

# STRATEGIC INTERSECTIONS

THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

STRATEGIC INTERSECTIONS



Edited by

Milovan Subotić &  
Șerban Cioculescu



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA  
UNIVERSITY OF DEFENCE  
Strategic Research Institute, Belgrade

in partnership with

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE (ROMANIA)  
Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History



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Thematic International Monograph

Monograph editors  
Milovan Subotić  
Șerban Cioculescu

Belgrade, Bucharest 2023.

## **STRATEGIC INTERSECTIONS**

### **The New Architecture of International Security**

Thematic International Monograph

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#### **Publishers**

University of Defence, Strategic Research Institute, Belgrade in cooperation with the Institute for  
Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Bucharest, ROMANIA  
Veljka Lukića Kurjaka 1 St. 11000 Belgrade

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#### **Computer processing**

*Zvezda* Jovanović

ISBN 978-86-81121-32-0

DOI [https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod\\_srint.2023](https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod_srint.2023)

The press: Vojna Štamparija

Circulation: 200

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## FOREWORD

In the past decade, events in global politics have demonstrated the extent to which the world is globalized and how challenging it is to isolate crises that initially appear to be regional in nature. Significant moments of crisis have been present in global politics over the past decade such as the "Arab Spring" and the migrant crisis, followed by the first Ukrainian crisis of 2014, the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, and finally the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. All the mentioned events have simultaneously served as a unique test for the global community, both at state and multilateral level, in terms of the potential to create frameworks for cooperation and collective action to find adequate solutions. With a reasonable degree of certainty, we can conclude that the outcomes of interstate cooperation have been insufficient so far.

The future direction of global politics is unlikely to be marked by cooperation, at least not at the level envisioned by idealists in the realm of international relations. It is foreseeable that the current events will not simply disappear due to the political maneuvering of the most significant stakeholders, each vying for a more favorable position within the sphere of the world politics.

The geopolitical landscape of contemporary international security underscores the importance of enhancing the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy. Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has been confronted with non-traditional security challenges, spanning from terrorism and organized crime to migration and cyber threats. However, the ongoing Ukrainian crisis rekindles Europe's need to refocus its security agenda on traditional military threats. Despite the increased significance of economic and informational power over the past decades, and the undoubted waning of the political utility of military power, it would be a mistake to prematurely assert the absolute predominance of economic and informational influence over the realm of military power. In truth, modern conflicts have evolved beyond their historical paradigms, where victory and defeat were two sides of a single coin. In contemporary warfare, in addition to military engagement, battles unfold across other dimensions - cultural, legal, and diplomatic - amid the surge of globalization and technological advancement.

In Europe, the active engagement of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), along with their responsiveness to current security challenges, will continue to greatly influence the security landscape in this continent. Concurrently, the European Union, through its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), can play a pivotal role in crisis management in regions within its sphere of interest, particularly in regions where there are aspirations towards European integration.



Viewed from the perspective of states seeking membership in the European Union, their gradual accession to this political and security community, rooted in mutual cooperation, assistance and solidarity, would elevate their security level and mitigate the vulnerability of these countries to potential risks and threats. Simultaneously, fostering more substantial involvement of these states in the European Union's military operations and civilian missions, alongside the integrated structures and activities of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), would positively impact their readiness to share the responsibility for peace and security in the region. Furthermore, it would enhance the overall capacity of the European Union to respond to potential crises and conflicts. Additionally, the gradual accession and the anticipated perspective of membership in the European Union would greatly alter the dynamics of cooperation between the EU and potential member states in the field of security and defense, especially regarding the planning, preparation and operationalization of the participation in the EU missions and activities of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), military-economic and scientific-research cooperation.

The robust impetus and support provided by the European Union to security and defense collaboration among states, including potential member states, holds the potential to yield significant advancements. These advancements are notably poised to be witnessed through the exchange of expert insights and the distillation of lessons learned in the intricate execution of missions and activities inherent to the framework of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). This endeavor would extend to the enhancement of educational, instructional and scientific-research collaboration within projects of mutual interest. Such efforts would substantively improve the operational capabilities of the armed forces of candidate countries, foster the development of capacities within their national defense industries and further cultivate their educational and research potential.

In the present-day context, no state operates in isolation with the capacity to unilaterally navigate the escalating complexities related to the preservation of national security. Nations are increasingly compelled to collaborative endeavors to counteract the negative processes and phenomena that imperil their security. Strengthening trust and cooperation to enhance stability and security, both in Europe and globally, remains the sole path towards enduring peace and sustained prosperity in the face of the inevitable uncertainties and insecurities that loom on the horizon.

Likewise, a parallel approach should be adopted by the academic community when addressing the issues that burden contemporary security. It is solely through a comprehensive and inclusive approach that the multifaceted challenges facing the modern world can be effectively analyzed. This necessitates a collective endeavor by representatives of the scholarly community both at national, as well as international level.

The international academic monograph entitled "Strategic Intersection – the New Architecture of International Security" can be regarded as an academic contribution to a shared and more secure future that we all, even if declaratively, aspire to.

The monograph encompasses 15 papers, authored by 23 researchers from 9 countries (Romania, Cyprus, Croatia, North Macedonia, India, Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia), representing a total of 15 academic institutions. The manuscript is organized into four sections.

The first section entitled "*Security Transformation in the Theory of Security and Political Sciences*" is primarily focused on the prevailing theoretical underpinnings of security through the lens of political and security sciences. Additionally, it explores innovative approaches in the fields involving the implementation of contemporary technologies during crises, the development of intelligence studies as an academic discipline, the spectrum of holistic needs of regions such as the Balkans and the Southeast Mediterranean region, as well as concepts and models of regional police cooperation.

The second section is entitled "*Challenges of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU*" and delves into the contemporary security landscape within the European Union member states, as well as the Western Balkan region, which holds particular significance for the overall European security. The section examines innovations in peacekeeping arrangements, integrated approaches to potential military force engagement, the potential end of hyperglobalization and the challenges Europe faces in the ongoing context of migrant pressures. These topics constitute key focal points addressed within this section.

The third part of the monograph, entitled "*Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Area and Implications for European Security*", offers multiple perspectives on the most pronounced security threat to Europe at present. The shortcomings of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) are examined in the light of the challenges posed by the Ukrainian crisis. The section also delves into frozen conflicts as tactics of hybrid warfare, the informational aspect of conflicts, and the influence of the Russian "soft power" on Western Balkan countries. These are some of the pivotal topics addressed by the authors within this chapter.

The fourth section, "*Contemporary Challenges of Human Security*", underscores the growing imperative to allocate more attention within security studies to this segment, which has long been overshadowed by the so-called grand security narratives, such as international and national security. The dynamics between human rights and national security, deepened exploration of the concept of gender equality within the defense systems of the Western Balkan states, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on human security within contemporary academic literature and the challenges and prospects for further theoretical contemplation of the concept of human security are some of the elaborated inquiries within this section.

The papers included in this monograph have undergone two independent reviews and plagiarism checks using Turnitin. We owe a great debt of gratitude to

the authors who have responded to our call, with the hope of continuing and enhancing future collaboration. Special gratitude is extended to the reviewers of this edition for their patience and dedication, which have been of immense importance both to us as editors and to all the authors, whose papers have been accepted and published in this monograph. Lastly, we express our appreciation to many colleagues, assistants and friends who have contributed to the work on this monograph.

In Belgrade and Bucharest, September 10, 2023

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# Section I

## TRANSFORMATION OF SECURITY IN THE THEORY OF SECURITY AND POLITICAL SCIENCES

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# STRATEGIC COMPLEXITY AND COMPREHENSION: "THE ROAD TO A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE"

Marios P. Efthymiopoulos<sup>1</sup> 

DOI: [https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod\\_srint.2023.ch1](https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod_srint.2023.ch1)

## Keywords:

strategic priorities,  
technology,  
strategic alliances,  
risks,  
partnerships



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**Abstract:** *It is essential to comprehend the current and future state of affairs, the importance and use of technology in crises, while also knowing how to make a right choice regarding collaboration and strategic alliances. It is important to understand the complex and volatile environment in the European Continent and beyond. While we live in the world of change, the digital ecosystem is borderless and showing us the ways to the future. It is a matter of a contemporary challenge. Therefore, we have to be agile, well-versed and multidimensional in approach and processes when examining the greater picture ahead of us, regionally and globally. At the time of new emerging alliances interrupting the current state of affairs and partnerships, we have to be resilient and reliant on short-term variables, and provide optimal solutions to risk assessments in the future. Through this chapter, we envision what we will call "the road to a new security architecture". The chapter deems it a requirement against the current market and political volatility ahead of us. It analyzes the current state of affairs, considers regional and ongoing global phenomena and the need for long-term alliances. It is a theoretical research approach that includes a risk assessment analysis and requests further support for more profound pragmatic-based research.*

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## Introduction

It is essential to identify "the political ecosystem" of our region, namely, the Balkans and the Southeast Mediterranean region. We consider developments around us. There is a need for a risk assessment in order to forecast and identify the current and future challenges, local or peripheral, to indicate options for a possible breakthrough, having in mind that the world is not peaceful at this stage. Through this chapter, we envision what we will call *"the road to a new security architecture"* and we deem it a requirement against the current market and political volatility ahead of us.

This chapter assumes that regional and national threats are interconnected as political issues and affect negatively all regions. The area, in turn, looks and feels volatile in a constantly changing political, economic and military environment. This chapter seeks to comprehend the boundaries that define the interconnected political ecosystem through strategic and security approaches. In turn, the chapter attempts to envision methods that can be used when translated into political affairs, what we call peace resolutions, the end of conflicts or premature avoidance of a potential dispute that may be implemented. The region of our interest in this chapter is the Balkans and the East Mediterranean region.

This chapter calls for a regional power balance, that is, a new strategic and security architecture that first provides regional stability and then the future one. This chapter calls for the first actual road map that defines, among other things, a new security architecture for the Balkans in its totality. The path to the Western Balkan Euro-Atlantic integration may be an option and a course. However, this is a greater vision. The pragmatic process states that this will ultimately depend on regional power solutions and multilateral collaboration; other paths will be created if they fail.

This chapter requires scientific and political openness, a feasibility mentality and an approach to dimensional comprehension. If one attempts to read this chapter, political realism and pragmatic awareness are necessary. Moreover, if one is likely to be associated with the actual methodology from a theoretical approach, it will transform it to a practical one, thus improving the theory on security architecture in the 'world' of political affairs.

A new security architecture is considered a road map. It defines ways or solutions for possible collaboration and ultimately calls for regional alliances. The current chapter seeks critical solutions considering regional pending problems. The cases continue to emerge regarding the global geostrategic landscape, which is also in a state of flux. This new political spectrum defines and examines possibilities, at a theoretical level, between coordinating subjects and considering the regional needs and approaches in a greater need for stability. This includes a combination of requirements for the following groups: economic, social, political, criminal justice, national security, international affairs, defense, technology, investment and business, since all cases are somehow interconnected to each other, as we have stated above. In a combination with their regional issues, this calls for a new strategic and security architecture.

This chapter considers three facts in real time: the changing political landscape, the scarcity of natural resources and the increase in competition. At the same time, wars rage worldwide and actual regional cooperation is necessary. Volatility is a truly vital characteristic of our region and the world today.

Moreover, this chapter believes that multipolarity with multiple actors in similar regions damages the element of peace and, therefore, a balance of power. It disrupts the purpose of regional prosperity. Additionally, the main characteristic of the Balkans and the Southeast Mediterranean region defines issues as regions competing with each other with regional national issues that are yet to be solved. The global changing political landscape requires countries to be simultaneously more active in an attempt to have a more prosperous, more stable, and thus more peaceful region.

This chapter provides the theoretical recording and request for an architectural proposal for a regional strategic and security architecture, which defines a much-needed regional balance of power that may bring us closer rather than apart. This chapter is about the needs and requirements related to a security architecture, that is, a design that feels like using, to a possible extent, modernity and technology as core tools to negotiate for. In a changing financial and geopolitical landscape, with the scarcity of natural resources and commodities, reliance on actual free trade economies is necessary. Currently, there are some agreements on the enhanced trade, but this is based on power projection and competition, which we consider, in the long run, undermining actual security resilience and business continuity while the world becomes more multipolar.

We examine and analyze technological importance to strategic reality and security architecture in the first part. We do not see technology solely as a tool. Instead, we envision technology as a part of the epicenter for a regional political balance discourse. This chapter believes that technology could be leveraged for this reason. We could establish stronger cooperation during this regional and global change ahead of us, where new power balances are being created. Bearing in mind the need for the modernization of technology when research and development (R&D) increase in military affairs, we foresee that the use of technology to increase the level of collaboration and mediation is to be enhanced further. Moreover, technology has continued to hold a great deal of military utility, which will be shown in this chapter. Technology is believed to have a political purpose and utility for peace. Technology can be leveraged, as stated above, to the level to become a tool to negotiate pending cross-regional issues, drifting away from volatility.

In the second part, we examine and emphasize the importance and efficiency of strategic cooperation. What is the best or right choice for possible strategic alliances in our regions, considering transient commitments and/or the option to have hybrid partnerships? Therefore, we assume that the current powers or the ones seeking to be powers comprehend viable and long-term cooperation and ultimately alliances.

The third part proposes the path to a new security architecture. Resilience and reliance on the current and future affairs are considered to be vital characteristics. We forecast the possibility of positive future if only viewed as a power option between newly allied states, defining the character of modern alliances in a futuristic environment. The complete chapter considers various events that require agility,



resilience and decisiveness at a national level, while giving an impetus for strong alliances to thrive, thus possibly raising the standard of regional power stability, cooperation and respect. Operational recommendations and conclusions on the main subject will follow in the end.

As disclosure, the author would like to state that this chapter is theoretical and hopes to be used as a theoretical construct for a complete set-value comprehension community in order to enable a broader public and scientific discourse in the hope of elevating it to a political level. Therefore, the whole paper is considered to be in its initial steps. It views and examines the issues holistically. Regionally, we cannot escape from global things and the vibes we receive from global events. The entire paper is not related to any government, institution/organization or affiliated with any government or political centers. These are scientific assumptions. There are merely analyses for consideration and proposals that are to be considered an act of scientific submission solely by the author.

It is essential to state that this chapter considers two main points: firstly, the world is in a state of flux and we seek options that may ignite public discourse on the possibility of a more stable political ecosystem and the second point is more directly related to the chapter itself. Various terminologies in this chapter, definitions, explanations and analyses have been carefully used. We believe that the theoretical thinking and use of terminologies complement each other. As stated above, the thinking behind it should be understood as a first attempt to record the request and the need for a security architecture in our regions that we consider missing, while premature thinking may be there – having in mind the ongoing changing landscape and geostrategic chessboard. Any expressions of the current or future state of affairs are, by definition, tough to combine and define or explain. Thus, we comprehend what is happening around us at different dimensions. We attempt to clarify thoughts about what is taking place and what could take place positively or negatively from a theoretical point of view. This entails the future and further analysis of any critical issues raised through this current publication.

The title of this chapter includes the terms complexity and comprehension, and this is what we try to do. This chapter considers the current regional and global political complexity, as well as attempts to comprehend it and propose elements for a more peaceful ecosystem. History has shown us that our environment is, by now, extremely complex and cannot be "simplified" if we do nothing about it.

Reading this chapter requires open-minded and holistic thinking, as well as the will to agree to the state of affairs as we go through it. When reading this chapter, one should think above the national spectrum. As we aim to examine and analyze what is taking place or its shape, we do not attempt to take any national position or lead the reader to any assumptions. We state the theoretical facts through an analysis approach that is based on realism and pragmatism. We merely seek to showcase what we consider a much needed security architecture, therefore requesting negotiations rendering deeper cooperation and leading to possible alliances starting from a regional standpoint, considering global and regional volatility. We attempt to identify policy options that unite regional states rather than keep them apart.

This chapter discusses various questions raised in real time. The time of writing this chapter takes place in the summer of 2023. To put it in a nutshell, the chapter forecasts that we are expected to see the rise of more regional competition. At the same time, while globality gives rise to further challenges, opportunities, instability, insecurity and volatility, the considered developments have to be overcome first.

The paper does not necessarily relate things as they may be to the current power cooperation that we deem to be established for the purpose of pure national interest by each nation separately. We believe that if such collaboration does not include depth and a security architecture established on the basis of strategic cooperation in order to create a possible alliance, considering our new characteristics, the current associations may be short-lived. Thus, we are to see attempts for a more substantial presence of regional power engagement and, therefore, regional competition between powers that would like to be engaged further and ultimately and will have to compete with current neighbors or collaborators.

By 2023, many countries have already attempted to write modern and future history based on ancestry or historical values or earth-related values that make up for their national need for grander posture and strategic depth. However, this may not mean that modernity, technology and supranational threats may require more than a single attempt for regional power status in a changing world.

## Setting the pace of a necessary new architecture

To envision peace, one has to propose peace, at least the architecture of it. This current chapter is the first attempt. It projects and offers the establishment of a new security architecture, the one that necessitates a collective process, both political and sociological methodologies for development. The aim is to seek a peaceful resolution to the current or upcoming issues in order to avoid further escalation of small or large claims that may lead to new conflicts. As aforementioned, we are more than ever volatile, and a "spark" can ignite hate, fear, competition and regional wars. Unfortunately, this seems to be the reality of a multipolar world without "standards" of cooperation and alliances, without a regional balance of power.

The current global state of affairs, as such, is in flux. It affects all of us. The war in Ukraine, which continues throughout 2023, may not end as soon as one may have wished or anticipated, having in mind the seriousness of the matter. For those who comprehend the relationship between Ukraine and Russia, or the NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine relations, the possibility of marking the subject of Ukrainian-Russian relations as volatile was always there (European Parliament, June 2022). The case of the conflict has been developing over years, and there is a lot to say about it on various fronts: religious, political, military, sociological, even identity one (Friesendorf and Wolff, 2022). Nevertheless, this is not the main aim of this chapter at this stage.

Inter alia, war has managed to raise questions on power and leadership, globally and regionally. On a global scale, the current state of affairs cannot be considered to

have any kind of balance at any level (financial, political or military), rather than "transient commitments" in the socio-political and economic business affairs. Many people have viewed the shift to a multipolar world as an opportunity. They have considered the balance of power and the need or wishes of all states to develop and compete. It was first seen by the fall of the Soviet era and the Cold War when liberalism overtook socialism. By 1989, in the bilateral world, the balance of power between the West and East could no more rest at a bilateral level. Instead, there was a move to a new, more multilateral perspective and prospect for greater ability to occur in business and trade, political affairs, communications, healthcare, research and development, investments, production, defense and regional or global politics. New country actors were to emerge (Shlapentokh Dmitry, 2012). If we could only create time-lapse events, the 1990s would reorganize the financial status and infrastructure, and the mid-1990s would lead to regional and national wars for independence on the appearance of need/wish and opportunity.

The 21<sup>st</sup> century events have been/are considered, among other things, to be characterized by the age of technology, the fight against terror and other forms of conflicts, financial attempts to overthrow or control trade wars, the dawn of genetics and healthcare, space race and competitive industrial development. By the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the fight against global terror has shifted socio-political, religious, trade and business assumptions and ideologies and has established new paths for new alliances in the world that would soon attempt to become multipolar.

The rise of technology and, within this, the ever-growing digital ecosystem and amongst it the internet, the later social media and now artificial intelligence (AI), cloud computing and/or genetics in the world of robotics (UNCTAD, 2021), has the power to emerge even further, offering an abundance of options and choices, from minor to mega projects, involving the complete socio-political "stratosphere" of our communities.

The overall environment and our climate are changing. New forms of economics and finance are emerging, some regulated and yet-to-be-regulated cryptocurrencies. These are to become a complete set of new digital conditions of living that will add value to the digital format of our ecosystem, that is, a new living standard that goes with technology. This crossroads between the virtual world we live in and our tendency to spend more than approximately 7 hours per day (according to our phone/computer data provided by our service provider or phone we have) put to the 21<sup>st</sup> century equation with a digital living model. And more is yet to come.

The rise of digitization of our lives provides the opportunity for a new world structure. Inter alia, there are more social rights to an individual, who may have been discriminated against. This would ultimately create movements for even more freedom, such as gender movements and greater civil rights to the individual or collective in nations that have been/are considered as "traditional". This is the new "digital society Modus vivendi".

In politics, such elements and characteristics, if we can call them in such a manner, have proven to enlarge the agenda with the emergence of new social and

political issues, mixed with the current or pending national historical problems between states and political, economic and religious matters. Through them, the wish or need for further regional powers to emerge, leads to balance and/or control. This allows countries to become regional powers and "bid" for possible power globality in the 21<sup>st</sup> century new strategic chessboard.

In the post-Covid crisis era, firstly within the 21<sup>st</sup> century, while some say that more may come, human volatility is now marked. In its totality, humans are volatile from many issues, and now a global health crisis, the one that can be deadly indeed. Opportunistic, as this can be viewed, such elements mentioned above give rise to new political, economic and sociological options.

Within 2023, various global powers continue to seek political improvement in their regional status and others from regional to global power status. This is, after all, their right to do so, to create history or claim their record or claim the future history. As stated, this is the new Game of Thrones (Efthymiopoulos, 2014), a possibility for new cooperation and new or revived alliances. Thus, the request for a new security architecture appears.

To date, states have started claiming some or all power and bid for power through primary sources, trade and commodities, negotiations and investments, governance and participation in global affairs and negotiations. Furthermore, the wish has developed to take over others in various ways, including "a peaceful way" that may not be as peaceful after all as we wish to be or as one may initially think. The rising or falling demographics, the increase in power through necessary industrial development and space race, where genetics also meets robotics, when the discovery and use of our human DNA are now globally examined, among other things, completes the 21<sup>st</sup>-century equation (Sergey Nurk et al., 2022). This is the greater picture of the global world in the 21<sup>st</sup> century with no balance of power. This is the environment we live in and it is as simple as this. We just need to accept it... or not.

The projection of power or the projection to control resources makes up for an excuse to exercise influence and establish power. This is the modern framework. Whether we like it or not, new alliances, greater than the current ones, are necessary in the world of competition that the author has also called "hybrid alliances" (Efthymiopoulos, 2019).

A 'hybrid methodology of alliances' dedicates the mixture of activities and resources to a specific time frame and time shift used inside an association and implemented through political/economic/technological elements, whereas, in the business world, Andersen and Medlin call this hybrid nature of things or "transient commitment". For example, all socio-economic and political affairs affect the European EU and non-EU member states. Trade, business and technology are involved and interrelated now more than in the past. This is the core of "negotiations and discussions" on achieving power. Each state would like to ensure, inter alia, that its economy and society operate well, modernize constantly and develop.

Trade routes have been affected due to the extent of wars. New ones are thus negotiated. As such, a fresh balance of trade and business is attempted. A "domino" of new options and new cooperation/alliances has been created. New potential regional players emerge, making good use of an opportunity to initiate processes of a country's "upgrade" in regional and global affairs.

We are thus called upon to adapt to new realities. This eventuality brings new options, opportunities, challenges and regional or global threats. And we need to, first and foremost, be aware of this reality. In its totality, Ukrainian illegal invasion by Russia in February 2022, which led to war, has brought Europe (as a continent) and the globe into a new reality, not that the world was more peaceful earlier (i.e., the fight against global terror and the war in Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan, to name a few, or the ever ongoing wars in Africa and the bid to control Asia). However, this war has affected socio-political, economic and trade market structures. Our regional proximity including the Balkans, the East Mediterranean, the Middle East and North Africa has been affected and the global war machine is raging havoc. Power is thus transient. It has moved to a hybrid mode of cooperation and alliances. The world is no longer balanced and indeed not peaceful.

This chapter seeks to end the possibility of new or spillover wars meaning wars that, for any reason, may also "blossom" elsewhere. For some, this period is "a true opportunity" to rise in power. Global and regional politics look more volatile than ever before while powers dream of a grander vision of force against "the opponent".

As we comprehend this "new reality", the paper recommends a call for an architectural design of security and stability including a new order of things, that is, a new regional order, not solely a temporary balance. This may be the sole solution to avoid further ignitions of war and become a step closer to the world war that people may call World War III. The characteristics of the war around the globe seem to be very retrospectively similar to World War I, leading to a new rise of ideologies (extreme and therefore security related) as World War II.

From the abovementioned paragraph, one wonders about "the temporary balance" that we believe is not even achieved, or moreover, about the characteristics of the possibility of a new world war. These are due to the fact that there is no respect for actual rules in the ongoing power games that are taking shape globally. International law, being ill-utilized, announced and desired by all parties, seems not to be obeyed. We should consider that the activities of the United Nations (UN), at times, operationally, may not even be admired. There are many examples of it that we could refer to on a global scale. The not-so-far to the Balkans, divided Island of Cyprus, located in the Southeast Mediterranean region, is a crucial example of what happens when the invader does not respect not only the sovereignty of an independent state, but also the activities of the UN in the buffer zone of Pyla (UN report on operations in Cyprus, 2022) or back to the Balkans, how easily an issue can elevate international concern over car plates (UNMIK, 2022). And again, one may say that both cases are complicated. And they are. However, the lack of ability to resolve issues is what raises concern. The fact that all issues become "a gray zone" and that these issues may be examined at some point does not provide solutions.

We, therefore, first have to comprehend the current state of affairs we live in, that is, actually envision a more stable and prosperous future meaning to wonder about possible solutions that we may add on some mediation/negotiation platforms. In other words, we have to envision and elaborate realistically and pragmatically on our near future and forecast long- term for us and our communities. We need to assure and ensure a balance in order to establish cooperation, avoid insecurity and at least minimize volatility. We need to comprehend the concept and design of architectural security in our regions, to accumulate and resolve issues using accurate methods that are reliable and practical. The opposite may be disastrous: with more threats and challenges to come and, ultimately, clashes and conflicts. The fact that scenarios are constantly written and presented to the public as a communication effort, in case of ignition of regional wars, is not a good signal (Jabbour, 2021).

Leaders have realized the needs within a pragmatic world: 1. routes to trade with, 2. great use of natural resources to survive, 3. provide both regional and global systems with direct access to primary resources. 4. race for industrial success, 5. mega-project planning that secures development investment, communication and trade, 6. engagement in international affairs of the global community.

We have to bear in mind that while all leadership skills and personalities matter, modern leadership values have changed. Leaders would like to be considered no less grand leaders today. Therefore, their respective states should be no less than regional or extraordinary powers. This is the only way they may envision their own "leadership abilities", unlike past leaders, where different values were implemented.

## The rise of technology defines strategic priorities for architectural design

Technology development leads to world affairs. It defines priorities in all sectors: political, military and business. This is evident. It is a primary characteristic of our 21<sup>st</sup> century. It is called the century of technology, after all. Technology defines the length and extent of all issues. Among them, it "provides a push" for potential political negotiations to follow if a peace plan or a road map of architecture can be implemented. This is because technology allows us to see beyond regional or global volatility. With technology, we can "dream and implement" faster. Through a strategic architecture and road map, technology is located at the epicenter of issues. It renders the countries vulnerable and volatile to developing when used appropriately to bring communities together in such a way that when the opportunity arises, cross-border trade and development, infrastructure and economies rely on technology or cross-knowledge technology. Technology uses, ensures and assures acquiring business knowledge that, if implemented regionally, can bring parties together.

Technology has always been at our side. It has always been a tool of utility. Yet, politically, it has never been at the epicenter of all political, business and societal

discourse on the future of regions and stability itself. The human approach to things has always been the critical element, the epicenter of progress. However, technology has not.

Today, technology continues to be a tool. Yet, while there are human-centered discussions, technology has become an increasing facilitation method and device. Technology provides credibility of issues that are or may be required to bring parties together during great market uncertainty and scarcity of resources. Technology has been upgraded to become a tool for the epicentral use of human-centered progress. Therefore, when implemented in societal/governmental terms, power and stability make an impact. Technology enables constant, efficient methods for negotiations and mediation on all socio-political, economic and political issues. It multiplies efficiency and capabilities for development, research and production. By a general overview, technology is, therefore, a tool for progress, communication, observation, the one that allows our "analogue" and "digital ecosystem" for practical use.

The utility of technology is everywhere. It surrounds us. It is at the forefront of our every day and our world, our society, family communication and employment. We are connected by technology. The continued and constant research and development have allowed us to increase all levels of employment, production, services, contact, policy research, efficient decision-making methods, medical issues and defense, among other things.

The question that one may ask is: can technology be used to become an interlocutor for peace? Can technology render innovation that can be related to peace and alliance in the decision-making, regionally and globally, when combined with political affairs? The answer could be a positive one.

Consider the following: The age where science fiction stories have become the reality, where technology has been seen as the epicenter of things. And this is precisely the case today. The world of dreams, when somehow taking books and stories or history to what we all know as "the small screen", otherwise television, has initiated a variety of options. New objectives and goals were successfully included in small or large-level films that made us dream and combine books with history and stories, allowing us to see how people view and envision future things. Moreover, it helps us establish a societal framework for the future. Furthermore, documentaries help us become more knowledgeable and aware at all times in combination with pure research and reading materials.

By the time technology became a central point for development, states realized the necessity and use of it in the most significant possible ways. Following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, technology has continued progressing, and multiplied in its efficiency, has created, among other things, a new digital world. Nevertheless, it has become more business-oriented. Technology today is used almost everywhere in modern architecture, design, social structures, healthcare, education and defense. Technology is everywhere around us and has enabled a new market economy, a new reality. It has brought people closer.

It has also been exploited mainly by information methods, known as the world of the media, followed by the creation of the internet and the combination of things. A new world, digital in nature, progressively develops and simplifies our lives. While in the world of healthcare, it provides us with the most significant depth in the battle against any medical obstacles, technology helps us live longer. In defense, technology has changed pathways. While it was used for national security against external threats, now every nation that aspires through constant development to continuously expand security resilience ensures military technology agility and strength.

Technology has furthermore allowed us to explore our world geologically, to dig deeper and greater for the current or new natural resources, utility methods, to exploit. What has been provided by Mother Earth? However, it is a cycle. Natural resources and commodities provide substantial fungibility. With them, we further increase our knowledge and terms of use of technology to facilitate the exploitation of resources.

Having in mind two following examples, it is no coincidence that through the 21<sup>st</sup> century and even more, mainly from 2010 to date, the use of natural resources and commodities, as shown below, has been massively exploited and increased. The industrial development has leveraged technology to manipulate as many resources as possible to ensure economic prosperity; economic knowledge for our economy is implemented in our societal structure.

#### Total revenue of Pioneer Natural Resources from 2010 to 2022 (in million U.S. dollars)




Figure 1 – Statista 2023<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Total Revenue of Pioneer Natural Resources from 2010 to 2022 (in US dollars)



The digitization of things "includes all elements of the value chain including product design, supply chain, manufacturing, while creating new business models." The digitalization of manufacturing across industries, in turn, has "resulted in the emergence of service-based revenue models to complement the already existing product-based models". Furthermore, digital technologies "have also begun to usher in an era of customization at a much lower cost in both B2C and B2B segments" (Statista, 2023).

Technology is, therefore, everywhere. Through this chapter, it is believed that we can and have to use the "fruits" of technology in a greater capacity and capability to render our regions more peaceful and stable through development.

On the government level approach, technology and resilience matter. It matters to all extents and depths of our societal needs and our assurance that our society develops. Moreover, it increases power and efficiency when using technology to trade while having negotiating elements that need to be dealt with through technology. The chart below shows the importance of globalization and trade through the use of technological advances, which are directly related to political affairs as they progress.




Figure 2 – Statista (August 2023)<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> "In 2022, the global trade value of goods exported worldwide amounted to approximately 24.9 trillion US dollars at current prices. This figure stood at around 6.45 trillion US dollars in 2000. The rise in the value of goods exported worldwide reflects developments in international trade, globalization, and technological advances". <https://www.statista.com/statistics/264682/worldwide-export-volume-in-the-trade-since-1950/> Main source: UNCTAD.

Technology is also used for the military to narrow issues related to this current chapter, which is based on strategy and security. Technology assures national security resilience in national defense and overall military affairs. Since we live in a volatile security-based environment and, moreover, the arms race continues due to insecurity, technology spending for the military has increased. As shown below, global military expenditure has increased radically since 2001.




Figure 3 – Statista (August 2023)<sup>4</sup>

The distribution by country presented below clearly shows the dependence on technology, while global volatility is now evident.

<sup>4</sup> Published by Statista Research Department. "In 2022, the military spending worldwide amounted to 2.24 trillion US dollars, including the highest one during the period under consideration. The reasons for this are the Russia-Ukraine war and increasing tensions in the South China Sea. The United States accounted for nearly 40 percent of total military spending globally".




Figure 4 – Statista (August 2023)<sup>5</sup>

Regionally, it has been noted that as volatility remains, insecurity leads countries to spend more. To this end, various instruments, such as trade agreements and increased technology-based defense spending, increase in regions (i.e., Balkans and the Southeast Mediterranean region) or continue to grow steadily considering the purpose of self-defense.

The tables below show the Balkan and Southeast Mediterranean states that are members of both NATO and the EU or aspire to become either members of the Euro-Atlantic link or seek a more multipolar world. In all cases, the essential element is that all countries consider the political and military environment to be fragile and volatile; therefore, military expenditure increases. Technology is at the epicenter of all levels of military build-up, as seen below in details provided by SIPRI:

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.statista.com/statistics/272481/shares-of-selected-countries-in-world-military-spending/>

Military expenditure by country as percentage of government spending, 2015-2022							© SIPRI 2022	
Countries are grouped by region and subregion								
Figures are for military expenditure expressed as a percentage of general government expenditure, and are for calendar years except where otherwise stated.								
Data for general government expenditure are from the IMF World Economic Outlook, and include spending by all levels of govt.: central/federal, state/provincial/regional, municipal and local government, etc								
Figures in blue are SIPRI estimates. Figures in red indicate highly uncertain data.								
". " = data unavailable. "xxx" = country did not exist or was not independent during all or part of the year in question.								
Country	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Europe								
Central Europe								
Albania	3.78%	3.79%	3.78%	4.03%	4.39%	3.98%	3.87%	5.12%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.32%	2.23%	2.13%	2.08%	2.02%	1.83%	2.17%	2.00%
Bulgaria	3.34%	3.80%	3.82%	4.22%	8.74%	4.21%	3.93%	4.06%
Croatia	3.67%	3.42%	3.68%	3.42%	3.50%	3.15%	3.94%	3.93%
Kosovo	2.86%	2.73%	2.85%	2.73%	2.78%	3.05%	2.91%	3.83%
North Macedonia	3.08%	3.12%	2.82%	3.12%	3.69%	3.41%	4.12%	4.59%
Montenegro	3.03%	2.97%	2.89%	2.90%	3.03%	3.20%	3.53%	3.95%
Romania	4.23%	4.49%	5.56%	5.61%	5.45%	5.24%	4.97%	4.97%
Serbia	4.28%	4.17%	4.58%	3.97%	5.27%	4.36%	4.31%	5.25%
Slovenia	1.91%	2.18%	2.23%	2.25%	2.44%	2.07%	2.52%	2.55%
Western Europe								
Cyprus	4.19%	3.77%	4.31%	4.14%	4.69%	4.36%	4.45%	4.52%
Greece	4.81%	5.15%	5.29%	5.60%	5.49%	5.12%	6.63%	7.26%

Figure 5 – SIPRI 2022 showcases the military expenditure by country as a percentage of government spending in the period 2015-2022 [seen August 2023]

Military expenditure by country, in constant (2021) US\$ m., 2015-2022 © SIPRI 2022								
Figures are in US \$m., at constant 2021 prices and exchange rates								
Figures in blue are SIPRI estimates. Figures in red indicate highly uncertain data.								
". ." = data unavailable. "xxx" = country did not exist or was not independent during all or part of the year in question.								
Country	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
<b>Europe</b>								
<b>Central Europe</b>								
Albania	178.4	171.7	178.2	192.9	217.0	210.4	222.8	296.6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	176.8	175.4	168.9	175.1	176.5	177.4	209.7	187.7
Bulgaria	760.6	814.9	844.9	1043.0	2394.8	1199.2	1275.2	1336.5
Croatia	999.4	950.5	1009.8	986.5	1070.2	1044.9	1361.2	1341.2
Kosovo	58.3	60.6	64.9	67.5	71.9	84.7	79.6	108.0
North Macedonia	116.2	121.1	114.5	127.2	162.6	166.2	205.6	230.9
Montenegro	65.2	71.1	72.9	77.4	79.8	88.1	91.1	97.7
Romania	2906.5	3066.6	4161.0	4627.8	5065.8	5418.7	5300.0	5161.1
Serbia	911.4	903.9	970.3	891.2	1282.4	1216.2	1270.8	1443.5
Slovenia	456.3	513.1	526.0	549.2	616.4	600.2	762.8	758.9
<b>Western Europe</b>								
Cyprus	358.6	328.7	389.9	460.5	498.5	513.8	541.8	514.6
Greece	5195.8	5412.3	5408.0	5780.5	5683.9	6063.0	8299.9	8347.5

Figure 6 – SIPRI 2022 showcases the military expenditure by country in constant (2021) US\$ m. in the period 2015-2022 [seen August 2023]

Defense build-up is a fact and technology, as mentioned above, is at the epicenter. The use of technology is, therefore, critical. Modern war capabilities include military technology and intelligence, advanced weaponry, cyber security, logistics and support systems.

What seems clear is rapid technological advancement globally and regionally. This means that defense technology will continue to evolve. As volatility increases, new technologies and systems develop to provide militaries with a strategic advantage on the battlefield. We assume that future military affairs will continue growing, including space military weaponry and exploration technology. What happens to the overall possibility of peace in avoiding war-like situations from evolving, but keeping it solely for explorative or balanced defense purposes in what is becoming a multipolar world? At what end do the current powers request to remain powers in their region and not emerge to become a competitive power to others regionally and potentially globally?

There is solely one certainty among other things - that technology surrounds each state socio-political, economic and military methods and approaches. Technology reaches out to governmental policies satisfying both national security and national interest.

This chapter questions whether technology resilience and/or research or development can be used for more peaceful purposes and in a balanced sheet. For 2022, R&D World editors forecast that \$2.476 trillion will be invested globally in R&D efforts, which is an increase of 5.43% over \$2.348 trillion spent in calendar 2021(R&D Global Forecast 2022). So, what if technology becomes a tool for a new strategic and security architecture? If one is proposed?

## Strategic cooperation: the right choice for possible strategic alliances

Making the right political choices in any form is necessary for cooperation. Marking and making the proper steps for constructive step-by-step cooperation is a pragmatic political move. In establishing or upscaling strategic cooperation into strategic alliances by 2023, the format of the coalition has to be developed for the long term and with an actual purpose, because without them, they can be short-lived.

In this 21<sup>st</sup> century multipolar environment, we see alliances to be hybrid, as stated by Efthymiopoulos (Efthymiopoulos, 2019), or transient, as Andersen and Medlin state (Andersen and Medlin 2022). And that applies everywhere, both in the business and intelligence world.

And where peace is achievable or negotiable, we have to reach out for a new security architecture considering the constantly changing landscape.

According to Randall (2006), on Alliances, "...the greatest challenge is the translation of overwhelming might..." of alliances "...into effective influence". The

conditions of the 20<sup>th</sup> century chessboard, according to Brzezinski (Brzezinski, 1997), leveraged power through bilateral and multilateral alliances based on power and influence. Even so, the establishment of Alliances, based on Steven Walt's *Origins of Alliances* (Walt, 1987), assumed a role of power effectiveness, but also influenced the world that was, back in the day, ready to change.

The challenge is to seek out force-command and leadership regionally and globally, with a vision that supersedes the current issues, challenges and threats in the world where its order is yet to be defined, where unconventional threats are explicitly seen and shown. In the world of structured hybrid alliances, allies seek operational capacity development, power and influence of leadership that acquires and requires strong legitimacy and power effectiveness. Alliances reflect future societal global and regional governance models with morality, ethics and values. Models should be, therefore, of hybrid nature: self-nurtured and self-adaptive to new challenges or threats constantly facing the threat of instability.

In a modern and constantly self-modernizing society, the method of understanding and cooperative delivery, the approach to alliances, should be simplified. As of 2023, the world will be more volatile. We seek a security architecture, a framework of possible dimensions that alliances are not yet applicable at. The current Alliances are somehow "static" (Efthymiopoulos, 2019). Necessary rules of and for political stability and resilience to peace and, moreover, sustainable growth could be implemented in an otherwise volatile environment.

In a truly global and interconnected society, alliances should reflect our societal needs and requests. They should provide clear-cut and simplified rules with the aforementioned self-adaptive methods; regulations should be robust and resilient; actions should provide effectiveness and political happiness for success and regional or global security resilience. Alliances should be methodological and operational of hybrid capacity-building and delivery.

In 2023, the world is in a state of alliance fluidity. Alliances are being reshuffled. The war in Ukraine called upon Europe and NATO to renew its alliance posture objectives and methodologies. Furthermore, it has called for more alliances to emerge as the world becomes more multipolar and states seek solutions. In the structure of initial cooperation in various fields, this strategic cooperation between two or more states has the potential to emerge as new alliances.

For those new alliances, being financial, military or political one does not matter. We foresee that such partnerships will become the impetus for further or deeper structured associations.

Alliances have changed in their character of operations and objectives. Today, they are inspired by a hybrid format, which translates into needs. They are transient, although currently known alliances are founded on factors and timeless common objectives of security, strategic affairs and challenges, threats, and also opportunities.

New cooperation in the form of alliances, such as the BRICS (created today on the basis of tactical objectivity, political acceptance, and the rule of law that is

comprehended on a hybrid methodology) considers the political and strategic ecosystem challenges and changes, while the regional and global geopolitical chessboard is constantly changing. New forms of cooperation necessitate the change of each state into an element of power and influence. Good management allows a state to become a security provider at least to the region it is located in, giving reasoning and purpose while political importance on strategic cooperation to become new formats of alliances. We live in the non-symmetrical world that is indeed 'hybrid'.

## Towards a new security architecture

It is believed that new and modern alliances will emerge from targeted strategic cooperation as long as there is a purpose, reasoning, objective and pragmatic comprehension of where we are, where we are heading and which tools can be used. It is a matter of power projection and efficiency in multilateral world.

Regional or international alliances can be short-term or long-term. They require resilience, continuity, robustness and efficiency. In the age of constant changes in the world that tends to become more and more multipolar, complete hybrid definitions are yet to be acknowledged and defined, but they will certainly come. We seek innovative methods of approach to a new security architecture, the one that is modern in societal and financial terms, political, civilian, economic and military combined.

Through capability and capacity building, there has to be a moral capacity to deliver peaceful resolutions and mediations, leadership skills and great use of technological advances. Moreover, it is necessary to have the ability to discuss power balance and peace in a new format that allows for the resolution of the current or potential conflicts that are not merely projected by the increased military spending due to volatility, but rather due to the cooperation approach of joint security power providers.

In the 21st century, during the 4th revolution of technology, where resilience on security is of imperative importance, where cooperation is not an option yet a solution, we seek clear strategic leadership and vision in cooperation that does more to promote regional and international environmental strategic cooperation, i.e., the Balkans and Southeast Mediterranean region—at the same time, understanding the current and future challenges.

We need a security architecture that goes beyond and creates a clear political momentum with a clear vision, mission and objectives - considering emerging unconventional threats that may continue to trouble the European countries in the continent.

We are now at the forefront of asymmetrical challenges with no conventional solution methodology approach. We seek national solutions that may not be viable without a regional process and discussion. Threats are yet to be defined, still threats need to be responded to. Illegal migration, for example, has become an unconventional challenge and possibly one of the elements of hybrid threat (Treverton et al., 2018).

We therefore consider a road map made of security architecture, to build on a 'path' that includes:

1. the comprehension of our landscape
2. regional resilience on national and regional security
3. knowledge and recording of regional issues to be negotiated
4. methodology of approach in business-to-business and direct free trade between the Balkan countries and Southeast Mediterranean states
5. capability building and trust methodologies between neighboring states
6. negotiations and mediations on the issues of regional concern without external interlocutors
7. agreement to engage international interlocutors when and if negotiations between regional leaders fail
8. projection of a regional development framework for the next fifty years to include sociological elements, infrastructure, research and technology dependence between states
9. each state should be acknowledged to hold a primary "identity in research and development that seeks out global and regional agreements for progress"
10. development of a free market economy between states that holds the values and capabilities, similarities and standards as observed by the European Union
11. agreed values on all peaceful resolutions of any issues and conflicts
12. multinational program development in the exploitation of the landscape of the regional alliance and approach in levels of new technology use and practice such as outer-space exploration and science

In a regional architecture, resilience and reliance on each other's economies and power abilities should be characterized. As an ongoing global phenomenon, from war-torn areas to climate changes, the scarcity of resources and the need for an alliance, technology in a versed understanding of the current state of affairs is required. These exact elements are the ones that will bring parties together.

## Conclusion

Throughout the paper, we have deemed it essential to identify the regional "political ecosystem", that is, the spectrum of regions such as the Balkans and the Southeast Mediterranean region and their holistic needs. We aimed to identify upcoming current needs and needs related to a constant geopolitical landscape. We have attempted to indicate several theoretical options for a possible much-needed breakthrough, considering that the world is not peaceful at this stage. We have entitled it *"the road to a new security architecture"*.

This chapter has assumed that regional and national threats are interconnected as political issues and affect all regions negatively. This chapter has attempted to comprehend the boundaries that define the interconnected political ecosystem through strategic and security approaches.



This chapter called for a new regional power balance, that is, a new strategic and security architecture that first provides regional stability and then the future one. A realistic and pragmatic process states that this will ultimately depend on regional power solutions and multilateral collaboration if agreed upon to a road map for a security architecture that can offer more than the current political situation.

As we move along in time, we forecast more and more insecurity and market volatility. There is a need for social and security inclusion, that is, more utility of methods that bring us together to solve our problems. The world pandemic that we survived from 2019 to 2021 may only be the beginning of things. A holistic approach has been considered while security elements have been examined.

This is merely the beginning of grander research that requires further details and an additional approach to many issues from a theoretical perspective to a practical one. However, this is only the beginning of a public document that we hope will become the commencement of a vision of what can be achieved considering the multipolar world we are moving on to and the choices that we have or may hold ahead of us, considering climate changes and the scarcity of resources while at the same time adding to them any current and future hybrid challenges.

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# INTELLIGENCE STUDIES – AN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE?

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DOI: [https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod\\_strint.2023.ch2](https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod_strint.2023.ch2)

## Keywords:

Intelligence Studies,  
academic disciplines,  
epistemology,  
methodology,  
theory



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**Abstract:** *Is Intelligence Studies an academic discipline? The subject of many debates, Intelligence Studies represents an intellectual corps of almost four-decade long academic efforts focused on the development of science journals, research monographs, scientific conferences, university academic programs, theses and dissertations, research projects, etc. Its epistemological base is located somewhere between the disciplines of Political Science, International Relations, Security Studies, and History, and its thematic scope is practically limitless, covering topics from Management Studies, through Psychology, to Sociology of professions. This review of the development of Intelligence Studies is trying to map all the established elements of the Studies as a possible academic discipline, and to collect all the intellectual efforts related to critical examination of the Studies within the available academic sources. The expected result should be embodied in the comprehensive map of pros and cons related to the epistemological, methodological, and theoretical potential of the Intelligence Studies at present. State of the art sources and academic contributions in this field will be used as a material for analysis.*

## Introduction

During the Second World War, the idea of professionalizing the United States (US) intelligence service was born, which later influenced the final look and ways of functioning of the US Intelligence Community, as well as intelligence services around the world. Behind that idea was the so-called Father of intelligence analysis, history professor

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and intelligence analyst Sherman Kent, who after the war in his most famous work, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*,<sup>2</sup> described in detail and explained the importance of intelligence for conducting foreign policy, which became some kind of a standard in the professional intelligence of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Due to his later engagement as the head of analytical unit at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Kent gained enough knowledge and experience to observe some of the key gaps that distinguish intelligence work as a casual occupation and intelligence work as a profession and career. Within the article entitled *The Need for an Intelligence Literature*<sup>3</sup> published in the first issue of the CIA's internal journal, Kent laid the intellectual foundations of what would later be known as the discipline of "intelligence studies" (Dimitrijević, 2022).

As Shulsky and Schmitt noted, over the last quarter of a century, "intelligence - despite the fact that secrecy remains one of its essential features - has been regularly represented in media writings and has become the subject of a large body of academic research and work. Open discussion of intelligence issues is no longer a matter for upheaval and scandal; it is accepted as an integral part of the public debate about state activities in general" (Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002: xi). One of the reasons for this situation lies in the fact that during the last thirty years, a great number of official archives of intelligence services around the world have become available to the professional and scientific public, especially from the Cold War period. Also, when it comes to current events related to intelligence, there is a trend of "leaking" data that becomes available to general public. Finally, intelligence, in the broadest sense, is no longer the exclusive domain of national institutions, i.e. intelligence services, for several decades. For decades, private companies have been using numerous intelligence methods and techniques completely legally and legitimately to obtain data about the market and competition, to the extent that the experiences of individuals in that field are now available to general public, both professional and academic.

Study and explanation of intelligence during the 20<sup>th</sup> century has been done by various authors, mainly professionals in the field, and also by the members of academic community without necessarily professional experience in the field. At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the number of authors coming from the academic world is increasing, while the number of papers and research on intelligence is practically exponentially growing compared to the period up to 2001. At the same time, there is an increased interest of the university community in thematizing intelligence as a part of existing academic programs at various faculties, especially security studies.

With this body of preserved knowledge about intelligence, it is not surprising that there have been attempts to establish the discipline of "intelligence studies" advocated by the most prolific authors of the (few) theoretical and research results in this field. However, there is still no clear consensus on what "intelligence studies" should represent and what kind of discipline it should be. This is best explained by the research conducted by Loch K. Johnson and Allison M. Shelton in 2012. The

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<sup>2</sup> Kent, S. (1949), *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

<sup>3</sup> Kent, S. (1955), *The Need for an Intelligence Literature*. *Studies in Intelligence*, 1(1), 1-11.

research included an online survey of members of the editorial board of the journal *Intelligence and National Security*, who answered a set of nine questions:

- 1) What are the key debates in contemporary intelligence studies?
- 2) Which topics are the most and the least researched in the field of intelligence studies?
- 3) What are the biggest gaps in the intelligence literature?
- 4) How would you rate the relationship between intelligence studies and intelligence-based decision-making in the contemporary context?
- 5) How would you rate the relationship between intelligence researchers and journalists dealing with this topic?
- 6) What do you see as the biggest challenge facing intelligence studies today?
- 7) Do you think that intelligence studies will become a recognized topic within larger disciplines such as international relations, political science and history?
- 8) Should quantitative social science methods be adopted by researchers in the field of intelligence studies, and for which questions would these methods be appropriate?
- 9) How could the journal *Intelligence and National Security* be improved in this regard?

The very fact that the opening of these questions took place in the community engaged in research and scientific journalism in intelligence studies speaks about the potential of this area for differentiation as a sub-discipline of existing scientific disciplines. Certainly, regardless of the existence of any thematic branching and subject focus of "intelligence studies", they still remain an "academic supplement to the practice of intelligence in national security"<sup>4</sup> (Marrin, 2016:266), and their study should be approached interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary, primarily due to the unequivocal absence of some of the key constituents of scientific disciplines - theory, language and methods.

## Intelligence in Academic Research

The task of intelligence services is to "serve state policy makers by providing relevant, timely and objective information about national security" (Faini, 2015:4), so national intelligence is organized according to this task - it is "a process in which specific types of information of importance to national security are requested, collected, analyzed and forwarded to political decision makers" (Lowenthal, 2002:8). From these relatively simple definitions, we can conclude that an important element of the work of intelligence services is intelligence information, which can be defined

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<sup>4</sup> It is important to note that the approach to "intelligence studies" from the perspective of national security (national security intelligence) is a narrower view of this nascent discipline, while a broader one would include, in addition to it, the perspective of business intelligence, competitive intelligence, and even the field of computing, i.e. artificial intelligence. Certainly, the phrase is recognized and conceptually accepted in the field of national security, so it will be used from that perspective unless otherwise noted.

as "information, not necessarily publicly available, about the forces, resources, capacities and intentions of other states that can affect the lives and security of citizens" (Walters, 1978:621). The complexity of intelligence work in the circumstances of the modern world can be guessed from the aforementioned definitions - it is a process that is (1) directly related to the making of the highest political decisions; (2) the subjects of its interest are threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and security risks; (3) its key resources are diverse information about those threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks.

These various concepts related to national or international security issues obviously draw their theoretical and analytical bases from many different theories, concepts, and categories from the established disciplines like sociology, psychology, political economy, organizational sciences, international relations, and finally, security studies. For instance, "the study of the behavior of small states is often implemented through the application of one or more theoretical concepts from the disciplines of international relations and security studies" (Dimitrijević & Lipovac, 2017:73). Likewise, terms like national interest is "located in the core of international relations science and security studies" (Lipovac & Dimitrijević, 2015:88). In the same manner, intelligence can be the subject of research from different scientific disciplines depending on the aspect being examined. If it is the relationship between intelligence services and state policy makers, it will be approached from a political perspective in the way that Matteo Faini did in setting up the theory of the politicization of intelligence services, or Robert Jervis in researching key reasons for intelligence failures of the US in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and also Keren Yarhi-Milo, who dealt with the question of how decision-makers and the intelligence community interpret the intentions of the enemy. If the subject of the research is the learning and behavior of analysts in the intelligence process, cognitive psychology will be used to select the theoretical framework, as Stoney A. Trent did in his research (2007). Certain researchers, such as Christopher A. Theunissen, use knowledge from multiple disciplines. In his case, it is about the relationship between state power (the way it is defined in political theory) and intelligence in the age of knowledge (determined through the concept of information management in management and organizational sciences) (Theunissen, 1998). Nathan A. Kreuter, for example, uses rhetorical theory to analyze the language of the US intelligence community (2010).

On the other hand, in addition to research conducted in established scientific, mostly social-humanistic disciplines, and with the use of adequate theoretical frameworks, there is a smaller body of research results that attempted to theoretically shape what many authors call Intelligence Studies. It is from this perspective that research focused on certain aspects of intelligence, which are recognized as sufficiently complex, and therefore worthy of investment of intellectual effort, were created in order to observe and shed light on some regularities or legalities in them, and then make generalizations. The best examples are the research conducted by William C. Spracher and Stevyn D. Gibson. The first dealt with the research of

academic programs of intelligence work at civilian universities in the US<sup>5</sup>, and the second author with open data sources in modern intelligence work.<sup>6</sup> Both authors built their theoretical frameworks on a review of the previous conceptualization of intelligence work, which enabled them to precisely operationalize key terms, develop relevant taxonomies and spot gaps in the existing body of knowledge, while their main methodological tool was grounded theory, which enabled them to open new hypotheses during the research itself.

Certainly, the amount of research published so far is of enough high quality and scope that one can talk about the academic thematization of intelligence work, while one of definite indicators of this claim is the increasing representation of academic programs of intelligence at civilian universities, not only in the US, but also in the rest of the world (Wark, 1993; Hindley, 2000; Rudner, 2008; Landon-Murray, 2011; Gearon, 2015). Since the cited works are the results of the research conducted over the last twenty or more years, it is clear that the body of literature on which these researches are based is relatively recent. What period are we talking about, who are the key authors and what are the key events that influenced the development of this literature?

Notable sources that refer to relevant intelligence literature are the 1978 article *The Development of Intelligence Literature in the United States* by David H. Hunter, the US Army War College Library publication, *Strategic Intelligence*, and *National Security: a Selected Bibliography from 1992*, as well as an online bibliography by J. Ransom Clark entitled *Literature on Intelligence Work: a Bibliography of Materials with Essays, Reviews and Comments for the Period from 1998 to 2015*. These bibliographies cover all significant areas of intelligence.

## Intelligence Studies

This chapter will provide an overview of the most important conceptual and substantive characteristics of intelligence in modern conditions. In this sense, firstly, a brief overview of the discipline of "intelligence studies" that has been developing theoretically during the last few decades will be made, which will provide a historical and theoretical context for understanding modern intelligence. The purpose of this chapter is to present the most relevant knowledge from the discipline of "intelligence studies" that was created during the last 70 years since the first attempts to establish it as a scientific (sub)discipline were developed. Therefore, this chapter will provide enough "evidence" about the disciplinary positioning and scientific foundation of "intelligence studies at the intersection of several different scientific disciplines and sub-disciplines in social and other sciences.

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<sup>5</sup> Spracher, W.C. (2009). *National Security Intelligence Professional Education: A Map of U.S. Civilian University Programs and Competencies (Dissertation)*. Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University.

<sup>6</sup> Gibson, S.D. (2007). *Open Source Intelligence: A Contemporary Intelligence Lifeline (PhD Thesis)*. Cranfield: Cranfield University.

Where necessary, references will be made to historical examples that better explain specific concepts or taxonomies, but a historiographical approach to this topic will certainly be avoided, especially since the subject of the paper refers to the period of modern intelligence work from the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and especially during the first two decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Certainly, if some historical events provide additional quality to the elucidation of these terms and the content of contemporary intelligence, relevant historiographical literature on intelligence work will be used.<sup>7</sup>

The establishment of the study of intelligence, that is, an adequate theoretical framework that would deal with this field, suffered from the same deficiency that Kenneth Waltz<sup>8</sup> pointed out when he spoke about the study of international politics, namely that "researchers... the term theory used freely, often to denote any work that goes beyond simple description, and only rarely work that meets the standards of the philosophy of science" (Waltz, 2009:9). It is in this context that Sherman Kent is recognized as a representative of the intellectual predecessor of the theory of intelligence work, and other authors today all too often refer to him as the first theoretician of intelligence work and intelligence analysis.<sup>9</sup>

In his most famous work, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Kent, 1949; 1966), Kent gives intelligence a threefold meaning: "It is 1) a type of knowledge, 2) an organization that creates knowledge, and 3) an activity carried out by an intelligence organization" (Kent, 1965). Herman believes that the second meaning is central, and through that meaning he determines the remaining two: "...intelligence services carry out intelligence activity... for the purpose of creating intelligence knowledge" (Herman, 1996:2). This chapter will provide an overview of the works of the recognized authors, who have dealt with the most important issues in the field of intelligence during the last 60 years. It should be emphasized that the first works in this area are the results of the work of experts with extensive experience in intelligence work and academic biographies, while an increasing number of later works come from the academic milieu.

Attempts to establish a true theory of intelligence work are more recent and are reduced to individual considerations of the possibility of developing a theory from the perspectives of certain scientific disciplines through the use of specific methods and

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<sup>7</sup> Some of these sources are the following: Andrew, C. (2018). *The Secret World: A History of Intelligence*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Haswell, J. (1977). *Spies and Spymasters: A Concise History of Intelligence*. London: Thames and Hudson; Lerner, K. L. & Lerner, B. W. (2004); *Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security*. Detroit: Gale; Warner, M. (2014). *The Rise and Fall of Intelligence: An International Security History*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

<sup>8</sup> Kenneth Waltz is a theorist of international relations and one of the founders of neorealism in the theory of international relations.

<sup>9</sup> Kent is, of course, better known as "the father of strategic intelligence" or "the father of intelligence analysis". The reference to Kent, however, did not have the continuity that the literature inadvertently suggests. Throughout the Cold War, his contribution was known mainly to members of the intelligence community, and only thanks to the works of Jack Davis in the 1990s, Kent was recognized in the academic community.



techniques of these disciplines. The situation is not made easier by the fact that the literature on intelligence is dominated by professional publications (journalism, essay writing), mostly by authors with previous work experience in this profession, while specific academic literature<sup>10</sup> can be limited to the last thirty to forty years, when the first scientific magazines from this field - *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*<sup>11</sup> and *Intelligence and National Security*<sup>12</sup> appeared. It should be noted here that the vast majority of the used sources came from the US authors (and somewhat less from British ones), which is a consequence of the fact that the US intelligence community is currently the most developed in the world, as well as that its openness to the public in terms of publishing research is much greater than in the rest of the world.<sup>13</sup>

In 2007, Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian edited the collection of papers *Intelligence Theory: Key Concepts and Debates* (Gill et al., 2009) in which there are some attempts to establish a theoretical and conceptual framework for the study of intelligence. Gill (2009) notes that the term *Intelligence Studies* is increasingly used to describe the rapid expansion of this field of research interest. He believes that intelligence studies "...have a pre-scientific character in relation to accepted scientific disciplines, but that they describe in a fairly precise way what takes place in them as a process of arriving at concrete scientific knowledge" (Gill, 2009:210). He concludes that "...researchers in already established scientific disciplines such as political science, history, international relations and criminology are increasingly turning to intelligence as an area largely ignored by social sciences before September 11, 2001" (2009:210).

David Kahn, who analyzed the historical approach to the study of intelligence, proposed three principles that the theory of intelligence should provide: "1) intelligence serves to optimize the resources of a given institution; 2) intelligence is a supplementary, not a primary element in the conduct of war; and 3) while intelligence is necessary for defense matters, it is only an option offensively" (Kahn, 2009:8-10). Kahn (2009) discusses that these proposals are testable, but that the problem lies in their limitation to certain types of (now) traditional battlefields, that is, there is very little doubt that intelligence in current circumstances is the primary element for defense and fight against terrorism.

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<sup>10</sup> Academic literature existed before, but it was not published as continuously and systematically as the literature mentioned during the last forty years.

<sup>11</sup> According to the SCImago Journal Rank indicator for 2019, the journal's impact factor is 0.280 and is ranked in the second quarter in the Political Science and International Relations category.

<sup>12</sup> According to the Web of Science Master Journal list for 2019, the impact factor of the journal is 0.481. According to the SCImago Journal Rank indicator for 2019, the impact factor of the journal is 0.308 and it is ranked in the second quarter in the Political Science and International Relations category and in the first quarter in the History category.

<sup>13</sup> Authors from the United Kingdom are dominated by historiographical publications, which is again related to the fact that in this country funds of archival materials of all intelligence services are opened more often, while the most probable reason for the practical hyperproduction of the historiography of intelligence work is the legacy of the former colonial power and/or the need to explain and elucidate various causes of a large number of intelligence failures during that period.

The largest number of scientific and professional works in the field of intelligence refers to intelligence analysis, where several monographs published in the period after the Second World War established the theoretical foundations of Intelligence Studies (Petree, 1946; Kent, 1949; Hilsman, 1956; Dulles, 1963; Ransom, 1970). On these foundations, during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, a large number of scientific and professional articles on intelligence analysis and the intelligence process were published (Jervis, 1986; Johnson, 1986, 1989; Lowenthal, 1993; Burris, 1993; Sharfman, 1995), as well as a couple of monographs on the same topic (Heuer, 1999; Hughes-Wilson, 1999). The period of the beginning of the publication of the academic literature is related to the so-called Year of Intelligence,<sup>14</sup> 1975, when, as a part of the congressional investigations<sup>15</sup> into the abuses of certain intelligence services in the early 1970s, the Church Committee (Frank Church) in the Senate and the Pike Committee (Otis G. Pike) in the House of Representatives produced a huge amount of reports that became publicly available. For the first time, these reports allowed researchers to gain direct insight into the work of the US Intelligence Community, which resulted in an increase in the quality and quantity of published work in this area.

Within the works dealing with intelligence analysis, a special group of works consists of those, whose authors focus on the knowledge and skills of intelligence analysts. Among these authors, Richards Heuer stands out, who in the monograph *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (1999) provided a very detailed analysis of the mental abilities of analysts, the so-called tools for thinking and the most common cognitive biases in the work of intelligence analysts. Since it is the most cited single scientific result in the field of intelligence, the corpus of works that resulted from Heuer's research is huge, of which Rob Johnston's research can be singled out. In the monograph *Analytical Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study*, he analyzed the problem of bias in the work of intelligence analysts, the relationship between secrecy and the efficiency of intelligence, the time constraints that the job puts before analysts, the relationship between default skills and scientific research methodology, the process of training analysts, etc. Johnston provided a typology of variables in intelligence analysis, which he divided into four broad groups: (1) systemic variables, (2) systematic variables, (3) idiosyncratic variables, and (4) communication variables.

Since 2001, the number of scientific and professional articles on the subject of intelligence analysis and the intelligence process has grown dramatically (Hoyt, 2008; Immerman, 2011; Wirtz, 2012; Marrin, 2012; Lowenthal, 2013; Simon, 2013; Marchio, 2014), which was also the case with monographs and collections of

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<sup>14</sup> This year was also known among members of the US intelligence services as the Intelligence Wars (Johnson, 2007:1), which is an excellent illustration of the resistance of the US Intelligence Community at that time to the opening of the intelligence services to the public and the instruments for their control and surveillance. Moreover, after the congressional investigations of the intelligence services in this period, a system of control and supervision over their work, which is common today in the rest of the world, began to establish.

<sup>15</sup> In addition to the investigations resulting from the mechanisms of legislative control over the work of the US intelligence services, the White House also participated in this process through the Rockefeller Commission during the term of President Gerald Ford.

papers (Matthias, 2001; Grabo, 2010; Johnston, 2005; Moore, 2007; Gill et al, 2009; Hall & Citrenbaum, 2010; Johnson, 2010; Sinclair, 2010; Lowenthal, 2011; Agrell & Treverton, 2015). The reasons for this lies, first of all, in the fact that the attacks of September 11, 2001 caused an increased interest in the work of intelligence services with a special emphasis on the issues of intelligence failures, the role of intelligence in the process of making political decisions (Jervis, 2006) and the control of their work. Also, the expansion of the Internet and its users in this period enabled access to an increasing amount of data on the work of intelligence services.

When it comes to books on intelligence work, as early as 1974, Ransom (Harry H. Ransom) provided his division of the books published until then into the following three categories: "1) memoirs or interpretations of intelligence work written and published by former intelligence officers with tacit consent (or even the support of) intelligence institutions; 2) books written on the basis of investigative journalism, whistleblowing or prejudice, which offer authentic views of intelligence work, but fail to meet academic standards; and 3) books (mostly monographs) in which social science researchers and/or historians<sup>16</sup> objectively analyze how the intelligence system functions in a specific historical context" (Ransom, 1974:133). The latter were the fewest, and the reasons for this should be found in the fact that access to data on intelligence work was still limited, regardless of the changes that occurred in the period when Ransom made the abovementioned division of the available literature.

Perhaps the greatest influence on a more serious methodological approach to the study of intelligence work was given by Glenn P. Hastedt. In the 1991 analysis, he proposed new fields for the comparative study of intelligence work, by noting the existing methods of comparative analysis that had dominated the literature up to that point, namely: "1) comparing the characteristics of the intelligence agencies of different countries, and 2) comparing the ways in which these agencies approach a certain event or activity" (Hastedt, 1991).

Many authors often equate intelligence studies with intelligence analysis, and they take the reasons for this from the intelligence process itself, which, together with intelligence analysis as its central segment, resembles scientific research work in many ways. In this sense, "intelligence analysis has many important epistemological similarities with science, such as problem solving, new discoveries, skills in the use of tools, verification of knowledge", etc. (Sfetcu, 2019).

A part of authors who have dealt with intelligence analysis have also examined the use of open data sources in this segment of intelligence work. If we exclude the passing mention of open data sources in papers dealing with intelligence in general and intelligence analysis, the first papers on the subject of open sources were written in the 1990s (Steele, 1995, 1997). In order to continuously publish papers on this subject in scientific and professional journals, this trend continued

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<sup>16</sup> Historians also belong to the corpus of social and humanistic sciences, and here a difference is made in relation to the used research methodology.

in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century (Hulnick, 2002; Gibson, 2004; Mercado, 2005; Best, 2008; Watson, 2010; Calkins, 2011; Cuijpers, 2013), when the most important monographs and collections of papers in this field were published (Treverton, 2004; Burke, 2007; Wil, 2011; Appel, 2011; Bean, 2011; Olcott, 2012; Hobbs, Moran & Salisbury, 2014). Along with the actualization of the topic in magazines and monographs, the first master's theses and doctoral dissertations that study open data sources in intelligence work were published (Krejci, 2002; Gibson, 2007; Spracher, 2009; Duvenage, 2010; Valdez, 2011; Holland, 2012; Starr, 2013; Coulthart, 2015).

Also, a great effort in explaining intelligence work in the context of the development of science was given by Wilhelm Agrell and Gregory F. Treverton in the monograph *National Intelligence and Science: Beyond the Great Divide in Analysis and Policy* (2015), in which they tested the thesis whether there is a great resistance in thinking about intelligence issues from a scientific perspective due to various political and cultural reasons. The goal of their book is to "position intelligence work in the broader context of knowledge creation, rather than as a specific activity or separate organization" (Agrell & Treverton, 2015:3). They explore intelligence work "as one way of creating knowledge for action, a way that is not limited to intelligence work, but that crosses other fields, including those central to the public role of science" (2015:3-4). In this sense, "intelligence is not (regardless of definition, organization and self-image) a matter of closed state security, but also a way of defining problems, structuring data, formulating and verifying explanations and managing uncertainty in the social context in which decisions should be made and actions for certain activities undertaken" (2015:4). When authors talk about intelligence, they "primarily mean intelligence analysis - the process of evaluation, interpretation and assessment, which constitutes the last stage of the intelligence process" (Agrell & Treverton, 2015:4).

## *Conclusion*

Finally, is Intelligence Studies an academic discipline? Due to the fact it is the subject of many debates, Intelligence Studies represents an intellectual corps of almost four-decade long academic efforts focused on the development of science journals, research monographs, scientific conferences, university academic programs, theses and dissertations, research projects, etc. Its epistemological base is located somewhere between the disciplines of Political Science, International Relations, Security Studies, and History, and its thematic scope is practically limitless, covering topics from Management Studies, through Psychology, to Sociology of professions. This review of the development of Intelligence Studies has tried to cover all the established elements of Intelligence Studies as a possible academic discipline, and to collect all the intellectual efforts related to critical examination of the Studies within the available academic sources.

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# THE INFLUENCE OF REGIONAL SECURITY DYNAMICS ON INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION – THE CONCEPT AND MODELS OF REGIONAL POLICE COOPERATION

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DOI: [https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod\\_strint.2023.ch3](https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod_strint.2023.ch3)

## Keywords:

cooperation,  
police,  
security,  
region,  
complex



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**Abstract:** *All the changes in the world related to the end of the Cold War have stimulated regional security dynamics, and regional level, as a level of analysis, has received a very significant place in modern security studies. One of the most important post-Cold War theoretical approaches (if not the most important), which deals with regional security dynamics, is the Theory of the Regional Security (Sub) Complex. We cannot help, but notice the indirect influence of this theory on changes in the approach to the study of subjects, concepts and methods of international police cooperation. Namely, modern trends of stronger regional connection and strengthening of regional security identities have led to the regional dimension of cooperation being in the foreground. Regional police cooperation implies a series of relations that are established between countries that belong to the same regional security (sub) complex with the aim of undertaking joint activities to solve common security problems. In this paper, we will present the concept and models of regional police cooperation.*

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## Introduction

After the end of the Cold War, significant changes took place in the world security architecture. Until then, all security phenomena, including interstate relations, were determined by the struggle of two opposing blocs – the NATO Alliance led by the United States and the Warsaw Pact led by the Soviet Union. In this sense, the importance, intensity, modalities and levels of international police cooperation were determined by this global security dynamics. Therefore, this important segment of international relations, which includes the cooperation of law enforcement services of different countries, was overshadowed by the Cold War for a long time, fitting, theoretically and practically, into the security paradigm of that time.

The security paradigm, in the post-Cold War environment, has significantly changed, and one of the most important changes is related to the intensification of regional security dynamics. Barry Buzan and Ole Waver developed the theory of the regional security complex, which emphasizes security interdependencies within different regions. Simply put, states that belong to a regional security complex have common security problems that they have to solve together. This is where we come to the concept of regional police cooperation. The importance of mutual cooperation between the law enforcement services of the countries of a region has grown rapidly due to contemporary trends of stronger regional connections and strengthening of regional security identities and institutions (Vejnović et al., 2022).

We cannot help, but notice the connection that exists between the origin and development of regional police cooperation and the development of the theory of the regional security complex. This theory has been developed as a result of the need to supplement theoretical framework of that time for the analysis of international security. This has certainly led to some changes in the approach to the study of international police cooperation. Namely, the theory of the regional security complex has over time become one of the most prominent and useful theoretical frameworks in the studies of security sciences, and the regional security (sub) complex has become rather significant level of analysis in terms of law enforcement cooperation.

Therefore, in order to come to a valid conceptual definition of regional police cooperation, we have to start from the concept and content of international police cooperation. After that, by implementing the theory of the regional security (sub) complex as a theoretical framework, we can also define regional police cooperation.

## The concept and characteristics of international police cooperation

International police cooperation is not the result of modern international relations and globalization processes. Various modalities of police cooperation have been known since the beginning of the police profession, but institutionalized forms

appeared only in the 19th century. In the past, police cooperation was used for political purposes, in the fight against the opposition and political dissidents, and in modern international relations, police cooperation is one of the ways to suppress cross-border organized crime (Guide to cooperation in internal affairs in the European Union, 2015).

Security interdependence is one of the basic characteristics of the modern world, and crime has been known for a long time and does not recognize state borders. The mobility of perpetrators of criminal acts and (international) criminal groups is a by-product of international integration processes carried by the wings of globalization and liberalization of a market economy. The fall of the USSR, the establishment of the Schengen Area within the European Union, the emergence of new global and security forms of communication and highly branched forms of international traffic have contributed to the establishment of criminal organizations that can operate across borders in many countries, without much risk (Picarelli, 2012). Thus, today it is almost impossible to talk about organized crime that in one way or the other does not cross the borders of a country, taking into account the fact that criminal organizations located in various countries establish cooperative relationships, trying to achieve greater profits and stronger influence (Bošković, 2004). In the same way, it is impossible to talk about a terrorist activity that does not have an international or regional feature, and "internationality, as a prefix of theorism, forms a tip of the blade of the threatening spear of criminal activities, whose modalities of manifestation are less and less aware of the ethnic and territorial borders of modern nations and states" (Krstić, 2015: 313).

By their very nature, transnational organized crime and terrorism are the issues of international security and certainly the subject of collective state actions. The modern process of securitization of migration has only shown the need for joint engagement and cooperation of all subjects of international law in the field of security (we are referring to the broadest interpretation of security concepts). Almost every international organization (United Nations, European Union, WTO), regardless of its main activity, has tried to contribute to the fight against international crime. Such activities resulted in numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements between member states. A part of those agreements referred to mutual cooperation of judicial authorities and security services of different countries, while the other part dealt with the opposition to certain forms of crime (terrorism, monitoring of money, illegal trade, etc.) – (Joubert & Bevers, 1996). Parallel to that, the existing and new institutional capacities for international cooperation have been adapted.

The method of cooperation is also very important for the work of intelligence and security services. The development of high-quality intelligence work, both at strategic, as well as tactical and operational level, is a prerequisite for successfully combating serious forms of crime (Đukić, 2016: 136). The very fact that intelligence and security agencies are increasingly dealing with global security threats, primarily terrorism and organized crime, has influenced the intensity of cooperation with intelligence services of different countries, and also with national law enforcement agencies. The benefits of information exchange are multiple: joint removal of threats,

joint actions, networking and education, elimination of work duplication, cost savings, timeliness of information and decision-making (Đukić, 2017: 77).

Therefore, *conditio sine qua non* of effective management of modern security risks, effective counteraction to global threats and, above all, a high-quality strategic framework for combating transnational crime is the foundation and constant improvement of international criminal law cooperation. The main types of international cooperation between countries in criminal matters are:

- international cooperation of judicial authorities (international criminal legal assistance), and
- international police cooperation – lobby of international criminal legal assistance (Ivetić; Rosić, 2015).

There are different definitions of international police cooperation. Since some authors believe that international police cooperation is a part of international criminal legal assistance, we could start from its definition. International criminal legal assistance can be defined as "taking certain actions of criminal proceedings by national courts or other state authorities at the request of foreign procedural authorities, i.e. taking procedural actions of foreign procedural authorities (courts and other authorities) at the request of national courts" (Banović and Bejatović, 2011: 319). In the definition, we see that, in addition to courts, other state bodies, including the police, are listed as the subjects of providing international criminal legal assistance.

Thus, Professor Nikač (2003: 81) believes that "international police cooperation is an integral part of international criminal legal assistance and in most cases precedes international judicial cooperation, because it enables judicial authorities to fulfill the procedural and legal prerequisites for starting, conducting and ending criminal proceedings."

In general, police cooperation involves the interaction of two or more police agencies (including state and private ones) for the purpose of exchanging criminal intelligence data, conducting investigation and, ultimately, arresting suspects. International police cooperation is a dynamic process of sharing criminal intelligence data across national and geopolitical borders (Lemieux, 2013).

Budimir Babović (1997) distinguishes between international police cooperation in a broader and narrower sense. In a broader sense, we define international police cooperation as an integral part of the overall international cooperation that has a political character and, as such, takes place between the subjects of international law - states and international organizations. In a narrower sense, international police cooperation is understood as a relationship between countries and their police structures established for the purpose of preserving international public order and rendering a joint response to transnational crime. It is, therefore, about official interstate relations, i.e. relations between official police bodies of different countries.

Professor Eldan Mušanović (2015: 9) defines international police cooperation as "cooperation between police bodies of different countries, which the aforementioned bodies undertake based on the request of another country or international organization, while acting according to international or national police regulations."

By international police cooperation Ivetić and Rosić (2015: 29) mean "all the activities that police agencies of a country carry out in order to execute their regular, legally defined tasks, in which they cooperate with the police or judicial authorities of other countries or international organizations, and in accordance with the corresponding international agreement." The same authors add that the subjects of international police cooperation are not exclusively international police organizations, but also any international organization that helps state police agencies in the performance of their tasks.

On the basis of these definitions, we can determine some characteristics of international police cooperation (subjects, cases, content).

The subjects of international police cooperation are national police organizations, judicial authorities (courts, prosecutor's offices, authorities for the execution of criminal sanctions), non-state (non-governmental) organizations and international organizations (not only police).

International police cooperation is a dynamic field, whose range of activities is increasing every day. In the first institutional forms, its content included two segments: the establishment of a system of tracing measures and an accelerated method of data exchange between member state (Ivetić and Miladinović, 2013). At the current level of development, the subject and content of international police cooperation includes information exchange, undertaking appropriate operational and tactical measures and procedural actions at the request of a foreign state (search, arrest, interrogation, detention, extradition), joint actions ("breaking" regional criminal networks), cooperation in the technical and logistical domain, police training, etc. (Nikač and Juras, 2015).

An important characteristic of international police cooperation is that it is based on national and international police law, certain institutional mechanisms, as well as some information systems and databases. In addition to this formal part, we have to also mention the possibilities of informal contacts between police officers from different countries. This informal type of cooperation has always been important at all levels, but its importance has certainly increased in conditions when all types of international traffic are highly developed, especially information and communication channels and technologies. It should be noted that global integration processes have not only led to the association of criminals and criminal groups. Namely, police officers and police managers also communicate and cooperate with colleagues around the world. Combining formal and informal forms of police cooperation is definitely recommended (Đukić and Milić, 2022).

The world leader in the fight against international crime and synonymous with international police cooperation is certainly the International Criminal Police Organization – INTERPOL. Interpol is the world largest police organization, which today has a total of 194 member states. It was founded in 1923 with the aim of internationalizing police cooperation in response to the increase in international crime after the First World War. Interpol has its statute, flag and emblem. Interpol is headquartered in Lyon, France. It should also be emphasized that Interpol does not

represent any supranational police, and it is simply a global network that enables cooperation between the criminal police of different countries. Interpol's work is concentrated on the most current segments of international crime, such as transnational organized crime, terrorism, illegal migration, crimes from the domain of international war and humanitarian law, trafficking in narcotics, people and weapons, economic crime and corruption, high-tech crime, etc. The leading and working bodies of Interpol are the General Assembly, the Executive Committee, the General Secretary, and the General Secretariat as an expert and administrative-technical body. Also, the National Central Bureau is incorporated into the police system of each Interpol member country. These bureaus represent contact points through which the national police of the member states exchange information with each other, and also maintain constant contact with the General Secretariat of Interpol. Interpol is financed from registration fees of member states (Nikač, 2003).

Finally, we must not leave out police diplomacy as a specific type of international police cooperation. Police diplomacy can be defined as "a chain of measures and procedures in the deployment of the police officers and authorities from one internationally recognized entity (internationally recognized state, official international organization) to another in an official capacity, who at the same time possess certain immunities and privileges in the international entity within which they are accredited, whereby they perform tasks important for confronting, preventing and fighting against international challenges, risks and security threats" (Kekić and Subošić, 2009, p. 147). The police-diplomatic representatives are the police attachés and liaison officers.

## The Theory of the Regional Security Complex and international police cooperation

Security studies have long been dominated by two levels of analysis – the international system and states/nations, so that in the post-Cold War period, the research and practical field of security studies have expanded in several directions - downwards, upwards and laterally.

Namely, the fall of the Berlin Wall has caused a change in the global security constellation, which also meant the end of the bipolar international order. After the implosion of the USSR, the world has changed so much that the classical security paradigm became too narrow and insensitive to many essential security problems. The glasses through which the Cold War world was viewed simply had to be replaced with much more sensitive lenses. This is why the theoretical framework for the analysis of international and/or national security was re-examined, where numerous shortcomings of the conceptual apparatus at that time were identified. Since then, the concept of security began to expand both horizontally (shifting the focus from military to non-military threats, environmental, energy and social sectors), and also along the vertical axis (individual and regions as levels of analysis) –

(Buzan, 1997; Lipovac, 2014; Kučeković, 2014). Also, for the first time in history, the main security threats have not come from powerful and, relatively speaking, aggressive states. On the contrary, the problem has become weak, the so-called failed states, which are unable to provide minimum living conditions for their population (Jazbec, 2009).

All the changes related to the end of the Cold War era have stimulated regional security dynamics and led to the removal of the so-called global "overlay" from numerous security hotspots in the world. Until then, almost all the phenomena that bore the sign of security were defined by the global dynamics of the struggle between two superpowers – the US and the USSR. All relations in the world, both those that implied conflict and cooperation, were influenced by such global dynamics. After that, with the establishment of a unipolar order, the relations of conflict, competition or cooperation between smaller countries at regional level, which are not subject to the influence of any major power, have intensified (Ejdus, 2012; Lipovac, 2016). Thus, the end of the Cold War has stimulated interest in regional security, i.e. the security of the region. The region represents a series of "fatally connected and geographically close states, between which a clear and significant subsystem of security relations has been established" (Vejnović and Obrenović, 2019, p. 122), and regional security represents the aspiration towards the absence of threats in the same. It is, in fact, a mechanism aimed at overcoming stereotypes of historical hostilities between neighbors and building security interdependence. This analytical level is suitable for understanding those security challenges that are generated at regional level and which, as such, can only be overcome at that level (Buzan & Weaver, 2003; Mijalković, 2011). One of the most significant post-Cold War theoretical approaches (if not the most significant), which deals with regional security dynamics, is the Theory of the Regional Security Complex (Obradović and Đukić, 2020).

The Theory of the Regional Security Complex (hereinafter: TRSC) was developed, in their works, by Barry Buzan and Ole Waver, in the period from 1983 to 2003 (Buzan, 1983; Buzan & Rizvi, 1986; Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan & Waver, 2003). The goal of these scientists was to neutralize the tendency of (neo) realists to reduce the importance of regional level in security analysis, as well as the tendency of globalists to abolish this level (Vučić and Milenković, 2014). Therefore, the concept of "the regional security complex" has gone through a long development path that lasted some twenty years, so that, in the end, we finally got the well-founded and well-rounded TRSC. For the purpose of this paper, we will only consider the so-called revised TRSC. Thus, Buzan and Waver (2003, p. 44) define the regional security complex as "a set of units, whose main processes of securitization and/or desecuritization are so interconnected that their security problems cannot be logically analyzed or solved separately."

They also believe that TRSC needs to be enriched with the theory of securitization, in order to be able to understand the conditions under which a specific RSC has been created. In this sense, the theory of securitization allows us

to understand how the securitization of certain phenomena in the region took place, i.e. how some social phenomena have acquired a dominant security sign. Precisely in this way, we will later be able to understand the genesis of the emergence of some security interdependence in the region, as well as the etiology of regional security dynamics that gives such a region all the characteristics of RSC (Lipovac, 2016).

TRSC has undoubtedly highlighted the importance of the regional level of analysis in security science. However, the discussions on RSC do not offer a definite solution to the problems that countries face at regional level. Rather, it could be said that they generate a whole series of new questions and dilemmas. The central issue would be, of course, the question of how states can manage their security at regional level, taking into account that the structure of RSC is influenced by patterns of friendship and enmity (social constructivism), as well as the distribution of power between the main states (different levels of development of member states, uneven distribution of resources, etc.) – (Vejnović and Obrenović, 2019). This is exactly where we come to regional security cooperation, its importance, its mechanisms and regional security organizations. States have to be aware of the necessity of cooperation with other states that, together with them, enter the borders of the regional security complex or sub-complex. Those countries face the same problems that they have to solve together and, for this purpose, establish cooperative norms and structures, by creating internal mechanisms and common (regional) institutions that improve security through trust and the promotion of common values. The reality of international relations favors the concept of developing several regional security cooperation systems, which in the foreseeable future could grow into a kind of global federation of those systems (Bajagić, 2007).

According to Louise Fawcett, since the end of the Cold War, regional institutions have contributed to more orderly relations between states, especially if we talk about cooperation. This author also defines regional security institutions as organizations whose charters contain an open indication of cooperation in defense, security and foreign policy. This cooperation has two characteristics. Firstly, regionalism in the field of security was encouraged by changes in the international system that required states to respond to changes in the global and regional balance of power, and cooperation was a means of increasing security, and also influence and predictability. Secondly, states value institutions. By providing a basis for better anticipating cooperation and negotiations in an interdependent world (especially in the region), regional organizations have become invaluable tools of diplomacy and statesmanship (Fawcett, 2012).

We have seen, therefore, how the post-Cold War affirmation of the regional level of analysis in security studies, theoretically supported by TRSC, has affected the quality and content of international security cooperation. This has undoubtedly led to a change in the approach to the study of the subjects, concepts and methods of international police cooperation. To simplify, the regional dimension of international police cooperation has gained a lot of importance.



## Regional police cooperation – the concept and models

International police cooperation takes place at bilateral, regional and global (multilateral) level. Contemporary trends of tighter regional connection and strengthening of regional security identities have pushed regional cooperation to the foreground. Regional cooperation has different forms and is mainly related to certain security challenges, risks and threats, as well as different forms of the police and judicial work. Of course, it is necessary to take into account the specificities of some region in terms of geopolitical and security circumstances that are important for better mutual relations between states and cooperation (Nikač and Juras, 2015). We could define regional police cooperation as a relationship between states that belong to the same regional security (sub) complex and the relationship of their police authorities that is established with the aim of undertaking joint activities to solve common security problems.

We can distinguish between two models of regional police cooperation – horizontal and vertical.

The horizontal model of police cooperation includes adopted state strategic documents (strategies or plans of internal affairs bodies), established priorities in international cooperation and the interests of state and non-state actors (Bigo, 1996).

We could illustrate this model with the formula: strategy + priority + interest = police cooperation. Also, according to the horizontal model, there are three components of police cooperation. The first factor refers to the existence of such a geopolitical environment that requires an accelerated exchange of information that is traditionally kept within the framework of the nation state. An example of such an environment is the regional security sub complex of the Western Balkans, through which the routes of illegal narcotics trade pass, and also the routes by which migrants try to reach the developed countries of Western Europe. Data exchange implies the establishment of information systems that are accessible to all actors (Schengen information system). Finally, the intensity of police cooperation also depends on the ability of the states of certain region to react to security challenges, risks and threats based on some legal or institutional framework. Another factor that is necessary for successful police cooperation is available material, financial and human resources, in terms of information systems that support the exchange of data, budgets and experts from the police and judicial structures. Finally, the third factor refers to the organizational structure of the work of the police initiatives - through informal contacts of the police managers to develop institutional mechanisms (which often develop from informal contacts), such as Europol or Interpol (Guide to cooperation in internal affairs in the European Union, 2015). Therefore, a systemic approach using the horizontal model of police cooperation would imply "a common view of the security challenges, risks and threats of the region, translated into multilateral legal and institutional mechanisms of international police cooperation, with effective use of resources and adaptation of the appropriate organizational structure of the police forums" (Keković and Dimitrijević, 2017, p. 165).

The vertical model of police cooperation includes three levels of analysis – macro level, meso level and micro level (Benyon, 1996). At macro (state) level, internal

security policies and basic methods of cooperation are defined. In other words, state expresses its (un)willingness to cooperate with other states of the region regarding common security challenges and, accordingly, ratifies certain international agreements and harmonizes national legislation with the standards of international police cooperation. At meso level, the organizational structure, practice and existing procedures for the work of the police services are analyzed. The cooperation at this level implies the creation of profiles of the police officers who will know how to work with criminal intelligence data. Those officials become the so-called police diplomats. The police actions at micro level refer to specific police investigation activities – the establishment of joint investigation teams, the exchange of the police officers and joint training (Guide to Cooperation in Internal Affairs in the European Union, 2015).

The needs of regional police cooperation explain the advantages and disadvantages of centralized and decentralized models of information management. The centralized model implies the existence of a special organizational unit within the national police system whose competence is related to sending and receiving data. This service coordinates all activities related to international police cooperation. Such a model does not correspond to contemporary circumstances in international relations. On the other hand, the decentralized model enables all organizational parts of the national police system to exchange data with partner services abroad. No central authority has the need and obligation to be involved in this type of communication. This model, on the other hand, destroys the principle of sovereignty, while the speed of data exchange is often not satisfactory due to the involvement of a large number of the police organizational units. In practice, it is recommended to combine these two ways with the horizontal and vertical model. At the center of such reflection is the concept of multilevel management - vertical, which implies standard communication between traditional bureaucratic state institutions, while horizontal refers to direct functional contacts (Guide to cooperation in internal affairs in the European Union, 2015; Keković and Dimitrijević, 2017).

There are several instruments and techniques of regional cooperation on whose basis the activities of regional initiatives take place. The basis of cooperation is defined not at political level, but through conclusions and declarations. This is followed by concretization through various action plans and programs, and then concrete projects. Regional initiatives also influence the development of specific legal instruments ("memorandums of understanding", "declarations of intent") by which regional states commit themselves to cooperation in some field in a political and/or legal sense. Finally, as a part of the need to implement specific activities of regional initiatives, we come across a smaller number of binding agreements, which also refer to quite specific and narrowly defined areas of cooperation. In this sense, the system of regional initiatives represents a special group of international organizations/forums, which often do not have full legal subjectivity, or are considered the subjects of international law, and which develop specific forms of functioning and rules, thus playing a very special, original and unique role in interstate cooperation (Lopandić and Kronja, 2010).

## Conclusion

The post-Cold War intensification of regional security dynamics and the general affirmation of the regional level of analysis in security studies have led, among other things, to the need to approach the problem of studying international police cooperation in a different way. Through the paper, we have noticed how much theoretical importance, in this sense, the Theory of the Regional Security Complex of Barry Buzan and Ole Waver has. On the basis of this theory, we have shown how important it is for states that belong to the regional security (sub) complex to cooperate with each other in order to deal with modern security challenges, risks and threats. The founders of the Theory of the Regional Security Complex spoke precisely about the security interdependent units of the region that have common problems that have to be solved together. In other words, it is about states that have a common security identity. Therefore, regional police cooperation is, in the conditions of stronger regional connection and strengthening of regional institutions, a "conditio sine qua non" (a condition without which one cannot do) in the fight against crime, which has, dominantly, regional features. Using the abovementioned theory, we have defined regional police cooperation as a relationship between states that belong to the same regional security (sub) complex and the relationship of their police authorities that is established with the aim of undertaking joint activities to solve common security problems.

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# Section II

## CHALLENGES OF THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EU

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# THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, COLD GLOBALIZATION AND DEGLOBALIZATION

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DOI: [https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod\\_strint.2023.ch4](https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod_strint.2023.ch4)

## **Keywords:**

cold globalization,  
deglobalization

**Abstract:** *Similar to the emblematic work of Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History and the Last Man", the topic of "the end of globalization" is becoming attractive and debatable, as well. The question is whether attitudes and opinions will be as changeable as "the end of history" phenomenon. The central focus of this paper is directed to the question: Are we witnessing today the end of globalization, synonymous with growth in recent years? Have the end of the US unilateralism and superiority and the establishment of the new world order been announced? The Covid-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, climate changes, tensions over Taiwan and China are parameters that are contrary to the philosophy of globalization. Undoubtedly, the end of hyper-globalization has begun. It is a period that extends from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the crisis in 2008 and which has marked the opening of half of the world to the world global flows. Here we think of China, the countries of the former USSR and India and their opening or closing to world trade. It is evident that geopolitics, i.e. its product – the new world order – determines globalization and deglobalization. The successive shocks of the past 15 years have encouraged the retreat of states into themselves, which is unfavorable for any idea of globalization. There are no*

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*doubts that globalization will be partially sustained, but it is difficult to assume that the exceptional growth of the hyper-globalization period will be reached (Dadush, 2022). Full globalization i.e. establishing a system of "cold globalization" is possible only if there is an invasion of Taiwan by China. The Russian intervention in Ukraine, although tense, is not decisive enough to completely threaten globalization. Compared to China's importance in world trade, Russian participation is far disproportionate to China's one. Will these processes create some feedback on the state of the Western Balkan countries?*

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## Introduction

In 2021, the world faced the sanitary crisis, a year later (2022) the geopolitical crisis due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and simultaneously, the climate change crisis. The main consequences of the sanitary crisis and particularly the war in Ukraine are the loss of lives, the humanitarian crisis associated with the multitude of displaced persons, the devastation of urban and infrastructural facilities, the destroyed economic, agricultural and raw material system. These events have also raised the question of the cohesion of the EU and the US and have generated severe multiple economic consequences for the whole world (STUDY, 2022). Before the outbreak of war, most major global macroeconomic variables were expected to return to normal during 2022-2023, after the end of the Covid-19 pandemic. However, the Russian intervention in Ukraine has worsened the overall economic and financial situation in the world. Global value chains have been called into question. An analysis by corporate and investment bank research analysts suggests that there are strong signals that the era of globalization is coming to an end (Barclays, 2023).

The war has emphasized the importance of minimizing dependence on Russia for certain essential imports. Politicians have re-examined the relevance of market organization in order to ensure energy security. World trade fell by 0.7 points in volume, and world industrial production by 0.6 points. Changes in the price of oil, gas and electricity have reduced the growth in European most powerful economies by 1.4 points, but the shock has been neutralized by fiscal policy.

The rising tensions between the US and China represent a new source of uncertainty, which could have a major impact on global economic activity (Polytechnique insights, 2023). Analysts are divided between those who believe that with the war in Ukraine the world is finally "deglobalizing" and those who claim that the real deglobalization would happen if there was the military intervention by China on Taiwan (Santi, 2022).

True "deglobalization", that is, the complete breakdown of the global economy would be triggered by significant geopolitical events. One of those anti-globalist challenges would be possible invasion of Taiwan by China (Thebault, 2022). It would be a great problem for the economy of Europe given the high dependence of the EU on exported digital products and semiconductors with which Taiwan participates with 60% in the world production and with 85% of the latest generation of these products (European Chips Survey, 2022). Foreign policy analysts sometimes indulge in grand narratives that have little basis in data. If China decides to attack Taiwan, and the US and its allies respond by introducing sanctions against China, international trade and investment will drop significantly. Such geopolitics between China, Russia and the West will split into two opposing political and economic blocs. Then the real deglobalization will happen.

The talk of "deglobalization" has been one of such narratives since 2016. According to some measures, global economic integration is at a standstill, while according to others, it continues to grow. The collapse in trade and international investment as in the glorious 1930s did not occur after the global financial crisis in 2008 or after the election victory of Donald Trump. However, the risks of full deglobalization have clearly increased following Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine and Xi Jinping's decision to strengthen ties with Russia (Springford, 2022).

The mentioned geopolitical, sanitary and climate crises have resulted in stalling globalization, society, economy and technology. At the same time, international relations have entered such an intertwined crisis that they will not normalize for a long time. These are mainly the negative parameters of the crises. However, some analysts believe that in the whole world galimatias, several positive sides have been revealed, such as the adjustment to the energy shock or local efforts to compensate for deficient products. How is Europe holding up? From a series of inconveniences that have affected the EU and the world economies, it emerges with a much larger public debt. The average EU public debt in 2021 was 88.1% of GDP (gross domestic product) (Aljazeera, 2022). The EU states have mobilized numerous resources to offset the energy shock. And implicitly, it is the mobilized resources that would be useful to facilitate the ecological transition and subsidize the consumption of fossil fuels. This is the other negative legacy of the crises. Europe is left with fewer resources for the ecological transition (Sampognaro, 2022).

## Establishing the new world order?

Although Russia and Ukraine carry relatively small weight in global world production, they are the major producers and exporters of essential food products, mineral and energy products. The war has caused economic and financial shocks of enormous magnitude, especially in commodity markets, where the prices of oil, gas and wheat have soared. The changes in the prices of raw materials and fluctuations in the financial markets have affected the reduction of the growth of GDP, accompanied by severe recession and an increase in global inflation. The World Bank warns that the war in Ukraine risks "the biggest commodity shock" since the 1970s (Josephs, 2022).

The United Nations and the Security Council have shown that they are not powerful enough to maintain the boundaries of the current international system. The changes in the international order confirm much greater global stakes than the conflict in Ukraine. In this context, this conflict can appear as the beginning of great maneuvers among the three greatest powers - the US, the EU and China, the destruction of the old and the establishment of the new world order. Unquestionably, the behavior of the other G7 or G20 major powers is not to be underestimated.

The concept of the new world order from a geopolitical point of view should not be identified with the conspiracy concept of the new world order. The expression "New World Order" ("Le Nouvel Ordre Mondial" in French) is also the title of the book of the novelist and journalist H. G. Wells (H. G. Wells 1866 - 1946) published in 1940. The author deals with the constitution of the unique world government immediately after the outbreak of the Second World War. This book is actually a response to Clarence Streit's manifesto published in 1939 and entitled *Union Now*, in which Streit appeals for the immediate formation of a *world government* after the failure of the League of Nations.

The new round trip of the world order begins with the fall of communism and the implosion of the Soviet Union. During this period, the speech of President George H.W. Bush from September 11, 1990 singles out and it grows into the conception of the New World Order. George Bush's conception was supported by Francis Fukuyama in his seminal work "The End of History and the Last Man" (Fukuyama, 1990).

Geostrategic plans were also developed by Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzeziński (1928-2017). In his last major work "The Grand Chessboard", Brzeziński pointed out that "the US needs to preserve its hegemony and take advantage of rivals such as China, Russia or Japan." He believed that the United States would have to join forces with Europe to dominate Eurasia. Brzeziński says that "the US needs European partners". However, considering that Europe is too divided, Brzeziński advocates closer cooperation among the most powerful countries in Europe – the United Kingdom, France and Germany (Brzeziński, 1997).

However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 put an end to the illusions of lasting peace and prosperity promoted by George Bush in 1990. The events of September 11, 2001 and the terrorist attacks affected Samuel Huntington's theory of "the clash of civilizations". This thesis has troubled the spirits of the clash between Islam and Christianity in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. "If the 19<sup>th</sup> century was a century of interethnic clashes, the 20<sup>th</sup> century of a clash of ideologies, the 21<sup>st</sup> century will be a century of the clash of civilizations", wrote Huntington (Huntington, 1969).

The pandemic, global warming problems and especially Putin's war intervention in Ukraine since February 2022 have accelerated the emergence of the new world order. Ukraine has become the geopolitical and geostrategic space, where the East (Russia, Belarus and allies) and the West (EU, NATO and allies) have indirectly opposed. The role of the countries of the South (the former Third World) in the war in Ukraine has grown into a factor around whose orientation a great diplomatic battle is being waged between the warring parties. Russia is trying to win them over with the

help of Anti-Americanism, anti-colonialism and the establishment of the new world order that will change the previous primacy of the United States, while the West points to the need to preserve the world order, to the battle between authoritarianism (Russia, China) and liberal democracy (the US, Western Europe).

In the international relations of the 1990s and 2000s, supporters of "the global empire" thesis believe that the use of this expression by politicians testifies to the desire to expand everything that schematically defined the US model during the Cold War including democracy and market economy. The term is taken up by certain anti-globalists and anti-capitalists to condemn economic globalization, which would be dominated by liberal "single thought".

Although no one disputed the hegemony of the US empire, the topic was debated everywhere in Europe and the US. Among the authors, the critical thesis developed by Emmanuel Todd stands out, elaborated in the essay "After the empire, according to which the United States is a power in decline" (Todd, 2002). According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Obama's primary strategic task was to restore the US legitimacy by leading the collective efforts for a more inclusive global system of governance (Yong Deng et Fei-Ling Wang, 2005).

Even today, two decades after the affirmation of this theory, when the world is faced with the war in Ukraine, the theses of Russia and China are aimed at challenging the unipolar world order. Thus, at the joint press conference between the MFA of Russia Sergey Lavrov and the MFA of Turkey Mevlut Çavuşoğlu held on June 8, 2022, speaking about the possible peace process with Ukraine, Lavrov emphasized: "Negotiations can only take place on the basis of taking into account Russian interests... Peace negotiations for Ukraine are possible only if they aim to establish 'a new world order' without American dominance" (Le Figaro, 2023).

Chinese President Xi Jinping also criticized unipolarism in his speech at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China, stating that "China will oppose unilateralism in all its forms" (MFA, 2022).

In this direction, several dilemmas arise: is the world moving towards a new, more balanced order – multipolar, bipolar or apolar or simply towards an affirmation of the old unipolar order dominated by the United States? Is another international political and economic order possible with "two-world" globalization? Could this war be an indication or opportunity for a transition in power cycles? Will neoliberalism and Western democratic values give way to other value systems if they do not embrace them?

## Globalization

The current world economy is the result of a very long process of political, economic and cultural globalization, which began with the spread of the first people on the planet. We, their descendants, now live in a world united by economics, but divided by politics and religion. However, this process is not only economic: the economy is not actually an autonomous system with its laws. Globalization is the name given to

what appears when societies are analyzed in terms of economic discourse. It is one aspect, nothing more. The economy only completes the multi-millennial movement that translates the fundamental unity of human society. The unification of the world takes place in successive waves, communicating and constantly attracting new subjects, states and territories. Some processes are enigmatic. For example, how to explain the energy that motivated Rome to conquer the Mediterranean? Why did the Ottoman Empire bypass Constantinople for almost two centuries before finally conquering it in 1453? Or what made the Europeans set out to conquer the world or how to interpret the beginning of the industrial revolution?

Around 8000 BC, in the fertile regions of Southwest Asia, people invented agriculture, and a few millennia later, in the same places, cities appeared. Agricultural and urban civilization then spread across the Earth, bringing surplus production to markets. Nations experienced social changes with the division of classes, metallurgy developed, writing began on parchments, and city-states emerged. The idea of humanism, democracy, rule of law, philosophy and art developed from the ancient world, and all these parameters started the birth of Christianity.

Around 1000 AD, feudalism, trading cities and the first outlines of the European world economy ruled by the Italian city-states emerged. In the 16<sup>th</sup> century, with the great discoveries, the European world economy expanded and became global. Through colonization, Europe tied the future South to its economic and other needs. It seems that nothing could stop this planetary moment: the Ottoman Empire, a great Muslim power, after five centuries of rule began to decline. China just broke through and showed interest in exploring the world, but soon gave up and closed down just like Japan. India, the other giant state, fell under the imperial rule of England. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, England, due to its control of sea routes and world markets, embarked on the industrial revolution and spread it across the planet.

The general progress in the world has affected the growth and density of the population, industrialization, the occupation of the Earth's energy, the productivity of labor, urbanization, the explosion of world trade. However, the First World War slowed down this process. At the very moment when the US suddenly became the master of the world and was preparing to seize the scepter of the world economy, the Russian revolution of 1917 broke out and broke the unity with Tsarist Russia. The Second World War followed, and after 1945, the Cold War, which continued the division of the world.

The socialist fortress extended to Eastern Europe and the vast territory of China. By 1950, socialist-communist regimes encompassed one-third of humanity. However, four decades later, the system broke and the reforms of the state economy in the USSR failed.

China was the first to end its isolation (1978), and after the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and the USSR imploded, it announced "glasnost" and "perestroika". The US power had never before seemed so victorious and superior. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century "the US empire" was challenged by new world powers, former colonies or dominating huge civilizations (India, China, Brazil...). These countries stepped onto the world stage, which during the Cold War was monopolized by the US-Soviet duel, while they developed in the shadow.

These countries confirm their superiority in the world. For the first time in three or four centuries, the West is no longer the sole master of the world. The period between 1990 and 2008, when the world GDP grew from 39% to 61% is the golden age of globalization. Thomas Friedman published his bestseller "The World is Flat" as the personification of globalization in all directions. The world has become flat, and also interdependent due to globalization. In recent years the world has changed. We divide this century into the period before the sanitary crisis and the Ukrainian crisis, which were integrated after these crises. There is virtually a silent war of globalization between the world major powers.

## The new world of deglobalization?

After the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, we are witnessing the creation of a different world. Will it be the world that Thomas Hobbes envisioned, with a chaotic war of all against all? Will it be the world of Huntington – as the clash of civilizations, or that of Francis Fukuyama, dominated by the model of Western liberal democracy and the United States?

After the events of September 11, many believed that Huntington was right. At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the US is the undisputed master of the world. The blueprint for a new US century was drawn up long before the election of George W. Bush by his associates - Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Dundes Wolfowitz (Theatrum Belli, 2006). This project argues a) that the US must never again tolerate competing industrial or military power at the international scene. This imperial project was repeated obsessively, in all of President Bush's public speeches after September 11. In his speech on September 11, 2001, President Bush announced b) an endless war to "liberate the world from evil", and c) the declaration of an "indefinite time" preventive war. All these goals are contained in the strategic document of September 17, 2001 (Géopolitique, 2002).

However, in the last two decades, great changes have taken place in the international community. The "American Empire" can no longer hold the same position in the world as it did in the 2000s. The Director of the Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), Pascal Boniface, who published the book "Requiem pour le monde occidentale", during the mandate of President Trump, thought similarly. Boniface, disappointed by Trump's foreign policy, believed that in certain conditions the US can be a serious strategic danger for the planet due to its unilateral vision towards international relations (Boniface, 2019).

Even in the mid-twenties of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it seemed that the globalized world was in the twilight, and experts compared this period to the beginning of the Cold War era.

Today, after the pandemic and the Russian aggression in Ukraine, people do not think in such a way. Anti-Americanism has disappeared from Europe. It is true that both Scholz and Macron have stated that Washington seeks to profit economically from the war in Ukraine and violates the principle of free market, but transatlanticism has

experienced a renaissance. First of all, they showed solidarity in the economic sanctions (Russia) and the military aid to Ukraine, and then at the NATO Summit in Vilnius (July 2023) they openly strengthened Euro-Atlanticism (Politis, 2022). At the expense of this transatlantic love, Russia and Putin seized the former US monopoly on terror.

The Cold War seemed simple and Manichean in comparison to its incredible complexity when great nations like India, which absorbed everything, Saudi Arabia, which literary mocked its great traditional ally, or China, which suddenly realized that its huge dollar reserves could be unilaterally frozen by the US. Multilateralism has found itself on a deathbed. It once experienced clinical death during the great financial crisis (2008), when it was anesthetized because of the pandemic and now because of the Russia-Ukraine conflict it is on a respirator. Regardless of who wins and who loses this war, it is politics that will, quite logically, dominate the economy from now on. It is politics that will command nations to unite under the banner of hostile blocs. Deglobalization is growing into a guarantee of the world resilience (Santi, 2022).

The term deglobalization was elaborated by the Filipino sociologist Walden Bello. In 2002, he published the book entitled *Deglobalization - Ideas for a New World Economy*. He will assert himself as one of the figures of anti-globalists. The Right Livelihood Award website is a leading critic of the current model of economic globalization. He states that "globalization has betrayed its promise" and therefore called for another world (Guillaume, 2022: 112).

Deglobalization has begun its march, and experts' forecasts for economic growth in the world recession for 2023 are not optimistic. The engines of the world development have slowed down GDP. The forecast by Zone of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 2021 – World 6.1%, Eurozone – 5.7%, China 8.1%, 2022 – World 3.2%, Eurozone – 2.6%, China 3.3%, 2023 – World 2.9%, Eurozone – 1.2%, China 4.6%, 2022 is marked by rising inflation and commodity prices worldwide. After this complicated year, what hypotheses are foreseen for the future? In general, optimism is not justified and global recession should occur in countries that have not yet entered this phase (Darmet-Cucchiari, 2022).

## Rivalry between China and the United States

As for the current situation of China – the US tensions, protectionist and industrial policies are gaining ground. In the US, spending on industrial policies is set to rise from 0.4% of GDP to 0.7% in 2023 alone. This percentage is huge. According to Maxim Darmet, "dependence on Chinese inputs has increased significantly". China is estimated to be a critical supplier for 141 products in the EU and 276 in the US. By the way, 15% of the total imported Chinese products are critical for the EU, and 51% for the US (under the term capital product is considered one that is not easy to find an alternative in the short term). However, the US and the EU still have some influence on China. The EU is a critical supplier for China for 188 products. The US has an advantage in high-end products that China struggles to make itself (Ibid).

Probably, the most strategic industries today and tomorrow are semiconductors, green technologies, biotechnology and agricultural products. The US content in intellectual property and technical information is large in these sectors. The US could restrict investment and exports to China through this channel.

As for the pessimistic estimates for the US inflation in 2023, it is quickly receding while the economy looks increasingly likely to avoid a deep recession. Allianz sees GDP declining in late 2023 – early 2024 before relatively slowly recovering. What is remarkable is that the US economy may be on track to avoid recession as inflation normalizes, despite the unpleasant combination of elevated inflation and sharp monetary tightening (Ibid).

The idea that the process of deglobalization is gradually intensifying both theoretically and practically is becoming a reality. Deglobalization means that most countries are gradually becoming less connected through all or most channels: trade in goods, trade in services, capital flows, and movement of people and transfer of technology. Such a break would mark a reversal of economic trends that have prevailed over the last 150 years. They were interrupted only by world wars, the Cold War and economic depression. When it comes to those interruptions, geopolitics has always played a decisive role.

Even today, three major contradictions or rivalries are manifested in the contemporary international community, namely: 1. China – the US rivalry; 2. democracy-autocracy rivalry; 3. Rivalry between bloc states that are in favor of preserving the current relations in the world and those that are in favor of revision (Russia, China...). For the West, a lot of attention is paid to the rivalry between China and the US. Regardless of its actuality, everyone is focused on the war in Ukraine. What is the awakened world giant China hiding? What is its political, geopolitical and economic conception? Why does the US perceive the greatest danger and challenge in China?

## The philosophy of Jiang Shigong

The most significant rivalry likely to engage so far is that between China and the United States. One of the greatest Chinese apologists of the President Xi Jinping is Jiang Shigong. His narrative is simple and focused on China's future supremacy. The Chinese people stood behind Mao, got rich with Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997), and now China is becoming a powerful world state headed by Xi Jinping. In the same text Jiang Shigong explains why the "Era of Xi Jinping" will fulfill all these dreams of Chinese wealth and power by 2049, at the centennial of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Jiang goes into some detail to show how the era of "Xi Jinping fits into narratives of the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the history of Chinese civilization and the history of the international communist movement". Xi Jinping's thought is therefore now the key to China's contribution to world civilization. The past and present, China and the world – Jiang integrates everything into a seamless story of how development and the recovery of Chinese agency bring about great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (Shigong, 2018).



Regarding the rivalry with the US, Shigong believes that "empires have not disappeared, but they have only changed their form and function." China is inevitably entering a new phase, which he calls "the phase of the World Empire." Shigong seeks to explain why "socialism with Chinese characteristics" is not an empty slogan, but a description of the Chinese political economy that paves the way for the world domination when the US liberal democracy and Soviet communism fail (Ibid).

The model of imperial rule within this global empire has constantly evolved. It is no longer content with mere colonial plunder. Instead, global empires focused on controlling colonial economies through the dominance of science, technology and finance. The two world wars have contributed to the construction of the world empire in a new historical phase.

The world wars were given the epithet "world" not only because powers around the world were involved in them, but also because many global colonial empires fought to build "a world empire". In fact, the two parties of the Cold War that developed after World War II reflected the competition between two models of "world empire". One was the US model, which inherited the "imperialist model" developed by the British Empire. The other was the "Soviet model", as a stable political alliance based on the shared belief that two types of world empires were called "liberalism/imperialism" and "communism", which in terms of values translated into "liberty" versus "equality".

At the end of the Cold War, the abandonment of the United Nations by the United States and its acceptance of unilateralism fully demonstrate that the construction of "world empire" is complete. In today's world, China and Russia are within a system ruled by "a world empire" – the United States. Therefore, instead of understanding the end of the Cold War as "the end of history" from an ideological point of view, it is more accurate to perceive it from the angle of "world empire". The US-led "globalization" in the post-Cold War era, whether in terms of ideas or military strategy, promotes the US "imperialization" and the construction of a single global empire. In the Western context, this is often referred to as "the new Roman Empire". Henceforth, no country will be able to exist apart from this system of the world trade with its freedom, rule of law and democracy (Shigong, Ibid).

The current state of the global empire (the US) faces three major intractable problems: 1. the ever-growing inequality created by liberal economy; 2. state failure, political decline and ineffective governance caused by political liberalism; and the decadence and nihilism created by cultural liberalism. Faced with these difficulties, even the United States has retreated in terms of global military strategy, which means that the global empire is currently facing a major crisis and rebellions, resistance and revolution from within the empire are collapsing the system, Shigong writes.

The 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Communist Party of China has politically cemented the power of President Xi Jinping. The messages from the Congress are "the unity and continuation of authentic Chinese development and completion of the road of construction towards a modern socialist state by 2035." The Chinese leadership is aware that "democratization according to the Western model" would return China to

the status of an economic and political colony. This Congress, as well, was held in a spin of the change of pro-Western and pro-American young politicians called "Consomols". At the same time, the Congress supported the "hard line", which considers that the greatest danger that will destabilize China is the "anti-China coalition", which is against China's progress as a world power. To this end, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Xinjiang are being used to destabilize China. The US would like to drag China into a war with Taiwan at any cost, just as it forced Russia into a war. China's official ideology holds that the US is under great pressure to maintain its global empire, especially due to Russian resistance and Chinese competition (MFA, 2022). However, we have to admit that this is a competition that takes place within the framework of the world empire system, a struggle to take economic and political leadership after the accomplishment of the "world empire". Although China's claims are more than ideological in nature, it is fair to ask: is China overreacting and demanding too much?

## The position of the EU – "less romanticism, more realism"

The European Union has been deeply affected by the war in Ukraine. Among numerous bombastic statements, in France the great "paradigm change" is stated, in Germany the "Zeitenwende" ("the change of the era"), in Europe "the end of naivety". Across the continent, an outpouring of sympathy and solidarity with Ukraine and its suffering has swept public opinion, right down to the blue and yellow colors of the European Union and Ukraine flags prominently displayed by Ursula von der Leyen. The European Union has massively helped Ukraine economically (20 billion EUR already paid, and another 20 billion EUR planned for 2023) and received 4 million refugees from this country. At the European Council in June, the Union accepted the candidacy of Ukraine, as well as Moldova, and the prospect of membership as the beginning of the wars in former Yugoslavia it has also demonstrated its ability to exercise "hard power". Under the impetus of its common defense policy, it has delivered weapons to Ukraine for the first time through its "peace facility" (3 billion EUR). By almost completely divesting itself of Russian fossil fuels, the EU is accelerating its energy transition. This shows the huge change that the war in Ukraine represents for the European project, which is going through a new existential crisis after repeated crises in recent years (eurozone crisis, migration crisis, Brexit, the Covid-19 pandemic), which again seems to confirm Jean Monnet's prophecy "that Europe will be built through crises and will be the sum of solutions adopted for these crises" (Joannin, 2023).

By defending its values against Russia, the European Union asserts "a liberal power". Similar to the US, the European Union defends both interests and values, as foreseen since the Maastricht Treaty (Articles 3-5 and 21-2 TEU). Accordingly, it is "a liberal power" or "democratic empire", as Philippe Moreau Defarges called it (Moreau Defarges, 2022). It is precisely this orientation that made it extended to the countries of

Central and Eastern Europe, formerly communist countries, to develop "a European Neighborhood Policy" towards the neighbors in Eastern Europe and the Southern Mediterranean (2002), then "Eastern Partnership" aimed specifically at the Eastern neighbors (2009) and gradually to distance itself from Vladimir Putin's Russia.

From the described cascade of rivalries and complex geopolitical relations, it is necessary to find a key. An agreement is needed for the changes in the world, argues Dominique de Villepin, the former Prime Minister of France. In the newly created conditions, it would be desirable for the EU to get the role of a diplomatic mediator between China and the US and possibly in the peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. At this moment, it is known that only China, Turkey and India can influence Putin's foreign policy. To this end, the EU has to be balanced to manage such an initiative. The EU can play a major role in the world balance. The war in Ukraine is being waged on European soil. That is why the EU seeks to create its grammar of deterrence, to sober up and return to reality. It is essential to put the French-German partnership on a new track. It is essential that each party shows that it has more understanding of what the other party would like. Take the example of defense policy: France aims for the European defense community, autonomous in the field of armaments, because Paris also intends to defend the interests of its defense factories. Germany has a more transatlantic view of things. These differences are not catastrophic and the French-German couple remains solid (CF2R Services, 2022). However, it is essential to redefine these relations. It is understandable that the EU is on the way to show "less romanticism, more realism".

## The Western Balkans in the New World Order

What is the position of the Western Balkan countries against the establishment of the New World Order and the effects on local globalization or deglobalization? Regardless of John Kerry's famous statement in 2015 that the Balkans is the first in the "line of fire for separation" and that it carries a negative reputation of "instability and explosiveness", there are certain hopes if the Serbia-Kosovo syndrome has been overcome and weakness of the Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina region has been completely stabilized. The war in Ukraine is not the happiest moment for the stability of the region, but the EU and NATO, despite some shortcomings, are solidly controlling the Balkans. Furthermore, on the agendas of all political groups, the EU membership is a leading strategic goal. However, it is not a simple task. On the one hand, the inertness of the EU has developed the feeling of Euroscepticism and undervalued all the reform efforts of the Western Balkan countries. On the other hand, the countries of the region themselves have their problems. Jovan Teokarević rightly singles out three groups of problems: firstly, there are common problems shared by all countries in the region, secondly, specific problems for certain countries, and thirdly, there are external problems that threaten the further successful European integration of the region (Teokarević, 2016: 8).

At this moment, something that gives hope and is contrary to the concept of deglobalization is the Berlin Process and the Open Balkan initiative. The Open Balkan Initiative dates back to the 2010s, that is, four years before the Berlin Process Initiative, with the aim of creating the space for discussion between the Balkan countries on regional cooperation, stabilization, security and strengthening of cross-border trade. Serbia, Albania and North Macedonia signed an agreement on regional cooperation nine years later, in 2019 in Novi Sad (Serbia), i.e. five years after the signing of the Berlin Process Agreement. This trilateral agreement was signed in order to facilitate social and economic activities between the Balkan countries, to strengthen trust, cooperation and to overcome regional tensions. Initially, the Initiative was created under the name Mini-Schengen. A year later, two more meetings took place, in Ohrid (North Macedonia) in November 2019 and in Durres (Albania) in December 2019. The three countries have stated that they will form a single market of 14 million people by the end of 2020. It is believed that with this alliance of goods between these three countries goods will move faster, citizens of these countries will be able to cross the borders only with an identity card. It is estimated that every year more than 30 million hours will be saved between the borders of the mentioned countries. On September 4, 2020, Kosovo agreed to join the Mini-Schengen Area in accordance with the Kosovo-Serbia Agreement from 2020, but this initiative was soon abandoned. The World Bank pointed out that this project will save 3.2 billion dollars, of which Serbia alone, according to President Vučić, would save at least 1.5 billion dollars. This economic zone would also represent the country's preparation for membership in the European Union (Kutuk, 2022).

The importance of the security axis and stabilization in the region of the Western Balkans is a need that has to be nurtured at multiple levels and through multiple methods. Modern preventive diplomacy tries through various forms to influence the development of good neighborhood and regional economic and other forms of cooperation in multiple domains. This has become the *sine qua non* of the Open Balkan. This dimension is also present in the Berlin Process Initiative of 2014, which has been unjustifiably identified as a competing model of the Open Balkan Initiative. The critics of the Open Balkan Initiative believe that it is only a copy paste of the Berlin Process or even a failed surrogate. Unfortunately, this argument has also served as an excuse for some countries not to join the OB Initiative, allegedly due to the unoriginality or possible Serbian leadership (Vukićević, 2022).

Regional cooperation between the Western Balkans states is an essential political goal in all countries because it is considered a very important step towards European integration. For European integration, it will firstly try to overcome the old nationalist conflicts in the region and create a new spirit of cooperation between countries. It is this dimension that contributes to the Open Balkan to provide security and stability in the region, as well as to start preventive diplomacy.

On the other hand, the Balkan countries are relatively small and share more or less the same characteristics and problems in their economic and social development. From this point of view, the integration of these countries in the European Union can be seen as the integration of the region as a whole. From a

pragmatic point of view, the EU has emphasized that the "gate" for the Balkan countries is open. However, populist responses to the restriction of the access to the EU seem to have delayed new accession plans. Instead, we can consider the cooperation between the countries as a "school" or "lobby" of European integration, although the EU has conducted open accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia, as well as Serbia.

In this context, it is important to consider the Berlin Process, which was launched in Berlin in 2014, followed by the meetings in Vienna in 2015, Paris in 2016 and Trieste in 2017, as well as the ongoing meetings. At the Summit of this Initiative (Trieste, July 2017) a fund of more than 500 million EUR was allocated precisely for the development and promotion of the regional integration of the Western Balkan countries, which is an inevitable driver towards the ultimate goal. At the same time, the proposal of Prime Minister of Serbia at that time, now President of Serbia A. Vučić in February 2017 has confirmed the need for interregional cooperation for the establishment of a customs union with the Western Balkan countries.

According to the example of the OB and BP, regional integration took place simultaneously with global trade integration, although after the invasion of Russia in Ukraine, the process of deglobalization, that is, regional globalization, began. This suggests some complementarity between the two initiatives. The increase in the regionalization of the WB can be attributed to the inability of global integration to address various issues such as the disadvantageous position of developing and least developed countries in trade compared to developed countries, difficulties in the modernization of national industries in the course of liberalization and consolidation for developing competitiveness, amid fierce global competition, sudden capital outflows and crises.

Trade regionalization can help countries gain experience and increase competitiveness by expanding into narrower regional markets. Moreover, transaction costs can be reduced through regional regulatory adjustments, such as the reduction of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, harmonization of customs procedures, mutual recognition of standards, permits and certificates, the steps that have been taken by initiating examples of the OB Initiative such as the free movement of goods, people and capital. Regionalization of trade with RIA (Regional Integration Agreement) expands markets from national to regional borders, while the common state resources can be used to set up a more competitive regional framework in terms of regulations and infrastructure and to develop strategies that promote economic development.

## In conclusion – three possible scenarios

For the first time in the post-war history of the international community, the fear of a global and nuclear war is manifested among all actors. The peaceful epilogue is far from reality for the time being, but the world order under the pressure of geopolitics and geostrategy is gradually evolving and affecting the gradual slowing down of globalization. The beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was the golden age of

globalization. Thomas Friedman published his bestseller "The World is Flat" (Friedman, 2005) as a personification of globalization in all directions. The world has become flat, and also interdependent due to globalization. In recent years, the world has changed. We divide this century into the period before the sanitary crisis and the Ukrainian crisis, which were integrated after these crises. There is practically a silent war of globalization between the world major powers. Who can be the winner in such a war, especially when the world is in recession? For now, one gets the impression that "cold globalization" is working in certain parts of the world. It would only be functional if China does not occupy Taiwan. How possible is that and can the leading political authorities afford such a rate of historical irresponsibility that would completely block globalization? According to Thucydides' trap philosophy, war can weaken belligerents and result in a long-term defeat like the war between Athens and Sparta. The challenges in the world order can result in at least three possible scenarios:

The first is the pessimistic scenario, which would mean new decades of a kind of inter-globalist rivalry or cold war between the bloc represented by China, Russia and their allies against the bloc of the US, the EU and their allies. China, relying on the newly established position has already announced that by 2045 it will be the leading world empire and will advocate for major changes and taking the position of the first world power instead of the United States. This will mean the gradual establishment of the new world order followed by "cold globalization". The US is in favor of maintaining the current world functional system of the international economic and political system. After all, the US is still the biggest world power that can control China.

A sub-variant of this scenario is the consequences to the new world order from a possible invasion of Taiwan by China. In that case, in the current context of the Ukrainian war, Russia would approach China and segmentation, i.e. the complete globalization of the world economy, technology and society would be expected to occur.

China, Russia and their allies represent the personification of authoritarianism, while the West and its allies are conspirators of democracy, or rather the system of liberal democracy. If we compare this context with the one of the Cold War, probably such a system under current conditions could not last for 45 years, but much less. Simply, the functioning of the economy cannot be limited to autocracy and strict protectionism. In this case, we would be talking about a bipolar world, and maybe even a tripolar one depending on India's positions.

The second possible scenario will depend on the epilogue of the war in Ukraine and the fate of President Putin. If a peaceful solution to the war in Ukraine is found, it is possible that Russia will distance itself from China, move closer to the EU and BRICS, and then the rivalry and battle to be reduced to a clash between the United States and China, otherwise the most powerful economies in the world.

In such a scenario, the EU will play a significant role as a mediator in relations with Russia, China and the US. In this scenario, as well, there will be possible stoppage of globalization, partial deglobalization and reglobalization of economic and technological capacities.

The third possible scenario is overcoming deglobalization and re-establishing globalization, or we can call it "new globalization" with certain modified rules, but still with normal cooperation between world economic and political engines. The West and the US along with allies would continue according to Fukuyama's model, while China and allies would develop their political system without abusing economic performance. Another scenario is theoretically possible, which is the Hobbesian model of "war or rivalry of all against all", but it would destroy both the planet and the lives of people.

Faced with the upcoming tectonic changes, the Western Balkan states are oriented completely or discretely towards the Euro-Atlantic positions of the great powers. The EU membership has no alternatives, and the Western Balkan countries have no time to lose, especially after obtaining the candidate status of Ukraine, Moldova and promises to Georgia. It is desirable for Serbia and Kosovo to find suitable compromise solutions, just like Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Open Balkan and Berlin Process Initiatives are useful formulas for overcoming tensions about strengthening local globalization in the region.

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# INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND SUBREGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

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DOI: [https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod\\_strint.2023.ch5](https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod_strint.2023.ch5)

## Keywords:

Southeastern Europe,  
security,  
peace,  
international order



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**Abstract:** *The post-Soviet and post-SFR Yugoslavia space has been sharing some similarities in terms of post-socialist transitional changes and security arrangements related to peacemaking and peacekeeping missions. The arrangements have been dominantly made in the framework of international order. There are a few types of international security presence represented by the United Nations and OSCE, and also some examples of the so-called ad hoc peace operations such as IFOR/SFOR/EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina or UNMIK/EULEX in Kosovo and Metohija. This paper examines which goals, efficiency and future peace missions in Southeastern Europe will have in the light of changes of international order and strategic relations between great global players and international organizations in relations with regional countries and the framework of the Russian-Ukrainian war and its impact on maintaining peace. This changed environment should also be connected with initiatives and acceptance for regional cooperation and impact of international players on establishing regional networks.*

## Introduction

The issue of international order is usually periodically actualized since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and essentially depends on relations between great powers. Regional order depends on relations of great powers to their regions and themselves, as well as relations between regional states. "International order refers to the settled arrangements that define and guide relations between states" (Ikenberry, 2014:85). It

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reflects either a set of arrangements or activities that characterize common behavior of states. The main source and basis of contemporary international order has gained its form from the European state system based on the idea and principle of multiplicity and coexistence of sovereign states. Contemporary international order is shaped by two pillars: the United Nations and its principles of maintaining peace as a universal human right. After hundreds of years of relations between sovereign states in the conditions of anarchy, the globalization process has been introduced as "a postmodern state as a relatively new phenomenon, mainly concentrated on the capitalist core... Postmodern states have a much more open and tolerant attitude toward cultural, economic and political interaction, and have by and large convinced themselves that opening their economies and to a lesser extent their societies and politics to a wider range of interactions is good for their prosperity and security" (Buzan, Waever, 2005:23.)

A few years ago the US President Joseph Biden claimed that "international order that the United States had been establishing is just in the process of decomposition" (Le Monde Diplomatique, November 2020:5). The equality of sovereign states as the basic principle of the UN, which creates a unique internationally recognized forum is threatened by geographically limited alliances. Contemporary global processes have initiated the issue of another phase of development of international order. The Russian – Ukrainian conflict has posed several dilemmas when one talks about relations between states. Firstly, the understanding of sovereignty assumed in the conditions of globalization has been questioned.

Are we witnesses to renewing and strengthening a role of sovereign states in international relations? Who has the main impact on defining international relations? How to provide security of states that do and belong to the circle of great powers? Who has the right to intervene in internal processes of sovereign states? What is the role of the United Nations and its possibility to intervene in internal processes of member states and the relation of the United States to interventions, particularly unilateral one and how does it fit in the framework of international moral values? How to define and regulate relations to self-determination, secession and international recognition of new states including territorial issues? How to provide security in the increasing security threats in new environment? Does the new global multipolar world emerge in front of our eyes?

Having in mind the increasing role of international organizations and alliances including regional cooperation initiatives, the objective of this paper is to compare two sides of international suborders: the kind of transition, which is the wider framework of peace missions in the territory of the two dissolved federations: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

## Transitional changes, international relations, need for peace operations

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union from 1989 to 1992, a few wars were sparked among population of ethnic minorities requesting independence from new independent countries, which had earlier depended on Moscow, i.e. Russia.

Regardless of conflicts and tensions, historians and political scientists emphasize the fact that the USSR or "Russian Empire" laid out as the USSR had broken up more than ever with small bloodshed that was not possible to imagine for the break-up of any empire in history. Geopolitical changes had reflected a real character of the Soviet Federation. In the fall of the 1980s only three Baltic countries clearly defined and strongly expressed national politics and organized national movements, defining their statehood. Ukraine followed them, and Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan intended to do the same to some extent. Most of other former Soviet republics were stunned inadvertently with suddenly gifted independence.

In the very beginning Russia, as the central state, was faced with the problems which imposed post-socialist transition of territorial integrity, sovereignty, polity and economy including the necessity of state establishment. There were three types of states – three Baltic states, which were absolutely Western-oriented and viewing Russia as the biggest security threat, but at the same time having a great Russian population as ethnic minorities in them. The second type are Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan with strong independence intentions and a bulk of Central Asian 'stans' characterized by the so-called 'oriental democracies' (Parakhonsky n.d.) persecuted as 'islamist' states, usually named 'sultanistic' as the type of personalistic power tightened in family and client cliques and featured by lifetime powers combined with dynastic secession intentions.

They are recognizable due to volatile policies, the lack of clear foreign policy, national security and military concepts. Giving advance to ethno-national and clan policies in Central Asian states, then state borders of these republics became concern of Russia and its new concepts of foreign policy. Simultaneously, newly pro-independent states such as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus, as well as the government in Moldova, have intended to stress their defiance to Russia trying to avoid direct dependence and Russian impact on their internal foreign policies. Some of them have tended to emphasize non-Russian approach institutionally establishing GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) as an attempt of imposing counterbalance to Russia. Politically, this means that the post-Soviet space is contained in the mostly pro-Russian state Belarus, leading counterbalance to Ukraine, a few pro-independent states in the west side of the Commonwealth of Independent States and some Central Asian states, which are rather dependent of Russia and states in the post-Soviet space.

The post-Soviet countries share Russian as lingua franca, the common Soviet legacy including common roads and railroads, pipelines and electrical power, as well as other parts of infrastructure which mostly go through and around state borders. Apart from Baltic states, the former Soviet space is covered by weak states and powers with very low capacities to develop mutual relations and common regional institutions and policies with relatively low national and ethnic potential. Russia has initiated the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and partly the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as the instruments of providing regional security and Russian interests based on the concept of the 'near abroad', considering their interests in the relative youth of new states.

The former Soviet republics are considered to be the Russian sphere of interest. Russia has the necessity to regulate security in the region, as well as economic interests. The participation of Russia is justified by the necessity to protect Russian minorities in all post-Soviet countries, based on the orientation to multilateralism, an active role in international organizations and international law. "The very term 'near abroad' has revealingly created an in-between category between national and truly 'foreign' affairs, thus suggesting a polity concentrated in concentric circles...At global level, Russia and Russian policy have consistently promoted multipolarity and resisted the US unipolarity" (Buzan, Waever, 2005:405).

The conflicts in the post-Soviet area emerged on four bases – intrastate conflicts, ethno-territorial disputes in the pro-independent countries in the Caucasus and Moldova, ethnic conflicts in Central Asian republics and, recently, the interstate conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which is far from solution at the moment. The first Russian intervention was in Tajikistan in 1992. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the worst conflict broke out in Tajikistan as the civil war in which neo-communists, Islamic and democratic parties, as well as traditional, dominantly family, clans participated. The genuine conflict was ended with agreed cooperation between Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The conflict resulted in the dependence on Russia that increased to such a level that Tajikistan has become a Russian protectorate.

A lot more capacities and dynamics of conflicts have been hidden in the Caucasus and Moldavia, where ethno-national Armenian and Azerbaijani war regarding the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which was populated by Armenians, but sparked deeply in Azerbaijani territory in 1988, when both were firm members of the Soviet Federation. This was the conflict with the most numerous casualties, which had been revived a few times. Until 2020 and Azerbaijani military assault on Nagorno-Karabakh, it was the one of many frozen conflicts. After gaining some Azerbaijani success, Russia mediated the conflict and the peacekeeping mission with 1960 soldiers was introduced. At the same time, Russia initiated the establishment of the Russian-Turkish Joint Monitoring Center (RTJMC) in order to provide surveillance of the Lachin corridor, which connects Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh as a de facto state. In the meantime, the actors agreed to leave Nagorno-Karabakh territorially in Azerbaijan and that should be the first conflict to unfreeze since the break-up of the Soviet Union.

Trans-Dniester case was triggered by the dissatisfaction of citizens living on the left bank of Dniester (Slavic Russians, Ukrainians and Gagauz) in Moldova, when they decided to separate from the state of Moldova, proclaiming their version of secession. Separatism was strongly provoked by the intention of Moldovans to reunify with Romania, which initiated the armed conflict with a few hundred casualties in the period 1989 – 1992. Regardless of the fact that the conflict was frozen by Russian mediation and there was no formalized peace mission, warring parties accepted peacekeeping forces composed of Russians, Moldovans and Trans-Dniester forces. Despite Moldova protested later against the presence of Russian troops, the Russian 14th Army that dominantly enrolled local Russian population was used as some sort of peacekeepers due to the fact that it acted independently of Moscow.

The Caucasus is a very conflictual region. The North Caucasus is well-known due to two Russian-Chechen wars, rebellions in Dagestan and Ingushetia and the fact that North Ossetia would like to hoover South Ossetia, the territory in internationally recognized borders of Georgia. Three conflicts characterize Russian-Georgian relations. The first and the greatest one is the case of Abkhazia, then South Ossetia that had a special status in the Soviet Union and after its dissolution it made requests for independence, which is the case of the so-called *recursive secession*.<sup>2</sup> After declaring independence of two areas, the violent Georgians reflected an intention to regain control over separated territories. Russia brokered the conflict and the outcome was that Russia had exploited these conflicts to impose itself as a guarantor of an inconclusive status quo (Buzan, Waever, 2003). Georgia succeeded to achieve an agreement on closing down the main Russian bases, but incredibly slow implementation, even not ending, had been retaining Russian 'peacekeeping'. The bases were there in 2008, when Georgia assaulted Abkhazia and South Ossetia in order to regain control over its whole territory. Russia recognized Abkhaz independence and maintained military peacekeepers in the region, and provided extensive military support (Concordiam, Vol. 1, Issue 2). Like in Transnistria and South Ossetia, Russia has deployed great 'peacekeeping forces', investing a lot of money in their economies, providing a substantial political influence including security.

## The changes in the Balkans

The Balkans as the post-socialist transitional case significantly differs from the post-Soviet countries and processes. Firstly, the majority of the Balkan countries have been more or less established on the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in its last decades. Secondly, the powers and interests of external actors are overwhelmingly managing the Balkans to be viewed as the integral part (subregion?) of Europe. The West, the European Union and the United States have taken over the driving processes and political development in the Balkans. Thirdly, as a declared part of the European Union, the entire Balkans was the object of plans for the EU and NATO enlargement. In other words, internal dynamics is dependent on external powers including neighborhood, regional countries and great powers. External actors made the key impact on the break-up of socialist Yugoslavia. Therefore, for any process or event in the region the main concern is how great powers would react. "In contrast to the situation in the 19th century, it was no longer possible for the Balkan nations to draw their great power allies into war over strictly local issues" (Jelavich, 1989:443).

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<sup>2</sup> Recursive secession is the establishment of a state in the already separated state (Aleksandar Pavković with Peter Radan (2007). *Creating New States: Theory and Practise of Secession*. Hepshire, Aldershot).

The region is characterized by two hotspots, which are, as everything else in the Balkans, ethno-nationally conditioned. The first one are conflictual relations between Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks; the second complex one is about North Macedonia, which includes its bordering countries Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, as well as Turkey. International approach is characterized by geopolitically and historically relative unchangeable interests. In the time of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Croats very early felt supporting policies from Germany, the Serbs stared at Russia and the Muslims had the impression that the US was devoted to their assistance (The Balkans 2010:3) and thus did not agree to any compromise regardless of the fact that they were the weakest in the region.

The transitional model in the Balkans was the least efficient. The common denominator for all six Western Balkan<sup>3</sup> countries was the continuation of the old political elites in the cloak of the new, "democratically" elected political leadership and their collaboration with the primitive, irresponsible and criminalized new economic elite (Šolaja, 2007). The state form has some parallels with the situation in Africa in that the states are more an arena for, then the agent of, power in politics (Eide 1999). The region was burdened with a number of issues belonging to the political and societal spheres: ethno-territorial conflicts, internal integrity and sovereignty (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, North Macedonia), de facto independence, national minorities' disputes, etc. Transition in the Balkans has been going on very slowly regardless of the fact that many authors consider Yugoslavia the country that had better preconditions in comparison to "hard socialism" in the Warsaw Pact countries. Economic recovery from the post-communist economic collapse has been stronger, and the share of the private sector in GDP is greater in the formerly state capitalist and nominally 'central planned economies' than in the already nominal economies, at least in semi-marketized former Yugoslav republics (Bideleux, Jeffries, 2007:19).

## The Balkans and peace missions

In the last decade of the 20th century, the Balkans has been a huge laboratory for models of peace initiatives, re-examining previous experiences and testing new ideas including different actors. Firstly, besides classic mediation, peace initiatives for Yugoslavia started with international conferences and special efforts made by the European Union, which had felt itself responsible for the peace in Europe since Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos assigned it with words "It is not the hour of Americans, this is the hour of Europe" (New York Times, 1996). While the EU was trying to achieve peace in the internal conflict in former Yugoslavia, the United Nations started its classic peace missions, which are categorized as

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<sup>3</sup> Former Yugoslavia meant 'minus Slovenia' plus Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia (FYROM at the time of its establishment) and Serbia.

'interposition peacekeeping' (Fortna, 2008). These were the 'classic' UN missions with the aim to provide restraint of an armed conflict and opposing parties based on the political and moral authority that the UN has, but not on the power of blue helmets' units, whose task was to accomplish goals related to the separation of warring parties.

The UN peacekeeping has opened a few principle questions: who is authorized to initiate peace missions in member states in the case of internal conflicts? Can the UN intervene in these conflicts without the permission and invitation of sovereign countries? How to create peace forces, particularly in a case of sensitive relation to some countries? These and other questions were raised in the beginning of the establishment of the "New World Order", as it was called by the US President George Bush in 1990, taking into account the unipolar US world. The UN missions in the beginning of the break-up of Yugoslavia were the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia, firstly in Croatia and later in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it lasted until the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA)<sup>4</sup> in December 1995, but the UN mission UNCRO replaced it in Croatia from March 30, 1995 until January 1, 1996.

All these missions were the so-called 'traditional missions', well-known due to their role of the deterrence of the United Nations in conflict resolution since its founding. More precisely, they are called "interposition" (Farna, 2008). Their main aim was sustaining worrisome parties and preserve opportunities for further political actions of parties involved in conflict.

The things in the Yugoslav retorts started with giving the UN peace mandate even during the existence of former Yugoslavia, firstly in Croatia and then broadening it to Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, a 'new generation' of peace initiatives started with the role of the European Economic Community (since 1992 the European Union). The first peace plan was submitted by a Portuguese diplomat and writer José Cutileiro, then the special European and the US envoys David Owen and Cyrus Vance. After these two, the EU represented by David Owen and Norwegian Thorvald Stoltenberg offered once more the version of the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into three autonomous units. The end of the peace process started with the Contact Group plan in 1994, when Americans anticipated division into two territorial units. The peacemaking process was completed by the DPA, when the vast "NATO-led" peace forces of 62,000 soldiers that were confirmed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) were introduced.

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<sup>4</sup> The peace agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina was achieved in two steps. The first one were multilateral negotiations in the US military base Wright-Patterson in Dayton, Ohio since November 1 until November 21, 1995, when 11 annexes of the agreement were signed by the participants. The agreement was formally signed under the official title "General Framework Agreement for Peace" (GFAP) in Paris, France, in December 14, 1995. This process reflected the EU wish to be recognized as an important factor in the peace process for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was done by the Contact Group established by the UNSC, whose members were the US, Russia, Germany, France and Great Britain.

Since the DPA established 'new Bosnia and Herzegovina' with only international continuity, but, based on constructivist approach' declared break with any type of previous system, and imposed an absolutely new political system, a new type of peace operations, which were the best characterized as 'multidimensional' was introduced (Fortna, 2008). Such types of peacemaking and peacekeeping operations were established by the consent of actors. Their goal was the accomplishment of substantive effects oriented to preventing the renewal of fighting, which means the duration of peace. Multidimensionality is usually achieved through protection of human rights, monitoring entire processes, even organizing elections, monitoring reform of judicial systems, effective functioning of polity and other processes aimed at functional institutions and peaceful resolution of any danger threatening to a 'newly-shaped state.' In politics, this approach is recognized as the 'nation building' in the US terminology. However, in the Balkans ethno-national embroilment is much more recognizable than 'state building'.

The initial and the greatest 'NATO-led' troops under the name IFOR–Implementation Force contained soldiers from the entire world, and Americans were the most numerous. After the expiry of a year mandate, this Mission continued in 1996 under the name SFOR (Stabilization Force) until April 2004, when it was replaced by EUFOR (European Union Force) known as Operation Althea.

Although the European Union peacekeeping mission under the name Operation Concordia of 327 members in North Macedonia was the first one in the history of the European Security and Defense Policy, it was launched two weeks before Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was the first serious 'comprehensive approach' as a 'civil-military operation' rather than a purely military one that could be used as a 'testing ground' for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Boštjančič Pulko, Muherina, Pejič, 2016) of the EU on the European soil in the state building process.

A very similar model was implemented in Kosovo as the self-declared independent territory. Initially, Kosovo Force - KFOR started as the 'NATO-led' military mission with the mandate of the UNSC in compliance with the Resolution 1244 passed in June 1999. The implementation of civil aspects of the Resolution 1244 that was used as the 'state building' mission began with UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) and continued with additional, but de facto full mandate given to European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). It became the huge EU challenge, which was strongly criticized by Serbia, particularly because of not obeying the UNSC Resolution 1244 and neglecting sovereignty of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija as its autonomous province and even more - deregulating the Serbian state system institutions in the northern part of the province and the south enclaves settled down by Serbs. On the other hand, the EU and the US have strongly been supporting and assisting in 'bottom-up' state building, practically from the ground-zero of the self-proclaimed state of Kosovo, neglecting and cancelling the previous Serbian state institutions (Šolaja, 2018). Even some agreements like the Brussels Agreement in 2013 accepted by both parties – Serbian and Kosovo governments have still not been implemented without a chance to be completed soon.



## *Conclusion*

The post-Soviet and the Balkan cases show some similarities, as well as essential differences in terms of peace missions and other peace activities.

Firstly, some transitional processes and diseases related to the post-socialist changes could be interconnected in terms of social situation, values, state building capacities, transition of sovereignty to new independent countries, security and other problems. The first troubles that affected the former federal units of the Soviet Union and socialist Yugoslavia as multinational federations have a political character. It includes the impossibility of liberal stabilization, elite competition, the absence of democratic building process and populist policies available for ethnic mobilization (Iveković, 2000).

Furthermore, both fields are comparable in terms of political, military and ethnic mobilization and regional wars for territories, ethnic discrimination and weakness of civil society, populism, historicism and abuse of religion. Another important characteristic are external pressures and international brokering in disputes with neighborhood, territories intensively caught up in international competition. Dominantly, power and regimes in both post-federal countries are presidential and featured as the authoritarian ethnocracy or at least partly monopoly governing.

In economic terms, they are characterized by more or less planned economy, which could not regulate an increasing number of the unemployed, technology lagging and dependence on the West and their banks (Berend, 2012). State bureaucracies could not deal with economic problems, multiparty democratic regimes, interest of people and economic competition in foreign, eventually global, markets. Depopulation, as well as inadequate and not sufficient modern education has not been the convenient environment for transcending difficulties and hurdles. The break-up of large socialist federations has brought up the necessity of the transition of sovereignty, demanding the need of new regimes to position in international order. On the other hand, they belong to the unregulated regional as the part of international order and relations between newly declared independent countries.

The post-Soviet space differs from the post-Yugoslav Balkans geopolitically and geostrategically, and by international approach and ways of the control of the space including peace missions. Two Balkan countries, the former members of the Soviet bloc, have become the EU and NATO members. The former non-aligned countries that were a part of former Yugoslavia – Slovenia and Croatia have emerged and become the EU members. Some became the NATO members such are Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Montenegro and recently North Macedonia. Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have declared military neutrality regardless of their status of candidates for the EU membership.

The most former Soviet Union republics, particularly in Central Asia and partly in the Caucasus, have gained independence without their particular will and wishes, and they were even surprised with the series of events. Their process of state building started to flow independently, mainly depending on the leaders, the former members of 'state and Communist Party' nomenclature, who became the

authoritarian leaders in the meantime. The ground borders did not play such a crucial role in their statehood like the importance that ethno policies have, including ethnical, religious, clan and other population divisions. Wars between and inside them were much less horrible comparing to ethnic wars between former Yugoslav republics. Internationally, they became the actors of international relations and specifically in the space that contemporary Russian foreign policy assigns as the 'near abroad' and the sphere of the Russian interest. Almost all peace missions in the former USSR territory were Russian in different sorts of arrangements. These missions, parallel with influences on leaders, political parties and other actors including the Russian language as the common communication tools were the part of the Russian policies to provide strategic control of the space of the former Soviet Union. The Western influence was much weaker, as some scientists claim. "The US moved in with bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and, although it had limited presence with an unclear long-term outlook, this was sufficient to trigger yet another regional realignment centered on Uzbekistan" (Buzan, Waever, 2003:428).

Later on, Americans were defeated in Afghanistan and lost the important point for influence in the region. The other actors intend to be more present in the area like Iran, Turkey and China. Therefore, Russia tends to keep strategic presence in the space. Apart from peace missions and other agreements with particular countries, initiating and co-leading the Shanghai Cooperation Organization represents keeping the US and other Western countries far away of the area which was traditionally the space of interest of the Russian Empire (70 years in the shape of the Soviet Union) and contemporary Russia. In the political strategy and processes, the role of the concentration on the dependence on Russia was not convenient for internal strengthening of new states and their political systems, but it was unavoidable. Russia has been more dealing with the focus on the former Soviet infrastructure including contemporary devices which connect states between them, security interests and personal links. Foreign interference was roughly rejected as witnessed by Georgian and Ukraine cases. Neither the direct US and NATO support, nor Ukrainian signing of the agreement on partnership with the EU in the frame of the "Eastern Partnership" initiative was accepted by Russia. In that period Russia understood that crucial importance for its security is in the states in direct neighborhood – the former members of the Soviet Union. The new ruling elite has consciously been developing relations on the new foundations, knowing that they are of utmost importance because Russian economy depends on energy resources in the surrounding countries and mutual connectivity (Cipek, Boban, 2017:307).

The Balkans is much more complicated case because of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The conflicts were much stronger in the space, where six republics felt equal in the former Yugoslav federation. The new coined space and terminology of the "Western Balkans" – former Yugoslavia minus Slovenia, but plus Albania – reflects that there is no state capable of fighting for the control of the entire region. The interest of the West was to dismantle Yugoslavia in order to exert control over the space more easily (Šolaja, 2013). During the period of non-alignment

Yugoslavia was not a confident player and neither the West nor the East was satisfied with its role. Its break-up was welcomed in the West, which recognized separated Yugoslav republics very fast. Peace management was gradually introduced in the region, monitoring through types of peace missions and by the power and role of actors. The first period was significant due to the UNSC efforts to impose a halt in fighting and separation of parties without any deep insight and attempt to put states in order. Due to the lack of morals, responsibility, political knowledge and mutual mistrust results were very poor until the US 'coercive diplomacy' forced parties to negotiate in Dayton in 1995 in the same way like Serbia – Kosovar rebellion movement negotiations in Kumanovo in 1999. Afterwards the period of 'state building' started, and which was related to the policy of implementation of 'civil aspects' of peace agreements. This aspect of peace missions<sup>5</sup> was the innovation that was introduced in order to create a state due to the model of liberal multiparty democracy and free market economy. The part of the process is the policies of the European Union and NATO enlargement, which is almost completed. Only Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (exclusively because of the standing point of the Republic of Srpska as the state-shaped autonomous 'entity' in Bosnia and Herzegovina) have remained good relations with Russia, and recently with China, which is not well-accepted in the West, as well.

After the initial UN peace missions where Russia participated, Russia continued to join IFOR and later on SFOR peace troops under the supreme command of Americans. These troops executed the mandate given by the Dayton Peace Accords asserted by the UNSC until 2004 when European Union Force – EUFOR handed over the mission. The EU was the 'new actor' on the scene of peacekeepers. Its security identity was not defined enough and the EU searched for the more active and important role in the European security. It is hard to define the power of the EU. In practice, European Force is not so much autonomous as it has been developed for such symbolic efforts as peacekeeping or special missions involving a few risks (Kissinger, 2003:52).

The processes in the Balkans in the last decade of the 20th century were the signpost to the layout and functionality of unilateral world order. The processes in the post-Soviet space revealed the other side of the coin. Finally, peacekeeping missions in two studied regions have become the part of establishing regional order with very diverse actors and plenty of their interests. Belonging to the globalized world, these two regions, as well as other regions, too, are the aim of interest of many great and regional powers. Countries individually and also as the part of initiatives of regional cooperation are not only pure members of the United Nations and other international organizations, but active participants and creators of new international order in which Russia has the importance. Every serious student of history recognizes the importance of a significant role of Russia in establishing a new international order without encouraging it into its historic patterns (Kissinger,

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<sup>5</sup> Peacemaking missions differ from peacekeeping missions in terms of the concepts of 'imposing peace' and 'keeping peace'.

2003:71). The 'new multilateralism' needs new alliances and power centers. The regional processes in the Soviet and Balkan space announce the redefinition of interests and roles of regional countries related to positions of great global powers. It was very hard to hide value diversities on the line which divides the culture of classic hierarchical organization of states and societies such is the dominant one in the East (including Far East) from values of liberalism, transcending classic state and imposing modern visions through new forms of political cooperation, security and free market.

It is clear that immediately after the Cold War ended in the frame of good relations between great powers in the processes of liberalization, globalization, war against terrorism, security guaranteeing and free markets, the embryo of a post-Cold War order was hidden in peace initiatives and repositioning of actors in different parts of the world. Even some ideas of reforming the United Nations Security Council were based on regions and differentiation of new regional and great powers. The Russian – Ukrainian war should relatively soon give a new light on the essentiality of sovereignty and the role of individual states and their positions as great powers in the process of the contemporary world multipolarization including certain institutional shaping of G7, BRICS and other groupings of powerful countries.

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# DESIGN THINKING AND OPERATIONAL ART: THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND WAR

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DOI: [https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod\\_strint.2023.ch6](https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod_strint.2023.ch6)

## Keywords:

non-state actors,  
VUCA,  
social wave-front theory,  
design thinking,  
operational art



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**Abstract:** *In order to uphold the architecture of international security, most countries are committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes. In case diplomatic efforts fail, most of them have the military power to settle disputes by the use of military force. The outgoing 20th and the unfolding 21st century have clearly displayed that conflicts can degenerate into asymmetric, irregular and low intensity wars with the involvement of non-state actors. It has also become clear that these actors take advantage of the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous, or in short VUCA environment posed by globalization. The social wave - front theory provides a useful narrative to this environment as it regards human history as a succession of three waves of changes and every time the waves clash, bloody wars break out as tensions between the representatives of different waves accumulate. Tensions can feature macroeconomic and geostrategic forces, risks on a regional and global scale that pose challenges of a various kind to humankind. In this paper the author argues that this requires a new lexicon and a special approach that have their mark on operational art. Integrating ends, ways and means to align forces and actions in time and space meaningfully is very much needed for the successful conduct of military operations to get a grip on the dynamics of the VUCA environment.*

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## Introduction

Not necessarily most popular on a global scale, it is obvious that NATO is still the strongest player of the international arena. The Alliance consists of 31 independent member states with Finland being the latest to join it in 2023 and Sweden most probably soon following suit. Its security posture results from the member states' values and interests and as an international political-military organization, the Alliance's sole task is to guarantee the member states' freedom and security through the implementation of various political and military means. They can consult and cooperate on defense and security related issues in order to solve problems, build trust, and prevent conflict. The Alliance is committed to the peaceful resolution of any disputes, but in case diplomatic efforts fail, it certainly has the military power to undertake any sort of operations that may fall under the collective defense clause of the North Atlantic Treaty or under the United Nations mandate. NATO may carry out such operations either alone or in cooperation with other countries and various international organizations.<sup>2</sup>

## Non-state actors

Since the end of the Cold War, military operations have fed from many sources. The first is the unwanted and long-lasting consequence of the demise of the bipolar world order that increased the number of non-state actors, who constantly challenge the status quo. Unlike the traditional international arena in which state actors primarily interact with other state actors, the last three decades witnessed state actors increasingly interacting with various non-state actors.

The second is the proverbial complexity of the international arena that provides non-state actors with an abundance of opportunity to become successful, even over a long period of time.<sup>3</sup>

The third is that contrary to the optimistic assumptions, the end of global confrontation did not end armed conflicts as various forms of state versus non-state actor interaction have come to the fore. Globalization offers a limitless terrain for these interactions that can erupt anytime and anywhere. State versus non-state actor interactions very often feature violence fed by the endless cycle of terror and counter-terror that occasionally displays an unprecedented level of lethality.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> What is NATO? Available at: <https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html>, accessed on April 20, 2021.

<sup>3</sup> Porkolab, Imre. (2013). When the Goldfish meets the Anaconda: A modern fable on unconventional leadership. *Counter Terrorism Exchange*, 3 (3). pp. 5-21.

<sup>4</sup> Hardt, Michael, Negri, Antonio (2004). *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*. Penguin Press. pp. 26-27.

State versus non-state actor interaction is also a strong actor versus a weak actor contest and can result in asymmetric, irregular and low intensity wars. The consequence of this special type of war is serious, as an examination of their outcome in the last two hundred years reveals. Weak actors increasingly win the percental outcome of strong actor versus weak actor contests displays.

Strong actor dominance dropped from 88.2:11.8 in the period between 1800-1849, to 79.5:20.5 in the period between 1850-1899, to 55.1:44.9 in the period between 1900-1949, and to 45:55 in the period between 1950-1998.<sup>5</sup> It has also become clear that weak actors very often use time to help their cause against the strong actor. Clausewitz stated that one can win by using time. The main goals include the setting of limited objectives, for example, causing small, but continuous casualties to strong actor. In this way, weak actor can exhaust strong actor over time, thus negating obvious shortcomings in terms of DOTMLPF.<sup>6</sup>

The major NATO involvements in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century in Iraq and Afghanistan were, despite the Alliance's clear technological and material advantage, long campaigns that did not end with a clear defeat of the weak actor. In a classic article published in *Foreign Affairs* half a century ago, Henry Kissinger lamented on what went wrong during the war in Vietnam. He concluded that the strong actor wanted to fight a military war, but the weak actor fought a political one.

The strong actor sought physical attrition, whereas the weak actor preferred psychological exhaustion. During the war the strong actor lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of this special type of war: weak actor wins if it does not lose and strong actor loses if it does not win.<sup>7</sup> Things have just become worse for the strong actor since then. The dramatic increase in the number of non-state actors, the accelerating trend of technology development, the explosion in the number of information exchange result in the fact that strong actor has to cope with a wide range of simultaneous threats and challenges.<sup>8</sup>

## Three waves

The conduct of military operations takes place in an environment that contemporary military terminology describes as volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, or in short VUCA. The social wave-front theory provides a useful narrative to understand these attributes. The theory regards human history as a succession of

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<sup>5</sup> Arreguin-Toft, Ivan: How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, *International Security*, 26 (1), 2001, pp. 93-128.

<sup>6</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von (1993). *On War*. Everyman's Library, pp. 102-103; DOTMLPF is an acronym that stands for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities. Rowan, James R.: A Quick Look Across the DOTMLPF Domains, *Engineer*, January-April 2009, pp. 13-19.

<sup>7</sup> Kissinger, Henry A. (1969). The Viet Nam Negotiations. *Foreign Affairs*, 48 (2). pp. 211-234.

<sup>8</sup> Porkoláb, Imre – Zweibelson, Ben. (2018). Designing a NATO that Thinks Differently for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Challenges, *Defence Review*, 146 (1). pp. 196-212.



three waves of changes such as the agricultural, the industrial, and the informational one. The basic assumption is that innovations and break points influence human social development which generates waves moving at certain speed.<sup>9</sup> Thus, the social wave-front theory explains the way wars change as the waves accumulate their force. A thorough understanding of the waves is of utmost importance, since general conclusion is that every time the waves clash, bloody wars break out, as tensions between the representatives of different waves accumulate.<sup>10</sup>

According to the social wave-front theory, the way humans generate wealth and the way they wage war are related. War is a part of human social existence, and reflects the society with which it evolves in consonance. Understanding the social context of military operations is critical as throughout human history wars, social entities other than states, social organizations other than armies, and combatants other than soldiers, waged war. Clausewitz acknowledged that nothing is eternal in war and there could be "little doubt that many previous ways of fighting [would] reappear".<sup>11</sup> During a long period of human history, wars were a permanent way of life, mostly conceived as a natural phenomenon. Most non-state actors represent earlier waves and see war from a different perspective. They fight for different aims and by different means.<sup>12</sup>

The NATO forces can commit to such operations maximum lethal efficiency, as their capability to kill is unparalleled on a global scale. However, political effectiveness often counts more than military efficiency, and in the VUCA environment, indicators of military efficiency might often be irrelevant to political effectiveness.<sup>13</sup> Military operations tend to degenerate and become confusing, distant, and squalid, rather than decisive or heroic. Similar conflicts held off large armies during the First Wave, when the price to be paid seemed too high or the gain too small for empire builders.

The Western expansion and colonialism during the Second Wave proved that primitive or imperfect warfare could not defeat modern armies supported by

<sup>9</sup> Toffler, Alvin (1980). *The Third Wave*, Bantam Books. pp. 10-12.

<sup>10</sup> Toffler, Alvin – Toffler, Heidi (1993). *War and Anti-War, Survival at the Dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Little, Brown and Company. pp. 19-25.

<sup>11</sup> Coker, Coker, Christopher. (2002). *Waging War Without Warriors, The Changing Culture of Military Conflict*, IISS Studies In International Security, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 2002, p. 6; Clausewitz, pp. 84, 101, 173; Hammes, Thomas X.: *The Sling and the Stone, On War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Zenith Press, 2004, p. 3; Toffler – Toffler, p. 64; Crevel, Martin van: *The Transformation of War*, The Free Press, 1991, p. 73; Quotation in Clausewitz, p. 624.

<sup>12</sup> Wegman, Yehuda. (2005). *Israel's Security Doctrine and the Trap of "Limited Conflict"*, Military Technology, March. pp. 86-89; Clausewitz, p. 608.

<sup>13</sup> Hammes, Thomas X. (2004). *The Sling and the Stone, On War in the 21st Century*, Zenith Press, 2004 pp. 16-32, 207-215; Wilson, G. I. – Sullivan, John P. – Kempfer, Hal: *Fourth Generation Warfare, It's Here, And We Need New Intelligence-Gathering Techniques for Dealing with It*, *Armed Forces Journal*, October 2002, pp. 56-62; Wilcox, Greg – Wilson, Gary I.: *Military Response to Fourth Generation Warfare in Afghanistan*, Internet, accessed 23. 09. 2002, available at: [www.emergency.com/2002/4gw5may02.htm](http://www.emergency.com/2002/4gw5may02.htm); Knox, MacGregor – Murray, Williamson: *The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050*, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 192; Biddle, Stephen: *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare*, *Foreign Affairs*, 92 (3), 2003, p. 46.

advanced technologies and organization. In the context of the unfolding 21st century, it seems so that political and psychological factors predominate over traditional military ones.<sup>14</sup> This Third Wave is characterized by several parallel revolutions in information related technologies, the continuous geostrategic restructuring, and the diminishing role of the nation state. Traditional poles of attraction break down as boundaries and dividing lines in the international arena evaporate. Whereas the Second Wave allowed for discernible principles and boundaries, the Third Wave stands for constant fragmentation and fractalization.<sup>15</sup>

Non-state actors display a wide variety of relations including both alignments and enmities often without a dominant axis. Allies on a particular issue might be adversaries on the other. Various patches on a global and regional scale emerge and disappear constantly. They feature both enclaves of order and disorder, very often existing side by side. This constellation is extremely war-prone as various forms of violence can flourish in highly anarchistic enclaves. The Second Wave stood for a multitude of conventional wars between ambitious and capable state actors, but the Third Wave increasingly yields the aforementioned special type of war waged in the VUCA environment. Most non-state actors exploit and feed on hopeless poverty, wealth discrepancies, and various religious motives. This indicates new and hybrid forms of violence that can negate NATO's advantage in traditional terms and dangerously stretch resources.<sup>16</sup>

## Six megatrends

In the Third Wave certain macroeconomic and geostrategic forces called megatrends shape the world on a global scale. These are rapid urbanization, demographic and social changes, climate changes and resource scarcity, shift in global economic power, and technological breakthrough. Megatrends alter the current status quo and definitely have the potential to influence the world collective future in a profound way. The implications are broad as megatrends stand for tremendous risks that require mitigation. The depth and the complexity of the forces involved indicate security challenges that reach deep into the very fabric of the societies involved. Solutions have to ease the confluence of the defense and security challenges posed by these trends on a mega scale.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Gray, Chris H. (1997). *Postmodern War, The New Politics of Conflict*, Routledge. pp. 21-23, 81, 155-158, 168-177, 196.

<sup>15</sup> Binnendijk, Hans. (1995). A Strategic Assessment for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn 1996, p. 67; Lyotard, Jean-François: *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, University of Minnesota Press, 1984, pp. 14-17; Kumar, Krishan: *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society, New Theories for the Contemporary World*, Blackwell, 1995, pp. 101-104.

<sup>16</sup> Brown, Seyom (2003). *The Illusion of Control, Force and Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Brookings Institution Press, 2003, pp. 67-69; Peters, Ralph: *Fighting for the Future, Will America Triumph?* Stackpole Books, 1999, pp. 1-17; See also Jobbagy, Zoltan. (2005). *Wars, Waves and the West: Putting Effects-Based Operations into Context*, TNO Defence, Security and Safety, May 2005, pp. 11-25.

<sup>17</sup> Five Megatrends and Their Implications for Global Defense & Security, PWC, November 2016, Internet, accessed 20 April 2021, available at: <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/government-public-services/assets/five-megatrends-implications.pdf>.

A very wide variety of military and non-military risks that come from multiple sources and point into multiple directions influences the security of the NATO member states. These risks contain uncertainty and instability, and are difficult to predict. They have the potential to cause regional problems at the periphery of the Alliance that originate from ethnic rivalries, religious tensions, disputed territories, conflicts over resources, especially water scarcity, inadequate income, failed reforms, human rights abuses, collapse of governments, and dissolution of states. This can affect regional stability, cause human suffering, and ignite armed conflicts that can spill over into neighboring countries, including the NATO member states. Global problems stem from the prevailing global context and contain risks on a much larger scale. The acts of terrorism, various forms of sabotage, organized crime, the disruption of the flow of vital resources, the uncontrolled movement of great numbers of people profoundly and adversely affect the perception of security and stability of NATO on a global scale.<sup>18</sup>

According to a recent UN report, the number of conflicts has sharply increased since 2010. For example, in 2015, the number of ongoing conflicts increased to 50 compared to 41 a year before with battle related deaths largely concentrated in the Middle East. Conflicts increasingly affect civilians living in densely populated areas with the result that the number of forced displacements since the end of World War II is all the time high. Despite the relative high number of battle related deaths it seems so that in the unfolding 21<sup>st</sup> century interpersonal and gang violence kill much more people than political violence.

These forms of violence tend to be increasingly interrelated in countries where institutions are weak and social norms tolerate violence. This tendency does not affect all regions in the same way, but they are persistent as many countries and subnational areas face cycles of repeated violence, weak governance, and instability. Conflict and violence also have the tendency to cross borders and can affect life in multiple ways. A result is that the poor are increasingly concentrated in countries suffering from prolonged conflicts as these conflicts keep countries poor.<sup>19</sup> Things have just become even worse since the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022.

Risks on a regional and global scale demand a vast range of different responses with the consequence that NATO is required to execute a variety of military operations concurrently and at different scales. Non-state actors attempt to achieve their goals through different forms of destabilization by taking advantage of the VUCA environment as boundaries between state and non-state actors increasingly blur. The NATO forces may confront an enemy, who blends the elements of conventional and unconventional warfare thus waging the aforementioned special type of war. The recent discussion on hybrid warfare well reflects this reality.

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<sup>18</sup> Allied Joint Doctrine, Allied Joint Operations AJP-01(E) pp. 2-6 – 2-10

<sup>19</sup> Marc, Alexandre. (2021). *Conflict and Violence in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Current Trends as Observed in Empirical Research and Statistics, World Bank Group, Fragility, Conflict and Violence, internet, accessed 29 April 2021 available from <https://www.un.org/pga/70/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2016/01/Conflict-and-violence-in-the-21st-century-Current-trends-as-observed-in-empirical-research-and-statistics-Mr.-Alexandre-Marc-Chief-Specialist-Fragility-Conflict-and-Violence-World-Bank-Group.pdf>.

Hybrid wars arise when a compound of coincidental or uncoordinated state or non-state actors successfully mix conventional and unconventional threats in a simultaneous and coordinated manner. Their activity can gain momentum by the implementation of a broad range of non-military measures to exploit the NATO vulnerabilities wherever they see it possible.<sup>20</sup>

State or non-state actors, who wage hybrid war, do not necessarily follow those legal or ethical standards that are accepted by the NATO member states. The spread of nuclear capabilities, the proliferation of CBRN weapons and devices, and the easy availability of innovative delivery means remains a matter of serious concern. Despite the existence of international non-proliferation regimes, weapons technology proliferation increases the access to sophisticated military capabilities. Non-state actors possess the ability to acquire offensive and defensive air-, land- and sea-borne systems, various theatre missiles, and other advanced weaponry. The hallmark of the Third Wave is information technology and the reliance on such systems is growing. This creates vulnerability to cyberspace attacks that can even reduce or cancel the NATO forces' superiority.<sup>21</sup>

## Design thinking

Megatrends, risks on a regional and global scale, and challenges of different kind require a new lexicon to foster innovative thought and promote original approaches. Non-state actors successfully manipulate the perception of audiences on a local, regional and global scale, and can fully exploit modern communications media to mobilize supporters and sympathizers. Their speed of action surpasses the speed national governments can achieve by far. Non-state actors exploit ingrained belief systems composed of religious, ethnic, tribal, or cultural elements for the creation of extremely lethal and very often non-rational reactions among social groups. They use various real and cyber domains to create ideological, religious, or cultural blind spots.

From these safe havens or legal loopholes, they can provoke state actors into an overreaction that results in expensive containment, prevention, and response efforts in dozens of remote areas.<sup>22</sup> Non-state actors try to exhaust state actor and force it to change its political objectives. In modern conflicts, exhaustion does not necessarily come from high military casualties, but to remit the political support in the home country. Modern democracies cannot wage war without political and public support for long.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Allied Joint Doctrine, Allied Joint Operations AJP-01(E) pp. 2-10 – 2-13.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, pp. 2-13 – 2-17.

<sup>22</sup> Kilcullen, David J. (2021). New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict, *Small Wars Journal*, Internet, accessed 20. 04. 2021, available at: <https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/new-paradigms-for-21st-century-conflict>.

<sup>23</sup> Mack, Andrew. (1975). Why Big Nations Loose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflicts, *World Politics*, 27 (2), 1975, pp. 175-200.

The defeat of non-state actors requires a special sort of approach that stands for creativity ranging from problem definition to problem solution, including iterations. A problem solution is a viable result that can differ widely in terms of applicability from other similarly good enough solutions delivered by others. Every creative process is messy and painful as a high degree of creativity and originality has to be controlled and directed to channel early approaches towards a few possible solutions, from which one is selected. A creative process is full of tensions characterized by the constant need to balance between planning and adapting, knowing and sensing, executing and coping.<sup>24</sup>

Military operations feature challenges manifested in a broad range of various problems that can be either tame or wicked. A tame problem is linear in nature and yields to traditional approaches. It is decomposable into parts and solvable through a chain of causal assumptions. Unfortunately, the bulk of problems posed by such operations are wicked, and not amenable to linear solutions.<sup>25</sup>

In the VUCA environment chaos meets order constantly in a disorderly way, as occurrences move continuously back and forth. The resulting complexity denies the primacy of order and causality, and the drive for efficiency and constant affirmation. Tackling complexity requires freedom and openness, action and possibility.<sup>26</sup> The bewildering array of relationships among the constituents spans over several scales. It features emergent properties that come from the constant interplay of chaotic and non-chaotic forces, and a network of various alternatives. A creative approach helps to deliver an explanatory framework to help frame, perhaps even understand, the spatial and temporal consequences of actions and effects.<sup>27</sup> The VUCA environment reveals both deterministic outcomes and random fluctuations that come from the constant shuffling between stability and instability.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Ambrose, Gavin – Harris, Paul. (2017). *Design Thinking, the Act or Practice of Using your Mind to Consider Design*, AVA Book, 2010, pp. 6-8; Anderson, Wendy R. – Husain, Amir – Rosner, Marla: *The OODA Loop: Why Timing is Everything*, Cognitive Times, December 2017, Internet, accessed 02. 04. 2020, available at: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/155280/WendyRAnderson\\_CognitiveTimes\\_OODA%20LoopArticle.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/155280/WendyRAnderson_CognitiveTimes_OODA%20LoopArticle.pdf).

<sup>25</sup> Liedtka, Jeanne. (2020). *The Essential Guide to Design Thinking*, Darden Executive Education, 2015, pp. 3-6; Jobbagy, Zoltan: *Innovation Methodologies for Defence Challenges: On Design Thinking and Organic Approaches*, Hungarian Defence Review, Volume 148, Issue 2. pp. 50-64.

<sup>26</sup> Lefebvre, Eric – Letiche, Hugo. (1999). *Managing Complexity from Chaos: Uncertainty, Knowledge and Skills*, Emergence, 1 (3). pp. 7-15; Axelrod, Robert – Cohen, Michael D.: *Harnessing Complexity, Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier*, The Free Press, 1999, pp. 28-31; Lissack, Michael R.: *Complexity: the Science, its Vocabulary, and its Relation to Organizations*, Emergence, 1 (1), 1999, pp. 110-125.

<sup>27</sup> Levin, Simon A. (2003). *Complex Adaptive Systems: Exploring the Known, the Unknown and the Unknowable*, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 40 (1). pp. 163-168; Baranger, Michel: *Chaos, Complexity, and Entropy, A physics talk for non-physicists*, pp. 9-11, Internet, accessed 24. 11. 2005, available at: <http://necsi.org/projects/baranger/cce.pdf>; Cilliers, Paul: *Complexity and postmodernism, Understanding complex systems*, Routledge, 1998, pp. 2-5; Nicolis, Grégoire – Prigogine, Ilya: *Exploring Complexity, An Introduction*, W. H. Freeman and Company, 1989, pp. 5-8, 31-32; Prigogine, Ilya – Stengers, Isabella: *Order out of Chaos, Man's New Dialogue with Nature*, Heinemann, 1984, pp. 131-137.

<sup>28</sup> Stacey, Ralph D. (1996). *Strategic Management & Organisational Dynamics*, Pitman Publishing. pp. 324-329.

Creativity can help comprehend things localized in space and time, and to attain a temporary and partial interpretation to avoid confusing causation with correlation and simulation with prediction. Whereas the former refers to the preference for creating retrospective validation to identify best practices, the latter points to the fact that even if it is possible to simulate something, it does not obviously mean that it is possible to equally predict its future.<sup>29</sup>

## Operational art

Creative processes balance with several different possible futures, where there is not always time for mechanical, deductive systemic analyses aimed at detecting causality. Thus, instead of focusing on certain desired effects, the emphasis should be on the ability to respond consistently to unpredictability. The VUCA environment prohibits the conduct of military operations based on single and prescriptive models as such operations require that the NATO forces adapt and evolve rapidly in order to handle dynamic and changing situations.<sup>30</sup> This naturally raises the demand for a better conceptualization when it comes to operational art. One has to be satisfied with understanding certain general features in terms of correlation rather than attempting to discover causal mechanisms. Consequently, the VUCA environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century of military operations should be regarded as an opportunity to successfully act in evolving situations instead of inaccurately predicting futures in terms of desired effects.<sup>31</sup>

Traditionally, operational art is a conceptual framework that underpins the planning and conduct of military operations by taking advantage of two interrelated concepts such as operations design and operations management. Operational art helps clarify the problem at hand, provides a framework to assess opportunities and associated risks, fosters possible actions to gain advantage, and delivers logical and executable solutions to complex problems posed by an operating environment. It integrates ends, ways and means, and determines which forces conduct what actions in time and space to achieve objectives and end states. Operational art blends intuition, experience and leadership, and serves as the critical link between strategy and tactics, and allocates the necessary military and non-military resources.<sup>32</sup>

Operational art requires the maintenance of situational awareness, the balancing of ends and means, the determination of ways, and the orchestration of actions and the use of capabilities. It combines a broad vision, anticipation, planning, preparation, execution,

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<sup>29</sup> Flood, Robert L. (1999). *Knowing the Unknowable, Systemic Practice and Action Research*, 12 (3). pp. 247-252; Kurtz, Cynthia F. – Snowden, David J.: *The new dynamics of strategy: Sense-making in a complex and complicated world*, *IBM Systems Journal*, 42 (3), 2003, pp. 462-463; Snowden, David – Stanbridge, Peter: *The Landscape of Management: Creating the Context for Understanding Social Complexity*, *ECO Special Double Issue*, 6 (1-2), 2004, p. 146; Stacey, pp. 346-347.

<sup>30</sup> Snowden, David. (1999). *The Paradox of Story, Scenario and Strategy Planning*, 1 (5). pp. 16-20.

<sup>31</sup> Emmeche C. – Køppe S. – Stjernfelt F. (1997) *Explaining Emergence: Towards an Ontology of Levels*, *Journal for General Philosophy of Science*, 28. p. 116.

<sup>32</sup> Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations AJP-5, May 2019. pp. 1-1 – 1-3.

and assessment. The commander has a primary role in operational art as they have to frame the larger context, set forth objectives and priorities, identify opportunities and risks, formulate operational ideas, maximize the military effectiveness, and promote responsiveness and flexibility. The commander's staff conducts detailed planning and assessments. Operational art combines the commander's skills with staff-assisted processes. It includes framing the environment and the problem, developing or refining options that give a comprehensive logic to the operation, expressing a vision and refining plans and orders that have to be turned into action by integrating, coordinating, synchronizing, prioritizing and allocating military and non-military capabilities.<sup>33</sup> A key element of operational art is to find ways to weaken or destroy enemy centers of gravity, and strengthen or protect friendly forces centers of gravity sufficiently enough to achieve various objectives and the end states set. Centers of gravity are contextual and subject to change at any time during the execution of the operation. As a result, center of gravity analysis is an iterative, continuous process.<sup>34</sup>

## *Conclusion*

It is clear that players, forces and trends together craft the new architecture of international security. The road ahead is a bumpy end, and everyone has to expect challenges and threats that have to be addressed. Thus, military operations in this VUCA environment and practicing operational art in the unfolding 21<sup>st</sup> century in a meaningful way that requires a peripheral vision instead of a focused one. Understanding the periphery of such operations, becoming familiar with the dynamics of ethnic rivalries, religious tensions, disputed territories, inadequate income, failed reforms, human rights abuses, is extremely difficult, in some cases impossible.

Mastering information related technologies, being in sync with various aspects of geostrategic restructuring requires a new lexicon and innovative approaches. Only a broad vision makes it possible to detect and take advantage of unfolding opportunities and to harmonize external demand and internal diversity. Operational art has to become truly artistic, hence a creative process that balances the unity of perspective and the diversity of purpose with the diversity of perspective and the unity of purpose. In order for this to happen, one has to move away from focusing on predefined and static end-states aimed at synchronizing activities of the NATO forces towards ideas in which diverse elements collaborate simultaneously.

It is not enough to synchronize operational design with operational management. The VUCA environment puts a clear pressure on operational art must. Both the commander and the staff have to become able to self-synchronize, de-synchronize, and a-synchronize these two interrelated concepts. Fragmented directions, relinquished control and a multitude of possible options combine the higher rhythm

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid, pp. 3-1 – 3-5.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, pp. 4-1 – 4-12.

generally found at lower levels, with the lower rhythm generally found at higher level to achieve vertical and horizontal harmony within the NATO forces. Military operations require an operational art that has a simple focus and increased flexibility. A few critical processes can define directions without confining them.

Operational design and operational management as concepts should merge in the phase of transition that does not settle into stable equilibrium nor does it fall entirely apart. Operational art should be rigid enough to organize change, but not too rigid to prevent change. This requires agility, information sharing and a peer-to-peer relationship in which everyone is empowered to contribute.

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# EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE MIGRANT CRISIS

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DOI: [https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod\\_strint.2023.ch7](https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod_strint.2023.ch7)

## Keywords:

migration,  
security,  
EU,  
Islamism,  
right-wing extremism,  
public opinion

**Abstract:** *The topic of modern migrations and the associated effects have long since ceased to be of importance only to experts in the fields of demography, social and economic policy. The turbulent migration events in the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century have shown us that modern migration has become a serious security issue for all European countries and the Union itself as never before. The security problems related to the massive wave of migration to Europe, mainly from the Middle East, and also from North Africa, are twofold. One side of the coin concerns general security problem that irregular migration poses for migrant transit countries and migrant destination countries. This is usually presented as a fear of Islamist extremists infiltrating migrant convoys to Europe, or more generally as a fear of the "Islamization of Europe". Another problem related to the dramatic migration flows to Europe is the rise of the radical right in many European countries and the emergence of strong anti-immigration and Islamophobic narratives. European national populist discourses have used the opportunity to emphasize more strongly the threat of Islamization of the Old Continent, and the fact that many of the asylum seekers were Muslims, who made the image of the "Muslim invasion" even more effective. What also benefited right-wing populists were the terrorist attacks on European soil that coincided with the migration wave. Right-wing populism, based on the narratives of anti-migration policies, has also become*

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*a part of the electoral slogans of political parties, some of which have also become a part of the executive branch. This paper analyzes the problems faced by European countries due to the increasing insecurity caused by the sudden influx of migrants, and also the spread of rightwing extremism, which is a problem in itself in the complicated security algorithm today.*

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## Introduction

The displacement of people and human communities around the globe has been a part of human history since its beginnings. Sometimes voluntarily, sometimes forcibly, often due to economic problems, sometimes for political reasons, sometimes fleeing wars and sometimes as participants in them, individuals and groups leave their habitat in search of happiness and a safe place in a new geographical, social and cultural environment.

Contemporary anthropologists say that the history of identity has been a succession of migration, chance, and adaptation. One of them, French scholar Michel Agier, the creator of the term "new cosmopolitanism", even claims that no human being has ever been native and that borders have always been unstable, "rebuilt and challenged" (Ažije, 2019), and borders are not just walls, there are many other forms of them. Thus, we distinguish the boundaries of place (here and there), time (before and after, once and now), and the dividing line of the social world (everything that is capable of existing in a social sense and "demarcates" what is intrinsic to it from what is different). Although the ideologues of globalization have often emphasized this in their enticing narrative, globalization (as we live it, not as it is imagined) has not abolished borders. It has only transformed them, shifted them, and separated them. It has multiplied them.

Nor has globalization, though heralded as an important transmission and connection "apparatus", diminished the full range of human differences (cultural, ethnic, religious - general identity). It has only made it easier for us to meet and live with different strangers and to be bothered by some of their characteristics that are foreign to us. The prevalence of people and human communities has conditioned the emphasis on differences, which some like to portray as more significant than ever, and others as different and irreconcilable worlds and civilizations, before which only conflict and clashes are possible. Are we really more different than ever and so entrenched in our rigid views that we should only expect conflict? What is the truth?

Using the example of the relationship between the former colonial power and the former colony and the relationship it represents in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, Harari (Yuval Noah Harari) makes a great point when he says, "The difference between Anglo-Saxon England and the Indian Pala Empire was much greater than the difference between

present-day India and Britain, but in the time of King Alfred the Great, British Airways did not offer direct flights between Delhi and London" (Harari, 2017: 184). The increasingly dynamic crossing of borders in search of work, security, and a better future, as well as the need to meet, accept, or reject strangers, "strains our political systems and national identities, which were forged in an age of much less mobility" (Harari, *ibid.*).

Migrations and conflicts have always gone hand in hand, "migrations have created divisions, which in recent times have been characterized mainly by different cultural (some would say civilizational) contexts" (Subotić, 2022: 12). Culture is a faithful companion of the migration flows and their determinant at the same time. Cultures that came from others were accepted or rejected depending on the criteria by which they were evaluated. The risk of declaring universal values to which the "heralds" have become accustomed is a point of view that was characteristic of the ideologists of colonization. They were guided by the idea of the "enlightenment of others" and believed that the whole world should enjoy the benefits inherent in their society. Taking the example of the relationship of the Western countries, primarily the US and the leading countries of the EU, with the countries of the Muslim world, we can see clear inertia from this period.

This time, the "exporters of democracy" met a "market", where it is currently impossible to "sell this article" (Subotić, 2022: 12). The peculiar secularism in the Islamic world, embodied in secular-type absolutist monarchies and socialist countries with a strong national narrative, has collapsed with the attempt to import democracy to this part of the world. The Arab Spring is a product of people's desire for change, and also of interventionism, which, on the principle that "the day before the election is tyranny, and the day after the election is democracy", only fueled conflict and brought Islamists to power. Finally, "transitional losers are perfect prey for protagonists of extreme attitudes and ideas" (Milenković, Subotić, 2017: 64).

By the time "democratic Islamism" took an increasingly dominant militant form amid the general decline of the regional economy, it was too late to reconsider all the choices. Evil in the form of the Islamic State was born, conflicts and wars inflamed the region, rising the flow of migrants who moved towards Europe at a drastic rate, creating a series of problems, both for the migrants themselves and for the migrants' "transit societies already burdened with their problems (from the economic to those representing the legacy of the wars of the 1990s - the example of the Western Balkans route). This flood of migration has raised many new questions and revived old ones that have remained unanswered for too long.

The current migratory movements, therefore, bring with them problems that occur in the well-known interregnum, whose main feature is causality, according to which migrants have to adapt to the "host society", which in turn has to adapt to them.

Much of the contemporary literature in this area deals with various problems encountered in the adaptation of immigrants to their new environment. While the newcomers do not usually face the same problems, they often challenge the self-determination of the host society and demand a share in the sources of power within that society (Giddens, 1990).

The other side of the equation, however, is how the hosts of these immigrants respond. National populist discourse in Europe has seized the opportunity to increasingly emphasize the threat posed by the Islamization of the Old Continent. Right-wing populism, based on the narratives of anti-immigration politics, has also become a part of the electoral slogans of political parties, some of which have also become a part of the executive branch. It is precisely for this reason that the following pages analyze the duality in the understanding of security on European soil in the context of mass migration movements. The problem of mass migration to Europe in itself deserves an analysis, but so does the radicalization of European societies, in which the migration crisis plays an important role.

## Migration and the "Islamization of Europe"

If we reject the spread of fears among the population, used as a campaign tool by the ideologists of right-wing extremism, the fact remains that migration to Europe from the immediate environment will continue. Compared to its immediate surroundings, the European population is stagnating, and the Old Continent is much more economically developed. At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Europe had a population of about 400 million, while the population increased only to about 750 million in the entire century (Bülent, 2002). In contrast, the African population has increased tenfold from about 130 million to nearly 1.3 billion over the same period and continues to grow. Since 1950, the population of the Middle East has increased from 92 million to over 350 million, with stagnation predicted for the first twenty years of the new century (PRB, 2001).

Although we have experienced significant benefits related to promoting births in recent decades, European fertility rates are among the lowest in the world. No European country has a rate of 2.1, which is the minimum necessary to replace the current residents with new ones, according to the 2016 World Bank data. In sub-Saharan Africa, the fertility rate is 4.8, and in the Middle East 2.8. On the other hand, the life expectancy of Europeans is among the highest in the world, ranging from 71.5 years in Ukraine to 83 years in Switzerland (Rosser, 2017).

If we assume that the economic gap between these regions and Europe will not change soon, we can expect new waves of migration to Europe in the future. These waves will not be able to change the demographics of Europe, but there is currently no comprehensive strategy to address this future challenge. In the current circulation, "there is a barbed wire of nationalists and ad hoc behavior of the pro-European broader center" (Subotić, 2022: 285).

The Italian right-wing Salvini threatens that Europe will become an "Islamic caliphate" if the right does not win, fake news spreads panic about migrants among the population, conspiracy theories about the massive replacement of "Christian Europeans" with people of other races and religions, barbed wire and pragmatic deals with authoritarian leaders to stop waves of refugees. This is what public opinion in Europe has looked like to a great extent over the last seven or eight years.

Public opinion is certainly one of the most important driving forces for this process, to advance the interests of the nation, the elite, and certain interest groups. How and in what way the interests are represented and to what extent they are fulfilled depends on the structure of the society and the administrative system that governs it. However, the general constant that prevails in almost all modern societies, and that is certainly reinforced by modern media and the Internet, is that public opinion is a manageable and generated category. In any case, it is used as a justification, cover, or motivation for certain decisions made by the political elite, including those related to migration and migrants (Mitrović, Perić, 2022). Above all, populism-inspired public opinion represents a strong potential generator of extremist and destabilizing social potential.

Nevertheless, leaving aside opportunistic and populist platitudes towards migrants, this issue will remain one of the main issues on European soil, because the issue of immigration is not only a question of the number of people who will come to European soil, but also an issue that is divided into economic, cultural, religious and demographic areas.

At present, there are few constructive voices on this phenomenon in the European political arena. Even if migrants are no longer such a burning issue as they were in 2014 and especially in 2015, immigration will not disappear as an issue in Europe; in fact, it will be one of the most important issues in the future and, consequently, will influence the future appearance of the European political scene.

While there is currently no proposal in the pro-European mainstream for a comprehensive and long-term solution to the immigration problem, anti-immigrant sentiments and conspiracy theories are rampant on the right. They are characterized by different variants of right-wing identity politics that refers to the "danger" of white Christians being forcibly replaced by people from other continents, especially the Middle East and Africa.

In general, violence is the main cause of the abuse of ethnic or ethnonational identity, either in the usual sense of supporting the nation or forcing people to change or hide their identity, which is rarer, but not uncommon (Subotić, Mitrović, 2018: 25). Thus, the inertia and ignoring problems prevail on one side of the political spectrum, while ultra-populism prevails on the other.

Since the outbreak of the migrant crisis in 2014, just over 2 million people have arrived in Europe. Of these, as many as 1 million arrived in 2015. For the Continent, this represents slightly more than 0.3% of the population, which can hardly change anything demographically (Subotić, 2022: 286). Theories about the "great population shift" and similar discourses fall short in the face of concrete numbers. However, conspiracy theorists and disinformers on the Internet have shown that the data of the UNHCR or the European Commission is an important tool.

The Islamic population, constantly targeted by the far right, is far from establishing a "caliphate" in Europe, as Matteo Salvini claims. According to the 2016 estimates by the Pew Research Center, Muslims constitute 4.9% of the population in the EU.<sup>3</sup> Most of them live in Bulgaria - 11.1%, France 8.8%, Sweden 8.1%, and

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<sup>3</sup> The data also includes the EU non-member countries: Norway and Switzerland.

Austria 6.9% (Lipka, 2017). National (Serbian) conspiracy theorists such as Dejan Lučić often mention phrases such as the "Islamic Republic of Germany", since in Germany Muslims constitute only 6.1% of the population, or in Italy only 4.8%. They also rarely mention Russia, where this religion makes up a much larger share of the total population, around 10% (Lipka, 2017).

With an optimistic estimate of the average level of immigration, the Islamic population could represent only 11.2% of the EU population in 2050. This means that the situation where the "Islamic population takes over Europe" has no factual basis. Even if the entire Middle East moved to Europe tomorrow, the Islamic population would not have been the majority, let alone with moderate or lower immigration trends.

Taking into account the fact that the "baby boomer generation" (Baby Boomers) will soon be retiring *en masse* to Europe, a multitude of concrete problems arise about which there is hardly any constructive debate. In the countries of the European Union, the working population continues to grow, and stable financing of pension funds is becoming impossible. One solution is to continue to adjust the retirement age to increasing life expectancy, and both of them would be wrong. The question is whether workers are still productive at 67 or 68, and these measures are also quite popular politically.

On the other hand, 2 million migrants who have arrived to Europe and who can only meet a part of the current and future needs have caused a real upheaval on the European political scene. The united migrant population, the narrative of Islam as a religion prone to extremism, is a powerful weapon of right-wing populists, who often surround themselves with the so-called New Christianity.

On the waves of the crisis, "anti-Islam and anti-immigration populists, as well as various Eurosceptic parties, become the structural difference of the political landscape in the size of European countries" (Subotić, 2020: 312).

Thus, although immigration is already economically beneficial to the country receiving new residents in several ways in the medium term, it proved to be quite unpopular in the short term. The natural skepticism of people towards foreigners was helpful and fake news, such as the disinformation that the increase in crime is directly related to migrants, although in the countries used as examples, such as a data for the Italy premises, minimized.

This environment and real challenges, however, pose a major problem in Europe, where cultural right-wing populism and economic left-wing populism increasingly rule rather than policies based on action and evidence. On the one hand, Europeans are intimidated into not accepting immigration that would compensate for the lack of the people of working age, and any postponement of the retirement age or correction of the level of state benefits of the nationalist population."

The problem of the fact that the European population has traditionally been accustomed to a high level of social benefits is reflected in the fact that this model was introduced during a period of great population boom, when a large number of people absorbed a great number of workers. The current demographic trends in Europe have reversed, and this model is already unsustainable. Any minimal correction will lead to mass revolts, especially in countries like France and Italy.



Therefore, the implementation of real policies in the future of Europe will be very complex, as the population of European countries will neither reform nor immigrate.

Although populists in power are likely to face the reality of their demagogic policies, they can do considerable damage both to the already "wounded" multiculturalism in Europe and to the budgets of the member states. On the other hand, the pro-European center (left and right) has little room for maneuver in the medium term. Either to allow immigration and risk the influx of populists, or implement reforms that cushion the effects of negative population trends and also risk the influx of populists due to social discontent. This is a task that is anything, but easy.

Where is room for sober reflection on this problem, apart from the rationalization inherent in the expiring liberal model (precisely because of its open flirtation with right-wing - ultimately corporatist - approach), even if it may sound strange at first sight, particularly in the field of religion? Is the impossibility of the coexistence of Muslims coming to Europe and people residing here (mainly Christians) exactly what the two extreme narratives (Islamist and right-wing - European) aim at in their expressions of hatred? The answer is yes, especially considering the differentiation of their hatred, which ultimately refers to those who would like to "put out the fire" rather than those who "set the fire".

The theological concepts based on love and forgiveness are not "fire accelerants", on the contrary. Everything that happens in the violence along the migratory route is not a product of religion or of the nation. It is a product of their abuse, that is, of the fact that these identity elements have made it convenient to start and (or) complete dreams of various psychopathological traumas or brutal financial benefits, easily obtained in troubled times, in their name. A person (and consequently a collectivity) who serves God out of fear does not see themselves as a relative subject in their relationship with God, but primarily as an object of religion. Such a person (collectivity) constantly has in mind the image of the God who is ready to punish those who do not fulfill norms, laws, and various ecclesiastical or other religious rules and customs (Subotić, 2019: 493). These persons do not see the God who is love, but consider him as a form that has to be appeased from time to time, before who something has to be earned. Therefore, "religion understood as love can contribute significantly to peace and cooperation, not only between groups belonging to the same faith, but also between different religions and denominations" (Subotić, 2019: 493). The idea of religious tolerance as a product of religion, which is in essence love, was created precisely with the aim of saving lives, reducing conflict and, consequently, giving people the freedom to choose their religion.

One of those who believe that religion and culture should be a factor of cohesion and growth rather than discord and regression is certainly Bassam Tibi, who because of this orientation has become a target of militant Islamists who, like moderate Europeans with their articulation and influence, consider far-right populist leaders and their followers to be enemies. Tibi rightly argues that most of the problems the world faces today when it comes to relations and conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims in the West are not due to a "clash of

civilizations”, but to the clash of two universalisms. The large influx of Muslims into Europe and the clash of these universalisms have produced a multitude of problems, including Islamism as not the only one, from which other problems branch off, at whose top is the real threat - terrorism. These challenges could be overcome by a different attitude of Europeans and Muslims when meeting on European soil. Tibi believes that Europeans have to renounce exclusivity and Eurocentrism, which has reduced Muslims in Europe to an ethno-religious underclass, hence the emergence of parallel societies and Islamic enclaves (Tibi, 2020: 157-174). Tibi also points out that Europeans have created two extremes: on the one hand, a populist anti-Islam approach and, on the other, a non-discriminatory multiculturalism based on the cultural relativist understanding that “everything is possible, everything passes” (Tibi, 2008: 191). Euro-Islam, which Tibi offers as a way to a peaceful and sustainable way out of this antagonism, implies the politics of integration that is simultaneously distinct from multiculturalism and assimilation. It is necessary that Europeans and Muslim migrants share the same basic values. Otherwise, Tibi argues, we will continue to see Islamists and Salafists seeking a place for Islam in the Western society while refusing to accept the European idea (Tibi, 2008: 180). “Being a European citizen”, Tibi concludes, “is much more than a passport”, it belongs to a state system based on the culture of democracy and individual human rights, implying the acceptance of secular civil society (ibid.).

## Migration and the strengthening of right-wing extremism

The unification of Islam implies several basic premises: the absence of differences between factions (especially between Sunnis and Shiites), the ignorance of various sources of Islam, the perception of the Islamic holy book as a document used primarily to justify the fight against infidels, an immanent warrior ethos, the ossification of patriarchy and traditionalism in the culture of Muslims (Jovanović, Ajzenhamer, 2017: 262). In the next step, Islam is associated with concepts such as fundamentalism, extremism and terrorism, which gives the recent monotheism the prerogative of a monolithic, violent religion, “although the entire history of Islam is marked by polemics and differences within the religion itself” (Subotić, 2015: 89).

Therefore, in order to portray Islam as hostile – “The Other” - it is first necessary to erase all distinctions, so that the next step would be the derivative identification of Islam with certain terrorist-organized movements. Who insists on establishing such a narrative in Europe today? The answer is usually simple: right-wing populists, who often cloak themselves in the so-called “New Christianity”.

The medium-term trends in contemporary Europe, reflected in the weakening of party democracy, the mediatization of politics and the commercialization of the media, and the seemingly widening gap between citizens and the “places where

decisions are made", can explain the success of populism in recent decades. They also help explain the tendency of political actors to address directly "the people" and to adopt at least some elements of the populist communication style.<sup>4</sup> Given these circumstances, it is easier to understand why anti-Islamic and anti-immigration populists, as well as various Euroskeptic parties, are becoming a structural feature of the political landscape in most European countries. Crisis is not a neutral category in social analysis, rather "it is a category of social and political practice mobilized to accomplish a particular political task" (Brubaker, 2011: 102), or as Moffit states more explicitly: "Crisis does not precede populist politics and is not independent of it; on the contrary, it is a central component of populist politics" (Moffit, 2016: 111).

Apart from Spain and Greece, where the populist pattern temporarily "went left" and is a clear product of the economic crisis, right-wing populist reaction was most directly and obviously caused by the migrant crisis, which "more than any other geopolitical process shook the European continent" (Despotović, 2017: 169). The number of immigrants in 2015, although large, was not objectively insurmountable and could not be channeled. The number of 1.3 million asylum applications filed in the EU countries is almost double the previous high number of 1992, but it is still only "a quarter of one percent of the EU population" (Pew Research Center, 2016).

The most immediate political impact of the migrant crisis was felt in Germany, Sweden, and Hungary. In Germany, the crisis led to a moment of unusual openness, by Angela Merkel's decision in September 2015 to open German borders to all asylum seekers, who entered it via Hungary and Austria. At the same time, there was a strong reaction against this openness, which "manifested itself in the transformation of the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland - AfD) from a neoliberal party to an anti-immigrant populist party that achieved previously unimaginable electoral success in the 2016 local elections and the 2017 federal elections" (Goeres, et al., 2017). The Social Democrats also won the 2019 state elections in Brandenburg, and the Christian Democrats in Saxony. However, these two parties achieved their worst results in these eastern provinces since the reunification of Germany. The right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) came in second in both provinces with record results (Bojić, 2019).

In Sweden, which took in more refugees per capita than Germany in 2015 (Rydgern, Meiden, 2016), the far-right, anti-migration "Sweden Democrats" party won 17.6 percent of the vote in the 2018 elections, a significant increase from 12.9 percent they received in previous elections (Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2018). In Hungary, one of the main stops on the Western Balkans route at that time, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán took an anti-immigration initiative by erecting barbed wire

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<sup>4</sup> In the part that refers to the populist aspect of the anti-immigration narrative, the authors will use the work: Subotić, M. Dimitrijević, I. (2019). Ivan Dimitrijević, „Populizam kao generator desnog ekstremizma na primeru migrantske krize“, Novi Sad, *Kultura polisa* no. 38. pp. 295-310.

fences. Following Orbán's lead, leaders in Poland, Slovakia and Czechia have adopted this rhetoric. The futility of "deideologization of ideology" today is also illustrated by the example of the Slovak Prime Minister who, as a nominal social democrat (!), promised that "the country will not accept Muslims" (Matharu, 2016). In Austria, another important stop for migrants on their way to Germany and the northern countries, the support for the radical right-wing, anti-immigrant "Freedom Party" has skyrocketed, with the Party regularly topping Austrian party charts in recent years. This is also true for Geert Wilders' eponymous party in the Netherlands, which "even inspires the populist right with the stridency of its anti-Muslim rhetoric" (Vossen, 2016: 26).

The refugee crisis, as Offe correctly notes, "like the economic crisis before it, has triggered a broader crisis of European institutions" (Offe, 2016: 19). The Dublin system, which governs asylum applications, begins to be overwhelmed, and the Schengen Agreement on free movement within the EU is on the verge of collapse. Free movement, which was one of the most cherished values of European integration, depended on the seemingly permeable external borders of the Union. In parallel with these events, there have been growing demands from migrants, who speak of the need to protect the jobs, cultural identity, and way of life of people often referred to as "domiciliary", "indigenous", or "native". In recent years, the need for protectionism on the oldest continent has most often been associated with protection against the Islamization of Europe.

The wave of terrorist attacks in 2015 brought new "support" to populist responses to an increasingly complex crisis. The total number of victims of recent terrorist attacks is about 400, which is significantly less than nearly 3,000 killed in the September 11, 2001 attacks or nearly 2,500 killed by IRA and ETA in the United Kingdom and Spain (Table 1).


However, the increasing frequency and symbolic resonance of the attacks in Paris, Brussels, Berlin, London, Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Barcelona, as well as the enormous media attention they attracted, enabled the populist right to amplify and dramatize the sense of insecurity and vulnerability, and to link the semantics of friend and foe to Huntington's thesis of the clash of civilizations. This happened most directly and immediately in France, where there was the highest concentration of attacks and where a state of emergency was officially declared in November 2015 and extended six times.<sup>5</sup> In response to religiously motivated extremism and terrorism, the extreme right is gaining strength and has been gaining ground on the French political scene in recent years (Đorić, 2018: 54). While the September 11 attacks, Madrid 2004 and London 2005 attacks are interpreted as acute and unrepeatable events, the wave of terrorist attacks in Europe in 2015-2017 supports right-wing populists' claims of chronic insecurity.

<sup>5</sup> On how human rights become a hostage in the fight against terrorism, on the example of France, see: Subotić M, Milenković M. (2018), *Borba protiv terorizma iz ugla redefinisane bezbednosne paradigme i teorije politike*, *Vojno delo* 2/2018.

## Terror's toll

Major attacks in western Europe, September 11th 2001 to March 23rd 2017\*

Attacks causing two or more deaths<sup>†</sup> by: ■ jihadists ■ other ■ unknown/no affiliation □ =1 killed



Sources: Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland; press reports

\*At 11am GMT †Excluding perpetrators

Economist.com

Table 1 – The number of victims in terrorist attacks in Europe 2001-2017  
(The Economist, 2017)

Another important companion, some would say a crisis generator, is the crisis of public knowledge, evident in debates about fake news, alternative facts, and the "time after truth". As Huxley (Huxley, 2014) notes in *Brave New World*, "the abundance and seemingly democratic hyper-availability of 'information' in a hyperconnected digital ecosystem, exacerbated by the proliferation of disinformation marketed for profit or as propaganda, has weakened the authority of the intermediary institutions that produce and disseminate knowledge: universities, academia, and the press" (Persily, 2017: 67-68).

Certainly, management and, in a negatively motivating context, manipulation of the media is one of the instruments of manifestation of strategic communication, and as such it is read not only in the formation of public opinion, but also in the strategic areas of communication relevant to and based on defense and security - propaganda, public diplomacy and advocacy (Mitrović, 2019). The crisis of public knowledge opens the door to populists, especially the populist right. At the same time, it is also an opportunity to create and disseminate not only "alternative facts", but an entire alternative worldview that is not only protected from any challenge, but also receives ample confirmation through a constant stream of new "information".

A particularly influential channel for creating attitudes, marketing alternative truths, and creating strongholds of public attitudes based on manipulations and half-truths is certainly the Internet. Therefore, it is very important to recognize the need for proper training, compliance with procedures, control and necessary restrictions to

avoid manipulation and misuse of information in the information sphere, especially on the Internet (Mitrović, Vasiljević, 2021). Otherwise, through manipulation it is possible to create or deepen the meaning of the very crises that populists claim to respond to, as well as the power to exacerbate and deepen the division between the "people" and the "elite", which is the main populist weapon today.

## *Conclusion*

Mass migrations in contemporary Europe are mostly perceived as "a retrograde and paradoxical novelty and an extraordinary scourge, when in fact they represent a general historical phenomenon occurring at uneven intervals" (Simeunović, 2016: 10). Besides the undeniable negative, they also have a justified positive historical role as the main medium of interaction between different civilizations. Migrations are also a repetitive process, and when someone artificially interrupts them, they tend to renew, continue and complete themselves. Modern migrations are not only due to the usual migration factors, but also an inevitable consequence of the world globalization and the introduction of the principle of free movement of people, goods and capital on a broad international scale.

Migration, especially the so-called irregular migration, has significant security implications. When it comes to the type of violence that is growing as a security issue with the influx of migrants, the answer is seemingly simple and straightforward: the danger that is growing is the danger of Islamist-motivated terrorism, since a large percentage of modern migrants are Muslims. However, things are not quite that simple. The future that awaits us in Europe will certainly be marked by the rise of Islamist extremism, but its rise will be accompanied by another type of extremism, namely right-wing extremism, which will increasingly have a reactive character in relation to migration. Simeunović (2016: 7) points out that "vigilantist right-wing extremists now gloat over the failure of the EU and its late response to the challenge of migration, offering themselves as salvation from this scourge, while the fact that migration is always accompanied by a high degree of politicization is undoubtedly in their society, as well as the inevitability of emotional reaction".

Security and general geopolitical issues also tend to go hand in hand somehow with a wide variety of conspiracy theories. Proponents and opponents of conspiracy theories argue about the current migration movements to Europe, i.e., about the answer to the question of whether there is a conspiratorial element in the last great wave of migration. However, those who make fun of conspiracy stories are not right, nor are those who claim that everything that happens is the result of a conspiracy. Conspiracies exist, but not all of them are serious or sufficiently functional, even if they are true. It would be irrational, however, if some forces did not try to use these migrations to carry out their secret plans. "While the so-called Islamic State is unhappy with the fact that a large number of young Arabs are fleeing to Europe instead of fighting for its goals, it makes no secret of the fact that it is infiltrating its own people into the ranks of migrants in order to later carry out terrorist attacks in Europe, and this practice can be expected to take on further dimensions in the future" (Simeunović, 2016: 14).

It is undisputed that migration can have positive economic consequences, not only for the countries that receive the migrants, but also for the countries from which they come, because their departure relaxes unemployment, reduces unresolved social problems, and the remittances they send to their families bring them great financial benefits. Due to the fact that immigrants are more mobile and more efficient in taking advantage of opportunities in the labor market, they have greater potential to close the gap between supply and demand and thus have a positive impact on the labor market. In this context, a common, carefully planned immigration policy is proposed, which would lead to rejuvenation and economic growth of Europe.

With respect to the "permissible" passage of migrants, particularists usually take the hard-line position that the state sets a criterion by which it determines who is "let in" criterion that defines what is a family or close family, what are the refugees who can settle there and start new life, what is a legitimate asylum claim, etc. In addition to these two categories, family migrants and refugees, there is a large number of migrants who are also judged on certain criteria. "Do they have a criminal record; could they pose a threat to national security; what is their health status and how could it affect public health; what is their financial situation, is there someone to support them, or would they be a burden to the state; and finally, what is their education and cultural background, and whether they would be able to find a job and integrate successful" (Đorđević, 2008: 245). Moreover, for the majority of particularists, the ethnic, religious, and cultural view blurs the real differences in the basic sense of social class, as well as those of status in the sense of citizenship. It fails to recognize that the danger is not so much from foreign workers and refugees, but from a system of aggressive capitalism that disenfranchises locals and foreigners alike and further erodes the labor and social base, as well as the rights of all (Župarić - Iljić, 2016). It is very easy to use the ethnonational and religious key and blame foreigners for all social problems in society. Extreme, but more and more often, moderately right-wing conservative currents use discourses of exclusivity, as well as numerous ideologues in order not to justify the closing of borders and discrimination.

At the same time, in a state of economic and moral crisis, the majority of the population is in an existential convulsion, which leads to individualistic atomization and withdrawal into themselves. People forget the need for empathy, humanity, and solidarity, equally towards the neighbor as towards the stranger in need, even when this clearly represents the main value determinant of their culture and religion. If we add to that that the state responds to the arrival of people by changing the law in the direction of further criminalizing solidarity and sanctioning helping people in need, it is not surprising that the support base for migrants and refugees is declining. However, this is precisely where the greatest area of struggle and responsibility for changing the situation lies - in raising awareness of the fundamental causes of this situation, as well as the activism that would contribute to the reduction of such inequalities. Yet this is where the greatest area of struggle and responsibility for changing the situation lies - in raising awareness of the root causes of this situation, and in activism that would help reduce these inequalities.

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# Section III

## CONFLICTS IN THE POST-SOVIET AREA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

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# THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

Robert Barić<sup>1</sup>

DOI: [https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod\\_strint.2023.ch8](https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod_strint.2023.ch8)

## Keywords:

war in Ukraine,  
NATO,  
EU,  
CSDP,  
military capabilities



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**Abstract:** *The war in Ukraine has been a warning for European countries, alerting them to the fact that defense issues are again relevant. The current framework of the European Union Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is not appropriate for the new strategic situation. Despite the notable CSDP successes, the key CSDP problems persist. Those unresolved issues are impeding the further CSDP development. There is a need for a complete overview and overhaul of the CSDP. Based on the mentioned issues, the paper analyzes the possible future development of the CSDP, emphasizing the search for answers to two key questions: what is the objective of the CSDP and how the EU should strengthen the defense of Europe?*

## Introduction

Without doubt, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused long-term global political, economic and security consequences. The war in Ukraine is accelerating changes started by the COVID-19 pandemic, the US-China geopolitical conflict and climate changes.

The current conflict represents a crucial challenge for the liberal world order established after World War II and strengthened in the post-Cold War period. This is the culmination of the processes started after 2000: the weakening of the US global

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influence as a result of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the rise of China and Beijing's willingness to challenge the US global dominance, the revival of Russia and growing intra-Western divisions. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is accelerating the division of the world into three competing groups of states led by the US, China and countries of the Global South, which refuse to take sides in the ongoing geopolitical conflict.

On the economic front the war in Ukraine is reinforcing the ongoing process of weakening globalization and strengthening regionalization. The direct economic influences of the war and the US-China geopolitical conflict are growing challenges to energy security, disruptions of global food chains, slowed economic growth and return of high inflation. Further economic consequences are the introduction of sanctions and trade restrictions. Those restrictions are disrupting global trade and supply chains. The response of many international companies is twofold: nearshoring of their production, and attempts to build regional supply chains.

Another consequence is the renewed Cold War perception that the access to modern technology is again an instrument for achieving a strategic advantage over your opponents. In response to the Ukrainian war, the US and their allies are introducing country-level restrictions on high technology exports.

The security consequences of the Ukrainian war are the growing probability of high-tech conventional warfare between great powers and the possibility of renewed acceptance of territorial conquest as a means of resolving interstate disputes. After the end of the Cold War, the prevailing opinion was that wars between great powers are now a thing of the past. Interstate wars will be limited to a few regional conflicts, and the prevailing type of armed conflict will be intrastate wars and insurgencies.

This optimistic view was not shared by everyone. Late Colin Gray wrote almost two decades ago about the strong possibility that the rise of China and the revival of Russian power in two or three decades will again start great power competition. This could increase the possibility of wars between great powers (Gray, 2005). Those warnings were disregarded. The Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 were also neglected. Finally, the second Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 showed two things. Firstly, that interstate conventional war is not a relic of the past. Secondly, great power competition can cause the re-emergence of conventional warfare not only in the European neighborhood, but also on the European continent.

Another serious consequence is putting the norms of state sovereignty into question. After the Second World War the development of the international law has been focused on outlawing territorial conquest as a legitimate way for settling interstate disputes. If Russia is successful in breaking Ukraine, regional powers in other parts of the world could use this precedent as a justification for the use of military force with the intent of resolving territorial disputes.

## How is changing strategic environment affecting the European Union?

The EU is compelled to rethink its role in the world. In the current circumstances, Brussels is forced to abandon the key goal of the EU as a foreign policy actor in the last two decades. In its first security strategy, the EU stated that the European model of governance and regional integration should be offered as a template for other regions in the emerging multipolar world order (European Security Strategy, 2003). Also, the EU should be a more autonomous foreign policy actor. This has not meant that transatlantic relations are in jeopardy. This was an opportunity for a more balanced relationship with Washington, a goal which European allies tried to achieve from the beginning of the 1970s. The following security strategy quietly put this goal in the background. Now the emphasis is on achieving the security of the EU from external and internal threats. Simultaneously, the EU should be able to influence events not only on its continent, but also in the European neighborhood (Global Strategy, 2016).

The EU is forced to decide where it stands in the current geopolitical confrontation. Brussels is now in a situation where it has to choose alignment with one of the opposing parties instead of balancing security relations with the US and economic relations with China and Russia.

Regarding security, the future of European security and the Union's role in European security architecture are at stake. The Ukrainian crisis shows that the EU has to develop a capability for a sustained military response to the current and future security threats, including the threat of high-tech conventional war with Russia.

The confrontation with Russia is also forcing the EU to rethink its approach in the area of military capabilities development. Despite some achievements, this is still the work in progress. The key challenge is how to harmonize the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) goals with member states' preferences in resolving military capabilities shortfalls. In the past, the EU member states avoided more or less the issue of coordinating their national security and defense policies, preferring the accomplishment of their separate security interests and goals.

The current war is forcing the member states to rethink their security and defense policies. For them, the crucial question is: does this mean that the future development of the EU military capabilities should strengthen the main European security institution (NATO), or should the Union try to reinforce its military capabilities?

The war in Ukraine represents an opportunity for the EU to strengthen the CSDP and to address its defense capability shortfalls. Despite that, the fact is that the current framework of the CSDP is not appropriate for the new strategic situation. Instead of trying to preserve solutions appropriate for the strategic environment in the 1990s, the CSDP should be adapted to the new reality.

Two key dilemmas of the CSDP are still present:

- What is the objective of the CSDP - territorial defense or crisis management and soft security concerns like peacekeeping, border management, protection of shipping lanes, and/or cyber security?

– Should the EU engage strategically in global affairs based on a firm commitment to the NATO-EU cooperation, or should it try to create strategic autonomy and equilibrium towards great powers, including the US?

Those are the issues which have to be urgently resolved.

## Successes and problems

Surprisingly, despite the mentioned problems, the EU member states have shown the unexpected unity and resolution to take fast action after the Russian invasion. The Union used a wide spectrum of instruments, from sanctions and diplomacy, and economic assistance to direct military support to Ukraine.

The EU unanimously passed the eleventh package of sanctions against Russia.<sup>2</sup> Also, it invited Ukraine and Moldova to start membership talks in a very short period after receiving their applications. In normal circumstances, this process requires a great period.

Regarding the CSDP, by adopting the decision to provide direct military assistance to Ukraine (including the delivery of lethal weapons systems), for the first time in its history the EU is helping a non-EU state attacked by the great power armed with nuclear weapons.

In 2022 the member states delivered military weapons and equipment worth 13 billion USD using a new mechanism called the European Peace Facility to channel military assistance to Ukraine. The EU alone provided 4.6 billion euros in military assistance financing Ukraine (4.1 billion euros for weapons systems and 380 million euros for non-lethal equipment).

In October 2022 the EU launched the Military Assistance Mission EUMAM Ukraine aimed at training 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers in the European Union.

In March 2023, the EU agreed to provide Ukraine with one million rounds of artillery ammunition within a year, from the existing ammunition stocks or through joint procurement (worth around 2 billion euros).<sup>3</sup>

However, if we view further, these successes have not resolved any of the CSDP key problems - the issue of financing the development of the EU military capabilities, the question of different national interests and security perceptions, the issue of insufficient defense industry base in the EU and the process of the European defense fragmentation.

Despite the activation of the European Peace Facility (EPF) framework, a key limitation of this mechanism is still present. The EPF is an off-budget instrument financed by the member states' contributions, with a limited amount of financial assets (5 billion euros for the period 2021-2027). The use of the EU structural funds is still off-

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<sup>2</sup> For an overview of adopted sanctions, see: EU response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/> (4 August 2023).

<sup>3</sup> For an overview of military and non-military help sent to Ukraine by the EU, see: EU support for Ukraine: from sanctions to military and humanitarian aid, <https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/explainers/eu-support-for-ukraine-from-sanctions-to-military-and-humanitarian-aid-how-is-the-eu-helping/> (5 August 2023).

limits. This situation is the result of the key problem regarding the CSDP development – foreign relations and national security issues are the responsibility of the member states, not the EU institutions. This means that the European Commission cannot finance procurement of weapons systems and military equipment.

The second issue is different national interests and perceptions of security threats and challenges between the EU member states. As a result, the member states are more focused on fulfilling their national interests, not the proclaimed EU goals in the area of defense.

These differences are impeding the effectiveness of the EU response to the war in Ukraine. Nine member states have used an opt-out option and refused to participate in the joint purchase of artillery ammunition for Ukraine. Even the implementation of this decision is problematic. During negotiations, France asked for assurances that the joint arms procurement deal will benefit only the EU-based companies. This proposal was criticized by other member states for potentially slowing down support to Ukraine due to the fact that ammunition manufacturing capabilities in the EU are not sufficient.<sup>4</sup>

Another example of the member states dissimilar interests are different views about policy towards Russia. Ukrainian war has again revealed divisions over response to Russian aggression, and also on the issue of future relations with Moscow and Russia's place in European security. The European core states (Germany, France and Italy) are against the total defeat of Russia. The Central and Eastern European states (especially Poland and Baltic countries) would like a comprehensive Ukrainian victory. Their views are in line with the positions of the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland and Sweden.

The ongoing shift of influence inside the EU - from Western Europe towards the northern and eastern periphery of the Union - highlights the existing divisions. After the Cold War, foreign and defense policies of Nordic, Baltic and Central European states have been strongly transatlantic oriented, with the US and UK as the most important security partners. The new members of the Union are using opportunities created by the war in Ukraine to promote policies, which were previously opposed by Germany and France. During the war, frontline countries on the European north and east have been at the forefront of the European support to Ukraine. For those states, the key security partner in Europe is Washington, not Brussels (see Koziej, 2018).

The third challenge for the CSDP is the insufficient defense industry base in the EU. The best example is the Union's decision to provide Ukraine with one million rounds of artillery ammunition. The current war in Ukraine is marked by the gigantic consumption of artillery ammunition. For example, before the beginning of the Ukrainian offensive in June 2023, daily Ukrainian consumption was around 7,000 artillery rounds and Russian between 10,000 and 15,000 rounds. This means that the EU delivery of artillery rounds will be late and insufficient for Ukrainian needs.

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<sup>4</sup> Barnes, Joe, France accused of delaying EU's €2bn plan to replenish Ukraine's artillery shell stocks, *The Telegraph* 15 March 2023, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/03/15/france-accused-delay-eu-2bn-plan-replenish-ukraine-artillery/> (30 June 2023).



The problem of the insufficient defense industry capabilities is visible not only in the EU, but also in the US. This is a consequence of the decision made by most Western states after the end of the Cold War. During the Second World War and afterwards, the US developed industrial capabilities for mass production of weapons systems, military equipment and ammunition. During the Cold War, other Western states also developed those capabilities. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the period 1989-1991 also removed the threat of the conflict with a military adversary, which was technologically more or less equal to the Western armies (at least during the 1960s and 1970s) and had a quantitative edge regarding a number of conventional weapons systems. The disappearance of this threat has also removed the need for excessive military industry capabilities. As a result, most Western states, including the US, have gradually lost capabilities for the mass production of weapons and ammunition.<sup>5</sup> Now, the Western Alliance has to rebuild those industrial capacities in a very short time.<sup>6</sup>

This is a daunting task for the EU. The key problem is the accepted approach for the development of the EU military capabilities. The CSDP is a part of the efforts focused on the development of more integrated and competitive European defense industry and market. The development of the EU military capabilities which could be used immediately is not a priority. This goal will be accomplished after the establishment of an integrated European defense market.

The described strategy is a result of the first unsuccessful attempt to develop the Union's military capabilities between 1999 and 2008. The first approach was based on the member states' willingness to provide necessary military units and capabilities for the EU led military operations and missions. Despite the ambitious goal adopted at the EU Summit in Helsinki in 1999<sup>7</sup> the member states were not willing to provide the necessary support. As a compromise solution the concept of the EU battlegroup<sup>8</sup> was adopted in 2004. Any serious discussion on the future development of the ESDP was stopped in 2008 after the beginning of the global financial crisis.

The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty has not significantly changed the development of the EU military capabilities. The European Council meeting on defense held in December 2013 was crucial for the adoption of the current strategy for the development of the EU military capabilities. At this meeting two proposals for further CSDP development were presented.

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<sup>5</sup> The exception to this rule is South Korea. Due to the constant threat represented by the North Korean military, Seoul has been forced to develop and maintain strong defence industry, capable of mass production of weapons systems and military equipment.

<sup>6</sup> For an explanation of this problem see Vershinin, 2022.

<sup>7</sup> At the Helsinki Summit, the EU member states declared that by 2003 they could deploy a rapid reaction force of 60,000 soldiers within 60 days and sustain it for a year.

<sup>8</sup> Battlegroups are reinforced battalions of up to 1,500 soldiers capable of deployment on short notice. Despite being operational since 2007, battlegroups have not been deployed in any military mission due to the fact that battlegroups remain under the political control of contributing member states and their deployment requires a unanimous decision, which is impossible to achieve even in emergencies such as the 2014 crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The first proposal, endorsed by the chairman of the EUMC<sup>9</sup> General Patrick de Rousiers (and supported by the member states' military establishments), was focused on the development of military interoperability. This proposal asked for the development of the EU military doctrine, joint military education, coordinated member states' defense planning, joint training, common acquisition of weapons and military equipment, and intensification of military cooperation with NATO. Instead of long-term development of industrial capacity the focus was on better coordination and use of the existing military capabilities of the member states.

The second proposal has been endorsed by the European Commission and President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy. This proposal was focused on the transformation of the member states industrial defense infrastructure into the integrated European defense industry and market. The issue of military interoperability was barely mentioned.<sup>10</sup>

The adoption of the second proposal means that the development of the CSDP from 2013 onwards is based on the idea of the European defense integration, with the goal of pooling national capabilities, overcoming military duplication and conducting joint military procurement. In order to achieve defense integration the EU has to create more integrated and competitive European defense industry and market. This will be achieved by transferring the future development of the defense industry from the national (member states) to the supranational (EU institutions) level.

The described shift resulted in numerous ambitious policy initiatives from 2016 onwards, following up on the release of the EU global strategy. Innovations included the European Defense Fund (EDF), which seeks to foster an innovative and competitive defense industrial base, and the establishment of the Directorate General for Defense Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) in the European Commission.

Unfortunately, this approach has not resulted in the significant development of the EU military capabilities. The EU initiatives generally focus on long-term development and procurement of military capacities. They do not, and cannot, meet short-term drive to resolve military gaps and deficiencies.

Another factor is the persistence of the member states to preserve their sovereignty in defense issues. The initiatives launched by the EU institutions are too limited to break the member states' resistance and accept the European defense industry integration. Smaller member states also think that only the industries of the largest member states will benefit by those initiatives.

The final result is a continuation of the European defense fragmentation. Instead of the centralized defense procurement on the EU level in Europe numerous overlapping bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements can be noticed. Also, the European states use multilateral frameworks of the EU and NATO. This means that

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<sup>9</sup> The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body set up within the Council, composed of the Chiefs of Defence (CHODs) of the member states. The EUMC directs all military activities within the EU framework.

<sup>10</sup> EUROPEAN COUNCIL 19/20 DECEMBER 2013 CONCLUSIONS, Brussels, 19 December 2013, [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140214.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140214.pdf) (30 July 2023)

the PESCO mechanism intended as the main framework for defense procurement in the EU is now only one of numerous initiatives on the European continent.<sup>11</sup>

Instead of managing defense procurement through the EU, the European states are entering into agreements on weapons purchase with their neighbors and leading European military power (the US). Buying weapons systems and military equipment from the US and other non-EU suppliers means that gaps in military capabilities can be filled more quickly than if weapons are developed and produced in the EU. An example of such approach is the recent decision of many member states to become a part of the European Sky Shield program.<sup>12</sup> Procurements out of the EU also do little to strengthen the ability of the European defense industry to develop and produce new weapons systems in a short period.

All mentioned issues are impeding further CSDP development. The current EU long-term strategy has focused on the development of the integrated European defense industry and the market is neglecting the development of real military capabilities which are needed now.

The EU as an institution is focused, from the ECSC up to the Union today, on economic and political integration. From the beginning of the European integration process the field of security and defense was (and still is) the domain of the member states' governments and NATO. When thinking strategically, the EU is focused on economic considerations and soft power instruments.

The changes in the European security made by the ongoing war in Ukraine are questioning this thinking. This also means that the current CSDP policies have to be examined and adapted to the new security environment.

## The defense of Europe or European defense

The outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war has had a strong punch on the current European security architecture and the belief that interdependence could prevent or at least mitigate all kinds of conflicts. The war has also shaken the normative foundations of the European security architecture, which is based on sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The European security order was broken well before Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. The first crisis was in 2008, when Russia invaded Georgia. A further blow was in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and intervened in eastern Ukraine.

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<sup>11</sup> The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is a legal and institutional framework launched in 2017. This is a mechanism for willing and capable member states to cooperate on specific defence projects including the organization of military missions and operations. The original idea was the establishment of a group of states willing to develop and use military capabilities for specific missions and operations. The PESCO was supposed to be an exclusive mechanism, but because of German pressure, it includes almost all member states (Barić, 2017).

<sup>12</sup> The European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) was launched by Germany (and supported by the US) in October 2022 with a goal to strengthen the European air defence. 17 countries participating in the ESSI will jointly purchase short, medium and long-range air defence systems. The systems acquired will be interoperable with the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS).

The Kremlin's threats that it will do whatever it takes to win this war – indiscriminately killing civilians, attacking critical infrastructure, and threatening nuclear retaliation – imply that the European security order, which was established in 1975 by the Helsinki Final Act, risks being utterly demolished.

In such conditions the current focus of the CSDP is insufficient. The development framework of the CSDP is not appropriate for the new strategic situation, which means that there is a need for a complete overview and overhaul of the CSDP. Everything points to one question – what is the strategic goal of the EU efforts: is this the defense of Europe, European defense, or both?

The first possible task – the defense of Europe – is based on the presumption that NATO will remain the key organization for the defense of the continent. In those circumstances, what should be the goal of the current and future EU defense initiatives?

Some ideas based on the division of labor between NATO and EU – that NATO would be responsible for the defense and deterrence in Europe, and the EU for providing external support for the Western/US activities in the Middle East, Africa, or Asia-Pacific – are not realistic. The EU security strategy from 2016 clearly states that the primary focus of the Union activities (including the CSDP) is the security of the European continent against external and internal threats.

The second possibility is that the EU defense efforts should be directed to provide support to the European collective defense within NATO. This would be the creation of the often mentioned, but never fulfilled European pillar of NATO. For example, the EU activities should be a part of the implementation of the NATO Madrid Summit decision about the formation of a pool of 300,000 troops in a high state of readiness in Europe.

The problem with these scenarios is in admitting that the EU would not be the primary organization for the defense of Europe – this will be the responsibility of NATO.

The second possible task is the development of the European defense. Unfortunately, this means a continuation of the current EU efforts towards the development of limited military capabilities for crisis management.

The EU has had the Common Security and Defense Policy for 24 years.<sup>13</sup> During this period the goal of the CSDP and its predecessor ESDP,<sup>14</sup> despite the changed strategic environment, remained the same. Since 1999 the EU has been clear that the objective of the Union's military efforts is quite limited – the development of the capabilities and mechanisms necessary for conducting peace support operations on the European continent and abroad. In other words, its limited goal was essentially focused on peacekeeping and stabilization operations. It was based on the underlying assumption that territorial defense and deterrence against potential invasion threats was primarily a job for NATO. As a result, the EU defense policy is focused on the development of military capabilities for low- and medium-intensity peace support operations. This kind of operations was conducted by the EU in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East and Afghanistan.

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<sup>13</sup> For a historical overview, see Handbook on CSDP, 2021.

<sup>14</sup> The European Security and Defense Policy.

However, the geostrategic context has now radically changed. The issues related to territorial defense and deterrence against major powers are once again coming to the fore in debates on security policy. A renewed emphasis on territorial defense and deterrence seems set to displace the traditional focus on peace support operations.

This also means that the CSDP has to change its focus from military capabilities necessary for Petersberg tasks-type operations to the capabilities for high technology conventional land warfare, together with air and maritime operations. Despite the changed strategic environment, all plans for the development of the EU military capabilities are still focused on creating capabilities for Petersberg tasks defined in 1992 and later expanded.<sup>15</sup> Those tasks, created three decades ago, are still a basis for the EU defense planning. Even the latest proposals for the establishment of a 5,000-strong EU Rapid Deployment Capacity mentioned in the EU Strategic Compass state that the new formation is intended for crisis management type of operations, not for conventional warfare.

Finally, there is the third scenario, which combines elements of two previous scenarios. The war in Ukraine shows that, despite their differences, NATO and the EU are both essential for European security. Now, as in the past, discussions about the EU-NATO relationship were focused on different proposals about the division of labor between them. Those proposals are limiting the EU to deal with civilian aspects of conflicts (post-conflict crisis management) and leave military matters to NATO (see Rotfeld, 2001).

Despite the attractiveness of those proposals they are misguided. The division of labor presumes that both organizations are ready to give up some tasks to avoid overlapping of functions and activities. Up to now, neither the EU nor NATO has shown the willingness to make that step. Even if this kind of division of tasks intended to eliminate overlapping is possible, a long-term consequence would be pushing NATO and the EU further apart.

The real challenge is not about the division of labor, but how to achieve the coexistence and complementarity of two different models of defense organization. Separate, but overlapping responsibilities of the EU and NATO should be a basis for cooperation instead of competition between two institutions (Matlé, 2023).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has reaffirmed NATO as the key defense institution in Europe. NATO's role as the cornerstone of European security has been accepted by the EU (Strategic Compass, 2022). The war has also encouraged the transformation of the European Union into a geopolitical player, which is now (among other things) trying to accelerate the development of military capabilities.

The EU and NATO have proved successful in bringing together their member states in a coordinated multidimensional response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Doing that two organizations have been operating within one another's core

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<sup>15</sup> The Petersberg Declaration adopted at the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union in June 1992 lists the following tasks: humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making; joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks; post-conflict stabilization tasks.

policy areas. This complementarity based on separate, but overlapping responsibilities and mandates of the EU and NATO should be further developed to strengthen deterrence against Russia, and also to respond to other threats.<sup>16</sup> The EU and NATO have to cooperate in strengthening partners, stabilizing neighboring countries and developing military capabilities. A real test for the development of complementarity between both organizations will be the post-conflict reconstruction of Ukraine, which has to combine credible security guarantees with political and economic stabilization of Ukraine.

For the execution of the described scenario, two conditions have to be fulfilled. The first condition is the development of the new EU-NATO framework for cooperation. The current framework (Berlin Plus agreement) is insufficient and obsolete for the new strategic environment (Zima, 2021). The last attempt to create a new framework after the NATO Summit in Warsaw in 2016 has been terminated after the change of administration in Washington. Despite that, both organizations are strengthening their relationship (Schuette, 2022).

The second condition is a clarification of the idea of the European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) inside the EU. Today there are many interpretations of the ESA.

The first is the French vision of the ESA, which is officially mentioned in the 1994 National Defense White Paper, although the achievement of autonomy has been the goal of French foreign and security policy in the last seven decades (see Helnarska, 2013). The ESA is repeated in the 2017 Strategic Review on Defense and National Security. In the French view, the ESA means the development and engagement of the independent European military capabilities without reliance on the US. France has recently expanded the ESA from the military sphere to the economy (technology, trade, finance). Many European countries are worried that such a policy would lead to economic protectionism. In those views, the goal of broadening the ESA is the legitimization of the French economic policy objectives in the EU (Bora, 2023). The French vision of the ESA has been rejected in Central and Eastern Europe, and the rest of the EU and NATO members are not supportive of this kind of strategic autonomy.

The second vision of the ESA was conveyed in the St. Malo agreement between the UK and France in 1998. This agreement states that the EU should have military capabilities for the management of international crises in the European neighborhood when the US does not want to be involved (Gegout, 2002). This version of the ESA is the basis for the development of the EU military capabilities from 1999 up to now.

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<sup>16</sup> The currently most visible threat is Moscow's destabilizing actions in Europe (South Eastern Europe and Western Balkans area), the Middle East, North Africa, Sahel and equatorial Africa. As a part of efforts to strengthen its global influence, China is increasing its military presence in parts of Africa and the Middle East. Those activities do not represent a direct military threat to Europe, but Chinese support to non-democratic regimes could have a destabilizing influence in those regions, with negative consequences for Europe. Also, Chinese efforts to divide the EU member states (Barić, 2019) could create negative effects on the European defence efforts.

Finally, the EU is trying to define the concept of open strategic autonomy, which is much broader than defense. The goal is to strengthen the resilience of the Union and to reduce the external dependence of the EU in the key strategic areas such as energy, rare earth or technology (Molthof-Köbben, 2022). Together with strengthening its defense capabilities, those steps should enable the EU to become a more credible and stronger actor globally and to be able to stand up in the alliance with the US. This variant of the ESA is a new attempt to achieve a more equal partnership with the US, which is the goal of European allies since the end of the 1960s.

Despite those different views on the ESA, one thing is clear. The war in Ukraine is forcing Europeans to rely on NATO as the only defense organization that can ensure their security. Considering the ESA means that ideas about promoting strategic autonomy distinct from the US are now redundant. The EU member states should reach a consensus on the ESA content, how to organize themselves for it, and how to distribute the costs necessary for its implementation.

## *Conclusion*

Despite the progress achieved during the war in Ukraine, the key dilemmas important for the future development of the CSDP are still unresolved. Instead of strengthening efforts to address the deep structural problems in the CSDP, the war in Ukraine has only reinforced them. The described situation indicates an urgent need for answers to two key questions - what should be a goal of the revised CSDP and how to improve the development of the EU military capabilities.

As a consequence of the war in Ukraine, NATO will remain the key defense institution in Europe tasked with the organization of deterrence against possible Russian aggressive moves. This means that the EU has to reconsider its role as a security provider in Europe and adapt its defense activities according to the new strategic environment. The EU can play a secondary, but critical role in providing and resourcing deterrence through the reorganization of the European defense industrial base, change of its efforts regarding the development of its military capabilities and the development of some specialized capabilities in the areas like cyber, space, resilience, or military mobility. Doing so will require a much deeper and permanent institutional linkage between the EU and NATO, and a change of the CSDP goals to reflect a new reality.

Regarding the development of the EU military capabilities during the last three decades, this process has been focused on crisis management operations abroad (peacekeeping, stabilization and fight against terrorism). The armed forces of the member states have been seen as an instrument for the use in expeditionary operations. Their primary role of deterrence against external aggression and territorial defense has been neglected.

This focus has to be changed. The EU should acknowledge that the primacy of crisis management operations out of Europe has to be replaced with an emphasis on

the development of military capabilities necessary for deterrence and collective defense in support of NATO activities.

In new circumstances the revision of the EU Strategic Compass is necessary. Instead of an emphasis on the fourth basket capabilities (external crisis management), priority should be given to the first three baskets (capability development, partnerships, resilience). This means that plans for the formation of the rapid reaction force for responses to crises out of the EU<sup>17</sup> should be shelved and an emphasis put on capabilities for conventional warfare.

The described strategic shift will not be possible without resolving the conflict between two aims present at different European defense initiatives. Those initiatives are often divided regarding the need for filling military capability gaps and strengthening the EU defense industrial base. The EU has to find a way to balance now an urgent need for restoring the European conventional military capabilities and the long-term need to invest in the development of the European defense industry and market. To achieve both goals simultaneously, the EU member states have to prioritize European considerations over their national interests.

The war in Ukraine represents an opportunity for the EU to strengthen the CFSP and address its military capability shortfalls. This means the development of the EU pillar within the Euro-Atlantic Alliance framework with the goal of setting up the new European security architecture in which the EU and NATO should seek to complement and mutually reinforce one another.

Gradually, the EU should be able to reduce its military dependence on the United States. Due to the Ukrainian war, the United States has retained its role as an essential provider of European security. The US long-term strategic priorities lie in the Indo-Pacific area, which means that sooner or later European allies should be ready to take responsibility for their security. This will also open the possibility of the EU-US security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region on certain security issues (maritime security and freedom of navigation, sanctions enforcement, regional security integration, non-proliferation, energy policy, cybersecurity).

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<sup>17</sup> Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) is a modular military formation of 5,000 soldiers that should be operational in 2025.



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# FROZEN CONFLICTS AS A TOOL OF THE RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE

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DOI: [https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod\\_strint.2023.ch9](https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod_strint.2023.ch9)

## Keywords:

Russian Federation,  
hybrid warfare,  
frozen conflicts,  
post-Soviet area,  
European security



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**Abstract:** *Since the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation has been seeking to maintain its influence in the so-called "Near Abroad" by employing a wide range of tactics and instruments collectively known as the tools of hybrid warfare. In certain situations, the process of achieving this interest has led to the emergence of frozen conflicts in the territory of some states that belonged to the Soviet Union. An interesting question arises as to whether frozen conflicts are a tool of this hybrid philosophy or not. This paper aims to demonstrate that frozen conflicts represent hybrid warfare tactics that allows the Russian Federation to keep these states in its sphere of influence with negative consequences not only for their security, but also for European security. In order to do that, the theoretical research focused on the understanding of the concepts of "hybrid warfare" and "frozen conflicts" will be carried out followed by an empirical analysis based on the connection between these two concepts with reference to the conflicts in the European Post-Soviet area.*

## Introduction

The disintegration of the Soviet Union transformed the Russian Federation into an actor that has proven to be a real threat to the specific order of the rules-based international system. Despite the Cold War period being considered formally

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over, it is becoming increasingly evident that the "roots" of this "frozen conflict" have not been eradicated. The position adopted by Russia, based on its actions throughout the 21st century, demonstrates a fierce desire for reaffirmation, integration among states capable of influencing the international system, and a revisionist state (policy) willing to pursue its interests by any means, even renouncing rationality. Thus, Russia, practicing a policy of force based on spheres of influence, seeks to regain lost prestige at a time when the West, represented by the US (the main bastion of democracy), appears to be reaching the apex of its history in terms of international influence.

In this context, the tension that spills over and influences the entire international community becomes both attractive to study and challenging to manage.

Regarding the tactics used by Russia to achieve its established political interests, it is not surprising that researchers have become interested in studying the concept of "hybrid warfare". From 2014 to 2019, around 221 articles using this concept were published only in the central Russian press (Pynnöniemi & Jokela, 2020), not to mention the greater number of works published in the West. This high interest should not be unexpected. Although a disputed concept, hybrid warfare can offer an explanation of Russia's behavior and actions on the international stage. However, there are many inherent challenges in conducting an analysis focused on the study of the term "hybrid warfare". One challenge has been, is, and will be to clearly identify the specific components underlying this approach.

Despite attempts to clearly distinguish the component instruments, studies have failed to highlight whether the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space can play a role in the Russian strategy for achieving its objectives. Our paper aims to explore whether manipulating the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space could represent an instrument of "hybrid warfare". This issue equates to the main research question of this paper. Starting from the hypothesis that Russia pursues a policy of force in which the post-Soviet space is a part of its sphere of influence, we intend to demonstrate how the favored status of a third party in the conflicts of Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia can influence not only the fate of these conflicts, but also help Russia consolidate its power within its sphere of influence and achieve its strategic objectives in the distance conflict waged with the West. To achieve this, we propose, first of all, to provide a context that highlights the peculiarities of the post-Soviet space. Next, we will terminologically analyze the concepts of "hybrid warfare" and "frozen conflict", and subsequently attempt to demonstrate how the two approaches can be interconnected. Finally, we will practically and comparatively analyze the conflicts in the post-Soviet space.

While Russian foreign policy and the concepts explored in this paper have received considerable attention from other scholars, less emphasis has been placed on examining frozen conflicts from the perspective of hybrid warfare, which is the focal point of our study. Firstly, we focus on a topical subject, "hybrid warfare", aiming to contribute with our perspective and understanding of this phenomenon. Secondly, alongside this subject, we introduce the issue of "frozen conflicts", a

delicate topic on the agenda of entities concerned with ensuring peace and international security. Thirdly, we consider this endeavor important as it offers a starting point for future approaches to understanding the main concepts with which we operate and for individuals eager to delve into the particular phenomenon we will study. On the other hand, we believe our effort could help establish certain aspects regarding both the resolution of the analyzed frozen conflicts and the prevention of threats arising from the hybrid approach "as a whole".

We are aware of the limitations of our study. In terms of the theoretical part, although not a defining element for the objective of our paper, specific components of the hybrid approach could have been highlighted more clearly, facilitating a more straightforward allocation of this "new" instrument we seek to present. Concerning the practical part, the presented theory has not been implemented on all existing frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The reason we have excluded Nagorno-Karabakh from our analysis and selected only Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria is the greater involvement of Moscow in the outbreak and perpetuation of these three conflicts, materialized by the Russian military presence since the early 1990s and its interest to influence the foreign policy of Georgia and Moldova, which unlike Armenia and Azerbaijan, aspire to become members of the EU (both Georgia and Moldova) and NATO (only Georgia). On the other hand, we do not exclude the possibility that Russia might employ other means of manipulating frozen conflicts that our paper might have overlooked. We have highlighted the most important aspects from our point of view.

## Russia and its "Near Abroad"

As Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union was a multinational state, composed of 15 different republics. Another similarity rests in the territorial distribution of the largest and most influential ethnic group (Serbs/Russians). Even though ethnic Russians were the largest ethnic group only in the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, they constituted a significant minority in almost all other union republics, with approximately 25 million Russians residing in non-Russian republics according to the 1989 Soviet census. With the Soviet Union on the brink of dissolution, they risked losing their dominant position given the fact that in a very short period of time they became ethnic minorities in new countries that were in the process of constructing national identities, based mostly on nationalistic policies (Rotaru, 2022). Nevertheless, the difference between the two multinational states was that during the existence of the Soviet Union a process of Russification took place, which implied not only a change in the demographic composition of non-Slavic republics, but also a cultural dominance over the other ethnic groups.

In these circumstances, the post-Soviet Russian government did not remain indifferent and formulated the so-called "Near Abroad" concept, which implied that the post-Soviet space is a zone of special interest for Russia and that Moscow has

to intervene to protect the rights of Russians or Russian language speakers wherever they are. However, this Russian approach also has to be understood through the lens of the realist political theory. James Coyle argues that instead of maximizing its power, Russia appears to achieve a relative increase in power by decreasing the relative power of the states surrounding it (Coyle, 2018).

That seemed also to be the case at the beginning of the 1990s, when the weakened Soviet Union and then Russia chose to first prevent the secession of constituent republics of the USSR, and, after the collapse being inevitable following the failed Putsch in August 1991, to impede the state-building process and development of the former Soviet republics and to keep them as weak as possible. In specific situations, an approach to achieve this goal was to provide backing to separatist movements or, at the very least, maintain a supportive stance towards them. This was evident in scenarios involving the secession of predominantly Russian-speaking Transnistria or the separatist aspirations of non-Russian ethnic minorities in Georgia. These minorities perceived Moscow as their protector against what they viewed as Georgia's efforts to marginalize them as the secondary citizens.

As the geopolitical space, the "Near Abroad" corresponds roughly to the boundaries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), composed of 12 of the 15 former Soviet republics and centered around Russia. This formula was at first a compromise between the 3 Slavic republics of the USSR (Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus), and a solution for Russia to exert control over the post-Soviet space, even after it lost control over it *de jure*. In the cases of Georgia and Moldova, conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria played an important role in their decision to join the CIS. Weakened by the wars with the separatist authorities and facing a civil war, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze accepted the accession of Georgia into the CIS, after it first refused to join it in 1991. On the other hand, Moldova joined the CIS for economic reasons and the need to secure Russian engagement towards the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. As a result, Russia, through its more or less direct involvement in the three wars, managed to keep Moldova and Georgia in its sphere of influence.

Unlike former Yugoslavia, where the international community paid a great deal of attention during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, the conflicts related to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the negotiations did not catch the same interest. This is because the West considered the stakes for European security to be far greater in the Balkans. Moreover, the United States was interested in cultivating good relations with the Soviet Union and, after 1991, with Russia. The consolidation of the Yeltsin administration was a guarantee for the US that Russia would not plunge into chaos (Oprea, 2022a, p. 38), an outcome which could have produced undesirable consequences since Russia was the inheritor of the overwhelmingly Soviet nuclear arsenal. Thus, it can be inferred that the West considered it wise not to get involved in the ex-Soviet regional affairs and to support the policies of Russia in relation to the former Soviet countries, including what concerns Moscow's management of frozen conflicts. Undeterred by any other major actor, Russia imposed itself as a mediator in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia and has

since controlled the negotiations for the settlement of these conflicts. Only in the mid-2000s, after the Color Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine and the expansion of NATO and the EU towards the East, did the West start to pay more attention to the Black Sea region and the frozen conflicts. Consequently, in 2005, the US and the EU were incorporated, though in the capacity of observers, into the established framework for resolving the Transnistria conflict (referred to as the 5+2 Mechanism). Furthermore, the EU established the mission (known as EUBAM – the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine) with the primary objective of fostering positive trade practices at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border within the Transnistrian region (European Union External Action Service, 2023). Also, the West decided to play a more prominent role in Georgia by mediating the agreement that put an end to the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and deploying afterwards the civilian mission to Georgia (EUMM – the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia). However, the influence of the Western engagement in addressing frozen conflicts remains limited. The European Union, functioning as an observer within the 5+2 Mechanism, lacks the decision-making authority within an outdated framework following the Russian incursion into Ukraine. Additionally, the EU mission in Georgia encounters the constraints imposed by the Russian-dominated Abkhazian and South Ossetian administrations, preventing it from fully executing its intended mandate.

Taking into account all that was discussed above, it can be said that the post-Soviet space has certain characteristics to which the Russian strategy is addressed. The convergence of the sizable and influential Russian diaspora, coupled with the absence or limited influence of other significant players, creates an environment conducive to a specific strategy employed by the Russian Federation. This strategy involves leveraging elements from the hybrid warfare toolkit against nations that are at risk of drifting away from its sphere of influence, such as Moldova and Georgia. We have previously observed that an immediate outcome of the frozen conflicts was the inclusion of these two nations into the Russia-influenced CIS. However, in order to make sure that frozen conflicts, in a broader sense, are aligned with the comprehensive Russian strategy in which hybrid warfare approach is used, it is the imperative to scrutinize shared attributes in these three conflicts. These attributes should correspond with the forthcoming definition of hybrid warfare that will be examined.

## A framework for analysis

With the presented research objective and the steps to demonstrate the supported hypothesis, as well as the specificities of the analyzed space (the post-Soviet space) highlighted, it is necessary to establish the terminological delimitations of the main concepts used in this research. Considering the intention to demonstrate how the manipulation of frozen conflicts represents a specific way of hybrid warfare, it is understandable why the concept of 'hybrid warfare' will be discussed first, followed by the concept of 'frozen conflicts'.

The concept of "hybrid warfare" is paradoxically as simple to understand as it is vague in itself. This might explain the significant interest of analysts studying military phenomena in this term. However, the primary reason for leaning towards understanding this concept is that the term "hybrid warfare" captures the complexity of modern armed conflict in the 21st century very well. The technological advancements specific to this era combine with diversity expressed at all levels. The involved actors, the multitude of used means, and the operating environments are interconnected. The effect can be devastating. In many analyses, the concept of "hybrid warfare" is used with the same meaning as the concept of "hybrid threats" (Weissmann, 2021). Providing security increasingly becomes a challenge, and the solution has to begin with the understanding of the nature of the threats we face.

Regarding threats of hybrid nature, the conceptual debate is quite controversial. It has to be mentioned that the concept of "hybrid warfare" lacks a universally accepted definition, and depending on technological advancements and developments in military affairs, the significance of this concept may evolve over time. Moreover, even though the concept is closely linked to understanding the behavior of the Russian Federation on the international stage, Russian military analysts do not use this concept (Renz, 2016).

Therefore, in the West, most analysts believe that the debate on this concept gained momentum with the actions of the Russian Federation leading to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and events in eastern Ukraine in 2014 (Monaghan, 2015; Renz, 2016; Wither, 2020; Pynnöniemi & Jokela, 2020; Libiseller, 2023). However, the first definitions of the concept do not revolve around that date. Moreover, from a historical perspective, the concept is not considered to be a phenomenon that originated from that moment (Wither, 2020). Although the initial discussions of the concept date back to 2002, the US Marine Corps, through Frank Hoffman's contribution, "Conflicts in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars", represents a primary source that brought the debate on this concept to the attention of general public. In this paper, hybrid warfare, understood through the concept of "hybrid threats", incorporates "a full range of different modes of warfare" that can be categorized both in the realm of conventional military (kinetic actions) and non-military (irregular and asymmetrical tactics and operations) actions conducted by state or non-state actors to achieve "synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict" (Hoffmann, 2007).

Based on this method of arguing the conceptual understanding, over time, multiple similar definitions have been adopted. Naturally, the effort to find a definition for the concept intensified after 2014. For example, according to Reisinger and Golts (2014), "hybrid warfare" is "an effective and sometimes surprising mix of military and non-military, conventional and irregular components, [that] can include all kinds of instruments such as cyber and information operations" (p. 3). In addition to Hoffmann's approach, the two authors highlight an exemplification of the non-kinetic component that belongs to this hybridity. This perspective can be complemented by the definition provided by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (2015)



regarding the concept of "hybrid warfare" as "the use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign, designed to achieve surprise, seize the initiative and gain psychological, as well as physical advantages utilizing diplomatic means; sophisticated and rapid information, electronic and cyber operations; covert and occasionally overt military and intelligence action; and economic pressure" (p. 5). A better synthesized hierarchy of specific action dimensions in "hybrid warfare" is highlighted by Mikael Weissmann (2021), who, in addition to the military dimension (kinetic actions), proposes six other dimensions: diplomatic, economic, cyber (technological), information and influence operations, the dimension of unconventional methods and the civilian (non-military) dimension (p. 65).

It is not an easy task to explain this concept while attempting to reduce its complexity. However, from the entirety of the presented approaches and those studied, the following specific characteristics of the "hybrid warfare" approach can be extracted.

First and foremost, there has to be a combination of various elements that give meaning to the concept of hybrid. These elements can be a part of the realm of conventional means of conducting military actions (kinetic actions) or from the sphere of irregular actions through which an armed conflict can be waged (non-kinetic actions). According to Bercaru (2023), the main differences between the conventional and irregular approaches are "the legal and political status of belligerents, as well as the means and methods of conducting armed combat" (p. 51).

Secondly, these elements have to be used in a coordinated and combined manner (Jasper, 2020). Hybrid actions involve a high degree of surprise, primarily triggered through used irregular and asymmetric means. If we redirect our attention to the definition provided by the Institute for International Strategic Studies mentioned earlier, as well as many other formulated definitions (e.g.: Libiseller, 2023), we will notice that the hybrid approach places significant emphasis on the unpredictable nature achieved through the combination of used means. Particularly, non-kinetic actions provide the element of surprise because there are no clear indicators signaling the use of certain means falling under the non-kinetic sphere (e.g.: cyber-attacks). However, considering the Russian Federation's attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it has been demonstrated that surprise can also be triggered through kinetic means. Of course, in this context, such a status could not have been achieved without the utilization of certain non-kinetic tools (e.g.: information operations). It is important to note that the target of hybrid threats is not an army; it is the entire society of the adversary (Treverton, 2021). According to Weissmann (2021), "it is sometimes difficult to know for sure that warfare is ongoing, and in the same way, it is inherently difficult to identify if, and when, a perceived threat of future actions becomes a reality" (p. 69). A fundamental characteristic of the hybrid approach is this problem in differentiating between a state of peace and a state of war. This condition also favors the element of surprise because, despite some doubts, in the absence of clear factors, a state actor can easily assume its society is in a period of peace while a presumed rival is using specific non-kinetic instruments against it. Hence, the characteristic of ambiguity is inherent to hybrid warfare.

Thirdly, the desired effect sought through the use of the hybrid warfare approach has to encompass both physical and psychological advantages. While in conflicts conducted through traditional (kinetic) means, the balance of effects on the enemy may lean more towards physical gains (military losses), concerning actions specific to the realm of irregular (non-kinetic) warfare, the balance tilts more towards achieving effects at psychological level (exploiting the vulnerabilities of the enemy's society). Despite the fact that the effects at physical level are more visible, psychological effects can be much more destructive. The ultimate goal is to impose one's own will on the adversaries through any means that can destabilize their center of gravity. According to Monaghan (2015), "hybrid warfare seeks to deceive, undermine, subvert, influence, and destabilize societies, to coerce or replace sovereign governments, and to disrupt or alter an existing regional order" (p. 67).

Regarding the concept of "frozen conflicts", it appears to have not garnered as much interest among analysts as the concept of "hybrid warfare" has done, but nevertheless, it remains a topic of considerable debate. It is believed that the "Cold War" itself, with its avoidance of a direct confrontation between two superpowers, can be considered the first conflict that falls under this title (Milevschi & Secieru, 2013). However, in the current vocabulary, the concept gained prominence at the end of the 20th century, immediately after the end of the bipolar era.

The definition of this term that will underpin our analysis is the one proposed by Michael Smetana and Jan Ludvík. According to these two researchers, frozen conflict can be defined as a protracted, post-war international conflict process, characterized by the absence of stable peace between the opposing sides and core unresolved issues (Smetana & Ludvík, 2018). We will not view this concept as a static phenomenon and will adhere to Fergoso and Živković's perspective (2012, p. 20), where the term "frozen" implies that the existing tension between parties does not simply disappear, but rather transforms as its violent phase, for a moment, has come to an end.

Since we aim to study this concept in the well-defined context of the post-Soviet space, we find it suitable to analyze "frozen conflicts" through an approach focused on the interstate level. This approach, compared to the individual, intrastate, and global ones, argues that the nature of relations between neighboring states and the characteristics of the macro-regional system are the main explanatory factors of the process of unfolding "frozen conflicts" (Milevschi & Secieru, 2013). This perspective helps explain how the Russian Federation, due to the collapse resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, tends to become a hegemonic power in its geographic proximity.

## The Russian perspective on hybrid conflicts

From a terminological point of view, due to different historical and conceptual roots, there is no exact adaptation of the Western theory regarding "hybrid warfare" in the Russian military literature. Russian theorists use two options to refer to what the Western military thinking understands as the concept of "hybrid warfare". Either

the term "*gibridnaya voyna*" is used at the policy-making level, or the term "*New Generation Warfare*" is used at the war-making level. The distinction in the meaning of these two terms used is not clear because of "the pressure by the Russian military for greater funding" (Suchkov, 2021). However, whenever the meaning of "hybrid warfare" is used in the Russian military literature, it is meant to discuss the Western strategies of "non-linear war" (Friedman, 2017).

According to Friedman (2018), the Russian approach to the concept of "hybrid warfare" is particularly focused on ways that political actors can undermine their adversaries by eroding their national and international political legitimacy and stability (p. 95). A more in-depth Russian perspective on hybrid warfare aims to achieve both an informational and a political objective (Clark, 2020). The informational objective seeks to gain information superiority, while the political objective aims to manipulate the governance of the target state. In pursuing this direction, all the tools utilized, both kinetic and non-kinetic, are oriented towards achieving the final goal of reshaping the target state's strategic orientation and international policy. Two aspects have to be mentioned. Firstly, in the logic of this hybrid approach, the kinetic tool (armed conflict) is reserved for the final phase, when the desired objectives cannot be strictly achieved through non-kinetic means. Secondly, information operations are the main non-kinetic tool used within this hybrid approach (Bercaru, 2023). According to Lilly (2022), the information component represents "the agent of cohesion and the lifeblood" of modern conflicts (p. 18). On the other hand, gaining information superiority is a prerequisite for achieving political objectives.

Valery Gerasimov was one of the prominent figures who, through his writings, provided explanations that later could be used to understand Russia's behavior concerning the events in Ukraine in 2014. Due to the fact that his explanations could fit into what the Western conception considers "hybrid warfare", Snegovaya regarded him as one of the theorists representing the "face of the hybrid warfare approach" (Snegovaya, 2015). The main ideas of Gerasimov's theory, known as the "Gerasimov Doctrine", are as follows.

Firstly, it emphasizes that Russia feels threatened by the Western actions perceived as "imperialist" (e.g.: supporting Color Revolutions, exerting influence in international organizations). Consequently, the West is viewed as the source of the economic and political disruptions felt internally by Russia (Pynnöniemi & Jokela, 2020). These destructive effects on Russian society are brought about through the exercise of a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic instruments, with an emphasis on the use of the latter. Therefore, Russia believes that the Western states employ the specific tactics of hybrid warfare against it.

Secondly, Gerasimov, while considering the alleged *modus operandi* of the West and the difficulties in achieving planned objectives when maximizing the benefits of Russia derived from the kinetic tool (as seen in Georgia and Chechnya), argued that the "rules of war have changed" (Gerasimov, 2013) and therefore the Russian Armed Forces have to adapt to this new reality. This change is defined by the role that non-military instruments have to play in a conflict. Therefore, there has to be a

transition from simply using military force to employing political, diplomatic, economic, and other non-kinetic instruments, crucially, in a combination with military force. Through this approach, the aim is to destabilize the adversary's center of gravity (the adversary's will to fight and a country's ability to engage in a war) by using non-kinetic instruments in such a way that little or no military force is necessary. However, the importance of kinetic instrument should not be entirely excluded. This fact is demonstrated both by its use in the Syrian conflict and by the "special military operation" launched on February 24, 2022, against Ukraine. In addition to this aspect, with the Russo-Georgian War (2008), a revolution in military affairs focused on modernizing the armed forces and enhancing military capabilities to strengthen readiness levels was noticed. It is interesting that, just as an observer of the US military phenomenon noted, even though Russia and the United States have similar perceptions regarding the characteristics of the operating environment, their perspectives are different in the sense that "the US military is cutting back heavy conventional capabilities, while Russia is doubling down on hers" (Monaghan, 2015). This leads us to believe that, despite Russian focus on using non-kinetic instruments against the militarily stronger West, there is also a tendency to find solutions to balance this disadvantage from a military perspective.

Thirdly, the differentiation between a state of peace and a state of war becomes a consciously challenging effort that is increasingly difficult to achieve. According to Weissmann (2021), the Russian style of warfare can be understood as a conflict that combines the political, economic, social, and kinetic elements without recognizing clear boundaries between civilian and combatant, covert and overt, war and peace. It is a strategy where achieving victory permits and demands whatever means will be successful (pp. 61-62). This perspective is also reflected by Gerasimov, who emphasizes that "war in general is not declared, it simply begins with already developed military forces" (Gerasimov, 2013). As a result, the concept of the "grey zone" seems to be less applicable in this situation. The blurred lines between peace and war, civilian and combatant, overt and covert actions make it challenging to identify the exact starting point of a conflict. The Russian approach to warfare seems to blur these lines deliberately, allowing for actions that might not fit neatly into traditional definitions of war or peace. This ambiguity creates a strategic advantage by confusing and destabilizing the adversary, making it harder for them to respond effectively. As a result, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between peacetime activities and acts of aggression in the context of hybrid warfare.

Even though we agree with the view that not every action of the Russian Federation should be perceived as a form of "hybrid warfare" (Renz, 2016), we believe that frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space, in their specific phase, can represent instruments of hybrid warfare. In order to justify this assertion, we have to clarify Russian position in these conflicts. The Russian Federation is the powerful third-party involved in the dynamics of these conflicts, presenting itself as an actor capable of solving the underlying causes through peaceful means, such as dialogue. However, this position can lead to what Smetana and Ludvík (2018) refer to as

"complex patron-client relations". When the interests of a state (the patron) clash with a timely resolution of the dispute that gives a conflict its "frozen" character, the conflict itself may be preserved in a latent state or even thawed to return to a violent phase. In any case, a return to stable peace is unlikely. Regarding the nature of interests held by the third-party state, King (2001) noted that the frozen conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia are the examples where "multiple domestic actors with parochial economic and political interests intervene to keep the conflict frozen". These conflicts are maintained or reignited through Russian influence, serve Russian strategic interests in the region, allowing it to exert control over the territories involved and maintain leverage over the neighboring states. By perpetuating the unresolved disputes, Russia can assert its influence and manipulate the situation to its advantage, using both kinetic and non-kinetic means.

Therefore, while not every action by Russia can be labeled as "hybrid warfare", the exploitation and manipulation of frozen conflicts to further its strategic objectives exemplify how Russia employs hybrid strategies to exert influence in the region. These frozen conflicts become a tool in the broader context of hybrid warfare, enabling Russia to pursue its geopolitical goals while avoiding a direct confrontation with the international community.

Firstly, we believe that the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space serve as a tool of hybrid warfare due to the privileged position that Russia holds within these conflicts. We view the Russian military presence (often under the guise of peacekeeping) in the disputed territories involved in frozen conflicts as a kinetic aspect of frozen conflicts. This perspective is supported by Gerasimov (2013), who includes peacekeeping operations as a part of the measures in the "New Generation Warfare". Additionally, when a frozen conflict escalates into violence, complex measures can be undertaken to reduce tensions between the disputing entities, which Gerasimov perceives as non-military actions. Hence, it can be noticed that depending on the state of relations between the entities involved in the frozen conflict and the way in which the Russian Federation relates to it, "frozen conflicts" can represent instruments of the hybrid approach that can be interpreted both as a part of the kinetic sphere and as a part of the non-kinetic sphere.

Secondly, as mentioned earlier, manipulating the developments in the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space can be coordinated and combined with other kinetic or non-kinetic instruments, such as information operations, to achieve established strategic objectives. The effects of Russian position on the targeted areas can be felt both physically (through the military forces available in these territories in the event of a nearby intervention) and psychologically (towards the internationally recognized states to which these territories with secessionist tendencies belong).

Thirdly, having the ability to manipulate the manifestation of a frozen conflict offers an opportunity to influence it towards either a state of peace or a state of war. If influenced towards war, the effects can be felt at regional level. Conversely, keeping a conflict unresolved allows a state to maintain a sense of instability and insecurity in the region, which can create influence over other states and a fragile security environment.

In consequence, in a context of an indirect confrontation with the West and viewing this conflict in inter-civilizational terms, Russia manipulates the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space to protect its regional sphere of influence, retain control over the territories in that area, and preserve the vision of its former Soviet empire. Obtaining these advantages influences the strategic orientations and international policies of the Western states. Therefore, manipulating frozen conflicts contributes to achieving the political objectives of the Russian Federation promoted through this "New Generation Warfare" that is being conducted.

Thus, despite opinions similar to those of Kofman & Rojansky (2015) that "hybrid war becomes a catch-all phase...resulting in a misguided attempt to group everything Moscow does under one rubric" (p. 7), we support the viewpoint that the existing frozen conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia are an important instrument in Russian hybrid approach. To illustrate Russia's behavior as the third-party in each of these frozen conflicts, we will briefly examine the history of the conflicts and then we will select and discuss three characteristics (patterns) that the three conflicts have in common.

## The emergence and evolution of the post-Soviet frozen conflicts

Under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union experienced dramatic changes at the end of the 1980s, which culminated in the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union two years later. Although this fate was certainly not desired or expected by Gorbachev, the policies of perestroika and glasnost initiated by the party's secretary-general not only failed to maintain the reformed Soviet Union, but also paved the way for centrifugal movements within the constitutive republics of the USSR. As public debates regarding history, ethnicity, culture, and identity were no longer taboo subjects according to the official policies, republics like Moldova and Georgia, though not the only ones, began to distance themselves from Moscow and followed a path to secession and independence, a move which alienated their national minorities in Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, respectively.

In Moldova, the new law adopted by the Supreme Soviet in 1989 declared Romanian (called Moldovan at that time) the sole state language in the republic, while Russian was granted the status of "the language of interethnic communication" (Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, 1989). This rather moderate linguistic legislation, although a significant departure from the previous situation, caused discontent among the Russophone minority (which comprised 35% of the total population), especially in Transnistria, a strip of land on the left bank of the river Dniester. Not only ethnic Russians and Ukrainians were in an absolute majority there, but the impact of the new law was more pronounced in this heavily urbanized and industrialized area as its Russian-speaking bureaucratic elite risked losing their status

and privileges. By accusing the central authorities in Chişinău of nationalism and violation of minority rights, the Russophone minority in Transnistria began the process of detachment from Moldova. Another factor that added to the mistrust of the Russophones and even Moldovans on the left bank was Moldova's strengthening relations with Romania and the fears of a union between the two countries. In these circumstances, Transnistria sought to remain in the Russian sphere of influence as only Moscow could guarantee their privileged position (Oprea, 2022b).

As Moldova proclaimed its sovereignty (23 June 1990) and independence (27 August 1991), the separatists established their parallel political and paramilitary structures and declared their independence. The conflict evolved into a brief war between March and July 1992 in which the separatist forces were backed decisively by the Russian 14th Army. On 21 July 1992, the ceasefire negotiated in Moscow between the President of Moldova Mircea Snegur and the President of Russia Boris Yeltsin, established the peacekeeping mission composed of Russian, Moldovan, and Transnistrian troops.

With the conflict being frozen, the negotiations for its resolution, held under the mediation of the OSCE, failed to produce any result. The two main issues that blocked a final settlement are the future status of Transnistria and the withdrawal of the former 14th Army (whose presence in Transnistria is not regulated by any international agreement nor accepted by Chişinău). Even if Russia had made the commitment at the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit to withdraw its troops, it has never fulfilled that promise until now, as Moscow argues that its forces have to be withdrawn only after a political settlement is reached. Officially, Russia does not recognize Transnistria and therefore views this territory as an integral part of Moldova. Nevertheless, the separatist regime in Tiraspol would not have survived for more than 30 years without the economic, military, and diplomatic support of Moscow.

Regarding the situation in Georgia, at the end of the 1980s, a new wave of nationalism led to the worsening of relations between the ethnic Georgian majority and the Ossetian and Abkhazian minorities. The authorities in the autonomous region of South Ossetia came into conflict with the central government in Tbilisi and unilaterally declared South Ossetia an autonomous republic separated from Georgia and demanded to be accepted as an entity of the Soviet Union (Coyle, 2018). Ethnic tensions rose further as the government in Tbilisi, led by the prominent nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia, abolished the autonomy of South Ossetia and declared a state of emergency in the country (Muradov, 2022). The war that followed (1991-1992) ended after Gamsakhurdia was replaced by the moderate Eduard Shevardnadze, who accepted the disadvantageous ceasefire elaborated by Russia that established the joint peacekeeping mission established by Russian, Georgian, and North Ossetian forces (Milevschi & Secieru, 2013).

Simultaneously, Tbilisi had to deal with another conflict in Abkhazia. Despite the fact that ethnic Abkhazians represented only 18% of the population, their leaders declared their independence and requested to be accepted as a republic within the USSR (Muradov, 2022). Just like in South Ossetia, tensions between the separatist

and Georgian government led to the violent war in 1992. In 1994, the parties signed the ceasefire agreement in Moscow, mediated by Russia, under the supervision of the UN and OSCE. The document provided for the peacekeeping mission established exclusively by Russians, with their activity supervised by the UN monitoring mission (Milevski & Secieru, 2013).

The two frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia reignited in August 2008, when Russia launched a war against Georgia in response to Tbilisi's attempt to regain control in South Ossetia. After the war, Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and established military bases in the two breakaway regions, putting an end to the multilateral peacekeeping missions. These events effectively denied Georgia any real chance of bringing back the two territories under its control.

## The patterns of Russian strategy related to frozen conflicts

### *The presence of Russian troops*

The three frozen conflicts subject to our analysis followed similar sequences of events. Their military phases ended with three ceasefires, all mediated by Russia, which "froze" the conflicts and arranged for the deployment of joint peacekeeping forces, primarily consisting of Russian troops. In the case of Transnistria, along with the official peacekeeping forces regulated by the 1992 Snegur-Yeltsin Convention, Russia continued to maintain an undisclosed number of soldiers as a part of the OGRF (Operational Group of Russian Forces) formed in 1995 from remnants of the Russian 14th Army.

Despite the Russian government's attempts to portray these operations as successful, serious questions arise about whether Russian peacekeeping operations adhere to international standards. Firstly, the peacekeeping missions in all three cases lack an international mandate from the UN. Although the peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia received a mandate from the regional organization (CIS) (Coyle, 2018) and was monitored by UNOMIG (the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia) (Milevski & Secieru, 2013), and the one in South Ossetia was monitored by the OSCE Mission, peacekeeping missions are typically associated with the UN practice, which has overseen over 70 such operations, more than any other entity (Williams, 2022).

Hence, peacekeeping missions have to be evaluated based on the three principles established by the UN: the consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense and the defense of the mandate (UN, 2023). These three peacekeeping missions mostly fall short of these standards. Firstly, Russian troops sided with separatist authorities both during (in Transnistria) and after (in all three cases) the conflicts, acting as a guarantee of their survival. Secondly, given Russian failure to differentiate between peacekeeping troops regulated by the 1992 Convention and the OGRF, the Russian military presence contradicts the wishes of the Moldovan government, which has repeatedly requested the withdrawal of the OGRF in line with the conclusions of the 1999 OSCE Summit



and the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 72/282 ("Complete and unconditional withdrawal of foreign military forces from the territory of the Republic of Moldova") (UN, 2018). Moreover, Moldova deems the existing peacekeeping format outdated and calls for its transformation into a multilateral civil mission with an international mandate. In 2023, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly adopted the resolution inviting parties to initiate discussions in this regard (OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 2023).

Concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the presence of the Russian military forces as peacekeepers not only failed to facilitate the conflict resolution process, but also acted as a disruptive element in maintaining regional stability during the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia. Muradov points out that "Russian peacekeepers, along with separatist forces, could be viewed as irregular or even regular forces of Russia, capable of transitioning into regular forces against the Georgian Army" (Muradov, 2022). Following the August 2008 conflict, Russia dismantled the prior peacekeeping arrangement and established military bases in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia after evacuating its military bases in November 2007.

Considering all these factors, it becomes evident that Russia has managed to sustain its military presence after the Soviet Union's collapse under the guise of peacekeeping missions. This strategy resulted in diminishing the sovereignty of both Moldova and Georgia. Essentially, Russia maintained a state of undeclared conflict against both Chisinau and Tbilisi, and even after more than 30 years since the Soviet Union's dissolution, it continues to occupy significant portions of their territories without their consent. These observations lead us to conclude that the Russian military presence in Moldova and Georgia represents a kinetic (military) tactics within the context of hybrid warfare.

### *"Passportization"*

The dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted in various challenges, and one of them was the issue of citizenship. Each of the new 15 states adopted distinct legislative frameworks in this regard. A particularly intricate situation emerged for the residents of the unrecognized republics, as many of them declined to accept the citizenship of the state that they had seceded from. Given that passports from breakaway regions like Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia were not internationally recognized, acquiring the Russian passport became the sole means for these individuals to facilitate international traveling. The ease of this process was due to the 1992 Russian citizenship law, which allowed them to acquire Russian citizenship through a simple declaration. This approach originated from the belief that an open citizenship policy would serve the interests of the Russian Federation in safeguarding the rights of ethnic Russians and individuals who viewed Moscow as their protector against external actors, as it was the case with the three secessionist republics. However, during the 1990s, the Russian Government did not actively support or facilitate this process (Nagashima, 2009).

Significant changes occurred in 2002, when Russia initiated the passportization campaign in Abkhazia, followed by a similar effort in South Ossetia in 2004. This occurred against the backdrop of deteriorating relations between Russia and Georgia, marked by the deployment of the US troops in Georgia and the ascension of Mikheil Saakashvili to power. Saakashvili sought to restore Georgia's territorial integrity, which raised concerns in Moscow that Georgia might employ military force to regain control in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Empowered by substantial administrative support from Russia (Nagashima, 2009), the passport issuance process led to a substantial increase in the percentage of Russian passport holders in Abkhazia, rising from 20% in May 2002 to 80% by January 2003 (Kriveniuk, 2002; Glanin, 2002; Vignanski, 2003). Similarly, in South Ossetia, the percentage of Russian passport holders surged from 56% in May 2004 to 98% in September 2004 (Gordienko, 2004). In contrast, Transnistria experienced a steadier rate of passportization. While around 65,000 Transnistrian residents held Russian citizenship in 2001 out of the population of approximately 500,000 (Vinogradov, 2001), the current estimates by separatist authorities suggest that over half of the population now holds Russian citizenship (220,000 out of approximately 400,000) (Radio Europa Liberă Moldova, 2023).

Scholars debate whether the issuance of passports to residents of unrecognized republics reflects an aggressive Russian policy towards countries in the post-Soviet space, such as Georgia and Moldova. Nagashima argues that passportization in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was a reactive measure to deter Georgia from using force against the two unrecognized republics. Similarly, in Transnistria, the granting of Russian citizenship is viewed as a tool to influence the internal politics of the region rather than exert pressure on Moldova. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that passportization is a part of the Kremlin's strategy to employ citizenship for political purposes (Nagashima, 2019). This was particularly evident in 2008, when Russia invoked the need to protect Russian citizens as a justification for its invasion of Georgia, particularly in South Ossetia.

On the other hand, the passportization of these three separatist republics contradicts Russian official policy of non-recognition and respect for the territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova that was considered (until 2008) in relation to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as Transnistria. A sincere approach by Russia would have refrained from widely distributing passports in these uncontrolled territories. Of note, Russia established a consulate in Tiraspol to address the considerable demand for passports in the region, without seeking the consent of Chisinau (Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of Moldova, 2022).

Taking all these factors into consideration, it can be argued that while this process might not have initially been aimed directly at Georgia and Moldova, Russia manipulated the presence of the majority of Russian citizens in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria as circumstances demanded, as evident in the events of the August 2008 war. This underscores the ambivalence of Russian commitment to the territorial integrity of these two countries. Coupled with the element of surprise, as seen in the rapid passportization in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it can be concluded that passportization constitutes a non-kinetic instrument within the Russian hybrid warfare strategy.

### *Manipulating the Kosovo precedent*

In this section, we will discuss a specific element that is a part of the Russian strategy to manipulate frozen conflicts in a manner that serves its interests. Unlike the previous two tactics that were earlier discussed, which were aimed at undermining the sovereignty of Moldova and Georgia, the following tactics reveals that Russia employs frozen conflicts in its hybrid warfare not only against neighboring states, but also against the West more directly.

Since Vladimir Putin assumed power in 2000, the relations between Russia and the West have progressively deteriorated. A point of contention concerned the province of Kosovo, where Russia and the West held differing opinions. While the United States, in particular, favored granting independence to Kosovo, Russia opposed it, citing the principle of Serbian territorial integrity enshrined in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). Russia emphasized comparable situations, especially the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet region. President Putin took actions to ensure the West comprehended his stance. In 2006, he cautioned that if Kosovo were granted independence, denying the same right to Abkhazia and South Ossetia would be untenable (Akçakoca, Vanhauwaert, Whitman, Wolff 2009, p. 26). While Transnistria was not mentioned at that moment, Putin later added it to the list by stating that "there is nothing to suggest that Kosovo is different from South Ossetia, Abkhazia, or Transnistria" (Fabry, 2012). As anticipated, Kosovo's imminent declaration of independence fuelled demands from separatist leaders for international recognition.

Despite these factors, Russia refrained from immediately recognizing the independence of any separatist republic in the post-Soviet region following Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. Instead, in April 2008, President Putin ordered the Russian Government to de facto establish relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia as though they were already the subjects of international law (Richter & Halbach, 2009). It seemed that Russia was awaiting the opportune moment to make its final move. That moment came four months later in August when, under the pretext of "aggression" and "genocide" committed by Georgian troops against civilians in South Ossetia—arguments previously used by NATO in 1999 to intervene militarily in Yugoslavia—Russia conducted the military intervention against Georgia. This move, coupled with the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent countries, marked a departure from Russian longstanding commitment to Georgia's territorial integrity (Fabry, 2012). This was not the last instance of Russia manipulating the Kosovo case to serve its interests. In 2014, Vladimir Putin justified the annexation of Crimea by invoking the Kosovo precedent.

Russian actions in August 2008 indicated that Moscow's opposition to Kosovo's independence was not rooted in a commitment to the international law, as it was asserted. Rather, it originated from the West's decision to grant Kosovo independence without consulting Russia - a reflection of Moscow's aspiration to be recognized as a major power in the multipolar world (Secieru, 2019). Another apparent contradiction arises from Russian selective use of the Kosovo formula in the post-Soviet space. This

disparity can be explained by Moscow's differing approach to Georgia and Moldova. While Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia's independence is justified by Tbilisi's (particularly during Saakashvili's presidency) aspiration to join NATO and the Alliance's consideration of Georgia's future membership, Russia continued to support Moldova's territorial integrity, which is related to Chisinau's policy of neutrality. Moreover, recognizing Transnistrian independence would diminish Russian influence in Moldova.

The rhetoric about the Kosovo precedent and its use to justify aggressive actions illustrate that Russia has developed a strategy to exploit the Western arguments for Kosovo's independence to its advantage. By asserting that Kosovo is not an exceptional case and that it sets the precedent for other frozen conflicts, Moscow possesses a coercive tool that can be employed at the appropriate juncture (as seen in the case of Georgia) against countries that act counter to its interests. This strategy encompasses the elements of surprise and uncertainty that characterize the non-military aspect of hybrid warfare. Furthermore, it targets the West by leveraging the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia based on the Kosovo precedent, coupled with the increased Russian military presence, to weaken the Western influence in Georgia. This shift has altered Tbilisi's foreign policy trajectory, leading it to become more ambiguous and inclined towards Russian interests, following the departure of pro-Western President Mikheil Saakashvili in 2012.

## *Conclusion*

Through this study, we have aimed to demonstrate that frozen conflicts can represent, within a well-defined and favorable context, an instrument of hybrid warfare used by Russia to achieve its strategic objectives in its indirect confrontation with the West.

Beginning with a well-delineated conceptual framework, we have shown, first of all, that the concept of "hybrid warfare" in the Russian military literature is understood with certain nuances different from how it is analyzed in the West. This aspect may even be paradoxical, especially considering that the analysis of this concept in the West has been largely formed based on Russian actions in the 21st century. Therefore, the perspective and understanding of certain aspects may differ. For instance, in the Western literature, explaining and attempting to prioritize non-kinetic instruments have received more attention than the desire to detail and approach kinetic instruments from the same perspective. Moreover, in the Western literature, there is no unified perception that considers information operations as a part of the hybrid approach throughout the entire crisis, whether it escalates into an armed conflict or not. Additionally, there are contradictory opinions regarding the connection between hybrid approaches and the concept of the "grey zone".

However, regardless of the approach, it should not be the subject of extensive debate whether manipulating frozen conflicts can serve as an instrument of hybrid warfare. Both from a general perspective and contextualized in the post-Soviet space, manipulating frozen conflicts can be used by the third party (especially with a

high degree of international influence) to gain benefits that may not necessarily lead to the resolution of the underlying dispute fueling the frozen conflict.

Studying Russian involvement in the conflicts in Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia has confirmed our research hypothesis. Manipulating frozen conflicts is employed by Russia as a part of its hybrid approach against the West. Depending on how a frozen conflict is managed, it can be manipulated to serve as a kinetic or non-kinetic instrument of the hybrid approach. We have identified three ways through which Russia manipulated the three studied frozen conflicts: the presence of Russian troops in the conflict zone, the "passportization" and the manipulation of the Kosovo precedent. The effect was to influence the evolution of the frozen conflict either towards a new violent phase or to keep it in a latent, non-violent phase. Having means that influence the course of such conflicts in the post-Soviet space, a climate of destabilization has been maintained in Moldova and Georgia, thereby affecting the security environment in the Euro-Atlantic region due to the instabilities in its immediate neighborhood. In this context, manipulating frozen conflicts contributes to achieving the established political end-state, which is influencing the behavior of the target actors on the international stage – the Western states.

Given this, the Western states must not remain indifferent to Russian approach to its post-Soviet space. This region should be regarded as a point of interest in Russian foreign policy agenda and may serve as a case study for understanding Russian deployment and interpretation of "hybrid warfare". Russia is capable of using any means at its disposal to achieve its interests, especially in a conflict where the Russian actor does not have a favorable position in the existing disproportionality of resources among the involved parties.

We believe that our study can open new perspectives on the discussed subject. For example, it becomes very interesting to analyze whether, as a result of the "special military operation" initiated in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russia could consider freezing the conflict at its borders. Regardless of the answer, this scenario cannot be dismissed, and the potential manipulation of this frozen conflict remains a possibility.

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# CONFLICTS IN THE POST-SOVIET AREA AND IMPLICATIONS ON THE SECURITY OF EUROPE AND THE WESTERN BALKANS

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DOI: [https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod\\_strint.2023.ch10](https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod_strint.2023.ch10)

## Keywords:

USSR,  
Russia,  
Ukraine,  
security of Europe,  
Western Balkans,  
Montenegro



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**Abstract:** *By undertaking large-scale military actions against neighboring Ukraine in February 2022, Russia clearly shows that it does not want NATO in its immediate neighborhood and that it intends to regain its role in international relations from the time of the functioning of the USSR in the international community, clearly showing that it does not accept the dominant position of the US in the international community. Considering that before the aggression Ukraine expressed clear ambitions to become a member of NATO and the EU, as well as the fact that Russia is a territorial part of the European state and that its economy was significantly related to the EU states, then it is crystal clear that this aggression is directly related to the EU security. In addition to the former USSR countries in the Baltics: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which became NATO members in 2004, Finland, which was a neutral country for a long time, also became a NATO member on the anniversary of the founding of this organization on April 4, 2023 and formal membership of Sweden is expected soon, which greatly changes the security architecture of Europe. The countries of the Western Balkans, which are historically and culturally linked to Russia and at the same time have opted for the Western European integration, have been brought into a security gap. The future course of events will undoubtedly have consequences on their safety. Montenegro, as the smallest country in the Western Balkans and a member of NATO, with already achieved results in the process of the European integration after 2020, is a politically and ethnically divided country and, with a high rate of organized crime and corruption, has been put in a situation where its state survival is also threatened.*

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## Introduction

After the dissolution of the USSR, in which Russia had a central role or 60% of the potential, there followed a period of realizing that in the 40-year period of the Cold War, the West won. In the initial period, Russia accepted reality (at least it seemed so) and started the process of developing the Western model of democracy together with other members of the USSR that declared their independence and became the UN members. The Baltic States Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania became members of NATO and the EU in 2004. Until the election of Vladimir Putin as the President of Russia in 2000, Russia had a very developed cooperation with NATO. However, the so-called Putin's doctrine was amended in the same year and adapted to new geostrategic circumstances. Right from the beginning, Putin has shown what he would like, first with the military occupation of Chechnya in the spring of 2001, and then with its complete pacification, up to 2009. The second case was the engagement of the Russian Armed Forces in Georgia, which was, first of all, a response to the decision at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008 on the establishment of the NATO-Georgia Commission, as a higher level of cooperation and Georgia's clear commitment to become a member of this Alliance. Then Russia annexed Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as parts of the territory of Georgia and recognized them as independent states. Putin's key goal was to appoint presidents loyal to him, like Kadyrov in Chechnya, to be the heads of the states of the former USSR.

Putin actually started the aggression against Ukraine by annexing the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, and immediately after that, in the same year, by sending his troops to the eastern part of Ukraine, the Donbass (Donetsk and Luhansk). Although he claimed in front of the entire international public that he would not do it, on February 24, 2022, the Russian Armed Forces with 100,000 soldiers carried out aggression in almost the entire territory of Ukraine.

With all his moves on the national and international scene, Putin has persistently shown that he does not agree with the current prestigious role of the US, NATO and the EU in the international community and that his ambitions are to restore Russian power and influence in the international surroundings from the USSR period and impose a new "sphere of influence" in the international community, where Russia would have a rather more favourable status.

## Conflicts in the post-Soviet area

### *The foundations of the establishment of the Russian state*

The Russian state was autocratic for about a thousand years. It was ruled by a hereditary monarch, whose power was not limited by any constitution. Only in the first decade of the 20th century did the Russian emperor agree with the constitution that provided for an elected parliament. However, the emperor quickly dissolved the

parliament and arbitrarily changed the constitution. In addition to autocracy, the historical legacy of the Russian statehood is characterized by absolutism, patrimonialism and Orthodox Christianity (Almond, et al. 2009: 386). Absolutism meant that the emperor sought to have absolute power over the subordinates in his empire. Patrimonialism refers to the idea that a ruler treats his empire as property rather than society with its legitimate rights and interests. Finally, the Tsarist regime identified itself with the Russian Orthodox Church. The continuity of the behaviour of the Russian Church has lasted to the present day, which can be seen in the example and conditions of the Russian aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, when Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew pointed out that the Russian Orthodox Church had betrayed the fathers of the Orthodox Church by supporting the attack on Ukraine. Russian Patriarch Kirill supported Moscow's action and mentioned that the Russian Orthodox Church should help the Russian Armed Forces more, so he called on all church parishes to "mobilize their parishioners" (CDM, 2023). Even Pope Francis warned the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, not to be "a Putin's assistant". In his harshest rhetoric to date, the Pope criticized Patriarch Kirill for publicly supporting the reasons given by Russia for attacking Ukraine (Danas, 2022).

Absolutism, patrimonialism and Orthodoxy are recurring elements in Russian political culture. At some points, the rulers of this state tried to modernize its economy and society following the example of the Western countries. Modernizing rulers, such as Peter the Great (1682-1725) and Catherine the Great (1762-1786), had a strong influence on Russian society and brought it closer to the Western European models. The development of Russian military and economic potential was also necessary due to the constant expansion of Russia through the conquest and annexation of neighbouring territories and the eternal need to defend its borders. At the end of the 17th century, Russia was the territorially largest country in the world. Nevertheless, in the greatest part of its history, the Russian Empire extended beyond the borders of its real power (Vukadinović, 2008: 18-22).

### *The establishment and dissolution of the USSR*

The Soviet Union consisted of the Soviet Federative Socialist Republics (SFSR) and the Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR), as well as autonomous and other areas within them, so a total of 15 republics and 36 autonomous areas. The State Proclamation (1922) united the Russian SFSR, the Belarusian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the Transcaucasian SFSR. The first Constitution was adopted on January 31, 1924. Then Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (1924), Tajikistan (1929), Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (1936), Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Moldova (1940) became separate Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Soviet Union was the greatest country in the world: in 1924, it had about 21.7 million km<sup>2</sup>, and in 1946 about 22.4 million km<sup>2</sup>. After World War II, the Soviet land borders in Europe were 4,216 km long, and in Asia 14,724 km long. The number of inhabitants grew from 147 million (1926) to 170.5 million (1939), 208.8 million (1959),

262.4 million (1979), and 286.7 million (1989). According to the national share (1989), the majority was Russians (145.2 million), followed by Ukrainians (44.2 million), Uzbeks (16.7 million), Belarusians (10 million), Kazakhs (8.1 million), Azerbaijanis (6.8 million), Tatars (6.6 million), Armenians (4.6 million) and other nations. Before the dissolution of the USSR (1991), the greatest part of its territory (76%) and population (about 60%) was included in the Russian SFSR (Mearsheimer, 2009: 253).



Figure 1 – USSR by administrative regions, 1989

Source: <https://www.mapsland.com/europe/ussr>

The limited democratization of the USSR began in the second half of the 1980s, under the leadership of M.S. Gorbachev through Perestroika programme. Relations with the US and Western European countries improved to a certain extent, there was the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan (1988–1989) and Central Europe (1990–1991), and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (1991). Due to the weakening of the central Soviet power, internal conflicts broke out (Armenian-Azerbaijani, from 1988) and republican demands for independence occurred (from 1990).

Since the mid-1980s, reforms in the Soviet Union were not carried out with the intention of leading to such rapid and uncontrolled events as the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, the collapse of communism, economic "shock therapy", nor the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR itself. Still, that is exactly what happened. The central place in these events is the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and the unification of Germany (Brzezinski, 2004: 18).

Gorbachev's intention was to implement gradual reforms over a period of 25 to 30 years. However, in these efforts, Gorbachev found himself torn between democrats – nationalists, who wanted quick reforms and a complete break with communism and the Centre, and conservatives, whose intention was to preserve *the status quo*. The relationship between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, as well as Yeltsin's relationship to the Communist Party, greatly contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and this course of events, and the Russian model of the "Declaration of sovereignty", adopted on June 12, 1990, served as an additional incentive for the other Soviet Republics that had not adopted them until then. This led to a chain reaction of other constituents of the USSR, so, in a period of 33 months, 41 former units of the USSR declared themselves sovereign states (Kaufman, 2010: 144).

Within the following few days, Gorbachev handed over the presidential prerogatives to Yeltsin and left the function of the President of the USSR, which then ceased to exist. It can be definitively concluded that this outcome ended the Cold War and that the West emerged victorious from it (Kostić, 2019: 508).

### *The post-Soviet period*

The turmoil of the conservative and liberal-democratic currents in Russian politics will have a great impact on the attitudes, fears and development of foreign policies of the countries of the European post-Soviet area. Each time conservatism increased in Russia, it would serve as a reason for new fears of these countries of possible re-Sovietization of the region, Russian imperialist ambitions and threats to their territorial integrity and sovereignty. An additional motive for Russian distance from the West was Russian expressed intention, since the first Foreign Policy Concept from 1993, to preserve the role of a great power in international relations, which has a special responsibility and a leading role in preserving security in the CIS area, i.e. its "near abroad", especially in terms of resolving conflicts in this area and monitoring the respect of human and minority rights of the Russian people who continued to live in these republics. This course of events indicates a mutual cause-and-effect relationship between the NATO expansion process and the expression of Russian intention to preserve the position, interests and population in this region (Tatalović, et al. 2008).

As a transitional phase towards the complete placing of Soviet nuclear weapons under Russian command, and in accordance with the Protocol on Unified Command from Alma Ata, the joint military command of the CIS was established, which functioned until mid-1993, and it was then officially disbanded. Therefore, the US, Russia and Great Britain, together with the four post-Soviet nuclear states, signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in 1994, so that they could join the Non-Proliferation Treaty and give up nuclear weapons. The document gave guarantees that the US, Russia and Great Britain will respect their independence, sovereignty and the existing borders, that they will refrain from the threat or use of force against their territorial integrity or political independence and that none of their weapons will be used against these

countries, except in the case of self-defence or otherwise, in accordance with the UN Charter, that they will refrain from economic coercion in order to subordinate these countries to their interests, that they will seek immediate UN action to provide them with assistance if they are threatened or the victim of the aggression in which nuclear weapons are used, that they will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear power, except in the case of an attack on itself or its allies when the very state acts in alliance with a nuclear state (Almond, et al. 2009: 423).

### *NATO relations with Russia, Ukraine and Georgia*

In addition to the evident and mutual disagreements, it should be emphasized that before coming to power of the President of Russia Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, the cooperation between Russia and NATO had an upward trajectory and a very wide range of joint activities. Russia joined the Partnership for Peace programme in 1994, and already in 1996, Russian soldiers were engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with NATO soldiers, in IFOR operation, under NATO auspices in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the stabilization of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The following great step towards establishing closer cooperation between NATO and Russia was made in Paris on May 27, 1997, when NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security was signed. The Founding Act reflected the change in the security environment in Europe and represented the commitment of NATO and Russia to jointly build lasting peace in the Euro-Atlantic region. In accordance with the agreement on the principles of the NATO-Russia strategic partnership and the definition of fields for further development of political and military cooperation, a new forum, NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, was established.

However, the different positions of NATO and Russia on how to resolve the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija in 1999 and Moscow's opposition to the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, led to Russian withdrawal from the work of the Permanent Joint Council, thus causing the work of this body to freeze. Only later, as a result of the Russian military intervention in Georgia, in August 2008, there was a great halt in military cooperation between Russia and NATO. Just when it was believed that relations were somewhat smoothed over, a new crisis arose between NATO and Russia, as, in mid-2014, Russia violently annexed Crimea and annexed it to Russia. The conflict continued with the direct interference of Russia, which, according to the same Crimean principle, tried to destabilize Ukraine, by encouraging and providing military assistance to the Russian population that rebelled in the east of Ukraine, which is why the relations between NATO and Russia were frozen and completely suspended.

As in the case of Russia, cooperation between NATO and Ukraine began in 1991, when Ukraine joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, immediately after gaining independence, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is the first of the states from the Commonwealth of Independent States – CIS, which joined the Partnership for Peace programme in 1994.

Ukraine opened its diplomatic mission to NATO in 1997, whose military part began operating in 1998. On the other hand, NATO opened its Information and Documentation Centre in Kiev in May 1997, whose role is to inform Ukrainian public about its activities, encourage debate on the Euro-Atlantic integration and promote comprehensive cooperation with Ukraine. Moreover, in April 1999, the NATO Liaison Office was established in Kiev, whose purpose is to provide assistance in the security sector reform, the participation of Ukrainian forces in joint training, exercises and peacekeeping missions, as well as to facilitate contacts with Ukrainian officials.

In May 2002, the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, announced Ukraine's intention to become a member of NATO. Shortly afterwards, in November 2002, in Prague, at the meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan was adopted, which clearly expresses Ukrainian strategic goals and priorities on the way to full integration into the Euro-Atlantic security structure and provides a framework for future cooperation. After the famous Orange Revolution (winter 2004-2005), NATO and Ukraine launched an intensified dialogue, at the meeting of the Commission in Vilnius (Lithuania) on April 21, 2005, as an additional contribution to Ukrainian aspirations to become a member of the Alliance. In addition to participating in IFOR/SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine contributed during the deployment of KFOR troops in Kosovo and Metohija, by engaging a helicopter squadron and continued to participate in this operation, within the joint Polish-Ukrainian battalion. Already in the fall of 2007, Ukraine included a corvette in "an active effort", and in the summer of 2008, another frigate. During the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, the heads of states and governments of the Alliance members agreed on Ukrainian future membership in NATO. In order to take practical steps to join NATO, in December 2014 the Ukrainian Parliament passed the resolution on the termination of Ukrainian military neutrality status.

Despite the clearly expressed commitment of Ukrainian officials to the integration of the state into NATO, this issue still remains a great challenge for the political forces in Ukraine, and also for the divided Ukrainian public as a whole. The outcome of hostilities in the territory of Ukraine after the Russian aggression on February 24, 2022 will largely depend on public support for further rapprochement with NATO (Tahirović, Petrič, 2015: 85-90).

Relations between Georgia and NATO officially began in 1994, when this country joined NATO Partnership for Peace programme. Russia has opposed these close ties, including those expressed at the Bucharest Summit in 2008, where NATO members promised that Georgia would eventually join the organization. Complications in the relationship between NATO and Georgia include the presence of the Russian Armed Forces in Georgian territory following the Russian military intervention in Georgia in 2008, in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, where the majority of Russians live. After those events, on September 15, 2008, the Commission for NATO and Georgia was established on April 4, 2009, and the heads of NATO states issued a joint statement, pledging to maximize their assistance, advice and support to Georgian and Ukrainian reform efforts.

### *The Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*

The process of the collapse of the geopolitical borders of the former Soviet area, as well as the relatively weak performance of the Commonwealth of Independent States – CIS, forced the Russian Federation to focus on defining the form of its regional dominance, in order to preserve the dependence of the former Soviet Republics on Russia. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) seemed, at that moment, to be the best way represented by the security alliance of several post-Soviet states, established on October 7, 2002, on the initiative of Russia, with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that became its members. The provision of military and other security assistance between the signatories of the agreement was established, and interstate cooperation, joint military exercises, intervention and peacekeeping forces, military infrastructure, etc. were organized. The Organization was formed as a result of the previous Agreement on Collective Security, concluded in May 1992 in Tashkent, between Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (the so-called Tashkent Pact). The Organization is an expression of Russian efforts to maintain military-political influence in as large a part of the post-Soviet area as possible, which in Central Asia is burdened with a series of political, ethnic and other problems, as well as the consequences of the military operation of the US and its allies in Afghanistan since October 2001 (it finished at the end of August 2021). The activities of the organization are disrupted by occasional disagreements between individual members. Its intervention forces (about 2,000 soldiers, mostly from Russia) participated in the suppression of unrest in Kazakhstan at the beginning of 2022, immediately before the Russian aggression against Ukraine (Kilibarda, 2012).

Due to political, economic and some other interests, and probably due to the diminishing importance of the CIS, in 2001, the Russian Federation, together with China, which is the initiator of the initiative, founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which, in addition to economic and cultural cooperation, was supposed to develop cooperation in the security field, primarily in the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism. Although the representatives of the SCO states assure that the Organization has no ambitions to grow into a military bloc, some sources of such development can be seen (joint military exercises). It can be said that the SCO is a regional security mechanism that serves as the counterweight to the United States. With this Organization, the member states would like to prevent the intervention of the only superpower in areas that are of strategic importance for them (Tatalović, et al. 2008:174).

### *The main reasons for the conflicts in the post-Soviet area*

In terms of security and defence integration, the issue of European post-Soviet Republics, as part of the broader theme of organizing the European security architecture, represents an essential source of instability in the modern world order, i.e.



the increasingly harsh relations between Russia, the US and EU. Some even consider it the line of the new division of Europe and the centre of the new Cold War. This area has retained enormous importance for the security and identity of Russia. It was formed as a "special area" of Russia, unlike e.g. the Baltic countries, especially if one takes into account the history of the establishment of Russia itself and the number of Russians who remained living in this area, and it also gained increasing importance for the accomplishment of the vision of the world order of the US and EU.

Since 2006, the US strategy has treated this area as an area of its vital national interest, which is why it will build relations with Russia in relation to the extent to which Russia enables/prevents the establishment and functioning of effective democratic and open regimes and freedom in the countries of this region. In this way, the US attitude towards this area is characterized by a constant tension between pragmatism and principledness; pragmatism because the US is aware that the success of democracy and the preservation of freedom and territorial integrity of these countries will depend on the situation in Russia, thus being necessary to maintain a dialogue on this area with it, and principledness because these countries have been given guarantees that Russia will not have the right to veto their sovereign foreign policy decisions, nor will they agree with Russia on their fate. This is particularly important after the growing suspicion of the US that Russia started to implement a revanchist policy, especially after Putin's statement in 2005 "that the collapse of the USSR was the greatest geopolitical disaster of the century", the policy of restoring the Russian empire through the establishment of state and oligarchic economies in post-Soviet countries, "governed democracies" that protect the state apparatus, and not the freedom of citizens, and to regroup these countries through organizations led by Russia (Kostić, 2019).

What makes the post-Soviet space unique is the role of Russia, which, even after the collapse of its former empire, the USSR, remained the dominant actor in the region, and which has the opportunity to act decisively in both aspects essential for the definition of frozen conflicts - both legal and factual. Legally - because it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, which can challenge the statehood of any territory, and factually - because it is a great power and regional hegemon, and can, with the exclusion of the influence of rival great powers, with the means at its disposal, including military, create a favourable factual situation for itself as the outcome of any regional conflict.

With these aspirations, Russia has ventured into aggression unprecedented in modern European history after the end of the Cold War. In the military and political sense, the attack is a continuation of Putin's policy of destabilizing the Russia-EU/NATO space, which is reflected in the creation of frozen conflicts using a combined method of political, military and hybrid actions. By attacking and waging war, all international law, humanitarian and other rules, which regulate the behaviour of sovereign and independent states in international relations, were mercilessly, brutally and intentionally trampled and violated by one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. The attack is, therefore, a precedent that should be interrupted, stopped, international mediation and negotiations should be carried out, a peace

agreement concluded and, accordingly, those responsible for war crimes should be sanctioned. Events from the recent past, after the collapse of the former SFRY, can be the starting point for sanctioning war crimes, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) based in the Hague (IFIMES, 2022).

## The implications of the Russian aggression against Ukraine on the stability of Europe and the Western Balkans

The Russian aggression against Ukraine resulted in a tectonic disruption of the international order. The US, Russia and China are today at the greatest distance since the end of the Cold War. Regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, it can mean a turning point when it comes to the world security infrastructure, given the fact that this conflict has opened up questions about national sovereignty, democracy vs. autocracy, human rights and the global world order, with evident implications for the world economy in the conditions of increasingly unstable global markets. Skyrocketing commodity prices are the most immediate economic consequence of the aggression against Ukraine, and the war threatens supplies of main goods from Russia and Ukraine, including food, energy and fertilizers. Interrupting and stopping grain delivery through the Black Sea ports could have catastrophic consequences for food security in poor countries. At the same time, the direct consequence of the Russian aggression against Ukraine is the greatest emigrant and refugee crisis in Europe after World War II.

Putin's expectation that the high degree of dependence of the greatest European countries, such as Germany, France and Italy, on Russian energy sources, would lead to discord between the EU members, and then with the US, did not come true. In contrast, the Russian aggression against Ukraine has united the EU and NATO more than ever since World War II. By the time this paper was written, all European countries, except Serbia, had introduced the 11th package of economic and various other sanctions and measures against Russia. Ukraine has received the status of a candidate for the EU membership, and its military has been provided with enormous assistance in weapons and equipment for successfully conducting war with Russia. In the period so far, the US has helped Ukraine in the total amount of over 70 billion dollars, and the EU with 68 billion euros. The UN General Assembly adopted two resolutions condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine by a huge majority.

On the contrary, Russia seeks to improve its alliance with China, India, South Africa, Brazil, Turkey, Syria, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Iran, as well as Serbia, trying to establish a new alliance that would represent adequate parity and a new balance of power in international relations.

Bearing in mind that Russia is the territorially greatest country in the world, with still very large and underutilized natural resources, whether it can get out of this very complicated situation without major consequences, or whether it has introduced itself and the rest of the world into "Russian roulette" with an uncertain outcome – remains to be seen in the upcoming period.

## *The Russian aggression against Ukraine and changes in NATO*

The Summit in Madrid, on July 1, 2022, was an opportunity for NATO, after a long period of trying to articulate itself after the end of the Cold War, especially since September 11, 2001, to return to the basics and focus on its main purpose: the collective defence of the Euro-Atlantic area. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there was a growing awareness of the importance of NATO membership, and concerns about its expediency and obsolescence (labelled "brain death" by French President Macron in 2021) were replaced by increased enthusiasm for strengthening the Alliance.

The strengthening of NATO, in several directions, represents one of the most significant international reactions to the Ukrainian crisis. The new strategic concept, the first one since 2010, focuses on Russia as the main security threat, while including cyber activities that could potentially trigger the Alliance's collective defence clause. The new concept also changes the attitude towards China, which in the previous period was called a partner, and now it is considered a challenge to the global order based on rules.

The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, which in the face of the Russian threat decided to give up their traditional neutrality and join it, will increase the credibility of the Alliance, and also expand the land area of operations of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) by over 866,000 square kilometres and change the European security architecture. As close NATO partners for two decades, with frequent experience of joint military exercises, the Finnish and Swedish Armed Forces are NATO compatible and interoperable. The new border will enable the establishment of a new ring of defence for the whole Western Europe because air defence capabilities and early warning detection will be based closer to the Alliance's border.

The concept emphasizes that the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region have strategic importance for the Alliance, which will continue to support the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the interested countries in these regions and strengthen efforts to improve their ability to respond to various challenges and threats they face and increase their resistance to malicious third-party influences. The very important announcements, which are contained in the Strategic Concept, will certainly be very challenging for the NATO member states and carry the risk of losing credibility if they are not adequately supported (Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, 2022).

## *The effects of the Russian aggression on the EU*

Until the war in Ukraine, Russia was the main source of energy for the rest of Europe and the world's greatest exporter of natural gas, the second largest exporter of crude oil and the third largest exporter of coal. Three quarters of its gas and almost half of its crude oil went to Europe. Russian threats and blackmail by reducing or suspending the supply of energy resources to the EU member states resulted in the European Commission's announcement of the total renunciation of Russian fossil fuels

by 2030, as well as plans to drastically reduce the use of Russian gas and increase gas storage capacities. The war in Ukraine was considered by many as a chance for the EU - not only to free itself from the dependence on Russian energy resources, but also to meet the goals related to climate protection by building renewable energy sources and increasing energy efficiency. In any case, policymakers will be faced with very difficult political choices, with great costs and the necessity of overcoming serious dilemmas (Thompson, et al. 2021:115).

In response to the Russian invasion, Kiev submitted a formal application for the EU membership, to which the European Commission responded by recommending that Ukraine be granted a candidate status, together with the Republic of Moldova, which twenty-seven EU leaders unanimously approved in June 2022. Along with all other clear effects, this decision is also an unequivocal sign that the response to the Russian aggression is considered the joint responsibility of all EU members.

Probably motivated by the accelerated granting of a candidacy status for Ukraine and Moldova, which are, above all, motivated by political and security factors, the heads of the governments of the EU member states, at the Summit held on December 15, 2022, confirmed the recommendation of the European Commission and granted Bosnia and Herzegovina a candidate status for the European Union. When it comes to Kosovo, the European Parliament adopted a decision on visa liberalisation on April 18, 2023, which ended all relevant decision-making procedures.

### *Russia, the EU and the Western Balkans*

The tightening of relations between Russia and the West in the context of the war in Ukraine could also reflect on the Western Balkan region, which represents the traditional neuralgic point of the European security. An important segment of the strategy of regaining the influence that was lost after the Cold War is pro-Russian forces in the former Yugoslav Republics, whose role is often neglected by the international community. Therefore, the best way to understand the role that Russia plays in its immediate neighbourhood and in the area of the Western Balkans, and also for the projection of its power in general is the thesis that Russia views its neighbours either as enemies or vassals – it controls vassals, and intimidates enemies politically and militarily.

The Kremlin, directly and indirectly, through its proxies in the Balkans, undermines the chances of the countries of the region for the NATO membership, while it has an ambiguous attitude towards the European Union, promoting the alliance with Russia as a political, military and economic alternative to the West. Russia, through its key exponents in the Western Balkan region and proxies for the destabilization of other states, could cause instability with greater security implications, in order to redirect the attention of the West (NATO) to this part of the European continent. In this sense, we should not ignore the assessments that after the attack on Ukraine, it can be expected that Russia will try to further destabilize the Western Balkans, having in mind that since the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis

radicalization in the area of the Western Balkan countries can also be followed, especially bearing in mind the behaviour of Milorad Dodik, the President of the Republic of Srpska, which almost led to the point of disintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the continuation of the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. In order to prevent possible interethnic conflicts, on March 4, 2022, EUFOR ALTHEA sent in reinforcements of 500 soldiers as a matter of urgency. Additional soldiers have arrived from Austria, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia as the Russian invasion of Ukraine continues. The additional 500 EUFOR soldiers have been deployed to parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina where excesses have been recorded in the past period, especially in returnee settlements, as stated by the head of the European Union (EU) Delegation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Johann Sattler. The EUFOR ALTHEA mission is the EU longest-running military operation, the only land mission, and the only one with an executive mandate to use force.

The Western Balkans is a region characterized by weak governance, fragile civil society and geopolitical disputes, as internal and regional factors that make it highly susceptible to local and external disinformation campaigns. The democratic vulnerability of the region favours the activities of Russia, which, since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the sanctions imposed by the EU and the US, has launched an extensive disinformation campaign in the Western Balkans with the aim of disavowing the values and perception of the EU and the US and obstructing the ambitions of the countries of the region on the way to their European and transatlantic integration (Defence Strategic Communications, 2015: 10-26).

This extensive campaign includes several narratives by which the Kremlin tries to achieve its political goals in the region, which it spreads through organization and exponents who are not members of political parties. Within this network there are a great number of non-governmental organizations, associations and brotherhoods that are close to the Serbian Orthodox Church. There are also media that directly distribute disinformation and propaganda from Russian media controlled by the Kremlin (Atlantski savez Crne Gore, 2022: 39).

Immediately after Russia attacked Ukraine, the activities of the Kremlin-controlled media and their followers in Montenegro have intensified. Numerous narratives and a series of suspicious information, videos and photos that appeared in the Russian state media were also broadcast by some Montenegrin and regional media. Although almost all the Western Balkan countries have been the target of pro-Russian disinformation campaigns in recent years, at local level it was hardly recognized as a security issue or issue of interest. The situation on the ground is not encouraging and it seems that the region is particularly sensitive to fake news and misinformation. In the 11th package of sanctions against Russia, the European Union included sanctions for banning the broadcasting of Russia Today in the Serbian language. Serbia, however, has not introduced a single measure against Russia since the beginning of the aggression against Ukraine, although Brussels is urging it to do so because the country is a candidate for the EU membership, so it is expected to harmonize its foreign policy with the EU policies.

Various activities of state actors, formal and informal, contribute to this situation, and their actions contribute to misinformation and the spread of nationalist policies in the Western Balkans. A very good example is "Non-Paper" by Janez Janša from April 2021, under the title "Western Balkans - a way forward" (Cirman, Vuković, 2021). This document particularly emphasizes the unresolved national issues of Serbs, Albanians and Croats. Later, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovenia at that time denied that he had participated in the development of this document, which became available to the entire public in Europe. It clearly specifies the new maps in the Balkans, which include the annexation of Kosovo to Albania, the Republic of Srpska to Serbia and Herceg-Bosna to Croatia. In these countries, nationalism was encouraged and motivated, and, on the other hand, among Montenegrins, Bosniaks and Macedonians, to whose detriment this project would be implemented, panic and fear of new war events like those of the 1990s spread.

In continuation of the negative campaign, the President of the Republic of Srpska, Milorad Dodik, visited Moscow on May 22, 2023, and discussed "important geopolitical issues" with Putin. Immediately after that, on June 21, 2023, deputies in the Parliament of the Republic of Srpska voted to stop publishing the decrees and laws of the High Representative, Christian Schmidt, in the Official Gazette, which means that they will no longer be recognized as official laws in this entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Just a few days later, on June 27, 2023, the deputies of the National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska decided that they would no longer implement the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in their territory (Vijesti, 2023).

Since the declaration of independence in 2008, the political discussion and rhetoric in Kosovo has primarily focused on the issue of the EU membership. After 10 years since the signing of the Brussels Agreement, on the initiative of French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, in Ohrid, on March 18, 2023, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Prime Minister of Kosovo Albin Kurti reached an agreement on the Implementation annex to the Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia. Unfortunately, like all previous agreements, these last ones did not bring the expected results. Instead of agreeing on the establishment of a Community of Serb Municipalities and the implementation of other agreed principles, Serbs in Kosovo, at the beginning of 2023, left all Kosovo institutions, including the police. After that, they refused to participate in local elections, which the Kosovo authorities called for and carried out with the participation of Albanians and representatives of national minorities without Serbs. Immediately after the elections, the newly elected mayors of municipalities, mostly Albanians, took up positions in all municipalities, where Serbs are the majority and Serbian protesters responded by preventing them from entering the municipal buildings.

All these events are an indicator of the purposeful implementation of a negative campaign and the creation of conditions for the formation of an atmosphere of insecurity and fear in the Western Balkans, especially in unstable areas such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.

Furthermore, bearing in mind fragile institutions and inadequate capacities for the protection of government infrastructure, as well as the very high influence of organized crime and corruption in the security system, Montenegro is very susceptible to various forms of cyber attacks and the influence of misinformation and negative campaigns. After cyber attacks in 2016 and 2017, during the period of finalization of NATO accession, which coincided with parliamentary elections in October 2016, organized by the Russian military intelligence service GRU (i.e. their APT28 group), Montenegro faced strong cyber attacks again in August 2022. The target of the attack was the complete information and technology infrastructure of the Government of Montenegro, which made it impossible to access official websites and e-mails, and employees in state institutions were instructed to disconnect computers from network for data protection.

The National Security Agency of Montenegro (NSA) announced that the Russian services are responsible for this cyber attack, with the assessment that it is hybrid war, and that it has been prepared for a long time and has not yet been carried out against any other country. NATO Allies were informed about the attack, and the US and France sent their teams to Montenegro, where they worked with their Montenegrin counterparts to alleviate the consequences of the most serious cyber attack on the governmental information and telecommunications infrastructure so far. At the same time, an initiative has been launched and willingness has been emphasized to support the establishment of a regional centre for cyber protection in Montenegro (Atlantski savez Crne Gore, 2022: 39).

## *Conclusion*

Bearing in mind the historical process of the establishment and inheritance of the Russian Federation, its Eurasian territorial position, the heterogeneity of the population and the potential of natural resources, and the absolutist system of government, which has important characteristics of the historical heritage from the period of the Russian Empire and the communist USSR, it can be concluded that it is greatly different from the Western system of values and the functioning of democratic Western societies. Analysing the post-Soviet armed conflicts, one can clearly notice the Russian intention to control the democratic development and international engagement of the former Republics and autonomies that functioned within the Soviet Union. In the development of antagonism towards Western civilizational values, in which the Russian Orthodox Church also plays a significant role, Russia led by Vladimir Putin, who established an authoritarian system of government in the country, strives to restore the Russian Federation's power and position in the international community from the period of the functioning of the USSR.

In addition to energy capacities, expressed in quantities of natural gas and oil, the Russian Federation also possesses one of the greatest nuclear potentials in the world, especially when it comes to nuclear weapons with tactical warheads. Having this, it blackmailed and imposed continuous threats to its neighbours and European countries. In this way, it succeeded in dissuading the former members of the USSR from carrying out democratic reforms and joining international organizations such as NATO and the EU.

In addition, Russia is trying to establish new alliances with similar authoritarian regimes, primarily with China, India, Iran, Turkey, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Venezuela and Syria, to create a new system of international relations, where the US and the EU will not have a leading role. Using the pan-Slavic cultural legacy and closeness to the Orthodox churches, especially the Serbian Orthodox Church, it skillfully carries out continuous information propaganda and influence on the Slavic nations in the Balkans, trying to dissuade them from pro-Western orientation and win them over to the accomplishment of their foreign policy goals.

However, with the aggression against Ukraine, one of the greatest countries of the former USSR and the country with the largest granaries in Europe, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, in order to prevent this country from becoming a member of NATO and the EU, the perfidious system of Russian power has been completely exposed and the effect totally opposite to the set goals has been achieved. The European Union has united much more firmly and finally made decisions to find mechanisms against permanent dependence on Russian energy sources. All European countries (except Belarus, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) have joined in introducing a very wide range of sanctions against Russia. NATO has united more than ever in history and at the same time strengthened with two new members, Finland and Sweden, which are immediate neighbours of Russia.

How Putin will react in the conditions when he is in a very unfavourable situation, whether he will try to open a new focal point in the Western Balkans and thus cause damage to the EU and NATO, or whether it will be a new focal point in the immediate Russian environment or the Middle East, or whether he will undertake drastic measures to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, which could lead to World War III, remains to be seen in the near future.

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# INFORMATION WARFARE AS AN INTRODUCTION TO RUSSIA-UKRAINE ARMED CONFLICT

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DOI: [https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod\\_strint.2023.ch11](https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod_strint.2023.ch11)

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## Keywords:

Russia,  
Ukraine,  
armed conflict,  
hybrid warfare,  
information warfare

**Abstract:** *After the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine was the area where and around which the interests of Russia and Western powers, primarily the US and NATO, clashed. Two "colour revolutions" in the 21st century best illustrate the dynamics of political balance changes and the influence of external factors in this European state. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine, particularly after the Russian annexation of Crimea, is viewed as a "hybrid warfare", whose significant component is, among others, "information warfare". This paper considers the characteristics of the information warfare that preceded the Russian armed aggression against Ukraine. Russia has been preparing for a long time and has shown great efficiency in information warfare in the period until the beginning of the current armed conflict. The Russian sphere of influence was global. Various forms of information warfare (cyber, psychological propaganda, electronic, intelligence, etc.) have been combined. The action in information space was characterized by the integration of various resources, dynamism and flexibility of their use. The Russian information operations in Ukraine can be characterized by a high level of sophistication and their complex character. In the confrontation with Ukraine, Russia had numerous advantages from the aspect of controlling information space: technical tools, vast experience, as well as long-term practice in conducting information operations. The lessons*

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*learned in the conflict with Georgia in 2008 were particularly useful. On the other hand, Ukraine proved to be unprepared for information warfare and the undertaken measures were, for the most part, reactive. The impact of social networks, various mechanisms for compromising information infrastructure, as well as unmanned platforms, were very significant.*

## From "the colour revolutions" to an armed conflict

The relationship between two close East Slavic nations, Russians and Ukrainians, who shared the common past and lived in the common state for centuries, once in Imperial Russia and later within the Soviet Union, is quite complex, and it has reached one of the lowest points in history with the current armed conflict. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 into fifteen states, which were autonomous republics until then, marked the end of the Cold War at the same time. This led to the fact that about 22 million Russians found themselves out of the territory of the Russian Federation, most of them in Ukraine. The term "Russian" could also refer to someone "who only speaks Russian, and is not of Russian origin, or identifies themselves with the Russian state or culture" (Samardžić, 2021: 159). After the separation, Ukraine and Russia have continued to function as independent states; they had intensive cultural, economic, political and military cooperation. However, in recent history, the overall relations between Russia and Ukraine, especially at political and security level, have been oscillating, and after Euromaidan in 2014, these relations have taken on an extremely negative character and a trend that culminated in the Russian aggression against neighbouring Ukraine.

What cannot be denied is that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has been at a kind of political crossroads between pro-European and pro-Russian politics. This dilemma of the state strategic foreign policy orientation has deeply divided Ukrainian society in which, according to the 2001 census, about 17% of the population declared themselves ethnic Russians (the greatest in Crimea), about 30% spoke Russian, and a large number belonged to the Orthodox Church under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate (Constantin, 2022). More serious signs of political instability in the context of this division are the elections between two presidential candidates of different political views; one oriented towards the East and Russia, and the other towards the West and the US. A series of protests and political events from the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005, which were related to the election process, is known as the Orange Revolution. Namely, the results after the second round of the presidential elections, in which Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, who was otherwise pro-Russian, officially won, were disputed by his opponent Viktor Yushchenko and the pro-Western opposition, claiming that such a result was the consequence of the election fraud. This

sparked off massive street demonstrations, after which the Supreme Court of Ukraine ordered a repeat of the elections and Yushchenko won. These elections were important, not so much because of the democratization of Ukrainian society, but because of the question of which party will exercise influence in this European state, Russia or the US, together with the European administration in Brussels.

Immediately after the Orange Revolution, Ukrainian official foreign policy priorities included joining NATO. Due to the opposition of Russia, which considered it a threat to its security, and also due to the obligations arising from the Friendship Treaty with Russia, Ukraine has postponed this decision. Due to the fact that in Ukraine itself there has always been a deep division over its membership in NATO, which has greatly destabilized its political scene, it saw a way out in the policy of balancing between the US and the EU on the one hand and Russia on the other (Jović-Lazić, 2015). The political turmoil has soon spilled over into the field of economics, that is, energy industry. It is well-known that Russia is very rich in energy resources and that, in addition to economic benefits, it often uses them for political purposes, as well. Despite the political upheaval, gas has continued to be the main means of the Russian influence in Ukraine. Thus, on two occasions, in 2006 and 2009, the gas supply from Russia via Ukraine was interrupted, jeopardizing not only Ukrainian, but also European market. Despite the official explanation that the problem arose due to a disagreement over the gas price, many saw it as the Russian pressure on Ukraine due to its pro-Western course (Jović-Lazić and Lađevac, 2018). The increased tensions between the two neighbours in those years were also caused by the issue of Crimea, i.e. the use of ports for the Russian Black Sea Fleet. In the period from 2007 to 2011, Ukraine conducted intensive negotiations with the European Union on the Association Agreement, which was already agreed upon the following year. However, the Government of Ukraine made a decision to suspend preparations for the signing of the Association Agreement, which was supposed to be signed at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius at the end of 2013.

Such a decision was the reason for new mass demonstrations from the end of November 2013 to February 2014 and an introduction into a new political upheaval known as Euromaidan. Due to the political crisis caused by mass demonstrations and the violent takeover of local governments across Ukraine, Prime Minister Mykola Azarov resigned. In an attempt to calm the situation, pro-Russian President Yanukovich offered the position of Prime Minister to the opposition, but his proposal was rejected and his resignation was demanded. In fear of his safety, Yanukovich left Kiev, and on the following day, February 22, 2014, the Parliament of Ukraine, contrary to the Constitution, dismissed him from the presidential function, which officially ended Euromaidan. Three months later, pro-Western candidate Petro Poroshenko was elected president. Ukraine signed the agreement with the EU on June 27, 2014, and on June 12, 2020, NATO granted Ukraine the status of the Enhanced Opportunities Partner.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> "The North Atlantic Council recognised Ukraine as an Enhanced Opportunities Partner. This status is part of NATO's Partnership Interoperability Initiative, which aims to maintain and deepen cooperation between Allies and partners that have made significant contributions to NATO-led operations and missions" (NATO recognises Ukraine as Enhanced Opportunities Partner, 2020).

Having in mind the actors, technique and the method of execution, it can be said that the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan are actually "the colour revolutions", which have resulted in an unequivocal political turn of Ukraine towards NATO and the EU. "The colour revolutions" are never just spontaneous gatherings of citizens, but well-planned campaigns with clear and highly focused messages and goals, and as a rule, they are externally supported (Milenković and Mitrović, 2019). In the geopolitical sense, both of these "colour revolutions" represent the victory of the US over Russia, which was very frustrating for the Russian political leadership. The Russian reaction to this kind of political change at the beginning of 2014 was the annexation of Crimea after the referendum held on March 16, 2014, which the Ukrainian authorities did not recognize. Already next month, there was an armed rebellion in the eastern parts of the state made up of the majority Russian population, which does not want to accept the new government in Kiev. Countering this, central Kiev authorities undertook the military action in order to quell the rebellion in the Donbass and re-establish full control over the eastern regions, leading to a more massive internal armed conflict. The establishment of the self-proclaimed states of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic, which had the Russian support at the time, further deepened Ukrainian-Russian enmity (Walker, 2023).

In attempts to solve the security crisis in the state, the newly elected Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, as well as his successor Volodymyr Zelenskyy, are trying to gain the support of leading Western countries. The new National Security Strategy of Ukraine, which was signed by current President Zelenskyy on September 14, 2020, has foreseen, *inter alia*, more intensive cooperation with Western partners and "the development of a special partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in order to obtain Ukrainian full membership in NATO" (Стратегія національної безпеки України, 2020). This was just another confirmation of the justification of the Russian fear of NATO expanding to the East and approaching its borders, which is why Russia has undertaken more serious actions in order to improve its security, protect its external borders and preserve its sphere of influence in the post-Soviet territory. This time the answer was the Russian aggression against Ukraine in the morning hours of February 24, 2022, or, as Putin euphemistically called it in his address, "a special military operation" with the aim of "the demilitarization and Denazification" of Ukraine (Putin's address, 2022).

## Information warfare as the content of "hybrid warfare"

According to some theories, activities that lead to the state destabilization, or to the overthrow of the government in it, with the aim of establishing a new, changed state that disrupts the established balance of power in international relations in order to achieve one's own interests, and which are carried out mainly by non-combat means, can be called hybrid (Kofman and Rojansky, 2015). Hybrid security threats are actually all phenomena that involve the synergistic use of conventional weapons, unconventional and irregular tactics, terrorist acts and criminal activities,

simultaneously acting on a battlefield, with the aim of achieving political goals (Hofman, 2007). As the content of hybrid warfare, numerous activities that affect different spheres of social actions are recognized, including information warfare and the already mentioned "colour revolutions" (Mitrović and Nikolić, 2022).

One of the characteristics of hybrid warfare is that in addition to state and its authorities, (violent) non-state actors also appear as conflict actors. Violent non-state actors can be used as intermediaries in pursuit of the interests of a state that sponsors them. "By acting via intermediaries, governments get the opportunity to achieve their goals, both within the borders of their state and abroad, violating their laws, international norms and signed contracts" (Milenković and Subotić, 2017: 60). In such a way, before the beginning of the direct conflict between the regular Armed Forces of Russia and Ukraine, the fighters of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic, which have had the support of Russia since the first days of their actions, have been perceived.

Although the term "hybrid warfare" has been known to the scientific and professional public for a long time, it became particularly frequent after the Russian annexation of Crimea, in order to describe the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Analysing the events from 2014 onwards, one can often hear the view that Russia waged a "hybrid warfare" in Ukraine that combines "cyberwarfare, a strong disinformation campaign and the use of highly trained special forces and local rebels" (Samardžić, 2021: 190). In addition to Ukraine, the European Union was also targeted by the Russian "hybrid warfare". "Russia has become increasingly aggressive in cyberspace, where it has exploited dissatisfaction with economics, politics or social status by spreading deception and fake news, primarily to create confusion and inflame fears in the EU" (Samardžić, 2021: 196). It is estimated that this action of Russia and a kind of indecision in the field of the EU foreign and security policy has led to the strengthening of populists in the Union itself, even in its immediate periphery.

The expansion of information warfare began in the 20th century with the development of information and communication technology. "Information society is characterized by a high level and speed of transmission, reception and exchange of digital data and information" (Vuletić and Đorđević, 2022). "Information and communication technology affects every aspect of the lives of individuals and communities, relations between states and their security" (Vuletić and Đorđević, 2021). The development of information and communication technology has enabled achievements in weapons and related equipment that has influenced the change in the manner of warfare.<sup>4</sup> The history of conflicts testifies to many examples that indicate the importance of information and achieving informational superiority over the opponent (FM 3-0, 2017). In information warfare, information is used as a weapon to influence the perception of the opponent, to subdue their will to fight instead of physical force. "Information enables the optimal functioning of the decision-making process of military

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<sup>4</sup> The term "war" represents a state of armed conflict between different countries or groups within a particular country, while "warfare" implies engagement or activity related to conflict.

commanders" (Vuletić and Stanojević, 2022). Information action affects the will, morale and perception of the opponent's decision-makers and other participants in operations, information flows that serve as support in the decision-making process, which directly affects the adversary's combat capabilities.

## The activities in the information space between Russia and Ukraine

The experience that Russia gained from the conflict with Georgia in 2008 spoke about the importance of the internet, social networks, blogs and similar platforms, as well as the issue of the time of initiation of informational action (attack). During the short conflict between Russia and Georgia, attacks on information infrastructure were launched simultaneously with military operations on the ground. Georgia effectively opposed Russia in information space, which has undoubtedly influenced the change in the conduct of subsequent operations. Russia adapted its informational confrontation strategy six years later against Ukraine, seizing Crimea quickly and without much resistance and keeping potentially intervening countries at bay. It is clear that Russia has dominated information space, which has been used to strengthen its propaganda, messaging and disinformation capabilities in support of geopolitical goals. Unlike the simultaneous digital and armed attacks in Georgia, cyber attacks on Crimea degraded telecommunications infrastructure, disabled websites of many institutions and jammed the mobile phones of key Ukrainian officials before Russian forces entered the peninsula on March 2, 2014 (Unwala and Ghorl, 2015; Iasiello, 2017).

Russia has been preparing for a possible armed conflict with Ukraine for years. Ukrainian media experts Vitaliy Moroz and Tatiana Lebedeva believe that it started developing the idea of dividing Ukraine into two or three parts about twenty years ago. In addition to an extensive information campaign at all levels (e.g. on television, social networks, in newspaper articles), the gas disputes emerged as a part of intensified information warfare against Ukraine (Holger and Sazonov, 2018). The goal of Russian information warfare was to undermine Ukrainian society internally by discrediting leading political figures, diverting Ukraine from the course of European and Euro-Atlantic integration, encouraging social discontent and separatist feelings and justifying the protection of compatriots in Ukrainian territory. The primary goal was the destruction of Ukrainian statehood, the denial of Ukrainian identity, language and culture (Pashkov, 2016).

Until 2013, Russian information campaign against Ukraine was in the preparatory phase, which included an informational study of the situation. A much more aggressive phase followed, in the autumn of 2013, on the eve of the EU summit in Vilnius, where the Agreement on Ukraine's accession to the European Union was to be signed. The main difference in terms of information war before the seizure of Crimea and after it is reflected in the fact that Russia took the position of Eastern

Ukrainians in the period after 2014 (Pashkov, 2016; Muradov, 2020). Russian information war against Ukraine was aimed at the pro-Russian population of the industrial regions of Ukraine, primarily civil servants, intellectual elite and the elderly population. Moreover, it was heavily involved in social networks, where pro-Russian messages were distributed. The Russian Federation continued to conduct special information operations throughout Ukraine, using a wide variety of channels, including media resources and social networks.

In the confrontation with Ukraine, Russia had numerous advantages in terms of controlling information space: technical tools, vast experience, as well as long-term practice in conducting information operations (Pierzchała, 2019). It has made a great effort to increase its media presence in Russian-speaking areas along its borders. Moreover, in both Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, it decided to take over the media companies so that it could control the content that was broadcast. The Russian government's sphere of influence was global. Many propaganda campaigns were carried out in Russian, English, Arabic, French, Czech, Georgian and other languages (Angevine et al., 2019; Helmus et al., 2018).

Russia was also engaged in a very intensive campaign aimed at several different regions, including its neighbours. Social media was by no means the only platform for this campaign. It synchronized actions on social media with actions via TV stations, portals, civil society organizations (Helmus et al., 2018). Many Western scholars have labelled Russian tactics in Ukraine as hybrid warfare, the use of hard and soft techniques that rely on proxies and surrogates to prevent attribution of certain activity to the Russian party, conceal intent and maximize confusion and uncertainty (Iasiello, 2017). The Russian informational campaign in Ukraine in 2014 was a massive, multifaceted, responsible and coherent operation. The military activities were supported by an active media campaign that undermined the Ukrainian authorities and their political goals to reunify the state. The Russian information activities skillfully targeted a wide range of population that had different beliefs and convictions. In addition to the content of messages, Russia controlled the availability of information (i.e. by controlling TV and radio towers, mobile phone operators, etc.) (NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2016). The Russian leadership has long understood that it is impossible to achieve the desired effects simply by setting up certain *websites* or displaying the comments of trolls. The reported news was prepared much earlier. The promotion of content was facilitated due to many similarities between the populations of both states (Muradov, 2020). The Russian informational tools for persuading the public were diverse and included historical myths, narratives and symbols. One of the most effective and frequently promoted narratives was the Soviet victory in World War II (Holger and Sazonov, 2018).

Before, during and after the annexation of Crimea, cyber espionage provided important information that enabled the achievement of objectives (Iasiello, 2017). Cyber espionage operations represented a significant segment of information collection and influenced subsequent events. Unlike the espionage in Georgia, cyber espionage was aimed at computer systems and accounts of journalists in Ukraine, Ukrainian information infrastructure, resources and accounts of officials of the North



Atlantic Organization and the European Union. By achieving such goals, Russia had insight into opposing journalistic narratives, as well as inclusive diplomatic initiatives. Many examples emphasize Russian intensive activities in information space. Operation Armageddon, in mid-2013, for example, aimed to discredit and compromise the Ukrainian government, military and police officials. As in Georgia, some groups, such as *CyberBerkut*, have also participated in various cyber attacks on Ukraine. This group carried out distributed denial-of-service attacks and compromised *websites* of various Ukrainian and NATO institutions, intercepted documents on the US-Ukrainian military cooperation and attempted to influence the Ukrainian parliamentary elections by disrupting the information systems of the Ukrainian Central Election Commission. The attacks contributed to a general confusion in Ukraine. Stolen information "leaked" to the public, such as a telephone conversation between the US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria J. Nuland and the US Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey R. Pyatt, which, in a way, negatively affected the US rating in the world (Iasiello, 2017).

Furthermore, Russian great activity was carried out on social networks (first of all, the most popular in the post-Soviet space Odnoklassniki and Vkontakte), where pro-Russian messages were distributed. The Russian Federation continued to conduct special information operations throughout Ukraine, using a wide variety of channels, including media resources and social networks. Russia has used social media as an effective tool to manage public perception (Szwed, 2016; Muradov, 2020). In addition to the above-mentioned, most commonly used social networks in the post-Soviet space, important activities also took place on other, global social networks such as *Twitter*. A record of 900,000 tweets in the second quarter of 2014 coincided with the escalation of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The Russian trolls were particularly active after the crash of *Malaysia Airlines Boeing-777*, which took flight MH17 from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur. The plane was brought down on July 17, 2014 in Donbass, and two days later, more than 65 thousand tweets were posted in which Ukraine was blamed for the disaster that occurred (Muradov, 2020).

Two types of activities were particularly characteristic in cyberspace - posting some content and disabling websites by *DDoS* attacks during which servers are flooded and congested, making them inaccessible to users. Russia has a lot of active hacker groups, such as *Sandworm*, *Cyber-Berkut*, *Sprut*, etc. It is assumed that the Russian intelligence services are "behind" their activities and operations. Moreover, in 2014, Ukraine organized its cyber groups such as *Falconsflame*, *Trinity*, *Ruh8* and *Cyberhunta* (Pashkov, 2016).

The aim of Russian cyber attacks was to cause an interruption in the Ukrainian power supply system in 2015, which had a great effect on the population. For the first time, cyber weapons has caused major disruptions to civilian infrastructure. The Russian attack in 2016 led to a blackout due to compromising the high-voltage transmission network in Ukraine, which supplies electricity to consumers. The destruction of critical energy and network infrastructure was not the ultimate goal of the Russian attacks. Their purpose was to achieve the greater goals of economic

and political weakening of the state (Stockton, 2021). Russia tried to demoralize Ukrainian troops and Ukrainian population. Using its intelligence capabilities, the Russian military compromised computer networks and sent targeted messages to Ukrainian troops and their families. It also conducted cyber operations in order to disrupt the Ukrainian government and business activities and intimidate Ukrainians and those who might support Ukraine or do business in it (Angevine et al., 2019).

The information infrastructure of Ukraine's *Boryspil* Airport suffered an attack in 2016. The great *online* sabotage against Ukraine's financial and banking sector was further evidence of the Russian cyber attack on Ukraine. On December 6, 2016, a hacker attack disabled the *websites* of the State Treasury, the Ministry of Finance and the Pension System. After the mentioned events, the attacks on the *websites* of the Ukrainian Railways and the Ministry of Defence continued. According to Turchynov, Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, the attacks were pre-planned and coordinated from a centre located in the Russian Federation (Pashkov, 2016).

The course of events in Crimea was shrouded in a sophisticated effort to control the flow of information. Russian information activities encompassed a spectrum of activities in various domains. The former head of the Ukrainian Security Service Valentyn Nalyvaichenko stated that the mobile communications of Ukrainian government officials were compromised. The Government websites and news portals suffered distributed denial-of-service attacks, so-called *DDoS* attacks. All of this contributed to the significant success of the Russian party in the domain of information in Eastern Ukraine. Owing to the internet and social media, the audience was global and communication took place in real time (Jaitner, 2015).

Russia has conducted sophisticated information operations in order to disrupt decision-making and discourage Ukraine from seeking assistance from Western countries. The analysis of the Russian operations in Crimea carried out by NATO emphasizes that Russia was fully prepared to wage information warfare in Ukraine (Stockton, 2021). Messages were prepared and distributed to different parts of the world. New channels of communication were launched, in which the evaluation of the effectiveness of the influence and its appropriate modification, i.e. the change of the narrative in accordance with the current conditions, was conducted. Among all key narratives, in the period from 2014 to 2015, the "civil war" narrative dominated on the Russian television, after which Ukraine was often referred to as a "Western puppet" and a "non-state under external control". At the same time, Russian literature, newspapers, television and film were popularized in Ukraine.

In Crimea and the Donbass region, it was not possible to obtain information from sources other than local Russian-controlled channels. Ukrainian TV channels were banned. New news channels like *LifeNews* were established, which first started as online news portals, but later grew into influential TV channels. The Russian media giants, *Russia Today* and *Sputnik*, have been actively broadcast in Europe, even in the US. Information operations were flexible, constantly evolving and quickly adapting. A combination of powerful fear mongering has facilitated the successful Russian information war in the Russian-controlled areas of Crimea and Donbass.

Intensive information campaigns promoted among the population enabled the quick and painless Russian takeover of Crimea (Holger and Sazonov, 2018). Some Russian sources stated that Western countries are also waging information warfare against Russia with the aim of discrediting the Russian political regime, weakening its position in the international community and spreading Russophobia.

In the period before the beginning of the armed conflict, Russia had an absolute advantage over the Ukrainian information space, electronic and print media. It has been shown that the presence of the "fifth column" in the Ukrainian media system, authorities, public organizations and political parties is a very important factor. Russia actively participated in its informational expansion by exploiting the pro-Russian sentiments of a great part of the population in the eastern part of Ukraine. The absence of a language barrier, the mental similarity of the citizens of both states, common history, the closeness of national cultures, a huge network of family contacts, etc., contributed greatly to media activity. Ukraine has adopted certain security measures to counter Russian activities in information space. Namely, in December 2014, the Ministry of Information Policy was established, and later, in October 2015, the International Broadcasting Multimedia Platform of Ukraine was launched. From 2015 until 2016, Ukraine introduced a package of sanctions against the Russian media, journalists, artists, publishing houses, etc. The Ukrainian government cancelled the intergovernmental agreement with Russia on cooperation in the field of television and radio broadcasting in 2014-2016. The National Radio and TV Council banned rebroadcasting of 78 Russian TV channels, and the Ukrainian State Film Agency banned 500 Russian films and TV series broadcast on television or in cinemas (Pashkov, 2016).

The number of *Twitter* accounts spreading pro-Russian information increased dramatically in December and early January 2022 compared to November 2021. Between December 1, 2021 and January 5, 2022, *Mithos Labs* identified 697 accounts spreading pro-Russian content in Ukraine, in comparison to only 58 such accounts identified in November 2021. Moreover, the number of new accounts identified each week steadily increased throughout December and early January 2022. The number of the tweets related to Ukraine and spreading pro-Russian information in December also increased by 375% compared to November and by 3,270% compared to September 2021. Unlike the earlier period, most accounts distribute (mis)information in English, not in Russian. They primarily tried to undermine support for Ukraine in the West (Labs, 2022). On January 15, 2022, *Microsoft* published information about the appearance of the malware called *WhisperGate* on the systems of the government agencies. Dozens of systems at two government agencies in Ukraine were compromised by a destructive tool that Ukraine believes was a part of a coordinated attack on their computer systems (Microsoft, 2022).

*UCMC*, *StopFake* and *Ukraine Today* were three very different platforms related to media production in various ways. Formally, *UCMC* is set up to serve media correspondents, *StopFake* to monitor news, while *Ukraine Today* is organized as a traditional media platform, producing and distributing television content. This implies that the three platforms differ in terms of organization, competence, work methods, strategy, ethics, economic resources and much more. However, all three organizations share a

common goal: to provide the international public with information about the current conflicts in Ukraine-Russia relationship, from a distinctly Ukrainian perspective (Bolin et al., 2016).

The influence of unmanned platforms was very pronounced in that period. The increased volume and intensity of various intelligence and reconnaissance platforms was noticeable. The Russian methods of action in certain segments of information warfare capabilities were revealed in exercises such as "West-2021" in Belarus and "Caucasus 2020" near Volgograd, as well as battles in the Donbass region. These findings enabled Ukraine to protect itself, to a certain extent, from the actions of the Russian party. In October 2016, the International Information Consortium "Bastion" was founded under the auspices of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, whose task was to counter Russian information influence (Pashkov, 2016). Regardless of the above-mentioned, Ukrainian countermeasures were mostly situational, specific to certain sectors and could not fully correspond to the scale of Russian action.

## Conclusion

Information war as a hybrid threat is becoming an increasingly serious and sophisticated form of security threat. It manifests itself in different forms, and the consequences for society and state as a whole are increasingly serious. The examples of the Russian information activities, both before and during the current armed conflict in Ukraine, are indisputable. Different forms of information warfare have been implemented, above all cyber, psychological and propaganda action. The Russian information warfare in Ukraine is characterized by a high level of sophistication, integration of various resources, dynamism and flexibility of their use. Some attacks were highly destructive, targeting the Ukrainian critical information infrastructure. The general conclusions, that is, the lessons learned regarding information operations in Ukraine indicate that Russia has prepared for a long time and was very effective, while Ukraine, on the other hand, was quite unprepared for this form of warfare. Information warfare will obviously continue to be a manner of confrontation between Russia and Ukraine in the future, and most certainly as long as combat operations last.

Various conflicts in the post-Soviet space, especially the current ones between Russia and Ukraine, in certain segments resemble the conflicts that took place in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. It can be expected that the process of reconciliation will have many similarities and will be accompanied by many difficulties. Analysing possible models of reconciliation between the states and nations of the former Yugoslavia, it has been noticed that "political will is a *conditio sine qua non* for the process of reconciliation" (Vučinić, Milenković and Pavlović, 2019: 1001-1102). Without it, it is impossible to persevere in this long and demanding process, which cannot be spontaneous, but has to be managed. The role of modern technology, media and social networks is invaluable in such an undertaking. In this process, activities characteristic of information warfare would have to take place in the opposite direction in order to build trust through (re)affirmation of positive values, narratives and bright examples from the common past.

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# Section IV

## CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES OF HUMAN SECURITY

A person is walking a tightrope, balancing a tall stack of five large, dark, irregularly shaped rocks on their head. The person is wearing dark clothing and is captured in a dynamic pose, leaning forward slightly. The background is a light, hazy landscape with distant mountains.

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Samir Rawat, Gayatri Ahuja (INDIA)  
Vanja Rokvić (SERBIA)  
Duško Vejnović, Predrag Obrenović  
(BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA)





# GENDER PERSPECTIVE IN THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN SECURITY – SAF EXPERIENCES AND CHALLENGES

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DOI: [https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod\\_strint.2023.ch12](https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod_strint.2023.ch12)

## Keywords:

contemporary conflicts,  
gender equality,  
scientific paper,  
professional development

**Abstract:** *The subject of our research is the concept of gender equality, whose understanding is important for the development of society and organisational systems in which human rights and gender equality are respected, there is tolerance and discrimination is prohibited. With this paper we would like to emphasize the contribution of scientific research work as a problem-based foundation of professional development and training of employees in the security sector for better understanding, acceptance and implementation of the concept of gender equality. We will present the level of gender equality reached in the Western Balkan region by considering situation in the defence systems of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia and the Republic of Serbia, on the basis of current analyses, available programmes and research on views about gender equality problems. We have found out that there are similarities and certain specifics of the programme concepts of professional development and training of employees, as well as the results of scientific research papers, and also the identification of problems and possible solutions by employees in the defence systems. The conclusion of this paper is that scientific research work, as the authentic experience of the defence system of the Republic of*

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*Serbia and training of employees based on research practices, greatly contribute to raising the awareness of the defence system personnel about the importance of gender perspective, not as an element that has to be added somewhere, but as a more effective way of thinking and defining all important issues and concepts in the defence systems.*

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## Introduction

At the beginning of the 21st century and the new millennium, certain intervention was announced in every field of life, presented as suitable for human and society of the "new age" - a human being with an inalienable right to fully develop all their potential and a society determined to create conditions in which this right can be exercised. Among the issues that could not be avoided when talking about assumptions for a "better tomorrow", there has been the issue of improving human rights, and within it, the issue of gender equality. Thus, on the eve of the 21st century, on October 31, 2000, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) issued Resolution 1325 entitled Women, Peace and Security, which emphasizes the importance of greater involvement of women in all activities for the maintenance and the promotion of peace and security. This Resolution requires the UN member states to undertake measures that, mainly, should ensure a greater number of women participate in decision-making at all levels, introduce gender perspective and training in peacebuilding, develop training programmes related to specific rights and needs of women and guarantee a greater degree of protection of women against gender-based violence, especially rape and other forms of sexual abuse. Gender perspective is important for the armed forces because its introduction is an obligation arising from ratified international documents and national norms that correspond to the highest democratic standards. The integration of gender perspective into the defence system implies incorporating experiences, knowledge and interests of men and women and is a means for developing a new modern concept of the defence policy, as well as new processes of their implementation and evaluation that are suitable for security challenges in the 21st century. The defence system reform is successful if it is supported by society, which is possible if women and men have equal opportunities to influence decisions and their implementation in the defence system.

Since women make up a half of the world population, including Serbia, the gender issue is also an issue of development policy, that is, of responsible planning of the future of a country. One of the main human rights is gender equality in terms of the right to work under equal conditions in all professions, including the military one. Considered from this point of view, gender equality in the military is an implicit obligation of every country to follow examples of good practice in this field, i.e. to become a part of the world in which

room for discrimination against people on any basis is systematically restricted – by innovating legal regulations and its consistent implementation in practice.

At the same time, this obligation is directly or indirectly imposed by some other circumstances. First of all, the specificity of the role of the military in new, non-traditional forms of its engagement, such as hybrid and cyber warfare or participation in peacekeeping missions, which has provided not only room, but also an additional need to include women in the military. The change in the warfare character has imposed on the armed forces the need to use some new competencies (knowledge and skills), where those that women successfully master are particularly welcome. In some of these situations, women are practically irreplaceable, which, above all, refers to those situations in which the military personnel can find itself as participants in humanitarian operations in different parts of the world. Namely, it is well-known that the customary law of some nations does not allow the presence of men in places where there is the local female population, which means that without the presence of women it is not possible to establish an appropriate contact and achieve high-quality cooperation with those who are being assisted. Even when there is no such a strict ban on contact with foreigners, there is a number of situations in which female engagement is preferable to male engagement (providing first aid to the female civilian population, medical-hygiene training, etc.). Advocating for more versatile engagement of women in special operations – operations different from war – has undoubtedly coverage in contemporary social-psychological and ethical observations of interpersonal communication and group dynamics. They interpret in a somewhat different way compared to traditional understanding the issues such as the ability to work successfully with other people, the ability to make valid ethical decisions in unforeseen circumstances and in the context of situational factors, the ability to make valid moral judgements that will affect a great number of people, the ability to successfully motivate other people.

Nowadays, according to the democratic model of military organisation, soldiers are not expected to be "blindly obedient" to their superiors when their orders are wrong or obviously morally questionable, thus leaving them initiative and room for an individual moral judgement. According to the democratic model, moral responsibility is distributed differently, in contrast to the classic model, according to which moral responsibility is almost entirely related to senior officers. Younger officers have simply followed orders and, in most cases, have not borne direct moral responsibility for their actions. Therefore, ethics is studied today as a compulsory subject at the military academies in the world. In addition, an increased emphasis on personal capabilities and skills, indirect control in military education, as well as more frequent emphasis on material benefits and group goals has paved the way for the understanding that army officers and leaders should also be military managers. These new circumstances undoubtedly represent an advantage for women, because usual arguments about the difficulty of military service, which is inappropriate for the fair sex, are questioned. Stamina and endurance, which have been traditionally understood as one of the priorities among military capabilities, and which still have, undoubtedly, great importance, are no longer of an eliminatory character,

considering that there is enough military duties for which they are not of crucial importance. Moreover, in accordance with the democratic model and characteristics of contemporary conflicts, the earlier classic emphasis on discipline has been softened by new requirements for knowledge of information technology, critical and analytical thinking skills and communication skills necessary for successful teamwork. *"The widespread use of modern information technology and the phenomenon of information abundance have led to the intensification of competition with regard to information, which has, in turn, led to an increase in the number and type of security challenges in the contemporary environment based on conflicts and influence through information."* (Miljković&Pešić, 2019, p. 1080). The modern security environment and cyberspace have a great impact on human security, starting with the creation of the so-called "Internet addicts" to digital gender-based violence. *"Cyberspace is the virtual world that enables people to communicate impersonally in real time (Facebook, forums, e-mail...). Facebook has become the most dominant form of impersonal communication because it provides people with great opportunities, starting with a real profile, through a 'boosted' one, all the way to a completely changed or even 'borrowed' identity".* (Đorđević et al., 2011, p. 1648).

## The analysis of the integration indicators of the concept of gender equality in the Western Balkan countries

The concept of gender equality and its implementation in the defence systems of the Western Balkan countries contributes to the spread of awareness of gender equality, the prohibition of discrimination, the strengthening of human rights and freedoms as a good basis for strengthening human security, which is recognised as a main prerequisite for the development of society in the 21st century.

This paper includes the analysis of the available data on the integration of the concept of gender equality in the defence systems of four Western Balkan countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, the Republic of Serbia) for the period 2019-2021. The main literature for this analysis has been the publication "Integracija rodne perspektive u vojno obrazovanje i obuke sistema odbrane zemalja Zapadnog Balkana". In the chapters of the aforementioned publication, the state of gender equality in the defence systems in each country has been analysed in detail. For the needs of our paper, the analysis is in the function of providing insights into the importance of relating the profession and science in solving specific tasks on the problem of gender equality.

The issue of gender equality and the prohibition of discrimination are defined by the Constitution, as the highest legal act of the state, in all four Western Balkan countries. In addition, they are signatories to numerous international conventions, protocols and agreements: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Optional Protocol (1999), United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 Women, Peace and Security (2000), Council of

Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), Beijing Convention and Platform for Action, United Nations Agenda for Sustainable Development until 2030 (Agenda 2030).

In the analysed countries, various laws defining gender equality and the prohibition of discrimination have been adopted, which can be said to be the result of signing international documents, and also a consequence of the development of society's awareness of the importance of the concept of gender equality for social development. These are primarily the Gender Equality Law, the Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination and the Labour Law. In all four countries, there are also strategies that develop policies and actions to reach gender equality in society in various fields, such as economy, social policy, health and education. The national action plans for the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 have been defined.

Normative acts in the defence systems of the Western Balkan countries do not contain discriminatory views or different criteria depending on gender. Non-discrimination is expressed by the statement: "terms used in the document, which have gender meaning, refer both to men and women". There are clearly defined criteria for military education and admission to military profession, which refer to the test of physical, mental and health capabilities in accordance with the requirements of the professional service. The concept of gender equality is present in the curricula during military education within social sciences subjects with a tendency to expand topics and number of subjects. Furthermore, there is the professional development of employees during military training by certified instructors for gender equality issues, with a tendency to increase their number, as well as the number of unified literature for the professional development of employees. The activities of professional development on gender equality contribute to raising employees' awareness of the importance of respecting human rights, creating work environment without discrimination, and also increasing the efficiency of military operations and missions.

A real indicator of respect for the concept of gender equality in all countries is providing opportunities for formal education and employment of women, which has increased their number in the military professional personnel. According to the 2019 research, women made up 6.5% of the total professional personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 6.2% in Montenegro, 9.5% in North Macedonia and 8.7% in Serbia (UNDP/SEESAC, 2021). Upon completion of formal education at the military academies, where countries train their future officers, initial duties are in accordance with the first initial ranks. By promotion to higher ranks, along with gaining professional experience, the conditions for the continuation of female professional development at forms of higher education (Command Staff Course/General Staff Course) are acquired, thereby increasing the number of women in higher ranks and managers of greater military organisational units.

With the increase in the number of women in military organisations, the number of certified instructors, whose task is to train employees on the issue of gender equality, also increases. Working bodies are formed, various thematic and periodic analyses on the issue of gender equality are conducted in accordance with the signed international and national documents that regulate this field. Organic

positions are established or organic duties of gender equality advisers are added at different levels of the organisational structure (Adviser to the Minister of Defence, Adviser to Chief of General Staff of the Serbian Armed Forces, etc.). Office for Gender Equality has been established in the Human Resources Sector of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia, as an internal unit that performs tasks and coordinates activities related to the implementation of gender equality policy. There is gender budgeting and the use of gender-sensitive language is under consideration (in some countries, for example, Montenegro, the Register of occupations and titles of women has been adopted as a contribution to the use of gender-sensitive language in the sphere of public communication). Personnel of the MoD and AF of all four countries of the Western Balkans took part in a regional survey that resulted in the conduct of two regional studies (2014, 2021) on the position of women in the Armed Forces of the Western Balkan countries. Further cooperation on monitoring the integration of the concept of gender equality was additionally strengthened by signing the joint Declaration in Budva in 2021.

## Scientific research on gender equality as a contribution (guidelines) to the professional development of employees in the defence systems

In order to consider the contribution of scientific research for the needs of this paper, we will present a series of projects that follow the development of the concept of gender equality and its integration into the defence system of the Republic of Serbia. The objective of this part of the paper is to indicate the importance of empirical knowledge about the problems of gender equality integration as a topic of future professional development during formal military education of future officers or during military training of employees in the defence system.

The objective of the project *Obim i modaliteti angažovanja žena u savremenim armijama* (2003-2005) was to gain some insight into the practice of female engagement in modern armies, to consider the main factors that determine the current situation and, based on this knowledge and experiences of the Yugoslav Army, to assess real needs (extent and most suitable modalities) of female engagement in the Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro. The tasks of the research were to define to what extent women are represented in personnel structure of modern armies, in what capacity they are most often engaged in the military, what types of jobs they primarily perform in the military, what the situation regarding female engagement in relation to contemporary trends in this field is in the Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro, whether certain organic positions in the military, which used to be exclusively staffed by men, can adequately be staffed by women.

The most important conclusion of this project was that there is a positive attitude towards greater involvement of women in the military, but that it is not real that all

duties are available to them. At the same time, there is real professional maturity of women in the assessment that they could not replace men in all jobs in the military, and that they do not expect to be completely equal to them. The general conclusion of this research is that it is possible to significantly increase the engagement of women in the military, but not their equal representation in all branches and services. Their number should primarily be increased in all jobs in the military whose main content of work is manning sophisticated technical equipment, provided that work environment does not set demands that are not in accordance with the specifics of female organism, i.e. that working conditions do not endanger some of their vital functions (roles) such as, for example, motherhood. The majority of such duties are in the air-technical, naval-technical, medical and traffic services and in the so-called non-combat branches such as signal, CBRN, electronic reconnaissance and counter-electronic operations and air surveillance, early warning and guidance. In combat branches (infantry, artillery, armoured cavalry units, air defence artillery and missile units, engineers), especially in the commands and headquarters of higher units, there are organic positions that, according to the assessments of respondents of both sexes, could and should be staffed by women with appropriate military competencies. These findings were, of course, significant for the decision to educate girls at the Military Academy and to activate other forms of basic professional military training of women (Šaranović, 2006).

During 2006, taking into account the results of the project *"Obim i modaliteti angažovanja žena u savremenim armijama"*, as well as the ongoing reform of the Serbian Armed Forces, the Strategic Research Institute, together with the OSCE Mission to Serbia, organized the first international conference entitled *"Žene u vojsci"*. One of the key issues was the issue of human resources and the place and role of women in the Serbian Armed Forces. The conference was held after the decision of the Military Academy of the Republic of Serbia on the enrollment of the first generation of women in 2007/08 school year. It was the first step towards opening the possibility for women to acquire necessary military knowledge and expertise, as well as their participation in the reforms and professionalisation of the Serbian Armed Forces. Aware of the complexity of the task, and not neglecting our experiences, we have thought of the valuable experiences of countries with a long tradition – Russia, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Great Britain and France. Representatives of international organisations participated in the conference and presented important relevant international standards and recommendations. Some of them were that the decision is an expression of respect for female human rights and an indicator of the increase in democratic standards in Serbian society as a whole, that the inclusion of women in military education requires special consideration of admission criteria in order to avoid imposed standards based on the traditional evaluation of male-female capabilities and talents, that the inclusion of women will contribute to bringing the Serbian Armed Forces closer to European standards, thus creating a precondition for its contribution to regional and international efforts to maintain and build peace.



The concept of gender equality continues to be studied by the project *Uticaj informisanosti o vojnom pozivu na motivaciju učenika srednjih škola za studiranje na VA*, which is based on the empirical research entitled *Stavovi srednjoškolske omladine o školovanju na Vojnoj akademiji*. The idea of this kind of research is the beginning of the education of girls at the Military Academy and the need to consider the attitudes and professional motives of Serbian high school graduates. The research on the attitudes of high school youth about education at the Military Academy covered 67 high schools and secondary technical schools from 25 Serbian districts, and a total of 2,527 students were questioned, including 1,407 girls. The orientation that the target group should be high school students is based on the assumptions that they are not yet directly determined regarding the choice of profession and that they are students with general education. The basis of this methodologically set research is the research by Professor Desimir Pajević, PhD, on the topic *Motivacioni činioci izbora vojne profesije*, which has been conducted in the earlier period in the military +. The research is based on modern theoretical achievements in the field of work psychology and professional orientation. It had the task, *inter alia*, to determine to what extent and in what way high school graduates were informed about the living and working conditions at the Military Academy and whether there are differences between the sexes in this respect; to what extent high school graduates, especially girls, are interested in studying at the Military Academy, as well as whether and what kind of relationship there is between socio-economic and educational characteristics of students and their interest in continuing their studies at the Military Academy. The results and general conclusion of the research is that the graduates were very little informed about military profession and the content and conditions of the implementation of the curriculum at the Military Academy. According to the research findings, the main sources of information were TV shows with military topic, and the greatest influence on the decision to choose the Military Academy was exerted by informal social groups that the respondents belonged to (Šaranović et al., 2008). An interest in education had a growing tendency that is still present today. The results of the project on the need to improve the general information of graduates about military profession and studies at the Military Academy were used in the development of *Smernice za strategiju komunikacije Ministarstva odbrane i Vojske Srbije za 2008. godinu* (Ministry of Defence, 2008). In accordance with the results, and in order to promote military profession and military education, a project - monograph *Maturanti o profesiji oficir* has been executed, whose promotion was held in Belgrade, in the ceremonial hall of the Military Academy, in February 2009. In addition to high-ranking officials from the Ministry of Defence and the Serbian Armed Forces and associates of the Institute from military and civilian teaching and research organisations, the promotion was attended by representatives of all secondary schools, where the empirical research was carried out, including secondary school principals, pedagogues and psychologists, as well as up to 10 high school students from each of the schools. High school students and their pedagogues, psychologists and directors were given a tour of the teaching, sports and boarding facilities of the Military Academy. High school students had an opportunity to socialise with students and have lunch together in the

dining hall of the Military Academy. This project has emphasized a good model of popularising military profession and military education among members of both sexes, namely the execution of the empirical research in secondary schools and the call for promotion of results and peer socialising in military environment. Confirmation of this attitude is the address of cadet Ana Tasić, who was a high school graduate at the time of the execution of the empirical research and a part of the research sample.

The process of recognising and developing the concept of gender equality in the military system has been followed by the process of integrating girls into the Military Academy and the issue of their professional selection for military profession. On the basis of the research, the monograph *Školovanje devojaka na Vojnoj akademiji* (Šaranović & Kilibarda, 2007) elaborates an empirical database on issues of motives, level of motivation, interest, psychological and educational capabilities. The commitment to equalise men and women in the military, in terms of rights and obligations, as a prerequisite for respecting the "principle of equal opportunities" in professional development, meant the same treatment in the selection procedure for professional training. Starting from this principle, the only acceptable solution regarding the selection of women for studies at the Military Academy was to select them according to the same selection procedure, using the same battery of tests. According to the existing selection procedure, physical fitness test and psychological test of candidates were carried out. The psychological test included the usual determination of the level of intellectual abilities; the evaluation of the level of emotional maturity; the evaluation of the level of social maturity; the evaluation of the level of motivation for military profession and appropriate guidance; the determination of the level of educational success, preferences, habits and specific knowledge important for studies at the Military Academy. The main goal of these tests was to predict the success of candidates for studies at the Military Academy. The prediction project was validated on a male sample, partially, given that the prediction was made on the basis of initial success at the Military Academy, and not on the basis of the final status, after the graduation from the Military Academy. Therefore, full validation was yet to come and, in the following period, it inevitably included the results of the psychological test of female candidates and the results of their educational success during studies. It was also an opportunity to try out and select some other tests that will eventually be used in the selection process. Until then, the selection of female candidates was carried out based on the criteria established on a male sample.

Previous experiences on female engagement in organic duties in the military and the possibilities of their further engagement are summarised in the third study *U korak s vremenom: Ministarstvo odbrane i Vojska Srbije na putu objektivizacije rodne ravnopravnosti* (Šaranović & Kilibarda, 2011), which represents a kind of synthesis of what was done in the Ministry of Defence and the Serbian Armed Forces from 1980s until 2010. This study contains many questions, doubts regarding the manner to implement the concept of gender equality in the military, because the topic itself has "suddenly" appeared on the agenda within the reform of the defence system, so many people, primarily those who were supposed to implement decisions on female engagement in the Serbian Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence

(commanding officers, heads of departments, etc.) were "caught up" in the execution phase of this task. Through research, an effort has been made to shed light on this phenomenon firstly theoretically, and then to elaborate it empirically in order to find the most adequate solutions for female engagement in the Armed Forces, so that this initiative would get the true essence and meaning, and therefore a long-term character. In the following phase of the implementation of gender equality, this topic acquires an institutional character, so first of all the Ministry of Defence and the Serbian Armed Forces are getting involved in the systemic solution of this issue, so that in the end, the Government of the Republic of Serbia, in accordance with the undertaken obligations, will develop an Action Plan for the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325. The study includes the following parts: Introduction, First step – Consulting the lessons and messages of the past; Second step – Gaining an insight into the results of modern research on the characteristics of the sexes; Third step – Defining one's own position in relation to the current situation and dominant trends in the world; Fourth step – Identifying jobs in the armed forces where women should primarily be engaged; Fifth step – Intensification of the admission of women into professional military service; Sixth step – Commencement of female studies at the Military Academy; Seventh step – Engagement of the Ministry of Defence and the Serbian Armed Forces in the development of the NAP for the implementation of UNSCR 1325; Part Eight - Next Steps.

The continuation of the implementation of the concept of gender equality in the Ministry of Defence and the Serbian Armed Forces was the work on the project *Prilagođenost studenata VA uslovima školovanja i obuke* (2010-2012), whose implementation included the Military Academy. The general objective of the project was to define the determinants of successful (psychological, sociological, physiological) adaptation of the Military Academy cadets to studies' conditions. The general and specific objectives of the research were to determine whether and in what correlation the variables of information about military education and profession, type and success in high school are with the success of adaptation to studies at the Military Academy, as well as to establish statistically significant differences between the profiles of adapted and non-adapted male/female cadets on the conditions of studies at the Military Academy. The obtained results have shown that there is a great influence of completed high school and school success, motivation for military profession, level of information on the degree of adaptation to the conditions of studies at the Military Academy. Respondents who had more information about educational requirements before deciding to study at the Military Academy had the opportunity to better self-evaluate their personal capabilities and self-prepare for the upcoming difficulties of specific studies. Respondents with better secondary school success achieve better educational results at the Military Academy (passed a greater number of exams and with higher average marks) compared to respondents with weaker school success. Respondents who have completed high schools (military or civilian), unlike respondents who have completed other secondary schools (economic and medical), are better adapted and more satisfied with the conditions of

studies and are more efficient in the educational process. Respondents who are more motivated for studies at the Military Academy are also more adapted, more satisfied with the conditions of studies and more educationally efficient compared to other respondents. The practical contribution of the project itself was the identification of problems and specifics that follow the process of adapting female cadets to the conditions of life and studies at the Military Academy, and, based on that, suggesting measures that would contribute to the provision of more favourable conditions for the full integration of women into military environment, as an essential prerequisite for the success of training future officers (women and men) for commanding mixed military units. The key role in this process is played by professional selection and objective information of potential candidates about military profession and the specific educational process of training for officer duties.

The following project was *Rodni aspekt u vojnoj profesiji* (2013–2015), within which, in 2013, the subproject *Žene lideri* was executed, whose empirical basis was used to conduct research on a sample of officers of the Command Staff and General Staff Course. The subject of this research were officers' views on women in leading positions. Three research questions were asked: about the aspects that contribute to less percentage of women being represented (compared to the percentage of men) in higher hierarchical positions; about the importance of social support for women in the system for their career development and how much such support is provided by officers who are preparing for leading positions in the Armed Forces. The second part of the work on the project is the empirical research on a sample of 1058 respondents at tactical level, which was carried out in units during October and November 2013. This research continued the study of the concept of gender equality in the military system by establishing views on the normative, institutional, social and psychological assumptions for the implementation of gender equality and to what extent they have been fulfilled. Values and views on gender equality have been studied in the sense of whether they are different in relation to civil public opinion, how homogeneous/heterogeneous they are and how their structure is affected by certain socio-demographic characteristics (gender, level of education, rank, social origin, etc.), as well as whether they represent an obstacle or a recommendation for the development of the concept of gender equality in the military system. The problem has also been considered from the level of organisational culture and the possibility of using experiences of implementation of gender equality from the defence systems of other countries. An integral part of the project was the international scientific conference *Rodna ravnopravnost u sistemu odbrane – dostignuća i perspektive* (2015), organised by the Strategic Research Institute and UNDP/SEESAC. Scientific announcements from the conference have proposed practical policies, including the most significant ones: political and military leaders of the highest level are an important target group that should be informed and educated for their active involvement in the process of implementing gender perspective in the defence system and providing their support; the need for professional development and training as the most effective methods of combating gender stereotypes and

prejudices has been emphasized, and in this sense, the role of educational institutions and the scientific community has been analysed; the need to include gender perspective in the entire process of crisis management has been expressed; the importance of social and cultural context has been emphasized when considering gender issues, which is particularly important in multinational operations; the role of the media and the importance of forming public discourse on gender issues are recognised; the importance of forming mechanisms that would provide an adequate balance between personal and professional life has been pointed out.

The result of many years of experience in scientific research and active participation in the implementation of the concept of gender equality in military organisation is the monograph *Rodna ravnopravnost u Vojski Srbije – nasleđe, dostignuća, izazovi* (Šaranović et al., 2021). In it, in addition to the mentioned indicators of the progress of the Serbian Armed Forces in the field of gender equality, which bear witness to the manifest aspects of gender equality, the authors have obtained the necessary additional knowledge for a more complete picture of such a phenomenon, for considering its deeper, less accessible layers through direct observation. They refer to the degree of integration and social status of women in military organisation - to how the other members of the collective of both sexes have accepted them as superiors and subordinates and to the social climate in gender-mixed collectives. The basic aspect of the concept of gender equality is indicated by the degree of mutual support and mutual respect of men serving in the military, as well as their perception of the effectiveness of gender-mixed units and belief in justification, i.e. profitability of increasing the representation of women among professional military personnel. Statistical analyses of empirical data on the effectiveness of gender-mixed teams show that it is equally difficult, or easy, for members of both sexes to adapt to the specifics of military profession. "On the basis of the average values of the respondents' answers on the Scale of Adaptability to Working Conditions in Military Organization, it can be concluded that the first five ranks, i.e. the most difficult adaptability to the conditions of military organisation are the following indicators: 'ratio of salary to work difficulty'; 'obligation to accept transfer as required by service'; 'stressful situations at work'; "overtime unplanned engagement in the workplace" and "separation from family for several months due to participation in peacekeeping operations". (Marček & Šaranović, 2022, p. 88). The results presented through the chapters of the monograph point to the conclusion that there is a great degree of congruence between the normative and the manifest in the objectification of the concept of gender equality in the military system, as well as measurable achievements of gradual, but constant progress in this field; that it is justified to refrain from sudden or careless steps in the sense of favouring attractive, but in practice difficult to implement solutions; that it is important to know good solutions from foreign armies, but it is more important to monitor and evaluate the situation by individual indicators characteristic of certain area; that the implementation of the concept of gender equality requires careful conceptualization and expert objectification in order not to lead to problems with the efficiency and effec-

tiveness of military collectives (Šaranović et al., 2021). Respondents' views on the increase in the number of women in the Serbian Armed Forces are mostly positive and are based on measurable indicators, although there are also negative views. "Negative attitudes about the increase in the number of women in the Serbian Armed Forces (in general and in high positions) are reasonably evenly distributed per age and rank groups". (Šaranović et al., 2022, p. 724)

The results indicate that there is already a high degree of formal equality of rights between men and women in terms of the availability of training for duties in military profession, as well as the possibility of advancement in the service based on professional development during work and through work. The second group of benefits, i.e. assumptions for increasing the reputation of women in the military collective and the armed forces in general, consists of the results that women achieve in the selection process for admission to military schools and their educational success during studies, their satisfaction with the choice of military profession and adaptation to living and working conditions in military environment, as well as the successful performance of professional duties, as evidenced by the data on the prevailing positive attitude of the military personnel towards the presence of women in ranks. Moreover, their presence generally has a favourable effect on interpersonal relations in military environment and they are relatively well-accepted as superiors and subordinates in gender-mixed units. The main obstacles to the strengthening of the status of women in military environment and their equalisation with male representatives are of an informal character and are related to the cultural patterns of the image of a woman in uniform, which, although greatly changed in relation to the traditional view, is still coloured by the stereotypical understandings of military profession as typical "male engagement" according to which a servicewoman should not and cannot be expected to be equal to a serviceman. In accordance with such a preconception, there is a lot more men than women who tend to consider gender-mixed collectives as less efficient in performing tasks and as less favourable social environment than collectives made up of men. Therefore, it is not unusual that men are much less convinced than women of the justification of further increase in the number of women among the professional military personnel and that a small percentage of them believe that the presence of women in high commanding and managerial positions would have a favourable effect on the quality of management and command (Šaranović et al., 2021). Certainly, women themselves have to deal with the challenges that this profession brings, which are, first of all, the psychological and physical unadaptability of a great number of women to field tasks. (Šaranović et al., 2022).

Such indicators point to the possibility of lower affirmation of the role of women in military profession, which may represent an obstacle to the further implementation of the concept of gender equality, and as a consequence may also result in a decrease in a female interest in military profession, which reduces the chance that, based on professional competencies, members of the female sex have a successful military career (Šaranović et al., 2021). A decrease in interest in military profession may also be a consequence of the fact that military profession is no longer new and interesting for women, but is taken for granted, and that there are already certain experiences of

women in military organisation that are transferred in informal groups they belong to. Longitudinal studies of value orientations, professional commitments and motivation for military service show that military profession will always be one of the options for the future professional choice of members of the male population (Pajević et al., 1975, Pajević, 1983, 1985, 1987, Stupar-Đurišić et al., 2006, Dimitrijević et al., 2007, Đorđević et al., 2007, Šaranović et al., 2007, 2008, Đorđević, 2014, Marček&Pešić, 2021).

Scientific research results can be implemented in professions dealing with health, sociological, psychological and andragogical problems of human resources in military environment through the development of military publications that can be used in training and professional development of the defence system personnel. One of the proposals for practical policies that has originated as a result of work on the scientific projects of the Strategic Research Institute: *Psihološki aspekti uspešnosti u vojnoj profesiji* (2011-2014), *Sistem vrednosti pripadnika vojske kao preporuka ili prepreka za evroatlanske integracije* (2008-2009) and *Rodni aspekt u vojnoj profesiji* (2013-2015), is a proposal for measures for the prevention of violence and discrimination in the organisational units of the Ministry of Defence and the Serbian Armed Forces. This proposal has initiated the need for the development of the work of military literature entitled *Prevenција diskriminacije i nasilja u Ministarstvu odbrane i Vojsci Srbije* (Vidaković et al., 2020), which has an informative and educational function, and is intended as additional literature for conducting training for professional members of the Serbian Armed Forces and employees of the Ministry of Defence.

Scientific research work, together with systemic and organisational changes in the defence system, as well as permanent individual and military professional development of employees has created the need of the system to structure publications in the field of gender equality in which knowledge would be systematised and presented in a way suitable for further professional development. This is how *Priručnik za obuke iz oblasti rodne ravnopravnosti u MO i VS* (Višacki&Đurović, 2016), a unique publication in this field in the region, has been developed. The publication was promoted in March 2016, which was followed by the execution of a series of training conducted by male/female instructors of the Ministry of Defence and the Serbian Armed Forces. During the training, special emphasis has been laid on gender stereotypes, saying that women and men differ in numerous psychological characteristics relevant to success in military profession. The aim of the training was to point out the discrepancy that arises between unfounded generalisations and stereotypical characteristics of women, on the one hand, and the required characteristics for the role of a soldier, on the other hand, which can have negative effects in the process of assessing possible success, evaluating, rewarding, promoting and career guidance in military profession. In addition to military training for employees of the Ministry of Defence and the Serbian Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia, within the framework of developed cooperation with international organisations (UN Women, Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces – DCAF, United Nations Development Programme UNDP/SEESAC), participated in the regional project (2012-2016) with UNDP/SEESAC. The result of this

cooperation is the regional study *Položaj žena u oružanim snagama Zapadnog Balkana* (UNDP/SEESAC 2014) and the established regional network of certified male/female instructors for gender equality in the armed forces.

## Conclusion

Security is a main prerequisite for the sustainable development of societies in the 21st century, and progress towards higher standards of gender equality is one of more or less recognisable trends in most societies of the modern world. The Armed Forces of the Western Balkan countries, as positive and developmentally oriented working environment, act in a planned and responsible manner in the direction of integrating the perspective of equal opportunities and responsibilities in daily activities - at strategic, operational and tactical level. In this way, with the undertaken measures and activities, they testify to the gradual change of outdated discriminatory attitudes, opening room for women, with their potential, to change the security sector, contributing to it being guarantor of peace and stability.

The future of the concept of gender equality in the defence systems of the Western Balkan countries, on the basis of similarities, and also specificities, identified as a result of scientific research practices, carried out through a correct and original methodological approach, which guaranteed the reliability of the obtained results and their useful value in a scientific-theoretical and practical sense, speaks of an amount of prudence, when it comes to still existing biased, stereotypical interpretation and unfounded generalisations of the gender aspects of the functioning of military organisation and the relativisation of the officially verified achievements of servicewomen. This raises doubts about the justification of increasing their representation in military profession. As research shows, the silent and informal disqualification of women in the military collective can have an impact on female self-confidence and their professional identity, which can be a justification for those with lower ambitions and weaker working habits to have a casual attitude towards professional tasks, which certainly affects affirmation of women in military profession and the integration of the concept of gender equality.

Individual beliefs and attitudes about the professional engagement of women in military profession cannot be removed by legal acts, but it is possible to make them meaningless by presenting convincing evidence of their unfoundedness. Certainly, experiential knowledge and research of current problems are the basis of education of future military personnel and military professional training of employees in the Armed Forces of the Western Balkan countries. Teaming up on empirical research of the civilian and military sector, as well as regional teaming up (in accordance with the joint Declaration signed in Budva in December 2021), are ways that can contribute to the strengthening of the concept of gender equality in the Western Balkan countries. For this engagement, based on examples of identified good practices and research findings, offering an original methodological approach, instru-



ments and research sample, the Republic of Serbia and its researchers are ready to provide the necessary knowledge and many years of experience dealing with the topic of gender equality.

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# EXPLORING HUMAN SECURITY AND RELATED FACTORS OF NATIONAL SECURITY FOR EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE

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DOI: [https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod\\_srint.2023.ch13](https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod_srint.2023.ch13)

## Keywords:

human rights,  
national security,  
political science

**Abstract:** Human rights and national security are two significant dimensions of society, yet often competing values in any society. The intersection between human rights and national security is an important area of inquiry, as these values are essential for ensuring the protection and stability of society. While human rights guarantee individual freedom and dignity, national security processes are necessary for safeguarding national sovereignty and citizens from potential threats. However, attaining a balance between these values may be difficult in practice, as national security measures may sometimes infringe upon human rights. This thematic research paper explores the relationship between human rights, national security, and political science theories. The paper addresses the following research questions: 1) How do human security, human rights, and political science theories intersect with national security? 2) Is security a necessary precondition for the existence of society? The paper argues that human rights and national security are complementary values that should be optimally balanced to ensure a secure society. Using a review of related literature, the paper examines challenges of balancing human rights and national security in practice. The paper also highlights importance of promoting democracy, accountability, and respect for human rights in enhancing national security while also protecting individual freedoms and dignity. Finally, this research contributes to a deeper understanding of the complex relationship between human rights, national security, and political science theories.



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## Introduction

Human rights are crucial principles that ensure individuals are treated fairly, with respect and equality. They are fundamental for establishing an equitable society and are essential for maintaining peace, security, and stability. The importance of human rights lies in their capacity to protect individuals and groups from abuse, discrimination, and oppression. Human rights serve as a framework for governments to uphold and safeguard rights of their citizens, guaranteeing that everyone has access to basic necessities such as food, water, healthcare, and education. They are also essential for promoting social justice, democracy, and the rule of law. Human rights provide a mechanism for holding governments and individuals accountable for their actions and ensuring that justice is served when human rights are violated. Furthermore, human rights promote cultural diversity, tolerance, and mutual respect, helping to create a sense of community and promote understanding between people of different backgrounds and cultures. The importance of human rights cannot be overstated, as they are vital for establishing a society that provides equal opportunities, full participation, and protection of rights.

The relationship between human rights and national security is a complex and questioned issue. On the one hand, protecting human rights can be viewed as essential for maintaining national security. By safeguarding the rights of citizens, such as the freedom of speech, association, and assembly, social unrest and instability can be prevented, which can threaten national security. Respecting human rights can also promote trust and cooperation between citizens and state, thereby improving security by encouraging citizens to work with law enforcement and other government agencies. On the other hand, some researchers argue that national security considerations may sometimes require restricting or even violating human rights. For example, measures such as surveillance, detention, and even torture may be justified as necessary to prevent terrorism or other security threats. Critics argue that such measures not only violate human rights, but can also undermine national security by fuelling resentment, mistrust, and radicalization among citizens.

Policymakers may carefully consider both human rights and national security when making decisions related to security. Protecting human rights can enhance national security by promoting stability, trust, and cooperation between citizens and state. However, national security measures that violate human rights can undermine trust and cooperation, posing additional security risks in the long run. Some research scholars, such as Borell and D'Souza (2021), argue that national security concerns may be used to justify limitations on human rights, leading to a trade-off between security and rights. Others, like Van Der Mei and Van Aaken (2018), suggest that it is possible to reconcile the two, and that respecting human rights may contribute to long-term national security. The relationship between national security and human rights is context-specific and requires a measured approach that considers the unique circumstances and context.

## The explanations of the key concepts

*Human rights:* The concept of human rights refers to the basic rights and freedoms that are inherent to all human beings, regardless of their race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or any other status. These rights include civil and political rights, such as the right to the freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial, as well as economic, social, and cultural rights, such as the right to education and the right to health. The idea of human rights has its roots in the Enlightenment era of the 18th century, when philosophers such as John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that individuals have natural rights that cannot be taken away by state. The concept was further developed in the aftermath of World War II, with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations in 1948. Since then, the idea of human rights has become a cornerstone of international law and has been enshrined in numerous treaties and agreements, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

*National security:* The concept of national security refers to measures and strategies that a government takes to protect sovereignty, territorial integrity, and stability of state from internal and external threats (Buzan, 1983, 1998; Mearsheimer, 2011; Walt, 2005). National security can encompass a wide range of issues, including military defense, intelligence gathering, law enforcement, economic stability, and cybersecurity. The concept of national security has evolved over time, influenced by changing global and internal contexts, such as the Cold War, terrorism, and the rise of cyber threats. National security strategies vary among countries and depend on their unique circumstances and challenges.

*Political science:* Political science is a social science that focuses on the study of political institutions, processes, and behavior. It involves analyzing political systems, ideologies, and policies, as well as the distribution of power and resources within societies. The field of political science encompasses a wide range of topics, including political theory, comparative politics, international relations, public policy, and political economy. Political scientists use various research methods, such as surveys, experiments, and case studies, to better understand the complex dynamics of politics and society.

### *The theories of political science related to national security*

There are several political science theories related to national security. *Realism* is a prevailing theory in the field of international relations and political science, which emphasizes the importance of power and national interest in shaping the behavior of states and other international actors. Realists argue that the ultimate goal of any nation is to maintain its security, which can only be achieved through an accumulation of power and pursuit of strategic interests. The theory of political science rea-

lism has had a significant impact on the study of international relations, shaping debates about the nature of international politics, the role of power, and self-interest in shaping state behavior, and the prospects for cooperation and conflict in international system.

Many researchers have contributed to the development and implementation of realism in political science and international relations, such as Hans Morgenthau (1948), Kenneth Waltz (1979), and John Mearsheimer (2001). Their works have been widely influential, and their theories have shaped debates about behavior of states and other international actors. For instance, Morgenthau's work on the role of power in international politics has been instrumental in shaping the debate about the use of force in international relations. Similarly, Waltz's theory of international politics has been central to the understanding of the anarchic structure of the international system, and Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism has contributed significantly to the study of great power politics.

Overall, the realism theory has facilitated to frame the study of international relations and political science, emphasizing the importance of power and national interest in shaping behavior of states and other international actors. It has also led to the development of various subfields within international relations and political science, such as security studies, balance of power theory, and international political economy. The theory of political science realism remains relevant today, shaping debates about the behavior of states and other international actors, as well as prospects for cooperation and conflict in the international system.

*Liberalism:* Liberalism is a theory that emphasizes the importance of cooperation and interdependence in international relations. According to liberals, the best way to achieve national security is through cooperation with other nations and promotion of free trade and democratic institutions. Liberalism is one of the dominant theories in political science that emphasizes the importance of individual freedom, democracy, and the rule of law.

The research work of Locke (1690), Mill (1859), Kant (1795), Doyle (1986), Keohane and Nye (1977) have all had a significant impact on the field of political science and international relations, particularly in the area of liberalism. Locke's *Two Treatises of Government* is a seminal work that argues for the importance of individual rights and limited government. Similarly, Mill's *On Liberty* emphasizes the need to limit state power and protect individual freedom. Kant's essay, *Perpetual Peace*, argues that democratic states are less likely to wage war with each other, and the spread of democracy may lead to a more peaceful international order. Doyle's book, *Ways of War and Peace*, also argues that liberal democracies are less likely to wage war with each other, and the spread of democracy can promote a more peaceful international order. Keohane and Nye's *Power and Interdependence* argue that international cooperation and institutions are crucial for achieving liberal goals, such as democracy and human rights. These works have shaped the field of political science and international relations, and continue to influence debates about the nature of liberalism and its implications for global politics.

Overall, the theory of political science liberalism has had a significant impact on the study of political institutions, democracy, and international relations, and continues to shape debates about the role of state and individual rights.

*Constructivism:* Some notable scholars, who have contributed to the development of constructivism in political science and international relations, include Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, and Martha Finnemore. Wendt's book "Social Theory of International Politics" (1999) is considered a seminal work in constructivist theory, where the authors argue that the nature of international relations is determined by shared ideas and social structures of states. Ruggie's article "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations" (1993) has also contributed to the development of constructivism, by challenging the conventional understanding of territoriality and sovereignty in international relations. Finnemore's book "National Interests in International Society" (1996) examines the role of norms and socialization in shaping states' national interests and behavior in the international system.

*Marxism:* Marxism is a theory that emphasizes the importance of economic factors in international relations. According to Marxists, the pursuit of national security is ultimately driven by economic interests, and is often in conflict with interests of other nations.

*Feminism:* Feminism is a theory that emphasizes the importance of gender and power relations in international relations. According to feminists, the concept of national security is often defined in ways that prioritize interests of men over those of women, and female experiences of conflict and insecurity are often overlooked in traditional approaches to national security.

## The relationship between human rights and national security

The relationship between human rights and national security is complex, and there are different perspectives on the nature of this relationship. Some argue that the promotion and protection of human rights are necessary for national security, while others argue that national security concerns may require limitations on human rights.

Research has explored the relationship between human rights and national security. Such a study is David Luban's article "Human Rights and National Security: The Moral and Legal Challenges of Terrorism" (2007), which analyses the tension between human rights and national security in the context of counter-terrorism policies. Luban argues that human rights have to be regarded as a fundamental component of national security. Aisling Swaine's book "Human Rights, National Security and Counter-Terrorism" (2010) examines the impact of counter-terrorism measures on human rights and asserts that a human rights-based approach to national security is both effective and morally justifiable. The report "National Security and Human Rights" by Amnesty International (2014) provides an overview of human rights implications of national security policies and argues that human rights violations can harm national security in the long term. Cathryn Cluver's article

"Human Rights and National Security: The United States' Response to Terrorism" (2016) explores how the United States has balanced national security concerns with human rights protection in response to the threat of terrorism. Finally, Margaret Satterthwaite's article "Human Rights and National Security: The Intersection of Torture, Rendition and Due Process" (2007) examines how torture, rendition, and denial of due process may undermine both human rights and national security. These studies provide a comprehensive understanding of the complex relationship between human rights and national security, highlighting the importance of balancing the two in the context of counter-terrorism policies.

These research papers validate that the relationship between human rights and national security is complex and that there are challenges that have to be directed in order to achieve a balance between these two important concerns.

## The relationship between political science and human rights

Political science and human rights are closely linked fields, as political scientists study the structures and processes of political systems that are responsible for upholding and promoting human rights. The study of political science can help us understand how political institutions, policies, and ideologies can either promote or undermine human rights. Political scientists also play a role in analyzing and evaluating the effectiveness of human rights policies and international human rights agreements. They may provide insights into factors that influence the implementation and enforcement of human rights norms, such as the role of national and international institutions, public opinion, and civil society. In turn, the study of human rights may inform political science research by highlighting the importance of individual freedoms and rights in political systems. Human rights considerations are often central to political science debates on the issues such as democracy, justice, equality, and power.

The intersection of political science and human rights is essential for promoting a better understanding of how political systems can work to protect and promote human rights, and how we can create more just and equitable societies.

## The criticism of the human rights approach towards national security

The human rights approach towards national security has been voraciously voiced in the literature. Williams (2017), Levitt (2014), and McDougal and Lasswell (1988) are among prominent scholars who have expressed concerns about this approach. One criticism is that the focus on human rights may hinder states from effectively addressing security threats. This is because human rights obligations, such as protecting the freedom of speech and association, may conflict with security measures like surveillance and detention of suspected terrorists. Another criticism is



that the human rights approach gives priority to individual rights over collective security of nation. In this perspective, protecting security of state is crucial to ensuring safety and well-being of its citizens, and human rights may have to be restricted or suspended in order to do so.

Finally, some critics argue that the human rights approach is too idealistic and does not account for the realities of global politics. They argue that international community is not always willing or can enforce human rights norms, and that states may prioritize their national interests over the protection of human rights. It is important to note that these criticisms are not universally accepted, and that there are many advocates who argue that protecting human rights is essential to promoting long-term stability and security.

## Human security and national security

Human security and national security are two distinct concepts that are related to different aspects of security. Human security is concerned with the protection of individuals and communities from threats to their lives, livelihoods, and dignity, including natural disasters, disease outbreaks, armed conflict, poverty, and human rights abuses (Marks & Burroughs, 2018). It aims to ensure that people have access to basic needs such as food, water, shelter, and healthcare, as well as the protection of their human rights and freedoms (Heyns, 2014). On the other hand, national security pertains to safeguarding nation state's interests and sovereignty against both external and internal threats, including terrorism, espionage, military aggression, and economic competition (Williams, 2017). National security aims to ensure that country's political and economic institutions are secure and that it has the capability to defend itself against threats to its territorial integrity. Although human security and national security are distinct concepts, they are often interdependent, and their objectives may overlap (Levitt, 2014). For example, addressing poverty and inequality may contribute to national security by reducing the likelihood of social unrest and conflict (Duffield, 2007). Conversely, protecting national security may sometimes require the protection of human rights and the provision of humanitarian aid (McDougal & Lasswell, 1988). Nevertheless, there are several challenges that hinder the effective implementation of human security policies and programs, including political will, inadequate resources, and the lack of coordination among different actors (Commission on Human Security, 2003; UNDP, 1994; Jones & Glover, 2016). Some of these challenges include:

- The lack of political will: Human security policies and programs require political will and support from governments, which may be difficult to obtain in cases where other priorities, such as economic development or national security, are set.
- Funding constraints: Human security programs often require significant funding to implement, and resource constraints may limit the ability of governments and organizations to adequately address the full range of threats to human security.

- The lack of coordination: The effective implementation of human security policies and programs requires coordination between various actors, including governments, civil society organizations, and international organizations. However, the lack of coordination can lead to duplicative efforts, gaps in coverage, and confusion among stakeholders.

- The complexity of threats: Threats to human security are often complex and interrelated, requiring multifaceted solutions that can be difficult to implement and coordinate. Addressing these complex issues requires a long-term approach and sustained commitment from stakeholders.

- Power imbalances: Power imbalances may limit the ability of certain groups, such as women, minorities, and marginalized communities, to access and benefit from human security policies and programs. Addressing these power imbalances requires the focus on social justice and human rights.

Addressing these challenges requires a sustained commitment to promoting human security, as well as the recognition of complex and interrelated nature of threats to human security.

## The intersection between human security, human rights, and political science theories with national security

According to Rotimi & Abimbola (2019), human security, human rights, and political science theories intersect with national security in several ways. National security is concerned with protecting state and its citizens from external and internal threats, while human security and human rights focus on protecting the individual and ensuring their well-being. Political science theories examine how states operate and how they interact with each other. An area of intersection is the protection of human rights within national security policies. National security measures should not violate human rights or undermine individual freedoms. Political science theories may inform policymakers on how to strike a balance between national security needs and individual rights. Another area of intersection is the concept of human security. Human security is a broader concept that encompasses the protection of individuals from a range of threats, including poverty, disease, environmental degradation, and political violence. National security policies that promote human security may enhance the overall security and stability of nation. Political science theories may also inform national security policies by providing insights into the causes of conflicts and threats to national security. Understanding political, social, and economic factors that may contribute to instability may help policymakers develop more effective strategies for promoting national security. In summary, the intersection of human security, human rights, and political science theories with national security highlights the importance of protecting individuals, promoting stability and well-being, and understanding the underlying causes of conflicts and threats. A comprehensive and balanced approach that considers these different factors may lead to more effective and sustainable national security policies.

According to Annan, Kilcullen, and Exum (2018), the question of whether security is a necessary precondition for the existence of society is a matter of debate among scholars and experts. Some argue that security is a fundamental condition for society to exist, as it provides necessary stability and protection for individuals to pursue their goals and aspirations. Without security, individuals may be subject to violence, crime, or other forms of harm, which could hinder the development of society. Others, however, argue that security is not necessarily a precondition for the existence of society and point to examples of societies that have existed in the past or present that may not have had strong security institutions or systems, yet still managed to function and thrive. These societies may have relied on other factors, such as strong social bonds, cultural norms, or economic systems, to maintain social order and stability. Ultimately, the answer to this question may depend on how one defines society and security. While security may not be a necessary precondition for the existence of society in some cases, it is generally agreed upon that security is an important factor in maintaining social stability and protecting individuals' rights and freedoms.

## Recommendations

Amongst others, recommendations to improve national security from the human rights and political science approach may include the following:

- Ensure that counter-terrorism measures are consistent with human rights: Governments should ensure that counter-terrorism measures, such as surveillance, arrests, and detentions, are consistent with human rights standards. This includes ensuring that individuals are not subject to arbitrary detention, torture, or other forms of mistreatment.
- Promote democratic governance: Democratically governed societies are generally more stable and secure. Governments should promote democracy and ensure that civil and political rights are respected, such as the right to free speech, assembly, and association.
- Address economic and social inequalities: Addressing economic and social inequalities can reduce likelihood of social unrest and political instability, which can threaten national security. Governments should promote economic and social policies that ensure fair and equal opportunities for all citizens.
- Strengthen the rule of law: Strong and independent legal systems may help to prevent human rights abuses and promote stability and security. Governments should ensure that the rule of law is upheld, and that there is equal access to justice for all citizens.
- Build strong and accountable security institutions: Effective and accountable security institutions can help prevent human rights abuses and promote stability and security. Governments should invest in training and resources to build strong and professional security institutions that respect human rights.

From a research perspective, further investigation is necessary to assess effectiveness of the human rights approach to improving national security. The future research could examine case studies of countries that have implemented the human

rights-based approaches to national security and assess impact on both national security and human rights outcomes. Additionally, longitudinal studies could be conducted to track changes in national security and human rights indicators over time in countries that have adopted such approaches. Such research could provide valuable insights into potential benefits and limitations of adopting the human rights-based approach to national security, and inform policymakers and practitioners in their efforts to balance security and human rights concerns.

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# COVID-19 – HUMAN (IN)SECURITY ISSUE

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DOI: [https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod\\_srint.2023.ch14](https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod_srint.2023.ch14)

## Keywords:

COVID-19,  
pandemic,  
threat,  
human security,  
sustainable development  
goals (SDGs)



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**Abstract:** *The objective of this review is to provide an overview of the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on human security. By an analysis of the literature, it has been estimated that the pandemic had a direct impact on the health dimension of human security, leading to a high rate of mortality and morbidity. On the other hand, measures undertaken at global and national level, such as lockdowns and curfews, have led to tectonic disruptions in the economy, job losses, the access to food and health care, as well as an increased rate of violence and human rights derogations. Threats to human security within one dimension and the consequences caused by them spill over into others, thus creating a vicious circle of threats to basic freedoms – from want, from fear and to live in dignity, as well as decline in the process of achieving sustainable development goals. Taking into account that pandemics of infectious diseases are a constant of human civilization, it has been concluded that in the future, states would have to find a balance between the measures undertaken to fight infectious diseases, on the one hand, and the welfare of ordinary people, on the other hand.*

## Introduction

Throughout history, the world has been affected by many pandemics that have taken away a large number of human lives, and have also significantly influenced changes in the strategic landscape and security.<sup>2</sup> In accordance with

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<sup>2</sup> Like the Justinianic Plague in the 6th century or the Spanish flu in the 20th century.

the conditions of the time, certain measures were taken to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, but the measures taken during the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the consequences of this pandemic for global society, were unprecedented. After the declaration of the pandemic in March 2020, almost every country took measures of closure and restrictions, and 95% of countries engaged the armed forces, giving primacy to the fight against non-traditional security threats (Erickson et al., 2023).

Due to the undertaken measures, there have been tectonic disturbances in the global economy, the loss of jobs, the access to food and health care, as well as an increased rate of violence, the derogation of human rights, xenophobia and hatred at global and national level. In other words, the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the measures taken, have led to the denial of basic human needs and rights, as well as the spread of waves of fear and uncertainty, thus endangering the vital principles on which human security rests – freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity (United Nation Trust Fund for Human Security, 2016, p. 6).

In this paper, based on the analysis of the content of scientific and review papers, reports by international organizations and media articles, a part of the scale of the impact of COVID-19 on all aspects of human security - health security, economic security, food security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security will be shown. In order to obtain relevant data, the JSTOR, PubMed, the National Library of Medicine and Google Scholar databases have been searched. The literature on the specific topic of the impact of COVID-19 on the mentioned dimensions of human security has been analyzed, including literature from the fields of medicine, economics, environmental protection, as well as political and security sciences. Considering the multidisciplinary nature of the topic and the large number of published papers, the selection criteria have exclusively been papers on the direct impact of COVID-19 on human security that have been published in Serbian and English. For each dimension of human security, those papers and research have been chosen that have illustrated this topic in the most adequate way with indicators and analysis. At the same time, the paper presents data on the achievement of certain sustainable development goals (SDGs), due to the fact that "the human security approach is a crucial ingredient to achieve sustainable development" (United Nation Trust Fund for Human Security, 2016, p. 5).

What I have to point out is that this type of review is not a novelty, since there have already been published works dealing with the analysis of the impact of COVID-19 and the measures taken on some or all dimensions of human security (Newman, 2022; Caparini, 2021; Onyeaka, et al., 2021). The contribution of this paper is reflected in the fact that, in accordance with the parameters for its preparation, this analysis has been expanded and deepened with a larger number of research and data, as well as a special reference to published experiences from Serbia.

## The concept of human security

The development of the concept of human security is related to the UNDP Human Development Report from 1994, which states that security has been interpreted too narrowly for a long time, as a matter of protecting territorial sovereignty and national interests, while problems (such as disease, crime, unemployment, threats to human rights, etc.) that ordinary people face on a daily basis are completely neglected (UNDP, 1994). The authors of the Report conclude that "the world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily life" (p. 1), and that it is necessary to redefine the concept of security, which would include human security in addition to national elements. Therefore, after the adoption of the Report, a large number of authors, as stated by Newman (2022), have devoted themselves to questioning the dominant military, state-centric view of national security. In other words, the attention of the academic community has focused on studying „the welfare of ordinary people“ (Paris, 2001, p. 87).

The Report (1994) states that the definition of human security cannot be rigorously determined, but that two aspects have to be taken into account in the determination: "safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression; and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life - whether in homes, in jobs or in communities" (p. 23). In order to understand it better, this concept is viewed through seven dimensions, from which the greatest threats to ordinary people arise. These are economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. Taking into account the outlined dimensions and threats, Tadjbakhsh (2005) defines human security as the ability to identify threats, avoid them when possible, that is, to mitigate their consequences in the event of their occurrence.

In order to see the impact of COVID-19 on human security, it is necessary to define its dimensions, at least in the broadest sense. Thus, economic security requires an assured basic income, food security means that all people have at all times both physical and economic access to basic food, while environmental security means the protection from natural hazards and other threats, as well as the access to sanitary water supply, clean air and a non-degraded land system. Personal security is the security against physical violence, community security refers to the protection of cultural identity and the protection from sectarian and ethnic violence, while political security in the broadest sense refers to the protection of basic human rights and freedoms. The greatest problem is the definition of the concept of health security, since, as stated by Malik, Barlow and Johnson (2021), there is no agreement on what exactly is meant by this term. According to Cárdenas et al. (2022) and Caparini (2021), health security implies the existence of an environment without diseases and infections, as well as the access to health services.

If the above-mentioned dimensions are examined, it could be said that COVID-19 as a disease, or SARS-CoV-2 as a virus, has had the most significant impact on health security. This is evidenced by the WHO data, according to which, as of 17th



May 2023, 6,932,991 people died and 766,440,796 people were infected worldwide as a result of COVID-19 (WHO, 2023). On the other hand, the measures taken in order to prevent the pandemic, lockdowns and mobility restrictions, as well as other measures, have led to endangerment of other dimensions. Therefore, when analyzing the concept of human security, one should always have in mind that exactly the state, in this case the measures taken, 'may be the primary threat to human security' (Newman, 2022, p. 434).

## Health (in)security in the time of COVID-19

In addition to the previously mentioned indicators in the form of mortality and morbidity, COVID-19 has had a negative impact on health security due to the impossibility of the access to health care for people suffering from other diseases. According to the UN report on the achievement of SDGs by the end of 2021, in 92% of 129 countries, "the pandemic has severely disrupted health systems and essential health services" (United Nations, 2022, p. 30). Thus, for example, the research on cancer diagnosis and treatment showed that the pandemic has dramatically impacted cancer care worldwide (Edge et al., 2021), while the research conducted by Einstein et al. (2021) on the subject of heart diseases in 108 countries, showed that diagnostic procedures decreased by as much as 64% in the period from March 2019 to April 2020. According to the research conducted in Serbia on the access to health services for thyroid patients, it showed that out of 206 respondents, as many as 60.4% had to switch from state to private treatment in order to receive the necessary medical service (Žarković et al., 2022). The transition from state to private treatment has additionally created pressure on economic possibilities of patients, leading to consequences for economic security, as well as discrimination of those who cannot afford it. During the pandemic, there was also a 93% decrease in the access to mental health services in 130 countries. The UN data state that the global prevalence of anxiety and depression was increased by 25% in 2020 (United Nations, 2022, p. 25).

The impact of COVID-19 on health security can be viewed by analyzing the achievement of the SDGs 3: good health and well-being. According to the UN data, the pandemic has reduced global life expectancy, has negatively affected the immunization process, so that 68 million children around the world remained unvaccinated. The disruption to health and vaccination services and the limited access to diet and nutrition services have the potential to cause hundreds of thousands of additional under-5 deaths and tens of thousands of additional maternal deaths in 2020. At the same time, the pandemic has also affected the increase in mortality from tuberculosis and malaria (United Nations, 2022).

Although the above-mentioned examples have already shown the extent of the impact of COVID-19 on the health dimension of human security, special attention has also to be paid to vaccination against COVID-19, that is, vaccine hesitancy as an additional way of endangering health security. According to the research

conducted by Watson et al. (2022), the COVID-19 vaccine prevented 14.4 million deaths in 185 countries between December 2020 and December 2021. However, the COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy is growing around the world (Sallam, 2021). In the research on vaccine hesitancy in Serbia, conducted by Rokvić (2023) in 2020 on a sample of 585 respondents, 40.3% of respondents declared against vaccination. Although mass vaccination in Serbia began on 19th January 2021, only 28.43% of citizens have been vaccinated with three doses so far.

## How has COVID-19 affected economic security?

The pandemic has affected economic flows, sending 'shock waves' and causing a global economic crisis, thus deepening the existing poverty and inequality (World Bank Group, 2022). According to the data from the World Bank Group (2022), the world economy has shrunk by about 3%, and increased inequality within and between countries. Although the consequences for the economy can be seen both at global and national level, the emphasis in this paper will be on the analysis of the impact on human security. Starting from the fact that economic security requires a guaranteed basic income, for the purpose of this paper, the research on the loss of jobs, that is, the impossibility of achieving a basic income has been analyzed.

After the adoption of restrictive measures, a large number of people around the world have lost their jobs and basic income. In studying the impact of the pandemic on job losses in the US, Montenegro et al. (2022) have concluded that just in the first few months of 2020, this loss was significantly greater than "the total multi-year effect of the Great Recession" (p. 851). Using the data from the World Bank High Frequency Phone Surveys, Khamis et al. (2021) state that in the East Asia and Pacific region 21% of respondents lost their jobs, 29% in the Europe and Central Asia region, 48% in the Latin America and the Caribbean region, 45% in the Middle East and North Africa region and 26% in the Sub-Saharan Africa region. Serbia was no exception. According to the official statistical data, 94,100 jobs were lost in the Republic of Serbia just in 2020 (UNDP 2020, p. 37).

The above-mentioned data give only an indication of the level of inequality and poverty. The loss of employment and income has led to a reversal of progress in achieving the SDG 8: decent work, as well as the SDG 1: no poverty. According to the UN (2022), pandemic "precipitated the worst economic crisis in decades and reversed progress towards decent work for all" (p. 42). The UN estimates that from 2019, more than 70 million people are expected to be pushed back into extreme poverty, being the first rise in global poverty since 1998. At the same time, for the first time in the last two decades, there has been an increase in the number of the world workers living in extreme poverty, from 6.7% in 2019 to 7.2% in 2020, pushing an additional 8 million workers into poverty (United Nations, 2022, p. 26). The pandemic has also led to "the first rise in between-country income inequality in a generation" (p. 17), that is, to the regression of the SDG 10: reduced inequalities.

## The derogation of human rights during the COVID-19 era

Due to the restrictive measures introduced by states, a debate began in the academic and public discourse about the violation of basic human rights and freedoms, that is, about the political dimension of human security. At the very beginning of the pandemic, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called on governments to ensure that measures comply with human rights standards (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2020). We should have in mind, as stated by Spadaro (2020), that the disease itself already threatens basic human rights - the right to life and the right to health. Therefore, according to Enmark (2007), the government can introduce restrictive measures, such as isolation and quarantine measures, which will, on the one hand, protect the right to health and life, but on the other hand, will affect other rights, such as the right to freedom of movement, gathering, and also on the rule of law. However, with the introduction of measures during the COVID-19 pandemic, the world faced a "pandemic of human rights abuse" (Kelly and Pattison, 2021).

According to Human Rights Watch (2021), in at least 83 countries, the authorities used the pandemic "to justify violating the exercise of free speech and peaceful assembly". The research by Human Rights Watch (2021) shows that in at least 52 countries new laws have been adopted criminalizing media reporting that is considered undesirable, in at least 18 countries security forces have physically attacked or killed journalists, the representatives of the political opposition and attorneys (e.g. in Cambodia in 2020, more than 60 activists, journalists and representatives of the political opposition were imprisoned).

A lot of controversy in the context of rights violations has been caused by the decisions of individual countries on the introduction of the digital COVID-19 surveillance for tracking contacts. As some of the examples by Sekalala et al. (2020) cite Indian decision to make the contact tracing app Aarogya Setu mandatory for all employees, or Singapore's decision to make the TraceTogether app mandatory exclusively for migrant workers. The mentioned authors believe that such mandatory applications for workers, especially for migrants, represent additional economic pressure, since the application requires the user to have a suitable smartphone and the internet (Sekalala et al., 2020). Therefore, this is a question not only of political, but also of economic security. In other countries, such as Israel, Mexico or Turkey, telecommunications were monitored for the purpose of contact tracing. This is just a part of the digital COVID-19 surveillance that points to a possible violation of the right to privacy and misuse of data, as a confirmed discriminatory policy towards minorities (Sekalala et al., 2020).

Discrimination of certain groups can also be viewed within the concept of community security, which clearly indicates the mutual connection of different dimensions of human security. Thus, in the analysis on the derogation of human rights in Serbia, it is stated that certain measures, such as curfews and movement bans, were rather more difficult for certain categories of the population. Namely, in

informal Roma settlements, the restriction of the freedom of movement meant at the same time the restriction of means for the prevention of infection, primarily water, as well as the loss of income (Trifković, 2020).

In the implementation of measures against COVID-19, even 95% of countries engaged the armed forces and other security forces, and the fight against the virus was described using war metaphors and military narratives. Due to all of the above-mentioned, the introduction of measures in many countries has resulted in the indignation of citizens and various protests and riots. In the analysis of the database of ACLED - Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project: COVID-19 Disorder Tracker, Rokvić points out that in many countries there have been anti-government demonstrations due to the state response to the pandemic and the socioeconomic measures taken, the impossibility of work and threats to the rights and freedom (Rokvić, 2020).

Bearing in mind the data presented, it is not surprising that in analysis of the impact of the pandemic on the derogation of human rights, Lebreton (2020) concludes that "Human Rights Courts will certainly be overwhelmed by applications in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis". In Serbia, moreover, proceedings have been initiated in front of the Constitutional Court on an initiative in which it is considered that the conditions for the declaration of a state of emergency and the measures taken in accordance with it were not met in Serbia at all. However, this initiative to start the procedure was rejected (Trifković, 2020).

## The shadow pandemic – personal (in)security and the rise of gender-based violence

As stated in the previous part, personal safety means safety from physical violence. In the 1994 UNDP report, it was stated that threats to personal security arise from the state (physical torture), other states (war), groups (ethnic tensions), individuals and gangs (crime, street violence), threats directed at women and children, as well as threats directed at oneself (suicide) (p. 30).

Analyzing the relevant literature, I have noticed that almost all types of threat to personal safety were present during the pandemic. As an example, I will cite violence carried out by the state. Thus, according to Kelly and Pattison (2021), in Kenya the police killed at least 15 people in the first 9 weeks of the curfew, while in Uganda during the arrest of the presidential candidate Bobi Wine, 54 of his supporters were killed and 45 were wounded. Also, the previously mentioned data on violence against journalists can be examined within the concept of personal security.

However, during the pandemic, a particular type of violence stood out - and that is violence against women. Bradbury-Jones and Isham (2020) consider that lockdown measures have given abusers "greater freedom to act without scrutiny or consequence" (p. 2047). Wijk et al. (2021) state that violence in family has increased by 23-32% in the WHO Europe member states since the lockdown began, while the

UN data show that globally since the beginning of the pandemic, 45% of women have been exposed to some form of violence. In their systematic review of literature, Mittal and Singh (2020) state that, for example, in Australia there was a decrease in the crime rate on the one hand, but on the other hand a 5% increase in violence in family, while this increase in the US was between 21%-35%. The research conducted in other parts of the world also shows an increase in the number of calls related to violence, such as an increase of 30% in France or 25% in Argentina, while according to research by Vora et al. (2020) in India at the beginning of April 2020 the number of complaints about violence increased by 100%. Serbia was no exception. According to Despotović (2020), at the beginning of the introduction of a state of emergency in Serbia, the number of calls to the Autonomous Women's Centre regarding violence tripled.

In the analysis of the achievement of the SDG 5: gender equality, it is stated that the pandemic has delayed the exercise of women's rights and equal opportunities, and it is estimated that with the current pace in the exercise of women's rights, it will take 286 years just to abolish the existing discriminatory laws (Azcona et al., 2021). Due to the scale of violence against women during the introduction of measures to combat the pandemic and poor progress in achieving the SDGs, this negative trend is called the shadow pandemic of COVID-19 (UN Women, 2021).

## A perfect storm for inequality

As in the case of the previous dimensions of human security, the pandemic has left negative consequences for community security, as well, and this can be concluded from the previously mentioned examples. According to UN Secretary General António Guterres, the pandemic has released "a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, scapegoating and scaremongering" (United Nations, 2020a). Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, stated that the pandemic has had a "disproportionate toll" on people from ethnic or religious minorities, as well as indigenous people (United Nations, 2020b). The pandemic is thought to have created the conditions for a perfect storm of disproportionality and inequality (McClure, 2021).

In the comprehensive review "Effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on religious and ethnic minorities", Loft et al. (2022) state that in many countries these groups have been the subject of hate speech and violence. According to these authors in the US, the UK and South America, certain ethnic minorities and indigenous communities have had a higher mortality rate due to living conditions and the inability to access medical institutions. As stated by Newman (2022) in the UK data on COVID-19, related deaths by ethnic groups indicated that "black males were 4.2 times more likely to die from a Covid-19-related illness than white males and black females were 4.3 times more likely than white females to die". The research conducted by Boserup et al. (2020) showed that in all states of the US the percentage of mortality was higher among minority racial/ethnic groups (African American, Hispanic, Asians, etc.) than whites.

The research by Human Rights Watch (2021) showed that in many countries the cases of discrimination and violence against the Asians were recorded, while according to Burke (2020), in Pakistan, the Shiite Muslim minority group was accused of bringing the virus from Iran. Burke (2020) also states that in Bangladesh, the government has cut off the internet access for about 900,000 members of the Rohingya, a group in the Cox's Bazar refugee camp, which has reduced the availability of information about the virus, and the stigmatization of potentially infected people has led to the fact that possible symptoms of the disease are not reported and not seeking an adequate medical treatment. According to Trifković (2020), Serbia was also among the group of countries where support for certain groups was lacking. Namely, due to the inadequate treatment and the lack of support for the Roma population, the European Court of Human Rights initiated proceedings against Serbia.

## Rising food insecurity

In order to understand the extent of the impact of COVID-19 on food security, it is necessary to start from the definition of this term: "food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food" (Boyac-Gündüz et al., 2021). Boyac-Gündüz et al. (2021) state that this definition of food security implies several dimensions, such as food availability, access, utilization, and stability of food supplies at global, national, and local level. Analyzing the impact of the pandemic on the mentioned dimensions, these authors conclude that due to the measures taken, both at national and international level, all aspects of food security during the pandemic were threatened. In their research, Mouloudj et al. (2020) state that the pandemic had the greatest impact on perishable food and caused remarkable food shortages in poor countries, conflict zones and war-affected regions, and also in some developed ones, whereas developing countries are the most affected due to their high dependency in securing their food supplies.

The extent of the impact of the pandemic on food security is indicated by the UN data on the achievement of the SDG 2: zero hunger. In the UN Report, it was estimated that due to the consequences of the pandemic, 1 in 10 people worldwide is suffering from hunger, as well as that in 2021, 150 million more people faced hunger than in 2019. At the same time, 2.3 billion people were moderately or severely food insecure in 2021, meaning they lacked the regular access to adequate food. The most worrisome increases have been seen in sub-Saharan Africa, followed by Central and Southern Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean (United Nations, 2022, p. 28). According to the database on the achievement of the SDGs in Serbia, the prevalence of serious food insecurity among the adult population increased from 1.7% in 2015 to 3.8% in 2020 (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2023). Food insecurity additionally affects the (in)security of other dimensions of human security, such as health, especially of children. Thus, the UN data (2022) show that in 2020, 22% of children under the age of 5 (149.2 million) suffered from stunting (p. 29).

## The polluting footprint of COVID-19

Although on the one hand there are studies that indicate that the introduction of certain measures in the fight against the pandemic has had positive effects on the environment (Gautam et al., 2020), especially in terms of air pollution decline (Venter et al., 2020), on the other hand, the use of protective equipment, such as masks, and large amounts of waste has led to its degradation.

Benson et al. (2021) estimate that on a daily basis, 3.4 billion single-use face masks/face shields are discarded, globally. According to the estimates of these authors, by the end of 2020, the most plastic waste was generated in Asia, with 1.8 billion of discarded face masks per capita a day. The data from the European Environmental Agency (2021) indicate that about 0.75 face masks per person a day, were imported to the EU during that period, resulting in additional greenhouse gas emissions and other types of pollution. This amount of waste, according to Shams et al. (2021) in a longer period of time will lead to mismanagement of plastic waste, that is, improper incineration, illegal dumping, and overloading the landfill capacity. In their study of the impact of plastic pollution from mismanaged face masks in coastal regions of 46 countries, Chowdhury et al. (2021) estimate that approximately 0.15 million tons to 0.39 million tons of plastic waste could end up in global oceans within a year.

In addition to the impact of plastic waste on the environment, a number of works are dedicated to researching the impact of COVID-19 on deforestation. According to the estimates by Brancalion et al. (2020), deforestation alerts were detected during the first month, following the implementation of government confinement measures to reduce COVID-19 spread, which were doubled compared to 2019. These authors state that deforestation increased by 63% in the US, 136% in Africa, and 63% in Asia-Pacific, and impacted most countries within these regions (the US: 24 of 28 countries; Africa: 30 of 47 countries; and Asia-Pacific: 15 of 28 countries). At the same time, according to Caparini (2021), in many countries, for economic reasons, the authorities made a decision to withdraw regulations on environmental protection, which has led to numerous illegal activities and environmental crimes. Unlike the previous dimensions of human security, where certain indicators were presented for Serbia as well, in the part related to endangering the environment in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, I have not found any adequate research.

## *Conclusion*

The pandemic of human rights abuse, the shadow pandemic, a perfect storm for inequality, a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, are just some of the terms used to describe the impacts and consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic in the analyzed literature and reports. On the one hand, the pandemic has directly affected the health dimension of human security, leading to high mortality and morbidity rates. On the other hand, through the measures adopted by the states in order to prevent the

pandemic, the impact on all other dimensions has been reflected. The global closure, movement bans and other measures have caused waves of economic shocks, violence, interrupted the process of food supplies, the access to health institutions... Threats to security within one dimension and the consequences caused by them have spilled over into others, thus creating the vicious circle of threats to basic freedoms (from want, from fear and to live in dignity) and regression in the process of achieving the SDGs.

Taking into account that pandemics of infectious diseases are a constant of human civilization, in the future, based on the lessons learnt from 2020, states would have to find a balance between the measures taken to fight infectious diseases, on the one hand, and the welfare of ordinary people, on the other hand. It should be kept in mind, as stated in the 1994 Report, that the world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily life. However, unfortunately, the Global Health Security Index (2021: 5) shows that all countries are "dangerously unprepared to meet future epidemic and pandemic threats".

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# HUMAN SECURITY IN TRADITIONAL SECURITY THEORIES – CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES

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DOI: [https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod\\_strint.2023.ch15](https://doi.org/10.18485/isimod_strint.2023.ch15)

## Keywords:

human security,  
realism,  
neorealism,  
liberalism,  
neoliberalism,  
challenges, perspectives

**Abstract:** *Since the mid-1990s, the concept of human helplessness has begun to appear in almost all theoretical discussions of the modern approach to security as one of the pressing problems. Today, after almost less than three decades, human security has become a key factor that is considered in almost all professional and scientific works all over the world, from the well-known position that security is a basic human need, a basic human value and the strongest guaranteed safety. It has become a key factor in preserving security, both at local level, at community level, and at regional level, and one could say at global level, as well. Today, there is almost no national defense strategy that does not pay special attention to the concept of human security.*

*Using scientific methods, primarily induction, then deduction, as well as description and comparison, we would like to point out that traditional theories of security such as realism, neorealism, especially liberalism and neoliberalism, indicate special importance to the individual. In addition to considering the concept of human security in traditional theories of security, this paper aims to point out the challenges and perspectives of further theoretical consideration of the concept of human security in modern society, which is increasingly characterized by multipolarity along with modern technical and technological development, based on such an analysis.*



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## Introduction

In recent years, various forms of attempts by a large number of theorists of disunity can be seen, and the most prominent ones among them are those of strategic security studies. In their reflections, it is pointed out that the end of the Cold War did not bring any tectonic disruption in the security concept understanding. However, the post-Cold War security agenda has become such that the above-mentioned hypothesis is largely in a dilemma. Namely, in addition to the state and military as the dominant references in the traditional security concept understanding, terms and definitions such as intrastate conflicts, problems of ethnic, racial and religious identity in multiethnic states, migration, organized crime, the environment, epidemics of infectious diseases, sustainable development, and the availability of food and natural resources necessary for sustainable life of the individual could be seen in analyses dealing with security challenges at the end of the 20th century. The emergence of new concepts in the field of security has provoked a reaction from a group of security theorists, primarily those advocating the neoliberal concept of international relations regulation, and thus the concept of security (for, precisely the last decade of the 20th century was the one of the vertiginous rise of neoliberal child-globalization). They pointed out that the traditional approach to security that has emerged under the influence of realistic and neo-realistic theories of international relations and security have to and should be changed, i.e., it is necessary to redefine and adapt it to the contemporary challenges and threats. In these new approach redefinition efforts, two directions can be identified in which the redefinition process should proceed. Firstly, the concept of security should be broadened to include threats from other spheres of human society such as economic, social and environmental, in addition to traditional ones such as military and political challenges. Secondly, the traditional ways of understanding the need to be redefined, i.e. expanded and deepened in order to deviate from the narrow separation of the state as the only reference object of security. Besides the state, the individual, society and region, as well as the global order are listed equally in terms of security (what needs to be protected).

The most significant criticism of the traditional approach to security has been made by human security theorists, who explicitly demanded radical expanding of the security research agenda to issues such as sustainable development, social well-being, the economy, and the environment of a human as an individual. As a reason for this attitude, these theorists have argued that the state is no longer and can no longer be the sole guarantor and provider of individual security, and in some cases even the source of insecurity. Accordingly, in security studies, the reference object of security itself should shift from the state to the individual. Considering this approach of the proponents of the human security theory, we can state that its followers are those of the neoliberal theory of security, i.e. the followers who only further militarize the concept of individual security by expressing their views on human security, thereby allowing individual regional or global security factors and international relations, a neo-imperial approach to the interpretation of security.

The aim of this paper is to indicate that additional militarization in theoretical interpretation and practical operation of human security is not necessary, because everything needed for the undisturbed life of every individual human being has already been brought almost to perfection through neoliberal postulates of security approach.

## The human security concept

As already stated in the introductory section, the concept of "human security" is of a more recent date and as such has multiple definitions and interpretations, which will be discussed further somewhat later in the paper. Despite its innovation and relevance to the post-Cold War security agenda, human security represents one of the contemporary concepts within the existing security studies that have since become the focus of scientific and professional debate. The very essence of the human security concept lies in the idea according to which the individual is the one and only object of security, not the state or nation.

Human safety – the safety of an individual is dependent manifold on the interrelationship of a number of different factors. It is this individual that constitutes the unit to which security analysis can be sublimated. Thus, "the basic concept of human security is such that the term human indicates that the focus is on the individual, and the term security indicates the need to protect against threats" (2006). This implies that human safety is concerned with the safety of individuals. A person is safe as long as his or her physical integrity, dignity, and privacy are protected from injury and endangerment. Thus, human safety is also defined as "the state of person's protection from danger, threat and injury to their personality, rights and property" (Miletić, 1997). Yet, this definition may seem very narrow and considered correct only in terms of the police role in protecting human rights and property.

Also, the idea that people have to be protected in everyday life is not new. Some theorists emphasize that "man-centeredness is actually a political philosophy feature of liberalism, which puts people and individuals at its center, and prescribes certain conditions, such as freedom and equality, for their security". (Carr, P.) Nevertheless, what is new is precisely the very term "human security", i.e. this long political and philosophical tradition focused on man has only been expressed under this term since the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in liberal and neoliberal considerations of international relations and security regulation.

Human security is gradually positioned at the center of special attention of the "Western society", which some international relations and security theorists treat as "democratic societies". Namely, the absence of all threats and risks that could endanger human physical integrity, dignity, social status, vital rights and freedoms, ensures the existence of basic prerequisites for the ability of individuals to achieve their life goals.

In modern theoretical discussion, when human (individual) security is an issue, one can find some of the concepts that characterize it, and they are often given as follows: life, health, status, abundance, freedom. By analyzing these elements, we can notice that in the absence of one of them, it is not possible to compensate for or replace it with another one, for it is precisely in this way that they imply the whole.

In this regard, in 1993, the Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Program (hereinafter referred to as UNDP) (UNDP, 1993, Human Development Report) states and emphasizes that the traditional security approach concepts have to be changed. Instead of focusing on national security, this Report puts emphasis on human security, so that the human security concept will be introduced into the discussion in the following year in this Report. In the aforementioned Report, human security is defined as security in relation to chronic threats (hunger, disease and repression), and the protection from sudden and harmful disruptions to the flow of daily life (UNDP, 1994, Human Development Report).

Unlike modern human security concepts, where, as mentioned earlier, the term implies the existence of several key concepts such as life, health, status, abundance, freedom, the 1994 UNDP Report on Human Development introduces the terms "freedom from fear", which includes human rights and security, and "freedom from want". The United Nations has linked human security not only to the protection of the individual from violence, but also to their overall development. Thus defined human security encompasses seven different dimensions, namely: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, social, and political security (Human Development Report, 1994, pp. 25–33).

Economic security implies an adequate and predictable income, predictable employment, safety and health at work, covered social security, income satisfaction, income disparity, and competitiveness. Food security involves physical and economic food availability, i.e. the availability and quality of food items and the purchasing power of people. Health security is achieved through the protection of people from diseases and infection, the availability and quality of health care, the health status of people and the existence of health care systems. Environmental security is achieved through the protection from pollution, as well as unimpeded access to clean water and air and an unpolluted terrestrial ecosystem. Personal security involves the absence of fear of violence and abuse, the protection of people from crime and self-destructive phenomena, etc. Social security implies family stability, quality of housing, quality of life in the local community, security of cultural identity, effects of community code of ethics, development and freedom of media and communication, freedom and effects of trade union organizations. Political security includes the development and protection of human rights, the impact of politics on the quality of life of citizens, and the impact of formal social control bodies on people's safety.

By analyzing the current professional and scientific debates and discussions, it can be concluded that at least three different approaches, three different conceptions of human security interpretations, have crystallized in them. The first approach is based on human rights, as well as the rule of law, and it defines human

security in terms of the feasibility of a wide range of different human rights. This approach is based on liberal postulates, i.e. the liberal assumption of basic individual rights to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness", as well as the obligation of the international community to protect and promote these rights.

It is safe to say that the second conception of human security is not much different from the first one, i.e. the followers of this concept advocate a humanitarian approach to human security. In advocating this approach, they describe security as the absence of fear and that this is precisely what international intervention should be aimed at in the future. Proponents of this approach view war as a major threat to human security and emphasize the idea that people should be protected from threats of violence. Also, since protection has to be provided by the international community, this approach introduces humanitarian intervention as a model of behavior in the "Western democratic societies" in the human rights preservation.

As we can see, human rights and their protection are at the core of these two concepts, whereas the third concept of understanding human security is in conflict with the first two, i.e. the followers of this concept of human security believe that human security has to and should be viewed more broadly, and as such it has to have breadth in its foundation that will encompass various forms of harm to the life and well-being of individuals. The third view is the broadest and includes sustainable human development, the exercise, protection and promotion of economic, environmental and social rights (Commission of Human Security, 2003).

Considering the concept of human security, it can be stated that currently there is no generally accepted consensus in the professional and scientific community about human security, and the concept has gained a large number of both followers and opponents over time. The main opponents of human security, meanwhile, are concerned with a broader definition of human security, according to which it represents not only freedom from fear, but also freedom from want, which encompasses so many contents (physical violence, environment, etc.) in a way that it is not clear what is and what is not the domain of human security. In addition, the concept of human security has been criticized for legitimizing humanitarian interventionism, which has been abused several times by the democratic West to undermine the sovereignty of primarily multinational states. Finally, it can be concluded that the concept of human security is based on liberal, i.e. neoliberal theories of international relations and security. However, in the following part of the paper, we will try to point out the different notions of individual and human security, because both of these concepts are at the heart of the neoliberal notion of security.

## Human security in traditional security concepts

In this part of the paper, special attention will be devoted to conceptions of human security, through four classical security theories such as realism, neorealism, liberalism and neoliberalism. For the purpose of this paper, we will consider that



security theorists, who base their views on security issues on the postulates of realism and neorealism, can be viewed, in a broader sense, as sharing the same considerations when it comes to the safety of the individual. If it is known that for realists and neo-realists the nation-state is the key and only factor in both international relations and security, then the relationship and correlation between the concepts of national security and human security will be briefly discussed.

Analyzing the professional and scientific approaches to understanding the concept of national security, it can be seen that this concept implies a synthesis of citizens' security (all members of society regardless of their ethnicity, religion, race and ideology) and state security, as well as their participation in the international and global security spheres.

The understandings of the security theories followers based on the postulates of realism and neorealism lead us to the conclusion that reference values and interests are protected from a wide range of threats to security of a human, natural and technical-technological nature, and not only from armed aggression or subversive activities of other states. A significant sphere of protective function is the prevention of emergencies, risks and threats, i.e. we can point out that followers of the theory of realism and neorealism advocate a defense approach to solving problems of human security within the framework of national security. The protection of national security involves subjects of all levels of security, such as individuals - people, society, state and the international community. According to the concepts of realists and neo-realists, states have and always will be the only ones that possess all the capacities (human, material, technical and organizational) to protect all levels of security, all its residents, as well as themselves from a large number of challenges, risks and threats. An essential characteristic of national security concept is its openness, according to which certain new and old values can simultaneously be included or excluded depending on circumstances, time and places change.

Traditional notions of national security based on realism and neorealism postulates in professional and scientific works have been presented as survival in the broadest sense, state and national survival, physical self-sustainability, territorial integrity, political independence, quality of life, national identity, and national interests. On the basis of the aforementioned, the conclusion can be drawn that national security implies the state of unimpeded access, exercise and optimal protection of national (state and social) values and interests (primarily peace, freedom, rights and security of people and social groups; quality of life; national unity, dignity, pride and identity; healthy environment; energy stability, economic and social prosperity; information resources; constitutional and legal order, the rule of law; territorial integrity; political independence; sovereignty) that are achieved, maintained and promoted on the basis of citizens' security, national security system and mechanisms, as well as the absence of (individual, group and collective) fear of their threat and a collective sense of tranquility and control over the development of future phenomena and events of importance for the life of society and the state (Mijalković, 2009).

National security includes people's security (citizens, foreigners and stateless persons in a country's territory) and the state security, and also participation in the field of international and global security.

However, changes that have occurred in the field of the conceptions of security have necessitated that the traditional division of the national security component into internal and external security be modified and adapted to new challenges and threats. Security, which encompasses an already overcome division, has integrated components both internally and externally, and the integral national security consists of several components, including peace and freedom (security from military challenges and threats), national sovereignty, territory and political system security, political independence, legal order, energy, information, social, environmental security and security of national identity, honor and dignity. These components permeate into multiple sectors and these are as follows:

- individual security sector;
- some social groups and minorities in the security sector (ethnic, religious, racial, gender, sexual, cultural, peer, etc.);
- the whole society security sector, including the one of its members living in other states;
- the state security sector, and
- the sector of the state participation in international and global security.

Therefore, nowadays national security does not only imply state functioning based on force, but also on political, economic, military, social, environmental and information stability, international reputation and integrity of the state (Simić, D., 2002). Contemporary national security is a synthesis of citizens (individuals) and state security, as well as their participation in international security. The protection of vital values is achieved through the implementation of the security function, i.e. state and non-state security sector activities, and also with the help of international cooperation in the field of security.

Evidently, new forms of security enabling the nation-state to respond to all or almost all challenges and threats jeopardizing the nation-state's security and thus each of its inhabitant regardless of religion, race, ethnicity or any other affiliation, have developed under the influence of realism and neorealism theory.

Just as for the purpose of this paper, the followers of realism and neorealism have been considered to share the same views on the security component, so liberalism and neoliberalism followers will be considered to have the same views on the security component, i.e. those that would like to remove the nation-state from the separation process in every security component. However, unlike the previous part of the paper, where the relationship of human security from the aspect of national security, in the case of liberal and neoliberal theories has been explained, the primary focus has to be on the relationship between the concepts of individual and human security, i.e. the relationship between human rights and security have to be considered.

When we begin to analyze both national and foreign professional and scientific literature, it can be noticed that a number of theorists identify individual safety with the concept of human safety. There is also a larger group of authors defining individual safety as an integral part, and for some it might be said to be the core of human safety. Sabina Elkir, for example, defines this core as "the minimum, basic or essential set of achievements related to survival, livelihood and dignity" (Elkir, 2012).

As stated in some interpretations, human safety is reduced to individual - as the absence of a threat to the physical survival of the individual. However, most authors, as well as the aforementioned and cited UNDP Report itself, interpret human safety as a broader concept that implies the focus on people and their physical and mental integrity, as well as their interaction with the social environment, for it is precisely such interactions that can generate negative consequences on the value of the person. Thus, Barry Buzan argues that most threats to individuals originate from the view that people "have merged with their social environment generating inevitable social, economic and political pressures" (Buzan, 1991).

As a means to achieve the desired state of human security, in addition to protecting the individual from violence, it is necessary to create all other social conditions for achieving comprehensive security, which includes emancipation as its ultimate outcome. According to some foreign authors, it is precisely this emancipation in people that creates freedom from restrictions that prevent them from doing freely what they would otherwise do, and not power or order based on coercion. It creates security that is both theoretical and practical.

The contribution of individual safety is also to shift the perception of the primary object of safety from the state to the individual. In order for the state, as a means of achieving security, to accomplish its goal, which is people's security, firstly it has to be able to ensure the security of individual integrity, i.e. the physical survival of a person. Nowadays, it is common to imply personal security, as the protection of the physical integrity of an individual from violence, because it is guaranteed by the state and a number of other regional and international entities, so this concept extends to the individuals' protection and other forms of threat.

As is shown, personal security concept, contained in the human security concept, has the status of a base around which all other dimensions of human security are concentrated, which, depending on the context, can be economy, ecology, health, food, education, etc. This list of human security dimensions is not definitive. Quite the contrary, it is as fluid as the concept of human security itself, and is conditioned by the time context, so that it is possible to distinguish between pre-Cold War, Cold War and post-Cold War era in understanding human security. Personal safety and individual security, which are focused on the individual in a social and biological sense, are the basic premise of a new post-Cold War conception of security contained in the human safety concept.

There is a close, or one might say inseparable, link between human security and human rights. Nevertheless, theories still offer different answers to these questions and carry out detailed analyses of the relationship between human security and human rights, although both concepts focus on the human being, i.e. the individual. Thus, in order to make any distinction between these two concepts, some authors have persistently been looking for differences in contrast to obviously similar features, asking such questions, as: Is human security a human right in itself? Are human rights the core or normative basis for the concept of human security? What is the relationship between human security and human rights in terms of the potential for "mutual support and enrichment"? Human security is definitely a holistic concept, as could be said for

human rights, which is distinguished, above all, by universality. Human rights have always implied the individual's safety. "Security" is a human right in itself, pursuant to Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 'Everyone has the right to life, liberty and personal security', refers explicitly to security within the framework of human rights. Regarding the relationship between human rights and human security, numerous questions have been raised, but at least two seem to have been asked at the level of theoretical and empirical debate: the first one, security is a human right in itself and the second one, the concept of human security relies heavily on the theoretical discourse, practice and framework of the human rights concept. Notwithstanding, this connection is even more pronounced in the daily lives and peer systems of individuals, who, especially in conditions where their personal safety is directly threatened, will neglect every other human right and seek to eliminate circumstances and risks that threaten the basic right to life.

Currently, it can be noted that states that adhere to the values of the "Western model of democracy" primarily based on neoliberal postulates of advancing international relations and security, have different approaches to the debate on human security. Thus, we can say that Canada places more emphasis on "freedom from fear", while other countries rely more on "freedom from want" as is the case in Japan. In any case, freedom from want is based on a modern understanding in the context of economic, social and cultural rights that every human being should enjoy, and is indisputably a part of human security.

It could be noted that human security as a derived and new social and security concept, still does not have complete social support, and as such does not have the institutional and theoretical capacity that the concept of human rights has recognized in the international law and practical implementation it has. For this reason, human security relies on both this infrastructure and a part of the academic and professional argumentation developed in the human rights doctrine.

In view of the breadth of the subject concepts by the followers of the aforementioned human security postulates, the opinion that human security is a broader concept than human rights, which, in addition to fundamental rights includes the basic abilities and absolute needs of an individual, has begun to prevail in the professional and scientific community. Human security, among other things, also refers to challenges and threats such as natural disasters, or it can be said that human security includes all emerging challenges, risks and threats that will arise from both state and non-state actors.

Hence, when it comes to human rights in the concept of human security, currently an acceptable answer could be given that human rights are a part of human security, that is, they are the very core or essence of human security.

## Human security – challenges and perspectives

As it has been shown, modern theorists, who base their views primarily on the neoliberal postulates of security theory, have placed the concept of human security very broadly, thus future challenges, risks and threats to human security can be viewed

through the prism of society and life quality. It can be stated that the society and life quality are closely interrelated and have both positive and negative interactions. The term "quality of life" describes the factors that affect the living conditions of a society or individual, and more generally, it implies the degree of well-being of an individual or group of people. The life quality concept refers to the overall well-being within a society, with the tendency to provide every member of society with equal conditions to achieve their goals, of course, as long as they are not illegal or harmful to the member or the environment.

The concept of human security has a very "long list of threats", as well as insufficiently defined values: human rights, quality of life, freedom from exclusion/fear or value understood as the ability of an individual to fully and freely realize their potential in the environment in which they live. Therefore, while there is no consensus about what human security is, it is worrying that it seems even more complicated to determine what it is not. Thus, while there is no consensus about what constitutes human security, even more disturbing is the difficulty in determining what it is not, when its concept is so broadly framed as to have unforeseeable implications for global security. There is a danger that the mere interpretation of human security in the future will be one of the risks to global security itself. To avoid this possibility, the aforementioned 1994 UNDP Report lists threats to human security, but allows a large number of future challenges, risks and threats to be classified into one of the following seven groups:

- *Economic security* – faced with threats of unemployment, job insecurity, poor working conditions, income inequality, inflation, poor social security and homelessness.

- *Food security* – is achieved by addressing problems related to physical and economic access to food. People starve not because of the lack of food, but because they cannot afford it.

- *Health security* – focuses on threats to human life and health caused by infectious and parasitic diseases, HIV and other viruses, diseases caused by polluted air or water, and inadequate access to health services.

- *Environmental security* focuses on the degradation of local and global ecosystems, water scarcity, floods and other natural disasters, irrational deforestation, as well as water, air and soil pollution.

- *Personal security* focuses on suppressing threats that can take several forms: torture by the state (physical violence), threats from other states (war), threats from another group of people (ethnic tensions), threats from individuals or criminal groups (crime or street violence), threats directed at women (rape and domestic violence), threats directed at children (abuse) and threats directed at oneself (suicide, drug use).

- *Community security* focuses on ethnic tensions and violent conflict.

- *Political security* is one of the most important aspects of human security and involves living in a society that respects basic human rights and does not carry out state repression.

Human security advocates feel that subjective insecurity among people today originates more from various everyday challenges than from fears of various military, subversive, or nuclear threats. Therefore, according to them, the greatest threat is no longer war, which seems to be at least a utopian theory, from standpoint today in international relations and security. Job and income security, health and environmental

security, protection from violence - these are the primary concerns nowadays in terms of human security around the globe. It can also be noted that the catalogue of risks, challenges and threats is huge, one might say quite long. Human rights, as a set of inalienable rights and freedoms of individuals, are under particular threat in many world regions today. Global society has faced numerous contradictions in the process of reshaping the very concept of global international order and security.

Today the world is in a much more complex state of global security in which the risks, challenges and threats to security compared to the last decade of the 20th century, when the neoliberal worldview was at its peak, are much more complex compared to the aforementioned period.

In addition to the multi-vector complication of challenges, risks and threats to global survival, an even greater challenge for us is the growing alienation of people from each other. Simply put, it is very difficult to explain that a human being, who is by nature a social being and depends on interactions with other human beings, in an era of undoubted technical-technological development of civilization, becomes increasingly alienated from others. As a matter of fact, when human beings are alienated from each other, they are actually alienated from themselves, from the very essence of their existence. The ultimate and most disastrous result of this seemingly sustainable state of our global society may be the destruction of an individual as an intelligent and human being, thereby nullifying the value of human life.

When human security prospect in the coming period is in question, we should first bear in mind that the human security concept presented in the UNDP Report from 1994 represents one of the most humane ideas of the world politics. Analyzing publicly published views and reflections of a large number of security theorists, it can be concluded that in the profession and science there is a great amount of restraint, not to mention skepticism regarding the scientific scope of such a broad concept, as well as the possibility of its contribution to security studies. The representatives of the critical school, whose teaching is the closest to the ideas underlying the human safety concept, often "hinge" from it, most notably due to the analytical unprofitability that results from the imprecise determination of what is implied by human safety, i.e. what should be the subject of analysis.

Human security has originally emerged as a practical concept aimed at identifying and solving problems to which a human being, as the lowest unit of security analysis, is exposed. Contemporary literature clearly recognizes and distinguishes between the scientific treatment of human safety (analytical applicability of the concept) and its treatment as practical policy (normative applicability). From this aspect, a highly significant division is made between the stated approach to human security put forward by Mary Kaldor and others, distinguishing between two aspects of the human security doctrine, which are as follows: "... lexis – what is said and written about it and praxis – what it means in terms of everyday practical activity" (Kaldor, Martin, Selchow, 2007). The aforementioned authors subject the human security concept to particular tensions, which is natural, because placing the individual at the center and focus of security calculations has caused major changes in modern security studies and at the same time has led to numerous criticisms and contradictions. This state of affairs can best be perceived in attempts to find and establish a point of balance, between the authority of the state and the freedom of the individual, and

one might say, between the individual and collective rights. Thus, the human security concept, in modern theory, especially in practice, reflects a multitude of different ideas and conceptual notions, which are frequently difficult to harmonize and reconcile.

By analyzing the concept of human security itself, it can be noted that it is extremely complex and multidimensional. It is this multidimensionality that is reflected in the following:

- comprehensiveness- very broadly-based, with no borders preventive;
- multi-sectoral;
- contextualized;
- participatory;
- gender-aware.

When presenting and clarifying the human security concept, it is important to bear in mind the principles upon which it is based. In order for this clarification to be done at a very high level, it is necessary to put the protection and empowerment principles in focus, especially the protection principle, because people and communities are facing a fatal threat of events far beyond their control: financial crisis, violent conflict, AIDS, terrorist attacks, water scarcity, poverty, environmental destruction, etc., and many of them can appear suddenly and then they are even more dangerous. In highly turbulent world today, it is vital to be aware of risks, challenges, and threats before they arise. Indeed, when a more detailed analysis is conducted, it can be confirmed that human security, as well, has to and should adopt a defensive approach in response to emerging multi-vector challenges, risks and security, in order for it to have a complete understanding.

The power and novelty of the human security concept is perhaps best reflected through synergy with related concepts that are widely accepted. For example, human security and human resource development are often described as two closely related concepts, which also applies to the concepts of "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want". Broadly speaking, the human security concept advocates the possibility for all to enjoy the fruits of human development in a safe environment. Therefore, human development represents an important mechanism to effectively strengthen and implement the concept of human security. These initiatives are complementary. One without the other may not make the concept of human security impossible, but it makes it meaningless.

The perspective of the human security concept based on the main principle of the "centrality" of the individual, despite current debates and criticisms, is entirely certain. It is the concept that will definitely remain in the international dialogue, experiencing many successes and failures, which is a natural and logical process.

## *Conclusion*

The individual security concept emergence after the end of the Cold War on the premises of liberal, i.e. neoliberal security theory was the expected reaction of different groups of theorists, when conducting various academic research, to include in the framework of security studies other and different levels of analysis that are below the nation-state, but with which it has the least possible interaction. By virtue of such efforts, the end of the 20th century marked the human security concept, or, as many theorists

put it, its worst-case scenario, the use of human security to justify the so-called "humanitarian intervention" that the "democratic West" carried out across much of the globe in pursuit of their proclaimed goals. Human security, on the part of its followers, was used to change the previous approach to security, which had been based on national state security. However, in analyzing the conceptions of human security through the postulates of classical security theories, primarily realism and neorealism and against them liberalism and neoliberalism, it is necessary to highlight the human dimension of human security, precisely the one mentioned in the 1994 UNDP Report.

With all the positive effects of human security, which are primarily based on its human dimension, human security can be embraced through theoretical considerations of security that are based on the concepts of traditional security theories, as contemporary challenges, threats and risks require a defensive approach to security, since modern multi-vector risks, challenges and threats cannot be eliminated if they are not recognized in time.

As long as we live in the world in which the tendency of some people to impose their views on others, by various forms and methods of coercion, will not and cannot be fully accepted, human insecurity will not and cannot be fully accepted. That is, as Albert Einstein said long ago, when the pursuit of creating and maintaining decent living conditions for all people is recognized and accepted as the common obligation of all people and all countries – only then we will be able to speak of the human race as civilized with some degree of justification. Meanwhile, we will be left with anarchy in security, where every individual, every state will seek ways and means to overcome security challenges, risks and threats.

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CIP - Каталогизација у публикацији  
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд

911.3::327(082)  
327.56::351.88(082)

STRATEGIC intersections : the new architecture of international security : thematic international monograph / monograph editors Milovan Subotić, Șerban Cioculescu. - Belgrade : University of Defence, Strategic Research Institute ; Bucharest : Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, 2023 (Belgrade : Vojna štamparija). - 255 str. ; 24 cm

Tiraž 200. - Str. 15-18: Foreword / Milovan Subotić, Șerban Cioculescu. - Napomene i bibliografske reference uz tekst. - Bibliografija uz svaki rad.

ISBN 978-86-81121-32-0 (SRI)

а) Геополитика -- Зборници  
б) Национална безбедност -- Зборници

COBISS.SR-ID 128986121

“In the present-day context, no state operates in isolation with the capacity to unilaterally navigate the escalating complexities related to the preservation of national security. Nations are increasingly compelled to collaborative endeavors to counteract the negative processes and phenomena that imperil their security. Strengthening trust and cooperation to enhance stability and security, both in Europe and globally, remains the sole path towards enduring peace and sustained prosperity in the face of the inevitable uncertainties and insecurities that loom on the horizon.”

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