod, is the fear of the consequences of possible breach of agreement. *The third* reason why states decide to cooperate is decreased transaction costs⁷⁸⁹.

SECURITY TODAY

Even during the Cold War, when the theory of realism was dominant, there were alternative or critical security studies. *The Copenhagen school* (a direction in constructivism), *the Welsh school* (critical theory), and a school of thought called *Peace studies* were among the first alternative directions that opposed realism during the Cold War. A key development within the academic matrix of security studies was the publication of *People, States and Fear* by Barry Buzan, one of the central figures of the Copenhagen School. This book fundamentally undermined at least two out of four main claims in traditional security studies. Buzan convincingly proved that security does not concern only states, but all human communities, and that focusing on military power is “inappropriate in itself”. Buzan instead developed a framework within which he proved that the security of human communities (not only states) is influenced by factors from five main areas, each of which with its own focus and an approach to prioritization. Those five areas are: *military, political, economic, social and ecological*⁷⁹⁰. Buzan’s five areas (sectors or spheres) are understood in security theory as a “widening” of the concept of security.

The Welsh School (of critical theory) contributed to the “deepening” of security as much as the Copenhagen School did to its widening. The Welsh School moved the focus of security away from the state, down to the individual, and up to global security. Besides the “deepening” of security, the Welsh School, and especially its most significant representative, Ken Booth, contributed to “politicization” of security, as well as emancipation and confronting power. Booth writes: “The new understanding of security is not simply something that concerns expanding the subject matter of study (expanding the list of issues beyond the strictly military ones). It is possible – as Barry Buzan (1991) showed in the first place – to expand ‘international security studies’ and still remain within the established neorealist framework and approach. Security means absence of threats. Emancipation is freeing

⁷⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁰ *Introduction to Security Studies*, op.cit., p 42

people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human limitations that prevent them from doing what they would freely choose to do. War and threat of war are some of those limitations, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression etc. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, and not power or order, creates true security⁷⁹¹.

According to a third school of thought that opposes realism, called *Peace studies*, true or lasting security does not ensue from the capability to demonstrate power over others. It ensues, first of all, from common effort to achieve security without denying others the right to security. During the Cold War such an approach was obvious in the then Prime Minister of Sweden Olof Palme's call to "general security", especially in his suggestion that supporters "must achieve security not against an enemy, but together with the enemy" (Olof Palme, 1982). "International security", Palme claimed, "has to be based on the duty of collective survival, and not on a threat"⁷⁹².

Other alternative directions do not perceive the world as an anarchic creation, but as an ordered system of laws and rules of behaviour, that is not a utopia, but an attainable goal.

Factors of geosecurity processes. The end of the Cold War in the sense of "What now?" was met unpreparedly by both the defeated and the victor. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the breakup of the USSR created confusion in Eurasian geo-area, the central area in most geopolitical theories. The breakup of the USSR, the world's largest state, was followed by two integrative processes: (1) NATO expansion and (2) the EU expansion. As the victors' "flagship", the USA, partly on its own and partly through the "obsolete" NATO, succeeded in asserting itself as the only superpower in international relations; this is often referred to as unipolarism. *Pax Americana* of the last decade of the 20th century announced the beginning of the new century with a "hot war", i.e. by a demonstration of military might against a small ruined state: the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. "Disciplining" of Eurasian states was "wind in the sails" for the aforementioned integrative processes, and a relatively large number of countries in that geo-area became members of NATO and/or the EU.

The beginning of the new century and its first decade were marked by several geosecurity factors, two of them crucial: (1) *the Western antithesis* and (2) *the Eastern paradigm*.

⁷⁹¹ Ibid., pp 155-157

⁷⁹² Ibid., pp 45-46

1) *The Western Antithesis*. A relative settling of ground in the Eurasian area after the fall of the Berlin Wall and geopolitical phenomena accompanying that act launched a new dilemma in international relations: what is the new geo-area of confrontation? It was not difficult to guess: it was Africa. Following the model of the “disciplining” of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (marking NATO’s 50th anniversary) and Iraq (from the ousting of Saddam Hussein’s regime to his execution), strategic planning for North Africa began. A particular event and a particular process were advantageous to those plans. The key event was the terrorist attack on the USA (the business centre in New York and the Pentagon building in Washington) on September the 11th, 2001. The US preemptive strategy, launched by President George W. Bush after the terrorist attacks, entailed an intervention by a great power in international relations if there was as much as a hint of a threat to democracy and world peace, not to mention a threat to a super power. *Nothing will be the same* was the motto of the strategy. The world financial crisis, as a process, started in 2007 as an avalanche grown out of a snowball formed in the USA. In American theory it is well known that when a crisis comes, a major war is needed⁷⁹³! The ousting of the so-called totalitarian regimes in African states, known as “African Spring”, started in the East (Morocco) and moved to the western part of North Africa (Syria). The intensity and horrors of conflict grew following the same order. Everything “went smoothly” until Syria, where the great power came face to face with the interests of others: Russia’s interests in the first place, but also the interests of other countries in the region, and those of the so-called Islamic State (ISIL).

After the “expansion boom” (2004), towards the end of the first decade of this century, the EU faced major crises characterized by: economic (financial) crises in some member states, especially in Greece; an identity crisis and confrontation within the EU regarding the projection of its further development; the straining of relations with Russia, because of the conflict between the Ukraine and Russia; and the migrant crisis, caused by mass migrations of population from war-stricken regions towards the EU, or more specifically, towards its most developed member states. The failed efforts regarding the EU Constitution (2005), were soon overcome by the Lisbon Treaty (2007, came into effect in 2009), and the EU started to enhance military capabilities more openly and to participate in peace operations and missions

⁷⁹³ Forca, B., *Vojni faktor medjunarodnih odnosa i njegov uticaj na razvoj Vojske Jugoslavije (The Military Factor in International Relations and its Influence on the Development of the Army of Yugoslavia)*, doctoral dissertation, Military Academy, Belgrade, 2003

around the world. The model according to which there is no great power without great military might was being tested. As the US ally, the EU, or its member states weither individually or within the NATO, became directly involved in African Spring, without a unified strategy and goal. Open friction within the EU led to two important processes. One of them is the strengthening of the nationalist regimes in some member states, and the other is voting NO to the EU, in the referendum in Great Britain, in June of 2016. The consequences of these processes are: (1) the EU cannot reach a consensus and formulate a unified strategy concerning the migrant crisis, (2) the number and intensity of terrorist acts increase in the most developed EU countries, and (3) the process of Great Britain leaving the EU has begun, already showing that it will not be easy at all, and that it will not be without additional consequences.

The USA – EU axis is “shaking”, primarily because of different views on processes in the international community, or more specifically, the way they should be handled. In the background of the shaken relations are the aspirations on the part of the leading countries of the EU to “break away” from the dominant influence of the USA and the aspirations of the USA to remain “the leader in charge”. It “went with the flow” until the elections in the USA, when Donald Trump “unexpectedly” won. Americans are heard saying that nothing will be the same again, corroborated by the pre-election announcements by the new President, as well as his first presidential moves, mostly unsuccessful, according to analysts. Trump’s rhetoric sends a message to “Russia and the rest of the world that the guarantees of security for Europe are shaky”, an expert on foreign policy at the American Academy in Berlin, Jan Techau, told AFP, after the NATO summit in May of 2017⁷⁹⁴.

The West “got stuck in the quagmire” of its own making, for the most part. The West against all – this is getting close to Huntington’s projection of the final conflict – the West against the Islamic world⁷⁹⁵.

2) *The Eastern Paradigm*. The European part of Eurasia, or more specifically, all former socialist countries, members of the Warsaw Pact, the countries formed in the region of former SFR Yugoslavia, with the exception of Serbia, as well as some countries formed through the breakup of the USSR, turned explicitly towards the West, most of them becoming members of NATO and the EU. The fact is that each former socialist country (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria), the countries

⁷⁹⁴ <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/381485/AFP-Trampovo-nediplomatsko-ponasanje-nanelo-stetu-NATO> (Accessed on the 26th of May, 2017)

⁷⁹⁵ Huntington, P., *Sukob civilizacija (Clash of Civilizations)*, CID, Podgorica, 1995

formed in the region of former USSR (Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia), as well as in the region of former SFR Yugoslavia (Slovenia and Croatia) had become members of the Alliance before admission to the EU. Certain countries of what is referred to as West Balkans (Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia) are still waiting to become EU members, whereas Montenegro is already a member of NATO¹⁷, which means fast admission to the EU.

Euroasia, without Europe, opens up a new “Eastern question” (paradigm), now in a new form, and primarily through two largest countries – Russia and China viewed individually, but also together. Russia, the main “loser” of the Cold War, returns to the global arena with the war in Georgia (2008), and the comeback is reinforced through: (1) significant development of strategic weapons and the participation in the military conflict in Syria, but also in the Ukraine; (2) competing through natural resources, especially oil and gas, and (3) forming strategic partnerships with some of the countries of the former USSR, as well as with China, India, Brazil, and the Republic of South Africa. From the security point of view, the Warsaw Pact had collapsed, but the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) have emerged. Russia has learned a lesson of the Cold War. China is strengthening its positions globally primarily through economy (the New Silk Road), but also through the development of modern technologies and forming strategic partnerships with Russia, India, Brazil, and the Republic of South Africa (BRICS). Military capabilities are not China’s first priority; they are being developed and maintained at a level which is sufficient to protect China’s regional interests, primarily in the South China Sea. China has learned lessons from the confrontation between the USA and Russia.

Four Key Approaches to Security. The powers that be have always “engineered” international relations, whatever the views on the position of the official international organisation – the UN. Hence, four strategic approaches to security exert the greatest influence on present-day global security and its perspectives for the future. The four strategic approaches can be found in two national security strategies (the USA and Russia), the Global Strategy (the EU) and the White Paper and the Military Strategy (China). It would take much space to describe the four aforementioned strategic approaches, and it will not be done here. Only a general assessment of their features will be provided, according to current studies on (theories of) security as well as the subject matter of this paper.

Generally, the following can be claimed regarding the aforementioned strategic approaches: (1) two approaches are in line with neorealism (the USA and Russia), and (2) two approaches are in line with neoliberalism (the EU and China) or constructivism. Furthermore, because of the EU’s enduring relations

with the USA and NATO, and its aspirations for becoming a superpower itself, the EU's strategic approach leans partly towards neorealism as well. On the other hand, China is almost completely in line with neoliberalism (globalism).

The USA adopted two national security strategies during Barack Obama's mandate (in 2010 and in 2015, respectively). President Obama signed *The National Security Strategy* on the 6th of February, 2015. It points to continuity and elaboration of the US national interests laid out in the *Strategy* of 2010, but it also puts clear emphasis on the US foreign policy priorities in days to come⁷⁹⁶. In May of 2015 a new document, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* was adopted in the Pentagon (the previous one was adopted in 2011), establishing the US armed forces' tasks and how they are to be performed.⁷⁹⁷ Globally, it is clear that the new *Strategy* emphasizes the continuation of re-balancing towards the Asia-Pacific region. In several places the security challenges in that region are emphasised, with a special focus on China and its military strengthening, as well as the territorial disputes it has in East China Sea and in South China Sea. Although the Asia-Pacific region is not explicitly mentioned in the previous document, focus on certain countries, such as China, as well as the strengthening of alliances and partnerships, clearly point to re-balancing towards that region.⁷⁹⁸

As in previous US strategic documents, terrorism, mass destruction weapons proliferation, especially North Korea's and Iran's nuclear programmes, as well as transnational organized crime, remain the main security challenges. Among the challenges emphasized in *Strategy*, some novelties can also be found: "confronting the Russian aggression in the Ukraine", the effect of the climate change, cyber threats, and outbreaks of infectious diseases, such as Ebola virus disease.⁷⁹⁹

One of the main factors indicating a change in perception of challenges, risks, and threats to the US security, is listing the enemies of the state, the Russian Federation being practically put in the same category with terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State (ISIL). With this document, the USA brought wars between states back into focus of its security considerations, in grand style, with a strong emphasis on the relations with great powers.⁸⁰⁰

⁷⁹⁶ https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf/ 15.06.2016.

⁷⁹⁷ Forca, B., Sekulović, D., *Vojna neutralnost u geostrategijskom prestrajavanju u savremenom evroazijskom prostoru (Military Neutrality in the Geostrategic Repositioning in the Present-day Eurasian Region)*, International Scientific Conference, Banja Luka, 2017

⁷⁹⁸ Barack H. Obama, *The National Security Strategy, February 2015*, The President's Foreword

⁷⁹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 3

⁸⁰⁰ *Ibid*, p. 10.

The Russian Federation adopted a national security strategy in 2009 for the first time⁸⁰¹. Since then it has been updated by President Putin's acts almost every year. According to *The Strategy*, the relations between Russia and NATO are still determined by non-acceptance of NATO expansion towards the Russian borders, which along with an attempt to ascribe a global function to NATO constitutes a breach of international law.⁸⁰² *The Strategy* specifies that within international politics a special long-term attention will be "focused on energy resources acquisition", specifically in the Middle East, in the Barents Sea, and in other regions of the Arctic. For the most part, *The Strategy* defines the Russian Federation's national interests, i. e. the areas of national security policies development. As a strategic goal in the accomplishment of national security in the area of economy, a medium-term task for Russia is to become one of the top five countries in the world in terms of GDP. To accomplish that, it is necessary to neutralize the main threats to national security in the area of economy.⁸⁰³

Strategic goals in national defence are "prevention of global and regional wars and conflicts, as well as strategic deterrence in the interest of military security of the country". Strategic deterrence is achieved through mutual political, military, economic, and information measures to prevent or decrease threats from other countries. The main tool for the accomplishment of Russia's national security is the armed forces. In line with the current *Strategy*, a new *Military Doctrine* was published in 2010. It put emphasis on the preservation of Russia's status as a nuclear power, along with the provision for a preemptive nuclear strike against the countries that intend to carry out aggression against Russia. Regardless of the fact that the 2010 doctrine has an anti-NATO character, there is still space for cooperation with NATO. Reality is different, though: NATO acts on its own and cooperation with Russia remains in the realm of documents, i.e. the realm of theory.⁸⁰⁴ In the 2014 *Military Doctrine*, NATO is for the first time clearly defined as an opponent, and expansion of NATO to include new member states as well as the expansion of its military facilities towards Russian borders is qualified as a direct military threat to Moscow.⁸⁰⁵

⁸⁰¹ Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года (The Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation till 2020), Совет Безопасности Российской Федерации (Security Council of the Russian Federation), Moscow, 2009.

⁸⁰² Ibid., chapter 2, item 8.

⁸⁰³ Ibid., items 53-55.

⁸⁰⁴ See further in: Perišić, S., *Nova geopolitika Rusije (New Geopolitics of Russia)*, Medija centar „Obrana“, Belgrade, 2015, pp 150-156.

⁸⁰⁵ See: <http://news.kremlin.ru/news/47334>, item 12, p 5 (Accessed on the 6th of May, 2017)

In *The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation*, published on the 31st of December, 2015, Russia is still focused on increasing its influence and prestige, as well as the strengthening of its national unity, but at the same time it feels threatened by the USA and its allies. It is also concerned about its economy being in recession. *The Strategy* emphasizes Russia's enhanced role in solving the most important international issues, and two main strategic goals are stated: "to increase competitiveness and international prestige of the Russian Federation". The Russian Federation wants to maintain strategic stability and further develop strategic partnerships through active participation in international organisations, the mechanisms of international law, and development of bilateral partnerships, first of all with China and India, but also through regional international arrangements, primarily through the advancement of cooperation within the Eurasian Union, CSTO and SCO⁸⁰⁶. Relatively safe from the flanks, besides economic ties with Europe, in terms of security Russia is fortifying a stable "front wall" towards Europe, from the North to Africa (Syria). Critical points in the wall are the Ukraine and Turkey. In those terms the following should be viewed: (1) the conflict with the Ukraine, and (2) economic rapprochement between Russia and Turkey, as well as the joint efforts against ISIS in Syria and the bordering regions⁸⁰⁷.

The EU adopted its first security strategy in 2003⁸⁰⁸. Under primarily internal pressure for a modern security strategy, the EU adopted *The Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy – Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe* in 2016. A detailed analysis of this document is almost unnecessary if one carefully reads the foreword, written by High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federika Mogherini. Mogherini's messages contain all aspects of the position, dilemmas, projections, aspirations, and problems faced by the EU, with the following as the most representative: (1) questioning the existence and identity of the EU, (2) the EU does not renounce the strengthening of its own position, made up primarily of economic power ("soft power"), (3) the EU is against the existence of a global policeman (somewhat of a "thorn in the side" for the USA), but it still considers NATO to be important for its security (23 out of 28 EU countries are members of NATO), (4) the EU does not renounce its own defence,

⁸⁰⁶ Forca, B., Sekulović, D., *Vojna neutralnost u geostrategijskom prestrajavanju u savremenom evroazijskom prostoru (Military Neutrality in the Geostrategic Repositioning in the Present-day Eurasian Region)*, International Scientific Conference, Banja Luka, 2017.

⁸⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁸ *Bezbedna Evropa u boljem svetu – Evropska bezbednosna strategija (Safe Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy)*, ISAK fond, Belgrade, 2006.

when the circumstances allow it, and neither does it dismiss member states' decisions to be neutral, and (5) the EU endeavours to redefine its globalist approach and it does not renounce its position of one of the centres of power⁸⁰⁹.

China does not have a document called the national strategy of security. Its positions on the domain of (primarily military) security are expressed in the White Paper, and since 2015, in the military strategy. Chinese general approach is reflected in the *New Silk Road* project, which draws general Chinese strategy close to neorealism or constructivism. The project was conceived as a large economic Asian-European zone of free trade. "Two and a half years ago, when President Xi Jinping announced this initiative, he said there would be a maritime component and a land component of the *New Silk Road*. On land, this economic belt will tie China, Central Asia, Russia, and Europe, from the Mediterranean to the North Sea. And the maritime silk road will connect the Chinese coast with the Indian Ocean and Africa, with the Mediterranean, with the South Pacific ... This project, whose completion will take 35 years, has a significant influence on peace and security in the world, because the nations that enter 35 years' projects, with over a billion dollars invested, will certainly be inclined to peace and cooperation, and not conflict", said Živadin Jovanović, former Minister of Foreign Affairs in FR Yugoslavia⁸¹⁰.

Early in 2017, President of the People's Republic of China participated for the first time in the World Economic Forum in Davos (Switzerland). Talking about the position and participation of China in world economic relations, Chinese President Xi Jinping said: "Like it or not, global economy is a great ocean that you cannot avoid. States should see their interests in a wider context and refrain from achieving their goals to the detriment of others. If we pull into a harbour every time we face a storm, we shall never reach the other shore ... No one will come out of a trade war as a victor ... Protectionism is like locking yourself up in a dark room to avoid danger, denying yourself light and air in the process ... Some people consider globalization to be a Pandora's box, and blame it for the chaos in the world. Neither the migrant crisis, nor the international financial crisis, were caused by globalization. The financial crisis was the result of an insatiable quest for profits and dismal failure in the financial regulation ... Global economy has been slow for quite some time. The culprits are to be sought in the shortage of robust development incentives, inappropriate management system and uneven global growth ... One percent of the population owns the wealth that equals that of the

⁸⁰⁹ <http://www.delme.ec.europa.eu/code/navigate.php?Id=414> (Accessed on the 25th of May, 2017).

⁸¹⁰ <http://beograd.in-da-li-ce-novi-put-svile-izmeniti-svetski-poredak-hiljadu-milijardi-dolara-zakineski-prodor-na-zapad> (Accessed on the 8th of May, 2017).

remaining 99 percent collectively ... In the next five years, China plans to import approximately eight billion dollars' worth of goods, around 600 billion dollars of foreign investment and around 750 billion dollars of Chinese investment abroad. Chinese tourists will make over 700 billion trips abroad in the next five years ... With such plans, China will keep its door wide open to the world, we shall not leave it ajar, let alone close it.⁸¹¹” According to numerous analysts, the Chinese President reacted to US President Trump’s announcement of taking a harsher stance towards Chinese economic invasion⁸¹².

CONCLUSION

Historically speaking, international relations have been determined by great powers, however unscientific and in need of proof this claim may seem, in principle. This claim, in particular, has been a fact of the modern time, for two centuries now. Domination of the United Kingdom in the 19th century was replaced by the US domination in the 20th century. Two world wars in the 20th century, in practice as well as in theory, solidified the classical approaches to strategic projections of global and own security, reflected in the opposing views: liberalism and realism. Due to the unfulfilled practical expectations between the two world wars, and based on the experience of the Second World War in particular, realism became prevalent in the second half of the 20th century. The state and its power, especially military power, are key guarantees of security: this is the main motto of the strategic concept of realism. Realism found especially fertile soil in the Cold War between the West and the East, headed by the superpowers, the USA and the USSR.

The forming of the United Nations Organisation, the downfall of colonialism, and other global processes encited hope that the world can enter a period of relative stability through avoidance of major wars. In the second half of the 20th century major wars were replaced by the Cold War between superpowers and regional and local hot wars, in which the superpowers participated directly or indirectly. It was exactly in this period that the theory of realism entered its golden age.

The EU saw the end of the Cold War as its chance to strengthen its position and role in the world. Gradually, besides political and economic influence, the EU developed its military capabilities and participated in peace operations and missions all over the world. The EU’s resistance to US

⁸¹¹ <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/372296/Si-Dinping-Vreme-je-Aza-novi-medunarodni-poredak> (Accessed on the 5th of May, 2017).

⁸¹² Ibid.

domination, soft at first, but getting stronger, and burdened by internal crises within the EU, has as a consequence the creation of a Western antithesis, characterized by: (1) a vague projection of the EU, (2) Great Britain exiting the EU, and (3) unpredictability of the US actions after Donald Trump's election. The West got stuck in the quagmire of its own creation.

Two decades after the end of the Cold War, its greatest "loser", Russia, returned to the world's center stage through the military campaign in Georgia. The symbolically military Russian comeback has powerful geostrategic layers. It is composed of huge natural resources, powerful strategic military capabilities and systems, and the establishment of strategic partnerships of economic (BRICS) and security nature (CSTO and SCO). On the other hand, a new power, China, has been increasingly asserting itself in the global arena, primarily through economic competitiveness, but also through strategic partnerships. Thus an Eastern paradigm is formed.

Obviously, the new West-East relation is dominated by four world players, in Brzezinski's words. They are the USA, Russia, the EU, and China. Three of these four powers (the USA, Russia, and the EU) in security strategies, and China in the White Paper, the Military Strategy, but also in diplomatic statements, have announced their strategic projections of world relations and security issues. An analysis of the aforementioned strategic projections confirms a thesis that: (1) the USA and Russia returned to neorealism as the dominant approach to security, and (2) the EU and China are closer to neoliberalism or constructivism. As for the USA and Russia, realism was and still is the dominant approach to security, having only been masked in certain periods. A power can only reason through power. The EU, both as an entity and as an orientation in terms of security, remains incomplete, vague, and unclear. The fact is that the EU is closer to neoliberalism, but it is no stranger to neorealism, for which the appropriate circumstances are needed. China is in word and deed a proponent of neoliberalism (globalism) in international relations, as well as in security. However, when it comes to regional interests (South China Sea), China does not shun the use of all means available to protect its own interests, including the military ones.

Classical strategic thought has returned to the practice of international relations. It actually never abandoned this practice; it was only low-key. The world is on the brink of new major conflicts, generated by great powers. They have a recognizable order: from economic competition, to political influence and mutual blocking, to armed conflicts. For the rest of the world, only hope remains that "the sword will not be drawn from the sheath".

Hope dies last.

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KLASIČNA STRATEGIJSKA MISAO I SAVREMENA MEĐUNARODNA BEZBEDNOST

Božidar Forca*

Fakultet za poslovne studije i pravo,
Univerzitet Union – Nikola Tesla, Beograd, Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Pojam „strategija“ potiče iz vojne sfere. U svom razvoju taj pojam se prostire u domen opšte (državne, velike, nacionalne), odnosno polistrategije koja, u najopštijem, utvrđuje put (način) dostizanja sopstvenih interesa i ciljeva. Jedan od ključnih aspekata opšte (državne) strategije jeste bezbednost, te se, kao posebna, izdvaja – strategija nacionalne bezbednosti. Klasična strategijska misao, u teorijsko-praktičnom smislu posmatrano, u svom središtu ima moć, koja je razapeta između njenih polova - „tvrda“ i „meka“ moć. Svet je ušao u 21. vek sa očekivanjem dugotrajnijeg perioda mira i bezbednosti, kao osnovnog preduslova opstanka i razvoja. Dosta je rasprostranjen stav, pa i uverenje, da novi teorijsko-praktični strategijski pravci prevazilaze klasične, kao i da odnos prema moći gubi primat, kad je bezbednost u pitanju. Međutim, realnost savremenih međunarodnih odnosa ukazuje da klasična strategijska misao nije napuštena, odnosno da je ostala pritajena i da se vraća na svetsku scenu, svakako sa novim modalitetima odnosa prema bezbednosti, na globalnom, regionalnom i lokalnom nivou posmatrano.

Ključne reči: strategija, međunarodna bezbednost, realizam, liberalizam, konstruktivizam.

* bozidar.forca@fppsp.edu.rs

WHY STRATEGY HAS COME OUT FROM SECURITY AND DEFENCE AREA?

Stjepan Domjančić*
Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia,
Republic of Croatia

Abstract: Contrary to the impression that the interest in strategic defence and security issues has increased; state institutions, armed forces, international organizations and similar entities are increasingly involved in conceptualizing security and defence strategy, this paper shows that the essence is actually the opposite. The process of fleeing from the strategic level of consideration of the problem. This tendency is well recognized by analysing concepts related to security and defence strategy. The notion of asymmetric warfare is so ambivalent that it has become unusable, and the situation is even more absurd with the concept of hybrid warfare. The terms have become a means of legitimating, political classification and not analytical tools. Different terms are not used to distinguish between different phenomena, to describe them more accurately and to explain them, but to make a certain appearance politically marked and thus determine how we ought to be treated as a state and society.

As defence and security issues begin to dominate in public and political discourse, scientific, expert, critical approach to these topics is reduced. Defence and security have definitely become daily political issues and have become problematic for military professionals. Strategic thinking in the area of security and defence is equally endangered and suppressed on the one hand by political voluntarism, irrelevant and arbitrary daily political influence, and, on the other hand, of the strategic surrogate offered in the form of simplicity, linearity, symmetry and mathematical accuracy.

Key words: strategy, security, defence, symmetric warfare, hybrid warfare.

INTRODUCTION

In spite of the fact that there are plenty of definitions of the term “strategy” which can sometimes be completely in contrast to each other - so we can actually state it is essential to clearly indicate its meaning for the

* stjepan.domjancic@gmail.com, stjepan.domjancic@morh.hr

necessary level of understanding of the meaning of the word in the context in which it has been used; the first association that crosses our mind when we hear the word “strategy” is most probably in the area of security and defence. The reason for it lies in the fact that the term “strategy” draws its origin from the military organization, and then it spread to all the other areas of functioning⁸¹³. However, even the positioning of the term “strategy” in the security/defence/military sphere will not contribute much to achieving its clarity and definition, but will stay characterized with the great level of ambivalence. Moreover, it can be claimed that the use of the term “strategy” in various fields in which it was “imported” has the higher level of clarity and consistency than it has in its original area. Could we here draw the conclusion that the military forgot what the strategy is or perhaps that the strategy we are used to in the security department became inadequate for it? The answer to this question is neither simple nor unambiguous. In order to answer this question, the term that has often been used lately - “symmetry”, i.e. “asymmetry” will be introduced in the analysis. Although we may have the impression there is increased interest in the strategic questions in the area of defence and security, and that the government institutions, military structures, international organizations and similar entities increasingly deal with conceptualizing the strategy in the area of security and defence, it is actually about avoiding the strategic level of the problem analysis.

SYMMETRY AND ASYMMETRY IN WARFARE

In encyclopaedias, asymmetry warfare is usually defined as the war between the clashed sides whose relative military power, i.e. strategy or tactics considerably differs. It is most often connected with the warfare between the unequal adversaries when the smaller or weaker forces have to use terrain, time, surprise or certain weaknesses of the bigger and stronger opposing forces in order to win or to achieve their strategic goals.⁸¹⁴

Asymmetric warfare is seen as unconventional approach mostly based on asymmetry between the opponents. That asymmetry implies that one side, due to its own weaknesses or strength of the adversary, is not capable of confronting the opponent conventionally. For that reason, the weaker side uses unplanned and unexpected weapons and tactics (relying on the surprise

⁸¹³ See more in: Domjančić, S., Gracin, D. *Kako promišljati strategiju u području sigurnosti i obrane?* Polemos, Vol. XIX, No. 37, Zagreb, 2017

⁸¹⁴ Lerner, K.L. *Asymmetric Warfare*. <http://www.encyclopedia.com/politics/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/asymmetric-warfare>

element), which could distract or reduce predominance of the enemy.⁸¹⁵ The recent literature suggests war in Afghanistan as a school example of the asymmetrical conflict. Asymmetrical warfare is also treated as a new method, not as a new way of warfare. Within this, the new method can also be used in the so-called traditional areas of military performance (high intensity of conventional conflicts), as well as in the new areas of military engagement (fight against terrorism, fight against organised crime, post-conflict stabilisation etc.).⁸¹⁶

All of these above and more other perceptions of asymmetry in military activities, i.e. asymmetrical warfare, derive from the simple and very admirable distinction between symmetry and asymmetry, traditional and new, conventional and unconventional, regularity and chaos, linearity and ambivalence, etc. However, the right question is: Has the symmetry, linearity and regularity ever existed in war? Isn't our symmetrical way of looking at things or explanation of particular warfare just an endeavour of its systematization? Hasn't that symmetry arisen from our attempt to simplify very complex and multi-dimensional elements that make the mosaic of war? Given the fact that many papers deal with "asymmetrical warfare" and asymmetry is referred to as considerably wide spectrum of the observed elements – asymmetry in the size and strength of the adversary, asymmetry in the political and social establishment, asymmetry in the war methods, asymmetry in defining political and/or military goals etc. – it is impossible today as it was in the past, to find the symmetrical conflict. Each and every conflict, that is to say, warfare in some or in majority of elements has the asymmetrical characteristics. If we narrowed the observed variables of certain warfare from the aspect of conducting warfare and then took it as criteria of symmetry, even then, we would not significantly reach a higher level of clarity. For instance, the World War I is very often cited as an example of conventional, symmetrical war. Nevertheless, if we look at the WW I battles, the very first shallow analysis will show that even there, most elements were not symmetrical. It is the opposite! And while the western battlefields still contained some elements (conditionally speaking) of traditional, positional warfare, the eastern battlefields were completely different.

⁸¹⁵ Brzica, N. *Asimetrični rat u Afganistanu i protupobunjeničke strategije*, Polemos, Vol. XV, No. 30, Zagreb, 2012

⁸¹⁶ Barić, S. *Vojne strategije i asimetrično ratovanje*, National Security and the Future, 4(11), Zagreb, 2010

ASYMMETRICAL, HYBRID AND SPECIAL WARFARE –
ANALYTICAL TOOL OR POLITICAL ATTITUDE?

Asymmetrical warfare, depending on the author or the context, includes wider or narrower spectrum of elements, but today it is considered to include particularly wide approach to understanding conflicts, in which wide range of resources, from political, economic, military to propaganda is being used, and the answer to the threat or intention of the threat of one side towards the other one, is not “symmetrical”. Symmetry has, therefore, become such an extensible term that it cannot be used in serious analyses because it is not clear what “*differentia specifica*” is. Inflation of the other emerging terms contributes even more to this absurdity. Hybrid warfare is used in terms of strategy, military strategy, military doctrine, format of warfare, method of warfare, etc. However, regardless of the chaos of various terms and indifference of the terms strategy, military strategy or doctrine, there is still something that connects all the definitions, approaches and efforts to explain what hybrid warfare is. Their bond is in the fact that the strategy/doctrine/format/kind consolidates conventional and unconventional (non-conventional, irregular, asymmetric) and cyber warfare; it largely uses propaganda resources, information and misinformation; it aims to cause the chaos; it raises the dissatisfaction within the population; it tries to destabilise the governance and so on. The term “special warfare” covers all of these things and this term has been used decades before insisting on the term “hybrid warfare”. Special war is most frequently defined as a set of organised and coordinated political, economic, psychological-propaganda activities of a certain country. It is aimed against another country, separatist movement, political organization or social group in order to impose their own interests by interfering in the existing political, economic and social relations. Various forcible measures and methods are being used for this purpose, including the limited use of military power, and usually the action of special and paramilitary forces. In accordance with this, special warfare is the hidden form of aggression or the introduction to the armed aggression. The goals and assets of the special war are decided and defined by the highest state political leadership. They are not made public; instead, they are attempted to be hidden by the general ideological and political slogans, and in most of the cases, their aims are achieved by the combination of different activities. The events before World War II are considered to be the inception of the special warfare. Nazi Germany had a leading role here. Before the beginning of the open military aggression, it ran the intensive psychological-propaganda and economic campaigns. Nevertheless, as a completely developed concept, special warfare reached the point of its highest development in 1960s, afloat the East-West

bipolarization and cold war conflict. The superpower used this type of warfare for frequent changes of political regimes in the third world countries (usually through various forms of military strikes) in order to establish desired political regime. If such methods were not effective, the countries in which a special war was led were exposed to destabilization, causing economic, political, ethnic or religious crises.⁸¹⁷

Just look at the newspapers of different countries and pay attention to the statements of political leaders to see how the use of a particular term has become a political expression. In NATO and the EU community, the term hybrid warfare is primarily reserved for Russian actions. The concept of hybrid warfare is far more dominant in the general political discourse than it is the concept of asymmetric warfare that will be used more by military structures. In the countries of the former Yugoslavia, regardless of NATO and/or EU membership, the concept of a special war dominates over the general political level.⁸¹⁸ What is surprising about it is the similarity of patterns used once in Yugoslavia and today in new independent states. The protagonists of special war are determined by political and ideological criteria; so-called the “fifth column” has been demonized and associated with the enemy from the outside; national unity has been advocated because enemy forces are everywhere; media and non-governmental organizations have been accused of non-patriotic behaviour, etc.

The terms have become a means of legitimation, political classification and not analytical tools. Different terms are not to distinguish between different phenomena, to describe them more accurately and to explain them, but to make a certain appearance politically marked and thus determine how we ought to be treated as a state and society.

DEFENCE AND SECURITY AS A DAILY POLITICAL ISSUES

As defence and security topics begin to dominate in public and political discourse, the scientific, professional, critical approach to these topics is reduced. Recently, we have witnessed a revival of interest shown for military and defence issues. This phenomenon can be observed on two levels, globally and nationally. However, the increased public interest reflects daily

⁸¹⁷ Hrvatska enciklopedija, on-line edition, Leksikografski zavod „Miroslav Krleža“, Zagreb (www.enciklopedija.hr)

⁸¹⁸ The notion of a special war, both at doctrinal and political level, was largely used in the former Yugoslavia. At that time, numerous publications on the special war were also published. At that time, the special war dominantly dealt with potential threats from the inside, the dangers of destabilization of the political order and the activities of emigrant groups.

political inputs; it is not the result of substantial changes in the attitude of citizens towards the formulation and implementation of public policies, or increased awareness of the problems of modern societies. Such an increase in the public interest is generally inversely proportional to the relevance of the topic involved.⁸¹⁹ The main reason for this is found in over-simplification of the issues and their arbitrary and superficial contextualization.⁸²⁰

Defence and security have definitely become daily political issues, and thus have become problematic for military professionals. As the area of strategy has become dominantly political area, resistance and/or disorientation of the military in the new circumstances can be seen as an escape from the strategy.

The classic military story about the ambiguously and inconsistently defined political/strategic guidelines by the military expects from political establishment represents the central point of every consideration of military-political relations. Let us just remember Moltke⁸²¹ and his views on the relationship between military and political aspect. Moltke thought that politics might be neglected when hostilities begin. He believed that politics could not be seen apart from the strategy. He agreed with the view that the strategy is closely related to the demands and conditions defined at political level, but the operations must be guided without regard to politics. Politicians are responsible for the strategy at the time of peace, while soldiers are responsible for military actions in the war.⁸²²

Moltke believes that politics uses war to achieve its goals. Politics decisively affects the beginning and end of the war. Where the strategy serves the politics better and works ultimately for the achievement of the goals of politics, it is entirely independent of politics in its actions. Military considerations are crucial for the course of war. On the contrary, political considerations are decisive only if they do not require something impossible from the military point of view. Moltke considered that politics could use its victories, because it was not its matter; the use of victory or defeat is the exclusive right of politicians.⁸²³

⁸¹⁹ Domjančić, S. *Civilno-vojni odnosi i tranzicija*, Despot infinitus Zagreb, 2015

⁸²⁰ Domjančić, S., Gracin, D. *Kako promišljati strategiju u području sigurnosti i obrane?* Polemos, Vol. XIX, No. 37, Zagreb, 2017. p. 103

⁸²¹ Helmuth von Moltke (1800th to 1891st) was a German field marshal. He was the head of the Prussian General Staff for thirty years. He was one of the greatest military strategists of the second half of the 19th century. Usually in the literature, he is known as Moltke the Elder, to distinguish him from his nephew.

⁸²² Domjančić, S. *Ratovanje u 21. stoljeću – postmoderna ili povratak u 19. stoljeće*. Polemos, Vol. XV, No. 30, Zagreb, 2012. p. 102/103

⁸²³ Vego, M. N. *Joint Operational Warfare – Theory and Practice*. U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 2009

As much as this Moltke's point of view today sounded anachronistic, it is in its essential elements quite strong. At the root of Moltke's doubt on the political involvement in leading the war is mistrust in the ability of politicians to understand the field of military expertise. "Give us clear and unambiguous political guidelines, let us do the job, and then do what you want with our results!" So, that Moltke's message could simply be expressed to politicians. However, the military sends this type of message today, as well.

Speaking about the operational level today, we can simply say that it is the area between strategy and tactics (no matter how banal it may be). For example, today the US military⁸²⁴ try to create an operational level as a policy-free zone where military expertise is unlimited and in which military returns the conduct of the war under its control. The desire of the soldiers: politicians to be focused on policy and strategy, leaving soldiers to run the war.⁸²⁵ The military wants to focus on the operational level of the war, which it considers to be its real professional area. They try to avoid strategy because strategy has become area of the strong interference of "civil" elements with classical military elements; because of the constant emphasising on new "non-military" abilities, new players in the exclusive military arena. The military sees the operational level as the last refuge of military autonomy and military expertise. On the one hand, military tries to protect its professional autonomy, and, at the same time, protect traditional and already obsolete conception of political-military relations. On the other hand, it is about classic strategy misunderstanding.

The strategy represents a higher level of abstraction, which must be conceptually derived through theory. The theory allows us to visualize what we cannot see. Our theories allow us to visualize the terrain we do not see (for example, geographic maps). We cannot "see" abstract theory; we can only theoretically visualize it. Since we can see tactical action well, it has become a natural way to fight against strategic abstractions.

Most of the thinking about strategy shows lot of misunderstanding of strategy. Strategy is the art of creating a creative logic that will rationalize violence or competitive behaviour. The strategy deals with creating the rules of the game rather than playing the game.

Strategic thinking and action for the military should not only represent the higher level of tactical or operational area, but their precondition and

⁸²⁴ It should be emphasized that this is in a very similar way related to other militaries. We specifically mention the American military because its engagement is most visible on a global scale; the operations being carried out are widely known and analyzed the most.

⁸²⁵ Domjančić, S. *Ratovanje u 21. stoljeću – postmoderna ili povratak u 19. stoljeće*. Pemos, Vol. XV, No. 30, Zagreb, 2012. p. 103

starting point. The strategy does not give directions to operational or tactical commanders, but provides the idea of a whole “game”. In the 19th century, a fairly distinct separation between the “great strategy” and the military strategy was visible, because the content of each of them was fundamentally different. The military strategy did not address “non-military” aspects of national power. The military, beyond its organizational boundaries, was only interested in using the capacity of society to carry out military operations. The military strategic aspect of the military was almost exclusively *military* aspect.

The twenty-first century faced a military with a completely new situation. The boundary between the military and civil society was blurred. The task of more active participation in a wider social context and, at the same time, to maintain relative autonomy, competence and group cohesion has become very demanding for military organization.⁸²⁶ Convergence is on the increase of the military and civilian institutions and increasingly powerful permeation of the military and civilian sectors of the society, due to technological and organizational revolution. Janowitz has named the complex consequences of that process for the feature of the military organization civilianization. It is a result of the technological development of the complex machinery of warfare that has weakened the line of distinguishing between military and non-military organizations. Military establishment has been increasingly showing features that are characteristic for any big organization.⁸²⁷ Military organization loses its exclusivity in relations with the state institutions. The military, which earlier expressed its expertise in the “management of violence”⁸²⁸, whose expertise, along with corporate identity and professional autonomy, was the main tool to build authority in relations with the state and society, today needs to prove its expertise. The military no longer deals with the non-military aspects to support the achievement of military goals, but military goals aligns with non-military goals; military capabilities are required to be more civilian than military, a soldier is required to be a diplomat, humanitarian, ecologist, and sociologist. As these appearances and tendencies are more noticeable at a strategic level, the military is trying to “protect” its traditional image, so they escape to the operational level as a policy-free zone.⁸²⁹

⁸²⁶ Smerić, T. *Sparta usred Babilona. Sociologijski aspekti vojne profesije*. Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada. Zagreb, 2005

⁸²⁷ Janowitz, M. *The Professional Soldier. A Social and Political Portrait*. New York- London: The Free Press-Collier Macmillan, 1974

⁸²⁸ Huntingtonsterm

⁸²⁹ Domjančić, S. *Ratovanje u 21. stoljeću – postmoderna ili povratak u 19. stoljeće*. *Polemos*, Vol. XV, No. 30, Zagreb, 2012.

STRATEGY - ESCAPE FROM THE ROOT

In addition to this, the escape from the strategic level of consideration of security and defence issues is evident in the misunderstanding of the concept of strategy. Narrow understanding of the strategy has become substitute for a broad, conceptual understanding. It has been mentioned earlier that the concept of strategy draws its origin from the military organization and has therefore entered into all other areas. However, since the mid-twentieth century, the understanding of the business-oriented strategy increasingly enters the military, defence and security sectors, and such understanding of the strategy becomes more dominant and wider than traditional, original understanding. While, for example, the general, grand strategy has been linked to the area of national security and identifying key long-term oriented interests and goals, new, business-oriented security strategies are more linked to short-term achievable goals, primarily related to budget planning and execution. As the strategy in the business sector is dominated by the market position and the possibility of increasing profits, it will emphasize in its articulation the measurability of achieving the objectives (increasing market share, increasing exports, productivity growth, cost reduction, growth of profits etc.). By translating the tools developed within such a concept of strategy, defence and security (or general public administration) is reduced to all those aspects that cannot be expressed numerically. One of the outcomes of such a situation is the adjustment of the goals in a way that is not exclusively related to the financial or material aspect, but yet to be measurable. In such attempts, goals, or indicators of achievement of goals are created in such a way that they are measurable, but insufficiently relevant or even irrelevant. For example, if the goal is raising the level of awareness in the society about the dangers of terrorism, the indicator of achieving that goal is the number of advertisements paid in the media or the number of public forums organized by a state institution. Alternatively, for example, the goal is to contribute to international security, and as an indicator of the achievement - the number of people participating in an international mission, etc.⁸³⁰

The difficulty of defining a strategy is that it, even in this context, has different meanings for different people in the organization. Some consider the strategy to be high-level plans, which are framed by the governing structure. Others argue that the strategy rests on specific and detailed activities that are being undertaken to achieve the desired future. Thirdly, the strategy is the

⁸³⁰ Domjančić, S., Gracin, D. *Kako promišljati strategiju u području sigurnosti i obrane?* Polemos, Vol. XIX, No. 37, Zagreb, 2017.

same as the best practice, while for some it is a pattern of consistency of activity over time.⁸³¹ It is quite understandable that the understanding of the strategy will be multiplied if we understand the defence and security strategy beyond the limits imposed by the logic of the business world.

The problem with the strategy in the public sphere in general, as well as in the field of defence and security, is the necessity of articulating the strategy in a wider, conceptual sense and, at the same time, in narrower, planning, business sense. Conceptual concept of the strategy must precede the narrower and the latter must arise from the first. It is not therefore a matter of replacing one strategy with another, but setting up a hierarchical relationship between them.

One of the fundamental differences between the strategies within the public domain and the strategies within the business sector is in their essentially different scope. While in the business sector this scope is imposed by itself, and it is, as a rule, the organization, the current or desired activity of that organization or stakeholders, in the public domain this scope is not so clear and unambiguous, and interested stakeholders are stretched to the whole society. For example, the strategy of healthcare development, education, or traffic in a society is not just about employees in these sectors, nor just institutions that work in these social areas, but also, almost every major intervention in one of these areas has implications for another or requires adjustments in another area. Although business sector strategies may have significant implications for society, the level of their social responsibility is significantly lower. It is not a social responsibility to direct those strategies, but the interests of stakeholders, while social responsibility will be something that will be imposed on them through state institutions or social regulatory mechanisms.⁸³²

Due to the above reasons, the strategy for the business sector is much more similar to the action plan. Its goals are simple and unambiguous, very exact and measurable. With the real strategy, things are much more complicated. Extents of security and defence strategy cannot be limited to a group of people, organization or financial effects. The real security strategy does not involve armed forces, training or armaments, but the society as a whole and the numerous interactions between different segments of society and, at the same time, it has implications for security and defence. Real strategic thinking requires a creative and critical approach. Ignoring a real

⁸³¹ Niven, P. R. *Balancedscorecard: Korak po korak: Maksimiziranje učinka i održavanje rezultata*. Zagreb: Poslovni dnevnik: Masmedia, 2007. p. 115.

⁸³² Domjančić, S., Gracin, D. *Kako promišljati strategiju u području sigurnosti i obrane?* Polemos, Vol. XIX, No. 37, Zagreb, 2017.

strategy and simplifying strategic issues to the level of business plans is reflected in the aforementioned artificially generated symmetry of understanding.

ENDS, WAYS, MEANS – A SALUTARY FORMULA FOR THE STRATEGY?

In the last couple of years, the American military leaders constantly emphasize the need to further develop the skills of those leaders with the prominent critical and creative way of thinking. Their skills would ensure the United States to remain the most dominant power in the years or decades to come. Those endeavours imply that the American defence sector did not really succeed to achieve that goal in the last fifteen years. General Martin E. Dempsey, former American Chief of the Joint Staff emphasized with particular regard the need to develop agile and adaptable leaders with prominent values, with the strategic vision and critical way of thinking. The current Chief of Staff, General Joseph Dunford said there was no alternative to those leaders who recognize the implications of the new ideas, new technologies, and new approach as well as anticipate the effects of their appliance.⁸³³

There are two critical factors that cause the problems within strategy: the first one understands the strategy itself, and the other one is simplified understanding of the assets and resources. With pretty high amount of confidence, we could say that there is nothing we could say it is generally accepted or to say the least widely accepted theory of the strategy.⁸³⁴ Even in the United States, where most attention was paid to the research of this issue, we cannot find a word about official or generally accepted theory of the strategy. Moreover, there is no compliance about the question of what the theory of strategy should contain. It could be said that there are pieces of something that could be regarded as a theory, something that was set up in the framework of U.S. Army College: it is the model *ends, ways, means*⁸³⁵.

The abovementioned model starts with the problem about very broad, indefinite and ambivalent comprehension of the term “strategy”. Taking into account the fact that strategy is very often used as a general term for plan, concept or the course of the action, this model endeavours to narrow that definition. Here, the strategy is considered to be the area of interest and action

⁸³³ Meiser, J.W. *Are Our Strategic Model Flawed?*
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/.../10_Meiser.pdf.

⁸³⁴ Domjančić, S., Gracin, D. *Idem*.

⁸³⁵ Yarger, R. H. *Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model*, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/stratpap.htm>.

of the leaders at the top level of management: state, army, business corporation or any other institution, depending on the strategy. For instance, Henry Eccles describes the strategy as ... “comprehensive course of work on controlling the situation and the area of interest, so the goals could be achieved.”⁸³⁶ This leads to conclusion that several factors are critical for the strategy: it is comprehensive, it defines the course of action, its aim is to govern and it refers to the use of power. By applying the strategy on the state i.e. national interests, we could say that strategy is the use of instruments (elements) of power (political, diplomatic, economic, military, information) to achieve political goals of the state or perhaps to achieve them by competing with other actors.⁸³⁷

The interests are the end state, namely the survival, economic prosperity, the persistence of the national values. National elements of power represent the resources that are being used for promotion or enhancement of national interests. Strategy is the endeavour for accomplishment, protection or enhancement of those interests by applying the instruments of power. Hence, before anything else, strategy is a matter of choice. It reflects the preferences of the future situation or conditions. Despite its roots in the present state, if it is to be built on the realistic basis, it must be directed and aimed at future.

Strategy answers to the question of HOW (method or concept – *way*) the leaders will use the power (assets or resources – *means*) they have at disposal to manage the processes in order to achieve the goals (*aims*) which support the national interests. Strategy offers the course of activities in order to achieve it. Strategy is not crisis management. On the contrary, strategy is its polarity. Crisis management arises when there is no strategy or when strategy fails. The first premise of the theory of the strategy is: it needs to be proactive and anticipating.

The other premise refers to necessity to define the end state i.e. what we need to achieve by using the strategy.

In formulation of the strategy, *ends, ways and means* represent the whole completeness, so in case it is about the general big strategy at the national level with the end state defined for that particular level, *ways and means* for achieving the end state must also be referred to the concepts and resources at the national level. Therefore, *ends, ways and means* have to be mutually consistent⁸³⁸.

There is no doubt this kind of conceptualization of the strategy is pleasing in a certain way and attractive within its simplicity, linearity, the ease

⁸³⁶ Eccles, H. *Military Concepts and Philosophy*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1965. p. 48.

⁸³⁷ Eccles, H. *Idem*.

⁸³⁸ Yarger, R. H. *Idem*

of identifying the proximate cause, but in all of this we can find the biggest obstacle/trap. In this kind of comprehension of the strategy – creative way of thinking pays its price.

In the framework of *ends+ways+means* formula, the concept of so-called comprehensive approach (*or whole-of-government*) in solving the strategic problems, leads to overrating (overstressing) the use of resources - i.e. means. Simply, it does not matter what problem is about, just use all the elements of national power – diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, etc., and the problem will be solved. By using this approach, the strategic experts have just one more task to do – to create diagram in which every single element of national will be denoted as an endeavour aimed at adversary's centre of gravitation. By doing so, the experts are driven away from the creative and innovative way of thinking and primarily focused on the resources and power.⁸³⁹

Ends+ways+means formula is eventually reduced to the allocation of its resources, and that is not a strategy. However, in the modern behaviour of the states, organization, alliances, etc. exactly the same comprehension of the strategy dominates. By reviewing all the official web pages of the European and non-European states and various regional organizations, in the statements of the heads of states and governments, or ministers of defence or some other officials, it is easy to notice that defence and security strategy is directly and quintessentially connected with the increase of defence budget. Most of the states proudly announce the increased future defence budget as a proof of awareness for the security issues, and within that increased budget, the specifically emphasized part is the increase budget for modernization (armament and military equipment).

Ends + ways + means formula is so widely accepted that it can be argued that for modern strategists it has become what Einstein's formula $E = mc^2$ for physicists is.⁸⁴⁰

Understanding the strategy as a process of achieving balances between the desired end state and the means (*ends - means* relationship) is a very attractive simplification. However, such understanding of the strategy is only a different version of the question - How many soldiers should be deployed to the operation in order to achieve the goals? Such an approach to strategy has been very clearly seen by American strategists for the last fifteen years.⁸⁴¹ This approach ignores the main function of the strategy - what these soldiers need

⁸³⁹ Meiser, J.W. *Idem*, p. 82

⁸⁴⁰ Echevarria, A. J. *Op-Ed: Is Strategy Really a Lost Art?*, SSI, September 13, 2013, <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.Army.mil/index.cfm/articles//Is-Strategy-Really-A-Lost-Art/>

⁸⁴¹ Perhaps the best example of this is the operation in Afghanistan.

to do in the operation; what their purpose is, or even better - what an alternative to sending these soldiers in operation is.⁸⁴²

Ends + ways + means formula and related concept of comprehensive approach actually leads to the transformation of strategy to resource-based discipline. Strategic, creative thinking is withdrawn and the planning of procurement and use of funds has become strategic surrogate. Strategies do not deal with a strategic issue - how to solve a security problem, but with resources. This problem is discussed only at a general, political level using uninventive doctrinal phrases of a comprehensive approach and hybrid threats. The political level does not give the strategic framework but only the political label in the function of political mobilization, justification or something else.

INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION - STRATEGY AS THE THEORY OF SUCCESS

Possible exit from this uninventive approach is, in the first place, to understand a strategy as a concept. The strategy cannot be considered too narrowly - for example, only through the prism of the use of the military element of power, or by the mechanical application of so-called comprehensive approach, which means a broad spectrum of elements, without any criticism.⁸⁴³ In Posen-Cohen's approach, this problem has been overcome by understanding the strategy as a theory of success.⁸⁴⁴ Defining a strategy as a theory of success stimulates creative thinking while at the same time keeping the focus on the analysis of causality with constant awareness of the ultimate desirable state. If we were to apply the Posen-Cohen model to Afghanistan, we could conclude that the process of adopting Afghanistan's strategy for US administration over the past period was deficient and problematic for at least two reasons: it was almost entirely based on means and just one option was seriously considered. The result can only be a bad strategy. The whole process of making a strategy has been limited almost exclusively to the question of how many soldiers to deploy to the operation and for how long. What was the second option?⁸⁴⁵ None! The question is, how you know that you have chosen the best option if no other is seriously considered.

⁸⁴² Meiser, J.W. *Idem*, p. 83

⁸⁴³ Meiser, J.W. *Idem*

⁸⁴⁴ Posen, B. *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986. p.13; Cohen, E.A. *Supreme Command Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime*, New York: Free Press, 2002. p. 33

⁸⁴⁵ Meiser, J.W. *Idem*

Strategic thinking in the field of security and defence today is equally threatened and suppressed on one side by the political voluntarism, irrelevant and arbitrary daily political influence and, on the other hand, by the strategic surrogates that are offered in the form of simplicity and uniformity, linearity, symmetry and mathematical accuracy.

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ZAŠTO JE STRATEGIJA IZAŠLA IZ BEZBEDNOSTI I ODBRANE?

Stjepan Domjančić*
Ministarstvo odbrane Republike Hrvatske,
Republika Hrvatska

Apstrakt: Suprotno utisku da je interesovanje za strateška pitanja odbrane i bezbednosti povećano; da su državne institucije, oružane snage, međunarodne organizacije i slični entiteti sve više uključeni u konceptualizaciju strategije bezbednosti i odbrane, ovaj rad pokazuje da je suština zapravo suprotna. U toku je bekstvo od strateškog nivoa razmatranja problema. Ova tendencija je dobro prepoznata analizom koncepata vezanih za strategiju bezbednosti i odbrane. Pojam asimetričnog rata je toliko ambivalentan da postaje neupotrebljiv, a situacija je još apsurdnija u konceptu hibridnog rata. Pojmovi su postali sredstvo legitimizacije, političke klasifikacije, a ne analitičkih alata. Različiti izrazi se ne koriste za razlikovanje između različitih fenomena, da ih preciznije opisuju i objašnjavaju, već da naprave određenu politički obeleženu pojavu koju treba da tretiramo sa stanovišta države i društva.

Pošto pitanja odbrane i bezbednosti počinju dominirati u javnom i političkom diskursu, naučni, stručni i kritički pristup ovim temama se smanjuje. Odbrana i bezbednost definitivno postaju svakodnevna politička pitanja i time postaju problematična za vojne profesionalce. Strateško razmišljanje u oblasti bezbednosti i odbrane jednako je ugroženo i potisnuto s jedne strane političkim volonterizmom, nebitnim i proizvoljnim dnevnim političkim uticajem, a sa druge strane, strateškim surogatom ponuđenog u vidu jednostavnosti, linearnosti, simetrije i matematičke tačnosti.

Ključne reči: strategija, bezbednost, odbrana, simetrična borba, hibridni rat.

* stjepan.domjancic@gmail.com, stjepan.domjancic@morh.hr

АРМИЯ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СОЮЗА – АДЕКВАТНЫЙ ОТВЕТ НА АСИММЕТРИЧНЫЕ УГРОЗЫ СОВРЕМЕННОСТИ?

Владлена Тихова^{*}
МГИМО Университет МИД России
Российская Федерация

Милинко Врачар^{**}
Институт стратегических исследований, Университет обороны,
Республика Сербия

Аннотация: В статье анализируются перспективы создания европейской армии. Дается определение асимметричным угрозам и рассматривается как ЕС может справляться с этими проблемами. Представлена краткая история становления общей внешней политики и политики безопасности. Авторы рассуждают о современном положении дел в Евросоюзе и насколько в данный момент реальна перспектива формирования европейской армии. Подводятся итоги саммита Евросоюза, который прошел в июне 2017 года и анализируются события в Каталонии, Испании (октябрь 2017 года). Делается вывод о том, что сейчас, особенно после намерения Великобритании выйти из Евросоюза, создаются условия для продвижения единой оборонной политика Союза и каким образом можно решать асимметричные угрозы.

Ключевые слова: асимметричная угроза, Европейский союз, Германия, Брекзит, Каталония, терроризм, военная политика, оборона, европейская армия.

Европейский союз во втором десятилетии XXI века играет большую роль на международной политической арене. В Евросоюз входит 28 государств с населением примерно в 508 млн человек. По численности населения ЕС превышает население таких государств как США, Россия, Япония, Бразилия. Евросоюз обладает огромной территорией, площадь которой составляет около 4 324 728 км. Союз имеет сложную институциональную структуру, которая взаимодействует как на наднациональном, так и на межгосударственном уровнях.

^{*} grand_mgimo@mail.ru

^{**} milinko.vracar@mod.gov.rs

Европейский союз является экономическим гигантом и весомым экономическим игроком в международной торговле. Евросоюз также является субъектом международного публичного права, что дает ему полномочия на участие в международных отношениях и на заключение международных договоров. Европейский союз имеет свои представительства в различных международных организациях, таких как ООН, ВТО и т.д.⁸⁴⁶

Помимо того, что Европейский союз представляет собой огромное экономическое интеграционное объединение, организация является центром политической силы, которая реализуется благодаря проведению общей внешней политики и политики безопасности. Эту сферу деятельности «отцы основатели Европейского союза» стали развивать еще до подписания Европейского объединения угля и стали в 1951 году [Тихова, 2015]. Сразу после Второй мировой войны, западными странами был создан Западный союз, позднее переименованный в Западноевропейский союз (ЗЕС). Однако он оставался в тени у основанной в 1949 году Организации Североатлантического договора (НАТО) и деятельность ЗЕС скорее была формальной. Сторонниками развития военной интеграции в рамках Евросоюза выступали, прежде всего, такие европейские страны как Франция и Германия.⁸⁴⁷

Начало политического сотрудничества было заложено в 1970-х годах с созданием системы Европейского политического сотрудничества (ЕПС). Она функционировала до подписания Маастрихтского договора (1992 г), в соответствии с которым было и объявлено о формировании Общей внешней политики и политики безопасности (ОВПБ) [Тихова, 2015]. В договоре впервые были сформулированы цели ОВПБ; учреждены новые виды сотрудничества - согласование общей позиции (государства члены были обязаны приводить свои национальные политики в соответствие общей позиции, а также придерживаться общей позиции на международных конференциях и в международных организациях) и процедура совместных действий (Совет ЕС получил полномочия определять сферу совместных действий при выработке позиций и деятельности государств Евросоюза). Не без внимания остался и Западноевропейский союз. Он был признан «оборонительным

⁸⁴⁶ См Тихова В. Регулирование внешнеполитической деятельности Европейского союза: от Маастрихта до Лиссабона // Право и управление XXI век, № 3(36), 2015. С. 170.

⁸⁴⁷ Стоить вспомнить знаменитый план премьер-министра Р. Плевена об идее создания Европейского оборонительного сообщества в 1952 году. Идея переросла в Договор, который был подписан Францией, ФРГ, Италией, Бельгией, Люксембургом и Нидерландами, однако, так и не вступил в силу.

компонентом» Евросоюза и стал ответственным за осуществление решений и действий ЕС, имеющих оборонное значение.⁸⁴⁸ Одним словом, Маастрихтский договор имел большое значение для политической и военной интеграции стран Евросоюза. [Тихова, 2015]. Евросоюз стал своего рода «мягкой силой» и проводил миротворческие операции по всему миру. Военные операции ЕС были проведены в Македонии (март-декабрь 2003) (CONCORDIA), Демократической Республике Конго (июнь-сентябрь 2003) (ARTEMIS), Боснии и Герцеговине (декабрь 2004) (ALTEA), Демократической Республике Конго (2006) (EUFOR RD CONGO); первая военно-морская операция ЕС против сомалийских пиратов прошла в 2010 (Atalanta). ЕС проводит гражданские миссии: в содействии обеспечения правопорядка («полицейские миссии»), помощь в становлении и укреплении судебной системы («правовое государство»), развития управленческих структур («гражданская администрация»), защите гражданского населения («гражданская оборона»). Полицейские миссии проходили в Конго (EUPOL Kinshasa), Македонии (PROXIMA), на палестинских территориях (EUPOL COPPS), миссии «правовое государство» в Грузии (EUJUST Themis), Ираке (EUJUST LEX) и др.

Для выполнения своих политических и военных идеи и амбиций Евросоюз создавал большой арсенал практических инструментов, чтобы, в конечном счете, стать полноценной военной организацией.

Так, в 1999 года на саммите Евросоюза в Хельсинки было решено создать к 2003 г. потенциал, позволяющий в двухмесячный срок развернуть военный контингент численностью 60 тыс. человек (т.н.«корпус быстрого развертывания»), способный к самостоятельным действиям по выполнению всего спектра «Петерсбергских задач».⁸⁴⁹

С 2000 года функционируют новые структуры ЕС - Комитет по политике и безопасности (для согласований по ВП и военным вопросам) и Военный комитет (в составе начальников главных военных штабов стран-участниц).

⁸⁴⁸ Тем не менее, создатели Договора о Европейском союзе пошли на ,своего рода, компромисс, который мог бы устроить как сторонников «атлантистов», так и «европеистов» ЗЕС был признан с одной стороны, военным компонентом ЕС, а с другой - средством укрепления европейской опоры в Североатлантическом союзе. Подобное двойственное положение ЗЕС с одной стороны было компромиссом, а с другой - источником споров стран Евросоюза при обсуждении дальнейшего формирования политического и военного сотрудничества.

⁸⁴⁹ Петерсбергские задачи: гуманитарные акции или меры по эвакуации; меры, направленные на сохранение мира; задачи боевых групп в ситуации кризисного управления, включая меры по восстановлению контроля.

В 2009 году был введен пост верховного представителя Союза по иностранным делам и политике безопасности - основной координатор и представитель общей внешней политики и политики безопасности Европейского союза. В настоящее время пост верховного представителя Союза по иностранным делам и политике безопасности занимает Федерика Могерини. Госпожа Могерини, представитель Италии, занимает этот пост с 1 ноября 2014 года.

Также была создана Европейская служба внешнеполитической деятельности (ЕСВД) — уникальное ведомство Европейского союза, которое приступило к выполнению своих задач с 1 декабря 2010 года. ЕСВД выполняет роль Министерства иностранных дел и дипломатического корпуса на уровне Евросоюза. Служба находится в подчинении Верховного представителя по иностранным делам и политике безопасности и содействует ему в области полномочий. Военный штаб ЕС также является частью Европейской службы внешнеполитической деятельности.

Страны-члены ЕС имеют свои собственные дипломатические представительства, в дополнение к общим делегациям ЕС. С другой стороны в дополнение к дипломатическим представительствам третьих стран Европейская Комиссия имеет собственные представительства в каждом из стран-членов ЕС. Там, где делегации ЕС не приняли полные обязанности по Лиссабонскому договору, национальное посольство государства-председателя Совета Европейского союза выполняет функции представителя общей внешней политики и политики безопасности, а делегации ЕС (ранее Комиссии) представляют только Европейскую Комиссию.

Относительно недавно, в марте 2015 года председатель Еврокомиссии Жан-Клод Юнкер заявил о том, что Европейскому союзу необходимо создать собственную армию как инструмент отстаивания интересов Европы в мире. «Общая европейская армия показала бы миру, что между странами – членами ЕС никогда больше не будет войны. Такая армия помогла бы нам осуществлять общую внешнюю политику и политику безопасности», – считает он.

Войска НАТО не могут справиться с этой задачей по ряду объективных причин, говорит он. «Не все члены альянса являются членами Европейского союза. И речь тут идет не о конкуренции с НАТО, а о том, чтобы сделать Европу сильнее», – сказал Юнкер. И совершенно очевидно, что в ближайшем будущем США откажутся от обеспечения безопасности Евросоюза.

Господин Юнкер также говорил о создании европейского оборонительного союза, которому в новых реалиях современного мира нужно уделять особое значение.⁸⁵⁰

Очень любопытным представляется заявление министра обороны касательно отношений Германии и России: «Мы знаем, что в настоящее время Россия больше не является нашим партнером, однако нам следует обращать внимание на то, чтобы Россия не стала нашим врагом. Мы хотим решать наши проблемы за столом переговоров, но при этом иметь внутренний стержень, хотим защиты международного права и прав человека».

В июне 2016 года Федерикой Могерини была представлена Глобальная стратегия Евросоюза.⁸⁵¹ Можно сказать, что в этом документе отражены претензии Евросоюза в качестве значимого глобального игрока в сфере политики и безопасности. В глобальной стратегии говорится, что необходима большая автономия от Вашингтона в области обороны [Громько, 2016]. Совершенно очевидно, что став более независимым от США и после выхода Великобритании из структур НАТО (о чем будет сказано ниже), ЕС становится огромной политической и военной силой, совсем недалеко от границ России, что не может не вызывать озабоченность с нашей стороны. Европа готовится стать более независимой в области обороны и укреплять свои возможности и благодаря позиции нового президента США Дональда Трампа. Скорее всего, Америка будет в большей степени концентрироваться на своих внутренних проблемах и вопросы европейской безопасности отходят в ее приоритетах на дальний план.

Более того, выход Великобритании из Евросоюза открывает перед ним новые возможности в построении своих независимых оборонных структур. Ведь известно, что Лондон всегда был против слишком большой самостоятельности Брюсселя в этом вопросе. После выхода из ЕС одного из лидеров союза, европейцы обретают большую независимость и свободу для обеспечения собственной обороны.

На прошедшем в июне 2017 года саммите Европейского союза в Брюсселе был сделан очередной шаг к созданию единой европейской армии. Для повышения эффективности разработок и покупки военной техники европейские лидеры договорились создать европейскую систему оборонного сотрудничества, которая будет заключаться в том, что члены

⁸⁵⁰ <https://lenta.ru/news/2016/11/09/juncker/>.

⁸⁵¹ https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/6649/predstavlena-globalnaya-strategiya-es-po-vneshney-politike-i-politike-bezopasnosti_ru.

будут углублять сотрудничество в разработке новых видов оружия и военной техники. В то же время, все закупки техники в настоящее время осуществляются только на национальном уровне. На саммите обсуждалось создание единого европейского оборонно-промышленного комплекса и оборонного заказа. Таким образом, европейская система оборонного сотрудничества повысит эффективность разработки и приобретения военной техники. "Саммит ЕС сделал сегодня исторический шаг вперед в плане развития европейской обороны", - прокомментировал это решение президент Франции Эмманюэль Макрон. "Впервые за долгие годы ЕС принял реальные меры в сфере оборонного сотрудничества", - продолжил он.⁸⁵²

Эти решения оживляют застойные процессы в области политики обороны Евросоюза. Ведь созданные европейские силы быстрого реагирования так и не были использованы, и разногласия относительно военной политики касались вопросов финансирования. Сейчас, в бюджете планируется выделить отдельной строкой «расходы на оборону», и по некоторым оценкам к 2020 году расходы на исследования и разработку вооружений составят 90 млн. евро.

До настоящего времени все отношения в области военного сотрудничества в Европе осуществлялись на двустороннем или региональном уровне. По определенным данным было около 400 проектов, которые не были связаны между собой. Тем не менее, стали появляться совместные проекты. К примеру, можно назвать программу снабжения боеприпасов для противотанковых систем, проводимую Эстонией, Латвией, Литвой, Чехией и Польшей.⁸⁵³

После саммита Евросоюза действительно можно говорить об улучшении возможностей для сотрудничества членов ЕС в области обороны. Так, ситуация с безопасностью континента в свете борьбы с международным терроризмом с каждым годом ухудшается и вынуждает европейские страны расширять сотрудничество в военной сфере и по вопросам безопасности. Резко возросло количество террористических атак. Так, за 2016-107 годы в Европе произошли теракты в Бельгии, во Франции, в Германии, в Швеции, в Великобритании. В некоторых странах теракты произошли не один раз. Европейские лидеры понимают, что защитить себя они могут только сами. В настоящее время изменилось отношение к проблеме военного

⁸⁵² <http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/4359523>

⁸⁵³ <https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2017/07/04/bryussel-byt-li-ne-byt-evroarmii-vot-v-chem-vopros>

сотрудничества со стороны европейских тяжеловесов: Франции, Германии, Италии и Испании. Также не стоит забывать и об укреплении позиций сторонников углубления сотрудничества в связи с выходом Великобритании из Евросоюза, поскольку Лондон был одним из главных противников создания евроармии и расширения кооперации в этой сфере на континенте и видел в них конкуренцию НАТО.

Безусловно, вопросы безопасности и обороны являются крайне чувствительными и их практически невозможно решать в одиночку. В 2016 году, Европа, не учитывая Великобританию, потратила 1,32% суммарного ВВП на оборону, что намного меньше того, что потратили США.

Основным двигателем развития сотрудничества Евросоюза в военной сфере, безусловно, является Германия. В интересах Германии было бы создание евроармии под ее командованием. Так, в мае 2017 года Германия объявила об интеграции вооруженных сил с силами Румынии и Чехии. Конечно, чешские и румынские армии не вольются в бундесвер и не перейдут под командование немецких генералов. В ближайшие несколько месяцев Прага и Бухарест «делегируют» в бундесвер по одной бригаде: румынская 81-я механизированная бригада присоединится к дивизии быстрого реагирования бундесвера, а чешская 4-я бригада быстрого реагирования, находившаяся в Афганистане и Косово и считающаяся одной из самых боеспособных частей чешской армии, вольется в 10-ю дивизию бундесвера. До этого, к немецким вооруженным силам были присоединены две голландские бригады.⁸⁵⁴ Все это говорит о том, что Германия больше чем все остальные страны в Европе готова приступить к практическим шагам по построению настоящей европейской армии и более того, намерена возглавить ее.

Те мне менее, Евросоюз сталкивается с огромным количеством проблем и угроз. Что касается так называемых асимметричных угроз, то в рамках Евросоюза можно выделить три категории подобных угроз: 1) Сепаратизм; 2) Терроризм; 3) Миграционный кризис. Мы бы хотели подробно остановиться на двух кризисных моментах для Евросоюза: на недавно прошедшем референдуме о независимости Каталонии и на выходе Великобритании из Евросоюза.

Одним из ярчайших проявлений сепаратизма произошло совсем недавно, когда Каталония (независимое сообщество Испании) заявила о своем намерении отделиться от Испании. Общеизвестный факт, что

⁸⁵⁴ <https://detroit7days.com/germaniya-sobiraet-armiyu-es/>

Каталония является автономным сообществом в Испании, в котором проживает около 7 млн 500 тыс человек. Президентом сообщества является Карлес Пучдемон. Эта территория имеет давние сепаратистские корни и несколько раз пыталась провозгласить свою независимость от Испании. В апреле 2014 года мадридские власти запретили проводить референдум об отделении от Испании. 1 октября 2017 года каталонские власти в одностороннем порядке провели референдум о статусе сообщества, который показал, что около 90 % жителей выступают за независимость своего региона от Испании. 15 октября 2017 года Пучдемон выступил перед местным парламентом и попросил своих коллег приостановить их решение о приобретении независимости Каталонии. Многие полагают, что Пучдемон упустил шанс о независимости Каталонии. Внутри самого сообщества существуют разные мнения относительно статуса этого региона. Развертывается борьба между каталонскими партиями по поводу этого вопроса. Тем не менее, Мадрид уже выступил с жестким заявлением о том, что Пучдемон должен дать ясный и предельно четкий ответ относительно того, провозгласила ли автономия свою независимость или нет. Многие европейские эксперты полагают, что отделение Каталонии от Испании может обернуться не только экономической катастрофой, но и разрушить Европу. Это мнение экс-премьера Франции, уроженца Барселоны Мануэля Вальса. "Необходимо предупредить каталонских лидеров и самих каталонцев: отделение от Испании означает выход из Европейского союза и из зоны евро. Это обернется экономической катастрофой, которая уже началась вместе с закрытием представительств некоторых компаний...Этот путь означает разрушение Испании, разрушение Европы. Это противоречит истории и идентичности Каталонии. Сила этого региона, его культуры и экономики заключается в том, что он является одновременно каталонским, испанским и европейским. Если вы отнимите один из этих элементов, вы потеряете часть идентичности» - написал Вальс в одном испанском еженедельнике.⁸⁵⁵

Для Испании, события, происходящие в Каталонии, явились самым большим кризисом за последнее время. Выход Каталонии из Испании также бы сильно повлиял на Европейский союз и только усилил сепаратистские тенденции внутри Европы. А территорий, которые хотели бы обрести независимость в Старом Свете очень много (к примеру, в Бельгии, во Франции, Греции, Чехии, Швеции, Польше и

⁸⁵⁵ <https://ria.ru/world/20171015/1506856084.html>

др.). Таким образом, сепаратистские движения могут охватить всю Европу, что безусловно очень сильно ослабит и регион, и сам Евросоюз.

Выше в статье уже анализировались последствия выхода Великобритании из Европейского союза. Стоит добавить еще несколько важных моментов. Во-первых, после Брексита, ЕС потерял основной глобальный финансовый центр в Лондоне. Больше подобных финансовых центров в ЕС нет. К примеру, Франкфурт – это сугубо региональный центр, который нельзя сравнивать с Лондоном. Во-вторых, Евросоюз становится все больше и больше немецким проектом. Германия становится негласным лидером, и в последующем, в случае создания единой европейской армии, командовать этой армией, скорее всего, будет Германия. Таким образом Евросоюз все в большей степени становится так называемым “немецким проектом”. В-третьих, Великобритания имеет верных союзников внутри Евросоюза. Вполне вероятно, что в след за Великобританией, Союз покинут еще несколько стран, что также может ослабить Евросоюз.

Евросоюз все в большей степени оказывается в поле влияния асимметричных угроз. Хватит ли у него сил противостоять им? Скорее всего, да. Ведь, несмотря на все кризисы и проблемы, которые охватили союз за прошедший период, можно сказать, что в настоящее время кризис ЕС остался позади. Так полагает председатель Европейской комиссии Жан-Клод Юнкер, который выступил в Страсбурге перед депутатами Европейского парламента с традиционным ежегодным посланием 13 сентября 2017 года.⁸⁵⁶ Юнкер в своей речи обрисовал основные направления работы Европейского союза в краткосрочной перспективе. Евросоюз будет делать ставку на продвижение свободной торговли. Борьба с изменением климата будет играть одну из главных ролей в будущей деятельности ЕС. Безусловно, будут созданы механизмы противодействия кибератакам. В этих целях предполагается создание Агентства по кибербезопасности. Особое внимание Евросоюз будет уделять совершенствованию миграционной политики. Конечно же, оборонная составляющая также будет развиваться в рамках Общей внешней политики и политики безопасности. И сейчас у Евросоюза есть реальный шанс создания единой европейской армии. Евросоюз имеет огромный потенциал, институциональную базу и средства для противостояния асимметричным угрозам. В будущем, скорее всего,

⁸⁵⁶ Jean-Claude Juncker's State of the Union Address 2017. European Commission – Speech. Brussels, 13 September 2017. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.html

Европе удастся преодолеть многие из тех проблем, с которыми сейчас сталкивается союз. Тандем между Францией и Германией в рамках Евросоюза только усиливается и эти страны, которые всегда были европеистами и движущей силой европейской интеграции не позволят этому европейскому проекту потерпеть фиаско.

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VOJSKA EVROPSKE UNIJE - DA LI JE TO ADEKVATAN ODGOVOR NA ASIMETRIČNE PRETNJE?

Vladlena Tikhova *

MGIMO-University under the MFA of Russia
Russian Federation

Milinko Vračar **

Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Univerzitet odbrane,
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: U članku se razmatraju različite perspektive stvaranja evropske armije. Asimetrični tretmani su definisani i analizirani. Članak takođe obuhvata istoriju stvaranja zajedničke spoljne i bezbednosne politike. Autor razmatra trenutnu situaciju u EU i koliko je moguća mogućnost vojske EU. Autor sumira samit EU, koji je održan u junu 2017. godine, kao i događaje u Kataloniji (Španija) u oktobru 2017. godine. Moguće je zaključiti da će, nakon što Velika Britanija napusti EU, biti stvarno stvorena šansa da se napravi zajednička odbrambena politika kako bi EU mogla da se suoči sa asimetričnim pretnjama.

Ključne reči: asimetrična pretnja, Evropska unija, Nemačka, Bregzit, Katalonija, terorizam, separatizam, vojna politika, odbrana, evropska vojska.

* grand_mgimo@mail.ru

** milinko.vracar@mod.gov.rs

ЭЛЕКТРОННЫЙ СМИ МЕЖДУ ТЕРРОРИЗМОМ И ИНФОРМАЦИОННОМ СУВЕРЕНИТЕТЕ*

Дарина Григорова**

Исторический факультет Софийского университета
“Св. Климент Охридски”, София,
Болгария

Аннотация: В информационный век развития Интернета, стратегия "информационного суверенитета" является одной из первоочередных приоритетов для Российской Федерации. Это отражено в Доктрине по информационной безопасности (2016 года) и в Военной доктрине (2014 года). Данная статья раскрывает роль электронных сми в борьбе за идеи и понимание образов в национальном информационном пространстве. Автор анализирует российскую духовную, кибер и государственную политику в области информационных войн. Мы все выступаем против терроризма, но мы делим на разные категории людей: на террористов или повстанцев. Это зависит от точки зрения.

Ключевые слова: электронные сми, терроризм, информационный суверенитет.

Террор – это инструмент войны в мирное время, будь то “гибридной” – ассиметричной, или “холодной” – симметричной, в зависимости от полифонической политической “реальности”, которая не меняет основной цели – подчинение массового сознания посредством страха. Отсюда следует и добровольное согласие на отказ от личной свободы опять-таки в мирное время – «Патриотический акт», принятый в Соединенных Штатах после 11 сентября.

Образ террора в средствах массовой информации также является инструментом той же войны, поскольку она ведется широкомасштабно на ментальном уровне, на уровне смыслов, создается в умах, прежде, чем перейти к горячей фазе военного конфликта или к холодной фазе полного политического контроля над личной и общественной свободой.

Если террор нацелен на эмоции, то СМИ должны вернуть общественное сознание на путь разума. Патетические “ответы”: “мы не

* Статья является редакцией доклада на международной конференции “Терроризм и электронные СМИ”, София, 26–29 сентября 2017 г.

** dgrigorova@mail.ru

боимся” на фоне медвежат, свечей и шариков с политиками, взявшимися за руки, культивируют инфантильную эмоциональную реакцию, которая приобретает в ЕС хронические измерения.

На СМИ лежит значительная ответственность, поскольку они могут с постоянством воспитывать рациональное поведение посредством анализа конкретных политических, идеологических, экономических и геополитических целей террористического акта и, посредством популяризации навыков самозащиты обыкновенного гражданина как на войне, чтобы не было войны – по израильскому опыту.

Электронным СМИ присущи скорость и эффективность, позволяющие действовать через социальные сети. Их скорость является положительным качеством, однако продолжительность их кратковременна, поскольку в электронном пространстве накапливаются, опять–таки быстро, бесчисленные материалы, что является неизбежным минусом. Внимание аудитории не удерживается, а серфирует по заголовкам, если к этому прибавить и зависимость от Гугл, алгоритм которого является избирательным при выборе материала, который будет отображаться на первой странице и который будет заглушен. А кто контролирует Гугл? Ведь он является корпоративным инструментом, а не национальным. Не случайно Китай имеет зеркальные, но свои аналоги и Гугл, и всех социальных сетей, и Ютуб – ввиду их воздействия на сознание на национальном уровне – там создано нечто вроде электронного карантина. Россия и ЕС не могут позволить себе китайскую модель виртуальной автаркии и отсюда вытекают их общие проблемы в отражении террора во всех его формах.

Средства массовой информации также являются корпоративными или национальными, что влияет на редактирование контента, на образы террора и антитеррора. Поскольку террор является инструментом, направленным непосредственно против государства, а не против транснациональной корпорации, важна медийная политика государственных СМИ.

КТО ТАКИЕ ТЕРРОРИСТЫ?

Все выступают против терроризма, однако существуют различные точки зрения по поводу того, кого считать террористами. Отражая террор, СМИ неизбежно принимают сторону уже при определении террористов. В случае с Донбассом и двумя непризнанными республиками, с точки зрения России, ополченцы и российские добровольцы, которые им помогают, действуют при самозащите от Киева после майдана 2013 г. Террористами являются добровольцы из

АТО, стреляющие по гражданским гражданам в ДНР и ЛНР. АТО является представителем государственного террора после переворота.

Позиция Украины противоположна – ополчи – это террористы и сепаратисты вместе с писателем Захаром Прилепиным, который является заместителем командира батальона в ДНР, вместе с режиссером Владимиром Меньшовым, передавшим деньги в помощь Донецку, за что был обвинен в “пособничестве террористам”⁸⁵⁷. И наоборот – российский актер, погибший как доброволец в АТО – Анатолий Пашинин⁸⁵⁸, является героем для Киева, однако террористом для Донбасса.

Существует и третья точка зрения, дистанцированная, представленная Людмилой Улицкой, которая отказывается от уточнения понятий, объявляет их лживыми: “Терминология «сепаратисты, защитники, повстанцы, боевики» — все эти слова лживы, ничто не отражает реальности”⁸⁵⁹.

Отличается и государственная реакция в России и Украине – Служба безопасности Украины возбудила уголовное дело против Захара Прилепина за “участие в террористической организации” и за “финансирование терроризма”⁸⁶⁰. Тогда как Россия не возбудила дела с подобными обвинениями в отношении Анатолия Пашинина. 16 января 2017 г. Украина подала иск против России в ООН, ссылаясь на две международные конвенции: “О Борьбе с финансированием терроризма” и “О ликвидации всех форм расовой дискриминации”.

Иск был отклонен, однако результат показателен. В Украине любой пророссийский активист является террористом; по мнению Киева, терроризм имеет национальное лицо, и это лицо русское. В электронной версии это выражается и наличием сайта “Миротворец”, на котором государство официально стимулирует доношничество, в открытом

⁸⁵⁷ Режиссер фильма “Москва слезам не верит” передал миллион рублей боевикам “ДНР”. – Униан. 05. 04. 2017. <https://www.unian.net/war/1861711-rejisser-filma-moskva-slezam-verit-peredal-million-rublej-boevikam-dnr-video.html>

⁸⁵⁸ Бывший российский актер воюет в АТО на стороне Украины. – Униан, 24.08.2017 <https://www.unian.net/war/2098314-byivshiy-rossiyskiy-akter-voyuet-v-ato-na-storone-ukrainyi-jurnalist-foto.html>

⁸⁵⁹ Людмила Улицкая. В этой войне никто не может победить. Интервью Ирины Славинской в “Украинской правде”. 12.09.2014. <http://inosmi.ru/sngbaltia/20140912/222952514.html>

⁸⁶⁰ Служба безопасности Украины возбудила уголовное дело в отношении российского писателя Захара Прилепина по статьям «участие в деятельности террористической организации» (ч. 1 ст. 258-3 УК Украины) и «финансирование терроризма» (ч. 1 ст. 258-5). Об этом сообщила представитель ведомства Елена Гитлянская. – Медуза, 16.02.2017. <https://meduza.io/news/2017/02/16/sbu-zavela-na-zahara-prilepina-ugolovnoe-delo-o-terrorizme>

доступе размещаются полные персональные данные украинских и российских граждан с пророссийской позицией.

Образ террора в СМИ имеет и исторический контекст: “сталинский террор” – разработанная украинскими СМИ тема Голодомора, представленного как национальный геноцид, а не как социальный – против богатых зерновых районов СССР, среди жертв которого были русские, казахи, кавказские народы, казаки и др. Почему бы России не вернуть образ “Молодой гвардии”, но с истинным виновником жестокого убийства молодых антифашистов во время Второй мировой войны – не немцев, как это описано в романе Фадеева, а украинских националистов. На сайте МИД РФ уже имеются рассекреченные документы по ОУН и УПА⁸⁶¹, но они лишь промелькнули в СМИ и остаются для специалистов, тогда как украинская точка зрения о Голодоморе является постоянной темой для СМИ, а также темой фотовыставок, путешествующих по Европе. Подход различен.

Проблема возникает и из-за отсутствия четкого определения «законного вооруженного сопротивления», что объясняет расхождения в обвинениях в терроризме и в отношении Ближнего Востока. Сирийская точка зрения гласит, что государство является “жертвой международной террористической войны”⁸⁶². Относительно “умеренной оппозиции” Асаду нет единодушия между США и Россией, отсюда и неуточненные списки “умеренных” организаций – для одних это террористы, для других – партнеры, что не мешает иметь партнера-террориста, однако важен образ и легитимность, когда речь идет о СМИ.

Российские СМИ могут популяризировать результаты регионального сотрудничества против терроризма в рамках ЕврАзЭС. Если экономические показатели ЕврАзЭС не в состоянии создать привлекательный образ, то роль сообщества как пространства безопасности может и будет расти – и с точки зрения геополитики, с учетом опасности со стороны Центральной Азии и Южного Кавказа, и с точки зрения внутренней политики. Вот возможный положительный образ, который российские СМИ могут культивировать особенно на фоне неспособности ЕС справиться с террором. Россия и Беларусь как “экспортер безопасности”. Казахстан под прицелом исламистов, а

⁸⁶¹ На сайте МИД России размещен документальный материал “Деятельность ОУН-УПА”, подготовленный из рассекреченных архивов. 05.03.2014. http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/maps/ua/-/asset_publisher/ktn0ZLTvbbs3/content/id/72162

⁸⁶² Ближний Восток: когда наступит завтра? 27-28 февраля 2017. Валдай. http://ru.valdaiclub.com/multimedia/video/bv-2017-sessiya-ii-terrorizm-regionalnye-izmereniya-globalnoy-ugrozy/?sphrase_id=17627

Киргизия тем более сложно вписать в эту картину, но русско-беларуской зоне безопасности – это весьма большое пространство. Одна сторона, на примере Сирии, другая сторона – Россия как пространство мирного сосуществования с мусульманским сообществом, в противовес европейскому, где существуют мусульманские гетто, тогда как в России православные и мусульмане живут вместе. Это готовый образ, который может быть представлен всему миру, и который российские СМИ могут поддерживать особенно в противовес русофобской кампании Запада, которая основана на невежестве в отношении России.

ИМЕЕТ ЛИ ТЕРРОРИЗМ НАЦИОНАЛЬНОСТЬ? ИМЕЕТ ЛИ РЕЛИГИОЗНУЮ ПРИНАДЛЕЖНОСТЬ?

СМИ либо отвечают на этот вопрос, либо умалчивают. В обоих случаях принимают сторону, что неизбежно.

Официальная позиция России, озвученная Сергеем Лавровым, заключается в том, что терроризм не имеет ни национального, ни религиозного происхождения⁸⁶³.

Российская общественность, которая может себе позволить недипломатичность, особенно среди либеральных кругов, придерживается иной точки зрения.

Андрей Кураев скептически настроен по отношению к тому, что молчанием обходится национальная и религиозная принадлежность террористов, поскольку «террористическая проповедь – это болезнь уже всего исламского сообщества»⁸⁶⁴.

⁸⁶³ Пресс-конференция С. Лаврова и Э. Абдылдаева. 04.04.2017. Сергей Лавров: «Согласен с тем, что сказал мой коллега и друг Э. Б. Абдылдаев – у террористов и у терроризма нет национальности. Недопустимо пытаться искать связь с происхождением человека, его религиозными убеждениями». – МИД России, официальный аккаунт в твиттере https://mobile.twitter.com/MID_RF/status/849223678860685312

⁸⁶⁴ Андрей Кураев: Телеинъекции на тему «у терроризма нет национальности и религии», каждый раз с предсказуемой очевидностью вспыхивающие после очередного теракта, просто глупы. Не инопланетяне же в конце концов взрывают наши самолеты и школы! С этим «политкорректным» тезисом можно было бы согласиться, если бы верующие мировых религий по очереди устраивали теракты. То буддисты захватят школу и расстреляют в ней детей... То даосы взорвут самолет... То христиане подорвут кинотеатр... Вот в этом случае можно было бы ограничиться повторением банальности о том, что у каждого народа есть право иметь своих подлецов... Но ведь все очевидно не так. [...] террористическая проповедь – это болезнь уже всего исламского сообщества. И отчего-то если в России, Казахстане или Узбекистане обнаруживают центры подготовки террористов – то эти центры чаще оказываются связанными с мечетями и медресе (мусульманскими семинариями), чем с клубами служебного собаководства. Андрей

Блогер Антон Носик более радикален: “ислам — это религия, прикрываясь которой, можно легально призвать единоверцев в России к финансированию терроризма”, по поводу объявленного США джихада Талгатом Таджуддином, верховным муфтием и председателем Центрального духовного управления мусульман в связи с войной в Ираке 2003 г. Последний джихад российских мусульман датируется 1941 г.⁸⁶⁵ После разразившегося скандала заместитель муфтия пояснил, что речь шла о “духовном джихаде” – оказании гуманитарной, а не военной помощи Ираку⁸⁶⁶.

СУЩЕСТВУЕТ ЛИ ИДЕОЛОГИЯ ТЕРРОРИЗМА?

Террорист может “не иметь национальности” в качестве стимула для террора, но всегда имеет идеологию. Исламизм - это идеология. Более того, существует перелив из одной идеологии в другую – любопытно, что есть добровольцы в ИГ, которые от радикально левых анархистских взглядов и почитания Петра Кропоткина перевоплощаются в осознанных исламистов с подчеркнутым пиететом к строительству социальной справедливости на основе шариата. Здесь мы упираемся в роль электронных СМИ – следует ли разьяснять эти тонкости для предотвращения “идеологической заразы”, или наоборот – любой материал, будет рассматриваться как пропаганда исламистской идеологии, как это произошло с интервью Павла Никулина в *The New Times* в марте 2017 г. с россиянином-джихадистом из Сирии и бывшим анархистом из Калужской области?

Некоторые исследователи с Северного Кавказа считают, что традиционализм местных элит как внутреннее явление также является идеологемой, не менее опасной для России, чем исламизм – внешний информационный продукт, поскольку ведет к “культурному

Кураев. У террористов нет национальности? 20.04.2013. <https://diak-kuraev.livejournal.com/472029.html?page=30>

⁸⁶⁵ Антон Носик: “Человек, сказавший: «Мы соберем в России деньги на финансирование терроризма». Это отдельный состав в ст. 205 УК РФ! То есть ислам — это религия, прикрываясь которой, можно легально призвать единоверцев в России к финансированию терроризма”. – Трудно быть с Богом. Священник, имам, раввин и блогер Антон Носик о причинах всплеска исламского терроризма. – Дождь, 13.06.2017. https://tvrain.ru/teleshov/trudno_byt_s_bogom/anton_nosik_islam_eto_religija_prikrывajas_kot_oroj_mozhno_legalno_prizvat_k_finansirovaniju_terrorizma-437374/

⁸⁶⁶ На святой Руси и джихад – не джихад. – Коммерсант, 09.04.2003. <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/375816>

сепаратизму”. И здесь звучат упреки в адрес российских СМИ, которые романтически представляют традиционные кавказские обычаи⁸⁶⁷.

ЭЛЕКТРОННЫЕ СМИ МЕЖДУ ТЕРРОРИЗМОМ И ИНФОРМАЦИОННЫМ СУВЕРЕНИТЕТОМ

“Информационный суверенитет”, или еще – “цифровой суверенитет”, “кибербезопасность” /кибер-суверенитет/ - это термины, связанные с защитой от терроризма – как в электронном, так и в автономном режиме. Россия начала проявлять серьезный интерес к этой теме после 2014 г., когда об “информационном суверенитете” было упомянуто в официальном отчете министра связей и массовых коммуникаций Н. Никифорова В. Путину (сентябрь 2014 г.)⁸⁶⁸. Санкции также стимулировали государственную поддержку этой специфической области Постановлением правительства о поддержке импортозамещения. Однако “защита всегда дороже, чем нападение”, по словам Натальи Касперской, главы IT-компании InfoWatch, инициатора создания ассоциации “Отечественный софт”⁸⁶⁹.

“Информационный суверенитет” является более широким понятием, которое включает в себя «кибер-суверенитет», а также и термин “информационная или цифровая колонизация”⁸⁷⁰, используемый

⁸⁶⁷ Шамсуев, Магомед-Эми. “Российские СМИ преподносят такие элементы традиционной кавказской культуры, как умыкание невест, абречество и др. как нечто романтическое. А вот постоянные усилия Президента Республики Ингушетия Ю. Евкурова по примирению семей, находящихся в состоянии кровной мести, не получили должной информационной поддержки. Между тем с помощью этого традиционного института рекрутируется значительное число боевиков на СК. Необходимо понимать, что реанимация в политическом сознании населения региона традиционалистской стратегии – серьезная информационная угроза безопасности России”. – Информационная безопасность России на Северном Кавказе: проблемы и механизмы решения. – Центральная Азия и Кавказ, Т. 15, вып. 4, 2012, 110–111.

⁸⁶⁸ Рабочая встреча с Министром связи и массовых коммуникаций Николаем Никифоровым. 24 сентября 2014 года. <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46668>

⁸⁶⁹ Наталья Касперская. Мой девиз – никогда не сдаваться! – Международная жизнь, 2017, 6, 60–61.

⁸⁷⁰ Игорь Ашманов: “Каждый виток ввода новых технологий являлся этапом цифровой колонизации нашей страны. [...] Мы даром (точнее, за свои деньги), добровольно за 1990-2000 годы отдали сначала кибер-суверенитет, а потом и информационный суверенитет. Примеры Украины и Арабской весны показывают, чего это стоит. Сейчас нам под видом сияющего будущего предлагается новый этап цифровой колонизации с окончательной потерей, в том числе, финансового суверенитета”. – Игорь Ашманов. Мы добровольно отдали сначала кибер-суверенитет, а потом и информационный суверенитет. – Бизнес online. 16.08.2017. <https://m.business-gazeta.ru/article/357547>

крупным предпринимателем Игорем Ашмановым, политически связанным с Николаем Стариковым и Евгением Федоровым, экономически и семейно связанным (супруг Н. Касперской) – с IT-технологиями.

Подверглась ли Россия цифровой колонизации – это спорный вопрос, и нам предстоит наблюдать, как ей удастся защитить себя в т.н. “информационно-психологической сфере” информационной войны – аспект Доктрины информационной безопасности РФ от 5 декабря 2016 г. (Понятие “национальные интересы в информационной сфере” использовалось еще в Доктрине информационной безопасности 2000 г.⁸⁷¹).

Любопытным является тезис о том, что “информационный суверенитет” государства может представлять собой “суверенитет путем экспансии” как “продвижение собственных информационных технологий, стандартов и правил их использования, стандартов регулирования и управления в другие государства и на международно-правовой уровень”, что, однако, гарантирует “суверенитет данных” (data sovereignty)⁸⁷².

Для этой цели “информационная инфраструктура” должна находиться под контролем государства и располагаться на его территории – это заложено в качестве основного приоритета в Доктрине информационной безопасности РФ 5 декабря 2016 г.⁸⁷³. Интернет воспринимается как часть “критической инфраструктуры” – термин со многими определениями, используемый и в России, и в США с основным смыслом: “может оказывать пагубное влияние на национальную, экономическую безопасность, здоровье”⁸⁷⁴.

ВОЗМОЖЕН ЛИ “ИДЕОЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ СУВЕРЕНИТЕТ” БЕЗ ИДЕОЛОГИИ?

Некоторые исследователи информационной безопасности придерживаются трактовки “идеологического суверенитета” как части “ментального суверенитета”, для чего необходима государственная

⁸⁷¹ Сиволов, Д.Л. Новые угрозы национальному суверенитету России в сфере информационной безопасности. – Социум и власть, 2015, 6 (56), с. 83.

⁸⁷² Ефремов А.А. Формирование концепции информационного суверенитета государства. – Право. Журнал Высшей школы экономики, 2017, 1, с. 206.

⁸⁷³ Доктрина информационной безопасности Российской Федерации. – Российская газета, № 4163, 6 декабря 2016 г. <https://rg.ru/2016/12/06/doktrina-infobezobasnost-site-dok.html>

⁸⁷⁴ Алексей Солдатов. Россия и информационная безопасность. – Международная жизнь. Спецвыпуск. М., 2016, 30–31.

идеология⁸⁷⁵. Приверженцы создания новой идеологии для России, несмотря на запрет конституции, романтически настроены по отношению к советскому прошлому с идейной точки зрения. С другой стороны, они видят, что либеральная идеология Запада имеет свою видимую экспансию в российское общество и ищут идеологическую контр-защиту. Атеизм не может обойтись без духовного суррогата, каковым является идеология, отсюда и пустота, которую пытаются заполнить, но она вряд ли имеет нечто общее с “информационным суверенитетом” – поскольку разрушение происходит изнутри, добровольно, как это произошло с СССР.

Однако, если под “идеологическим суверенитетом” понимается десакрализация чужих идеологий, таких как “киберхалифат”⁸⁷⁶ сети исламистской пропаганды, угрожающих “информационному суверенитету” и национальной безопасности, то здесь уже работа электронных СМИ может достичь результатов.

“Информационный суверенитет” связан и с “цифровой дипломатией” (Digital Diplomacy), которая является серьезным направлением в общественной дипломатии США через социальные сети для прямого воздействия на широкие массы. Одним из объяснений эффективности именно американской цифровой дипломатии является то, что это представляет собой “технологический инструмент”, “воплощающий бизнес-модель с информационной политикой google, facebook, twitter и других американских компаний интернет-индустрии”. Любопытным в тактике американской “цифровой дипломатии” является создание в 2006 г. на Ближнем Востоке Команды по цифровым внешним контактам (Digital Outreach Team), предназначенной для “ведения дискуссий по вопросам внешней политики США с пользователями популярных сайтов на арабском и персидском языках, а также на урду”⁸⁷⁷. Результат этих дискуссий налицо – информационная десоверенизация.

⁸⁷⁵ “Идеологический суверенитет определяется наличием своей государственной идеологии, языка и культуры. Если государство не в состоянии иметь собственную идеологию, то обществу такой страны легко можно навязать любую чуждую культуру, что может привести к потере самого государства. Именно с потерей идеологического суверенитета начался распад такой мощной державы, как Союз Советских Социалистических Республик”. – Кучерявый, М.М. К пониманию политики модернизации национальной безопасности. – Управленческое консультирование, 2015, 11, с. 25, 27.

⁸⁷⁶ Андрей Смирнов. Современные угрозы террористического и экстремистского характера в информационной сфере. – Россия и информационная безопасность. – Международная жизнь. Спецвыпуск. М., 2016, 111–112.

⁸⁷⁷ Елена Зиновьева. Цифровая дипломатия, международная безопасность и возможности для России. – Индекс безопасности, № 1 (104), Т. 19, 2013, 213–214, 215.

Следуя цифровой дипломатии своей IT-стратегии, США готовятся в 2017 г. к созданию в Сербии “медиа-центра для борьбы с российской дезинформацией” (Balkan security network), а американские фонды планируют выкупить сербские, словенские, черногорские и боснийские телевизионные каналы⁸⁷⁸.

Здесь мы уже наблюдаем реализацию “информационного превосходства” как цели “сетевцентричной” войны – американской концепции конца 90-х. (Network Centric Warfare), которая применяется и НАТО (NATO Network Enabled Capabilities)⁸⁷⁹.

От “информационного превосходства” до использования “информационного оружия” типа “логических бомб” (logic bomb⁸⁸⁰), доставляемых при помощи электронной почты, вирусов или троянских программ, всего один шаг. Ничего удивительного, что и в РФ военная концепция связана с информационной безопасностью. В обеих доктринах – военной 2014 года, и Доктрине информационной безопасности 2016 года, наблюдаются общие положения⁸⁸¹.

Переплетение информации, суверенитет, массовое сознание и военно-информационное поле в рамках ассиметричной гибридной войны с терроризмом как ее основной инструмент превращает виртуальное пространство электронных средств массовой информации одновременно и в оружие, и в лекарство. Доза определяет яд, когда существуют стандарты, причем не двойные. Информационный яд действует медленно, притупляет чувства, объясняет мир через вражеские

⁸⁷⁸ ТАСС по данным на в. “Вечерние новости”, 14.09.2017. <http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/4561898>

⁸⁷⁹ Чимаров, С.Ю. К вопросу о сетевцентрическом формате гибридной войны XXI века. – Управленческое консультирование, 2016, 2, 97–102.

⁸⁸⁰ “Логические бомбы” – скрытые управляющие программы, которые по определенному сигналу или в установленное время осуществляют несанкционированный доступ к информации, нарушают управление информационными ресурсами либо дезорганизуют работу технических средств – Макаренко, С.И., Чуляев, И.И. Терминологический базис в области информационного противоборства. – Вопросы кибербезопасности, 2014, № 1 (2), с. 19.

⁸⁸¹ Сергей Комов: “информационное воздействие на население России, в первую очередь на молодежь, в целях размывания традиционных российских духовно-нравственных ценностей”, а также “использование информационных и коммуникационных технологий в военно-политических целях для осуществления действий, противоречащих международному праву, направленных против суверенитета, политической независимости, территориальной целостности государств и представляющих угрозу международному миру, безопасности, глобальной и региональной стабильности”. – Сергей Комов. О “сдерживании и предотвращении” в информационной сфере. – Россия и информационная безопасность. – Международная жизнь. Спецвыпуск. М., 2016, 103–104.

категории, клеймит терроризм, однако есть свои и чужие террористы – в зависимости от идеологий или бизнеса – опять-таки идеология, потребительская. В силах средств массовой информации, однако, беречь общественную совесть, не забывая о том, что “Ревность, хотящая истребить всякое зло, сама есть великое зло” (Иосиф Оптинский).

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ELEKTRONSKI MEDIJI IZMEĐU TERORIZMA I INFORMACIONOG SUVERENITETA

Darina Grigorova *

Istorijski fakultet, Univerzitet u Sofiji „St. Kliment Ohridski”
Bugarska

Apstrakt: U informacionom dobu internet eksplozije strategija „suvereniteta informacija” je prvi prioritet Ruske Federacije, opisan u Doktrini o informacionoj bezbednosti (2016) i Vojnoj doktrini (2014). Ovaj članak je fokusiran na ulogu elektronskih medija u borbi za ideje i percepciju emitovanih sadržaja u nacionalnom informacionom prostoru. Autor analizira rusku duhovnu, sajber i državnu suverenu politiku u informativnom ratu. Svi smo protiv terorizma, ali kategorizujemo različite ljude u teroriste ili u pobunjenike - to zavisi od tačke gledišta.

Ključne reči: elektronski mediji, terorizam, informativni suverenitet.

* dgrigorova@mail.ru

**SIGNIFICANCE OF HUNTINGTON'S STRATEGIC
THOUGHT ON DEVELOPMENT
OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS**

Zoran Jeftić*

Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Ivica Đorđević

Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: In spite of the fact that the military is regarded as a state institution, established in order to protect its interests, there is a burdening question in existence from antique to modern times, of whether the armed forces can pose a threat to the state itself. It is natural that the military, as one of the core institutions of the state that possesses power, must in some way be limited not to use this force contrary to the general social interests. The civil-military paradox stating that the defence of democracy, by non-democratic means is possible, has most complexly been presented in theory by Samuel Huntington. He believes that the civil-military relations are a form of national security policy, and objective civil control is the only correct form of democratic control. It is based upon the view that by separation of political and military spheres of decision-making, the highest professionalism of the soldiers can be reached and that the conditions have been created for the armed forces to become neutral and autonomous in achieving the politically-targeted goals. A critical review of Huntington's strategic thought on civilian-military relations and democratic control of the armed forces, was given by a large number of authors at the time his capital work "Soldier and State" was published, as well as in the period following the break-up of the Warsaw Treaty and more intensive engagement of the academic community with the topic of civil-military relations. The basis of critical thought was first of all, the inadequately clear classification and definition of concepts, and a small empirical and predictable value. In spite of the criticism of Huntington's contemplation, none of the theoretical frameworks was accepted in the academic and scientific community, as a valid alternative to Huntington's theory. Those works were overly simplified, focused only on certain segments

* jeficz@gmail.com

of civil-military relations, scanning the state of it without the capacity to proclaim a consistent theory.

Key words: Civil-Military Relations, Democracy Control, Military.

INTRODUCTION

Civilian-military relations have been an indispensable topic since the emergence of the armed forces, as a state institution, in the context of determining its control and socially useful use. Although Plato raised the question "sed quis custodiet ip sos custodies" (who keeps an eye on the guards)⁸⁸² 2500 years ago, it was only after the emergence of the modern armed forces as products of contemporary political systems and parliamentary democracy in the 18th and 19th centuries, the first sociological and political research of the civil-military relations aimed at the questions of who and in what way manages the military power and what the division of responsibilities of the political elite and the officers' corps is began. The rise in the theoretical determination of the notion and essence of the civilian-military relations occurred after the Second World War, as a result of raising the level, popularity, as well as the political power of the officers' corps in the victorious countries.

Although the issue of the contemporary civil-military relations is easy to articulate, socially useful answer is not one-sided, but multilayered, and enters not only the context of sociology and politics, but also includes the fields of economics, technology, ethics and military science. Such an approach has conditioned the need to harmonize the civil-military relations as a prerequisite for building a comprehensive national security policy, as well as creating conditions for the successful development of democracy. Such an approach publicly raised the following dilemma: what sort and size of the armed forces are desired, how to prevent its political abuse, and at the same time preventing the military abuse of the politics as well.

The geopolitical change following the break-up of the Warsaw Treaty and the development of the new parliamentary democracies in the Eastern Europe gave a new impetus to the consideration of the civil-military relations and the attempt to define new theories.

¹ Platon, *Država*, Beograd: Kultura, 1986.

CONCEPTUAL DETERMINATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The starting point of the discussion of the topic of the civil-military relations is its notion, since a large number of authors offered their definitions, which have many common elements, but also specificities that often cause misinterpretations.

Professor Miroslav Hadžić (2000) was the most competent of the domestic authors, who, under civilian-military relations, implies a complex framework of relations that are established between the armed forces and other social structures, stressing that these relations are the most visible in the fields of politics, economics, science and technology.⁸⁸³

Vladimir Rukavishnikov and Michael Pugh in their work argue that civil-military relations are basically determined by the relations of civilians, "persons without arms" in society, and soldiers "persons carrying weapons" that cover all forms of social life. "Civil-military relations encompass every aspect of social life, where people who are defined as soldiers or warriors have something to do with people who are defined as civilians. Scholars, however, use the term to signify different things. Some use it to define the relationship between elite actors. Others use it for cooperation between civilian and military institutions aimed at implementing solutions to military problems – which is commonly known as Civil-Military Cooperation (or CIMIC). Some use it to denote the relationship between the military and the civil society groups. In this dissertation, I will distinguish between the civil civil-military".⁸⁸⁴

Andrew Cottey, Anthony Forster, and Timothy Edmunds, dealing with the civil-military relations of the post-communist countries of the Central and Eastern Europe, argue that civil-military relations are the basis for making effective policy in the Defence and Security domain. The authors are of the opinion that civil-military relations can best be understood as "a general term that encompasses all aspects of the relationship between the armed forces (as political, social and economic institutions) and society (and the state or political, social, ethnic movement). They emphasize that on forming the civil-military relations, and consequently democratic control of the armed forces, influence a wider range of factors, domestic as well as foreign, that differ from

⁸⁸³ Miroslav Hadžić, *Civilna kontrola vojske i policije*, Beograd: CCVO, 2000, 5 – 6.

⁸⁸⁴ Taken from: Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen, *Beyond 'The Soldier and the State' - The Theoretical Framework of Elite Civil-Military Relations*, Dissertation submitted to the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy London, August 2013, 7.

country to country. These factors are: historical heritage; domestic political, economic and social context; international context; institutional factors and military structure and professionalism.⁸⁸⁵

Eastern authors, above all the Russian ones, accept the universality of civil-military relations, but at the same time emphasize their specificity in relation to the structure of the society in different periods of time. Russian authors start from the assumption that the current concept of civil-military relations has been introduced by the developed Western countries, which conflicts with the view that it is necessary to consider the peculiarities of the national character and political tradition of each particular society and state. Therefore, they are of the view that for the development of the modern civil-military relations in the Russian Federation it is necessary to attach far more importance to one's own tradition and culture than mechanical takeover the foreign civil-military models from others.

Within the complex of civilian-military relations, most Russian authors consider it to be a much more complex interaction mechanism than the one represented by the usual tripartite scheme: state - society - the armed forces. Structurally perceived, the basic aspects of the civil-military relations, according to the Russian experts, are contained in the relations:

- Political regime and "institutions of power";
- "Institutions of power" and society;
- Different elements within the "institutions of power ";
- Within the society, in relation to the "institutions of power"
- Between "institutions of power" and state structures of different levels.⁸⁸⁶

In the post Cold war epoch in professional works, the notion of civil-military cooperation is often replaced and even identified with the notion of civil-military relations. Civil-military cooperation can only be viewed as an interaction of military and civilian resources in achieving the army's mission at the operational and tactical levels, whose successful implementation, among other things, raises the levels of trust in the armed forces and its activities. Civil-military cooperation is a classic function of the armed forces and

⁸⁸⁵ Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster, *Democratic Control over the Military in Postcommunist Europe*, London: Palgrave Publishers Ltd, 2002, 9 – 15.

⁸⁸⁶ Zoran Jeftić, Miroslav Mladenović I Vanja Rokvić, *Osnove civilno-vojnih odnosa*, Beograd: Belgrade University, Faculty od Security, 2014, 25-26.

represents the coordination of joint activities of civilian and military actors in order to provide support in the implementation of the military mission.⁸⁸⁷

The level of the achieved civil--military relations and, in the first place, the democratic control over the armed forces reflects the level of democracy in a society and at the same time is one of the basic prerequisites for inclusion into contemporary international trends, especially those related to the field of Security and Defence.⁸⁸⁸

HUNTINGTON'S UNDERSTANDING OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The fact is that Samuel Huntington offered to the scientific and general public a fundamental theoretical framework, which, along with all the weaknesses and criticisms of the latter theorists and practitioners, is not scientifically and professionally replaced by another more consistent theory.⁸⁸⁹

In his paper "*The Soldier and the State*," Huntington emphasized in his preface, he dealt with the theory of civil-military relations, starting from the notion that no theory, no matter how good, could explain all the facts related to the subject reality.⁸⁹⁰ He especially pointed out that civil-military relations suffer from too little theory and that they represent the complex balance of authority, the influence of the ideology of the army and authority, the influence of non-military groups. It is important to point out that Huntington, although mostly occupied by objective civilian control, emphasized that the control and balance of relations between the two groups can be achieved in countless ways. In the analysis and criticism of Huntington's strategic thought this attitude is often overlooked and it is as well forgotten that it is above all a theoretical framework of the civil-military relations.

Binding civil-military relations for the national security policy and considering them the main component of military security policy, Huntington rightly concludes that the essence of the military security policy is the development of civil-military relations that will increase military security with

⁸⁸⁷ See more: Zoran s. Jeftić, Milenko S. Lalović, *Civilno-vojna saradnja – stvarnost i potreba*, Beograd: Medija centar Odrana, 2011.

⁸⁸⁸ See more: Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, OESC, 1994., artical 20., 21.; Partnership for Peace Framework Document articles 3, 6. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January, 1994.

⁸⁸⁹ See more: Samuel Hantington, *Vojnik i država – teorija i politika civilno-vojnih odnosa*, Beograd: Centar za studije Jugoistočne Evrope, Faculty of Political sciences and Diplomacy Academy, 2004.

⁸⁹⁰ Ibid.

the smallest damage to other social values.⁸⁹¹ The achievement of this goal in Huntington's opinion requires a constant interoperability of the functional (threat to a society's security) and public (demands arising from ideology and institutions governing society) imperative, through the prism of the relationship between the officers' corps and the state. If the military institutions are formed by a public imperative, there is a possibility of their being limited in the exercise of their legally defined missions, while, on the other hand, if a society develops military capacities through a dominant functional imperative, it faces the problem of controlling military institutions. Huntington states that the very interaction of these two imperatives is the core of the problem of civil-military relations.⁸⁹² The basic concept of this theory is the military professionalism that can be achieved by military autonomy, with a clear distinction between the role of the armed forces and civilians.

The essence of Huntington's theory is given in the first part of the book relating to the state's military institutions. Starting from the notion of profession, he defined the military profession through determining the expertise, responsibility and corporate character of the officers' corps. The rise of the military profession is shown through five criteria¹⁴ and given in the analysis of the historical development from the hiring and aristocratic officers' profession, through the development of military institutions of the 19th century, through the experience of Prussia, Great Britain, France and the United States.

Considering the issue of the civilian-military and civilian control over the military, Huntington states that the basic problem is finding the answer to the question "how can the military power be diminished?"⁸⁹³ Explaining the possible answer to that question, he gives two models, through subjective and objective civilian control.

Subjective civilian control he considered unacceptable, since it presupposes the establishment of maximum civilian power giving members of the military civilian characteristics, presenting the state reflected in the officers' corps. This view of Huntington's gives unjustified power to the political parties and their leadership in the control of the armed forces through the appointment of the highest ranks that are politically loyal to them. In this way, he gives priority to the political affiliation and derogates professionalism of the members of the military.

On the other hand, by maximizing military professionalism, objective civilian control is achieved, thus achieving the militarization of the members

⁸⁹¹ Ibid,4.

⁸⁹² Ibid

⁸⁹³ Ibid, 89.

of the armed forces, making them state assets and independent of the influence of the political parties. By exercising objective control, Huntington proposes an option to reduce the military power, which, in his opinion, is achieved by the professionalization of military personnel, making it "politically sterile and neutral".⁸⁹⁴

Huntington sees objective civilian control as the only correct form of democratic control. The aim of this type of control is to achieve the highest possible degree of professionalism in the military by separating the political and military decision-making process. Political leaders do not interfere with the military operations and military commanders do not influence politics. Due to such a separation, this model of civil-military relations is called a *divergent model*. According to this Huntington's antithesis to an objective control is the participation of professional soldiers in politics.

By addressing the conditions that can contribute to the military professionalism and objective civilian control, Huntington concludes that the relationship of power and ideology is crucial. At the level of power, what is crucial is the relationship between the officers' corps and civil groups in the society, while at the level of ideology, the issue of compatibility of the professional ethics with the political ideologies prevailing in society is of great importance.

According to Huntington, the relationship between power, professionalism and ideology influences the formation of five *different ideal types of civil-military relations*: 1) an anti-military ideology characterized by high military power and low professionalism; 2) anti-military ideology, characterized by low military political power and low military professionalism; 3) anti-military ideology, which is characterized by low military political power but high professionalism; 4) pro-military ideology, distinguished by high military political power and high military professionalism; 5) pro-military ideology, characterized by a low level of military political power and high military professionalism.⁸⁹⁵

CRITICISMS OF HUNTINGTON'S STRATEGIC THOUGHT

Criticisms of Huntington's theory that have started in the academic public since the publication have lasted until this day and will surely continue. A number of authors consider the theory to be too simplistic, with

⁸⁹⁴ Ibid, 93.

⁸⁹⁵ Ibid, 105-106.

insufficiently clear classifications and definitions, and others emphasized its low empirical and predictable value.

The earliest criticism came from Huntington's contemporaries focused on the concept of professionalism. First of all, it came from Moris Janowitz, who viewed professionalism from a sociological angle and claimed its complexity, pointing out that the military profession is much more than occupation, and that it represents a complete lifestyle. Janowitz believes that civilian control can only be achieved through the integration of soldiers into the society, because "the officer is a subject of civilian control not only because of the rule of law and tradition, but also because of his own professional standards and integration with civilian values."⁸⁹⁶ Unlike Huntington, Janowitz argues that the creation of an apolitical armed force is an unrealistic approach, since it should be asked for an answer when political documents, such as a national security strategy, are drafted and when decisions are made in that domain that are relevant to the national Security.⁸⁹⁷

Samuel Finer appreciated the importance of Huntington's emphasis on the military professionalism but disagreed with the view that it automatically leads to loyalty. His opinion is that professional standards of the officers' corps can also bring about a coup in the country.⁸⁹⁸ Explaining such a view in his work *Man on a horse: the role of the army in politics*, Finer does not exclude the possibility of military intervention in politics if conditions are created for this. As a basic parameter for determining the possible level of influence of the military⁸⁹⁹ on the civilian authority, he introduced the category of the development of the political culture in the society. According to the level of development of the political culture, Finer puts all countries into four categories: countries with mature, developed, low and minimal political

⁸⁹⁶ Moris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960, 420.

⁸⁹⁷ Janowitz, M., *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960, 342-343. Moris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960, 420.

⁸⁹⁸ Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen, *Beyond 'The Soldier and the State -The Theoretical Framework of Elite Civil-Military Relations*, Dissertation submitted to the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, August 2013, 38

⁸⁹⁹ In accordance with the development of the political culture of a state and society, Finer defines four levels of military intervention: (1) Impact on civilian authorities; (2) Pressure or blackmail; (3) The replacement of civil authority with another civil authority by violence or threat of violence; (4) The removal of civilian authorities and the establishment of military regimes.

culture.⁹⁰⁰ He believes that civilian control of the armed forces is strongest in those societies that have a high degree of political culture, since it allows the civil-military relations to be clearly defined, valued and institutionalized.

A special momentum and actualization of the topic of civil-military relations and new critical reviews of Huntington's opinion was the works published since the breakup of the Warsaw Treaty and the development of new parliamentary democracies, the former Soviet bloc and the countries formed by the breakup of Yugoslavia.

Peter Feaver, Huntington's student, in his works and the theoretical framework critically looked at the insufficient capacity of predictability of Huntington's theory. The events during the Cold War did not confirm the thesis that if the United States want to achieve victory, the American society must resort to conservatism rather than to liberal democracy. The United States is the winner of the Cold War and has not become a conservative society to a large extent. Fiver believes that each theory must have large capacity of predictive power, and that this did not happen with Huntington's theory. In addition to criticism of empirical features, Fiver critically looks at Huntington's concept of ideology as very rigid. He considers the ability of democracy to have only two possible ideologies, liberalism or conservatism, too narrow, since it does not allow for the possibility of combined models.

Fiver argues that civil-military relations can be presented as a combination of "an army that is strong enough and capable of carrying out the tasks that civilians demand from it, with an army that is sufficiently subordinate to do exclusively what the civilians authorized it to do."⁹⁰¹ In his work on civil-military relations, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, he gives a new approach known as *an agency theory*, developing a model of relationships between actors who have a position of authority and their subordinates (agents). The basis of this theory lies in the idea that civil-military relations are an essential form of strategic interaction between the masters and their military servicemen.⁹⁰² The citizens try to achieve two goals: functional and rational. Under the functional objective, Fiver implies the protection of civilians from external enemies, and under the rational goal the establishment of political control over the armed forces.⁹⁰³

⁹⁰⁰ Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback: Military Intervention into Politics*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1975, 88-89.

⁹⁰¹ Feaver, Peter D., *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003, 2.

⁹⁰² Ibid

⁹⁰³ Ibid, 61

According to Concordance theory and Rebecca Schiff's understanding, civil-military relations are established between three main subjects: military, political elites and citizenship.⁹⁰⁴ The theory of consensus sees the military, political leaders and citizens as partners, who, through the cultural agreement can build valid civil-military relations. Consensus, in her opinion, must come from four basic variables: the social – social composition of the officers' corps, the political decision-making process, the method of recruitment and military style. The basic problem of this view refers to the very definition of variables and the definition of culture. Its capacity is limited to determining the state of the civil-military relations and does not possess the necessary theoretical framework.

Douglas Bland's view of the civil-military relations has been published in the *Unified Theory of Civil-Military Theory*. He considers that the civil-military relations and civilian control of the armed forces are best understood and maintained through the so-called regimes of the theory of shared responsibility between civilian and military leaders. By this theory, the author tries to offer a comprehensive "analytical framework and a guide to civil-military relations management".⁹⁰⁵ According to his understanding the existing theories have two drawbacks. Firstly, they are too narrowly conceptualized and, secondly, at the same time they are limited by culture and national politics of the theoreticians. Therefore, a new, unique theory is needed, which can help to find out the internal structure of civil-military relations, its constituent parts, as well as their interrelations. Bland defines a model of shared responsibility, according to which civil control is implemented and maintained through control responsibility in which civilian leadership and officers are jointly involved (partnership relationship). More specifically, civilian authorities are responsible and in charge of some aspects of control, while the military leadership is responsible and in charge of other aspects of control.⁹⁰⁶

The understanding of the civil-military relationship as a partnership, in which "each side knows for certain how the other side will react in most situations", determines civilian control as "directing and guiding the army towards socially acceptable goals", and Bland proposes a terminological substitution of "*Civilian control*" by "*Civilian direction*" of the armed forces.⁹⁰⁷ The key to the civilian direction of the armed forces is an effective

⁹⁰⁴ Rebecca Schiff, "*Civil – Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance*," Los Angeles: Armed Forces & Society Vol 22, Issue 1, 1995, 7-24.

⁹⁰⁵ Douglas Bland, *A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations*, Los Angeles: Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 2: Issue 1, 1999. 9.

⁹⁰⁶ Ibid, 10.

⁹⁰⁷ Ibid, 19

mechanism of responsibility that enables civilian authorities to check, question, and finally praise or sanction military officers in case their conduct is contrary to the established standards. Therefore, civilian control should be conceived not only as a means of protection against military strikes, but also as a management of a "regime" that "legitimizes and restricts the actions of all players (civil and military) in the interest of society".⁹⁰⁸ According to Bland, the theory of shared responsibility is an attempt to construct a unique theory of civil-military relations that would overcome the shortcomings of the existing theories and better serve the needs of political and military leaders, as well as society as a whole.

Michael Desch, another of Huntington's students, in his work "*Civil control of the military*" "mission model", speaks of the existence of a changing relationship between the strength of the civilian control of the armed forces and the level of internal and external threats, that is, he considers the impact of structural changes in the society and the international scene on the character of the civil-military relations. Therefore, this theory is also referred to as the *structural theory of civil-military relations*.⁹⁰⁹ The basic assumption of this theory is that the armed forces facing external threats and oriented to external tasks will be more inclined to cooperate with the civilian authorities and civilian control than those facing internal threats and oriented towards solving internal state problems. Desch states that in many countries the strength of the civilian control of the military is shaped by "structural factors, particularly threats, affecting leaders, military organization, state, and society."⁹¹⁰ Desch's analysis of the civilian control proven through his empirical research is important for the civil-military relations, but it does not consider the complexity of the problem, nor can it be considered as a comprehensive theory.

Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina C. Matel, in addition to democratic civilian control within civil-military relations, also introduce the operational effectiveness and efficiency of security institutions in the use of their own resources. Their criticism first of all relates to the inclusions of Huntington's theory that they consider only theoretical without special empirical capacity.⁹¹¹

⁹⁰⁸ Ibid, 20

⁹⁰⁹ See more Michael Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.

⁹¹⁰ Michael Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001, 11.

⁹¹¹ The Routledge Handbook of Civile-Military Relations, Edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristian Matei , The Routledge Handbook of Civile-Military Relations, London and New York: Routledge, 2015. 1

Reflecting on Huntington's theory, Paul Bracken thinks that the theoretical framework of the civil-military relations has not changed much in the last forty years. It is certainly true that Huntington's theory itself, with all its criticisms, can be considered sufficiently current and theoretically coherent.⁹¹² Undoubtedly, the thesis which states that the root cause of the problem of the development of the civil-military relations is primarily based on the fact that in the second half of the last century it was theoretically based in the US and was accepted as a dogma of part of the military sociology and spread through global trends to the NATO member states as well as to most of the countries of the democratic community should be taken into account. None of these theoretical frameworks have been accepted in the academic and scientific community as valid alternatives to Huntington's theory as they are overly simplified, focused only on certain segments of the civil-military relations, scanning the state without the capacity to proclaim it a consistent theory.

CONCUSLION

The need for controlling the armed forces, as the main bearer of force in a society, exists practically from the very creation of the state. The rulers of all social epochs sought to exercise control over the military and use it in accordance with their interests and at the same time prevent the armed force from turning against them. It is justified to bind the modern notion of the civil-military relations and democratic control of the armed forces to the parliamentary democracy, and legally regulated relations between legislative executive and judicial authorities and define the areas of the organization of defence of the society and command of the armed forces. Nowadays civil-military relations represent a complex relationship established in society between the military and other social segments with the aim of establishing a complete democratic control over the military.

The entire theoretical approach to the study of the civil-military relations, starting from the beginning of the Second World War to the present day, could be classified in several stages of learning. The basic civil-military relations theories were developed by Huntington and Janovic. New authors throughout 60s and 70s of the last century, either in criticism or support of these theories, introduced new economic and political approaches to the study

⁹¹² Taken over from Thomas C. Bruneau, *The Routledge Handbook of Civile-Military Relations*, London and New York: Routledge 2013, 14.

of the area of the civil-military relations. By the end of the Cold War, based on the experiences of the post-communist countries and the need to reform the security and defence sector, a new phase of civil-military research begins. In addition to the ongoing scientific debate about the validity of theories dealing with civil-military relations, post-conflict countries and peacekeeping operations become the focus of attention in the 21st century, which as a topic introduces a more serious study of the civil-military cooperation.

New security challenges, first of all terrorism, infectious diseases and the migrant crisis have also given rise to new demands for the use of military effects, but at the same time the need for democratic control, and therefore civil leaders must focus both on control and on good management of the defence system and performance of the armed forces.

Since the publication of the book "Soldier and State" and the promotion of his own theory of the civil-military relations, Huntington was faced with a very large number of critics who are mainly focused on the fact that Huntington's theory has not developed enough capacity of foreseeable power, especially for events during and at the end of the "Cold War".

However, authors who were dealing with the civil-military relations following the emergence of Huntington's theory, criticizing his work and developing their own views of the civil-military relations, mostly focused on individual segments rather than on a theoretical approach in general. It is difficult to compare a certain number of authors with Huntington since their research was carried out at different research levels, no matter whether they were dealing solely with political or just sociological issues.

The fact is that recent authors have in some segments contributed to a better understanding of the civil-military relations and that in modern research they took into account the variables that Huntington did not have in mind (the place of homosexuals in the military, gender dimension, new security paradigms), but none of them have succeeded in reaching the necessary level of theoretical coherence that could replace the comprehensiveness of Huntington's theory.

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ZNAČAJ HANTINGTONOVE STRATEŠKE MISLI O RAZVOJU CIVILNO-VOJNIH ODNOSA

Zoran Jeftić*

Fakultet bezbednosti, Univerzitet u Beogradu,
Republika Srbija

Ivica Đorđević

Fakultet bezbednosti, Univerzitet u Beogradu,
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Uprkos činjenici da se vojska smatra državnom institucijom ustanovljenom da bi zaštitila svoje interese, od antike do modernog vremena prisutno je opterećujuće pitanje, da li oružane snage mogu predstavljati pretnju samoj državi. Prirodno je da vojska, kao jedna od ključnih institucija države koja poseduje vlast, mora na neki način biti ograničena da ne koristi tu silu suprotno opštim društvenim interesima. Paradoks civilno-vojnih odnosa da je odbrana demokratije moguća nedemokratskim sredstvima, najkompleksnije je predstavljena u teoriji Samjuela Huntingtona. On smatra da su civilno-vojni odnosi oblik nacionalne politike bezbednosti, a cilj civilne kontrole je jedina pravilna forma demokratske kontrole. To je zasnivano na mišljenju da se razdvajanjem političke i vojne sfere odlučivanja može postići najviši profesionalizam vojnika čime se stvaraju uslovi da oružane snage postanu neutralne i autonomne u postizanju političkih ciljeva. Kritički pregled Hantingtonove strateške misli o civilno-vojnim odnosima i demokratskoj kontroli nad oružanim snagama dat je od strane znatnog broja autora u vreme objavljivanja njegovog kapitalnog rada „Vojnik i država”, kao i u periodu nakon raspada Varšavskog ugovora i intenzivnijeg angažmana akademske zajednice na temu civilno-vojnih odnosa. Osnova kritičke misli bila je pre svega neadekvatno jasna klasifikacija i definicija pojmova i mala empirijska i predvidiva vrednost. Uprkos kritici Hantingtonove kontemplacije, nijedan od teorijskih okvira nije prihvaćen u akademskoj i naučnoj zajednici, kao validna alternativa Hantingtonovoj teoriji. Ti radovi su bili preterano pojednostavljeni, fokusirani samo na određene segmente civilno-vojnih odnosa, skeniranje njegovog stanja bez mogućnosti da proglasi konzistentnu teoriju.

Ključne reči: civilno-vojne odnosi, kontrola demokratije, vojska.

* jefticz@gmail.com

ASYMMETRY AND STRATEGY

Orlando Mardner*

Professional Security Academy, London
Great Britain

Abstract: This paper defines the concept of asymmetric threats within the context of Caribbean Community (CARICOM). In order to achieve this objective, the author focused on presenting the concept of asymmetric threats with respect to CARICOM and other developed states and regions such as the United States of America and countries within the European Union. Further, the author provides the historical context of the manifestation and development of asymmetry forms of endangering security. Notably, within CARICOM, the present researches established not a single form of asymmetric threat to have happened in the past. Thus, the strategic context of the contemporary asymmetric threats was found to have a high likelihood of occurring in CARICOM in the future. They include asymmetry of the method; asymmetry of technology; and the asymmetry of WILL. Thus, in order to prevent such asymmetric threats from taking place within CARICOM in the future, there is need to adopt appropriate political means, innovative and well-formulated diplomacy, to have a proper regional commitment to fight terror threats, and to develop regional strategic communication strategy (to be defensive and offensive in nature). Overall, this paper proved the relevance of classical strategic thought in preventing asymmetric threat within CARICOM.

Key words: asymmetric threats, Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

INTRODUCTION

In the contemporary society, there are increasingly unstable, unpredictable and more dangerous security concerns around the world. Several factors have been associated with the endangering security; among them are the fascinating technological progress and the ambivalent global processes. The results of the changing multinational dynamics include extremism, terrorism, and antisocial nature of the global processes exhibiting asymmetrical threats. Importantly, various concepts, buzzwords, and theories have been postulated to explain the origin, occurrence, and trends of the asymmetric threats (Møller, 2003). However, there is limited scientific proof

* viperprosec_7@hotmail.com

to the existence of the asymmetric threat. For example, scholars have used several theories like the core principle of international relations theory, which indicates that “the power implies victory in war” (Arreguin-Toft, 2001, p. 96); whereby, in the asymmetric conflicts, the strong actors always emerge victoriously. Thus, the primary objective of this paper is to define the concept of asymmetric threat, provide the strategic context of contemporary asymmetrical threats, and to examine the relevance of classical strategic thought. Thus, this paper contributes to the appreciation of the asymmetric threats including the destabilizing factors that contributes to the generation of conflicts within a regional organization, Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Notably, CARICOM is one of the two sub-regional organizations within the Caribbean region, which was established 1973 based on economic, political and security grounds with the dominating powers such as Jamaica, T&T and Barbados.

THE CONCEPT AND FORMS OF ASYMMETRIC TREATS

There are various definitions and descriptions of asymmetry and asymmetric threats, which have been postulated by scholars. For example, Bennett et al. (1999) defines asymmetric threats as the “attack on the vulnerable members of the community or a threat who is no prepared against the threat. Also, Gray (2002, p. 5) indicates that the definition of asymmetric threats relies on the “identification of principal characteristics of, and corollaries to, asymmetry. In this paper, asymmetry is defined in terms of the military doctrine. In the development of a comprehensive definition of asymmetry, several countries and cultures have postulated unique definitions depending on the context and culture. The non-English-speaking nations such as Russia have defined asymmetry as “the absence or destruction of symmetry” (Thomas, 2001). The first explicit mention of the asymmetry was recorded in the Joint Doctrine (1995), where the concept of asymmetry in the military was used within a limited sense. The Joint Doctrine in 1995 defined asymmetry in the context of asymmetric engagement, which exists between dissimilar forces such as air versus land. Further, the Military Strategy approach of 1995 in the US decided to incorporate several aspects such as the words terrorism and threatened use of weapons in mass destruction into the definition of asymmetry. Consequently, in 1997, the concept of asymmetric threat was incorporated into military concerns, where the Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) indicated that:

“the US dominance in the conventional military arena may encourage adversaries to use...asymmetric means to attack our forces and

interest overseas and Americans at home” (Arreguin-Toft, 2001, p. 98; Cohen, 1997).

The report by the National Defense University (1998) in the US defined asymmetry as a “not fighting fair” (Arreguin-Toft, 2001, p. 99). Otherwise, in 1999, there came the agreed definition of asymmetry, where the Joint Strategic Review defined asymmetric approaches as the:

“attempts to circumvent or undermine US strengths while exploiting US weaknesses using methods that differ significantly from the US’s expected method of operations” (Arreguin-Toft, 2001, p. 98; Joint Strategy Review, 1999).

Therefore, in the military context and within a multinational security framework and as held in this paper, asymmetry is defined as ‘acting, organizing and thinking differently compared to opponents so as to maximize your advantages while exploiting the opponents weaknesses, gaining freedom of action and attaining an initiative to overcome the opponent’. Also, asymmetric threats are the threats involving “not fighting fair” and which takes advantage of the critical weak points in a stronger enemy’s defenses (Primmerman, 2006, p. 1).

Overall, the definition of asymmetry is evidently building to the wider concept of the asymmetric threat. A comparative review of the definition of asymmetric threats from the literature obtained several instances where asymmetric warfare leads to the defining situations of the asymmetric threats. Notably, the US government documents, dated between the 1990s and 2016, indicate that asymmetric warfare means everything ranging from the 9/11 terrorist strikes to the supercomputer viruses to the roadside bombs (Harris, 2014; Buffaloe, 2006). Otherwise, most scholars agree that asymmetric threats tend to be unusual in our eyes and are irregular in the sense that they are posed by instruments unrecognized by the long-standing laws of war involving the regular military machines, which have been engaged in open combat.

There are various forms of asymmetry and asymmetric threats, which fall within the realm of national security and warfare. First, there is the asymmetry of the method, which involves the use of different tactical doctrines or operational concepts compared to a target or enemy (Johnson & Metz, 2001). There is also the asymmetry of technology. In this asymmetry, the threats emanate from industrial advancements pitting a developed state against the one considered to be backward in terms of industrial advancements. According to Johnson and Metz (2001), another form of asymmetry is that of WILL, wherein an antagonist considers its vital interest to

be at stake, thus it launches attacks as a strategy to calm the attacks by the less-than-vital interest. For example, such asymmetry is manifested where a country such as the US play a role in conflicts in states such as Somalia so as to protect her interests.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF MANIFESTATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF ASYMMETRY FORMS OF ENDANGERING SECURITY

The context of asymmetric threats that is considered in this section involves warfare instances that fall within the relevant international (particularly the US) and to the larger extent the South American continent. In the Caribbean Community, all the Caribbean nations are considered in this manifestation and development of asymmetry forms that have or will endanger their security. Thus, the historical manifestation of the asymmetric threats, which are considered in this paper, covers only the previous forms of the asymmetric threats that have hit the rest of the world.

The historical examples of warfare exhibiting asymmetric threats are numerous. Notably, the Japanese behavior in the World War II is a perfect example of an asymmetric threat. Accordingly, Japan began the war that involved an asymmetric action, whereby they sneaked attack on Pearl Harbor despite the ongoing peace negotiations (Primmerman, 2016). The other classical asymmetric threat is where the same Japanese used kamikaze attacks, where they combined elements of asymmetric equipment, strategy, and tactics to hit about American ships off Okinawa. Further, During the Cold War, Soviet Union also exhibited asymmetric action; specifically, they signed the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention that banned the application of biological weapons. The agreement did not last, as the Soviet Union began a massive expansion of offensive biological-warfare program just after one year of the agreement. It is this act of negotiating and then ignoring the treaties on the use of biological weapons by the Soviet Union, which exhibits typical asymmetric threat.

Within the US, the asymmetry and asymmetric threats have developed in a version of “not fighting fair”. The asymmetric forms that have been witnessed involve the use of surprising operations and strategic dimensions in terms of the use of weapons in ways that are unplanned by the world’s superpower, the US. The historical context of the manifestation of the asymmetric threats includes NATO’s Cold War doctrine of the first application of nuclear weapons, which was meant to compensate for the nonnuclear superiority of the Red Army (Chilcoat, 1998). The other historical manifestation of the asymmetric endangering of security is where there was the exploitation of major nuclear-armed allies like China and the Soviet Union,

which was conducted by North Vietnam and North Korea. The purpose of such exploitations was to limit various options for military escalation by the US in its respective Major Theater Wars (Johnson & Metz, 2001).

There is also the terrorism by proxy, which was used by different Islamic states against the US as well as the European interests (Chilcoat, 1998). The literature by Heim (2016) showed some of the manifestations of the asymmetric threats where the US and allied efforts failed to completely neutralize the threat of Iraqi theater ballistic missile (TBM), particularly in the Persian Gulf War. In this case, Saddam Hussein military contingent succeeded in laying a failure of the American-led coalition to locate and destroy their mobile theater missiles (Heim, 2016). Thus, such tactics employed by Saddam Hussein indicates a clear case of asymmetric threats, where the US military failed in their war strategies in Iraq. Overall, all these historical examples indicate the strategies that manifested the context and development of different forms of asymmetry, which significantly endangered security.

Presently, there are various manifestations of asymmetry threats within the US. Notably, the continued development in the cyberspace creates a major room for the enhancements of the asymmetric threats. For example, in the US, cyberattacks could provide a platform for the terrorists to attack the national strategic infrastructure (NSI) including their allies. In Jamaica, a threat to the manifestation of asymmetry is posed by the Islamic States (ISIS), which is a common threat to all Caribbean states. The ISIS group, which emanates the Middle East and Boko Haram (Central Africa), are constantly causing fears, deaths, and destruction of property. The ISIS group is well resourced, having a monstrous act that seems unstoppable; thus, their quest and reach in the Caribbean islands could prove to be the real danger for CARICOM.

Despite the international asymmetric threats that have been witnessed, it is important to note that within CARICOM, there is no single asymmetric threat that has occurred. Thus, there are only intentions of unique asymmetric threats, which are propagated by the locals. According to the report by Epps (2013), the prevailing asymmetry threats consist of the mutually-reinforcing relationship that exists between the transnational organized crime activities, which involves illegal guns and drugs, cyber-crime, gangs and organized crime, and corruption among other economic crimes. These asymmetric threats are thus grouped as the Tier 1 threats, which imply that they are the main drivers of the prevailing criminality levels with a possibility of crippling the fragile socioeconomic development progress among the Caribbean states. Besides, the organized crime is influenced by the facilitators of criminality, who operate in both the licit and illicit world (CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy, 2013). The Tier 2 threats are considered to be substantial threats to

CARICOM, which include human trafficking, and smuggling. All these activities are organized in forms that manifest the asymmetric threats to the Caribbean states. Therefore, CARICOM security agency should take into keen consideration into while dealing with asymmetry.

Overall, the manifestations of asymmetric threats are exhibited by the existence of equipment asymmetric threats, which include the use of biological weapons, chemical weapons, lasers for blinding, and some types of mines (Primmerman, 2006). Further, there are various forms of tactical asymmetric threats that have been developed; they include the suicide attacks, brutal attacks on civilians and neutral nations, environmental attacks, and surprise first strikes. Lastly, the strategic symmetric threats are the ones where specific groups fund terrorists to launch attacks, and groups engaging in a fight with the intention of not winning (Primmerman, 2006).

STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF CONTEMPORARY ASYMMETRICAL THREATS

There lay various questions based on the kinds of asymmetric threats that the CARICOM may face in the future including the prevailing circumstances under which the asymmetric threats may thrive. The increasingly global security concern, particularly in the contemporary society has been associated with the concrete form of asymmetric endangering of security. According to Blank (2003), contemporary writings recognize the asymmetric threat in form of terrorism and other unconventional or guerrilla warfare, cyberwarfare, or the information warfare. Further, the report by Conference of heads of government of the CARICOM member states of July 2001, indicate the potential security risks in the form of asymmetric threats. The task force formed by the CARICOM heads of states admitted to the existence of the new form of violence and crime that have been witnessed or will occur in the region. The report by the task force identified aspects like illegal firearms, illegal drugs, rising crime rate, criminal deportees, increased poverty and inequity, lawlessness, and terrorism as the major security threat to the member states. Other reports also indicate the possible increase in cyber crimes and terrorism to be the key threats to the socio-economic and political development of the region.

CARICOM and Cyber Securities. Focusing on the CARICOM, this research aimed at reviewing these contemporary asymmetric threats in terms of their possibility in occurrence within the member states. First, the issue on the cyberwarfare has realized a significant growth in the Caribbean. Cyber crime is ranked in Tier I (level of key threats), with the possibility of causing

major social and economic problems to CARICOM. This is according to the Global Crisis Response Support Program (GCRSP) (2016); whereby, in the Press Release, it was indicated that government websites have been hacked as well as the exploitation of children online. Other avenues for the potential asymmetric threats in CARICOM that were labeled to at risk of cybercrime are telecommunications and health systems. Also, the increased fraud through information security and weapons are the biggest problem, particularly in the financial sector. For example, the ministerial report on the Jamaican National Cyber Security (2016) indicates that the cyber threats are real, with the increase in organized international gangs targeting critical infrastructure such as communication system. Thus, the devastating impacts of the cyberwarfare should be well addressed to ensure that the social and economic development of the member states is not hampered.

Terrorism and CARICOM. The review of the literature indicates that in the CARICOM context, the asymmetric threats in the form of terrorism rises from the possible affiliation of the member states to the U.S. Presently, there is fear of the possible movement of materials and personnel by the terrorist, who may use the same route as drug traffickers. According to the report by the US News (2016), there are about 150 radicals, within the CARICOM member states, who have attempted to join ISIS in 2016 only. Also, Trinidad is reported to have the highest rate of Islamic State recruitment in the whole of Western Hemisphere (The Atlantic, 2016). This is a significant number that should create a clear indication of the threat such a group can cause to the CARICOM bearing in mind that the countries do not proper intelligence services such as the FBI. For example, the movement by the terrorist along similar routes as the drug traffickers present platform for the possible attack on nuclear waste shipments and other hazardous materials within the Caribbean Islands. The situation may worsen depending on the number of Americans who visit the Caribbean (7 million people in 2014), and who might be attacked by the extremist group (US News, 2016), which in the long run hamper the economic growth supported by the tourism sector. It is, therefore, possible that continued attacks by the US military on the ISIS territory in Syria and Iraq may be countered through attacks on US citizens in the CARICOM. Thus, the existence of funders and recruitment of the extremists in the Caribbean poses a serious asymmetric threat to the CARICOM and allies.

In the Caribbean Basin, there are various extremist groups that have been notorious throughout Tobago and Trinidad. The group includes Jamaat al-Muslimeen, which is a traditional group comprising Afro-Trinidadian Muslim converts who are converted to Islam. Besides, the existing terror group, the CARICOM member states are prone to high rates of violent crimes and

homicides. The following excerpt shows the possibility of the Caribbean being at the risk of extremism and terrorism:

“ An ISIS video featuring four Trinidad-born fighters urging Trinidad and Tobago’s Muslims to take up arms to fight in Syria; news that between 80 to 130 Trinidadians and their families have now travelled to Syria to fight and live in the so called Islamic state; the arrest in St Maarten of three people probably of Syrian origin travelling from Haiti on false Greek passports; and in the French territories in the Caribbean the declaration of a state of emergency” (Caribbean News Service, 2015).

The excerpt clearly shows that CARICOM is no longer safe, as the extremists combined with the activities of gangs and organized crimes, financial crimes, cybercrimes, and corruption in the member states, which all contribute to major threats in asymmetries. It is, therefore, important that the Caribbean community develops a workable strategy to prevent the contemporary asymmetric threats.

Overall, CARICOM faces the multiplicity of asymmetric threats, from increasing number of sources. The highest risk of asymmetric threats includes cyber threats and the potential attack or influence of world’s major terror groups amongst the individuals within the member states. The increased vulnerabilities and threats in the region towards asymmetric threats could, therefore, cause serious impacts on the region’s social and economic development as well as stability. Thus, the increasingly numerous and complex risks to CARICOM states in terms of cyber threats and terrorism should be properly countered.

HOW TO PREVENT THE CONTEMPORARY ASYMMETRIC THREATS AND THE RELEVANCE OF CLASSICAL STRATEGIC THOUGHT

The theoretical and practical aspects of asymmetry and strategy indicate that asymmetries always arise where the opponents enjoy a greater freedom of action. Thus, the opponents take the advantage of freedom and ability to follow the specific course of action to launch attacks while they remain encountered effectively (Barnett, 2003). The first strategy that CARICOM can consider in its strategy to prevent asymmetric threats includes redefining of its policies on illegal guns and drugs, migration and financial crimes. Among the CARICOM member states, there is no single member state that manufactures ammunition or imports significant quantities. The review of the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategic Goals indicates 14-strategic

goals, which have been developed for implementation of counter-symmetric threats. The strategic goals include taking the profit out of crime where the criminal assets are targeted and the financial systems protected from possible financial crimes. There is also a strategy to increase the trans-border intelligence as well as information sharing among the member states.

Considering the nature of terrorism, the strategy to ending the contemporary asymmetric threat is based on the nature of the threat that is posed by the existing terror groups such as ISIS and al Qaeda. The strategies that have been adopted include the elimination of the leaders, elimination by the strong force, ensuring no generational transition and a switch to political means. There is need to develop a technical approach with the intentions of reducing communication networks such as the modification of circuits that can prevent cyber-crimes. The other proposed strategy here is a switch to the political means. For example, there should be the creation of an American Islam, which should be taken as a serious part of the societies in Caribbean island and the entire American continent. The countries should enhance their political capacities even if it means the involvement of the United Nations special political missions, with the intention of regaining control and helping them maintain the rule of law.

The strategy that was proposed by CACI International (2008) is the need to have an integrated national asymmetric threat strategy. In the report, CACI International (2008) indicated the possible opportunities, which the even the CARICOM can employ in dealing with the asymmetric threats within its member states. The opportunities include; having a strategic communication strategy, an economic strategy, a diplomatic strategy, and a defense and homeland security strategy. It was important appreciating the need for both the member states including non-governmental institutions such as the industries to provide more strength to the existing partnerships that will ensure a unified Grand National security strategy, which can then proactively address the increasingly asymmetric threats to the CARICOM and the rest of the world (CACI International, 2008). The CARICOM can borrow the strategies used by the US and other global security strategies to effectively prevent asymmetric threats within its boundaries.

The diplomatic strategy that has been proposed by various researchers of the asymmetric threats indicates important strategies that CARICOM should develop. According to Wilson (2010), preventing asymmetric threats requires innovative diplomacy and proper regional commitments. The same strategy was proposed by Kugler and National Defense University (2011); whereby, there is need to embrace diplomatic approaches so as to achieve regional objectives in ensuring security. It implies that CARICOM should have a well-formulated diplomacy strategy with other nations such as the US and other

like-minded countries in dealing with asymmetric threats. The report by CACI International (2008) recommends that states such as the US should work towards convincing her allies and other international partners to have unified approaches that can effectively counter asymmetric threats such as the “revolution through participation”.

Lastly, CARICOM should embrace a strategic communication strategy as a means of preventing asymmetric threats. This is one strategy that has not been effectively used in the US, where both international and external communication programs are the major weaknesses in dealing with asymmetric threats (CACI International, 2008). It is there appropriate that the regional strategic communication strategy within CARICOM should be defensive and offensive in nature; whereby, there must be integrated capabilities of the member states such as Jamaica to counter propaganda and untruths used by the cybercriminals and terrorists (Janczewski&Caelli, 2016; CACI International, 2008). Thus, the Caribbean community should recognize its strengths in communication strategies and plan appropriate protections as well as countermeasures. Overall, the CARICOM must be proactive in its strategies and approaches to preventing contemporary asymmetric threats.

Strategic thinking refers to a mental or thinking process, which is applied by a specific individual within the context of achieving success in an endeavor (Zhu, 2016). The Classical Strategic Thought has been widely considered in the international security, specifically in the characterization of the transition period from unilateral to the multilateral world. In the contemporary international security, Classical Strategic Thought is particularly useful in the modern world; particularly, with the increasing asymmetric threats. This is because; warfare in the future will be different from the existing nature of wars. For example, it is anticipated that cyber-crimes will be more intense in the future compared to the present crimes. Thus, it is important that classical strategic thought is considered in the analysis of strategies in preventing future asymmetric threats.

There are previous instances where classical strategic thought has been implemented and became effective. In the 1980s, the United Kingdom successfully navigated into the Cold War. The classical strategic thought in Britain continued to thrive through the 1990s, with the rehabilitation of two pariah states (Russia and The People’s Republic of China) of the Cold War era (<http://www.ccw.ox.ac.uk/>). It may be seen that it is difficult to predict the future, and the contemporary asymmetric threats have significantly changed from the Cold War or World War II era. However, the strategies those are involved or considered by the classical strategists is still relevant in the contemporary era.

CONCLUSION

The primary objective of this was to establish the asymmetric security concerns and the strategies used to prevent them in the contemporary society. Consequently, the author investigated the factors that are associated with endangering security. In order to achieve this objective, the research focused on defining the concept of the asymmetric threat as well as providing the strategic context of these threats. Thus, classical strategic thought was proposed as a relevant strategy to preventing asymmetric threat within the Caribbean Community. Some of the notable achievements of this paper include the definition of the concept of the asymmetric threat as postulated by various scholars in the previous researches. From the numerous definitions of asymmetric threats, the author established the agreeable definition of the asymmetric threat in the military context as “the attack on the vulnerable population, exploiting the weaknesses of stronger (protective forces) using strategies that are significantly different from the methods of operations”. As a result, the definition of asymmetric threats summarizes the whole concept of “asymmetric threats” as used within the CARICOM.

The author found out various forms of asymmetry and asymmetric threats, whereby, in the present paper focused on the space of national security and warfare in CARICOM. Among these forms of asymmetric threats are: asymmetry of method (use of different tactical doctrines in comparison to the target); asymmetry of technology (threats emanating from industrial advancements between developing and developed countries); and the asymmetry of WILL (involving an antagonist considering its vital interest to be at stake and consequently launching attacks as a strategy to calm the perceived attacks). Otherwise, with respect to CARICOM, the potential forms of asymmetric threat are asymmetric of WILL and that of technology, where Caribbean Community may be attacked as a soft target by stronger powers with advanced technological strength. Otherwise, CARICOM may likely experience the asymmetry of WILL, where this region may be attacked as a soft target to “shaken” the interested and stronger powers in the community.

Further, the review of the literature to establish the historical context of the manifestation and development of the forms of asymmetry that endangers security, several similar asymmetric threats were found. It was important to appreciate the fact that in CARICOM, no such asymmetric threats have been recorded in the past. Thus, the historical asymmetric threats were recorded from various parts of the world. Notably, during the World War II, Japanese staged an asymmetric threat where they attacked Pearl Harbour using asymmetric equipment to hit about the American ships off the Okinawa. Another instance of asymmetric threat was recorded during the Cold War

where the Soviet Union signed Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention that banned the application of biological weapons. However, that agreement did not last for over one year before the Soviet Union began a massive expansion of the offensive biological-warfare program. The other recorded asymmetric threat is by the US, where states organized surprising operations and strategic dimensions to states that were perceived to disobey the world's superpower. Otherwise, the manifestation of the asymmetric threats in contemporary society includes cyber attacks on the NIS and their allies. Moreover, the ISIS group from the Middle East and Boko Haram pose serious asymmetric threats to CARICOM.

Overall, the classical strategic thought proved to be relevant in preventing asymmetric threats within CARICOM. Thus, this paper established that CARICOM needs to redefine policies on financial crimes (such as virtual currencies and terror financing), illegal drugs and guns, and migration. Otherwise, the overall strategies to preventing asymmetric threats by CARICOM include developing the proper political approach to maintaining rule of law and technical approach to counter the cyber-crimes through modification of circuits. Besides, CARICOM should develop an integrated national asymmetric threat strategy comprising strategic communication, economic, diplomatic, defense and homeland security strategies. Summarily, the classical strategic thought is critical in the characterization of the transition period from the unilateral aspect of the world to that of multilateral.

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ASIMMETRIJA I STRATEGIJA

Orlando Mardner*

Professional Securiti Academi, London
Velika Britanija

Apstrakt: Ovaj rad definiše koncept asimetričnih pretnji u kontekstu Karibske zajednice (CARICOM). Da bi se ovaj cilj postigao, autor se fokusirao na predstavljanje koncepta asimetričnih pretnji u odnosu na CARICOM i druge razvijene države i regione kao što su Sjedinjene Američke Države i zemlje unutar Evropske unije. Nadalje, autor daje istorijski kontekst manifestacije i razvoja asimetričnih oblika ugrožavanja bezbednosti. Naime, u okviru CARICOM-a, dosadašnja istraživanja nisu ustanovila niti jedan oblik asimetrične pretnje koja se dogodila u prošlosti. Stoga je utvrđeno da strateški

* viperprosec_7@hotmail.com

kontekst savremenih asimetričnih pretnji ima veliku vjerovatnoću da će se u budućnosti pojaviti u CARICOM-u. Oni uključuju asimetriju metode; asimetriju tehnologije; i asimetriju volje. Stoga, u cilju sprečavanja takvih budućih asimetričnih prijetnji u CARICOM-u, potrebno je usvojiti odgovarajuća politička sredstva, inovativnu i dobro formulisanu diplomatiju, kako bi imali odgovarajuću regionalnu posvećenost borbi protiv terorističkih pretnji, i kako bi smo razvili regionalne komunikacione strategije (odbrambene i ofanzivne u prirodi). Sve u svemu, ovaj rad je pokazao relevantnost klasične strateške misli u sprečavanju asimetrične prijetnje u CARICOM-u.

Cljučne reči: asimetrične prijetnje, Karibska zajednica (CARICOM).

DISCOURSE AS A FIELD OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS

Andrej Kubiček*

Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: Although military skill is performed to large extent in the field of discourse (propaganda) since the time of the first civilizations, strategic actions in this field in the contemporary era are both more important and complex than they ever were. Their importance is growing because in most modern countries political factor (civil government) controls military forces, and citizens who vote for government predominantly have pacifistic values and low level of motivation, abilities and knowledge to directly engage in war. Any kind of military activity demands to be formally legitimate both on internal and international plan. On the other hand, extremely fast development in all spheres of technology made conventional warfare too destructive, while the room for manoeuver in discursive field became large enough to enable new forms of action, as well as threats. Throwing flyers from the air, putting posters on the walls and emitting radio signals was replaced by digital contents on the Internet, as well as mobile phone and satellite communication channels, and also global popular culture contents.

The aim of the paper is to offer usable and heuristically fertile socio-linguistic definition of the discourse as a phenomenon which includes both linguistic and social reality in which competition for different kinds of power takes place. Then, it seeks to show basic guidance for discourse analysis (on phonological, morphological, lexical, syntactical and semantic level) for military purposes. Finally, and most importantly, the aim of the paper is to explain strategic nature of discursive action, as well as social dynamics which will cause different interpretations among special (groups): army, civilians, countries and other relevant actors. In other words, it will be considered why the same utterance/discourse can have completely different effects on different actors.

Key words: discourse analysis, discursive strategies, propaganda.

* andrej.kubicek@gmail.com.

INTRODUCTION

Language, written or spoken, is the principle mean of propaganda. Although propaganda sometimes includes different images, they can also be treated as verbal phenomenon, because even images can be verbally described, and at the same time, texts and utterances can invoke powerful visual images.

Nature of relationship between language and individual's perception of any kind of reality, including social one as well, is very complex and has long research tradition in science and philosophy. For the purpose of this paper, we will define two extreme standpoints. The first comes from the classical Greek philosophy and has its roots in Pythagoreanism and Platonism. According to this view verbal expressions are just reflections of some kind of "higher reality", or simply speaking, "the truth". Notions expressed by the use of language – written or spoken – are usually imperfect and prone to mistakes.

The main question here is how to express the ideal truth by using unreliable means such as language. Only a few chosen philosophers can reach such cognition, while most people keep living in illusions imposed by deceptive language. Francis Bacon had very similar notion in his concept of *Idols of the Market (Idola fori)*, which is one of the four sources of mistakes concerning thinking⁹¹³. Finally, we can find this understanding of relationship between language and truth in Marxist philosophy, where the former makes only superstructure of realistic, material relations. From this standpoint any propaganda is not only (inherently) viewed as bad, but also as powerless against certain (idealized) individuals who reached high level of consciousness and intellectual integrity.

Still, some political and social practitioners had – and still have – radically different approach to this problem. They are trying to interpret the use of verbal means as an instrument for shaping beliefs of particular people. Such approach, both practical and (quasi) theoretical is deeply rooted in a type of anthropological pessimism which claims that "human nature" is irrational and that one's mind has little strength, which can be easily broken or bluffed with propaganda⁹¹⁴. Goebbels's (supposed) maxim according to which lie which is repeated many times becomes truth is basically core of this viewpoint, which is not only nihilistic towards humanistic ideals, but also towards the idea of truth. Here "Truth" is understood in terms which some

⁹¹³ "Men associate through talk; and words are chosen to suit the understanding of the common people. And thus a poor and unskillful code of words incredibly obstructs the understanding", Francis Bacon, *The New Organon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 42.

⁹¹⁴ Vladimir Ilić, *Oblici kritike socijalizma* (Zrenjanin: Gradska narodna biblioteka „Žarko Zrenjanin”, 1998).

would call "Machiavellian": essentially it is irrelevant and can be used instrumentally. From this standpoint, propaganda is the integral part of any human activity and can potentially have unlimited applications, scope and effects.

Between these two poles there is whole abundance of phenomena we can name "propaganda". Although propaganda is as old as the mankind, its scope was very narrow until recent times in human history. Famous examples of ancient and medieval propaganda affected only small number of literate people, or only those people who could indirectly attend certain events. The age of propaganda began with the age of great technical inventions, starting with the printing press, then radio, cinema, television and the Internet.

Still, in order to understand those different aspects of propaganda, we need to sociologically contextualize relation between language and human mind. Although we live in an era which highly appreciates individualism and all kinds of personal integrity (moral, intellectual, esthetical and so on), this is prejudice brought by modernity and it must be rejected. As Karl Mannheim claimed⁹¹⁵, it is very discomfoting when one realizes that one's thoughts, which he held to be unique and very intimate part of his personality, are actually determined by external, social factors. The only thing which is even more discomfoting is to be confronted with this fact. That is why propaganda, as any other form of communication, is a social process which cannot be reduced on individual, psychological level.

On the other hand, language⁹¹⁶ cannot be reduced to any kind of "derivation" or "superstructure" of material reality. Instead of that, it is a constitutional part of the material world which has real and tangible consequences, as Valentin Voloshinov stressed one hundred years ago⁹¹⁷.

DISCOURSE

Discourse is a concept which was frequently used in the second half of XX century, although this word was used long before with different meanings (conversation, presentation or written discussion). Today it is one of the most frequently used concepts in social sciences and humanities, but the goal here is not to list all definitions of discourse, but to offer its applicable model. First of

⁹¹⁵ Karl Manhajm, *Ideologija i utopija* (Beograd: Nolit, 1978), 41.

⁹¹⁶ Here "language" means any verbalized action, not a set of grammatical rules or any particular language.

⁹¹⁷ Valentin Voloshinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1973), 48-49.

all, discourse is a phenomenon which connects society and language⁹¹⁸. It is usually presented as a spoken or a written text (speech, song, article, message, order, book...), but it is never only one text and it can be manifested in many different ways. Norman Fairclough introduced a notion of *order of discourse*⁹¹⁹, which means that one particular type of discourse is manifested in different textual/verbal forms, but at the same time these conceptual forms are also hierarchically arranged. For example, one discourse can be presented in a complex philosophical paper or a scientific study, in some sort of popular literature, political pamphlet or in everyday speech. Although the message is articulated in different ways, it is still the same discourse, which is textually interwoven. Thus discourse can be defined as a process of social interpretation of texts sets. The process within its nature can be seen in its historical perspective variability, because discourse slowly gains different forms and it develops, becomes redundant or retreats from opposite interpretation perspectives.

This is the first problem concerning discourse analysis. A rich philosophical tradition of hermeneutics, as well as the literary theory, stress authentic and genuine text interpretation exposure. Typical example of such endeavour is interpretation of religious texts which aim to reach higher truth and understanding of a divine, or secular attempts to find out the authentic idea of the author. While analyzing discourse sociologically in order to understand propaganda, or any other field of activity, one must be aware that there is no "authentic interpretation" of the content essence. What one author really thinks about the text he composed can be even irrelevant or unavailable to analyst's cognition. The aim of the analyst is to find out how audience can understand certain text and discourse. That is why any possible understanding of a certain text is important for analyst⁹²⁰.

So, the key feature of discourse analysis is understanding of other social actors. This process of interpretation is very complex because it includes

⁹¹⁸ Still, it's important to bear in mind that most of human verbal expressions are societal in nature. Some affective reactions or unconscious utterances are negligible. Even though there are lot of examples in which people tend to reflect on nature ("There is a storm in the mountains"), the very same sentence can also be a line of patriotic song, for example, or a everyday social ritual ("It's a lovely weather!").

⁹¹⁹ Norman Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse - textual research for social research* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

⁹²⁰ For example, while true or timeless messages from holy books may, or may not, be interesting for discourse analyst personally, she or he would be generally more interested to understand and explain how the very same text can inspire different people to be moral and hardworking or violent; conservative or revolutionary; optimistic or pessimistic; spiritual or bound to material etc.

use of different *resources* that social actors invest in its understanding. Even the very simple sentence such as "Belgrade is located on the mouth of the Sava and Danube river" demands some geography knowledge. Actors who lack such resource (knowledge) will not understand the sentence, or they will understand it in another way, if they have different resources. A key concept at play here is that texts authors assume that other actors (audience) have some resources that will enable them to understand the message in desirable way. The above mentioned example concerning Belgrade will be very informative for an actor who knows that Belgrade is the capital of Serbia, but does not know anything about its hydrographical features, or knows that the Sava river flows into the Danube river, but does not know the exact location of the mouth. On the other hand, the same text will be completely meaningless for somebody who does not recognize any of those three geographical terms. At the same time such message will be irrelevant for an actor who lives in Belgrade, or has visited it many times. If we analyze this example even further, it will become clear that this simple sentence actually contains much more information than it seems. The actor can further conclude that the Danube and the Sava are rivers that separate different regions of Europe, that they are both very important for transport, so that Belgrade has an important strategic position and so on. Still, where do all those additional information come from? How do actors exactly form those different interpretations of the same text, coming from different discourses? Still, where do those resources come from?

DO, SAY AND BE

Some of the resources are related to one's actions: we know very well place where we live, tasks we have already completed, or persons we have met. This simple observation becomes significant when we think about more complex domains of human activity. For example, an experienced strategist cannot explain complex plans to somebody who never participated in military activities. On the other hand, his opponent will try to interpret goals without asking for an explanation, because strategy is practical activity, as well as politics, sport, art, crafts and so on. It is impossible to learn principles of such activities without being actively involved in them, and any attempt to verbally explain them can only be even more confusing⁹²¹.

⁹²¹ James Paul Gee, "Language as saying, doing and being", u *The Discourse Studies Reader: Main currents in theory and analysis*, Angermuller, Johannes et al. (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamin's Publishing Company, 2014).

Still, human capacity to directly experience different situations is limited, and that is why great part of one's beliefs is transmitted symbolically through language or image⁹²², which is the second way people acquire resources needed for texts interpretation. For example, in developed society only small number of population has ever had any military or combat experience. Yet, there are even less individuals who have no knowledge concerning the military and some ideas about it, since they heard about it, as well as about many other topics from their family members. They watched about it on TV or in cinema, or they read something about it⁹²³.

The third source of such resources are social roles of different actors or groups they belong. Social roles are connected with different *textual genres*. Only an officer can compose texts in form of military orders, only the novelist can write novels, and politician can hold political speeches. Dissonance between genres and appropriate social roles can be interpreted comically, or can be a sign of social or political conflict. Specific *discourse communities* belong to different social groups. Anybody can recognize a soldier by the way he speaks – especially by terminology he uses – and every soldier is expected to be fluent in this particular type of speech and to use it on duty⁹²⁴.

Still, this does not mean that different patterns of texts interpretation, and at the same time processes of discourse forming, are individual, voluntary or situational. They tend to follow and reflect more thorough social processes. Although it is possible to understand one text in many different ways, actors will most frequently understand it in a way that is present in one social group or society as a whole. In other words, understanding of discourse tends to become routine in an indisputable way which was considered "normal", although it has capacities to contain different, even conflicting interpretations. Of course, exceptions are artistic texts such as literature and film which have a "purpose" to be reflected and interpreted in different ways. In all other cases different interpretations of the same text or texts sets are a clear sign of social conflicts.

POWER ASYMMETRY AND DISCOURSE

The next problem that arises is concerning the influence of discourse on social reality, or how actors use it to achieve concrete goals. First of all, popular understanding of discursive formations in Michel Foucault as sets of

⁹²² Large areas of human knowledge (history for example) are acquired exclusively by language, or other symbolical means.

⁹²³ *ibid.*

⁹²⁴ *ibid.*

rules which affect people on an unconscious level⁹²⁵ should be left to abstract philosophical speculations. It was already shown that interpretations, which are constitutive part of discourse can be very diverse and socially determined, originate from "below" or "within" society, and not from "above".

So, discourse does not have a power on its own, rather it takes it over and accumulates it from actors who use it. It is clear that such relations are typically asymmetric: alternative discourses can have marginal influence, while dominant ones can achieve enormous power. In order to understand better asymmetry in discursive field, it is useful to see three typical cases⁹²⁶:

1.) *Power in discourse*, which means that one actor/group can impose his/their interpretations in discursive field through situational verbal or textual clashes. This is usually done by persuasion, negotiations, silencing opponents, setting rules of communication and so on.

2.) *Power over discourse* means ability to access persuasion situation and to impose certain topics. It is clear that people cannot choose between unlimited number of ways to speak and think about some topic, because the number is defined by different social and political processes. Some people have right to speak and to be included in discussion, while others are excluded. This type of power is usually manifested at institutional level.

3.) *Power of discourse* is an ability of discourse to shape historical macro-structures. For example, discourses of liberal democracy or "political Islam" show greater influence on people today than monarchism (even though there is struggle with demagogic and authoritarian politicians from USA and EU to Turkey in the former). Still, what is the source of power of some narratives and their interpretations? As it was already said, the main thesis which is presented in this paper is that social actors give power to discourse, especially if they are part of important social processes. So, even when it seems that some discourse was imposed "from above", it is actually powerless unless it is generated within the group. Thus power of certain narratives should be searched in their potential for creating and maintaining concrete groups – which are also discursive communities. Still, which concrete discourses will be accepted? Answer is in group dynamics. Delimitations and local intergroup differentiation can be accumulated and have global consequences. For example, radical islamist groups members may accept specific interpretations of holy texts in order to morally dominate their immediate surrounding. Logic

⁹²⁵ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).

⁹²⁶ Anna Holzscheiter, *Power of Discourse and Power in Discourse: an Investigation of Transformation and Exclusion in the Global Discourse of Childhood*, PhD dissertation, FU Berlin, 2005, preneto u: Ruth Wodak, *The Discourse of Politics in Action, Politics as Usual* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

is clear – “If we are ready to follow strict rules, you must subject to us, because we have extraordinary ethical competencies”. That is how readiness to accept one discourse and right to lead group, and sometimes to form the group through the process are related. Thus narratives about confrontation with "the West" can be interpreted in the context of achieving intergroup domination. Although radical Islam will never rule Western world, it will justify power of its pleaders over other Muslims. Possible opponents from inside – non-radical Muslims – expose themselves to great risk of being labelled as "traitors" and stigmatized as unworthy of being followers of "morally incorruptible" leaders. Opponents who come from outside – non – Muslims – are viewed as "natural enemies", who only strengthen radical interpretations by opposing them.

So, when one speaks about discourse power to form macro – structures, one should also take into account social and political factors behind the process. In the particular case – strategic use of the enemy image. Even when narratives become dominant and commonly reproduced within one community, they will not survive for a long time if they lose their social foundation, or if they fail to form it in a way that suits them. In any other case, they will become negligible and obscure narratives – without social base, discourses that once had dramatic power of tragedy will become farce.

DISCOURSE

DESCRIPTION, INTERPRETATION AND EXPLANATION

Every strategic activity must have its instruments, so we will only briefly show what can be included in strategic discourse use elements. In order to better understand this discourse nature, first it is necessary to develop methodological means to analyze its content. We will present here basic methodology which can be developed in more sophisticated way⁹²⁷. Three steps in analyzing these elements are:

1.) Text description

This step is intuitive and it resembles literary analysis in many ways. Analyst tries to describe a.) Lexical characteristics of a text (which words are used, whether they have controversial meaning, some synonyms, antonyms or hyponyms, whether the author uses any metaphors or euphemisms...); b.) Grammatical characteristics (what type of actor or process is dominant; is it clear who the agent of certain action is; what kind of grammatical form, tense

⁹²⁷ Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power* (London: Longman, 1989).

or mood is used; which gender and number is used...) and c.) Text structure (Whether there are significant substructures and how they are arranged and presented).

2.) Interpretation

In this step analyst tries to understand which resources audience use in order to interpret the text. This task is interwoven with goals description of the author. Basically, these two tasks can be viewed as one, because (in normal situation) discourse author is aware of the communication context, as well as social and cultural characteristics of his audience. However, it does not have to be like this – the author of a propaganda pamphlet does not always have all information about population he is addressing, the information may be wrong, or he is not competent enough to use data he has. Still, first of all, the main goal of the analyst is to list all elements of the text that are not explicitly linguistically present in it, but are important for its understanding. In other words, he must understand the context of communication and interpretation. Also, the analyst must take into consideration knowledge and attitudes about the text that the audience he addresses have. Do the knowledge and attitudes change within the text content, or remain the same?

3.) Explanation

This step can be understood as the other side of interpretation. While in the previous step the analyst is interested in way society affects text understanding, now he focuses on the reverse process – how discourse affects society. What social determinants are at play? Can we identify power relations between actors? Are existing power relations legitimized or challenged? Are there any ideological contents and what are they like? What are the effects of the struggle that will help with meaning interpretation? Is that struggle situational, where one individual is trying to achieve his goal during concrete social event, or institutional and contains tendency to change rules or procedures of one society? Is that struggle latent or manifest?

STRATEGY AND DISCOURSE

Basically, everything that what was previously described forms parameters and elements of strategic discursive activity. *Discursive strategies* are more or less developed plans for achieving certain goals through

verbalized action⁹²⁸. As any other type of plans, they can be separated into smaller action units (sounds, pauses, words or sentences). Such action units are called *discursive moves*; when they are used in systematic manner, the moves compose a strategy.

What are the typical goals of discursive strategies? Generally speaking, they can include a.) informing the audience; b.) propagation of personal or group beliefs; c.) persuasion of the audience in order to adopt certain aspect of concrete events interpretation and d.) strengthening group solidarity. All these types of tasks can be used defensively if their purpose is to prevent opponent to achieve any of these four goals. It is clear that discursive strategies can be applied on all three previously mentioned cases of discursive power relations. Simply, it is possible to defeat opponent in an exchange of arguments or by monopolizing rights, even chance to speak/write. Final goal of such activity on the highest level can be normalizing one's own discourse to the level of "obvious truth" which people take for granted, or as something which is in their best interest.

Discursive strategies include not only things which are spoken/written, but also other relevant – and sometimes even crucial! – contents which are excluded. So, if we try to define basic types of strategies, they will include: a.) emphasizing positive speech about self; b.) alleviating/evading positive speech about opponent; c.) emphasizing negative speech about opponent and d) alleviating/evading negative speech about self⁹²⁹. All other concrete strategies can be based on any of the linguistic elements mentioned in methodological part of the paper. On lexical level we can stress certain words, repeat certain expressions, use terms which can have multiple meanings or tactically use certain related synonyms, antonyms, euphemisms or dysphemisms. As far as grammar is concerned one can use passive or active form, imperative or conditional mood, generalized by plural form use or personified by using singular form. Finally, concerning structure, one can use gradations in both directions, circular arguments and contrasts.

Discursive moves can refer to previous parts of the text, with the aim to further "clarify" and "explain" them, or to future segments with the aim to prepare audience for them. Author of the propaganda text must be familiar with interpretation resources his audience have and other preferences. By combining those two types of information the author can achieve maximum effect. For example, the author can match an unfamiliar concrete event and familiar (supposed) interpretative pattern. Sometimes it is even more effective

⁹²⁸ Teun van Dijk, *Prejudice in discourse* (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1984), 115.

⁹²⁹ *ibid.*

to offer narrative about particular event only partially, in order to mobilize and actualize audience's interpretative resources.

Smart use of metaphor is another tactics used in propaganda, especially if it is related to some kind of physical activity, which can be either pleasant (meal) or frightening (being swept off one's feet). Famous and illustrative example offered by Teun van Dijk is one in which journalists tend to present arrival of the migrants as if they are coming "in waves"⁹³⁰. What effect can this have on readers? They will probably feel they are drowning and struggling for air. The same goes for any other natural disasters which are frequently used as metaphors for social events and processes: eruptions, earthquakes, avalanches and so on. It is even more interesting to note that most of the readers have never experienced such phenomena. For example, when someone speaks about "an eruption of violence", many readers will be overwhelmed by feeling of destruction and unbearable heat, although they never saw an active volcano in the real life.

Another specific, and commonly used type of discursive strategy is representation of opponents as radically different from one's own group. It can include three subtypes: barbarization, when enemies are represented as strangers, brutes and savages; bestiality is a case when opponents are represented as animals, which can include either threatening species (wolves, gorillas, snakes...) or as species which are harmless, yet loathsome (pigs, dogs, rats and insects...); and demonization which mainly means only symbolic presentation of enemy as personification of evil forces. These examples show that discursive moves can be very subtle. For example, if one says that enemy group is "a horde", "a pack" or "a herd", one does not need to specify he also meant that members of those groups are savages, wolves/dogs or some kind of cattle.

Last of the strategic moves that will be mentioned here are sarcasm and irony, two figures of speech that have broad scope of application. These two cases are also interesting because they offer a chance to paraphrase and ridicule opponent's discourse. For example, propaganda texts can name opponent forces as "liberators" (if they attack) or "freedom fighters" (if they put up resistance); or quote words or slogans of their leaders. It is very important to note use of inverted commas here for the purpose of frightening. Sarcasm and irony imply that authors of propaganda discourse are self-confident and have faith in interpretative resources of their audience.

⁹³⁰ Teun van Dijk, *Racism and the Press* (London: Routledge, 1991).

CONCLUSION

Still, discursive strategies are not necessarily rational and effective – they only tend to be such. Many actors still use the same approach which has shown some results before, even when it becomes ineffective. There are many reasons why discursive strategies may not lead actor to preferred goal: he may lack information about interpretative resources of his audience sometimes or misinterpret the context of communication⁹³¹. He can also make bad decisions even when choosing communication channels. There are lots of examples when audience were addressed in language they did not understand, or by using communication channels they were not accustomed to, or did not use them at all. It is especially important to bear this in mind today, in the era of widespread belief that "everybody knows English and uses the internet and social networks". This slightly explains why interpretation of texts is neither completely chaotic nor hegemonically uniform today, as some think. It rather follows deeper social lines of division. Some segments of population are completely ready to accept particular types of discourse, while others cannot accept them and grow even stronger in their (opposite) beliefs.

Careful researcher must take into account the same parameters as the author of the analyzed text. Instead of confronting contents, he feels anger or judges author's moral and intellectual qualifications. The analyst must think about the purpose of such text, and the interpretative prerequisites which make the text relevant to particular type of audience. In some way, in order to realistically analyse propaganda, researcher should be able to step into both communicative roles: the role of author and audience.

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DISKURS KAO POLJE ASIMETRIČNIH KONFLIKATA

Andrej Kubiček*

Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu,
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Iako se znatan deo ratne veštine ostvaruje diskurzivno (propagandno) još od vremena prvih civilizacija, danas je strateško delovanje u ovom polju istovremeno važnije i složenije nego što je to ikada bio slučaj. Važnije je zbog toga što u većini savremenih država politički faktor (civilna vlast) upravlja vojnim snagama, a kod građana u čije ime se vlada preovladava pacifistički vrednosni obrazac i nizak nivo motivacije, sposobnosti i znanja da se neposredno uključe u rat. Bilo kakva vojna aktivnost zato zahteva legitimaciju kako na unutrašnjem, tako i na spoljnom planu. Sa druge strane, izuzetno brz razvoj u svim sferama tehnike učinio je konvencionalno ratovanje previše razornim, dok je manevarski prostor u diskurzivnom polju postao dovoljno širok da omogući nove vidove delovanja, ali i pretnji. Bacanje letaka iz vazduha, plakatiranje i emitovanje radio talasa zamenili su digitalni sadržaji na internetu, kao i kanali mobilne i satelitske komunikacije, zatim i sadržaji globalne popularne kulture.

Cilj rada je pre svega da ponudi upotrebljivu i heuristički plodnu sociolingvističku definiciju diskursa kao fenomena koji obuhvata i jezičku i

* andrej.kubicek@gmail.com.

društvenu stvarnost i u kome se aktivno odigravaju borbe za različite vidove moći. Zatim, da ukaže na osnovne smernice za analizu diskursa (na fonološkom, morfološkom, leksičkom, sintaktičkom i semantičkom nivou) u vojne svrhe. Konačno, i najvažnije, u radu će biti objašnjena strateška priroda diskurzivnog delanja, kao i društvena dinamika koja uslovljava njegova različita tumačenja kod posebnih (grupa) delatnika: vojske, civila, države i drugih relevantnih aktera. Drugim rečima, biće razmotreno zbog čega jedan te isti govor/tekst može imati sasvim različite efekte na različite segmente društva.

Ključne reči: analiza diskursa, diskurzivne strategije, propaganda.

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AS A KEY FOR CONFLICT REDUCTION AND REDUCING THE THREAT POSED BY RADICAL ISLAMISTS

Zoran R. Vitorovic*
Association Swiss Morning Star,
Switzerland

Abstract: In this paper, the author focuses on preventive diplomacy in order to increase confidence and diffuse tensions between the parties in a conflict. Since the concept of preventive diplomacy has become binding on all members of the UN, they must build trust and partnership relations in order to reduce the prospects of violent conflict between states by applying PD. The paper also deals with why states have not yet managed to find a solution to form the Global Village, a key vision in seeking to combat conflict and crisis.

Key words: asymmetry, diplomacy, conflict, UN, concept.

INTRODUCTION – MAGIC PHRASE “PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY (PD)”

In the multipolar world of today, which is slowly growing, one of the models for easing and reducing the incidence of asymmetric conflicts is certainly the use of preventive diplomacy. The basic idea was promoted by the first UN General Secretary U Thant and developed by UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros – Ghali in the UN “Report Agenda for Peace”¹. The idea is that, at the very least, by recognising and paying attention to the appearance of “smoke”, we may be able to prevent the outbreak of “fire and conflict”. This focus on prevention was discussed at numerous international conferences.

It was not until 1971, however, when the expert of psychodynamics of ethnic conflict, Professor Joseph Montville², pointed out the importance and essence of preventive diplomacy (PD) as a mechanism for preventing the

* Prof h.c. Dr. h.c. Zoran R. Vitorović is the president of Association Swiss Morning Star. E-mail: zoransv1@gmail.com.

¹ <http://www.un-documents.net/a47-277.htm>, Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peace making and peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary General, UN, 17.jun 1992., A/47/277), Interner access June 23, 2017

² Dr Josef Montville , Interview, Radio Deutsche Welle, June 18, 1995

emergence of conflicts, that PD really became an integral part of global processes. This was the reason why I addressed this concept of Preventive Diplomacy in a book published in 2003³ under the same name.

In that book I am pointing out that this concept moves beyond the diplomacy of everyday situations which are linked by “vertical lines” inside of one society, and “horizontal lines” through the so called “bridges of interest groups” between two states, that can be in some form of conflict.

People of the same ideas connect first through informal groups, after that when the number of informal group members increases, they begin to put pressure on the top of the pyramid in the society or state administration. This bonding takes place in various spheres of sports (sports diplomacy), and in literature, science, culture, politics.

The basic motives for all those involved in these informal groups are spreading the idea of communion, unity of diversity, and ultimately (at the end) the prevention of conflict. One of the ultimate consequences of the use of preventive diplomacy is the change of existing structures in power, and another is a stronger connection with the same-minded “on the other side of the state border.”

When the so-called “critical mass” is formed, it begins to act like a torrent of a river flowing in one direction. At a later stage, this torrent, by the nature of the dynamics of the groups involved in social processes, chooses the leaders. In the beginning, everything is structured in so-called informal social groups, and in the end, the political entity is born in the form of a party or movement. The most obvious example is the case of “Solidarnost” in Poland, which ultimately chose Lech Wałęsa as the leader.

However, like any idea born on healthy ground, the ways in how preventative diplomacy has been used and pursued often look like a case of Nobel’s Dynamite. The dynamite was supposed to help people to overcome easily the natural obstacles. However, it was used more in conflicts and wars rather than upstream for genuine peaceful preventative purposes. More clearly explained, it all looks like the story about a little Indian who came back from the forest. Dad, the tribal chief asked him, “Son, I saw that you had tried to send smoke signals, but I did not understand the message.” The little Indian replied, “I did not send anything, my blanket was on fire”.

Today, the practice of how preventive diplomacy is used, often seems to look like the story of a small Indian.

³ Zoran Vitorovic: „Preventivna diplomatija - kako spreciti sukobe i ratove”, Ars Libry, Beograd, 2003., str. 23-27.

It is enough to point out the cases of “Arab Spring” that began with the goals of getting rid of power from dictatorial and authoritarian regimes, and at the end of the day all switched to chaos and destabilization of Libya, Egypt and Iraq. The same has happened in Ukraine, after “Majdan”, where a dispute started with a protest and finally ended with a civil war.

American strategists were the first who had used the program of preventive diplomacy to develop mechanisms of non-violent regime change. On the other hand, great superpowers like China or Russia did not sit with crossed hands and wait. They also began to develop and implement numerous models of preventive diplomacy in order to achieve their own desired geopolitical aims. The importance of preventative diplomacy concepts can be seen in the number of centres that have been established in America, China, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, and Indonesia.

So today, we have:

- *The Centre for Preventive Diplomacy of Japan*, founded in 1995, led by distinguished Japanese diplomat Jasusi Akashi. Given that the term “preventive diplomacy” was quite incomprehensible for most of NGO activists in Japan, and following the need for a wider social engagement, the founders were in February 2002 renamed the Centre’s name into the Conflict Prevention Centre.

The Centre strives to work through programs, which could properly address potential conflicts “at an early stage of development”. If the conflicts fail, then the activation of a whole series of actions leading to rapid conflict eruption follows. After that, the program’s accent is to eradicate all neuralgic spots and to stop the conflict, preventing all points that could lead to wars again. All components are included in the prevention programs – from individuals to the state and non-governmental organizations and business associations.

To make the prevention effective, it is necessary:

- first, to clearly define the terms used in each phase of conflict prevention,
- secondly, to establish the theoretical framework for the determination of one particular conflict and
- thirdly, to develop an early warning system for all potential problems that may escalate into an armed conflict.

The Chairman of the Centre, Mr. Jasusi Akashi, says that after 1989, the largest number of conflicts in the world is based on ethnic or religious diversity and adds:

“If the international community really wants an effective way to deal with potential conflicts, then it must adopt a general principle that would correspond with the UN Charter, where it is particularly important to distinguish and establish: the rule of law, social justice, respect for human rights, freedom of the media and the good State Administration (good governance)”.

- *Jordanian Institute for Democracy*, founded in June 2000, as the Centre for Early Warning and Conflict Prevention. In the strategic development policy, it first started from the determination of the current situation in this part of the world, which, according to analysts, has always had plenty of ties, misunderstandings and potential hot spots. The next step in the development of the centre is the establishment of a data bank related to the economic, political and social development of the countries of the Middle East, in cooperation with representatives of the ministries of Foreign affairs ... To keep peace and stability and prevent all forms of conflict disputes, the Centre has formed the huge network of non-governmental organizations for early warning of potential conflicts.

- *Swedish IDEA Institute*. In Sweden, the International Institute for Democracy and Election Support IDEA works largely on analyses of current events and the prevention of potential conflicts. The IDEA's characteristic of the work is to link the conflict-management tools with a process of the development of democracy, whereby democratic institutions are used as a basic tool for solving potential conflicts. IDEA's orientation is to stimulate the development of dialogue by strengthening civil society organizations, tolerance of confinement, which most directly affects the prevention of all types of possible conflicts. The programs are so pious that they offer practical means for democratization of some environment, whereby resources are adapted to concrete truths. For example, in the guide “Democracy and Reconciliation”, the creators of political processes give concise instructions and advice that help them implement the democratic values in a post-conflict society.

- *German's Schleswing-Holstein Institute for Peace Research (SHIP)*. It was formed in the German city of Kiel at the Kristian Albrecht Institute in 1995, with the goals aimed at solving potential conflicts in the Baltic States. In the publication “Papers from Kiel”, which is regularly issued by the SHIP

Institute, problems in the domain of preventive diplomacy are dealt with, in particular.

- *Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).*

After the Paris Summit of the Heads of States or Governments, held on November 19-21, 1990, OSCE began with the establishment of the CPC Conflict Prevention Centre. At the Paris Summit of the OSCE, new elements of international politics have been introduced, which the organization is especially mindful of: human rights, democratization of society and the rule of law. A decade later, when analysing the structure of the OSCE, we see that the basic elements of preventive diplomacy are: early warning, information gathering, monitoring the development of events - and also the basic settings in the work of the OSCE.

Today, the OSCE has a number of mechanisms and instruments designed for successful implementation of the core principles of the Preventive Diplomacy Program. These mechanisms or instruments are:

- Permanent Forum for Security Cooperation, meets once a month
- Personal Representative of the Chairperson of the OSCE for the Crisis regions – Georgia, Ukraine, Tajikistan ...
- Office for the development of democratic institutions and human rights
- OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, and others.

According to OSCE experts, it is currently not only the largest regional organization that has not only focused its work on the development of sub-programs of the Preventive Diplomacy program, but also helps other regional organizations such as the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership ASEAN to form their Regional Conflict Prevention Centre.

- *ASEAN's Regional Forum.* The states assembled in the ASEAN Association established the Regional Forum for Strengthening Cooperation and Conflict Prevention at a meeting held on 7-8 November, 1996 in Paris, in cooperation with the Washington Centre for International Strategic Studies CSIS, the French Institute for International Relations and the OSCE. A special emphasis in the line of the ASEAN Forum is on preventive diplomacy programs. After the founding of the Forum, it began with the establishment of "early warning networks" of the conflicts in Southeast Asia.

- *America's CSIS – Centre for International Strategic Studies – Washington, USA.* Since 1994, CSIS has a special department under the name of the Program of preventive diplomacy run by Dr Joseph Montvil. The program is widespread and includes the most explosive ethnic national problems in various parts of the world. The essence of these programs is the development of ethnically religious dialogues.

- *Interpaz – International Institute for Peace Studies - Brazil.* This private non-profit institute was founded in 1995 in the city of Kiritibu in Brazil with the aim of developing projects in the field of culture, education and science. The emphasis in this paper is to study the problem of establishing, maintaining and developing a global culture of peace, tolerance, cooperation and dialogue. The most important project for Iterpaz is the development of the Centre for the Study of the World Peace. Within the Centre, there are Peace Information Sector and the Training Department for individuals who make decisions in the conflict prevention. The orientation is to promote processes for the prevention of all forms of conflict through the promotion of social activities of different ethnic, cultural or religions groups.

- *“Abdullah's Initiative” - Saudi Arabia.* Due to the specificity of the political system in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, initiatives in the domain of prevention of the Middle Eastern conflicts arise more as a result of the deliberate efforts of the members of the ruling Al Saud family. One of them is the Prince Abdullah al-Saud's Initiative, aimed at strengthening dialogue between Israel and Palestine.

From the basic ideas of the preventive diplomacy, ideas and concepts of cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy⁴, soft power diplomacy⁵, sports diplomacy, and more have been “born” over time. Today we are talking about “permanent transformation” of classical diplomatic theory and practice.

GLOBAL VILLAGE - YES, BUT HOW

Accelerated development of technology and artificial intelligence, known as the fourth industrial revolution (automation, digitalization and robotics), poses numerous challenges in front of humanity. One is a clear move to an interconnected Global Village in which there will no longer be

⁴ Christopher Ross, “Public Diplomacy Comes of Age,” in *The Battle for Hearts and Minds* (Washington, D.C.: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2003), p. 252

⁵ “Soft power” concept, Nye, Joseph S. Jr. 1991, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. NY: Basic Books, p. 330.

places for isolated societies. This was discussed in 1995 when the first United Nations Conference on Human Rights⁶ was held at the United Nations in Vienna. At that time, the basic guiding idea was “how the Global Village should be built” in view of the galloping process of developing technologies that force us in that direction.

All subject of the international community, from the permanent members of the Security Council -China, Russia, Great Britain, France and USA - to the representatives of the countries of Latin America, Asia and the Arab world, agree that this is “the direction of the future development of the Earth’s globe”. At the UN conference, it was necessary to define the minimum human rights as the basis on which the national, regional and international legal order would be developed.

Regardless of the good will to seek a peace settlement, UN member states failed to agree on the baseline values of the future Global Village. The adopted declarations and conclusions of the UN Human Rights Conference have not only been “Lukewarm” and non-binding, but also emerged at a time at the beginning of a whole range of regional, national and international conflicts, which took place for the next 20 years after the end of the conference. Each side has tried to convince the other, in practice, that their concept of Global Village was the only correct one. Behind the formal proclaimed aims, very soon it was clear that the ultimate priority for states was in geostrategic and geopolitical interests.

The lines of deep divisions were not only between the states, but also within the national political business structures and establishments inside countries. In the end, in 2017, everything “exploded” when it was clear for everyone that behind the scene there is a tectonic conflict between the owners of huge capital. They are split into main groups – one is a still for the option that Global Village must be built on a form of transnational, regional, social structures in which national states will “drown”. On other hand, there are those who still believe that regional organisations could be functional and effective only with a stronger presence, in the decision-making processes, of national states.

An additional stroke was the knowledge that when the world was confronted with a Global financial crisis (2009), huge state interventions resulted in many countries like Russia and China and in the Western economies.

This was a shock for many Western analysts who until that moment had repeated, like a mantra, that the time “of the state’s interference with the

⁶ <http://www.un.org/en/development/devagenda/humanrights.shtml>.

economy is going to pass, and that it is enough to release the free market, which could on their own successfully regulate all financial problems and crisis”. In the end, it became clear that Global multipolar Society is slowly growing up and that liberal capitalism must be essentially reformed.

Talking about five priorities for the current year (2017), the founder of the World Economic Davos Forum, Professor Klaus Schwab⁷, stressed that “for the leaders of the global elite urgent priority must be the reform of existing structure of liberal market capitalism”. Professor Schwab says, “it is most important to constructively think about the future and to catch up with existing problems. Instead of hacking and expanding pessimism, it is more important to examine what specific measures should be taken to overcome the problems. One thing is clear: market capitalism has to change, to improve, but we simply do not have a better system for the development of democracy.” “Representatives of the elite and political leaders had made a lot of mistakes because they had been concentrated on the needs in contexts of short-term (daily) solutions. Instead of that, they should be dedicated to activities that will lead to the fulfilment of long-term vision.”

SUB REGIONAL STRUCTURES VERSUS NATIONAL STATES

One of the asymmetric conflicts present around the world has been created as a reflection in the processes of Global integration – conflicts between national countries versus sub-regional structures.

For example, the idea of the great (and perhaps the last) visionaries of the common European Union - Mitterrand and Kohl - to develop the EU “first through the strengthening of the euro currency and then through the integration of common European values” is largely in crisis and retreat.

What happened? It is best explained by EU Parliament President Martin Schulz (WEF Davos 2017)⁸, who said: “The primary goal, when building the EU and insisting on the freedom and rule of law, was to prevent the emergence of authoritarian or dictatorial regimes. Unfortunately, in some countries like Poland or Hungary, there is the emergence of authoritarian regimes, and that’s contrary to the basic values on which the EU was built.”

Martin Schulz emphasizes that “the EU is not a federal state and the EU Commission is not a federal government. The EU is an alliance of sovereign states. The EU is neither pro-German nor pro-French! Our

⁷ WEF Davos 2017, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/03/klaus-schwab-new-narrativefor-globalization>.

⁸ Ibid.

institutions are clearly defined by agreements that all 28 members have accepted and signed. Therefore, decisions are made unanimously and it does not matter whether the country is ‘small’ or ‘big’, economically stronger or weaker, all members are equal. The EU is a joint project of all member states.”

The “double standards” of the political representatives of EU member states are explained by Schulz with the words “And now, one minister comes to a meeting in Brussels, he actively participates in the work of the Commission or the Parliament, and then when he returns home, for domestic audience he says I have nothing to do with it. They decided there in the EU! It’s scandalous! Here, we all participate in the decision-making process and then they ‘do not know anything.’ That’s exactly why we have lost confidence of citizens in the EU institutions!”

In the meantime, some countries like the United Kingdom through a referendum decided to “exit the Common Europe”. In other words, the clashes between supranational organizations (EU, Mercosur, ASEAN, etc.) and national states have been intensifying. Let’s take as a second example China. It has, along with active participation in the organization of ASEAN countries, started with developing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the project “Road and Belt of Silk in the 21st Century” as a model for the realization of Chinese interests from Asia to Europe. From the above examples of double standards - political representatives of the members of the European Union and China’s geopolitics - it is evident that the policies that most countries follow are related more to national priorities instead of readiness to develop subnational state structures.

Princeton economist Dani Rodrik²⁷, speaking several times at the World Economic Forum in Davos, underlined that the causes of Brexit and the „intensified conflicts” between national states and regional organizations are in a ground because of “Globalisations trilemma” According to Rodrik, democracies and national sovereigns, which are highly valued among the inhabitants of the state, are incompatible with unlimited models of globalization expanding: free trade and free capital flows. Rodrik remarks that when the state signs contracts on the free flow of capital, it ceases to have control over many elements of national economy, and consequently, there is a lack of stability, primarily financial and social²⁸.

Many leading Russian and Chinese economists agreed with Rodrik, reiterating that many countries, such as China or India, have maintained

²⁷ Dani Rodrik, *Das Globalisierungs-Paradox. Die Demokratie und die Zukunft der Weltwirtschaft*, C.H.Beck Verlag, Berlin, 2011, ISBN-13:978-3406613517.

²⁸ WEF Davos, www.weforum.org, 2015.

control over the key parts of their economies, which is contrary to international free trade agreements and World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations-. Only when businesses and economies were sufficiently strong, these countries, but again selectively, accepted the standards of the WTO.

Financial analysts say that there is no system of regulation on the Globe, the world capital market, but that in many respects North American, European and Asian are opposite. For example, in the European Union, offshore companies are banned.

The “double standards” of the political representatives and the “trilemma” of globalization are increasingly undermining overall stability in most of the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, creating conditions for the exponential rise of crises and military offensives. Along with these, relations within regional organizations are becoming more and more unstable, and one consequence has been reflected as a conflict with national states (along with the Damocles still present global economic crisis, which is partly consolidated after 2008, but not solved) threaten to seriously damage the Global Peace.

ISLAMIC (RELIGIOUS) RADICALISM AS REBELLION AND RENAISSANCE OF A MUSLIM SOCIETY OR MECHANISM FOR DEMOLITION OF “DISOBEDIENT” REGIMES

One of the factors that further reinforces all aspects of asymmetric threats to peace and stability is the global strengthening of radical, Islamic fundamentalism. The reasons for this are numerous, from the socioeconomic to the average Muslim’s sense of “inferiority” in relation to the West or Asia.

The reflection of the power of Islamic radicalism has been felt by the peoples of Iraq, Libya, Syria. Instead of building up a prosperous society systems after the “Arab Spring” - with more democracy, rights and freedom - civil wars have exploded. The so-called secular Islamic states are slowly becoming warlike conflicts places with incalculable consequences, or like Algeria, in order to calm the emotions of the population, establishing more radical political structures of power.

However, this phenomenon, which many, above all in Europe, had looked at as a specific form of Autism (“it happens somewhere there”), with a growing migrant crisis seriously “moving” to the domestic European terrain. With the “tsunamis” of the refugees in Europe the whole brigade of fighters of Islamic fundamentalists came (covert), whose presence began to become more and more frequent, with a number of terrorist strikes, known as “bites of green axes”. From Berlin, Marseilles, Paris, Brussels, London, Manchester, the

brigade pointed out a problem that can never be solved by the use of classic police military models.

Terrorist attacks in Barcelona and Kanlibris⁹, 17 and 18 August 2017, and then in Finland on August 19¹⁰, indicate a heightened intensity of terrorist actions and obviously Europe is about to face a “hot” autumn.

Every “eye closing” or minimizing real threats from new attacks by Islamic terrorist groups is a suicide with premeditation! On the other hand, in order to prevent the occurrence of mass fear and panic, it is necessary to regularly monitor the occurrence and transfer of all measures for their prevention.

In the preventive work, the role of religious thinkers and the political-cultural elite is especially important, because with the use of exclusively police-military measures terrorism cannot be defeated in the long run. It is necessary to develop awareness of the need for more general and wider society prevention in which the representatives of liberal Muslims have a special role to play¹¹.

It is very strange that all former wars (First and Second World War, ex-SFRY war, etc.), “tsunami” of migrants and increasingly frequent attacks by Islamic terrorists (from Brussels, Nice, Paris, Berlin, London, Barcelona ...), as well as the warnings of the US CIA, the Russian FSB and the Israeli Mossad, *have not yet sufficiently sensitized the leadership structures of the Europe’s operative security systems*. This comes primarily from political leaders and security service leaders.

The old, troubled and dysfunctional security structures are a feature of the security apparatus in Germany, since it was only after the attack in Berlin publicly known that “the German police and the relevant agencies *did not have a central coordinating body* to exchange information and coordinate actions. It was so that military services intelligence had known all about potential terrorists and their intentions, and that the civilian services of the provinces did not have any information about it.“

Diligence, unwillingness and thoroughness are the only explanations why, only after the terrorist attacks in Barcelona and Berlin were carried out, a whole set of measures of physical and technical protection of the set-up zones

⁹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/21/spain-terror-attacks-death-toll-main-suspect-hunted-across-europe>).

¹⁰ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/19/finnish-knifeman-moroccan-say-police/>

¹¹ Anthony J. Blinken, “Winning the War of Ideas,” in Alexander T. J. Lennon, ed., *The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), p. 287.

of the downtown centres of these cities was applied, for example by imposing concrete obstacles.

Another aspect of the problem is related to the information served to the public after something happens. The need for panic prevention is understandable, but certainly, the truthfulness and timeliness of information is far more effective than selective one.

The best example for this is the “case of Barcelona”. In the first information, the media “talked” about several dead and dozens of wounded civilians. Only three days later, official sources of the police confirmed everything that analysts had suspected at the first moment: they were coordinated attacks on four counts, two were successfully taken in Barcelona and Kanbilis, twice shaken (Valencia and suburb of Barcelona), the number of dead a total of 30 and injured over 130.

Initially, it was talked about “only two assassins”, two days later we find out that in the direct preparation and execution of the attack 12 terrorists were involved, with the logistical support of at least 40 participants of the action. This means that this was a campaign in which two infantry cells were engaged (the standard categorization of the YNA, infantry cells in the peacetime composition has 30 in the war 90 fighters), which took several months to prepare the attack. How is it possible then that the security services did not notice anything? Who denied it? Agents or informers?

As for the “Spaniard case”, it is obvious that the parts of the Islamic terrorist brigade of “sleeping” terrorists, long sought after by the European Union, are scattered - from Great Britain to Finland, Germany and Spain. While political and command structures in most of the EU countries are exhausted by political legality discussions about the legitimacy and eligibility of certain anti-terrorist measures, while the “competent” are slowly consolidating and activating, so far the Islamic Brigade is increasingly showing presence.

New characteristics of terrorist attacks across Europe are:

- a large number of engaging terrorists, direct executors and supporters,
- simultaneous actions at distant points of the European Union (from Spain to Finland),
- increased use of van and cold weapons,
- fast transfer of direct attackers from one city to another (from Barcelona to Kanbrilis and further to Italy),

- strong and efficient logistic structure (number of flats and houses for accommodation of direct executors, a large number of so-called “stacks” for withdrawal after done actions ...)
- direct perpetrators are younger and more fanatical (from 17 to 23 years of age).

This is followed by an increasingly noticeable form of autism or a blind eye to a real state of affairs, accompanied by no or very weak realistic prevention by the security structures of most EU countries.

The exception is Switzerland, which on several occasions managed to prevent the formation of the conditions for the conduct of terrorist attacks with very successful preventive actions. Another case is the closure of the Mosque in Winterthur in 2016, and the expulsion of the then radical imam.¹²

Parallel to this, the work of Imam was documented in video and background materials, finally with the provision of two witnesses (aged 21 and 24) who were provided with all possible security protection.

At the same time, in all cantonal police of the Confederation, there are specialized sections for inter-religious dialogue¹³, which employ several civilian inspectors who regularly visit mosques and religious associations and monitor life and work of members of these communities. If one feels threatened or thinks he has noticed something “somewhat suspicious and dangerous”, he certainly does (as these two males of Muslim believers who regularly visited the preaching of the radical imam).

After all the relevant information, which as a rule are “very sensitive” are obtained, the police and the security services make everything necessary to protect the “sources” of the collected data. This additionally reinforces the confidence of all minority communities in the entire security system and the competent Swiss Confederation’s security service.

In order to avoid the occurrence of mass fear and panic, it is always necessary to timely inform the public¹⁴, with a precise indication of the difference between “the classic criminal act committed by an individual in the appearance of mental disorder” in relation to a terrorist attack (for example, random killing and wounding passers-by downtown). It does not mean that

¹² <https://www.srf.ch/news/regional/zuerich-schaffhausen/an-nur-moschee-in-winterthur-immer-noch-geschlossen>

¹³ www.fluechtlingshilfe.ch/news/archiv/2017/zusammenarbeit-mit-der-kantonspolizei-bern-fuer-praevention.html

¹⁴ Terry Deibel and Walter Roberts, *Culture and Information: Two Foreign Policy Functions*(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976), pp. 14-15.

every wound is ‘cold’ or caused by firearms or that every attack is a terrorist attack.

By highlighting the difference, when something happens, between the terrorist and the criminal act is the most reliable method of avoiding panic and general civil uncertainty. In this part, the role of social networks and means of information is remarkable.

In the context of public debates that have been going on across Europe in recent months, it seems that a good part of the experts has not yet truly understood that the problem of terrorism cannot be resolved by using only military police measures.

It is necessary to expand and constantly engage all social segments, with the emphasis on dialogue, co-existence and daily promotion of all liberal Muslim intellectuals, thinkers and religious leaders.

Unless the whole set of measures from the domain of prevention, with the participation of all parts of society, is applied, it is easy to “slip” in the zone of unilateral labelling of all Muslims as a potential danger, which brings us to a state of general chaos and mass panic. Swiss experts recall that this process must be prevented at all costs because the goal of the attackers is precisely the polarization of society and the provocation of radical actions primarily against Christian communities. If this spiral of “reaction to actions” is initiated, it leads us towards the total chaos that will never end.

The only way out is to actively involve all politicians, intellectuals and religious leaders from the Arab Muslim world in the process of suppressing this estate that can very quickly endanger not only all European countries, but also North Africa and the Middle East.¹⁵

At the same time, it is essential that the international community, in the form of a new “Marshall Plan”, urgently invests huge amount of money in stabilizing economic and social problems from the Maghreb to the Persian Gulf.

This approach would annihilate the strength and flight of radical Islamists, and above all the “domestic public”. The ideal method to act in these two directions - the involvement of Islamic intellectuals and businessmen, as well as the implementation of an emergency and, to the extent, a very large Marshall Plan, is the application of the overall mechanisms given in the PD.

¹⁵ Nobel-winning economist Amartya Sen writes in "Identity and Violence," Penguin publications, 2006.

SPREAD OF CONFLICTS, BOTH LOCAL AND REGIONAL, AS RESCUE
FOR STRONGEST ECONOMIES

The former President of the EU Parliament, Martin Schulz, is one of few world's leading politicians who underlies the hypocrisy of modern political thought and the ethics of those who made decisions using "double" standards, spinning and inversions. That is why many analysts wonder: "do we live in a time when the emergence of a crisis of liberal capitalism is sought in regional, local and sub regional conflicts" that most favour military-industrial lobbies and is the ultimate goal "stabilizing the economies of the world's strongest powers using the fascist principle - Strengthening of the war Machineries, provoking wars and cheap post-war take-up of natural resources?"

According to my analysis, the greatest enemy of any modern political leader is he - himself. More precisely, a mirror in which every morning he looks at. If everyone started to treat the world individually from that perspective, without having a double or triple morals, I am convinced that the current global asymmetric crisis would burst apart like soap foam. It is enough that people, ordinary citizens, start direct communication and start to build, right now and immediately, one better future and things will quickly "get into normality".

Take as example a residential block in one building in Bosnia, after the war. When three tenants agreed (in 2002) to reconstruct and repair the entrance, all the floors, galleries, the parking space and the windows on the building, without waiting for the municipal authority - it was very fast, in two days all done. Three started the action during the day, the neighbours from all flats of the given entrance joined (in total, 42 people). After two days, the entrance and stairs were shining – like new.

The inhabitants of the neighbouring entrance saw that "it is nice, everything is shining there", with the comments "we are not any less incompetent than the neighbours" they self-organized and brought everything in order in two days. After that, actions were transferred to the neighbouring buildings like viruses. Within 7 days, the whole quarter looked like it had been recently built and tenants began to behave far more responsibly towards their immediate surroundings.

If this was possible to be done at the level of the whole quart, a multinational, after war in Bosnia, surely the same can be done at the level of the state of Bosnia and the whole Western Balkan as a region. The important point is a will, readiness for the concrete action of individuals, and that people are connected about common needs and interests, without waiting for the

municipality, the canton, the state. This is a major example of preventive diplomacy in practice.

CONCLUSIONS

Observing the Global Village, it seems that the fear and general insecurity of the citizens are dominant. The increasingly reflection of the old ideological conceptions with the present deeper crisis of global liberal capitalism does not give hope that the use of “sincere” preventive diplomacy will give positive results for the Global Peace.

Maybe it is already too late for preventive diplomacy. If the day is known by the morning, the world is at the doorsteps of greater global conflicts and wars. The question is when this will start, how and in which forms?

If this is a case, then the best definition of complete humanity is recorded in a single cartoon: The cartoon shows the monkeys, in front of the monkey is a Neanderthal, in front of the Neanderthal is a Modern Man. From the other direction, a man is coming back from 23rd century. He looks at the group and says “Please, let’s go all back. We ruined everything what we could!”

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DIPLOMATIJA KAO KLJUČ ZA REDUKCIJU KONFLIKTA I SMANJIVANJE PRETNJE RADIKALNIH ISLAMISTA

Zoran R. Vitorović*
Udruženje „Swiss Morning Star”,
Švajcarska

Apstrakt: U ovom radu, autor se fokusira na preventivnu diplomatiju kako bi povećao samopouzdanje i otklanjanje tenzija između strana u sukobu. Pošto je koncept preventivne diplomatije postao obavezujući za sve članove UN-a, oni moraju izgraditi poverenje i partnerske odnose kako bi smanjili perspektive nasilnog sukoba između država primenom preventivne diplomatije. Članak se takođe bavi pitanjem zašto države još nisu uspele pronaći rešenje za formiranje globalnog sela, ključnu viziju u borbi protiv sukoba i kriza.

Ključne reči: asimetrija, diplomatija, sukob, UN, koncept.

* Prof h.c. Dr. h.c. Zoran R. Vitorović is the president of Association Swiss Morning Star. E-mail: zoransv1@gmail.com.

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY IN STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF ASYMMETRIC THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

Veljko Blagojevic*

Strategic Research Institute, University of Defence,
Republic of Serbia

Milovan Subotić**

Strategic Research Institute, University of Defence,
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: Defence diplomacy is significant part of diplomacy and overall foreign policy of states. The functions of defence diplomacy are defined and regulated by diplomatic law and practice in the receiving state, as well as the position of the state in the international order. Globalization in the field of security enhances, bringing us more and more challenges to national security and forcing strategy makers to change approach to strategic considerations. It makes the process of developing comprehensive national strategy very difficult because apart from still existing “traditional” threats, there are new, asymmetric, threats as well. Therefore, it is necessary not only to find answers to new threats, but also to keep readiness for responding “traditional” threats and consequently form a comprehensive and wide-ranging strategic response to threats. Not less problem is how to distribute the competencies of the subjects of security and defence system in a proper way.

The aim of this paper is to consider the functions of modern defence diplomacy and its role in identification and countering asymmetric threat to national security. Consequently, this process could give some answers and contribute to contemporary strategic thought.

Key words: asymmetric threat, defence diplomacy, national security strategy, strategic thought, terrorism, migration.

INTRODUCTION

The defence diplomacy, like diplomacy in general, appeared as an evolutionary process that was determined with the development of international relations and national interests. The roots of defence diplomacy

* veljko_blagojevic_55@hotmail.com

** milovan.suboti@mod.gov.rs

lie in military diplomacy, which became a reality at the beginning of the nineteenth century and developed until the beginning of the twenty-first century. Namely, at that time international relations have become significantly different compared to the previous two centuries that have created the conditions for military diplomacy that got quantitatively and qualitatively different characteristics going more beyond just military issues. On the contrary, non-military, or asymmetric threat to national security is the most common threat in the contemporary world. In that sense, it is quite logical to try to find out the role of defence diplomacy in the process of identification and countering asymmetric threat in order to provide national security of modern states.

Diplomatic relations are codified by Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations, which defines the generally accepted functions of diplomatic representatives. Defence diplomacy is a part of diplomacy in general, so all rules of international laws that regulate the diplomatic relations apply to defence diplomacy, including functions. Having that in mind, we are able to perform, by analogy, specific functions of defence diplomacy that are most commonly reduced to the following:

- a) Representing the defence system of sending state to the receiving state;
- b) Protecting the interests of the defence system of sending state to the receiving state, within the limits permitted by international law;
- c) Negotiating with the defence and security system of the receiving state;
- d) Ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the defence and security system of receiving State, and reporting thereon to the defence system of the sending state;
- e) Promoting confidence building, friendly relations and cooperation between the defence and security system of the sending state and the receiving state, and developing cooperation in the field of defence and security.⁹³²

⁹³² Compare: *Ogorec Marinko: Vojno-diplomatska praksa* (Military-Diplomatic Practice), *Golden marketing – Tehnička knjiga*, Zagreb, 2005, pp. 46-52; *Zečević Milan: Vojna diplomatija* (Military Diplomacy), *Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, Beograd*, 1990, pp. 127-141; *Zdravković Miloje: Funkcije, karakteristike i uloga vojne diplomatije u savremenim međunarodnim odnosima* (The Functions, Characteristics and Role of Military Diplomacy in

Some authors who dealt with the functions of the defence attachés also added the function of principal advisor to the chief of diplomatic and consular missions on defence and security issues⁹³³. However, the role of defence attachés in diplomatic-consular missions is very important in the field of defence and security of every state.⁹³⁴

MODERN ASYMMETRIC THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

To define asymmetry, in the most simplified way, we can say that asymmetric threats or techniques are a version of not “fighting fair”, which can include the use of surprise in all its strategic dimensions and the use of weapons, means and instruments in the ways unplanned by the counterpart. Not fighting fair also includes the prospect of an opponent designing a strategy that fundamentally alters the terrain on which a conflict is fought.⁹³⁵

During the last fifteen years, the term “asymmetry” and “asymmetric” have become vogue words in American and European strategic and political science. It becomes most common to use this word, not only in terms of war or armed conflict, but also in context of overall national security. Therefore, it is very often to use terms taken from military strategists like⁹³⁶ strategy, battle, options, etc. to explain the nature of asymmetry threat and its objectives, countermeasures and the like. These terms are difficult to understand more than they enlighten, having become politicized rather than being truly analytical. In contemporary usage, asymmetric threats generally include terrorism, unconventional or guerrilla warfare as it is the case in Afghanistan and Iraq, the use of weapons of mass distraction, cyber-warfare, or information warfare. More recently, the use of cruise and/or ballistic missiles, and other weapons to fashion an anti-access or area denial strategy to include, in some

Contemporary International Relations), Master Paper, Faculty of Political Science, Beograd, pp. 8-9; *Goceovski Trajan: Osnovi na sistemot na nacionalna odbrana* (Basics of the System of National Defense), *četvrto dopolneto i izmeneto izdanie, Filozofski fakultet, Skopje*, 2005, p. 408
⁹³³ Compare: *Ogorec Mirko: Vojno-diplomatska praksa, Golden marketing, Zagreb*, 2005, p. 52 and *Vasić Dušan: Preventivna diplomatija- teorijski koncept, normativni okvir i političke kontroverze* (Preventive Diplomacy - a Theoretical Concept, Normative Framework and Political Controversy), *Službeni glasnik, Beograd*, 2010, p. 87.

⁹³⁴ More on functions of defense diplomacy in: Blagojević Veljko: „*Funkcije odbrambene diplomatije u međunarodnom pravu*“ (Funkcions of Defense Diplomacy in International Law), *Godišnjak Fakulteta bezbednosti* 2015, Beograd, 2016.

⁹³⁵ <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/sa98/sa98ch11.htm>

⁹³⁶ For more on history of strategies see: Kennedy Paul (ed.): *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1991.

cases, urban warfare, have been embraced as asymmetric threats. At the same time, we must note that many of these asymmetric threats are quite often long-standing ones⁹³⁷. For example, ballistic missiles were first used by the Nazi Germany in the V-1 and V-2 missile attacks upon London in 1944-45. As the U.S. Army War College study observes, asymmetry is a new word for an old concept whose provenance goes back to Sun Tzu's "all warfare is based on deception," through Liddell Hart's "indirect approach" to Edward Luttwak's "paradoxical logic of strategy."⁹³⁸

Asymmetric approaches can achieve powerful effect through manipulation of the psychological element. Aimed directly at the will of the opponent, they can compensate for materiel or other deficiencies. While the method of the approach may be tactical, the psychological effect is sought at the strategic level.⁹³⁹

Undoubtedly, the idea of avoiding enemy strengths while probing for their weaknesses and maximizing our own advantages is hardly revolutionary. The actuality of September 11 graphically and tragically validated the point that the asymmetric threat is the one that goes beyond the limits of our physical and mental capabilities to conceive of or execute. At the same time, while rattling on about asymmetric threats, we underestimated our enemy's potential for thinking strategically.

On the other hand, weak actors in international politics have a high interest in winning because only victory ensures their survival. Following figures point out this fact⁹⁴⁰:

⁹³⁷ Current asymmetric threats are countless, but there are some classifications, as follows: 1) Use of biological and chemical weapons, 2) Use of lasers for blinding, 3) Use of some types of mines, 4) Suicide attacks, 5) Surprise first strikes, 6) Particularly brutal attacks, 7) Indiscriminate attacks on civilians and neutral countries, 8) Environmental attacks, 9) Attacks on all satellite systems, 10) Attacks on all computer systems, 11) Funding terrorist groups to launch attacks, 12) Fighting not to win but to lose, 13) Intentionally exposing one's own population to high casualties, 14) Actually attacking one's own population, 15) Fighting to death, and 16) Negotiating arms-control treaties with the intent to covertly develop arms in contravention of the treaty. Taken from: Primmerma C.A.: *Thoughts on the Meaning of "Asymmetric Threats"*, Special Report 10-1165, Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, USA, 2006, pp. 8-9.

⁹³⁸ Blank J. Stephen: *Rethinking Asymmetric Threats*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, USA, 2003, pp. 3-20.

⁹³⁹ For more see: McKenzie Kenneth Jr.: *The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR*, Institute For National Strategic Studies – National Defence University, Washington, DC, 2000, pp. 6-11.

⁹⁴⁰ Ivan Arreguin-Toft: *How the Weak Win Wars - A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*, *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), p. 97.

Figure 1. Percentage of Asymmetric Conflict Victories by Type of Actor, 1800–1998.





Figure 2. Percentage of Asymmetric Conflict Victories by Type of Actor in Four Fifty-Year Periods.



Andrew Mack’s explanation for how weak states are able to win asymmetric wars comprises three key elements: relative power explains relative interests, relative interests explain relative political vulnerability and relative vulnerability explains why strong actors lose. According to the logic of this argument, strong actors have a lower interest in winning because their survival is not at stake, and they are not prepared to sacrifice themselves or their other national interests.⁹⁴¹

We have seen numerous definitions of “asymmetric threat”, but most of them do not stand up to historical or logical scrutiny. There is very little agreement on what constitutes an “asymmetric threat”. In attempt to find that out, experts from Massachusetts Institute of Technology offer us the following criteria that an asymmetric threat must satisfy:

- 1) It must involve a weapon, tactic, or strategy that a state or non-state enemy both could and would use against the state. Stating this criterion may

⁹⁴¹ *Ibid*, pp. 93–128

seem pedantic, but after all, there needs to be some reality to the threatened action.

2) It must involve a weapon, tactics, or strategy that the state would not employ. This criterion is very strong, and does not simply mean that the state does not currently possess such a weapon, would not use the tactic under present circumstances, or does not believe a strategy is effective. It means that the states would not employ the weapon, tactic, or strategy, even if we thought it efficacious, under any currently conceivable circumstances. This criterion assures that the threat is asymmetric according to the analysis of the previous section.

A consequence to the second criterion states that the threat involves a weapon, tactic, or strategy that the other state would not combat by retaliating in kind and, therefore, could not deter by threatening to retaliate in kind.

3) It must involve a weapon, tactic, or strategy that, if not countered, could have serious consequences. This criterion assures that the enemy action actually constitutes a threat. A corollary to the third criterion states that the threat involves a weapon, tactic, or strategy that is not already countered by systems designed to deal with symmetric threats.⁹⁴²

Concept of asymmetry definitely means more than simply making maximum use of one's advantages or fighting differently than we do for this concept to possess utility for strategic planners in understanding their enemies and their own forces and strategies. Its complexity gives us right to think that it is almost impossible to comprehensively define contemporary asymmetric threats to national security. Instead of "wasting time" in trying to find comprehensive definition of asymmetry, we will focus on the most immanent manifestations of asymmetric threats that endanger the majority of countries, extremisms, or its radical appearance – terrorism; the proliferation and use of weapons of mass distraction; and migrations, as one of the primary political and security problems of today's Europe.

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY IN STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF ASYMMETRIC THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

Defence diplomacy should be considered in frame of overall diplomacy, as its integral part, but also as a segment of overall foreign policy

⁹⁴² C.A. Primmerma: *Thoughts on the Meaning of "Asymmetric Threats"*, Special Report 10-1165, Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, U.S.A, 2006, p. 5

throughout every element and phase of engagement. Because of the fact that foreign policy generally consists of processes of creation and implementation, this article will have the same structure. In this paper, immanent asymmetric threat, extremism/terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass distraction and migrations, according to defence diplomacy functions, will be analyzed.

A well-known theorist of international relations Hans Morgenthau considers diplomacy as an element of national power on international level. He, justifiably, considers that diplomacy, understood in broader context of foreign policy, has the following basic tasks: 1) defining objectives in sense of actual or potential power for their realization, 2) foreseeing the aims of other nations and actual and potential power for achieving their goals, 3) determining each level of compatibilities among those aims, and 4) engaging appropriate instruments for execution of each own objectives. Failure in each of those tasks could jeopardize foreign policy and national interests.⁹⁴³

For adequate consideration of structure of the factors that define state position of defence diplomacy in state foreign policy and key strategic documents, we suggest following graphic shown in the Figure 3, as one of extremely simplified:

At first glance, one can see that there are a few foreign policy activities with no connection to defence diplomacy or the security issue. It is the fact that defence attaché, as the function of defence diplomacy, is one of the first state institutions responsible for identifying possible threat to national security. Concerning those facts, it can be said that defence attaché is a type of “early warning system” for the national security system of every state considering identification of contemporary forms of asymmetric threat.

The analysis of functioning contemporary states system shows us that high positioned executive authorities mostly received intelligence on important events and processes in the international arena, which could have impact on vital interests and national security from three, more or less, different sources. The first one is diplomacy service, the second one intelligence community, and the third one all kinds of direct communication with foreign government representatives. Diplomatic service and intelligence community are responsible for organization of collection and analysis of the intelligence information. Considering the interests of each state to be realized in the international arena, decision-makers have a need for different kind of expert and analytical teams and bodies. They are capably to recognize and understand

⁹⁴³ Morgenthau J. Hans: *The Future of Diplomacy*, taken from: Art J. Robert and Jervis Robert: *International Politics, Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, Tenth Edition, Longman, Boston, 2011, p. 135

events and changes abroad and give the assessment in the base of demands or defined tasks from the decision-makers.⁹⁴⁴




Figure 3: The structure of the factors that define state position in foreign policy⁹⁴⁵

Most of the world states has central body which is responsible for the implementation of foreign policy, has competence for concrete foreign policy activities, and gives tasks to appropriate national institutions, like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, Intelligence Community and the like. The name of this central body can differ from state to state, but mostly it is named: the National Security Council, Governmental Committee for Coordination and Management, Ministry Committee and the like⁹⁴⁶. Those bodies are responsible for management, coordination, direction

⁹⁴⁴ Бајагић Младе, *Методика обавештајног рада* (Methodology of intelligence), Криминалистичко-полицијска академија, Београд, 2010, стр. 75.

⁹⁴⁵ Вељко Благојевић, *Политичко-правни положај представништва система одбране у реализацији спољнополитичке функције Републике Србије*, докторски рад, Факултет за право, јавну управу и безбедност, Универзитет „Цон Незбит“, Београд, 2015.

⁹⁴⁶ In the United States, it is The National Security Council - NSC, The United Kingdom has Ministerial Committee on the Intelligence Services - CSI, in The Russian Federation Security

and cooperation of activities of all states subjects on internal and foreign policy level. The body usually consists of the highest representative of state authorities, president, prime minister, ministers of interior, defence, economy and foreign affairs, and head of security and intelligence services and others if required, which defers from state to state, according to the political and law system.⁹⁴⁷

In the general, grand or development strategy, the key relations between diplomacy and armed forces, as a supplemental foreign policy instruments in achieving vital national interests, are defined. According to *Dragan Simić* “no weapon, action or way of waging war are not by each self strategic – just consequences makes them strategic by putting them in concrete course of events, and framework of defined objectives”⁹⁴⁸. That framework should be defined in the general, grand or development strategy, which has to be based on the reality and consider the overall power of the society and their objectives, not only considering political and military aims.⁹⁴⁹

Defence Diplomacy in Combating Extremisms/Terrorism. We are witnessing the fact that the “number of interstate conflicts is getting lower, and there are more those in which violent non-state actors represent at least one of the opposing sides”⁹⁵⁰. After shocking suicide terrorist attack in the United States on 9/11, it is obvious that terrorism, as old phenomena, become one of the most important factors of international relations and security. Antiterrorist international coalition was formed; antiterrorist activities became the priority for most of the intelligence services all over the world. In 2002, our (US) long-standing foreign policy, built on a foundation of alliances and international dialogue, shifted. The new U.S. doctrine of pre-emption, military primacy, a “new multilateralism,” and the spread of democracy was sometimes viewed with suspicion by our historic allies, often seen not as multilateral but unilateral. We also faced reduced credibility because of U.S. pronouncements that were sometimes inaccurate or based on faulty information. Furthermore,

Council (*Sovet bezopasnosti*), in State of Israel it is Committee of Heads of service (*Va'adat Rasheem Hasherutim - Va'adat*), in the Republic of Serbia it is The National Security Council...

⁹⁴⁷ Бајагић Младен: *Методика обавештајног рада* (Methodology of Intelligence), Криминалистичко-полицијска академија, Београд, 2010, стр. 88-89.

⁹⁴⁸ Simić R. Dragan: *Svetska politika* (World Policy), Fakultet političkih nauka i Čigoja štampa, Beograd, 2009, str. 182.

⁹⁴⁹ See more in: *Simić R. Dragan: Svetska politika* (World Policy), Fakultet političkih nauka i Čigoja štampa, Beograd, 2009, p. 149-190.

⁹⁵⁰ Милош Миленковић, Милован Суботић, “Насилни недржавни актери и позиција Србије“, *Српска политичка мисао, 3-2017*, Институт з аполитичке студије, Београд, 2017, (55-70), стр. 69.

the war in Iraq has proven to be a divisive issue among the American people and our traditional allies, leading to a loss of focus on the clear threat terrorism poses. The task of rebuilding international trust and credibility will therefore be multifaceted and challenging, and require consistency over time.⁹⁵¹

Defence diplomacy has a significant role in that process, in almost all its function, as follows:

a) Representing counterterrorism activities of sending states. It is essential, because of image in the international policy. In the recent past, we were witnesses of statements of great power leader “You're either with us or against us”, concerning the fight against transnational terrorism.⁹⁵²

b) Protecting the security interests in case of any extremist or terrorist activities in receiving state against sending state. That includes all spectrums of diplomatic measures, for example diplomatic protest and the like, to the officials of the receiving State, but also to the all diplomatic corps in receiving state with verbal note or non-paper. The ultimate goal of this diplomatic activity is to put pressure on government of receiving state to quit support to extremist/terrorist organizations and take counterterrorist measures.

c) Negotiating with receiving state authorities on bilateral antiterrorist cooperation. In the pre-negotiation process, the defence attaché is obliged to find out the real political will of the receiving state to cooperate with the sending state, the extent and type of cooperation (formal or informal), and the like. As the defence attaché performs all the listed activities, we can talk about formal negotiations on counterterrorist/extremists cooperation. In the multilateral defence diplomacy, this process is much more simplified, because there is a clearly shown political will for cooperation by inclusion in an international organization or initiative.

d) Ascertaining by all lawful means extremist/terrorists activities on the territory of receiving state and counterterrorist activity on national or multinational level. It's about function of ascertaining data on activities of extremists/terrorist organizations and individuals and reporting to sending state, on one hand. On the other, defence attaché have the obligation to report counterterrorist activity of receiving state. There are at least few reasons for

⁹⁵¹ Dealing with today's Asymmetric Threat to U.S. and Global Security, An Executive Summary of the May 8th 2008 Symposium, CACI International Inc, 2008, p. 3.

⁹⁵² See: President Bush Addresses the Nation, Thursday, Sept. 20, 2001, Washington Post online, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html.

that: to make conditions for protecting security interest of sending state that can be effected by receiving country, to take expediciencies from receiving state, and to understand the foreign policy of the receiving state on antiterrorist issue for cost-benefit analysis. This is a very sensitive security issue for every state, so it is important to find adequate method for ascertaining necessary data.

e) Promoting confidence building and cooperation between defence and security system on counterterrorism issue. If there are good political relations between receiving and sending states, it is easy to promote confidence on counterterrorism issue. The problem appears in case of confrontation between states, especially in turbulent regions or post conflict areas. In those regions, decision makers are forced to choose between two “bad decisions”, to cooperate with the enemy state, or to cooperate with them on antiterrorism measures. Whatever they decide, there are possibilities to be accused of neglecting vital national security interests. The regions of the Balkans or the Middle East are a striking example for that dilemma, and a very difficult place for duty of defence attaches.

Defence Diplomacy in Proliferation and Use of Weapon of Mass Distraction. Nuclear weapons have extremely important role in foreign policy, which gives ultimate advantage to the owner state, but also great responsibility to all the mankind for the use of them⁹⁵³. Diplomatic negotiations with Iran and North Korea on the limitation of their nuclear programs are an obvious illustration of the advantage that the possession of those weapons gives the state in the foreign policy comparing to the one without it. At the same time, the Israel case shows us, among other factors, that the possession of nuclear weapons gives Tel Aviv the opportunity to achieve a sort of security domination over the Arabic states in the region. To avoid misunderstanding, Tel Aviv plan to use nuclear weapons only as the last option in case of war clashes the strategic principle that underlines the fact that Israel cannot afford to lose any war.

The U.S. Department of Defence launched a Counter-proliferation Initiative in 1993, in recognition of the fact that potential opponents in regional conflict might not play by the same rules as Saddam Hussein did in First Iraq War. The aim of the initiative was to integrate preparations to counter weapons of mass destruction into U.S. capabilities for power projection and joint operations. A great deal of progress has been made since 1993, including the creation of a Counter-proliferation Council chaired by the Deputy Secretary of

⁹⁵³ Vukadinović Radomir: *Osnovi teorije međunarodnih odnosa i vanjske politike* (Basic Theory of International Relations and Foreign Policy), Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 1989, str. 140-142.

Defence and the establishment of the Defence Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to bring together a number of WMD-related technology and field operations efforts. However, Department of Defence's technology and systems acquisition capabilities are still fragmented, and WMD preparations are still incompletely integrated into planning for joint operations.⁹⁵⁴

The greatest deficiency in counter-proliferation lies in interagency program coordination within the state security system. An interagency program planning mechanism is needed for counter-proliferation, similar to the one under "Homeland Defence" for countering catastrophic terrorism. A next challenge for counter-proliferation is the improvement of our international cooperative efforts. One such effort is the Nunn-Lugar program, which should be expanded in scale and scope. Cooperation with key allies and friends is also important: even if U.S. forces are adequately protected, the allied forces and allied population near the war zone cannot be left vulnerable to WMD attack. The administration should, therefore, support and sustain the NATO Senior Defence Group on Proliferation, as well as the bilateral counter-proliferation "Working Groups" with the United Kingdom, South Korea, Japan, Israel, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. It is clear that the role of defence diplomacy in this field is essential. Except the United Kingdom as a long-term strategic partner of the USA, other counter-proliferation partners are chosen mostly by regional position and level of technology development.⁹⁵⁵

The third need for counter-proliferation efforts is development of the technology based in bio-warfare defence that is as strong as our base in nuclear non-proliferation. The United States has strong Department of Defence laboratories with thousands of personnel skilled in nuclear technology, but few experts in the field of biotechnology, neither within civilian ranks, nor in its affiliated laboratories and contractors. Biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies often decline to participate in programs for fear of being "tainted" by defence work or because of the cumbersome contracting and accounting procedures required by the Pentagon. Yet the implications of the biotechnology revolution for the security will probably exceed those of the nuclear and information revolutions. Department of Defence must do more than increase funding in the related advanced research projects, Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, and for biotechnology research, although this is also necessary. A university-affiliated government-asymmetric threats funded laboratory will need to be founded to give Department of

⁹⁵⁴ Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry: *Countering Asymmetric Threats*, Keeping the Edge, pp. 123-124. http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/kte_ch5.pdf

⁹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

Defence a foothold in the biotechnology field, and to compete for talent despite the drawbacks of government employment practices and the attractive employment opportunities available to biotechnologists in the private sector.

Defence Diplomacy in International Migration Issue. During 2015 Migration crisis, more than one million refugees and migrants arrived in Europe, about half of whom fled the civil war in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and about one third of whom were seeking political asylum. The question of who should bear responsibility for the new arrivals and how those responsibilities should be shared generated very different, sometimes schizophrenic, policy responses among the European Union member states, with many states prioritizing national interests over European solidarity. These divergent national responses generated fierce political debates over legal and normative obligations towards the displaced within and across member states. In many capitals, these debates also kindled national divisions in ways that redounded strikingly to the benefit of right wing, nationalist political parties. The lack of EU solidarity and absence of a collective response to the humanitarian and political challenges imposed by the influx, further laid bare the limitations of common border control and migration and refugee burden-sharing systems that have never been wholly and satisfactorily implemented.⁹⁵⁶

Defence diplomacy role in migration crisis is, on a large scale, connected with counterterrorism activities. It is natural, having in mind the fact that some of refugees are Islamic extremists and potential terrorist, who are using the refugee flow to reach European capitals to launch terrorist attacks. Motivation that manipulates migrants by the ideologue of contemporary terrorism is based on the fact that "the difference between Islam and the rest of the world is still significant"⁹⁵⁷.

Key aspects of the engagement of defence diplomacy in the migrant/refugee crisis are as follows:

a) Representing migration policy of sending states and activities in the field of migration crisis. At the same time, a defence attaché in the neighbouring country is in the position to establish coordination and

⁹⁵⁶ Kelly M. Greenhill: Open Arms Behind Barred Doors: Fear, Hypocrisy and Policy Schizophrenia in the European Migration Crisis, *European Law Journal*, Vol. 22, No. 3, May 2016, p. 317

⁹⁵⁷ Милован Суботић, *Екстремизам под окриљем религије*, Медија центар Одбрана и Институт за стратегијска истраживања, Београд, 2015, стр. 94.

cooperation with appropriate level of military/police staffs engaged in border control.

b) Protecting the security interests of sending state in case of receiving state act, or deny acting, in according to the international law concerning migrants. Of course, it is important to emphasize the fact that the decision for official, or diplomatic, protest to receiving states officials can be made by an authorized person in the Defence System of sending state. It depends on the national law system, but most often it is the Defence Minister.

c) Negotiating with receiving state authorities on bilateral level in the joint border control activities or multilateral cooperation in the crisis management of the regional migration crisis. There are already prepared military, police and civilian pool for engaging in crisis under the United Nations Organization, European Union, OSCE and other regional organization, but the role of defence diplomacy are to arrange the process of negotiation; assessment of challenges, risks and threats coming from migrants and political will for the engagement of receiving state.

d) Ascertainning by all lawful means migrants activities on receiving state territory and crisis management activity in migration crisis on national or multinational level. Depending on migratory route, defence attaché function is a kind of “Early Warning System”, concerning number of migrants, their treatment by the official authorities of the receiving state and ways of illegal crossing the state border and the like.

In the case of migration crisis, the biggest efforts are given to preventing illegal crossing border and countering international criminal organization network. Because of these facts, the defence attaché function is becoming more important than the principal advisor to the chief of diplomatic and consular missions on defence and security issues. It is important for defence attaché to be timely prepared and informed on accurate data of migrant crisis to be able to realistically advises the ambassador for decision-making at the highest political level, but also the personnel in Consular Sector in diplomatic-consular mission at the operational level.

CONCLUSION

Globalization in the field of security brings us more and more common security challenges for the most countries in the world. At the same time, this “new challenges” are mostly classified as an “asymmetric threats” whatever we define as the core of that term. Contemporary strategic thought tries to find the ways for a comprehensive response to asymmetric threats, but

with respect to “classic threats” to national security. These efforts imply major changes in approach to develop applicable and realistic strategies that will be able to be applied at the same time in the face of old and new challenges, risks and threats.

Every national defence strategy has a part designated for tasks and responsibilities of the subjects of the national security system. In light of changing security environment, it is obvious that the strategic thought must also be changed in the sense of giving new tasks to the subjects of the security system. In this context, it becomes quite clear that the responsibilities of defence diplomacy are increasing from “traditional”, military related issues, to the responsibility for “civil”, asymmetric, threats. There are no reliable indicators that would indicate that the said process would not continue in the future, so it can be expected that the trend of strengthening the role and importance of defence diplomacy in the defence and security system is growing.

The analysis of immanent asymmetric threat, extremism/terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass distraction and migrations, in the context of defence diplomacy functions give us right to claim that defence diplomacy is crucial to the foreign policy of every modern state. It is crucial for, at least, two reasons. The first one is connected with the ability of defence diplomacy to perform the function of “Early Warning System” for all security systems of the state. In practice, it means the obligation to timely identify the appearance of security threat, and to give time for sending state security system to prepare adequate measures for countering both “traditional” and asymmetric threats. In some cases, like the migrant crisis, that measure means the changes of national laws and procedures for the Police service.

That requires quite a lot of procedures and time, and brings us to the second reason for growing importance of contemporary defence diplomacy. It is about the role of defence diplomacy in defining the countering measures to accurate security threats. Function of ascertaining data on security situation and developments in the receiving State and their counter measures, and reporting thereon to the sending state should give us reliable information about the threats and the response of the receiving state, which can help as a basis for considering the measures taken by the security system of sending state. Experiences from several countries certainly indicate a trend of response to certain security threats and can be a “guide” for decision makers.

Finally, we plan to turn our attention to the fact that changes in the strategic approach to security considerations should not effects only defence diplomacy, but all subjects of the state security system. That means that it is high time to consider on strategic level estimation of the need to enforce police or defence attaché network of the Republic of Serbia.

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**ODBRAMBENA DIPLOMATIJA U STRATEGIJSKOM
KONTEKSTU ASIMETRIČNIH PRETNJI
PO NACIONALNU BEZBEDNOST**

Veljko Blagojević*

Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Univerzitet odbrane,
Republika Srbija

Milovan Subotić**

Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Univerzitet odbrane,
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Odbrambena diplomatija je značajan segment diplomatije i sveukupnog spoljnopolitičkog nastupa država. Funkcije odbrambene diplomatije su definisane i precizirane diplomatskim pravom i praksom države prijema, kao i pozicijom države u međunarodnom poretku. Globalizacija u oblasti bezbednosti rezultirala je sve većim brojem izazova nacionalnoj bezbednosti i prinudila nadležne da promene pristup strategijskom promišljanju. To je dodatno otežalo proces izrade sveobuhvatne strategije nacionalne bezbednosti, jer se uz postojeće „tradicionalne“ pretnje, pojavljuju sve češće i nove, asimetrične, pretnje. Zbog toga je neophodno da se ne samo iznađu adekvatni odgovori na nove pretnje, već i da se očuva spremnost na odgovore na „tradicionalne“ pretnje i u konačnom usvoji sveobuhvatan strategijski odgovor na širok spektar pretnji. Ništa manji problem ne predstavlja distribucija nadležnosti subjekata bezbednosnog i odbrambenog sistema na odgovarajući način.

Cilj ovog rada je da se razmotre funkcije savremene odbrambene diplomatije i njene uloge u identifikaciji i suprotstavljanju asimetričnim pretnjama nacionalnoj bezbednosti. U krajnjem, ovaj proces može da ponudi neke odgovore na otvorena pitanja i doprinese savremenoj strategijskoj misli.

Ključne reči: asimetrične pretnje, odbrambena diplomatija, strategija nacionalne bezbednosti, strategijska misao, terorizam, migracije.

* veljko_blagojevic_55@hotmail.com

** milovan.subotic@mod.gov.rs

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS MODELS FOR ASYMMETRIC THREATS

Ivan R. Dimitrijević*

Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Nenad Stekić**

Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia

Abstract: Intelligence analysis in the 21st century, in the light of (post)modern security challenges, vulnerabilities, and threats, is completely adjusted to achieving asymmetric advantage, primarily through development of new techniques and methods for obtaining the data, but also with the use of new and more diverse information sources. New Information and Communication Technologies not only allowed to possible asymmetric threat subjects to increase their capabilities, but also required from nations to adapt their own capacities in new circumstances. The old threat paradigm (Cold War, traditional) asked for appropriate intelligence paradigm based on clear threat(s) holder and relatively known outcome of potential conflict (Mutually Assured Destruction). The new threat paradigm (post-Cold War, post-modern) expanded its focus on the new spectrum of security challenges, vulnerabilities and threats, whose subjects are no longer single nations and their national security capacities. New circumstances are additionally ‘aggravated’ by the fact that the post-Cold War period is at the same time the age of information and communication technology ‘explosion’, which certainly and largely effected the increase of academic community interest and stimulated research and development of appropriate intelligence models for the analysis of new threats in the new environment. In that manner, new intelligence analysis knowledge and skills were developed, especially in the context of situation development analysis in contemporary asymmetric conflicts. The most common models used for the asymmetric threat analysis are advanced systems for threat modelling, as well as models for analysis and response to asymmetric threats. In this paper, we present a brief chronological preview of transformation of the “old threat paradigm” into the new threat paradigm, from academic perspective, with recognizing the key elements that affected the

* dimitrijevic@fb.bg.ac.rs

** nenad.stekic@fb.bg.ac.rs

improvement of national intelligence capacities. Then we gave a preview of some of the most significant intelligence analysis models in the context of new threat paradigm, and we explain their mutual relationship.

Key words: intelligence analysis, asymmetric threats, analytical models, asymmetric advantage.

INTRODUCTION

In the context of (post)modern security challenges, vulnerabilities and threats of the 21st century, the intelligence analysis has been completely adjusted to achieving the asymmetric advantage, primarily through development of new tools and methods for obtaining the data, but also through new and more diverse sources of data needed to design timely and accurate intelligence. The development of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) gave to potential asymmetric threat subjects a possibility to increase their capabilities for attacking the traditional national security actors. The same trend of the ICT development asked from the national security actors, and firstly from intelligence services, to adapt their capacities according to new circumstances.

The old threat paradigm (Cold War, traditional) asked for appropriate intelligence paradigm based on clear threat(s) holder and relatively known outcome of potential conflict (Mutually Assured Destruction), or, according to Thomas Powers, “defining and describing ‘the threat’ was easier during the forty years of Cold War with the USSR, when estimators at the CIA hammered out the Annual Survey of Soviet Strategic Intentions and Capabilities”.⁹⁵⁸ On the contrary, the new threat paradigm (post-Cold War, post-modern) expanded its focus to the new spectrum of security challenges, risks, vulnerabilities and threats, whose subjects are no longer single nations and their national security capacities. New circumstances are additionally ‘aggravated’ by the fact that the post-Cold War period is at the same time the age of information and communication technology ‘explosion’, which certainly and largely effected the increase of academic community interest and stimulated research and development of appropriate intelligence models for the analysis of new threats in the new environment.

⁹⁵⁸ Powers, Thomas, *Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to al-Qaeda*, New York Review Books, New York, 2004. Cited in: Vandeppeer, Charles, *Rethinking Threat: Intelligence Analysis, Intentions, Capabilities, and the Challenge of Non-State Actors* (Doctoral dissertation), 2011, 53.

In that manner, new intelligence analysis knowledge and skills were developed, especially in the context of situation development analysis in contemporary asymmetric conflicts. The most common models used for the asymmetric threat analysis are advanced systems for threat modelling, as well as models for analysis and response to asymmetric threats. First, we present a brief chronological preview of transformation of the “old threat paradigm” into the new threat paradigm, from academic perspective, with recognizing the key elements that affected the improvement of national intelligence capacities. Then we give a preview of some of the most significant intelligence analysis models in the context of new threat paradigm, and we explain their mutual relationship.

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ASYMMETRIC THREATS

Notion of asymmetry and the concept of asymmetric threats in academic discourse are not new.⁹⁵⁹ According to Bruce Hoffman, these notions appeared in academic literature during the Cold War, although it is commonly claimed that they appeared in the last decade of the 20th century.⁹⁶⁰ Asymmetry, because of the factors that causes it, became ‘modern’ in the contemporary American political thought discourse.⁹⁶¹

Within the academic conceptualization of asymmetric threats, it is possible to make a distinction between several important “waves” of works.⁹⁶² Operationalization of threats in those works does not differ significantly. However, due to the constantly changing contexts in which threats are manifested, there are some inevitably different definitions. Among the most important milestones in expressing the asymmetric threats determinants, we could point out the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, after which the asymmetric threats *de facto* became primary threats related to traditional concepts. Unlike usual targets as economic, military, and political chosen by

⁹⁵⁹ According to Cambridge Dictionary, asymmetry/asymmetric is for entity “with two halves, sides, or parts that are not exactly the same in shape and size”. See: Cambridge Dictionary, available at: <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/asymmetric> (Accessed May 24, 2017)

⁹⁶⁰ Hoffman, Bruce and Gordon H. McCormick, „Terrorism, signaling, and suicide attack“, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27, no. 4 (2004): 243-281

⁹⁶¹ Blank, Stephen J. *Rethinking asymmetric threats*, Army war coll strategic studies institute, Carlisle, 2003

⁹⁶² Fishbein and Treverton say that there are a so-called ‘Cold War wave’, then the post-Cold War wave, and finally the wave of post-9/11 papers. See: Warren Fishbein and Gregory Treverton, Making Sense of Transnational Threats, The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers, Vol.3, No.1, October 2004

state actors, this attack was asymmetric in its nature, because the complete military power of the United States with all its military capabilities, was not able to prevent it.⁹⁶³

In his article published right after the 9/11 attacks, Christopher Bellamy said that academic authors had predicted this outcome one decade before it happened.⁹⁶⁴ Arreguin-Toft claims that besides the theoretical study of asymmetric conflicts after the Second World War (which was pressured with efforts to develop the new methodology that will enable further theory development), very important segment in asymmetric conflict research is approach focused on selection of actors (strategy), namely explanation of conflict outcome matrix.⁹⁶⁵ He makes a distinction between military and academic approaches, claiming that they “ignore each other”, which consequently led to, “duplicating the efforts to develop the theory of asymmetric conflicts”.⁹⁶⁶

In the most general sense, there were several efforts from academic authors to equalize their viewpoints on asymmetric threats, namely to establish the “Theory of Asymmetric Conflicts”. In the same article, Arreguin-Toft argues that the best prediction of asymmetric conflict outcome lies in strategic interaction of conflict actors. His classification of strategies of attack-defence in conflicts, into direct and indirect, namely guerrilla and planned warfare, as two large groups of possible behaviours in conflicts, present one of the first efforts on systematization of asymmetric conflict outcome.⁹⁶⁷ Through testing of hypotheses on specific conflict examples, he concluded that the conflict outcome is not determined explicitly by the hard (military) power, but also by the type of strategy used by conflict actors. Thus, it is possible that the weaker side becomes victorious. Therefore, he finds that relative force ratio is not always decisive factor in asymmetric warfare.⁹⁶⁸

⁹⁶³ Bellamy, Christopher. "Tools of Ill-Omen: The Shifted Conflict Paradigm and Reduced Role of Conventional Military Power." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 15, no. 1 (2002): 152

⁹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 149

⁹⁶⁵ Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How the weak win wars: A theory of asymmetric conflict." *International Security* 26, no. 1 (2001): 93-128

⁹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 101.

⁹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶⁸ According to findings by Arreguin-Toft, military superior adversary will win in the conflict if the same strategy is used in 76% of conflicts, while weak adversary will win in 63% if interactions between different types of strategies are achieved. See: Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How the weak win wars: A theory of asymmetric conflict". *International Security* 26, no. 1 (2001), 111

The nature of asymmetric threats largely depends on the perception of the object of those threats. Bellamy says that the Western civilization is specifically fertile ground for implementation and exploitation of asymmetric threats “because of all its inherent vulnerabilities”, such as huge concentration of a large number of people in one place, freedom of movement of people and capital, developed mass media and fast information transmission in digital world.⁹⁶⁹ The new environment in the context of post-9/11 threats is not suitable for aforementioned description. Namely, in the Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, published in December 2002, *asymmetry*, and *asymmetric threats* are not mentioned even once.⁹⁷⁰

In the article *Threat-perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma* published in 1958, author David Singer presented his threat model as a sublimation of initial efforts on conceptualization of threats in the literature at that time. He starts from the fact that the International Relations system was bipolar with clearly expressed military threat. In such a system, state actors perceive threat according to the quasi-mathematical model, which says that such threat perception is equal to the product of assessed possibilities and assessed intention.⁹⁷¹ Taking this course of argumentation, Robert Steele provided classification of threats into violent state, violent non-state, non-violent non-state and violent mixed threats.⁹⁷² New (post-Cold War, post-modern) threat paradigm expanded its focus to new spectrum of security challenges, vulnerabilities, and threats, whose actors are no longer states and their national security capabilities. In the context of new threat paradigm, authors like Bellamy and Stephen Blank claim that not much has essentially changed. What is specific for the 9/11 attack is the fact that it marked the end of the Cold War forever, and introduced new asymmetric threats.⁹⁷³ Bellamy believes that “New York and Washington have experienced now (2001) what the world has survived for decades, such as aircraft hijackings and attacks in urban areas”.⁹⁷⁴

⁹⁶⁹ Op. cit. Christopher Bellamy, 153

⁹⁷⁰ Integral version of document is available at: https://fas.org/irp/congress/2002_rpt/911rept.pdf (Accessed on May 23rd, 2017)

⁹⁷¹ Singer, J. David. “Threat-perception and the armament-tension dilemma”. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2, no. 1 (1958): 90-105

⁹⁷² Steele, Robert D. (2002). *The New Craft of Intelligence: Achieving Asymmetric Advantage in the Face of Nontraditional Threats*. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, p.12

⁹⁷³ Ibid. Christopher Bellamy, p.157

⁹⁷⁴ Ibid.

Vandeppeer says that Singer's definition of threat significantly determined not only further research within the scientific community in the USA and (former) USSR, but also had a deeper impact on defence policies of superpowers in the Cold War constellation.⁹⁷⁵ Although it is the first model almost universally accepted and applied in the academic literature dealing with intelligence and assessment of state and non-state threats⁹⁷⁶, this model was severely criticized by the academic community.

Among the most comprehensive academic criticisms of Singer's model, Vandeppeer gives a problem of measuring indicators of "intention" and "capabilities", as elements of threat.⁹⁷⁷ As an example, the National Security Strategy of the USA was used, which moved its focus from state to non-state threats, changing at the same time the ways for measuring indicators. In that sense, Vandeppeer gives possibilities (Singer's "capabilities") for threat achievement with use of conventional weapons, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, weapons of mass destruction, as well as other means for use of armed force. Contemporary technology enabled non-state actors an easy access to the weapons mentioned above, and use with almost the same effect as if it were used by state actors.⁹⁷⁸ Finally, he states that basic indicators of "capabilities" are actually the people, because without people it is not possible to carry out an attack, and thus to measure precisely the indicators of intentions and possibilities for manifestation of threat.⁹⁷⁹

REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS MODELS FOR ASYMMETRIC THREATS

For appropriate response to asymmetric threats, as already pointed out, certain means are needed for political decision-makers to be informed for achieving the asymmetric advantage. Since it is evident that "the predominant characteristic of non-traditional and asymmetric threats is their very character - *not* traditional, *not* symmetric"⁹⁸⁰, what was recognized as a key competence

⁹⁷⁵ Vandeppeer, Charles, *Rethinking Threat: Intelligence Analysis, Intentions, Capabilities, and the Challenge of Non-State Actors* (Doctoral dissertation), 2011

⁹⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷⁷ Vandeppeer navodi i da se kritika Singerovog modela vrlo brzo pokazala osnovanom, i u praksi. Videti više u: Vandeppeer, Charles, *Rethinking Threat: Intelligence Analysis, Intentions, Capabilities, and the Challenge of Non-State Actors* (Doctoral dissertation), 2011

⁹⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁰ Steele, Robert D. (2002). *The New Craft of Intelligence: Achieving Asymmetric Advantage in the Face of Nontraditional Threats*. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, p. 40

of future decision-makers and intelligence professionals who will inform them, is *conceptual flexibility*, according to Steven Metz⁹⁸¹ and Max Manwaring⁹⁸².

It is the main reason why it is essential for the *new craft of intelligence* to become a key factor in achieving the asymmetric advantage against non-traditional threats.⁹⁸³ The new craft of intelligence means adjusting to the new context and improvement of intelligence analysis as the only mechanism for achieving the asymmetric advantage in the 21st century. As already pointed out, new circumstances are additionally ‘aggravated’ by the fact that the post-Cold War period is at the same time the age of information and communication technology ‘explosion’, which certainly and largely effected the increase of academic community interest and stimulated research and development of appropriate intelligence models for the analysis of new threats in the new environment. In that manner, new intelligence analysis knowledge and skills were developed, especially in the context of situation development analysis in contemporary asymmetric conflicts.

Surely, what remain as constant in contemporary intelligence analysis, are the standard analytical techniques that allow us to understand the use value of different models for asymmetric threats analysis. Thus, Hank Prunkun recognizes three key analytical techniques that have to shape planning of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery (PPRR) regarding the asymmetric threats.⁹⁸⁴ Those are threat analysis, vulnerability analysis, and risk analysis, which could be summed through the following steps:

1. “Identify the threat(s);
2. Explore vulnerabilities to this threat(s);
3. Gauge the likelihood that the threat(s) will eventuate;
4. Assess the consequence the threat will have; and
5. Construct a PPRR plan”⁹⁸⁵.

In addition, models for asymmetric threats analysis which are already developed, are used in accordance with the ‘level of analysis’ on which the

⁹⁸¹ Manwaring, Max (2001). *Internal Wars: Rethinking Problem and Response*, Studies in Asymmetry, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2001, p. 76

⁹⁸² Metz, Steven (1993). *The Future of Insurgency*, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute

⁹⁸³ Steele, Robert D. (2002). *The New Craft of Intelligence: Achieving Asymmetric Advantage in the Face of Nontraditional Threats*. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, p. 40

⁹⁸⁴ Although Prunkun presented these techniques in the context of counter-terrorism, they are applicable to the whole scope of contemporary asymmetric threats

⁹⁸⁵ Prunkun, Hank, *Handbook of Scientific Methods of Inquiry for Intelligence Analysis*. Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 2010

given intelligence analysis functions. *Strategic intelligence* is focused on the long-term estimations in international relations, primarily for great powers, so these models are practically not applicable to this level, but could be used for predictions of certain trends for larger periods. *Operational intelligence* provides support to an operation that is either underway or about to begin.⁹⁸⁶ *Tactical intelligence* is short-term and time-limited, and it contributes directly to the achievement of an immediate goal.⁹⁸⁷ Certainly, there are different models in intelligence analysis, developed and used for threat analysis and assessment. Robert M. Clark gives his taxonomy of the existing models used in intelligence.⁹⁸⁸ He divides them into two main groups – generic and combined models. Generic model includes lists, curves, comparative modelling (Benchmarking), pattern models, relationship models, profiles, process models, and simulation models. Combined models are geospatial models, human terrain models, space-time models, and geographic profiling. The most common models used for the asymmetric threat analysis are advanced systems for threat modelling, as well as models for analysis and response to asymmetric threats and models for ontological analysis of threats and vulnerabilities. We are going to give a review of some of the most significant intelligence analysis models in the context of new threat paradigm, and explain their mutual relationship and possible applications.

Adaptive Safety Analysis and Monitoring System (ASAM) was developed in 2004 by researchers from the University of Connecticut, and it represents a software tool “which has to assist intelligence analysts to identify asymmetric threats, to predict possible evolution of the suspicious activities, and to suggest strategies for countering threats.”⁹⁸⁹ The goal of the ASAM system is to combine information about the adversary obtained from different intelligence services, in order to improve our understanding of their capabilities and prevent possible attacks.⁹⁹⁰ Like many other tools for asymmetric threats assessment, ASAM is based on Bayesian probability, namely on Bayesian networks and on Hidden Markov Model. This system is created mainly for asymmetric threats, for “tactics employed by some

⁹⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁸ Clark, Robert, *Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach*. London: Sage, 2013

⁹⁸⁹ Singh, Satnam, Allanach, Jeffrey, Tu, Haiying, Pattipati, Krishna, & Willett, Peter (2004, October). Stochastic Modeling of a Terrorist Event via the ASAM System. In *Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 2004 IEEE International Conference on* (Vol. 6, pp. 5673-5678). IEEE. Also: Singh, Satnam, Donat, William, Tu, Haiying, Lu, Jijun, Pattipati, Krishna, & Willett, Peter (2006, October). An Advanced System for Modeling Asymmetric Threats. In *Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 2006. SMC'06. IEEE International Conference on* (Vol. 5, pp. 3943-3948). IEEE

⁹⁹⁰ Ibid.

countries (“rogue and/or failed states”), terrorist groups, or individuals to carry out attacks on a superior opponent while trying to avoid direct confrontation.”⁹⁹¹

Using similar methodologies, Robert Popp and associates⁹⁹² presented in 2004 the collaborative environment with the goal of integrating and sharing information between different existing tools for modelling, named *Network Modelling Environment for Structural Intervention Strategies (NEMESIS)*. Tools used for NEMESIS are aforementioned ASAM system and *Organizational Risk Analysis (ORA)*.

Researchers from University of Arizona⁹⁹³ presented in 2010 the software package named *Asymmetric Threat Response and Analysis Program (ATRAP)*, which consists of “set of tools for annotating and automatically extracting entities and relationships from documents, visualizing this information in relational, geographic, and temporal dimensions, and determining future courses of action of adversaries by creating situational threat templates and applying customized prediction algorithms.”⁹⁹⁴ ATRAP is based on databases, and its main advantage is that, besides structured data, it processes unstructured data (text) through *Natural Language Processing (NLP)*.

Eric Little and Galina Rogova considered ontological⁹⁹⁵ analysis of threats and vulnerabilities⁹⁹⁶, with special focus on asymmetric threats. Authors start from the viewpoint that the “threat is a very complex ontological item and, therefore, a proper threat ontology must be constructed in accordance with... the complexities of the objects, object attributes, processes, events, and relations that make up these states of affairs.”⁹⁹⁷ That is why they suggest basic metaphysical concepts which are necessary for threat ontology construction, and give “...a formal ontological structure of threats as

⁹⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹⁹² Popp, Robert, Pattipati, Krishna, Willett, Peter, Serfaty, Daniel, Stacy, Webb, Carley, Kathleen, Allanach, Jeffrey, Tu, Haiying & Singh, Satnam, “Collaboration and Modeling Tools for Counter-Terrorism Analysis”. In *Computational Intelligence for Homeland Security and Personal Safety, IEEE, 2004*: 46-52

⁹⁹³ Chan, Erwin, Ginsburg, Jason, Ten Eyck, Brian, Rozenblit, Jerzy, and Mike Dameron, “Text Analysis and Entity Extraction in Asymmetric Threat Response and Prediction.” In *International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics, IEEE, May 2010, 202-207*

⁹⁹⁴ Ibid, 202

⁹⁹⁵ *Ontology*, in IT terminology, stands for formally defined system of notions and/or concepts, and relations between those notions/concepts.

⁹⁹⁶ Little, Eric G., & Galina L. Rogova, An Ontological Analysis of Threat and Vulnerability. In *9th International Conference on Information Fusion, July 2006, IEEE, 1-8*

⁹⁹⁷ Ibid, 7

integrated wholes possessing three inter-related parts: intentions, capabilities and opportunities, and shows how these elements stand to one another, as well as to conditions of vulnerability.”⁹⁹⁸

Besides the mentioned analysis models, in military intelligence there are various methods and techniques used for the *Situation Development analysis*, both for conventional and unconventional warfare (asymmetric, counterinsurgency, urban areas warfare, etc.). Briefly, “Situation Development is an ongoing process carried out by a team led by intelligence analysts to estimate current and future threats to friendly forces, the local populace and host nation government interests within a unit’s area of operation and with respect to the current and planned friendly-force missions.”⁹⁹⁹ Within Situation Development, a significant tool is *Asymmetric Threat Matrix (ATM)*, with the purpose “to identify most probable, feasible, dangerous and likely enemy courses of action in order to prioritize force protection effort in the area of operations.”¹⁰⁰⁰ This matrix specifies every threat within the enemy course of action, as a complex of four factors:

1. Prevalence of threat, which is assigned to a given enemy group (terrorists, insurgents, criminal groups, etc.);
2. Likelihood of achieving enemy goals (immediate, not long-term goals);
3. The number of people likely to be potentially reachable by attack, related to the avenue of approach (air, land, water, cyber, etc.);
4. Ease of acquisition and use of means for attack, related to the delivery system.¹⁰⁰¹

Bearing in mind the fact that these factors are multiplied and expressed numerically through previously given values, this method could be viewed as a risk assessment of the enemy course of action, because the value is given as a product of sums of severity of consequences, and probability for those consequences to occur.

⁹⁹⁸ Ibid, 7

⁹⁹⁹ Powell, Gerald M., Matheus, Christopher J., Ulicny, Brian, Dionne, Robert, Kokar, Mieczyslaw M., & Lorenz, David (2008, June). An Analysis of Situation Development in the Context of Contemporary Warfare. In *Proc. of the 13th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Seattle, WA*, 2-3

¹⁰⁰⁰ Ibid, 3

¹⁰⁰¹ Ibid, 4

Other authors also used risk assessment for development of the models for response to terrorist threat. Elisabeth Paté-Cornell and Seth Guikema presented the Probabilistic Model for Terrorist Threats, aimed at threat and countermeasures prioritization from the system analysis perspective.¹⁰⁰² The model they developed is based on probabilistic risk analysis, decision analysis, and elements of game theory, and could account for the probabilities of different scenarios. The goal of development of this model is bringing the order into large quantities of information available, and description of links between the core elements of different classes of scenarios.

Finally, in asymmetric threat intelligence analysis, there are different simulation models used, which are a valuable asset because for analysis, observation, and prediction of behaviour of different actors, they are less expensive, could be repeated, and tested on various scenarios.¹⁰⁰³ Among these models, we could single out the Counter-Terrorism Simulation Framework developed on the OODA loop.¹⁰⁰⁴ The essence of OODA loop is that it "...implies that the decision making cycle is shortened and faster than the enemy's. In this way, the enemy is constantly late after the actions of the 'faster' side in conflict, and in time there will be an absence of appropriate response to a new situation, and he is becoming ineffective and disorganized".¹⁰⁰⁵ It is this methodology that enabled the authors of Counter-Terrorism Simulation Framework to solve the following common issues in modelling terrorist threats: (1) because of the large amount of intelligence data from various sources, that are mostly not well organized, there are multiple parameters to be considered at the same time; (2) in order to use predictive and preventive advantages of counter-terrorism simulation techniques and tools in the best way, timely availability of information from various sources, is essential, and (3) it is necessary to avoid false alarms or false confirmations to ensure information authenticity."¹⁰⁰⁶

Based on the application of OODA loop in the existing simulation models for counterterrorist threats, a framework was suggested, which includes the introduction of two key novelties related to intelligence agencies.

¹⁰⁰² Paté-Cornell, Elisabeth, & Seth Guikema, „Probabilistic Modeling of Terrorist Threats: A Systems Analysis Approach to Setting Priorities among Countermeasures.“ *Military Operations Research* 7, 4(2002): 5-23

¹⁰⁰³ Tajwer, Khaula, & Shamsi, Jawwad, "Counter-Terrorism Simulation Network", *IEEE International Conference on Information and Emerging Technologies*, IEEE, 2010, 1

¹⁰⁰⁴ OODA (Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action) cycle was developed by John R. Boyd.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Mandić, Velimir, "Manevarski pristup operacijama". *Novi glasnik* 2/2016, 43

¹⁰⁰⁶ Tajwer, Khaula, & Shamsi, Jawwad, "Counter-Terrorism Simulation Network", *IEEE International Conference on Information and Emerging Technologies*, IEEE, 2010, 1

The first one is setting up a functional communication between intelligence services and other state services and institutions important to national security. The second one is the introduction of centralized intelligence database and process of information acquisition, where the OODA loop was applied.¹⁰⁰⁷ In this manner, the more realistic and authentic information could be provided, in space and time, for counterterrorist simulations and tools.

CONCLUSION

The application of these models within the asymmetric threats intelligence analysis has a wide scope, so those models could practically be applied for the widest possible spectrum of actual contemporary security threats, like fight against terrorism, counterinsurgency, urban areas fighting, etc.¹⁰⁰⁸ The essence of using the presented models is to empower intelligence analysts with the “ability to find pertinent data faster, conduct more efficient and effective analysis, share information with others, relay concerns to the appropriate decision-makers, and support them with better information to make effective decisions.”¹⁰⁰⁹ This is especially important in the 21st century, where the amount of data available is enormous and asks for more time dedicated to collection than for analysis, so the available tools are the way to preserve the quality of intelligence analysis of asymmetric threats with efficient time management, and thus provide relevant, appropriate, and timely information to decision-makers as fast as possible.

The added value of the development of presented models are the conclusions with recommendations which, if applied, could significantly improve not only the content and quality of intelligence analysis, but also the means in which intelligence services (especially within large intelligence communities with numerous agencies and organizations) are exchanging data with the biggest possible time saving and the most efficient management of the existing human

¹⁰⁰⁷ Ibid, 3-5

¹⁰⁰⁸ Hank Prunckun, for example, recognizes ‘threat communities’ in contextualization of contemporary threats for intelligence analysis, and within ‘external communities’ he includes: criminals and criminal groups, international and transnational terrorists, insurgents and guerrillas, domestic anarchists, cyber law breakers, rights campaigners, spies-for-hire, foreign intelligence services. In: Prunckun, Hank, *Handbook of Scientific Methods of Inquiry for Intelligence Analysis*, The Scarecrow Press, Lanham, 2010, 167

¹⁰⁰⁹ Popp, Robert, Pattipati, Krishna, Willett, Peter, Serfaty, Daniel, Stacy, Webb, Carley, Kathleen, Allanach, Jeffrey, Tu, Haiying & Singh, Satnam (2004, July). Collaboration and Modeling Tools for Counter-Terrorism Analysis. In *Computational Intelligence for Homeland Security and Personal Safety, 2004. CIHSPS 2004. Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE International Conference*, 46

and technological (primarily Information and Communication technology) resources. That is why it is not necessary to emphasize the importance of academic community for the development of the asymmetric threats analysis models, which in previous decades has made big efforts to research all the possible ways for application of the existing techniques, tools, and methods from natural, technical and social sciences and scientific disciplines, onto the improvement of the intelligence analysis process and intelligence work as a whole.

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MODELI ZA OBAVEŠTAJNU ANALIZU ASIMETRIČNIH PRETNJI

Ivan R. Dimitrijević*

Fakultet bezbednosti, Univerzitet u Beogradu,
Republika Srbija

Nenad Stekić**

Fakultet bezbednosti, Univerzitet u Beogradu,
Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Obaveštajna analiza je u 21. veku, u svetlu (post)modernih bezbednosnih izazova, ranjivosti i pretnji, potpuno prilagođena ostvarivanju tzv. asimetrične prednosti, prvenstveno kroz razvoj novih tehnika i metoda dolaženja do podataka, ali i kroz upotrebu novih i raznovrsnijih izvora informacija. Nove informacione i komunikacione tehnologije nisu omogućile samo potencijalnim nosiocima asimetričnih pretnji da povećaju svoju sposobnost, već su zahtevale i od država da usklađuju sopstvene kapacitete u novonastalim okolnostima. Stara (hladnoratovska, tradicionalna) paradigma pretnji, iziskivala je i adekvatnu obaveštajnu paradigmu zasnovanu na jasnom nosiocu pretnje ili pretnji i relativno poznatom ishodu potencijalnog konflikta (sigurno uzajamno uništenje). Nova (posthladnoratovska, postmoderna) paradigma pretnji proširila je svoj fokus na novi spektar bezbednosnih izazova, ranjivosti i pretnji čiji nosioci više nisu samo države i kapaciteti njihove nacionalne bezbednosti. Nove okolnosti dodatno su „otežane“ činjenicom da je posthladnoratovski period istovremeno i doba svojevrsne eksplozije informacionih i komunikacionih tehnologija, što je nesumnjivo, u velikoj meri uticalo na povećanje interesovanja akademske zajednice i podsticanje istraživanja i razvoja odgovarajućih obaveštajnih modela za analizu novih pretnji u novim okolnostima. U tom pogledu razvijena su nova znanja i veštine za obaveštajnu analizu, a posebno u kontekstu analize razvoja situacije u savremenim asimetričnim sukobima. Najčešći modeli koji se koriste za analizu asimetričnih pretnji su napredni sistemi modeliranja ovih pretnji, kao i modeli za predviđanje i odgovor na asimetrične pretnje. U radu se, kroz kratki istorijski pregled transformacije tzv. stare paradigme pretnji u novu, prepoznaju ključni elementi koji su uticali na unapređenje obaveštajnih

* dimitrijevic@fb.bg.ac.rs

** nenad.stekic@fb.bg.ac.rs

kapaciteta država, kao reakcije na ovu transformaciju. Zatim je pružen pregled nekih od najznačajnijih modela obavestajne analize u kontekstu nove paradigme pretnji i objašnjen je njihov međusobni odnos.

Ključne reči: obavestajna analiza, asimetrične pretnje, analitički modeli, asimetrična prednost.

ASYMMETRY OF POSTAMERICAN WORLD AFTER 2025 ACCORDING TO ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Srdan Starčević*

Military Academy, University of Defence,
Republic of Serbia

Goran Vukadinović**

Serbian Armed Forces, Republic of Serbia

Abstract: After the collapse of the USSR and the end of the bipolar world, America takes in its hands the fate of many nations and dominates international relations without limitations. Period of unilateral operation of the world's only superpower has been completed and nobody considers the scenario "if" America (more precisely, its planetary domination) fails, but "when" it fails. Even the crisis of the US security system causes the chain of security reactions that lead primarily to instability and "reheating" of tensions in the traditionally security-burdened regions, whereas on the other hand that leads to minor or major armed conflicts at the borders of states under direct American military or political protection.

According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the leading US strategist, and his book "America - China, the fate of the world" after the collapse of America the world will face the phase of quite chaotic regrouping of forces, both at global and regional level. Brzezinski believes that at this phase there will not be big winners but many losers in the context of the overall international uncertainty and potential fatal danger to global prosperity. In the absence of well-known and recognizable leader there will be uncertainty that is likely to increase tensions between rivals from many "frozen" conflicts. The absence of US military and political support will make many countries vulnerable, open conflict zones, which will slide towards international reality marked by survival of the strongest.

This paper will analyze the implications of this phenomenon, the collapse of the domination of the USA, on the global security situation, as well as on the region of the Western Balkans and the Republic of Serbia.

Key words: asymmetry, USA, strategy, security, geopolitics.

* srdjan.starcevic@vs.rs

** goran.m.vukadinovic@vs.rs

INTRODUCTION

Economic, political, military and cultural power of USA is not questionable for all other great powers nowadays. We still live in the age of one superpower, the United States. Still, certain strategic movements, economic and demographic trends and social breakdowns indicate that this situation will change, relatively quickly. The idea of a globalized neoliberal world with a mask of top-level Western values, the "Westernized" or "Americanized" world, has shown its ultimate reach and its critical weaknesses. While "increasing global interconnection"¹⁰¹⁰ remains undisputed because it is based on something that is objective (the lightning advancement of technology as an applied knowledge¹⁰¹¹) and it arises from the nature of things (such as the need of capitalism for expanding its geographical boundaries to overcome internal crises¹⁰¹²), the values of neoliberal globalization show their reverses. Economic efficiency generates social inferiority: there are growing differences between rich and poor within states and between states. "The largest part of the 'third world' is already gathering a gigantic explosive mass in which anti-western and anti-american fermentation takes place ... There is too much anger and a little hope," says Brzezinski.¹⁰¹³

Democracy and human rights stand in opposition to the supra-national institutions that are not accountable to the citizens and military interventions aimed at imposing their political formulas violently – Brzezinski claims that promotion of human rights becomes a Trojan horse, in order to shake the rival camp from within.¹⁰¹⁴ The advocated multiculturalism slides into remodeling of the world towards the western values on one side, but it also provokes resistance on the other.¹⁰¹⁵ It seems that the dispersion of the political, military and economic power of only one state (the United States), unknown to history, has found its own limits. Authority power decline, the loss of the glory of the liberators in World War II, the loss of the trust of the allies (for example, due to the eavesdropping on the French President and the German Chancellor) and many other problems put America in a position to realize what all the great

¹⁰¹⁰ Kejt Neš, *Savremena politička sociologija*, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2006, p. 59.

¹⁰¹¹ More in: Slobodan Pokrajac, *Tehnologizacija i globalizacija*, SDPublik, Beograd, 2004, p. 13.

¹⁰¹² Kejt Neš, *Savremena politička sociologija*, op.cit., p. 70.

¹⁰¹³ Momčilo Pudar, *Svet bez gospodara*, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2010, p. 71.

¹⁰¹⁴ Op.cit., p. 63.

¹⁰¹⁵ Miroslav Pečujlić, *Globalizacija, dva lik sveta*, Gutembergova galaksija, Beograd, 2002, pp. 19-22.

empires at some historical time had realized – that Empires are created with weapons, "but it takes more than weapons to keep them."¹⁰¹⁶ Moral credibility is undoubtedly one of the key resources of imperial power.¹⁰¹⁷ On the international political scene, some old forces are strong again: Russia, China and India are gigantic players on the world political scene. In addition, there are some new powers in the world that should be counted on as political players, not only in their regions: Brazil, South Africa and Mexico are just some of them. In one of his lectures, the Ambassador of the Russian Federation in Belgrade, Aleksandar Čepurin, expressed the opinion that the G-8 is no longer able to solve the problems in even three quarters of the world, and that global problems had to be resolved in the G-20 format¹⁰¹⁸.

The constellation of power in the world is in a condition of fluctuation. The battle for supremacy is in progress, that is from the American angle, the battle for maintaining the position of the world hegemony. Brzezinski considers that the main geopolitical award for America is the dominance of Eurasia. In his opinion, the US global primacy is directly dependant on how long and how effectively its domination on the Eurasian continent will be sustained. "Obviously, this situation is temporary. Its duration is not only crucial to the well-being of America but much more for the world peace."¹⁰¹⁹ During an informal meeting of US and Chinese officials, the latter, realizing the reality, informally asked to do all that is possible to prevent too fast collapse of America. According to Brzezinski, the sudden emergence of the first and only global force has created such a situation in which the rapid termination of its supremacy, either because of America would withdraw itself or because of the sudden appearance of a successful rival, would create general international instability.¹⁰²⁰ "A world without US primacy would be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States would continue to have more influence than other countries in shaping global affairs. The United States international primacy preservation is crucial not only to the welfare and security of Americans but also to the future of freedom, democracy, open economy and

¹⁰¹⁶ „In fact, most of the historical empires ruled indirectly, through domestic elites who often administered domestic institutions. If they lost the ability to get enough friends and domestic associates among their subjects, weapons would not be enough.“ Erik Hobsbaum, *Globalizacija, demokratija i terorizam*, Arhipelag, Beograd, 2008, p. 45.

¹⁰¹⁷ Herfrid Minkler, *Imperije, logika vladavine svetom od starog Rima do Sjedinjenih država*, Albatros plus, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2009, p. 30.

¹⁰¹⁸ Lecture of A. Čepurin at the Faculty of International Politics and Security of the University Union - Nikola Tesla in Belgrade, March 14, 2017.

¹⁰¹⁹ Zbignjev Bžežinski, *Velika šahovska tabla*, CID Podgorica, 1999, p. 33.

¹⁰²⁰ Op.cit, p. 23.

international order in the world"¹⁰²¹, warns Samuel Huntington. If his prediction is true, it means that the world will slip into a general instability, which will have its implications in the Southeast Europe. Our state and society must be prepared for these challenges.

DIVISION OF THE WORLD AND RANKING OF THE GREAT POWERS
AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY ACCORDING TO
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

In his book "The Great Chessboard", Zbigniew Brzezinski has divided the world, in geostrategic terms, into several continents. In the opinion of Brzezinski, the Eurasian chess board is divided into the Western, Southern, Eastern and Central area (Figure 1).



Figure 1: Geopolitical continent

In such a division, control over Eurasia almost automatically assumes the subordination of Africa and makes the western hemisphere and Oceania peripheral in a geopolitical sense in relation to the central world continent (Figure 2).

¹⁰²¹ Samuel Huntington, *Why International Primacy Matters*, International Security, Harvard University, spring 1993, p. 83.




Figure 2: Division of the world according to Brzezinski

Brzezinski claims that western space is important for the United States and that any expulsion of the United States by the Western partners from its positions in the western periphery would automatically be the end of the American participation in the game on the Eurasian chessboard, although this would probably lead to the subordination of the West hemisphere to the revived player from the Middle space (Russia). As a problem for American global hegemony, with undoubtedly large volume, he noticed its small depth, limited with internal and external obstacles. American hegemony, in his opinion, has an enormous influence, but compared with the empires of the past, it has no direct control.

In the last century, Halford Mackinder¹⁰²² began a discussion about the most important region of Eurasia in gaining control over the whole continent, with his concept of the Eurasian "heartland" (Siberia and a large part of Central Asia)¹⁰²³. He introduced his term of "heartland" with the famous sayings:

- The one who rules the Eastern Europe, commands the central land,

¹⁰²² Zbignjev Bžežinski, *Velika šahovska tabla*, op.cit, p. 26.

¹⁰²³ Op.cit, p. 25.

- The one who rules the central land, commands the world's island,
- The one who rules the world's island, commands the world.

Active geostrategic players are those countries that have the ability and national strength to conduct their power and influence beyond their borders in order to change, to the extent that affects American interests, the existing geopolitical situation. They have potential and/or predispositions for rapid geopolitical maneuvering. We are witnessing modern attempts of certain countries to achieve regional domination or global position. At the turn of the 21st century, it was possible to identify at least five key "players" and five geopolitical "pillars" (two of which could partially qualify as "players").

France, Germany, Russia, China and India are the main and active "players", while Great Britain, Japan and Indonesia, although they are undoubtedly very important countries, cannot be described as "players".¹⁰²⁴ Ukraine, Azerbaijan, South Korea, Turkey and Iran play the role of critically important geopolitical "pillars", although both Turkey and Iran to some extent, within their limited capabilities, are also geostrategically active.¹⁰²⁵

For our region it is important to highlight the attitude of Zbigniew Brzezinski that all the countries of the European Union are quietly classified either behind the USA or behind the France-Germany alliance. By contrast, Great Britain is no longer a geostrategic "player". It has several major options in foreign policy that are not concerned with the intentions of global domination; at the same time, Britain has no ambitious visions of the European future, and its relative decline has also reduced its ability to play the traditional role of balancing the forces in Europe. Brexit has just determined and confirmed the UK's intentions to embark on a path of European isolationism and even stronger ties to the United States. London has largely excluded itself from the European game. The accuracy of this Brzezinski's observation was testified by Brexit, and the consequences of such a decision will be examined after the final British exit from the EU.

America is superior in the four decisive domains of global power. In military terms, it has an unattainable possibility of reaching the distant parts of the world. In the economic sphere, it remained the main initiator of global growth, although it has to compete with some other countries (although none of them has all other attributes of global power) in some areas. In the field of technology, America is a leader in key areas of innovation. When it comes to

¹⁰²⁴ Op.cit., p. 33.

¹⁰²⁵ Op.cit., p. 34.

culture, it has unquestionable attraction, especially among young people in the world. The combination of all four of these attributes makes America the only comprehensive global force. At the end of the 21st century, according to Brzezinski's interpretation, the ultimate goals of American politics were:

1. Creating a truly cooperative world community,
2. Keeping pace with long-term trends,
3. Maintaining the fundamental interests of mankind,
4. Ensuring that the rival to American domination does not arise.¹⁰²⁶

Then, in 1999, Brzezinski predicted that Russia and China would be the forces that would endanger US hegemony, while Germany and Japan would be the two main allies of America. Still, it was clear even then that a relatively durable and stable world order is incompatible with the concentration of hegemonic power in the hands of a single state. "The world is too complex, spacious, dynamic and contradictory that it could be conquered no matter how great the power of a state or a coalition is..."¹⁰²⁷ Hence, America is not only the first true global superpower, but probably the last one. Therefore, once a US leadership begins to fade it is difficult to believe that any single state would be able to repeat the current global preponderance of America.

Brzezinski thinks that contemporary international relations are burdened by comparing the power with America's power and between other states, which confirms the thesis that the world moves towards multipolarity and that new (or revived) international relations and rules have appeared. The rise of the three Asian powers, Japan, China and India, significantly changed the global division of power and marked the beginning of a clear, unequivocal multipolarity. Still, the appearance of China on the world stage as the economic challenger of America, India as a regional power and rich Japan as an American ally in the Pacific not only dramatically changed the schedule in the rank of power but it also announced its dispersion. The current threat concerning the current dispersion of power is reflected in a potentially unstable global hierarchy. America still takes the most prominent place, but the legitimacy, effectiveness and sustainability of its leadership are constantly being questioned around the world. Still, in every significant attribute of power in the traditional sense, America is still unrivalled. The European Union

¹⁰²⁶ Zbignjev Bžežinski, *Velika šahovska tabla*, op.cit, p. 28.

¹⁰²⁷ Илија Кајтез, *Мудрост и мач*, МЦ Одбрана, Београд, 2012, p. 340.

could compete to be the world's number two power, but it requires a stronger political alliance, which includes common foreign policy and a joint defense capability. It will be very difficult for modern Europe to achieve this goal under these circumstances. The European Union is not a big, independent "player" on the global stage, although Germany and France undoubtedly have a residual global status. Therefore, these European countries can have a global impact, despite all the collective weaknesses of the European Union. China is now ranked just below the United States in the existing international hierarchy and it is very wise to have it for an ally. Relations between the Republic of Serbia and the People's Republic of China need to be promoted in all aspects and directions without keeping them only on the basis of friendship, not economic or any other partnership. Despite facing numerous internal problems and unsettled difficulties, modern China is a serious competitor to America for global hegemony. At best, ranking of other great powers below America and China would be imprecise. Still, each list without Russia, Japan and India, as well as informal EU leaders: Germany and France and at the end the UK, would be incomplete.

Brazil and Indonesia demand participation in global decision making, first and foremost in economy, through the G20, and also their aspirations for regional leadership in Latin America and Southeast Asia¹⁰²⁸. The domination of European powers over the major world regions has become the past, and the power of Western Europe is in constant decline, which was most clearly visible in the collapse of colonial empires, low intensity conflicts in which the former colonial powers experienced failures and bad experiences of Great Britain and France at Suez in 1956.¹⁰²⁹

The uncertainty concerning the sustainability of US leadership at the global level, the end of Europe's central role in world affairs as well as the challenges facing the EU, the rise of Russia's power, the awakening of China¹⁰³⁰, India's ambition to position itself as a world power and the mysterious refusal of Japan to transform its global economic power into political power, all of which together indicates an increased multipolarity of global power.

¹⁰²⁸ Zbignjev Bžežinski, *Amerika-Kina i sudbina sveta*, Albatros plus, Beograd, 2013, pp. 30-32.

¹⁰²⁹ Илупе у: Martin van Kreveld, *Transformacija rata*, Službeni glasnik, Fakultet bezbednosti, Beograd, 2010, pp. 13-40.

¹⁰³⁰ Napoleon's words are still current: „Let China sleep, for when she wakes the world will rue it.“ David G. Chandler, *The Military Maxims of Napoleon*, Greenhill Books, Lionel Leventhal Limited, London, 2002, p. 24.

THE ASYMMETRY OF THE POSTAMERICAN WORLD AND ITS IMPACT ON THE BALKANS

When the era of bipolarism was finished in 1991, no one was able to predict soon fall of the remaining superpower. Nowadays, this is a matter of serious considerations and disagreements. Hobsbawm wisely said that it could not be said precisely how long America's superiority would last, but we could be sure that it is just a temporary historical phenomenon. In his view, the main difference between America and other empires in history is that all other great powers knew they were not the only ones and therefore they did not seek for the global domination.¹⁰³¹ Therefore, the question is how the United States will behave in crucial, historical moments that will mark the turning point in the process of losing its supremacy, especially because US will remain the third state by the number of inhabitants, with enormous military and creative potential at least by 2040. In his book with a suggestive title, "A Brief History of the Future", Jacques Attali tried to find the answer. Attali believes that the world will face the decline of American omnipotence before 2035, and after that a new distribution of power between regional powers and markets will take place which is the next stage in his philosophy of history, whose possible utopian end is hyperdemocracy.¹⁰³² Summing up Atali's considerations of the role of America after the end of its omnipotence, one can say that this philosopher still sees the United States as a great power, but in the polycentric system in which the world market and not the states will make the main decisions. This future will not be conflictless, and one of the first threats to the peace in the world would be – regional ambitions.¹⁰³³

This view of the future without American supremacy in its essence is in the line with the predictions of Brzezinski. In his view, the crisis of the US system would produce a rapidly expanding chain of reactions that would lead to a global political and security chaos. There would be a situation of chaotic powers regrouping, initially at the regional level, and then at the global level. In this process, followed by conflicts, violence and victims, there would be many losers and probably several winners that would take advantage of the situation. In the absence of a well-known leader, there would be an uncertainty that would possibly increase the tensions between the rivals and enforce security "solo performance" and unilateral actions of many states that would feel "liberated".¹⁰³⁴ It is important for the world to prepare for the fact that if

¹⁰³¹ Erik Hobsbaum, *Globalizacija, demokratija i terorizam*, op.cit, p. 156, 148.

¹⁰³² Žak Atali, *Kratka istorija budućnosti*, Arhipelag, Beograd, 2010, p. 8.

¹⁰³³ Op.cit., pp. 136-150, 188-191.

¹⁰³⁴ Zbignjev Bžežinski, *Amerika-Kina i sudbina sveta*, op.cit., p. 82.

America "collapses", the world most likely will not be dominated by its successor, for example China. It will be, in a way, a return to the era of great powers. The problem is that this return can be accompanied by an escalation of intra and interstate violence.

While the process of building new empires was accompanied by the great wars, the fact is that the wars in which the power of the empires was tested took place "largely at the periphery of their area of influence, and imperial competitors were careful not to come into direct conflict."¹⁰³⁵ It is not encouraging that in many countries democracy «corrupts» and slips into populism, because if democratic societies are less belligerent, the same can not be said for societies infected with populism. Brzezinski points out that the promotion of democracy would recede against the tendency to increase national security based on the fusion of authoritarianism, nationalism and religion.¹⁰³⁶ The American role would remain in the positions of dialectical coercion.¹⁰³⁷ Until today, the untouchable UN Security Council, which has five permanent members with the right of veto, which is the reflection of the international relations in the world after the Second World War, could begin to lose its influence, political and military power, especially in the new circumstances.

Certainly, many countries are already evaluating new opportunities that will open up when America (as a world hegemon) "fails", especially those that are already strong. However, none of them (most likely) will have enough economic, financial and military power to succeed America on the world's throne.

Still, with the disappearance of American hegemony, the security of a number of weak states (usually those near to some of the regional powers) would be severely compromised as their powerful neighbors would perceive them as countries that symbolize the odious US invasion in their sphere of influence. Accordingly, the tendency of aggressive attitude towards them will spread in proportion to the decline of American global status. Zbigniew Brzezinski identified the most vulnerable countries, whose order in list does not imply neither a level of vulnerability nor geopolitical probability: Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel and the Middle East¹⁰³⁸.

¹⁰³⁵ Herfrid Minkler, *Imperije, logika vladavine svetom od starog Rima do Sjedinjenih država*, op.cit., p. 47, 52.

¹⁰³⁶ Zbignjev Bžežinski, *Amerika-Kina i sudbina sveta*, op.cit., p. 82.

¹⁰³⁷ Zbignjev Bžežinski, *Američki izbor*, CID, Podgorica, 2004, p. 18.

¹⁰³⁸ Op.cit., p. 95.

It is immediately perceived that in this assumption the Balkans and region of Southeastern Europe are not on the list. Is it possible to expect that the Balkans will remain stable and without any revisionist reactions, especially if it is known how much US has supported certain parties during the civil war in the SFRY and the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija in 1998 and 1999 to the present? The answer is no. In his geostrategic dictionary, Brzezinski himself introduced the term of "the world's Balkans", which denotes the war and crisis hotspots of the world.¹⁰³⁹ Slobodan Miladinović notes that modern global society can not be considered as a coherent network, because the network is woven from different cultural entities that are "either in the latent conflict or under the threat of its outbreak, and the root of this state is in "historically ingrained and relatively irreconcilable cultural patterns that make it possible for members of different societies to live in different ways, and these differences are perceived as irreconcilable since they are amalgamated by tradition and corroborated by religion."¹⁰⁴⁰ Unfortunately, the example of the Balkans where ethnic stereotypes are clashing, contradictory and often controversial historical narratives, religious fundamentalisms, nationalisms, "narcissism of small differences", political myths and political platforms for the creation of "great" national states ("Great Albania" is just one of them) both insane and potentially bloody, confirm the truthfulness of this claim.¹⁰⁴¹ This state of affairs can and will often be misused for the purpose of new positioning of great and/or regional powers. In addition to the long-standing influences of the United States and the European Union (Germany, in particular), the Balkans are again affected by the influence of Russia, but also Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. Brzezinski wrote, to mention one of his observations that proved to be true, that in the 21st century Turkey will strengthen its influence into the former territory of the Ottoman Empire.

The Balkans are already facing significant security challenges, risks and threats. Firstly, its shores and roads are cluttered with the waves of migrants willing to take risks in search of a better life, mainly in western and central Europe. Secondly, it is a place of historical contact of Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Islam: although the essence of all universal religions is love (for God and neighbor), religious differences and religious fundamentalism

¹⁰³⁹ Momčilo Pudar, *Svet bez gospodara*, op.cit, p. 129.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Слoбoдaн Милaдинoвић, „Бeзбeднoснe прeтњe глoбaлизaциje – рeлигијскe рaзликe и сyкoб цивилизaциjа“, Збoрник рaдoвa сa нaучнoг сyпa *Србиjа и стрaтeгијскa рaскршићa*, Вojнa aкaдeмиjа, Инститyт зa стрaтeгијскa истрaживaњa, Бeогрaд, 2016, p. 602.

¹⁰⁴¹ Examples are provided by research: *Etnički stereotipi i nacionalni mitovi kao prepreke pomirenju u srpsko-albanskim odnosima*, (ur. Goran Tepšić, Radmila Nakarada, Mirjana Vasović), Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd, 2015.

together with poverty and political abuses, had influence on the development of the bloody conflicts. There is no need to underestimate the forces that want to radicalize the Muslims in the Balkans and islamize islam in this area. Thirdly, the Balkans are economically underdeveloped, with a growing gap (in terms of property, opportunities and privileges) between a small number of rich and enormous masses of the poor. The workers, relatively well-protected in the communist past, became a cheap labor force. Poverty gives rise to dissatisfaction and fear. Corruption has greatly swallowed moral principles and legal systems. That is why many that have lost hope of a better life in their homeland go abroad not only to work, but also never to return. Those others who remain are to a certain extent susceptible to the seductive noise of populism, which offers simple but unrealistic solutions, and puts the blame for all problems on something outside the state. Fourthly, the demands for the creation of a "Great Albania" can be heard more and more loudly, which is a tragic project for the Balkans, since among the citizens of each of the Balkan countries there is a significant number of those who are related by ethnicity to another country. Insisting on nationally homogeneous countries and historical or ethnic borders instead on a fruitful encounter of cultures and tolerance would lead to tensions, crises and ultimately war, which would be not only irrational but tragic for peoples and economies in the Balkans. Fifthly, the Balkans are place where true elite culture is silent, ignored and left on the margins without any real impact on social events. "Without a guiding idea, a man is without a candle in the dark. And dark is a promised land for political games in which every ignorant offers the exits from the crisis, and the more he promises, the greater mass of people he seduces."¹⁰⁴²

The Balkans remind of a small "chessboard" where the chess game is played by great world players. Changed relations between them will undoubtedly influence the Balkan social and political reality. Attempts by the NATO to approach the borders of Russia correspond with Russian attempts to intensify its presence in the Balkans. The intention of China to gain the position from Thessaloniki to Budapest and thus become an important player in the Balkans may be shaken as well as the Russian South Stream, taking into account the rivalry of the United States and China, as well as the fact that the European Union often criticizes the Chinese regarding the economy. If the United States, in order to maintain influence in the Balkans, rely on "Greater Albania", it would be dangerous not only for Albanians and Serbs, but also for Macedonians and Montenegrins, and perhaps for the Greeks. On the other hand, if the influence of the United States is substantially weakened, it is likely

¹⁰⁴² Đuro Šušnjić, *Teorije kulture*, Zavod za udžbenike, Beograd, 2015, p. 346.

that there will be an intensification of the already bad relations between Turkey and Greece, as well as the strengthening of Turkish influence, primarily in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, thanks to the ability of Turkey to present itself as a protector of the Muslims. But relying on a religious or ethnic affiliation necessarily has to go with the withdrawal of dividing lines between different social groups, and those dividing lines will cause conflict relations between the citizens of those countries. The impact of the "Gulf monarchies" which strengthen their positions in the Balkans through the investments and religion, should not be forgotten.

The European Union's influence and the European perspective of the Balkans are the major obstacle to the Balkan intolerance. If the European Union's influence on this European peninsula would be significantly weakened, the Balkans would probably slip into numerous crises caused by the narcissism of "small differences".

"The world has already become multipolar and we are witnessing that the interests of the great powers shift and adjust the zones of influence. In this process, unfortunately, small nations and states are suffering the most, especially if they are not able to protect their national interests in a proper way."¹⁰⁴³ And all the countries in the Balkans are small and would be small even if they have achieved "great" ultranationalist platforms. Momčilo Pudar believes that history in the Balkans will turn over a new leaf when America withdraws from this region and when a common European security system is established from the Atlantic to the Urals¹⁰⁴⁴, but until that happens, we consider that Serbia must be prepared for the decline of American global superiority and its possible negative consequences for security. It will be prepared only if it has a strong army.

CONCLUSION

American planetary supremacy, like all other socio-historical phenomena, is ephemeral. Zbigniew Brzezinski predicted that the decline in the power of America would be obvious after 2025. Since the fall of every empire was either caused by wars or as a consequence had a chaotic state in which the second-class powers, as a kind of successor of the failed empire tried to take as much as possible of the sphere of influence, a simple analogy based on history imposes the conclusion that the fall of the United States as a

¹⁰⁴³ Митар Ковач, „Интереси великих сила на простору Балкана“, Зборник радова са научног скупа *Србија и стратегијска раскршћа*, Војна академија, Институт за стратегијска истраживања, Београд, 2016, р. 414.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Momčilo Pudar, *Svet bez gospodara*, op.cit., pp. 136-137.

world hegemony will not be painless, either because of the unwillingness of the United States to accept relatively calmly the loss of the position of the only superpower, or because of the insatiable new/old great powers to fight for the positions in the regions which they want to dominate.

Brzezinski predicts that after the decline of the United States there will not be one great superpower – a worthy successor of the world hegemon – but the world will sink into a chaotic state of increased tensions between the rival and the unilateral action of many states that would feel liberated from American influence. The great problem is that the return to the polycentric system, the system of the great powers balance, for many countries can be accompanied by the escalation of intra and interstate violence, because of a new regrouping of forces that would occur in response to major shifts in the global power distribution.

In a world of tomorrow, Brzezinski locates several regions and countries that would be affected, from Belarus and Ukraine, through Georgia, the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan, to Taiwan and South Korea. The Balkans are not on this list of the most vulnerable, but undoubtedly in the event of a global redefinition of power relation and the new positioning of great powers, the Balkans will face serious security challenges, risks and threats.

The Balkans are already facing the challenge of migration, religious fundamentalism, awakened ultranationalisms and political myths, poverty, corruption, organized crime, cultural stumble, loss of hope in a better life, populism. This makes the Balkan Peninsula a ground favorable for various external influences, games and outplay. Serbia must be prepared for the decline of US global superiority and its possible negative security implications, which is only possible if it has a strong army.

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ASIMETRIJA POSTAMERIČKOG SVETA PREMA ZBIGNJEVU BŽEŽINSKOM NAKON 2025. GODINE

Srdan Starčević*

Vojna akademija, Univerzitet odbrane, Republika Srbija

Goran Vukadinović**

Vojska Srbije, Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: Nakon kolapsa SSSR-a i kraja bipolarnog sveta, Amerika uzima u svoje ruke sudbine mnogih nacija i dominira međunarodnim odnosima bez ograničenja. Period unilateralnog delovanja jedine svetske supersile je

* srdjan.starcevic@vs.rs

** goran.m.vukadinovic@vs.rs

završen i više se ne razmatra scenario „ako“ Amerika (tačnije njena planetarna dominacija) propadne, već „kada“ propadne. Čak i kriza američkog bezbednosnog sistema proizvodi lanac bezbednosnih reakcija koje dovode u prvom redu do nestabilnosti i „podgrevanja“ tenzija u tradicionalno bezbednosno opterećenim regionama dok u drugom redu dovodi do pojave manjih ili većih oružanih sukoba na granicama država pod direktnom američkom vojnom ili političkom zaštitom.

Kako to razmatra vodeći američki strategista, Zbignjev Bžežinski u svojoj knjizi „Amerika – Kina, sudbina sveta“, nakon propasti Amerike nastupiće faza nezaključivog i prilično haotičnog pregrupisanja sila, kako na globalnom tako i na regionalnom nivou. Bžežinski smatra da u toj fazi ne bi bilo velikih pobednika već mnogo gubitnika i to u kontekstu ukupne međunarodne nesigurnosti i potencijalne fatalne opasnosti po globalno bezbednosno blagostanje. U odsustvu poznatog i prepoznatljivog lidera nastaće neizvesnost koja će po svoj prilici povećati tenzije između rivala mnogih „zamrznutih“ konflikata. Odsustvo američke vojne i političke podrške učiniće mnoge države ranjivim, otvorenim konfliktnim zonama, koje bi klizile ka međunarodnoj realnosti obeleženoj opstankom najjačih. Ovim radom analiziraće se implikacije tog fenomena, propasti dominacije Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, na globalno stanje bezbednosti, a posebno na region Zapadnog Balkana i Republike Srbije.

Ključne reči: asimetrija, SAD, strategija, bezbednost, geopolitika.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WESTERN BALKANS IN CONDITIONS OF ASYMMETRIC SECURITY THREATS

Snežana Vasić*

Ministry of Defence, Republic of Serbia

Goran R. Nenadović**

Ministry of Defence, Republic of Serbia

Abstract: In the "globalized world" there has also been a change in the physiognomy of challenges, risks and threats, both at global, regional, and national level. Modern security concepts, or strategies of national security and defense strategies must develop effective responses to traditional (armed conflicts within and between states) as well as to non-traditional asymmetric threats resulting from the development of a modern society (organized crime, terrorism, energy, environmental and demographic threats, cybercrime, the participation of foreign fighters in the war fires of other countries, migrant crises, etc.) and which, according to all elements, are transnational threats.

The existence and strengthening of asymmetrical threats of transnational character imposes the need for a new approach in their solution that must necessarily be different from the traditional, with the emphasis on preventive action. In that sense, it is necessary, on the one hand, to develop and strengthen national institutional mechanisms, and on the other, to constantly intensify international cooperation and regional cooperation.

Due to numerous and varied security problems and their intense connection at different levels and forms, the term "Western Balkans" has been in use in recent years, as a synonym for a region that still represents "a powder keg". The instability of this region becomes particularly complex if viewed in the context of the Middle East and the Mediterranean, which, in addition to geographical closeness, have a direct political and ideological connection with many actors of instability in the Balkans.

The focus of this paper will be on analyzing the national security strategies of the countries of the Western Balkans in the context of contemporary security challenges and threats. The necessary assumptions will be considered, which will ultimately be the subject of comparative analysis.

* snezana.vasic@mod.gov.rs

** goran.nenadovic@yahoo.com

The fact is that in the Western Balkans, there are countries that are members of NATO (the Republic of Albania and the Republic of Croatia and Montenegro), and also those that are not integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security structures (Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Serbia), but they are included in the NATO Partnership for Peace program. Also, in the political sense, the Balkan countries are at various degrees of integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, which on the one hand may pose a problem, but on the other hand may be the driving force for further efforts to stabilize political, economic, social and other opportunities achievement of national goals.

Key words: globalization, asymmetric threats, security, Western Balkans, national security system.

APPROVES THE ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL SAFETY
WESTERN SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE CONDITIONS
OF ASYMETRIC SAFETY ENVIRONMENT

The word security is used in today's world in all spheres of society, which completely lost the border between the so-called hard and soft security. The international security system faces numerous challenges, risks and threats, which have completely changed their character, the mode of operation. In the modern "globalized world", in addition to the existence of traditional threats (wars within and among states), we are also faced with asymmetric threats that are the result of the use of new technologies and the increase in the impact of non-traditional threats (organized crime, terrorism, environmental and demographic threats, etc.). In this sense, the traditional concept of security becomes an inefficient instrument in solving security problems, and the redefinition of the notion of security and the establishment of an international or collective security system on new bases becomes imperative.

Facing many forms of endangering state security aimed at achieving, preserving and improving the security of a state is carried out on two levels - the level of external, interstate cooperation with other subjects of international relations, but also at the internal level, the level of the state that seeks to maintain peace and order, i.e. the existing social, legal and political order, bearing in mind both the general social interests and the specific interests of individual social groups and individuals¹⁰⁴⁵.

¹⁰⁴⁵ *Encyclopedia of Political Culture*, Contemporary Administration, Belgrade, 1993, p. 1134.

The specific security problems of a region that distinguish it from other regions make up its security identity. In addition, it is important to emphasize that the essence of security identity, in the conditions of globalization, is not the security problems¹⁰⁴⁶ themselves, but the ways in which each community responds to security challenges, risks and threats.

On the whole European continent, the issue of security does not represent such a great limitation on the development of nations, states, and regions in their overall progress, as is the case with the countries of the Western Balkans.

It is necessary to note that during the last century the Western Balkans was treated as a European periphery, which kept it separate from the mainstream of European development. Unfortunately, all the antagonisms of this region have often put it in the epicenter of events that decided on the fate of Europe, such as the First and Second World Wars, as well as the bloc of division of Europe and the Cold War, during which the lines of the division of antagonistic military- political blocs went through the Balkans, although the Cold War was more central than the Balkan phenomenon¹⁰⁴⁷. The inherited problems of the past, the historical contradictions, and the consequences of the conflict of the peoples in the Western Balkans still affect the security situation in this region.

The Western Balkans¹⁰⁴⁸ implies a region made up of newly emerging countries in the former SFRY territory, which excluded Slovenia as an EU member, and added Albania. The fact is that in the Western Balkans, there are countries that are members of NATO (the Republic of Albania and the Republic of Croatia and Montenegro), but also those that are not integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security structures (Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Serbia) are already included in the NATO Partnership for Peace program.

Modern challenges, risks and threats that have an asymmetrical character require the consideration of the new place and role of the Western

¹⁰⁴⁶ In the conditions of globalization, they themselves take on the character of global problems.

¹⁰⁴⁷ In the historical sense, the region of the Western Balkans was the site of ten wars only in the twentieth century, two of which significantly influenced all social conditions in the Balkan countries. In the Western Balkans, there is a border of three often antagonistic cultural and civilizational circles: Eastern Orthodox, Western Roman Catholic and Islamic, or Oriental.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Due to numerous and varied security issues, a different level of interconnectedness of security challenges and threats and their risky regulation in the international understanding of security, the term "Western Balkans" has been used in recent years. The syntagm was first used in 1999 and then gradually reached "transition to diplomatic, then to public vocabulary and finally to international documents, scientific studies in political geography, geopolitics, international relations and science of security"

Balkans, and above all Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro, in the context of international integration processes¹⁰⁴⁹. Questions of strategic importance that these countries have to decide about urgently - how to set up in a new geopolitical environment dictated by contemporary security challenges and threats, and which is the best way to engage in the process of integration in response to those challenges and threats, without losing national identity.

CONTEMPORARY SAFETY CHALLENGES, RISKS AND THREATS TO THE THIRD COUNTRIES OF THE WESTERN BALKANS

Analyzing strategic documents and national security policies, the conclusion is drawn that contemporary societies are almost no different from social phenomena and processes, that globalism as the imperative of modern international relations has led to the fact that all regions in the world are confronted with the same security challenges and threats.

That is precisely why the countries of the Western Balkans define their security challenges, risks and threats like most modern European countries. Differences are reflected in the availability of available political and other mechanisms to try to solve the resulting social conflicts before they become a security problem, in parallel with the actors who create security problems and those who try to solve them.

When the security challenges, risks and threats identified in the strategy papers of the Western Balkan countries are concerned, we can split them into two groups:

- **classic security challenges, risks and threats** such as conflicts of varying intensity between states or within one state, between different entities or groups. The security threat arising from these challenges would most likely be manifested as a classical armed conflict (among states or as armed rebellion within a state by a population or organized groups).

- **asymmetric challenges, risks and threats** that are the result of the development of a modern society, transnational charity and whose bearers are non-state actors operating in the Balkans.

¹⁰⁴⁹ There are many economic, political, social, military and other debates and understandings on different levels and different aspects of the consideration of this issue regarding the inclusion of these Western Balkan countries in the Euro-Atlantic integration, but with their deeper analysis, we note that there is no single position on how to engage in integration processes.

By a comparative analysis of strategic documents, we can conclude that almost all the countries of the Western Balkans perceive the security environment and define asymmetric threats in the same way as the European Union¹⁰⁵⁰, adding certain specificities typical of each country individually. All the countries of the Western Balkans recognized them and made the right and only possible conclusion that they themselves can not oppose the mentioned asymmetric threats and that counter-agreement requires co-operation between countries and coordinated action within international organizations and the system of collective security. Only in this way can it be prevented or the consequences of the operation of international terrorist and criminal organizations can be minimized, which are the main causes of the greatest number of risks and threats to security.

Other threats defined in national Strategies are characteristic for some of the countries and reflect the specifics of the socio - historical conditions in which each of the countries of the Western Balkans is separately.

NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM OF WESTERN BALKANS

One of the indicators that indicate the achievement of the efficiency of the national security system of a country is the state of its strategic-doctrinal framework. By analyzing the Western Balkans' state documents, their hierarchy, the main actors involved in their creation and, of course, the content of the documents themselves, one can recognize the aspirations of the political elite for security and defense in the conditions of contemporary inter-ethnic relations and security challenges, risks and threats in the context of their asymmetry, transnationality and complexity.

The Republic of Albania. Through the goals outlined in the strategic documents, Albania declared itself a country ready to cooperate with international security institutions, especially those advocating collective defense concepts. In this way, it was intended, at least declaratively, to show that Albania was transformed from a "security consumer" state to a "security vendor" ready to become an active member of European and Euro-Atlantic security structures.

Starting from such commitments, the Republic of Albania has adopted several strategic doctrinal documents in the past period, which have

¹⁰⁵⁰ There are many economic, political, social, military and other debates and understandings on different levels and different aspects of the consideration of this issue regarding the inclusion of these Western Balkan countries in the Euro-Atlantic integration, but with their deeper analysis, we note that there is no single position on how to engage in integration processes.

determined the impact of the aspiration for NATO membership, regional cooperation, as well as the reform of the army, the police, integrated border management, the judiciary and the fight against organized crime¹⁰⁵¹.

The key factors influencing the process of drafting and updating the basic strategic documents in the field of security are certainly the creation of a legislative framework, changes in the internal and regional security environment, the aspiration for joining NATO and the EU, as well as the pressure of the international community to establish a comprehensive strategic framework in the area of security.

The Republic of Albania has defined the contents of the strategic security and defense policy, security challenges, risks and threats through three levels: local, regional and global, without prioritizing the ranking, nor separating their content. It is irresistible that as security threats at the regional level, internal problems (political instability, poor economy and organized crime) are identified, and not other countries as a potential threat to peace and stability in the region. This approach was probably due to the need for Albania to find itself as soon as possible in the union of NATO and EU members, as a factor that "produces and exports" security through the implementation of the policy of good neighborly relations and regional cooperation. Apart from the lack of a more precise assessment of security challenges and threats to their intentions and ways of acting, a rather poor division of security objectives is evident, as well as the lack of planned activities, measures and mechanisms for achieving the set goals.

Even today, after joining NATO, the Albanian government is not in a simple situation. Although focused on the right path to EU integration, there is still intensive work on the regulation of police equipment, legislation, the presence of political affiliation, inexperience of civil servants and corruption in this country¹⁰⁵².

¹⁰⁵¹ The most important strategic documents that determine the national security system in the Republic of Albania are: Security Strategy Document (adopted in 2000, amended in 2004); Defense Policy Paper (adopted in 2000, amended in 2007); Military Strategy (adopted in 2002, amended in 2005); Strategy of the Ministry of Defense (adopted in 2007); National Strategy on the Integrated Border Management Action Plan (adopted in 2007); National Strategy on the Public Sector and State Police Sector and its National Action Plan (adopted in 2007); Strategy for Combating Organized Crime, Smuggling and Terrorism (adopted in 2008), Enri Hide and Geron Kamberi, "Security Policies in the Western Balkans - Albania", Center for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, 2010, p. 10

¹⁰⁵² The 2003 European Commission's Stabilization and Association Report states that public administration in Albania is still weak and unable to provide key elements for the implementation of stabilization and association. Their equipment and infrastructure are scarce, human resources are not voluntary, and poorly trained. Retrieved from: European Commission:

All this imposes the need for the process of designing and implementing the concept of national security to be built up in accordance with the assessment of the country's position in the context of regional and global security, while respecting new conditions for the assessment of security. challenges, risks and threats.

Bosnia and Herzegovina. By the Dayton Agreement, which ended the long-running bloody war in BiH, an agreement was reached, which has been translated into the BiH Constitution and is still in force today. The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a collective, tripartite body, in which every constituent people in the state has their representative. As provided in Article 5 of the Constitution of BiH, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of three members: one Bosniak and one Croat who are directly elected on the territory of the Federation and one Serb, directly elected on the territory of the Republic of Srpska. The Presidency members appoint the President on the principle of rotation.

In February 2006, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a document entitled "Security Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina", which is essentially a national security strategy¹⁰⁵³.

BiH Security Policy is defined as a document that provides frameworks and guidelines for the construction of the system, structure and all mechanisms necessary for the efficient operation of the security system. In the development of the BiH Security Policy document, the same methodological approach, applied by countries that rely on the collective security system, was applied, hence the values were first defined and then the risks and threats. It is noted that the growing global challenges of risk and threats direct the attention of the international community to other regions of the world, and that BiH will

Albania: Stabilization and Asset Report 2003, p.19. available at: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/externalrelations/see/sar/rep2/com03>.

¹⁰⁵³ On its transitional path, Bosnia and Herzegovina has brought a whole set of documents that today constitute the strategic and doctrinal framework for security and defense of this, in many respects, specific countries: Defense Policy (adopted in 2001, amended in 2008), Military Strategy (adopted 2009), Military Doctrine (adopted in 2003), White Paper of Defense (adopted in 2005), Defense Review (adopted in 2009), Strategy for the Fight Against Terrorism (adopted in 2006), Anti-Laundering Strategy money (adopted in 2009), Fighting Corps Strategy (adopted in 2009), Strategy for Control, Prevention and Fighting against drugs (adopted in 2009), the Mine Action Strategy (adopted in 2002, supplemented in 2009), Kenan Dautović, "Security Policies in the Western Balkans - Bosnia and Herzegovina", Center for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, 2010, p. 36

not remain in the focus of the international community for a long time¹⁰⁵⁴. For this reason, BiH undertakes measures for the construction and dimensioning of such a security system, which will guarantee adequate protection and respect for vital values and opportunities for promotion and realization of its security interests.

In order for BiH to secure peace and stability independently, it must have a modern, capable and efficient system and forces that will be a guarantor of the state's and citizens' security and will be able to successfully respond to new security challenges and threats. In order to achieve this goal, BiH has made efforts to reform the security sector as one of the crucial aspects of political, social and economic reform in the country. In order to be an effective reform of the security sector, it should be based on a clearly defined national security strategy, which can be used to build a national, and in this case more state, consensus.

Macedonia. The process of the development of the strategic-doctrinal framework in Macedonia took place in two phases: the beginning of the creation of the state and national identity and the period of more favorable internal, international and regional environment when Macedonia started the Euro-Atlantic path and built resources for the development of a sound strategic-doctrinal framework¹⁰⁵⁵.

In 2003, the National Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia adopted the National Security and Defense Concept, which is the basic document of the Republic of Macedonia in the field of security and defense. It is based on an assessment of the international environment and position of the country and the threat to its security. Based on these estimates, national interests and goals are defined.

¹⁰⁵⁴ In the past period, one of the main problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the fact that its stability and security practically depend on an international military presence that is diminishing in continuity. In the short term, the foreign presence will continue to decline, but it can not yet be reliably stated when state bodies and institutions will assume responsibility for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The particular question is whether there will be a political will to keep peace and create a functional and prosperous state.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Today, the strategic-doctrinal framework of Macedonia consists of: Ohrid Framework Agreement (adopted in 2001), National Security and Defense Concept (adopted in 2003), Strategic Defense Review - Political Framework (adopted in 2003) National Security Strategy (adopted in 2008), The Defense Strategy (adopted in 1999, supplemented in 2010), the White Paper on Defense (adopted in 1998, supplemented in 2005), the Police Reform Strategy (adopted in 2003, amended in 2004), the National Strategy for Integrated border management (adopted on 03. year), Islam Yusufi, "Security Policies in the Western Balkans - Macedonia", Center for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, 2010, p. 97

In the creation of the Concept, a methodological approach characteristic for more powerful countries was applied, i.e. for those countries whose defense of their national interests is based on the collective security system. First, national interests are defined, and then the security environment and challenges, risks and threats. It has been declared, in the basics of strategic Documents, that the country is not threatened by a conventional war for a long time, but that it is certainly exposed to new challenges and threats to peace and international stability caused by the collapse of the bipolar world, the disintegration of the former SFRY, the negative consequences of globalization, national, religious and territorial confrontation. In addition, terrorism, extreme nationalism, transnational organized crime, misuse of strategic materials and dual-use technologies are listed as security challenges, risks and threats; the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, illegal arms trade, regional conflicts and crises, ethnic and religious intolerance; illegal activities of foreign intelligence services, computer crime and threats to information systems and technologies, natural disasters, technical and technological (industrial) disasters of larger proportions, epidemics, degradation and destruction of the environment and ecological potentials, internal economic and social problems, economic crime, poverty and unemployment.

In all strategies, it is clear that Macedonia has a lasting commitment to realize its future as part of the European family and membership in the EU and NATO, but also commitment to regional cooperation¹⁰⁵⁶. Macedonia is significantly engaged in the protection of territorial integrity and independence, the development of multiethnic society, participation in multinational operations outside the national territory led by NATO and the European Union, and the maintenance of internal and regional stability¹⁰⁵⁷.

Serbia. The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia¹⁰⁵⁸ is the highest strategic document whose implementation protects the national interests of the Republic of Serbia from the challenges, risks and threats to

¹⁰⁵⁶ However, the goals of entering the Euro-Atlantic family have so far been unfulfilled. The main reason for this is Greece's position on the dispute over the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia and their opposition to accept Skopje as a member of NATO. The same process takes place in connection with the European Union. The key problem is the fact that Macedonia in 2007 drafted its armed forces organizationally and numerically as a member of the collective security system.

¹⁰⁵⁷ *White Book of the Defense of the Republic of Macedonia*, Ministry of Defense, Skopje, 2005, p.21.

¹⁰⁵⁸ It was adopted by the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia at its session on 26 October 2009.

security in different areas of social life and establishes the bases of the security policy in the protection of national interests¹⁰⁵⁹.

This document primarily deals with the perception of the security environment, identifies challenges, risks and threats, and then determines national interests and goals. The applied methodology is potentially appropriate in view of the real power that Serbia possesses and its place and role in international relations. The basic principles of security policy, structures, principles of functioning and accountability in the security system are defined. It is stated that the Republic of Serbia's permanent commitments in the UN, European and other regional structures are actively involved in the preservation and building of their own, regional and global security, with no military neutrality being mentioned among the basic definitions, goals and principles of national security policy.

The National Security Strategy is a solid basis for defining the security system of the Republic of Serbia. Its application guarantees protection of the highest values and national interests and enables cooperation with other countries and all relevant international organizations in addressing contemporary challenges, risks and threats, at the regional and global level.

As a starting point in the consideration and presentation of challenges, risks and threats, the severity of consequences for the security of the Republic of Serbia that could arise in the event of their manifestation are taken into account. The danger of armed aggression is stated as unlikely, but not entirely excluded. At the same time, as the biggest threat to the security of the Republic of Serbia, an unlawful unilateral proclamation of Kosovo's independence was voiced.

Naturally, taking into account the character of modern security threats, the Strategy lists the threats to security as well as the transition, unresolved border issues with former SFRY republics, unresolved status of refugees and internally displaced persons, terrorism, organized crime and corruption, economic development problems, proliferation of weapons mass destruction, the danger of the spread of infectious diseases, drug addiction, the destructive action of certain religious sects and cults on the family and society, natural disasters and technical and technological disasters. By analyzing the strategic documents we can say that not enough attention has been paid to the ranking of risk and threat challenges, as well as the elaboration of mechanisms for protecting the country from them¹⁰⁶⁰.

¹⁰⁵⁹ National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, 2009, p. 3.

¹⁰⁶⁰ The strategic and doctrinal framework of the Republic of Serbia was shaped in the period from the acquisition of statehood by 2009, when all three strategic documents in the field of security and defense were adopted: National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia,

Croatia. A unique security system has been established in the Republic of Croatia, based on the defined defense policy and national security strategy. In this context, the basic task of the security system of the Republic of Croatia is to provide the capability for self-defense, whereby the new security reality requires the development of that system in the direction of providing capabilities for a wide range of tasks¹⁰⁶¹.

In the process of adopting its strategic documents, the Republic of Croatia, in the process of adopting its strategic documents, has been trying to find its identity, using experience in recent history, the knowledge of the academic community or the expertise of people who were directly part of the security and defense community, depending on the governing structure and its political goals¹⁰⁶². Such various presentations and methodologies for the development of strategic documents have led to a certain degree of confusion and their interweaving in defining the national goals and measures for their realization. The impression was that the strategic documents of the Republic of Croatia actually waited for "the new strategy of NATO to be adopted, so that the state political institutions, probably in a hurry, copied the new NATO strategic provisions that would be used in the preparation of new security strategies and defense, without investing much effort into seriously thinking about their suitability for Croatian society and the state in the future¹⁰⁶³."

According to the National Security Strategy, the overall security goal and interest of the Republic of Croatia is to build the preconditions for free, fair and stable political, economic and social development. This will be realized through the following special security goals: establishment, development and implementation of appropriate policies, measures, activities and institutions in the security area; building a favorable international security environment on a business and global level, with the support of international security integrations and in co-operation with other democratic countries; the

Defense Strategy of the Republic of Serbia and Strategic Defense Review, Maja Bjeloš, Security Policies in the Western Balkans - Serbia ", Center for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, 2010, p. 141

¹⁰⁶¹ For a wider look: the Defense Strategy of the Republic of Croatia, Narodne novine, 2002. broj 33, Zagreb, 29.3.2002.

¹⁰⁶² Zvonimir Mahečić, "Security Policies in the Western Balkans - Croatia", Center for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, 2010, p. 62

¹⁰⁶³ The Strategic and Doctrinal Framework for Security and Defense consists of: the National Security Strategy (adopted in 2002), the Defense Strategy (adopted in 2002), the Military Strategy (adopted in 2003), the Strategic Defense Review (adopted in 2005) and the Long-Term Development Plan (adopted in 2006), Zvonimir Mahečić, "Security Policies in the Western Balkans - Croatia", Center for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, 2010, p. 76

development of a stable and economically advanced society that will be able to build and maintain in the long term the security mechanisms and resources that will be able to respond to security challenges, risks and threats¹⁰⁶⁴.

In March 2002, the Croatian Parliament adopted the National Security Strategy, as a concept document that outlines the basic political views on national security. The Strategy defines the concept and scope of the concept of national security, the goals of building national security systems, the security environment, national values and interests, and ultimately the challenges, risks and threats to the security of the Republic of Croatia¹⁰⁶⁵.

For the Republic of Croatia, there is no danger of an international military conflict in the near future. However, some transitional criminal threats in the region have been described as unequivocal and positively security challenges: global terrorism, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, weapons smuggling, drugs and organized crime trafficking in narcotic drugs and humans¹⁰⁶⁶. The perception is that everything will directly or indirectly affect the national security of the Republic of Croatia¹⁰⁶⁷. Efficient control of the state border, but also cooperation in the field of internal affairs and in the struggle for the elimination of these dangers is a common interest and falls within the line of Croatian priorities¹⁰⁶⁸.

Montenegro. The construction of the Montenegrin strategic and doctrinal framework began shortly after Montenegro gained its statehood in May 2006. During the development of strategic and doctrinal documents, there was a lack of a clear plan which documents should first be adopted, as well as the vision of the goals to be achieved¹⁰⁶⁹.

¹⁰⁶⁴ National Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia, Narodne novine no. 32/2002.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Considering the size, economic strength and military power of the country, and given that at the time of the adoption of the Strategy, Croatia was not a member of NATO, it remains unclear, on what basis this methodological approach is based. By comparative analysis of the strategic - doctrinal and normative - legal documents of the Republic of Croatia from other social areas, the conclusion is drawn that the Republic of Croatia is claiming to have a leading role in the Balkan region, regardless of the contradictory attitudes about belonging to the geographical area.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Strategic Defense Review, Ministry of Defense, Zagreb, September 2005, p. 13.

¹⁰⁶⁷ The role of parliament in security sector reform in Western Balkan states, Miroslav Hadžić, Center for Civil - Military Relations, Belgrade, 2004, p.23.

¹⁰⁶⁸ National Security Strategy of R. Croatia, see: A collection of regulations and strategic documents from the field of defense, MDRC, Zagreb, 2004, p. 237-238.

¹⁰⁶⁹ The Montenegrin strategic and doctrinal framework consists of two main documents: the National Security Strategy (adopted in 2006/2008) and the Defense Strategy (adopted in 2007/2008), Rajko Radevic, "Security Policies in the Western Balkans - Montenegro", Center for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, 2010, p. 126

The National Security Strategy is a strategic document that defines the development and functioning of the security system of Montenegro. It expresses the unequivocal intention of Montenegro to become a member of the EU and NATO. The Strategy defines the basis for a fundamental reform of the national security and defense system.

The basic strategic goal of Montenegro is to build an integrated, functional and efficient security system that will enable the prevention and resolution of possible crises and disputes in accordance with international standards and principles¹⁰⁷⁰. The possibility of a military aggression against Montenegro has not been completely rejected, but the danger of asymmetric threats that can jeopardize the security of Montenegro is especially noteworthy.

In defining asymmetric threats, emphasis is placed on threats of an international character, such as international terrorism and organized crime, without indicating organized crime and corruption within Montenegro, as a risk, challenge and threat to the security of the country. From the point of view of the Western Balkans, it was only noted that the region is unstable and that instability can extend to the European continent.

Modern risks and threats that can influence the security of Montenegro include: international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, religious and ethnic conflicts, international organized crime, non-migration migration, smuggling of narcotic drugs and human trafficking¹⁰⁷¹.

By analyzing the text of these documents, there are certain inconsistencies and inconsistencies regarding the definition of security challenges, risks and threats of importance, or the degree of probability of threatening the security of the country. In addition, as with other Western Balkan countries, there are not enough developed mechanisms and measures to effectively counter contemporary security challenges, risks and threats.

COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NATIONAL SAFETY OF THE WESTERN BALKANS COUNTRY

National security and defense are one of the most important values of every nation and state. Clearly defined goals, attitudes and activities of the state that are expressed through strategic doctrinal documents are a basic prerequisite for building and strengthening the national security system. Of

¹⁰⁷⁰ In the development, a methodology was used which first defined national values and interests, and then challenges, risks and threats.

¹⁰⁷¹ Defense Strategy of Montenegro, Official Gazette of Montenegro, no. 79/08 of 23.12.2008.

course, the very existence of strategic and doctrinal documents does not guarantee better national security and defense. It depends on many factors, internal and external, but also the readiness of the state itself to respect and implement what is stated, among other things, precisely through strategic doctrinal documents, resolutions, but also through the Constitution and laws¹⁰⁷².

The national security strategy includes all the key elements that should have a document of the highest level of importance for the security of one state and as such should define the answers to the basic questions: what is protected (national values and national interests), from which it is protected (challenges, risks and threats), how to protect (national security policy) and who protects (the national security system, with its subsystems).

Most countries of the Western Balkans, with respect to their specificity, defined the structure of the basic document in the field of national security in a similar way. It describes the security environment, identified challenges, risks and threats to security, and promoted national interests and goals. The order of guidance¹⁰⁷³ depends on the methodology used during the development of national security strategies, the concept of national security or security policy, documents that are only by their name different when their essence is the same. By means of a comparative analysis of the national security strategies of the Western Balkan countries, three methodological approaches can be identified.

The first approach involves the definition of national values, interests and goals in the first place, and then the perception of the security environment and the identification of challenges, risks and threats. According to literature, this approach is the characteristic of economically, politically and militarily powerful countries¹⁰⁷⁴.

¹⁰⁷² The national security strategy is a solid basis for defining a country's security system. Its application guarantees protection of the highest values and national interests and enables cooperation with other countries and all relevant international organizations in addressing contemporary challenges, risks and threats at the regional and global level, which have asymmetrical and transnational character. The mere existence of a strategic doctrinal document does not mean that national security and defense of one country is better or more effective in countering security challenges, risks and threats.

¹⁰⁷³ Analysis of strategic documents from the field of defense of the Western Balkan countries reveals a diversity in ranking the significance of security challenges, risks and threats to the degree of probability of endangering the security of the country, that is, not enough developed mechanisms of protection, first of all, from insecure security threats.

¹⁰⁷⁴ In drafting the National Security Strategy, the Republic of Montenegro and the Republic of Macedonia applied it.

The second approach is inherent in small, underdeveloped countries that define their national interests and goals only after they conduct a detailed analysis of the security environment and identification of security challenges, risks and threats¹⁰⁷⁵.

The third approach is essentially a combination of the first two and implies the perception of the security environment in the first place, and then the definition of national values and interests. Eventually, the security challenges identified are risks and threats¹⁰⁷⁶.

In their national security constitutions and strategies, many countries in the Western Balkans have called upon national values, which are generally accepted values based on European history, culture and tradition, in defining national interests¹⁰⁷⁷.

In addition to national values and interests that are common to most countries, certain countries have clearly demonstrated certain specificities in defining national interests and seeing their place and role in the international community¹⁰⁷⁸.

Also, all countries, except the Republic of Serbia, defined EU and NATO membership as their primary national interest and goal.

The level of accomplishment of tasks within the defense activity varies from country to country, depending on the legal framework and the understanding of the security situation. Despite the new security risks and threats, the most important task of the armed forces has remained to defend the country from an armed attack from outside. However, in a globalized world,

¹⁰⁷⁵ Such an approach was applied by the Republic of Albania and the Republic of Serbia.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Such a somewhat unusual approach was applied by the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

¹⁰⁷⁷ The basic national values are: independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, freedom, equality, peace building and preservation, the rule of law, democracy, social justice, human rights and freedoms, national, racial, religious equality and gender equality, the inviolability of property and the preservation of the environment. National values are protected by the achievement of national interests, and the protection of national interests is the purpose of the existence of a national security system.

¹⁰⁷⁸ The Republic of Croatia expresses a significant concern for its own compatriots in neighboring countries. The Republic of Montenegro overestimates its commitment to EU and NATO membership. The Republic of Albania argues that the Albanian factor is of primary importance in the region, which promotes an unavoidable factor in creating a harmonious coexistence atmosphere. The greatest risk to the security of the Republic of Macedonia is the possibility of expressing extreme nationalism, racial and religious hatred, which can significantly affect the survival of the state.

the inevitability of national security is not only threatened by foreign armed forces and armed conflicts, but also by new non-military threats whose common denominator is transnationality and unpredictability. In order for defense activities to respond effectively to current and future challenges, it was necessary to reform and emphasize preventive action and regional or international cooperation.

CONCLUSION

Contemporary international relations are increasingly characterized by global turbulence, with increasingly prominent polarizations, social and political tensions, religious and ethnic conflicts, or risk in the broadest sense of the word. The ongoing process of security transformation, determined by modern security threats, has reflected on changes in the concepts and concepts of security, whereby the state is no longer the main object of interest in the study of security science, and the modern concept of security is increasingly focused on expanding cooperation and establishing a common security based on harmonized interests and values of countries involved in the security community¹⁰⁷⁹.

The Western Balkans is certainly not only a geographical determinant, but also a political term recognized for a region that is on a complex road to building democratic values of society and which is not yet fully involved in Euro-Atlantic integration. The countries of this region associate common history, degree of economic development, as well as interwoven security challenges, risks and threats. Despite the existing differences, it is noted that all the countries of the Western Balkans have correctly concluded in their strategic documents that they can not stand up to modern challenges, risks and threats, and that the mutual cooperation and coordinated action within international organizations and the system of collective security is the only possible solution. In addition, only the existence of strategic doctrinal documents in all Western Balkan countries can be seen as a major step forward towards greater stability in the region, which

¹⁰⁷⁹ The new security threats have led to a certain change in the approach to its preservation, which has led to the taking of common attitudes of the UN, NATO, the EU, as the most influential international security actors, that Euro-Atlantic security is indivisible and that freedom, democracy, human rights and the liberal the economy represents common values and common interests. Such reflections have led to the development of a variety of security concepts that we can freely classify in the three most important groups: the concept of collective security, the concept of security cooperation and the concept of collective defense.

inevitably leads to the actual adoption of the necessary values and the introduction of categories of defined norms.

A very important prerequisite for the joint, coordinated action of the Western Balkan countries in achieving a favorable security environment is the proper identification of security challenges, risks and threats. The regional and security environment has been significantly changed compared to the years when the strategies of national security of the Western Balkan countries were adopted. Consequently, the need for a new structuring and purification of the list of challenges, risks and threats in relation to them is stated in the test of existing national strategies.

The strategic analysis of the challenges, risks and threats to the national security of the Western Balkan countries highlights the transnational, asymmetrical character and the interdependence of contemporary risks and threats to international security. They by themselves impose an essential and geographical indivisibility of security and actualize the need to build a cooperative approach to security, that is, the adequate capacity and capabilities of the Western Balkan countries to independently and jointly counter the regional security threats. Challenges that threaten the security of the countries in this region, but also their geopolitical and geo-strategic environment, practically exclude the possibility of achieving the desired level of security and successful development, relying on their own power. That is why the Alliance is a way to preserve the vital national and state interests and increase the total social and defense power.

It is quite certain that due to the mutual conditioning of the security of the Western Balkans, it is necessary to establish regional and national mechanisms that will successfully overcome the current challenges, risks and threats to security. The future of the defense policies of the countries of the region must continue to be focused on Euro-Atlantic integration, confidence-building and cooperation as an option to respond to contemporary, new, asymmetric threats to the region. A further evolution of threats, the emergence of new security concepts will probably depend on the situation on the global level and the correlations between the leading powers of the world in the future.

In addition, the participation of military organizations in non-traditional missions, such as the fight against terrorism and organized crime, and post-conflict stabilization, show that they are unprepared for these tasks. However, in many cases, military organizations can no longer escape involvement in these types of missions.

Different forms of asymmetric warfare are present in all types of missions. Therefore, in order to understand the new challenges that arose before military organizations in the performance of the set missions, it is necessary to analyze all the problems arising from methods of asymmetric warfare that are used by opponents who can be institutionalized military

organizations, but also non-state actors (terrorist networks, organized crime, etc.), or both simultaneously.

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KOMPARATIVNA ANALIZA SISTEMA NACIONALNE BEZBEDNOSTI ZEMALJA ZAPADNOG BALKANA U USLOVIMA AZIMETRIČNIH PRETNJI

Snežana Vasić*

Ministarstvo odbrane, Republika Srbija

Goran R. Nenadović**

Ministarstvo odbrane, Republika Srbija

Apstrakt: U „globalizovanom svetu“ došlo je i do promene fizionomije izazova, rizika i pretnji, kako na globalnom i regionalnom, tako i na nacionalnom nivou. Savremeni koncepti bezbednosti, odnosno strategije nacionalnih bezbednosti i strategije odbrane moraju razvijati efikasne odgovore kako na tradicionalne (oružani sukobi unutar i između država) tako i na netradicionalne - asimetrične pretnje koje su posledica razvoja modernog društva (*organizovani kriminal, terorizam, energetika, ekološke i demografske pretnje, cyber kriminal, učešće stranih boraca na ratnim žarištima drugih država, migrantske krize i dr.*) i koje, po svim elementima, predstavljaju transnacionalne pretnje.

Postojanje i jačanje asimetričnih pretnji transnacionalnog karaktera nameće potrebu novog pristupa u njihovom rešavanju koji se nužno mora razlikovati od tradicionalnog, sa akcentom na preventivnom delovanju. U tom smislu neophodno je, sa jedne strane, razvijati i jačati nacionalne institucionalne mehanizame, a sa druge stalno intezivirati međunarodno povezivanje i regionalnu saradnju.

Zbog brojnih i raznovrsnih bezbednosnih problema i njihove intenzivne povezanosti na različitim nivoima i oblicima, poslednjih godina u opticaju je termin „Zapadni Balkan“, kao sinonim za region koji još uvek predstavlja „bure baruta“. Nestabilnost ovog regiona postaje naročito složena ako se posmatra u kontekstu zbivanja na Bliskom istoku i u Mediteranu, koji pored geografske bliskosti imaju i direktnu političku i ideološku vezu sa mnogim akterima nestabilnosti na Balkanu.

Težište ovog rada biće na analizi nacionalnih strategija bezbednosti zemalja Zapadnog Balkana u kontekstu savremenih bezbednosnih izazova i

* snezana.vasic@mod.gov.rs

** goran.nenadovic@yahoo.com

pretnji. Razmotriće se neophodne pretpostavke koje će na kraju biti predmet komparativne analize.

Činjenica je da se na prostoru Zapadnog Balkana nalaze države koje su članice NATO - a (Republika Albanija i Republika Hrvatska i Crna Gora), ali i one koje nisu integrisane u evroatlantske bezbednosne strukture (Bosna i Hercegovina, Republika Makedonija i Republika Srbija), već su uključene u Program NATO - a „Partnerstvo za mir“. Takođe, u političkom smislu, zemlje Balkana su na različitim stepenima integracija u evropske i evroatlantske strukture, što sa jedne strane može predstavljati problem, ali sa druge strane može biti i pokretačka snaga za dalje napore na stabilizaciji političkih, ekonomskih, socijalnih i drugih prilika radi ostvarenja državnih ciljeva.

Ključne reči: globalizacija, asimetrične pretnje, bezbednost, Zapadni Balkan, sistem nacionalne bezbednosti

STRATEGY FOR DEFENSE DIPLOMACY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Marjan Gjurovski*
Faculty of Security, Skopje
Republic of Macedonia

Abstract: Diplomacy and international politics are the key tools in the establishment of a sovereign and independent state as an international political subject, and also in its communication with other sovereign entities. Looking at the socio-political system on a global scale, we can come to a conclusion that the interaction between entities does not strictly have a civil dimension (economics, politics, resources).

Diplomacy has its own military side which is truly crucial in the establishment of peace and democracy. Defense diplomacy, de facto, creates a surrounding where the use of force is being replaced by dialogue, mutual understanding, recognition and respect. Aware of the power and real meaning of the defense diplomacy, the Republic of Macedonia undertakes serious and determined steps towards building a defense diplomacy network encompassing our key global partners, including some of the most powerful and influential countries in the world.

Key words: defense diplomacy; peace; security; Republic of Macedonia; international community; society; Army.

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of defense (military) diplomacy in the history of human society is a process that has been moving alongside the emergence and the development of the general diplomacy. This parallel development was conditioned by the historical developments during which the element of the power and power of the state was reflected above all in the power of the military. The powerful army within its own state has shown its influence on all institutions in the country, but also on the diplomacy, by putting the works of a military nature in the first place. Thus, de facto diplomats were required to have a good knowledge of military issues. Of course, the best soldiers in the

* mar.gjurovski@gmail.com

military are professional soldiers, so their knowledge as experts in the work of diplomatic institutions has become more than necessary¹⁰⁸⁰.

From time to time, the military factor in the diplomacy was more powerful than the general one, which inevitably led to "predominating" of the military diplomacy over the general diplomacy. This kind of diplomacy was probably imposed by the rulers of the time, who, despite being statesmen, were also military leaders, which means that the political and the military functions were concentrated in one person.

The middle Ages was devoid of complicated warfare, that is, there was no deliberate military planning, nor tactical movement of the troops, which more or less made it uninteresting among the military diplomatic activities. In fact, it can be said that Machiavelli was one of the few authors who studied the military diplomatic practices of the middle Ages in their works.

The conflicts between the states in the 17th and 18th centuries were mainly led by the allies, which has imposed the need for the participation of professional soldiers in the role of Liaison Officer, ie in the role that preceded the introduction of the post "Military representative". Their duty, as the name itself says, was above all maintenance of the relationship between their own and the allied forces, assistance in training soldiers, giving military advice to Allied generals, and reporting on where the financial assistance was directed by their government. The liaison officers also had the task of representing the ambassador in situations where the said person could not leave the capital for any reason. Certainly, in this way, the liaison officers of the occasional diplomatic missions were given the opportunity to become more familiar with the armed forces of the host country, that is, to be informed and to inform their own government about the situation inside the host country. "The sending of occasional missions at the time was almost the only way to maintain official political relations between the states, and such missions were valuable to familiarize themselves with the socio-political situation in the country, and

¹⁰⁸⁰ *Strategemicon*, Book I, ch. 1; Vagts Alfred, *The Military Attaché*, New Jersey: Prince. Univ. Press, 1967, p. 11. The first data on the action of professional soldiers for the needs of the diplomatic service comes in the first military work, that is, when it was ascertained that war is a skill that can be learned from the books. "The Roman writer Frontinus in his work *Stratagems* ("War cunning"), written for the training of Roman officers, describes how a certain Kaius Lelius is sent by Skipio to the Sifax camp under the pretext of carrying out a diplomatic mission. He took several high-ranking officers with the task of carrying out expert research. The officers were dressed in his servants, and when someone found himself in a situation to be discovered, the ambassador would punish him without a word, in order to convince everyone that he was the most ordinary slave."

when it was a remote country, notifications from such missions were also basic a source of information about an unknown country."¹⁰⁸¹

"The French Cardinal Richelieu, during the reign of Louis XIV, formed a Military Political Intelligence Office,"¹⁰⁸² and French officers were often sent by that office with the task of maintaining links between the Allied armies. "A French officer of the Swedish court has been sent with such a task, and what is particularly interesting with that officer is that he was the first subordinate (command) of the ambassador for the first time."¹⁰⁸³ Regardless of the case, that is one of the first attempts of establishing civilian control over the members of the armed forces.

Since the time of the first officers sent abroad, to this day, the military attaché has had some independence in relation to other diplomats and the ambassador himself. But, nevertheless, the ambassador had a general authority over everything including the military attaché. The military attaché was attached to the Ministry of Defense, not to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has given him independence, but only to the extent allowed by the ambassador. With the French Revolution and the reign of Napoleon, the conditions for the active participation of military personnel in the work of the diplomatic service were created. Napoleon among the first saw the benefit of sending his officers to foreign diplomatic missions and was the first (unofficially) who on March 3, 1806, sent Captain Lagrange¹⁰⁸⁴ to Vienna, with the task of "continuously keeping precise data on the strength of the Austrian army and on its combat positions."¹⁰⁸⁵

The said captain noticed the collected data on a daily basis, misdirected them by dates and sent monthly reports to his General Staff, that is, to the military intelligence service, as well as to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Due to the way the French captain works, which is still used in a more recent form, it can be said that it was the first military attaché¹⁰⁸⁶. At the same time, the referral of the aforementioned officer to the diplomatic service is in most of the literature taken as the official start of the activities of the officers

¹⁰⁸¹ Вајовић Петар, *Обавештавање као дипломатска и конзуларна функција*, Сплит: докторска дисертација, 1965, стр. 23.

¹⁰⁸² To be seen in: Ђорђевић Обрен, *Шта је то ипијунажа*, Београд: Политика, 1978, стр. 26.

¹⁰⁸³ Vagts Alfred, *The Military Attaché*, New Jersey: Prince. Univ. Press, 1967, p. 9.

¹⁰⁸⁴ For the basic biographical information of Captain Lagrange to be seen in: Зечевић Милан, *Војна дипломатија*, Београд: Војноиздавачки и новински центар, 1990, стр. 31, 32.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Vagts Alfred, *The Military Attaché*, New Jersey: Prince. Univ. Press, 1967, p. 9.

¹⁰⁸⁶ The word attache (fr. attacheer) means to add, to assign to work; to attract; to get used to something, something to love; Вујаклија Милан, *Лексикон страних речи и израза*, Београд: Просвета, 2004, стр. 83;

within the diplomatic mission that is, as the official start of the work of military diplomacy.

The mentioned captain had been noticing the collected data on a daily basis, selecting them by dates and sent monthly reports to his General Staff, that is, to the military intelligence service, as well as to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Due to the way the French captain works, which is still used in a more recent form, it can be said that it was the first military attaché. At the same time, the referral of the aforementioned officer to the diplomatic service is in most of the literature taken as the official start of the activities of the officers within the diplomatic mission that is, as the official start of the work of military diplomacy.

FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY DIPLOMACY

In order to be secured the important political positions of the state, as well as to realize its foreign policy by applying the allowed funds; the diplomatic missions have built their own organization, but have also established their own functions. It is considered that the word "function" comes from the Latin and signifies the performance of the service or the performance of a duty ¹⁰⁸⁷. At first glance, it may seem that the functions of diplomacy are the same as its tasks, because diplomatic affairs can be performed, or by performing tasks, so the logical question arises as to the difference between the two concepts of function and task.

"The function cannot be separated from the task, but complementarily unites all the tasks performed by the military diplomatic mission and which can be entrusted to it."¹⁰⁸⁸ On the other hand, the tasks are more numerous, more specific, and always set up execute, while the functions are reduced to a global setting within the framework of those tasks that can and do not have to be performed. So, functions are framework tasks that do not enter deeper into the way they are executed, and by whose execution a certain service achieves its final goals. The ratio of tasks to the function can be seen as a ratio of the part to the whole. Namely, tasks are parts of functions; or rather they are a sub function with the execution of which functions get their own characteristic features.

The Vienna Convention for the Diplomatic Relations determines the functions and tasks of diplomatic representatives. By performing and adapting

¹⁰⁸⁷ Вујаклија Милан, *Лексикон страних речи и израза*, Београд: Просвета, 2004, стр. 958

¹⁰⁸⁸ Зечевић Милан, *Војна дипломатија*, Београд: Војноиздавачки и новински центар, 1990, стр. 127-128.

them to the needs of the military diplomacy, these functions could be fully transferred to the military diplomatic missions and be introduced in the following manner:

- Presentation of the Armed Forces in the State of Reception;
- Protecting the interests of the armed forces and its members;
- Negotiating with the representatives of the host country's armed forces;
- Reporting to the host country's armed forces and submission of timely reports to its own government and
- Promoting friendly relations and developing military cooperation.

The first problem the diplomatic practice is facing by the implementation of the functions of both the general and the military diplomacy was seen in their imprecise formulation, precisely in the imprecise determination and with which means the diplomatic functions can be carried out. The fact that the ways and means of their implementation are not precisely defined results in the different legal interpretation and understanding of the contents of diplomatic functions. Hence, it is necessary for the diplomatic mission to know the laws of the state of admission, but also the laws of international law in order to successfully carry out its tasks and functions. At the beginning of their active engagement in diplomatic practice, officers appeared in two functions: in the function of military observers and in the function of securing the ambassador. This kind of engagement of officers within the diplomatic missions was a completely logical type of use of professional soldiers for the needs of the diplomatic service.

Over the time, the manner of functioning of the general diplomacy, and therefore of the military diplomacy, was adapted to the needs of its own state, but also to the laws of the state of admission. The implementation and adaptation of the functions of general diplomacy to the needs of military diplomacy over time proved necessary for military diplomacy to be able to successfully accomplish its tasks. If in some cases its activity was retained solely on the notification, military diplomacy could not perform its tasks, because without the implementation of other activities provided with the Vienna Convention, the function of the notification could not be fully implemented.

DEFENSE DIPLOMACY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

The Republic of Macedonia, through its foreign policy, which is in direct correlation with its defense policy, promotes its national values and

interests on a bilateral, regional and multilateral level and is fully committed to meeting the foreign policy priorities, which are also strategic goals.

The Republic of Macedonia is committed to meeting five foreign policy priorities: NATO membership, getting a date and starting negotiations for full membership in the European Union, maintaining the visa liberalization between the EU and the Republic of Macedonia, overcoming the issue of the name difference imposed by our southern neighbor and reinforcing economic and public diplomacy.

What is the most important in terms of the function of the Ministry of Defense is the European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the Republic of Macedonia, which has no alternative and is of vital interest for its long-term stability and development, ie it is of invaluable significance for the security and well-being to its citizens and to the preservation of peace and stability in the region and beyond.

The agenda of the Ministry of Defense is determined by three main activities at the state level, which are also guidelines for the defense reforms and the transformation of the Army:

- Internationally, within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic integrations and the European integrations, the Republic of Macedonia continues to implement the necessary reforms and provides for the forthcoming towards the global peace through participation in the myths and the presence / visibility of the state in all of the international institutions.
- On the inside plan, with the enrichment of the inter-ethnic and inter-ethnic relations and tolerance.
- In the area of the defense, the creation of a modern and highly professional army is continuing, with the more elaboration of the working conditions and improvement of the standard of its life, with democratic and civilian control over it and the affirmation of military service to the country.

The integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures is a process in which we are making significant progress and concrete results, since the country has invested in it since 1993. At that time, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia unanimously adopted the Decision on joining the Republic of Macedonia in membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and it was confirmed in 2007 and reaffirmed in April 2012 with the adoption of the Declaration of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia for reaffirmation of the determination for realization of the strategic goal for Macedonia's NATO membership.

For the membership in NATO and the EU, there is a political consensus among all parliamentary political parties, and this goal stands high on their political agendas, and there is also a social consensus, which is repeatedly confirmed through the results of the public opinion surveys, which state that this determination is enjoyed extremely high support among citizens. Since joining NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative in 1995, as a long-term partner, the Republic of Macedonia is recognized as a worthy ally of the Alliance, ready to promote common democratic values, share responsibilities and participate in the activities of the international community for tackling the threats and challenges to international peace and security.

For a long period, Republic of Macedonia has been giving a significant contribution to the regional and international peace and security by participating in the Alliance's efforts to combat global security threats. The great contribution of the country to the international community's peacekeeping operations is an indicator of the commitment of the Republic of Macedonia to the defense of the principles and values of NATO and is a confirmation of the demonstrated capabilities for top professionalism of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia and the personnel performing the most complex tasks and tasks in missions outside of their own country.

Republic of Macedonia is committed to the development and establishment of contemporary values - peace, democracy, human rights, ethnic, religious and cultural equality tolerance and respect, on a global level. Indisputable proof of this is the continued participation of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia in the international peacekeeping missions led by NATO, the EU and the UN.

MISSION OF DEFENSE DIPLOMACY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

The mission of the defense diplomacy is to provide capacities for carrying out various activities for promotion of the wider interests of the Republic of Macedonia, building and maintaining confidence measures, as well as expanding and deepening the defense cooperation at all levels (bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally).

The activities of the defense diplomacy form an integral part of the integral activities that the Republic of Macedonia undertakes in the conduct of its foreign policy. The implementation of the activities implies full coordination and concerted action with other foreign policy subjects, in accordance with the principle of separation of powers, established by the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. The development of defense diplomacy is closely connected with the development of the international

relations of the Republic of Macedonia with the world, as well as with the development of the capacities of the Army and the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia raises a number of initiatives in the field of defense cooperation. With the help of the defense diplomacy, we are active in the direction of affirmation of our country, implementation of defense reforms, development and promotion of multilateral, bilateral and military economic cooperation with the countries where the defense-diplomatic representatives and international organizations are sent, as well as development and promotion of partnership relations with international security and defense institutions.

CONCLUSION

According to the previously said, we can conclude that Republic of Macedonia, with the commitment to full membership in Euro-Atlantic structures sets military diplomacy to the fore. Her path towards full NATO membership leads through implementation of activities undertaken obligations and international agreements and their implementation including the activities of the Partnership for Peace initiative. When it comes to the strategic determinations of the republic of Macedonia, defense diplomacy is in the focus of the events and has a central role in the implementation of the commitments. The Euro-Atlantic integrations are in the interest of Macedonia, which is why it is a top start-up priority for which there is political consensus among the parties, as well as the greatest support by the citizens. The NATO admission is significant from a time aspect and it is necessary to make every effort to be realized with greater dynamics. Euro-Atlantic integration is important for the stability of the region, therefore defense diplomacy should focus on deepening bilateral relations with our neighbors. . Any delay causes the region's peace and stability and delays the development of the region, and this process needs to be completed and implemented at a faster pace, especially when there are still open issues, such as the northern part of Kosovo, the state apparatus in Bosnia and the functioning in that system, as well as our open name issue, which can easily contribute to destabilization. In general, the general assessment of Macedonia is that it meets the requirements for NATO membership. We need to be proactive and not give up or to be discouraged, especially because we have what to show. Macedonia is one of the most credible partners in the Alliance's international missions. At all meetings with the NATO structures, only good words are heard for our peacekeepers who are our most experienced ambassadors in the world and are an important segment of our defense diplomacy. Observed by the number of troops in missions, we are one of the countries that have the largest number of participants in

international missions per capita. We can also be an example of a model of an army with universal values, cohesion, integrity, high morale and professionalism, with mutual respect for interethnic, interreligious, intercultural cohesion, values that have existed for centuries in Macedonia. From importing countries or users of international peace we have become a contributor to peace or an exporter of peace.

The defensive diplomacy is a huge potential field for work, which is why it is imperative in a global context. The objectives of the defense diplomacy policy of the modern states are in the area of strengthening the relevant institutions and implementing effective measures and activities in the security plan, in order to protect the national interests and successfully preventive action and to overcome the challenges, risks and security threats. This involves development of a politically and economically stable and prosperous society, participation in building a favorable security environment at the regional and global level through inclusion in European integration and other regional and international structures and cooperation with other democratic societies.

The national security policy of the modern states, as well as the Balkan states, is based on the principles of prevention, defense, compatibility, security and responsibility indivisibility. The basic components of contemporary national security policy are foreign policy, defense policy, internal security policy, economic policy, social policy and policies in other areas of social life. All this, along with the promotion of education, science, scientific research, environmental protection, culture and other areas of social life, as well as their compliance with the standards of the European Union, have strategic significance for the protection of national interests.

The Republic of Macedonia has a broad political and social consensus in support of our determination to participate actively in the building of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. In this direction, we will constantly contribute to strengthening the Euro-Atlantic security through participation in the UN, NATO and EU. The Republic of Macedonia, in the long run, develops operational capabilities for deployable and sustainable forces, prepared and equipped for deployment in international operations. The long-term contribution to international operations will gradually increase in accordance with national interests and the development of the operational deployable capabilities of the ARM.

The Republic of Macedonia is working intensively to fully integrate into the EU and to actively pursue the development of the Common Foreign Security Policy and the European Security Policy.

The strategic partnership with the United States is of particular importance for the security, stability and economic development of the

Republic of Macedonia and the region. The US partnership and support resulted in strong assistance in the construction of the ARM military forces, as well as with the significant contribution of the Republic of Macedonia in the global fight against terrorism. The Republic of Macedonia is also committed to continuously improving regional and bilateral co-operation in the field of defense.

Indeed, what can be drawn by induction from the overall global quantum of data is that precisely the promotion of regional and bilateral co-operation in all regions is an imperative for achieving perpetual peace and stability as a prerequisite for economic and social welfare. An example is the countries that, because of their location, simply have to develop relationships of cooperation, friendship and tolerance.

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STRATEGIJA ODBRAMBENE DIPLOMATIJE REPUBLIKE MAKEDONIJE

Marjan Gjurovski*
Fakultet bezbednosti, Skoplje
Republika Makedonija

Abstrakt: Diplomacija i međunarodna politika su ključni instrumenti u uspostavljanju suverene i nezavisne države kao međunarodnog političkog subjekta, ali takođe i u komunikaciji sa ostalim suverenim entitetima. Posmatrajući društveno-politički sistem na globalnom nivou, možemo zaključiti da uzajamno delovanje između entiteta nema isključivo građansku dimenziju (ekonomija, politika, resursi). Diplomacija ima svoju vojnu stranu koja je zaista ključna za uspostavljanje mira i demokratije. Odbrambena diplomatija, zapravo, stvara okruženje u kojem se upotreba sile zamenjuje dijalogom, uzajamnim razumevanjem, priznavanjem i poštovanjem. Svesna moći i pravog značenja odbrambene diplomatije, Republika Makedonija

* mar.gjurovski@gmail.com

preduzima ozbiljne i odlučne korake ka izgradnji mreže odbrambene diplomatije koja obuhvata naše ključne globalne partnere, uključujući i neke od najmoćnijih i uticajnih država svijeta.

Ključne reči: odbrambena diplomatija, mir, bezbjednost, Republika Makedonija, međunarodna zajednica, društvo, vojska.

