



SECURITY AND DEFENCE ASPECTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA'S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION



Security and Defence Aspects of the Republic of Serbia's Accession to the European Union

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Introduction

*“Only in Growth, Reform, and Change,
Paradoxically Enough, is True Security
to be Found”*

Ann Morrow Lindbergh

The Collection of Papers has emerged as a logical product of the round table on security and defense aspects of the accession of the Republic of Serbia to the European Union. The round table was held on 30 March 2010, organized by the Strategic Research Institute and attended by representatives of the Ministry of Defense and the Serbian Armed Forces, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Interior, the Office for European Integrations of the Republic of Serbia, the Faculty of Political Sciences, the Faculty of Security, the Criminalist-Police Academy and NGOs.

The round table was the beginning of the project of the Ministry of Defense “Security and Defense Aspects of the Accession of the Republic of Serbia to the European Union” ‘which will be implemented until the accession of our country to the European Union. The project is very important from the aspect of establishing the common security and defense policy of the EU, in order to identify common organizational, legal and other principles, procedures, criteria and mechanisms for acceptance of complex rules and relations in the Union and reaching a certain level of required standards in security and defense. Relations between the candidate country and the Union and its Member States are based on the principle of voluntary acceptance of conditions, which has logical and powerful influence on a candidate country in numerous areas, including security and defense.

The cooperation between the EU Member States in the field of security and defense is based on active participation, complementary and coherent contribution to the development of common security capabilities and the preservation of collective security which is also the aim of the Republic of Serbia, and which will be realized through

the process of accession to the EU, first from the position of the so-called third country, then a candidate country and finally from the position of a Member State.

Participants of the round table have tried in their presentations to explain first of all, the facts about the EU, then the importance and complementarities between various fields in the Republic of Serbia and the European Union, as well as possible areas of cooperation and participation of our country in them.

In terms of security and defense, the process of accession of the Republic of Serbia to the European Union is very complex. Serbia's accession to the EU will depend on the mutual ability of the European Union and Serbia to overcome complex relations. We should not exclude the possibility that the EU might apply a "new" model of "phased approach" to the accession of the Republic of Serbia, which, in the first phase might not include the Republic of Serbia in all activities of the common foreign and security policy of the EU and its security and defense policies, as well.

The general conclusion of the round table is that Serbia can contribute significantly to the common security and defense policy throughout the Continent. In addition, it can be concluded that the Republic of Serbia has capacities which are competent to perform tasks that will be determined by the European Union in the field of common security and defense policy.

Prof. Dr. Tanja Miscevic

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Project Europe 2030

An Appeal of Uncertain Range

Abstract

Project Europe 2030 is the title of a report on the challenges the EU is likely to face by 2030 and possible responses to them. The report was drawn up by the Reflection Group, an independent body, in the period between 2008 and 2010¹. The researchers focused their analysis on the current state of affairs and possible developments in the field of economy, sustainable development, social policy, education, energy policy, foreign policy, security, defence and environment protection. The authors of the report came to the conclusion that the challenges likely to appear in the first half of the 21st century demanded a more decisive answer of the European Union as a whole in the form of a comprehensive reform programme. The recommended reform programme should not be limited to the measures defined in the *Europe 2020 Strategy*² only and should maximise the use of the tools provided for by the *Lisbon Treaty*. Among the issues analysed in the report, particular attention was paid to the issues of security, defence, the fight against organised crime and the war on terrorism³. In accordance with the aim of the project from which these collected papers, the result of an analysis of the security and defence aspects of Serbia's integration in the European Union, derive, the focus of this paper will be primarily placed on the Reflection Group's conclusions about the current state of EU internal and external security and possible development directions by 2030. At the secondary level, some space is given to foreign policy and economic, demographic and other challenges that might affect the safety and security of the citizens of the EU and its member-states.

Key words: 21st century security challenges; European Security Model; internal security; single European defence market; single defence procurement system.

1 The Reflection Group's report *Project Europe 2030*. http://www.reflectiongroup.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/reflection_en_web.pdf 15/05.2010

2 *Europe 2020* <http://europa.eu/eu2020/15/15/05/2010>

3 Danko Aleksic, *Reflection Group*, *Recnik evropske bezbednosti*, Centre for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, 2010, p. 53

Introduction

At the meeting of the European Council⁴ held in Brussels on 17-18 June 2010, a comprehensive report on the future of the European Union until 2030, entitled *Project Europe 2030, Challenges and Opportunities*⁵, was presented to the EU heads of state or government. The report was signed by Felipe Gonzalez Marquez⁶, former Spanish prime minister of long standing, in the capacity of the Reflection Group's chairman. The Reflection Group's genesis and scope of work will be described in more detail in a separate chapter. The purpose of this article is informative, aiming to acquaint the domestic (expert and general) public in more detail with the content of the report *Project Europe 2030* and in particular with its parts dealing with security and defence issues. The author's intention was to point to an expert group entrusted with the task of reflecting on the EU future in the long term, as well as to give an insight into the current output of the group's work, offering a daring vision of one of the possible EU development directions and the Union's future role on the global stage. In the process, the possibility that the analysed document might have a limited range in practice, due to the fact that the relevant EU institutions have not offered it their formal support yet and that it is uncertain whether they will ever do so, because of the open issue of the national governments' will to give up a part of their prerogatives (in sensitive areas which can be the symbol of every country's sovereignty and identity) and transfer them to the Union, was not disregarded for a minute.

The main source of information in drafting this paper was the report *Project Europe 2030* and the cover letter by the Reflection Group's chairman to the European Council's president, shown through the courtesy of HE Ambassador Gregor Woschnagg, a lecturer at the Diplomatic Academy of the Republic of Austria and a Reflection Group advisor, to the participants in the seminar called *Prospects of European Integration*, organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia at its Diplomatic Academy in 2010. The procedure further included an analysis of the documents referred to in the report by its authors, as well as studying the scope and competences of the EU institutions relevant to the security sector and mentioned in the report (those that already exist as well as those proposed to be set up in the future), based on the available reference material and information on the Internet. We would like to take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Woschnagg once again for his

4 The European Council (EC) or the EC summit is a top-level meeting of the EU heads of state or government... EC meetings deal with key issues of interest to EU foreign, security and internal policy... The conclusions are published as statements, becoming guidelines for the operation of the EU institutions... The European Council should neither be mixed with the *Council of the European Union* (Council of Ministers) nor with the *Council of Europe*, representing a separate international organisation founded in 1949, independently of the EU. *Rečnik evropske bezbednosti*, p. 46

5 Hereinafter referred to as the *Project Europe 2030* or the report

6 Biography of Felipe Gonzalez Marquez: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Felipe_Gonzalez 29/06/2010

assistance, the goodwill he demonstrated and the useful guidelines he provided for future research.

Reflection Group

An independent reflection group (hereinafter referred to as *the Reflection Group*⁷) was set up based on the European Council's conclusions from the meeting held in Brussels on 14 December 2007. It was entrusted with the task of helping the EU predict and address more efficiently the challenges expected to appear in the long term, namely, between 2020 and 2030. The Reflection Group held its founding meeting in December 2008. After that, it met on a monthly basis. Its final report *Project Europe 2030, Challenges and Opportunities*, was symbolically handed over to European Council President Herman Van Rompuy on 8 May 2010 in order to present it to the EU heads of state or government at a Council session.

As already mentioned in the introduction, the Reflection Group is chaired by former Spanish prime minister Felipe Gonzalez Marquez, who is assisted by two vice-chairmen; it has 12 members all in all. The post of the Reflection Group's vice-chairman has been entrusted to Vaira Vike-Freiberga, former Latvian president, and Jorma Ollila, president and former director general of the NOKIA corporation. The other nine members include prominent figures of different profession⁸, among whom we would especially like to mention Lykke Friis, minister of energy and environment protection of the Kingdom of Denmark, Richard Lambert, director-general of the Confederation of British Industry, Kalypso Nicolaidis, PhD, professor of international relations and director of the Oxford University European Studies Centre, and Lech Walesa, winner of the Nobel Prize for peace, former Polish president and leader of the Solidarity movement. The Reflection Group's scope of analysis and assessment included, among other things, the following: strengthening and modernisation of the European model of economic success and social responsibility, boosting EU competitiveness, strengthening the rule of law and sustainable development as the Union's fundamental goal, ensuring global stability, migration control, provision of energy and climate protection, as well as the permanent fight against global insecurity, international crime and terrorism. Special attention was paid to the establishment of more successful communication with citizens and meeting their expectations and needs. In addition to the permanent members and the Reflection Group's Secretariat, a large number of expert advisors, non-profit organisations, think-tanks and political analysts also helped draft the report.

7 Official Internet presentation of the Reflection Group, www.reflectiongroup.eu 29/06/2010

8 For the composition of the Reflection Group and brief biographies of its members, see: <http://www.reflectiongroup.eu/members/> 29/06/2010

In view of the long-term dimension of the Reflection Group's work, it was not mandated to deal with institutional issues or assessments of the EU current policies and financial frameworks⁹. Still, the impression remains that, more than once in the report, the nature of the analysed matter did not allow the researchers to stick firmly to the set form. The Reflection Group's task was to take into account in its work the most likely scenarios of developments in and outside Europe, and to find out the best way to achieve the long-term stability and prosperity of the Union and the broader region. In order to preserve its credibility, it was instructed to remain independent of governments, institutions and lobbying groups and to be solely responsible for the organisation of its work. The Reflection Group was to carry out the tasks entrusted to it within the legal framework defined by the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty¹⁰. More than once in the report, it was stressed that the proposed reform and measures would not require to amend the Lisbon Treaty or to adopt a new agreement and that, instead of that, one should try to find solutions enabling the full use of the tools provided for by the Treaty. It is not hard to understand this position in view of recent difficulties in reaching consensus on the adoption of the Treaty and the small likelihood of the Union being willing (in the near future) to subject itself to the challenges of the new revision of its fundamental legal document.

Content of the Reflection Group's report and general recommendations

The authors of the report *Project Europe 2030* are aware of the fact that today many people still see 2030 as a date far into the future, downplaying the value of the analyses aiming to predict the likely developments. Despite that, they warn that the world is experiencing a period of rapid and far-ranging global transformations, which will continue to have a significant impact on the lives of citizens. They believe that the past 20 years may have only given a hint to modern society of what the future has in store for it and predict that the next twenty years are bound to accelerate and exacerbate many of the trends we are witnessing and experiencing. Due to all that, their conclusion is that the message which must shape European policy-making should be the following: "Think long-term but act with determination now!"

The cover letter to the European Council president and members, enclosed with the report and signed by the Reflection Group's chairman on 30 April 2010, stated that the Reflection Group's findings

9 Information taken from the Reflection Group's official Internet presentation, chapter Mandate, <http://www.reflectiongroup.eu> 25/06/1010

10 Text of the Lisbon Treaty, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty 10/06/2010

were “reassuring neither to the Union, nor to its citizens”. The challenges, risks and threats believed to be the cause of greatest concern include the following: a global economic crisis; states coming to the rescue of banks at risk; ageing populations threatening the competitiveness of European economies and the sustainability of the European states’ social models; downward pressure on costs and wages; climate change and increasing energy dependence; the Eastward shift in the global distribution of production and capital accumulation, and, above all, “the threats of terrorism, organised crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”¹¹. The view was voiced that the current global financial crisis, the origins of which lay on the other side of the Atlantic, had affected Europe more than any other region of the world, uncovering “structural weaknesses in the European economy”¹² that have long been diagnosed but too often ignored”. Consequently, the Reflection Group’s chairman described the current crisis as “a wake-up call for Europe”, which must be capable of responding to the changing global order. According to him, as with all transformations, the emerging order will result in “new winners and losers” and, if Europe wishes to avoid being among the losers, it needs to look outwards and embark on “an ambitious long-term reform programme for the next twenty years”.

Due to all mentioned above, the Reflection Group suggested the implementation of medium- and long-term reforms (until 2020 and 2030)¹³, which would improve the strengthening of economic governance in the EU, the reform of the EU financial institutions, the development of a highly competitive and sustainable economy operating on the principle of “a socially responsible market”, efforts to maintain the development and competitiveness of an economy based on knowledge, the creation of a common energy policy and the necessary reduction in the dependence on external energy sources, the EU leading role in the global fight against climate change, the implementation of urgent measures to tackle the demographic challenge¹⁴, the completion and expansion of the EU Single Economic Market (accompanied by improved fiscal coordination), the reform of the European labour market (in order to increase productivity), the launching of “a new industrial revolution”, the citizens’ share in the management of the EU, and the establishment of “an efficient external and internal security policy”.¹⁵

11 Felipe Gonzalez’s letter to European Council President Herman Van Rompuy of 8 May 2010 (hereinafter referred to as *the Reflection Group chairman’s letter*, http://www.reflectiongroup.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/reflection_en_web.pdf 15/05.2010)

12 Lower productivity, structural unemployment, inadequate labour market flexibility, outdated skills not adjusted to the modern times’ needs and poor growth. *The report*, p. 19

13 *The Reflection Group chairman’s letter*, p. 2

14 The term ‘demographic challenge’ describes a situation in which, unless urgent measures are taken, the European countries’ ageing societies will be faced with unsustainable pressure on their pension, health and welfare systems, which will undermine the EU economic competitiveness. *The report*, p. 5

15 *The Reflection Group chairman’s letter*, p. 4

The report contains an alarming observation that the EU is faced with a clear choice: either it will undergo reform or it will surrender itself to decline.¹⁶ It predicted that, in the next 20 years, there would not only be several poles of power on the world stage, but the world's centre of gravity would also shift to Asia. It estimated that, in a new multi-polar world, Europe would register slower growth than its main competitors, while the EU share of global wealth would inevitably decline. It stressed that, in the past years, the EU's human capital had long underpinned its economy, based on innovation and creativity, warning, however, that other regions were now moving ahead through higher levels of investment in research, technological development and innovation. In this context, it predicted that, by 2030, Asia may be at the forefront of scientific and technological developments, positioning itself as a manufacturer of high-value goods, capable of transforming production and overall quality of life.¹⁷ Finally, it stated that, as power shifted away from Europe and the US, the rules of international engagement were being redefined¹⁸.

If the reform suggested by the Reflection Group is embraced, the EU task would be to build on its strengths¹⁹ and use its collective weight to become "an assertive and relevant player in the world"²⁰. According to the authors of the report, a decision not to launch reform would place the EU in a position to "cultivate fragmentation" and watch its currently relative decline turn into "absolute decline in a world where the rules are defined by those who matter"²¹. The year 2010 was marked as the possible beginning of a new phase for the EU, while the possibility of the EU long-term role on the world stage being decided in the next 50 years was recognised as "a fundamental challenge". Two possible scenarios were offered: one, under which the EU, after the implementation of efficient and comprehensive reform, could turn into a factor of greater global importance than it was until now and the other, under which it would slide into marginalisation due to its passivity and inadequate response to new challenges, becoming in time an increasingly irrelevant "**Western peninsula of the Asian continent**".

According to the authors of the report, there is an urgent need for a common *European strategic concept*, because the EU as a whole is

16 The report, p. 8

17 The report, p. 7

18 The report, p. 25

19 The authors of the report listed the following as real **EU strengths**, enabling it to spearhead international efforts to respond to major global challenges (social cohesion, climate change, sustainable development and preservation of peace among peoples) in the future: the biggest market on earth, a quarter of the world's trade, ownership of two thirds of development aid funds, joint infrastructure, the rights, services and opportunities offered by the EU to its citizens, the EU power to elicit positive perceptions and inspire many to join it (either by accession or immigration), the EU governance model described as "governing in partnership" and the "union of values". The report, p. 32

20 The report, 35.

21 The report, 43.

more capable of meeting the major trials of the 21st century than any of its member states. The necessary concept should unite the EU's foreign, defence, trade and development policy with the external dimensions of its common economic policies (the European monetary union, energy, transport). By merging all its available mechanisms, the EU should be able to act as a transformative power on the world stage and contribute to reshaping the rules of global governance. The first step towards the mapping out of the strategic concept should be the drafting of *the White Paper*, which would be regularly updated. The strategic concept would help define the Union's long-term priorities and would become the reference framework for day-to-day external action. The Reflection Group's stand is that the European Commission's project *Europe 2020*, adopted by the European Council as Europe's official strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, should be backed as well as made part of a large-scale reform programme with broader goals.

Internal and external security: the external challenge

The report section dealing with internal and external security²² gives a brief historical overview of the security context of international relations in the past 20 years, from the moment the population of Europe first witnessed the division of the continent into two blocs, followed by a "unipolar moment" dominated by the US, to today's gradually unfolding multi-polar world. It was noted that, in this new world order, different centres of power co-existed, while the global environment was far more unstable compared to the past. The current situation is described as a state in which old threats, including the nuclear threat, persist in new forms (like proliferation), while new threats have meanwhile emerged. These new forms of insecurity including financial instability, environmental degradation, energy dependence, organised crime and terrorism, are characterised as being "more diverse, less visible and less predictable than ever before"²³.

It was stated that globalisation had increased the Europeans' sense of vulnerability by dissolving the boundaries between internal and external forms of security, causing that armed conflicts in a distant continent could threaten Europe's internal security. To illustrate that, the report referred to the possibility of conflicts in distant zones (initially perceived as external problems) having as a consequence a large inflow of refugees to the EU, which could generate internal security challenges. Insufficient cooperation among European

22 'External security' is viewed in a broader context, so that the defence sector is its central, although not its only part. Considerable attention is paid to the civil dimension of external security, which will be discussed in more detail in the chapter on the structural limitations of the EU Foreign and Security Policy.

23 *The report*, p. 31

countries in law-enforcement and judicial matters was recognised as a weakness of the internal security system, which could jeopardise efforts to combat terrorism abroad, at the external level. The fact that all security risks are interlocked was stressed, as well as that poverty and instability in failing states were becoming a breeding ground for terrorism and other types of criminal activity. Based on the above information, the authors of the report concluded that addressing the 21st century security challenges would require global responses, based on the ability to predict things, which only an actor the size of the EU could provide, implicitly suggesting that the capacity of the EU as a whole exceeded the individual capacity of any of its member states and that it was therefore necessary to maximise it. It was noted that the current situation, in which it was necessary to reach consensus to take decisions on foreign policy, was widely seen as a handicap, and that the EU must therefore persist in its efforts to achieve greater coordination in order to “speak with one voice” or at least “orchestrate its polyphony”²⁴.

Urging the idea of the European Security Model

Acknowledging the EU’s years-long commitment to maintaining and developing an “area of justice, freedom and security”²⁵, aimed at facilitating the everyday life of its citizens, the authors of the report stated that, despite that, the terrorist attacks launched in the US (September 2001), Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005) had clearly demonstrated the need for more effective and coordinated action at the EU level in order to tackle the threat of terrorism and other cross-border security problems more efficiently. In terms of relevance, they especially pointed out the security challenges including human trafficking, the smuggling of persons and illegal substances, money laundering, the exploitation of women and children, cyber-crime, intellectual piracy and corruption.

The Reflection Group holds the view that policy formulation in the sphere of external and internal security at the EU level is much too often driven by events²⁶, and that CSDP missions have been forced by exigencies rather than launched in response to an overarching plan or strategy²⁷, believing therefore that it is necessary to take decisive action and implement the new European Security Model. Drawing on the vision and objectives provided for by the *EU Internal Security Strategy*²⁸, the recommended model must prioritise the interests of EU citizens facing the rapidly evolving challenges

24 The report, p. 36

25 The report, p. 31

26 The report, p. 32

27 The report, p. 31

28 EU Internal Security Strategy, adopted on 25 February 2010, <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2010/feb/eu-council-int-sec-prel.pdf> 29/06/2010

of the 21st century. The new security model would be expected to protect individual rights and freedoms in order to create the necessary balance between advancing security (on the one hand) and protecting individual rights and freedoms (on the other)²⁹, as well as to contribute to shaping the world so that Europe's values and interests are safely taken care of³⁰. The new security model should also improve cooperation and solidarity among the member states. Its strategic commitment should be placing the "focus on the causes of insecurity"³¹ and not just the effects. Priority should be given to prevention rather than elimination of consequences. The new security model should be characterised by engaging with citizens and recognising the interdependence between the internal and external dimensions of security in establishing a "global security approach" with third countries.

The Reflection Group's conclusion regarding the development of EU internal security to date is that joint action "has been hampered by member states' resistance to sharing information and coordinating policies" in the sphere of law-enforcement and judicial cooperation³², which is still considered one of the most sensitive issues in domestic politics. Despite the obstacles observed, the authors of the report are confident that this resistance of national governments flies against the wishes of EU citizens, who "want the EU to become a more relevant security actor"³³. They also believe that the described policy of the member states' governments "ignores the substantial instruments and resources that the Union has acquired over time in the field of security, not least through the recently adopted Lisbon Treaty"³⁴.

Building a culture of cooperation: security as a trans-national public good

The authors of the report *Project Europe 2030* believe that an EU-wide approach to the security challenges of the 21st century would require considerable cooperation efforts, setting up new common institutions or consolidating those that already exist, and proper funding. A "new culture of cooperation"³⁵ is needed in numerous fields, including judicial cooperation and cooperation in the sphere of law enforcement, border control and health, social and civil protection. All that would require increasing the powers of the existing agencies

29 *The report*, p. 32

30 *The report*, p. 44

31 *The report*, p. 31

32 *Ibidem*, p. 31

33 *Ibidem*, p. 31

34 *Ibidem*, p. 31

35 *Ibidem*, p. 31

and instruments such as EUROPOL³⁶, EUROJUST³⁷, the Situation Centre, FRONTEX³⁸ and the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. The Reflection Group believes that new bodies like a **European Centre of Good Police Practices** will have to be set up. The need to find the balance between advancing security, on the one hand, and protecting human or individual rights, on the other was especially underlined. Recognising the fact that time and circumstances dictated where the line between the two inseparable elements should be struck (and estimating that the subject would require ongoing political debate across the EU), it was recommended that, even in cases where security risks were at stake, clear limits to accessing personal data and constraints on exchanging them should be respected. Above all, confidence was voiced that the member states needed to acknowledge that internal security depended to a large extent on the ability to secure a safe external environment. It was warned once again that cross-border security challenges did not stop at the frontiers of the EU, and the view voiced that enhancing the security and freedom of European citizens would therefore require taking complementary action beyond the EU borders.

In addition to all mentioned above, it was suggested that the following issues be prioritised:

- Improvement of systems for exchanging information on the funding of illegal networks, trafficking routes for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), recovery after terrorist attacks and long-term preventive measures.
- Setting up a **European civil reserve** team of specially trained units ready to be deployed at short notice once they receive orders to this end and shaped along the lines of the EU forces' military component.
- Development of a more integrated external border management system by reinforcing FRONTEX with a new European body of specialised personnel available to support the member states.
- Ironing out inconsistencies in Europe's Asylum System, in particular by standardising the definition of a refugee.
- Creation of a unified visa policy and a European consular service within the European External Action Service (EEAS)³⁹.

36 EUROPOL - the European Police Office, *Rečnik evropske bezbednosti*, p. 111

37 EUROJUST - the body for investigation and prosecution of serious cross-border crime, *Rečnik evropske bezbednosti*, p. 111

38 FRONTEX - the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, *Rečnik evropske bezbednosti*, p. 111

39 *The report*, p. 32

The need to overcome the structural limitations in external security and a European vision of collective defence

Analysing the current state of and the needs in the external security sector, the authors of the report first focused on positive results including the fact that, over the past ten years or more, the EU had developed important instruments under the concept of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)⁴⁰, their practical result being the launching of 22 (observation, peacekeeping or stabilisation) missions worldwide, often carried out in cooperation with NATO, the UN and other international organisations. Referring to the positive results, they underlined how important the setting up of the Military Committee and the Military Staff, performing early warning and strategy planning functions, and the European Defence Agency (EDA) was. They pointed to the need to have at the disposal an array of civilian personnel, trained to provide assistance to local populations in conflict-torn areas throughout the world, stating that the said civilian capabilities were increasingly important for directing attention at “human security”/the notion that national and global security could not be separated from the well-being of individuals and the communities where they lived.

The report listed as the main, fundamental shortcomings facing the EU in the defence field the member states’ divergent strategic outlooks and no consensus on the overall purpose of increasing the Union’s defence capabilities. The major structural limitations of common defence were observed in the following: the national nature of the member states’ defence systems, the fact that the structure of the member states’ available military resources was not adapted to modern security challenges and the Union’s need for external action, the lack of common funding of the participation in EU-led missions and the problem of insufficient cost-effectiveness in defence industry.

The Reflection Group stressed that, in order to overcome the existing differences in strategic outlooks of some EU member states, it was important and necessary to agree on a long-term vision of EU defence, which could be laid out in the White Paper, with clearly-defined priorities in terms of threats, engagement criteria and earmarked resources⁴¹. The vision must spell out a coherent division of responsibilities between NATO and the EU, based on an objective assessment of both actors’ comparative advantages. The authors of the report concluded that, “unless EU member states are able to agree on a workable strategic concept for the EU, the latter will be

40 The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), called the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

41 *Ibidem*, p. 33

unable to fill the existing gap between the expectations of CSDP and its operational capabilities and resources”⁴²

As for the fundamentally national nature of individual defence systems, it was concluded that it kept the EU as a whole dependent on the member states’ voluntary military contributions (not always adequate), since the Union did not have “military resources of its own”⁴³. The structure of the available military resources not being suited to modern challenges and needs was illustrated by the fact that the member states’ military resources were still often based on territorial defence against a land invasion, even in the countries where such a form of insecurity was improbable, as a consequence of which “70 per cent of European land forces are unfit to operate abroad,” although nowadays conflicts required expeditionary troops deployable and sustainable outside the zones of their origin.⁴⁴ In this context, it was concluded that there was insufficient investment at the EU level in the type of capabilities needed to respond to new security situations (rapid deployment forces, strategic air transport, helicopters, communications and military police).

The effects of the above shortcomings and structural limitations were illustrated by the fact that, although the total military spending of the EU member states amounted to about 50 per cent of the US military budget, the overall EU overseas force projecting capabilities amounted to only between 10 and 15 percent of the US capabilities, indicating that “the system is clearly found wanting”⁴⁵. All of the above mentioned leads to a situation in which, although it has 1.8 million soldiers under arms (which is half a million more than the number of US troops), “the EU is not capable of deploying a 60,000-strong rapid intervention force and it finds it hard to deliver a 5,000-strong force for a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission”⁴⁶.

As a consequence of the fact that there is no common funding of the participation in CSDP missions, “there is no fair burden-sharing” among member states⁴⁷, resulting in “disincentives against participating in military missions”. A similar problem faces the civil dimension of EU-led missions, where “less than half of the personnel committed by member states tends to be deployed”, because of which missions are left without sufficient stand-by specialised teams and experience on the ground. The Reflection Group believes that, in order to eliminate the above shortcoming, the EU must encourage its member states to respect their commitments and must create

42 *Ibidem*, p. 33

43 *Ibidem*, p. 32

44 *Ibidem*, p. 33

45 *Ibidem*, p. 32

46 *Ibidem*, p. 33

47 *Ibidem*, p. 33

truly operative civilian rosters of judges, police officers, engineers and other experts. This would imply a truly operational and well-staffed **European Operations Headquarters**, tasked with planning, deploying and monitoring civilian/military operations abroad.

The problem of insufficient cost-effectiveness linked to the EU industrial and technological arms market is reflected in the fact that it costs Europe much more to produce far fewer products than other manufacturers of arms and military equipment elsewhere in the world (e.g. the US)⁴⁸. The authors of the report believe that, in order to respond to this challenge, the EU must develop a **single European defence market** and joint procurement in the defence field.⁴⁹ The success of the EU's Single Market can and should be extended to the defence field through the enhancement of the European Defence Agency and by lessening the barriers still protecting national markets.

In the above context, an analysis of the Serbian defence industry's competitiveness on the EU market, which should take into account all technological, economic, political and security implications (complementarity of technical standards for products, competitiveness of the production quality/cost ratio, and participation in broader security integration processes or neutrality), which can facilitate or render difficult the country's appearance on that market, should constitute a major segment of the research project called *Security and Defence Aspects of the Accession of the Republic of Serbia to the European Union*.

The statement Ambassador Woschnagg made while giving the lecture to Serbian public administration staff on the prospects of European integration, to the effect that, if a European army was ever set up, the move would not be initiated by the member states' defence ministries but by their finance ministries that would try to streamline defence spending, is complementary to the idea of streamlining the defence market and joint procurement at the EU level.

Reviewing the possible ways of overcoming the above shortcomings and structural limitations, the authors of the report observed that the Lisbon Treaty provided for a considerable number of important tools that could help the member states resolve the above challenges.

Through the innovative system of permanent structured cooperation, the member states' have been given an opportunity to advance in parallel and at different speeds in order to achieve specific aims, depending on their willingness and capacity. Consequently,

48 *Ibidem*, p. 33

49 *Ibidem*, p. 33

“pioneer groups of states”⁵⁰ will in future be able to increase their ambition level in terms of deployability, interoperability and sustainability of their forces, allowing them to field more capabilities for CSDP, NATO, UN and other missions⁵¹.

The report reviewed the possibility of cooperation among the “pioneer groups of states” through permanent structured cooperation in an optimistic context of helping the Union increase its overall capabilities to lead CSDP missions. Still, at this point we cannot but point out to the danger of the EU’s possible stratification and the member states’ division into the countries/groups of countries more capable or willing to contribute to the declared interests in this way and those less capable to do so.

The report voiced confidence that the Lisbon Treaty should also enable the member states to overcome the shortcomings related to the CSDP funding, by calling for the deployment of ‘**an initial fund**’ to support common missions, which would then be supported by the payment of ‘urgent funds’ during the planning of operations⁵².

As for the Republic of Serbia’s commitment to take part in CSDP activities at some point in the future, declared in the *Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia*,⁵³ it is necessary to analyse continually and in detail the financial aspects of the Serbian defence forces’ potential engagement in CSDP missions. Changing the currently unfavourable method of funding the troops committed to CSDP missions (from the sources of the countries contributing the troops) in the way suggested by the Reflection Group could in future affect the Republic of Serbia’s potential to contribute to EU-led missions.

In the final section, we find it necessary to point out the proposed measures which are not fully or directly linked to the defence sector but which might contribute to the long-term improvement of the external security of the EU as a whole, the national security of its member states and the security of their citizens. They primarily include the setting up of **a European Forecasting and Analytical Unit**, as part of the European External Action Service and working in close cooperation with national centres under the principle of shared intelligence. Such a unit would help focus attention on the need to revisit continuously EU policies. Finally, the Reflection Group suggested also that **a European Diplomatic Academy**, which would contribute to a sense of common diplomatic culture among officials from different European states engaged in the foreign policy sector, be formed as well.

50 *Ibidem*, p. 33

51 *Ibidem*, p. 33

52 *Ibidem*, p. 33

53 *Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia*, Article 4.1, Paragraph 6, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 88/09, Belgrade, 28 October 2009

Conclusion

The Reflection Group's *Project Europe 2030* provides an impartial analysis of the current EU structural limitations and of the challenges and threats which face it today and which could become its reality in the next two decades.

The authors of the report repeatedly pointed out that the national governments' policies were insufficiently adapted to the nature of the challenges of the 21st century, which could be efficiently addressed only by an actor the size of the whole Union, and that these policies flew against the wishes of EU citizens, finding the foothold for overall reform and more intense integration in the citizens' needs and wishes. The impression is that, in doing so, they did not sufficiently refer to the exact research on which they based their conclusions on the positions of the EU member-states' population, which raises the question of where to strike the line between the empirically established facts and the authors' subjective visionary approach, which could be the fruit of their sincere wish to blow the wind into the sails of deeper European integration and stronger ties among the European states in the spheres remaining far less integrated than the sphere of economy.

It is yet to be seen to what extent national political elites and the governments and ruling majorities in the member states, repeatedly criticised in the report as the key opponents to substantial integration in the spheres usually referred to as the second and the third pillar of the EU before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, will show understanding for and offer support to this vision of the EU future. From today's point of view, it would be too bold to predict whether *Project Europe 2030* will ever be fully backed in its integral version as a document behind which the EU as a whole stands, or whether only some of its concepts (urged in a bold and visionary way) will be embraced and get a chance to become a reality, while the other will be nothing but a testimony for future times to the ways of thinking and aspirations of a group of enthusiasts, who lived and worked at some point in history but whose ideas were never implemented due to the lack of political will.

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