DEFENCE DIPLOMACY IN STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF ASYMMETRIC THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract: Defence diplomacy is significant part of diplomacy and overall foreign policy of states. The functions of defence diplomacy are defined and regulated by diplomatic law and practice in the receiving state, as well as the position of the state in the international order. Globalization in the field of security enhances, bringing us more and more challenges to national security and forcing strategy makers to change approach to strategic considerations. It makes the process of developing comprehensive national strategy very difficult because apart from still existing “traditional” threats, there are new, asymmetric, threats as well. Therefore, it is necessary not only to find answers to new threats, but also to keep readiness for responding “traditional” threats and consequently form a comprehensive and wide-ranging strategic response to threats. Not less problem is how to distribute the competencies of the subjects of security and defence system in a proper way.

The aim of this paper is to consider the functions of modern defence diplomacy and its role in identification and countering asymmetric threat to national security. Consequently, this process could give some answers and contribute to contemporary strategic thought.

Key words: asymmetric threat, defence diplomacy, national security strategy, strategic thought, terrorism, migration.

INTRODUCTION

The defence diplomacy, like diplomacy in general, appeared as an evolutionary process that was determined with the development of international relations and national interests. The roots of defence diplomacy

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lie in military diplomacy, which became a reality at the beginning of the nineteenth century and developed until the beginning of the twenty-first century. Namely, at that time international relations have become significantly different compared to the previous two centuries that have created the conditions for military diplomacy that got quantitatively and qualitatively different characteristics going more beyond just military issues. On the contrary, non-military, or asymmetric threat to national security is the most common threat in the contemporary world. In that sense, it is quite logical to try to find out the role of defence diplomacy in the process of identification and countering asymmetric threat in order to provide national security of modern states.

Diplomatic relations are codified by Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations, which defines the generally accepted functions of diplomatic representatives. Defence diplomacy is a part of diplomacy in general, so all rules of international laws that regulate the diplomatic relations apply to defence diplomacy, including functions. Having that in mind, we are able to perform, by analogy, specific functions of defence diplomacy that are most commonly reduced to the following:

a) Representing the defence system of sending state to the receiving state;

b) Protecting the interests of the defence system of sending state to the receiving state, within the limits permitted by international law;

c) Negotiating with the defence and security system of the receiving state;

d) Ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the defence and security system of receiving State, and reporting thereon to the defence system of the sending state;

e) Promoting confidence building, friendly relations and cooperation between the defence and security system of the sending state and the receiving state, and developing cooperation in the field of defence and security.932

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Some authors who dealt with the functions of the defence attachés also added the function of principal advisor to the chief of diplomatic and consular missions on defence and security issues. However, the role of defence attachés in diplomatic-consular missions is very important in the field of defence and security of every state.

MODERN ASYMMETRIC THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

To define asymmetry, in the most simplified way, we can say that asymmetric threats or techniques are a version of not “fighting fair”, which can include the use of surprise in all its strategic dimensions and the use of weapons, means and instruments in the ways unplanned by the counterpart. Not fighting fair also includes the prospect of an opponent designing a strategy that fundamentally alters the terrain on which a conflict is fought.

During the last fifteen years, the term “asymmetry” and “asymmetric” have become vogue words in American and European strategic and political science. It becomes most common to use this word, not only in terms of war or armed conflict, but also in context of overall national security. Therefore, it is very often to use terms taken from military strategists like strategy, battle, options, etc. to explain the nature of asymmetry threat and its objectives, countermeasures and the like. These terms are difficult to understand more than they enlighten, having become politicized rather than being truly analytical. In contemporary usage, asymmetric threats generally include terrorism, unconventional or guerrilla warfare as it is the case in Afghanistan and Iraq, the use of weapons of mass distraction, cyber-warfare, or information warfare. More recently, the use of cruise and/or ballistic missiles, and other weapons to fashion an anti-access or area denial strategy to include, in some

Contemporary International Relations), Master Paper, Faculty of Political Science, Beograd, pp. 8-9; Gocevski Trajan: Osnovi na sistemot na nacionalna odbrana (Basics of the System of National Defense), četvrtoto dopolniteto izdanie, Filozofski fakultet, Skopje, 2005, p. 408


cases, urban warfare, have been embraced as asymmetric threats. At the same time, we must note that many of these asymmetric threats are quite often long-standing ones. For example, ballistic missiles were first used by the Nazi Germany in the V-1 and V-2 missile attacks upon London in 1944-45. As the U.S. Army War College study observes, asymmetry is a new word for an old concept whose provenance goes back to Sun Tzu’s “all warfare is based on deception,” through Liddell Hart’s “indirect approach” to Edward Luttwak’s “paradoxical logic of strategy.”

Asymmetric approaches can achieve powerful effect through manipulation of the psychological element. Aimed directly at the will of the opponent, they can compensate for materiel or other deficiencies. While the method of the approach may be tactical, the psychological effect is sought at the strategic level.

Undoubtedly, the idea of avoiding enemy strengths while probing for their weaknesses and maximizing our own advantages is hardly revolutionary. The actuality of September 11 graphically and tragically validated the point that the asymmetric threat is the one that goes beyond the limits of our physical and mental capabilities to conceive of or execute. At the same time, while rattling on about asymmetric threats, we underestimated our enemy’s potential for thinking strategically.

On the other hand, weak actors in international politics have a high interest in winning because only victory ensures their survival. Following figures point out this fact:

937 Current asymmetric threats are countless, but there are some classifications, as follows: 1) Use of biological and chemical weapons, 2) Use of lasers for blinding, 3) Use of some types of mines, 4) Suicide attacks, 5) Surprise first strikes, 6) Particularly brutal attacks, 7) Indiscriminate attacks on civilians and neutral countries, 8) Environmental attacks, 9) Attacks on all satellite systems, 10) Attacks on all computer systems, 11) Funding terrorist groups to launch attacks, 12) Fighting not to win but to lose, 13) Intentionally exposing one's own population to high casualties, 14) Actually attacking one's own population, 15) Fighting to death, and 16) Negotiating arms-control treaties with the intent to covertly develop arms in contravention of the treaty. Taken from: Primmerma C.A.: Thoughts on the Meaning of “Asymmetric Threats”, Special Report 10-1165, Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, USA, 2006, pp. 8-9.


Andrew Mack’s explanation for how weak states are able to win asymmetric wars comprises three key elements: relative power explains relative interests, relative interests explain relative political vulnerability and relative vulnerability explains why strong actors lose. According to the logic of this argument, strong actors have a lower interest in winning because their survival is not at stake, and they are not prepared to sacrifice themselves or their other national interests.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 93–128}

We have seen numerous definitions of “asymmetric threat”, but most of them do not stand up to historical or logical scrutiny. There is very little agreement on what constitutes an “asymmetric threat”. In attempt to find that out, experts from Massachusetts Institute of Technology offer us the following criteria that an asymmetric threat must satisfy:

1) It must involve a weapon, tactic, or strategy that a state or non-state enemy both could and would use against the state. Stating this criterion may
seem pedantic, but after all, there needs to be some reality to the threatened action.

2) It must involve a weapon, tactics, or strategy that the state would not employ. This criterion is very strong, and does not simply mean that the state does not currently possess such a weapon, would not use the tactic under present circumstances, or does not believe a strategy is effective. It means that the states would not employ the weapon, tactic, or strategy, even if we thought it efficacious, under any currently conceivable circumstances. This criterion assures that the threat is asymmetric according to the analysis of the previous section.

A consequence to the second criterion states that the threat involves a weapon, tactic, or strategy that the other state would not combat by retaliating in kind and, therefore, could not deter by threatening to retaliate in kind.

3) It must involve a weapon, tactic, or strategy that, if not countered, could have serious consequences. This criterion assures that the enemy action actually constitutes a threat. A corollary to the third criterion states that the threat involves a weapon, tactic, or strategy that is not already countered by systems designed to deal with symmetric threats.942

Concept of asymmetry definitely means more than simply making maximum use of one’s advantages or fighting differently than we do for this concept to possess utility for strategic planners in understanding their enemies and their own forces and strategies. Its complexity gives us right to think that it is almost impossible to comprehensively define contemporary asymmetric threats to national security. Instead of “wasting time” in trying to find comprehensive definition of asymmetry, we will focus on the most immanent manifestations of asymmetric threats that endanger the majority of countries, extremisms, or its radical appearance – terrorism; the proliferation and use of weapons of mass distraction; and migrations, as one of the primary political and security problems of today’s Europe.

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY IN STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF ASYMMETRIC THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

Defence diplomacy should be considered in frame of overall diplomacy, as its integral part, but also as a segment of overall foreign policy

throughout every element and phase of engagement. Because of the fact that foreign policy generally consists of processes of creation and implementation, this article will have the same structure. In this paper, immanent asymmetric threat, extremisms/terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass distraction and migrations, according to defence diplomacy functions, will be analyzed.

A well-known theorist of international relations Hans Morgenthau considers diplomacy as an element of national power on international level. He, justifiably, considers that diplomacy, understood in broader context of foreign policy, has the following basic tasks: 1) defining objectives in sense of actual or potential power for their realization, 2) foreseeing the aims of other nations and actual and potential power for achieving their goals, 3) determining each level of compatibilities among those aims, and 4) engaging appropriate instruments for execution of each own objectives. Failure in each of those tasks could jeopardize foreign policy and national interests.943

For adequate consideration of structure of the factors that define state position of defence diplomacy in state foreign policy and key strategic documents, we suggest following graphic shown in the Figure 3, as one of extremely simplified:

At first glance, one can see that there are a few foreign policy activities with no connection to defence diplomacy or the security issue. It is the fact that defence attaché, as the function of defence diplomacy, is one of the first state institutions responsible for identifying possible threat to national security. Concerning those facts, it can be said that defence attaché is a type of “early warning system” for the national security system of every state considering identification of contemporary forms of asymmetric threat.

The analysis of functioning contemporary states system shows us that high positioned executive authorities mostly received intelligence on important events and processes in the international arena, which could have impact on vital interests and national security from three, more or less, different sources. The first one is diplomacy service, the second one intelligence community, and the third one all kinds of direct communication with foreign government representatives. Diplomatic service and intelligence community are responsible for organization of collection and analysis of the intelligence information. Considering the interests of each state to be realized in the international arena, decision-makers have a need for different kind of expert and analytical teams and bodies. They are capably to recognize and understand

events and changes abroad and give the assessment in the base of demands or defined tasks from the decision-makers.¹⁴⁴

Figures 3: The structure of the factors that define state position in foreign policy¹⁴⁵

Most of the world states has central body which is responsible for the implementation of foreign policy, has competence for concrete foreign policy activities, and gives tasks to appropriate national institutions, like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, Intelligence Community and the like. The name of this central body can differ from state to state, but mostly it is named: the National Security Council, Governmental Committee for Coordination and Management, Ministry Committee and the like.¹⁴⁶ Those bodies are responsible for management, coordination, direction

¹⁴⁵ Veљко Благојевић, Политичко-правни положај представништва система одбране у реализацији спољнолитичке функције Републике Србије, докторски рад, Факултет за право, јавну управу и безбедност, Универзитет „Џон Незбит“, Београд, 2015.
¹⁴⁶ In the United States, it is The National Security Council - NSC, The United Kingdom has Ministerial Committee on the Intelligence Services - CSI, in The Russian Federation Security
and cooperation of activities of all states subjects on internal and foreign policy level. The body usually consists of the highest representative of state authorities, president, prime minister, ministers of interior, defence, economy and foreign affairs, and head of security and intelligence services and others if required, which defers from state to state, according to the political and law system.947

In the general, grand or development strategy, the key relations between diplomacy and armed forces, as a supplemental foreign policy instruments in achieving vital national interests, are defined. According to Dragan Simić “no weapon, action or way of waging war are not by each self strategic – just consequences makes them strategic by putting them in concrete course of events, and framework of defined objectives.”948 That framework should be defined in the general, grand or development strategy, which has to be based on the reality and consider the overall power of the society and their objectives, not only considering political and military aims.949

**Defence Diplomacy in Combating Extremisms/Terrorism.** We are witnessing the fact that the “number of interstate conflicts is getting lower, and there are more those in which violent non-state actors represent at least one of the opposing sides”950. After shocking suicide terrorist attack in the United States on 9/11, it is obvious that terrorism, as old phenomena, become one of the most important factors of international relations and security. Antiterrorist international coalition was formed; antiterrorist activities became the priority for most of the intelligence services all over the world. In 2002, our (US) long-standing foreign policy, built on a foundation of alliances and international dialogue, shifted. The new U.S. doctrine of pre-emption, military primacy, a “new multilateralism,” and the spread of democracy was sometimes viewed with suspicion by our historic allies, often seen not as multilateral but unilateral. We also faced reduced credibility because of U.S. pronouncements that were sometimes inaccurate or based on faulty information. Furthermore,
the war in Iraq has proven to be a divisive issue among the American people and our traditional allies, leading to a loss of focus on the clear threat terrorism poses. The task of rebuilding international trust and credibility will therefore be multifaceted and challenging, and require consistency over time.951

Defence diplomacy has a significant role in that process, in almost all its function, as follows:

a) Representing counterterrorism activities of sending states. It is essential, because of image in the international policy. In the recent past, we were witnesses of statements of great power leader “You're either with us or against us”, concerning the fight against transnational terrorism.952

b) Protecting the security interests in case of any extremist or terrorist activities in receiving state against sending state. That includes all spectrums of diplomatic measures, for example diplomatic protest and the like, to the officials of the receiving State, but also to the all diplomatic corps in receiving state with verbal note or non-paper. The ultimate goal of this diplomatic activity is to put pressure on government of receiving state to quit support to extremist/terrorist organizations and take counterterrorist measures.

c) Negotiating with receiving state authorities on bilateral antiterrorist cooperation. In the pre-negotiation process, the defence attaché is obliged to find out the real political will of the receiving state to cooperate with the sending state, the extent and type of cooperation (formal or informal), and the like. As the defence attaché performs all the listed activities, we can talk about formal negotiations on counterterrorist/extremists cooperation. In the multilateral defence diplomacy, this process is much more simplified, because there is a clearly shown political will for cooperation by inclusion in an international organization or initiative.

d) Ascertaining by all lawful means extremist/terrorists activities on the territory of receiving state and counterterrorist activity on national or multinational level. It’s about function of ascertaining data on activities of extremists/terrorist organizations and individuals and reporting to sending state, on one hand. On the other, defence attaché have the obligation to report counterterrorist activity of receiving state. There are at least few reasons for

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that: to make conditions for protecting security interest of sending state that can be effected by receiving country, to take expediencies from receiving state, and to understand the foreign policy of the receiving state on antiterrorist issue for cost-benefit analysis. This is a very sensitive security issue for every state, so it is important to find adequate method for ascertaining necessary data.

e) Promoting confidence building and cooperation between defence and security system on counterterrorism issue. If there are good political relations between receiving and sending states, it is easy to promote confidence on counterterrorism issue. The problem appears in case of confrontation between states, especially in turbulent regions or post conflict areas. In those regions, decision makers are forced to choose between two “bad decisions”, to cooperate with the enemy state, or to cooperate with them on antiterrorism measures. Whatever they decide, there are possibilities to be accused of neglecting vital national security interests. The regions of the Balkans or the Middle East are a striking example for that dilemma, and a very difficult place for duty of defence attaches.

**Defence Diplomacy in Proliferation and Use of Weapon of Mass Distraction.** Nuclear weapons have extremely important role in foreign policy, which gives ultimate advantage to the owner state, but also great responsibility to all the mankind for the use of them\(^\text{953}\). Diplomatic negotiations with Iran and North Korea on the limitation of their nuclear programs are an obvious illustration of the advantage that the possession of those weapons gives the state in the foreign policy comparing to the one without it. At the same time, the Israel case shows us, among other factors, that the possession of nuclear weapons gives Tel Aviv the opportunity to achieve a sort of security domination over the Arabic states in the region. To avoid misunderstanding, Tel Aviv plan to use nuclear weapons only as the last option in case of war clashes the strategic principle that underlines the fact that Israel cannot afford to lose any war.

The U.S. Department of Defence launched a Counter-proliferation Initiative in 1993, in recognition of the fact that potential opponents in regional conflict might not play by the same rules as Saddam Hussein did in First Iraq War. The aim of the initiative was to integrate preparations to counter weapons of mass destruction into U.S. capabilities for power projection and joint operations. A great deal of progress has been made since 1993, including the creation of a Counter-proliferation Council chaired by the Deputy Secretary of

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\(^{953}\) Vukadinović Radomir: *Osnovi teorije međunarodnih odnosa i vanjske politike* (Basic Theory of International Relations and Foreign Policy), Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 1989, str. 140-142.
Defence and the establishment of the Defence Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to bring together a number of WMD-related technology and field operations efforts. However, Department of Defence’s technology and systems acquisition capabilities are still fragmented, and WMD preparations are still incompletely integrated into planning for joint operations.

The greatest deficiency in counter-proliferation lies in interagency program coordination within the state security system. An interagency program planning mechanism is needed for counter-proliferation, similar to the one under “Homeland Defence” for countering catastrophic terrorism. A next challenge for counter-proliferation is the improvement of our international cooperative efforts. One such effort is the Nunn-Lugar program, which should be expanded in scale and scope. Cooperation with key allies and friends is also important: even if U.S. forces are adequately protected, the allied forces and allied population near the war zone cannot be left vulnerable to WMD attack. The administration should, therefore, support and sustain the NATO Senior Defence Group on Proliferation, as well as the bilateral counter-proliferation “Working Groups” with the United Kingdom, South Korea, Japan, Israel, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. It is clear that the role of defence diplomacy in this field is essential. Except the United Kingdom as a long-term strategic partner of the USA, other counter-proliferation partners are chosen mostly by regional position and level of technology development.

The third need for counter-proliferation efforts is development of the technology based in bio-warfare defence that is as strong as our base in nuclear non-proliferation. The United States has strong Department of Defence laboratories with thousands of personnel skilled in nuclear technology, but few experts in the field of biotechnology, neither within civilian ranks, nor in its affiliated laboratories and contractors. Biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies often decline to participate in programs for fear of being “tainted” by defence work or because of the cumbersome contracting and accounting procedures required by the Pentagon. Yet the implications of the biotechnology revolution for the security will probably exceed those of the nuclear and information revolutions. Department of Defence must do more than increase funding in the related advanced research projects, Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, and for biotechnology research, although this is also necessary. A university-affiliated government-asymmetric threats funded laboratory will need to be founded to give Department of

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955 Ibid.
Defence a foothold in the biotechnology field, and to compete for talent despite the drawbacks of government employment practices and the attractive employment opportunities available to biotechnologists in the private sector.

**Defence Diplomacy in International Migration Issue.** During 2015 Migration crisis, more than one million refugees and migrants arrived in Europe, about half of whom fled the civil war in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and about one third of whom were seeking political asylum. The question of who should bear responsibility for the new arrivals and how those responsibilities should be shared generated very different, sometimes schizophrenic, policy responses among the European Union member states, with many states prioritizing national interests over European solidarity. These divergent national responses generated fierce political debates over legal and normative obligations towards the displaced within and across member states. In many capitals, these debates also kindled national divisions in ways that redounded strikingly to the benefit of right wing, nationalist political parties. The lack of EU solidarity and absence of a collective response to the humanitarian and political challenges imposed by the influx, further laid bare the limitations of common border control and migration and refugee burden-sharing systems that have never been wholly and satisfactorily implemented.956

Defence diplomacy role in migration crisis is, on a large scale, connected with counterterrorism activities. It is natural, having in mind the fact that some of refugees are Islamic extremists and potential terrorist, who are using the refugee flow to reach European capitals to launch terrorist attacks. Motivation that manipulates migrants by the ideologue of contemporary terrorism is based on the fact that "the difference between Islam and the rest of the world is still significant"957.

Key aspects of the engagement of defence diplomacy in the migrant/refugee crisis are as follows:

a) Representing migration policy of sending states and activities in the field of migration crisis. At the same time, a defence attaché in the neighbouring country is in the position to establish coordination and

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957 Милован Суботић, Екстремизам под окриљем религије, Медија центар Одбрана и Институт за стратегијска истраживања, Београд, 2015, стр. 94.
Thematic Collection of Articles – *Asymmetry and Strategy*

cooperation with appropriate level of military/police staffs engaged in border control.

b) Protecting the security interests of sending state in case of receiving state act, or deny acting, in according to the international law concerning migrants. Of course, it is important to emphasize the fact that the decision for official, or diplomatic, protest to receiving states officials can be made by an authorized person in the Defence System of sending state. It depends on the national law system, but most often it is the Defence Minister.

c) Negotiating with receiving state authorities on bilateral level in the joint border control activities or multilateral cooperation in the crisis management of the regional migration crisis. There are already prepared military, police and civilian pool for engaging in crisis under the United Nations Organization, European Union, OSCE and other regional organization, but the role of defence diplomacy are to arrange the process of negotiation; assessment of challenges, risks and threats coming from migrants and political will for the engagement of receiving state.

d) Ascertaining by all lawful means migrants activities on receiving state territory and crisis management activity in migration crisis on national or multinational level. Depending on migratory route, defence attaché function is a kind of “Early Warning System”, concerning number of migrants, their treatment by the official authorities of the receiving state and ways of illegal crossing the state border and the like.

In the case of migration crisis, the biggest efforts are given to preventing illegal crossing border and countering international criminal organization network. Because of these facts, the defence attaché function is becoming more important than the principal advisor to the chief of diplomatic and consular missions on defence and security issues. It is important for defence attaché to be timely prepared and informed on accurate data of migrant crisis to be able to realistically advises the ambassador for decision-making at the highest political level, but also the personnel in Consular Sector in diplomatic-consular mission at the operational level.

**CONCLUSION**

Globalization in the field of security brings us more and more common security challenges for the most countries in the world. At the same time, this “new challenges” are mostly classified as an “asymmetric threats” whatever we define as the core of that term. Contemporary strategic thought tries to find the ways for a comprehensive response to asymmetric threats, but
with respect to “classic threats” to national security. These efforts imply major changes in approach to develop applicable and realistic strategies that will be able to be applied at the same time in the face of old and new challenges, risks and threats.

Every national defence strategy has a part designated for tasks and responsibilities of the subjects of the national security system. In light of changing security environment, it is obvious that the strategic thought must also be changed in the sense of giving new tasks to the subjects of the security system. In this context, it becomes quite clear that the responsibilities of defence diplomacy are increasing from “traditional”, military related issues, to the responsibility for “civil”, asymmetric, threats. There are no reliable indicators that would indicate that the said process would not continue in the future, so it can be expected that the trend of strengthening the role and importance of defence diplomacy in the defence and security system is growing.

The analysis of immanent asymmetric threat, extremisms/terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass distraction and migrations, in the context of defence diplomacy functions give us right to claim that defence diplomacy is crucial to the foreign policy of every modern state. It is crucial for, at least, two reasons. The first one is connected with the ability of defence diplomacy to perform the function of “Early Warning System” for all security systems of the state. In practice, it means the obligation to timely identify the appearance of security threat, and to give time for sending state security system to prepare adequate measures for countering both “traditional” and asymmetric threats. In some cases, like the migrant crisis, that measure means the changes of national laws and procedures for the Police service.

That requires quite a lot of procedures and time, and brings us to the second reason for growing importance of contemporary defence diplomacy. It is about the role of defence diplomacy in defining the countering measures to accurate security threats. Function of ascertaining data on security situation and developments in the receiving State and their counter measures, and reporting thereon to the sending state should give us reliable information about the threats and the response of the receiving state, which can help as a basis for considering the measures taken by the security system of sending state. Experiences from several countries certainly indicate a trend of response to certain security threats and can be a “guide” for decision makers.

Finally, we plan to turn our attention to the fact that changes in the strategic approach to security considerations should not effects only defence diplomacy, but all subjects of the state security system. That means that it is high time to consider on strategic level estimation of the need to enforce police or defence attaché network of the Republic of Serbia.
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